

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

Volume I of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* examines the origins and early years of the conflict. In the first comprehensive historical reexamination of the period, a team of leading scholars shows how the Cold War evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar period, and discusses how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomacy, and strategy after World War II. The chapters focus not only on the United States and the Soviet Union, but also on critical regions such as Europe, the Balkans, and East Asia. The authors deal with the most influential statesmen of the era and address issues that mattered most to people around the globe: food, nutrition, and resource allocation; ethnicity, race, and religion; science and technology; national autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty. In so doing, they illuminate how people worldwide shaped the evolution of the increasingly bipolar conflict and, in turn, were ensnared by it.

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THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE
COLD WAR

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VOLUME I
Origins

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Edited by
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and
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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837194

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First published 2010

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

The Cambridge history of the Cold War / edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-521-83719-4

I. Cold War. 2. World politics – 1945–1989. 3. International relations – History –
20th century. I. Leffler, Melvyn P., 1945– II. Westad, Odd Arne. III. Title.

D842.C295 2009

909.82'5–dc22

2009005508

ISBN 978-0-521-83719-4 Hardback

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Preface to volumes I, II, and III

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War has gradually become history. In people's memories, the epoch when a global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs has taken on a role very much like that of the two twentieth-century world wars, as a thing of the past, but also as progenitor of everything that followed. As with the two world wars, we now also have the ability to see developments from the perspectives of the different participants in the struggle. Declassification, however incomplete, of a suggestive body of archival evidence from the former Communist world as well as from the West makes this possible. The time, therefore, is ripe to provide a comprehensive, systematic, analytic overview of the conflict that shaped the international system and that affected most of humankind during the second half of the twentieth century.

In this three-volume *Cambridge History*, the contributors seek to illuminate the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War. We want to elucidate how it evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar era. We also seek to convey a greater appreciation of how the Cold War bequeathed conditions, challenges, and conflicts that shape developments in the international system today.

In order to accomplish the above goals, we take the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs. We seek to clarify what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the conflict cannot be grasped without understanding how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomatic events, and strategic thinking. Consequently, we shall deal at considerable length with the social, intellectual, and economic history of the twentieth century. We shall discuss demography and consumption, women and youth, science and technology, culture and race. The evolution of the Cold War cannot be comprehended without attention to such matters.

The *CHCW* is an international history, covering the period from a wide variety of geographical and national angles. While some chapters necessarily center on an individual state or a bilateral relationship, there are many more chapters that deal with a wider region or with global trends. Intellectually, therefore, the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach.

The authors of the individual chapters have been selected because of their academic standing in the field of Cold War studies, regardless of their institutional affiliation, academic discipline, or national origin. Although the majority of contributors are historians, there are chapters written by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. While most contributors come from the main research universities in North America and Britain – where Cold War studies first blossomed as a field – the editors have also sought to engage scholars working in different universities and research centers around the globe. We have included a mixture of younger and more established scholars in the field, thereby seeking to illuminate how scholarship has evolved as well as where it is heading.

The *CHCW* aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralist in its approach. The contributors have deliberately been drawn from various “schools” of thought and have been asked to put forward their own – often distinctive – lines of argument, while indicating the existence of alternative interpretations and approaches. Being a substantial work of reference, the *CHCW* provides detailed, synthetic accounts of key periods and major thematic topics, while striving for broad and original interpretations. The volumes constitute a scholarly project, written by academics for fellow academics as well as for policymakers, foreign affairs personnel, military officers, and analysts of international relations. But we also hope the *CHCW* will serve as an introduction and reference point for advanced undergraduate students and for an educated lay public in many countries.

The present *Cambridge History* was first conceived in 2001 and has therefore been almost ten years in the making. It has been a large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries. We have met for three conferences and had a large number of hours on the phone and in conference calls. Most chapters have been through three, if not four, different versions, and have been read and commented upon – in depth – not only by the editors, but also by other participants in the project. In the end, it was the spirit of collaboration among people of very different backgrounds and very different views that made it possible to bring this *Cambridge History* to completion in the form that it now has.

While the editors' first debt of gratitude therefore is to the contributors, a large number of others also deserve thanks. Jeffrey Byrne, our editorial assistant, did a remarkable job organizing meetings, keeping track of submissions, and finding maps and illustrative matter, all while completing his own doctoral thesis. He has been a model associate. Michael Watson, our editor at Cambridge University Press, helped keep the project on track throughout. Michael Devine, the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, worked hard to set up the conferences and provide essential funding for the project. At the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the wonderful administrative staff of the International History Department, the Cold War Studies Centre, and LSE IDEAS provided help far beyond the call of duty; Arne Westad is especially grateful to Carol Toms and Tiha Franulovic for all the assistance rendered him during a difficult period when he juggled the *CHCW* editorship with being head of department and research center director.

Both editors are grateful to those who helped fund and organize the three *CHCW* conferences, at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Besides the Truman Library director, Michael Devine, we wish to thank the director of the Johnson Library, Betty Sue Flowers, the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, Christian Ostermann, and the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton. We are also grateful to Philip Bobbitt, H. W. Brands, Diana Carlin, Francis J. Gavin, Mark Lawrence, William Leogrande, Robert Littwak, William Roger Louis, Dennis Merrill, Louis Potts, Elspeth Rostow, Mary Sarotte, Strobe Talbott, Alan Tully, Steven Weinberg, and Samuel Wells.

Being editors of such a large scholarly undertaking has been exhausting and exhilarating in turn (and roughly in equal measure). The editors want to thank each other for good comradeship throughout, and our families, students, and colleagues for their patience, assistance, and good cheer. It has been a long process, and we hope that the end product will serve its audiences well.

Melvyn P. Leffler
and
Odd Arne Westad

Note on the text

All three volumes use the simplified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Cyrillic alphabets (without diacritics, except for Serbian and Macedonian), Arabic, and Japanese (modified Hepburn), Pinyin (without diacritics) for Chinese, and McCune-Reischauer (with diacritics) for Korean. Translations within the text are those of the individual contributors to this volume unless otherwise specified in the footnotes.

The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century

ODD ARNE WESTAD

Historians have always believed that good sources make for good studies. When Lord Acton was planning the *Cambridge Modern History* a hundred years ago, his view of the massive enterprise was much influenced by the sudden and extraordinary access to historical archives that came about in the 1890s. In his instructions for contributors to the vast effort which he organized but never saw completed, Acton wrote:

In our own time, within the last few years, most of the official collections in Europe have been made public, and nearly all the evidence that will ever appear is accessible now. As archives are meant to be explored, and are not meant to be printed, we approach the final stage in the conditions of historical learning. The long conspiracy against the knowledge of truth has been practically abandoned, and competing scholars all over the civilised world are taking advantage of the change.¹

Many optimistic historians of and in the twentieth century believed that the events of the 1990s made for a breakthrough in historical knowledge similar to that which Lord Acton and his colleagues had perceived a hundred years before. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars began gaining access to the formerly secret archives of states and governments all over the world – not just because of the fall of authoritarian and secretive Communist regimes, but also because many political leaders in many parts of the world believed that “freedom of information,” as it is now often called, had become an integral part of good governance. While very often producing as selective and partial a documentation as that of the nineteenth century had turned out to be, the new access to information in the 1990s meant real advances for historians, especially those attempting to understand events of the late twentieth century.

¹ Lord Acton to contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History*, March 12, 1898, Acton Archives, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK.

But while John Acton believed in a progressive and positivist version of history, which met “the scientific demand for completeness and certainty,” the blood-soaked trail of the past hundred years has led scholars toward more skeptical attitudes in their research. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, historians’ evidence tends to be more multiform and their research questions more varied than could have been imagined four generations ago. Fields of human activity and sections of humanity that merited barely a mention in the first edition of the *Cambridge Modern History* have now become large fields of study in their own right. Some of the boundaries of class, ethnicity, and gender are being dismantled. The methodologies for the study of history have become more diverse and its communities more international. As a result of this increasing diversity, knowledge has become less certain, and the space for conflicting interpretations much broader.²

The *Cambridge History of the Cold War* is defined by such skepticism and contention. Very few of our contributors believe that a “definitive” history of the Cold War is possible (or indeed that it should be possible). But a heterogeneous approach creates a strong need for contextualization, what Acton thought of when he called upon his team to “describe the ruling currents, to interpret the sovereign forces, that still govern and divide the world.”³ We need to place the Cold War in the larger context of chronological time and geographical space, within the web that ties the neverending threads of history together. First and foremost we need to situate the Cold War within the wider history of the twentieth century in a global perspective. We need to indicate how Cold War conflicts connect to broader trends in social, economic, and intellectual history as well as to the political and military developments of the longer term of which it forms a part.

This chapter attempts to position the Cold War in the history of the twentieth century along some of its main axes: political and economic history, the history of science and technology, and intellectual and cultural history. It is not an extensive placing of the period within the greater whole – for that, one needs to continue reading until one has finished the last chapter in volume III.

2 For some of these discussions, see Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

3 Acton to contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History*, March 12, 1898, Acton Archives, Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK. Acton, who has sometimes been lampooned as a very English academic – one who sought contributors to his *Modern History* primarily from the senior common rooms of Oxbridge colleges – was in fact among the most international historians of his time both in terms of orientation and background (he was born in Naples of a French mother and did most of his training in Munich, thereby speaking four languages with ease).

By looking at the Cold War in its multiple contexts, we hope to better understand its long-term causes and also, perhaps, to get a better grasp of its outcome and consequences. But, in order to do so, it is necessary to begin with a look at that small patch of the century's intellectual history that the study of the Cold War itself has tried to fill.

History and historians

The term "Cold War" was first used by the British writer George Orwell in 1945 to deplore the worldview, beliefs, and social structure of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and the undeclared state of war that would come to exist between them after the end of World War II. "The atomic bomb," Orwell found, may be "robbing the exploited classes and peoples of all power to revolt, and at the same time putting the possessors of the bomb on a basis of equality. Unable to conquer one another they are likely to continue ruling the world between them."⁴ It was a new world system, Orwell found, dualistic, technology-based, in which nuclear terror could be used against those who dared rebel. To the author of 1984, the systemic aspects of the Cold War showed dark portents of the future.

Historians first took up the term "Cold War" in the late 1940s when attempting to explain how the wartime alliance between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had collapsed. In the first postwar decade, the term was mostly used by American historians as a synonym for what they saw as Soviet leader Iosif Stalin's confrontational policies from the latter stages of World War II on. The Soviet Union waged cold war against the West (meaning, mostly, the United States and Britain), while the West was seen as defending itself and the values it believed in. The Cold War, in other words, was imposed on the rest of the world by the Soviet leader and the tyrannical Communist system he had created.⁵

Throughout the Cold War, the main view of the conflict among historians both in the United States and in Western Europe remained colored by the anti-Stalinist approach. Deeply influenced by the wars against other authoritarian collectivist projects – Germany, Italy, Japan – that had just ended, this orthodox Western interpretation of the causes of the Cold War contains both a definition and a timeline. The Cold War means a period of Soviet

⁴ George Orwell, "You and the Atomic Bomb," *Tribune*, October 19, 1945.

⁵ For key accounts representative of these various interpretations, see the bibliographical essay.

aggression that was initiated by its growing power in the latter stages of the war and which had become doctrine by 1947. Most early historians, not only in the United States, but also in Western Europe, believed that this period would last as long as Stalinists were in command in Moscow. Though in no way uncritical of Western policies – both the United States and Britain were often blamed for not confronting Soviet policies strongly and early enough on the main issues and for inflexibility and lack of cooperation on minor points – the anti-Stalinist interpretation places the blame for the Cold War squarely on the Soviet Union and, increasingly from the early 1950s, on what is termed “Communist ideology” (meaning, in most cases, the anticapitalist agenda of the Soviet state).

The change from emphasizing Stalin to emphasizing Communism as the main cause of the Cold War can easily be seen as part of the rollback of the wartime cooperation between Right and Left inside the West itself. While the Cold War was initially viewed as a security emergency, by the 1950s it had become a battle of global alliances and of political ideas. Wartime cooperation had been an aberration, many historians working in the 1950s thought. The normal pattern was one of confrontation between Communism and its enemies, as had been the case in the interwar period. Even among the few left-wing historians writing on the Cold War in the 1950s – more in Europe than in the United States – the breakdown of the wartime alliance had become a confrontation of superpowers, each imposing their will and their political systems on Europe.⁶

With the expansion of the Cold War to the Third World in the 1960s – and especially with the American defeat in Vietnam – radical historians in the West gained a wider audience for their critique of the US role in the conflict. Still staying within the original political agendas of interpretation, these critics argued that the United States, with its increasingly global anticollectivist agenda, had caused and perpetuated the Cold War to at least as high a degree as the Soviet Union had. To some of them, the American government’s motives were driven by the economic needs of the United States as the global capitalist superpower. To others, Vietnam proved that the United States was simply not suited to pursue change abroad, and that it should rather concentrate on a progressive political agenda at home, rectifying injustices based on race, gender, education, and income levels. Though always a small minority among historians, these anti-imperialist revisionists managed to shift the

6 For an overview, see for instance André Fontaine, *Histoire de la Guerre froide*, vol. I, *De la révolution d'octobre à la guerre de Corée* (Paris: Fayard, 1967).

debate somewhat back in the direction of Orwell's initial idea of the Cold War as a globalizing system.⁷

By the mid-1970s, as superpower détente seemed to take hold, the view of the Cold War as a system had a breakthrough among Western historians. The most comprehensive challenge to the anticollectivist approach during all of the Cold War was the "realist" approach, which – inspired both by Realist thinking in the social sciences and by the evident longevity of the conflict – saw Soviet–American rivalry primarily as an interest-driven clash of the strategic security needs of great powers. In their behavior, the Soviet and American governments were not strikingly different from each other or from other great powers in history. The key concept for Cold War realists was "power," and, implicitly at least, "balance of power" – a global system in which the strategic arms race and formal or informal alliances had moved the Soviet–American relationship toward a high degree of stability and predictability.⁸

Always more popular in Western Europe than in the United States, Cold War realism foundered – as did its Realist cousin in the theory of international relations – on the way the Cold War ended. Instead of slow, gradual change or war – the two outcomes of the conflict that Cold War realism seemed to point toward – the "balance of power" itself collapsed as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the disappearance of the Communist "pole" seemingly happened mostly because of domestic political changes in the late 1980s. With the Soviet–American confrontation ended and the ideological civil wars in the West during the Reagan/Thatcher era fading, historians for the first time began studying the Cold War as a distinct period of history.⁹

Helped by their own training and by the widening access to source materials, the cohort of historians who came of age in the 1990s began

7 The term "revisionist" is used for by far the most eclectic grouping of Cold War historians, ranging from the (then) Marxist David Horowitz's *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965) via Thomas G. Paterson's *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), which emphasizes broader aspects of US expansionism, to the moderate "corporatist" version in Michael J. Hogan's *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

8 It is easy to see how the deemphasizing of ideological conflicts is connected to the emergence of détente in superpower relations; see Jan-Werner Müller's chapter in volume III. For the most influential statement of Realist principles, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), and, for a discussion, Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

9 For an attempt at rescuing Realism as a tool for understanding the Cold War, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95), 91–129.

emphasizing a more international and multidisciplinary approach to Cold War history. Very often – in spite of varying overall interpretations – they focused on the role of ideas, ideologies, and culture, in stark and deliberate contrast to the approach of their realist predecessors. While undoubtedly an intellectual response to the new knowledge of how the Cold War ended, this focus was also highly influenced by changes in the national historiographies, especially in the United States, where cultural and social studies had been ascendant for more than a generation.¹⁰

A significant subset of the international post-1991 historiography is what one could possibly call Cold War “conceptualism,” from the belief that each group involved in the conflict had sets of concepts or ideas which defined and constituted them.¹¹ These notions, Cold War conceptualists think, were very much products of the minds that shaped them, but they were not mere words or empty phrases, as the more extreme relativists claim. The key concepts in the Cold War had deep significance for the participants in the conflict. Often (though not exclusively) focusing on ideologies and patterns of thought, conceptualist historians tend to see a much wider variety of human agendas and processes of change intermingled in the conflict we now call the Cold War.¹² These agendas and processes center most often on domestic

10 For overviews of the debate on ideologies, see Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 90–109, and Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999), 539–76.

11 When being tempted by the term “conceptualism” I am thinking more of Immanuel Kant than of art history (even though Christo’s *Iron Curtain* [1962] may be relevant: it consisted of a barricade of oil barrels in a narrow Paris street which held up traffic; the artwork was of course not the barricade itself but the resulting traffic jam).

12 Some of the texts I have in mind are Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), which connects superpower politics to 1960s youth rebellions; Chris Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), which shows how leisure travel was fashioned politically; Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), which combines social and political history to give an overview of Soviet–German interaction; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), which does the same for Japanese–US dealings under the occupation; Juliane Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), which defines generational shifts in the Soviet Cold War; Detlef Siegfried, “*Time Is on My Side*”: *Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), which does the same for West Germany; and Robert A. Ventresca, “The Virgin and the Bear: Religion, Society and the Cold War in Italy,” *Journal of Social History*, 37 (2003), 439–56, which shows how the Cold War influenced Catholic devotional practices. In political science, Elizabeth Wood’s *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) places emotions at the center of Cold War battles, while in

developments, but also on generational experience and, in some cases, on international or even transnational or “imagined” communities.¹³ In a manifestation pleasing to those who look for historiographical dialectics, some Cold War conceptualists have a sharp reductionist approach to the larger role played by the conflict, seeing it as one of several “grand events” of the late twentieth century, linked to – but perhaps not as important as – decolonization and Asian economic resurgence. If the Cold War was ever a hegemonic discourse, then the reduction of it by historians who still claim to study the conflict is a nice twist of the historiographical tail.¹⁴

Among students of the Cold War outside Europe and North America, new perspectives are emerging, which will – eventually – merge with the historiographical debates in and on the West (here, of course, including Russia). As much of this work turns out to be undertaken by social scientists as by historians. In China, for instance, a popular world-history approach sees the Cold War as part of a long-term “Europeanization” of the world, as a period in which international rules and regulations were set up to preserve the global predominance of Europeans after they had taken control of the globe by force over the span of three centuries, settling three continents in the process. In Africa (and in parts of the Middle East), some scholars see the popularity of socialism and a Soviet alliance after independence first and foremost as a means to protect the patterns of the past from an onslaught by the ideas, and the economic practices, of the West. At the local level, at least, the language of Marxism was sometimes used to justify established customs and practices; it was a defensive measure more than a revolutionary one.¹⁵

anthropology Heonik Kwon's *Ghosts of War in Vietnam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) does the same for the physical and spiritual presence of departed souls. A good overview of the “conceptual” turn in Cold War studies is Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Cass, 2004).

13 The latter expression, of course, is Benedict Anderson's, from *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

14 For examples emphasizing demographics and food, see Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), and Nick Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 337–64. See also Matthew Connelly's chapter in volume III.

15 For China, see Liu Jinzhi, *Lengzhanshi: 1945–1991* [History of the Cold War, 1945–1991] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi, 2003); on Africa and the Middle East, see for instance Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004). See also Elizabeth Schmidt, “Cold War in Guinea: The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the Struggle over Communism, 1950–1958,” *Journal of African History*, 48 (2007), 95–121.

It has been clear for some time that the world regions in which there were clear connections between Cold War issues and other definitory contests – the Arab–Israeli conflict in the Middle East, the India–Pakistan tug-of-war in South Asia, and the contention created by US dominance in Latin America – are where the fluidity and hybridity of Cold War ideologies are easiest to observe. Perhaps, over time, historians of these parts who are *not* primarily preoccupied with studying the Cold War (or its immediate effects) will help develop patterns for how the different segments of twentieth-century international history can be put together in ways that incorporate the Cold War but do not attempt to subsume all other incongruities under it. Like some newer approaches to studying the contest itself from within, such attempts at seeing the conflict from its edges, as one part of much bigger histories, is perhaps the best way for the future to make sense of it all.¹⁶

Given the uncertainties that still surround the study of the Cold War, any placing of it within its wider context must be cautious and careful. In the three sections that follow, the main issue is therefore to suggest ways in which the wider implications of the Cold War may more readily be seen, along the axes of politics and economics, science and technology, and culture and ideas. The account is undoubtedly influenced by where the historiography stands today (not least because its author has helped edit the seventy-two contributions to this *Cambridge History*), but also by a need to see connections and relationships between the literature on the Cold War and the wider historical literature at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Politics and economics

The historical background for the Cold War was created by the expansion of capitalist economies in ever-widening circles from the West European and North American cities in the nineteenth century. While offering plentiful opportunities for people to change their own lives, the new economic system also created recurrent social and political crises, such as the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s, which were followed by World Wars I and II. Given the many underlying strengths of the economic system, it is reasonable to believe that the utopian and authoritarian alternatives to liberal capitalism – such as National Socialism, Fascism, and Communism – would not have stood

16 See, for instance, Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); on India, see Joya Chatterji, *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947–1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

a chance of mass popular support if not for these crises. Instead, by the middle of the twentieth century, for many people capitalism had become synonymous not with progress, but with wars and economic collapse.

The effects of the two great wars of the twentieth century did more than anything else to shape the Cold War. In addition to the impression of systemic crisis that the wars created, they removed, through the destruction and economic decline that they caused, much of the primacy that the main West and Central European powers had held in international affairs. The wars also led to an unprecedented emphasis on national security, in which domestic surveillance and international intelligence gained a significance never seen before. Perhaps most important of all, the losses suffered by the powers involved in the wars convinced two generations of leaders that lack of military preparedness and political determination in the future had to be avoided at all costs. After World War II, especially, the lesson many statesmen and ordinary people believed they had learned was that weakness and irresolution unavoidably lead to war.

The great wars of the twentieth century contributed decisively to the creation of the modern state. Without the increase in the cohesion, the strength, and the reach of the state that took place in the first half of the century, the form of rivalry that the Cold War took would have been impossible. The sheer expense of the conflict, both military and civilian, would have destroyed states if they had not already been primed for the effort. Also, without the experience of two world wars, states would not have been able to mobilize their citizens for a war that had few big battles and little visible heroism. The extraordinary loyalty to the state was primarily based on the measures governments had taken to curtail the chaos of the market and provide some form of security for its citizens. For all countries, including the United States, which saw fewer such efforts than other nations, the acceptance of the sacrifices that were needed to fight the Cold War was contingent on the social services and educational opportunities offered by the state.

While similar in terms of the state emphasis on big projects, civilian as well as military, the United States and the Soviet Union symbolized two modern extremes in the way politics was conducted domestically. In the United States there were many centers of power, and even though the president's administration always held the upper hand, the legislature, the courts, and the state governments had significant autonomous influence both on specific decisions and on how politics was conducted. In addition, military leaders and the heads of big companies had their own voice in decisionmaking. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, politics was extremely centralized, in theory and

very often also in fact. Intended from the very beginning to be a one-party dictatorship, the Soviet system during Stalin's terror of the 1930s developed only one universal center of power: the Communist Party Politburo and its general secretary. In most periods, except in the late 1960s and again in the late 1970s, one man at the top had the final say in all matters that were presented to the party leadership. With the abolition of the market and with no independent seats of power, the Soviet Union deliberately presented itself as the antidote to capitalist chaos and confusion. All countries that had to reestablish themselves after the cataclysms of the first half of the century were presented with these two forms of government as ultimate alternatives.

The combination of capitalist crises and world wars was a key factor in the collapse of the European colonial empires, a chain of events that decisively influenced the Cold War, especially in its later stages. By 1945, it had become clear both in the colonial periphery and in the capitals of the imperial centers that colonialism in its late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century form had to go: in Europe, there was neither the political will nor the economic strength to keep it going, and in the colonized countries resistance was on the rise. The United States took a strong interest in what should happen in the colonial territories right from the beginning of the Cold War era. Its purpose was both to abolish European colonialism – a form of government that most Americans found objectionable – and to influence the Third World to follow the US example in politics and economics. Increasingly, in the 1950s, with the strengthening of the radical Left and of Soviet influence in the Third World, a key US motive also became to secure these countries against Communism and alliances with the Soviet Union.

By the 1960s, the emergence of new states had done much to intensify the rivalry between the superpowers, and for the rest of the Cold War Asia, Africa, and Latin America stood at the center of the conflict – a key reason, in the view of many historians, why the Cold War lasted as long as it did. The Cold War in the Third World was not just a battle for influence between Washington and Moscow; it was a struggle within the new states for the future direction of their politics and their societies, a conflict between the two versions of Western modernity that socialism and liberal capitalism seemed to offer. The globalization of the Cold War that these struggles led to both intensified the superpower conflict through international interventions and increased the cost of the competition, while destroying many of the societies in which the battles were carried out.

As was shown in the Third World throughout the Cold War, the military power and the international involvement of the United States always far

exceeded that of the Soviet Union. The whole of the twentieth century – the Cold War included – was characterized by the rise of the United States, as it gradually became the key state in the international system of states. In terms of its economy, already by the late 1940s the United States produced fully half of the world's manufactured goods, was the world's largest capital exporter, and dominated the world's financial markets. And even though its relative economic position was never again as supreme as it had been right after the end of World War II, the centrality of its role became increasingly obvious toward the end of the Cold War. It is hard to exaggerate the consequences of this US ascendancy: for the first time in more than three hundred years the most powerful country on earth was located outside Europe, with values and ideas that in most cases originated in the "old world," but which still – over time – had become recognizably different from their source.

As we have seen, this consistent US preponderance has led some historians to conclude that the Cold War was really an American project for achieving global hegemony, rather than a competition between two superpowers. But even though Soviet capabilities overall were more on the scale of Britain and France than on those of the United States, the militarization of the Soviet economy and its society made it a formidable opponent in international affairs. First and foremost it constituted the other superpower as a result of its oppositional ideology: it was the only great power that throughout the Cold War steadfastly opposed US objectives and refused to be integrated into the global capitalist economy. By doing so it carved out a primary role for itself in international affairs, at great expense to its own development over time.

Science and technology

The growth of science and of technological knowhow throughout the twentieth century shaped much of the format for the Cold War. To many people, the conflict was about the products of the new science, and first and foremost about nuclear weapons and the threat their use posed to all humanity. The remarkable level of investment both superpowers made into research and technology gives credence to this view. But, as in the earlier conflicts of the century, the relationship between science, political ideology, and social structure is a complex one, in which these fields of human activity influence each other. Science did not create the Cold War, but it helped shape it into a distinctive conflict, and into one that was more dangerous and harder to end than other great-power rivalries in history.

Most Cold War science has its starting point in one of the two main discoveries of the early twentieth century: the Cambridge physicist Ernest Rutherford's reporting on the structure of the atom in 1911 and the Columbia University biologist Thomas Morgan's outline of the hereditary role of genes the following year. Together with breakthroughs in technological innovation, such as Guglielmo Marconi's sending radio signals across the Atlantic in 1901 and Orville and Wilbur Wright's flying of the first aircraft on the beaches of North Carolina in 1903, the beginning of atomic and genetic science furnished many of the means of competition that fueled the Cold War and made it into a global phenomenon. By 1945, all of the basic building blocks for the scientific cultivation of the Cold War were in place and already fitted into the political purposes for which the American and Soviet systems wanted to use them.

The increase in energy supplies available for industrial production and industrial-scale destruction was at the core of the Cold War; it could be said that energy drove the conflict in more than one sense. Oil and nuclear power increased the potential for military production, but cheap energy also promised a new life for ordinary people, by making industrial jobs more widely available and less burdensome, and by making goods cheaper. For the United States, especially, access to inexpensive energy became both a Cold War aim (through US control of the Middle East oil supplies) and an aim of the development of science. For both superpowers, the production of nuclear weapons defined their military capabilities and the state of the rivalry between them. While the Cold War arms race was not structurally different from earlier arms races between great powers, the destructive energy that it quite literally contained made its significance greater relative to diplomacy and strategy.

Other main applications of the advances in science and technology in the early part of the century were in transport and communication. By the 1940s, the United States could project its military power all over the globe through its navy and its air force. Twenty years later the Soviet Union could do the same. The combination of cheap energy and radio communications allowed the superpowers to keep large navies at sea at any time, or in bases abroad. It also, of course, allowed them to build nuclear missiles and guidance systems to train on each other and each other's allies. But, especially in the capitalist world, many of the advances in transport and communication were also put to civilian use, such as in the globalization of air traffic, entertainment through television, and the internet. The global market revolution of the late twentieth century, which did much to end the Cold War, would have been impossible without these advances.

Third, the advances in biology and medicine contributed strongly to the Cold War competition of social systems. The twentieth-century invention of health care that influenced people's daily lives – such as vaccinations, reproductive health, and infant care – meant that achieving the right form of modernity was literally a matter of life or death. In Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, and later on in the Third World, the competition between socialism and capitalism was as much about which system could deliver better health care as about principles of liberty or justice. In agricultural production, most countries were eager to replicate the gains made by the Soviet Union and the United States in the early part of the Cold War through crossbreeding and artificial selection, even though the Soviets were long held back in genetics by the politically motivated resistance against “Mendel-Morganism.”

The expansion of science and technology motivated the unprecedented increase in school and university education that took place during the Cold War. Both the United States and the Soviet Union placed education at the center of their social systems in a way never before seen among great powers. Instead of educating just an elite, both countries tried to achieve a higher level of modernity – and advantages in their Cold War competition – by educating more of their populations to a high level of knowledge. By the 1960s, they also educated large numbers of young people from other countries, especially from Europe and the Third World. Even though many of these students returned to their countries with social and political ideas that were very different from the ones their hosts had intended, the expansion and internationalization of education helped create a global intellectual agenda, in which ideas were more easily transferable – and transmutable – than ever before.

Culture and ideas

The Cold War was a clash of ideas and cultures as much as a military and strategic conflict. Different from the nationalist projects in Europe and East Asia that had led to war in 1914 and 1937–39, the ideas put forward by the American and Soviet contenders in the Cold War were universal in nature – they were supposed to be valid for all peoples at all times now and forever. By 1945, these ideas – individual liberty, anticollectivism, and market values on the US side; social justice, collectivism, and state planning among the Soviets – had hardened into ideologies, in which universalist political ideals mixed freely with older and more specific cultural traits. The elites of both countries believed that the future was theirs, because the world was unavoidably moving in the direction of the aims they themselves had set.

Much of the reason why such a faith could persist for as long as it did (or does, in the American case) has to do with the common lineage that the two ideologies represent. Against traditions of privilege, heritage, family, and locality, both Soviets and Americans offered a modern and revolutionary alternative, in which people could reinvent themselves and help create a new world. In the American case, this alternative meant the globalization of the US immigrant perspective, in which people could choose the communities to which they wished to belong. On the Soviet side, it globalized the Bolsheviks' hatred for "old Russia," which they considered backward and underdeveloped. For Americans and Russians – and for many people around the world who came to share one or the other of these visions – the global Cold War agenda was to change the world in the image of their ideas.

Many of the core ideas of the Cold War originated with two of the great thinkers of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Charles Darwin (albeit often in a form that neither would have recognized as his own). From the reading of Marx came the idea that the development of societies was hierarchical and that the struggle between social classes was a fundamental aspect of the "old societies" the moderns wanted to leave behind. These concepts of historical transcendence had a remarkable degree of influence on politicians and social scientists East and West during the Cold War, be it as a promise or as a specter. Darwin's biological philosophy was in the twentieth century twisted even further from its origin than was Marx's social philosophy. To many, Darwin's theory of natural selection could be thought to mean that human society operated according to the same rules as nature – that societies which filled the biological and ecological space open to them would thrive, while those that did not would fail. The struggle to produce more and better goods as well as the faith in continuous growth and expansion for one's own society (or form thereof) were based on the pseudo-Darwinian approaches of the early twentieth century.

The political principle of the developmental hierarchy of societies and the economic principle of maximizing industrial production were the twin ideas that connected Soviet and American modernity. The responses to these Marxian and Darwinian challenges were, however, as distinct as they could possibly be between states that shared a common background. Not only were the state formations themselves very different, as noted above, but the ideologies that drove them in some cases emphasized the opposite responses to the challenges of modernity. In the perception of American elites, a modern society based on individual opportunity and the market represented the top of the hierarchy of societies, while the struggle between classes was seen as

a thing of the past, and domestic attempts at returning to class-based politics were feared as anachronistic attempts at polluting American freedom. Success in production was dependent on the defense of that freedom against trade unions, recent immigrants, and the political Left. In the Soviet Union, class struggle was also seen as having come to an end, but only because the Communist Party elites believed that the working class had taken political power and begun creating its own state based on social justice and collective enterprise. While in other countries the struggle between classes was still the vehicle of progress, the advances in production that had taken place inside the Soviet Union had been dependent on the masses being led by the Communist Party within the framework set by the socialist state.

While the ideologies of American and Soviet elites stayed remarkably intact during the Cold War, entry into the elites was probably more open in social terms in these two countries than in most others. The domestic ideological hegemony that the elites preserved may in part explain the social inclusivity – it made it easier for individuals to willingly seek inclusion and it made the entry ticket in many cases no more than political and social conformity. But while American elites had to seek a wider legitimacy for their projects within a democratic political system, Soviet elites of course had no such constraints, meaning that over time they became increasingly removed from their country at large. While both sets of elites at times feared the people they were at the helm of, the Soviet elites undoubtedly feared their people more. And while elites in both countries saw themselves as managing the troublesome transition to full-fledged industrial societies on behalf of the people, the Soviet Communists mistrusted their countrymen to the extent that they regularly resorted to terror in fulfilling their mission.

These differences in domestic roles and methods were of crucial importance when Soviet and American elites were spreading their message of progress abroad. While the United States, because of its democratic politics at home, was able to forge diverse and pluralistic alliances with elites in Europe and East Asia – alliances that contributed decisively to its predominance during the Cold War – the Soviet alliances failed spectacularly, from Germany to China to Eastern Europe. While American leaders managed to develop strong and functioning transnational institutions together with European Social Democrats or Christian Democrats, and with Japanese conservatives, the Soviets could not even manage links with foreign Communist Parties. In the postcolonial countries these differences played less of a role, since neither Moscow nor Washington – except in their most messianic moments – foresaw real alliances growing out of their links with weak,

underdeveloped states. In such relationships the superpowers should lead by the strength of their ideals and by their power to intervene when necessary.

Since the beginning of the Soviet–American rivalry, the main imagined competitors of both ideologies were constructed as “narrow” nationalism and “unreasonable” religion. While advancing modernity would, over time, do away with these relics of the past, the Soviet and American role was to identify and support those local elites that would help abolish local concepts of nation and religion the fastest. Ironically, since toward the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union was increasingly fueled by Russian particularism and the United States by American evangelicalism, their support for the steamroller of modernization in the Third World (capitalist or socialist) never faltered as the number of its enemies increased. In countries such as Ethiopia or Iran, the superpower interventions supported wars against the identities and beliefs of the great majority of the local population.

Some of this warfare took place on screens or through the airwaves. The Cold War influenced all forms of popular culture, film, and television.¹⁷ By implicitly portraying their own societies as victors in a global struggle, US and Soviet films had a significant influence on the views of their own populations and those of people abroad. By the 1980s, this particular contest for hearts and minds was won by the United States, as US programming filled television schedules across the world. Especially in those states where access to US television programs and film was somehow restricted – by state control or by lack of means – accidental or illicit viewing gave an even stronger sense than in other circumstances of the plenty and beauty of life in the United States. Contrasting the image of a fictional United States with known repression and poverty at home was one of the main inspirations in the rebellions against Communism in 1989.

The cultural Cold War also influenced the physical organization of people’s lives, through the schemes intellectuals designed for the social control and improvement of the populations at large. Both suburbia and the collective farm resulted from ideas of better ways of organizing society, through moving people away from the identities they had grown up with, be it among immigrants in American working-class neighborhoods or peasants in Russian villages. Likewise, Soviet and US city planning took on striking similarities in architecture and planning ideals as a result of the need to regularize and quantify. In linking high modernism in architecture and city planning to defense needs and mobilization of labor resources, the Cold War

17 See Nicholas Cull’s chapter in volume III.

became the apotheosis of twentieth-century modernity, visually as well as socially.

While Cold War projects promised progress, their politics in many cases meant rule by experts. In both East and West, national security and national development were regarded as far too important to be left to democratic control. In its Stalinist perversion, the very term “democracy” came to mean party domination. But in the West, too, key projects integral to the Cold War were exempt from democratic control: bases, bombs, shelters, and surveillance were the domains of unelected officials or officers. In many countries this rule by experts extended far into the civilian sector: dams, bridges, highways, and border zones had plans and purposes that were withheld from parliaments and local authorities. While political participation expanded in the West – and in parts of the Third World too – Cold War elites often constituted themselves as representatives of the people’s interests, thereby subverting the very ideals that they claimed to fight for. This abrogation is one legacy of the Cold War that people in the twenty-first century will struggle with for some time to come.

Change

Understanding the place of the Cold War within the overall history of the twentieth century is very much about understanding global processes of change. The latter half of the century, in which Soviet–American rivalry shaped the international system of states, grew out of a first half during which wars and crises had made many question the very promise of modernity. The superpowers’ post-1945 models of development seemed, each in its own way, to rescue two key aspects of that promise: individual freedom and social justice. Indeed, the attempts of the superpowers to go beyond control of the international system and toward influencing global social and economic change bear witness to the centrality, for each of them, of changing other people’s lives into an image of their own. The intensity of the conflict between them was created by each side’s (and its supporters’) conviction that they represented the last, best hope for the rescue of a rational, transcending modernity from the horrors of war and nationalist conflict.

But at the same time as the placing of the Cold War within a larger twentieth-century context helps explain the centrality of the conflict during its heyday, it also helps in understanding its demise. Three key shifts in human societies originated in the first decades of the century, but were coming to

fruition only in its final decades. Together, these shifts changed the world to a sufficient degree for the Cold War to become obsolescent.

The first, quite simply, is the right to vote. Restricted by gender, privilege, and race in the nineteenth century, by the late twentieth century voting rights had spread to a very large number of people across the globe, most often followed by widening political participation and the building of democratic institutions. Even though constricted and often undermined by economic forces, the vote is a powerful weapon of the weak, which can transform states and societies (although not always – as one could have wished for – in the direction of less conflict and more cooperation). The attainment and exercise of voting rights undid Communism in Eastern Europe, and continue to break systems of control and servitude on a global scale.

The second, plainly put, is the triumph of the capitalist market. As Karl Marx foresaw in the middle of the nineteenth century, the expansion of capitalism has led to an increase in both conflict and cooperation on a global scale. Alongside the worldwide growth of industrial society throughout the twentieth century, the centers for capital and production have shifted from Europe to the United States to East Asia, widening the stakes of everyone involved in the global economy. Economic globalization, developing throughout the twentieth century (though, tellingly, with its most rapid expansion at the beginning and the end thereof), led to the gradual integration of global elites in the quest for economic gain. Tied to the centers by similar patterns of consumption, information, and communication, the Third World outpost of this system created a potential both for further economic growth and for growth in global social inequality.

The third fundamental change that defeated the Cold War was the end of colonialism. Although resistance to colonial rule was on the increase throughout the century (the first nationalist organizations in the main Third World countries were all formed between 1900 and 1914), it was in the aftermath of World War II that the system as such broke down. In the thirty years after 1945, seventy-five new countries were created out of colonial territories, a process that changed international politics forever. While the final battles against colonialism and the first attempts at constructing new states sometimes favored oppositional ideologies and alliances with the Soviet Union, by the late twentieth century most newly independent countries were moving toward market economies and more inclusive political systems.

These changes privileged those societies that were poised to take advantage of them, but seriously challenged those that were not. The Soviet Union, in this sense, was among history's losers, as was the Cold War international

system itself. Even though the attempts in the 1990s at strengthening international society and preventing unilateral interventions ultimately failed, numerous trends from the late Cold War era point toward such attempts being relaunched in the future. One is the continued growth of nationalism, which makes understandings between states a *sine qua non* for the absence of war. Another is the changing role of the state itself in a world increasingly dominated by markets. And a third is demographic and ecological changes, in which the combination of an aging population in the industrialized world and a mounting number of global ecological challenges pushes us toward a policy of compromise.

The Cold War conflict forms a significant part of the history of the twentieth century and is an important ingredient in most of its other parts. Its course and content were shaped by a continuum of international history reaching even further back in time, certainly to the social upheavals of the middle of the nineteenth century and perhaps to the French and American Revolutions two generations earlier. As an ideological confrontation with two powerful states at its center, the Cold War defined patterns of alliance, models of state-building, and discourses on society on a global scale during the fifty years between the US entry into World War II and the Soviet collapse in 1991. And, by threatening the world with annihilation through massive use of nuclear weapons, it created one of the most fundamental aspects of the human condition toward the end of the century: fear of the future and a rising uncertainty about that perfectibility of humankind which the opening of the twentieth century had seemed to promise. The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity for dealing with some of these fears and uncertainties. But it did not end history, or even that part of it which the bloody twentieth century had birthed.

Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962

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Russia's Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 triggered a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States that would last much of the twentieth century. In its early years, each side aimed to transform the other. American–Soviet conflict became global only in the 1940s, at which point it shaped the international system and every nation in it. In addition to competition over markets or territories, this new form of struggle – the Cold War – was at its root a battle of ideas: American liberalism vs. Soviet Communism.

The ideologies animating the Cold War had centuries-long pedigrees, emerging by the early twentieth century as powerful and compelling visions for social change. These ideologies – explicit ideas and implicit assumptions that provided frameworks for understanding the world and defining action in it – were not antithetical to material interests, but often shaped the way foreign-policy officials understood such interests. Ideologies were lenses that focused, and just as often distorted, understandings of external events and thus the actions taken in response.

Ideologies in conflict and in common

Though American leaders typically proclaimed their immunity from ideological temptations, this self-perception ignored a rich tradition of American thought and policy that developed, defined, and acted upon a clear set of ideological premises. The foreign policy of the United States, like so much else in that country, drew on a long tradition of liberalism originating in the ideas of John Locke. As the etymology suggests, Lockean liberalism was, at its core, a theory of liberty, one that viewed liberty as defined for the individual, based in law, and rooted in property. The Declaration of Independence paraphrased Locke in proclaiming human beings “endowed by their Creator” with rights to “life, liberty and [where Locke had

emphasized property] the pursuit of happiness.” Liberty could be protected only by a system of laws in a polity guaranteeing popular sovereignty. A government, furthermore, should provide only formal freedoms (protecting the rights of property and participation), not substantive ones (equality of condition).

American liberalism evolved beyond Locke’s ideas. It was progressive, implying that liberty was on a forward march and equating the spread of American influence with the spread of liberty. American liberalism saw this march as steady and gradual; too-rapid change was likely to result in tyranny or mob rule. It had an important economic basis; the spread of liberty could be measured by the spread of market economies allowing the free exchange of goods. American liberalism’s focus on formal equality meant, in the international realm, an emphasis on structures of statehood rather than on power differentials that might restrict nominal sovereignty.

Racial hierarchy touched all aspects of American liberalism in both its domestic and foreign-policy aspects. The notion that rising American influence was tantamount to the rise of liberty, for instance, led directly to the claims that westward expansion was both providential and inevitable – as the term “Manifest Destiny” suggests. American liberty was destined to grow; the fate of Native Americans, therefore, was to yield to the greater civilization, even if that meant extinction: would the United States “check the course of human happiness,” one Congressman asked in 1830, merely to save the “wigwam of the red hunter?”¹ Many peoples were seen as unworthy of the blessings of liberty. The liberal defense of black slavery rested on claims that the slaves were unfit to rule themselves. And racial hierarchies applied globally. Repulsed by the wave of South American independence movements in the early nineteenth century, John Quincy Adams declared that “You cannot make liberty out of Spanish material.”²

Political scientist-turned-president Woodrow Wilson, writing at the dawn of the American rise to world power, incorporated these strands of liberalism into his notion of politics. Wilson saw American history as a guide to the world’s future. His national history was a story of ordered liberty gradually attained; he celebrated the founding generation as “statesmen,” not “revolutionists,” noting George Washington’s “passion for order.”

1 Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 202.

2 Cited in Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 59.

Writing in 1902, in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, Wilson described the United States’ ultimate aim as the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny, setting it on the path to “self-government.” But self-government, he warned, was a thing of “infinite difficulty” and best not come too soon. Wilson saw liberal democracy as the endpoint of history, but appropriate only at advanced stages of development; democracy, he had noted earlier, “is poison to the infant but tonic to the man.” On this scale, Russians, like Cubans, were immature – “a people dumb and without knowledge of speech” in matters political.³ These views found full expression in Wilson’s expansive global vision in the aftermath of World War I. Wilson sought a liberal world order much like his vision of the American Revolution, ordered liberty gradually attained – with self-determination for those ready to assume such obligations.

Soviet ideology is much easier to describe and analyze than its American counterpart. Soviet leaders proclaimed their ideology obsessively, trumpeting slogans on stationery and street corners alike. Even as domestic and foreign policies shifted, Soviet ideological claims remained constant; each shift had an explanation rooted in what came to be called Marxism-Leninism (or, from the 1930s through the 1950s, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism). Especially before the mid-1960s, Marxist ideology was a key part of the framework in which Soviet foreign and domestic policy were made. The trove of once-secret documents declassified in the 1990s make clear that Lenin and his successors did not use ideology as mere cover for *raisons d’état*; in the apt words of one skeptical historian: “There was no double-bookkeeping.”⁴

The starting point for Soviet ideology is Karl Marx’s theory of capitalism. Capitalism, for Marx, relied on exploitation: the ruling bourgeoisie paid workers as little as possible in order to maximize profits. In spite of its dominance over society, the bourgeoisie faced eventual extinction; the laws of history dictated that capitalism would create its own gravediggers. The crisis would begin with declining profits, whereupon the bourgeoisie’s responses would only exacerbate the problem. Mechanization would increase overproduction; reducing wages would spark workers’ protest; overseas expansion would feed rivalries between capitalist states. Lenin paid particular attention to the historical necessity of imperialism, which he sarcastically celebrated as “the highest stage of capitalism” – that is, the stage just before

3 Arthur Link (ed.), *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (hereafter PWW), 69 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966–94), V, 71; XII, 218; XVIII, 87.

4 Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9.

its collapse. Capitalism would ultimately fall before a proletarian revolution that ushered in the age of Communism. Marx viewed history as a predetermined process ending in human liberation – in the form of Communist society.

What did these theories of history and freedom mean for Soviet ideology? First, Soviet ideology was deterministic: bourgeois and proletarian alike had little choice but to obey history's iron laws. Second, Communism dismissed liberalism's emphasis on gradual change; "revolutions," Marx had it, "are the locomotives of history." Third, Soviet ideology rejected capitalist institutions as creatures of the ruling class; the state was, in Marx's words, the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie." The political rights that stood at the center of American liberalism were, to Marxists, charades that helped maintain capitalist rule. Bourgeois democracy, sneered Lenin, offered democracy only to the bourgeoisie. The dismissal of bourgeois institutions shaped Soviet notions of foreign relations, too. Relations between governments served only the class interests of the respective national bourgeoisies. Soviet leaders would deal instead with other nations' revolutionary forces.

That American and Soviet ideologies were set in direct opposition to each other ensured disagreement between the two countries. But other nations with antithetical visions of social organization had in the past maintained diplomatic relations. What made this conflict an ideological one – and ultimately into the Cold War – inhered in the nature of the ideologies themselves. Soviet and American ideologies were both universalistic; they both held that their conceptions of society applied to all nations and peoples. Both nations prided themselves on their modernity, seeking to supplant what they saw as the moribund traditions of Europe – and ultimately to transform Europe itself. Both nations, furthermore, subscribed to progressive ideologies; they portrayed history as an irreversible march to improvement, which they defined as the spread of their own influence. Each side feared the advance of the other as a step backward. Americans understood Soviet expansion as a direct blow to the gradual spread of freedom, while Soviet observers saw American expansion as proof that the final crisis of capitalism was near. Both ideologies, finally, exhibited a tension between determinism and messianism. Leaders on each side believed that history itself was on their side, but at the same time exhibited a certain impatience with the workings of history; neither side was willing to stand aside and let history take its course. Thus, both countries equated the growth of their own power with historical progress. For this reason, the USA and the USSR represented new



1. A Soviet cartoon portrays the League of Nations with French, American, and British capitalists treading on starving workers, under the banner "Capitalists of all countries, unite!"

forms of international politics. Proclaiming their universalism and messianism, they each sought to transform the whole world as a means to social progress. With such broad aspirations, permanent coexistence was impossible.

The crucible of World War I

Both Soviet and American leaders proclaimed the novelty of their respective views of international politics during World War I and the postwar settlement. Indeed, historians have convincingly argued that the two ideologies emerged in direct competition with each other. Both Wilson and Lenin wrote obituaries for an international system divided into imperial blocs, centered in European nation-states, and maintained through secret and self-interested diplomacy. They promoted, respectively, liberal and radical transformations of the international system, seeking to overthrow the one in place since the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Consistent with their messianic ideologies, both Wilson and Lenin prematurely declared victory over the old order. Russia's new leaders declared their revolution the first step in a global surge, and immediately began operating with a new form of international relations. Lev Trotskii quipped, upon being named the Bolsheviks' first people's commissar for foreign affairs, that his duties should merely be to "issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up shop."⁵ Soviet foreign policy rejected traditional diplomatic relations and would be oriented to the world's workers, not its statesmen. The Third (Communist) International, or Comintern (1919–43), institutionalized this approach, working for revolution in the developed nations of Western Europe and North America. Wilson, meanwhile, sought a reconfiguration of the international system along messianic liberal lines: "liberalism is the only thing that can save civilization."⁶ Enumerating his Fourteen Points in January 1918, Wilson invoked the "common interest of mankind" to demand "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity" for all states as well as the expansion of free trade.⁷ These guarantees – and the Fourteen Points in general – aimed to find a middle ground between Right (nationalism/imperialism) and Left (Bolshevism) by promoting a liberal internationalism.

While neither Wilson nor Lenin succeeded in eradicating the old diplomacy rooted in imperialism and nationalism, they presented powerful ideological challenges to the old order – and to each other. True to Trotskii's dictum, Lenin wrote not to the American president but to American workers, expressing his misguided confidence that they would rise against the bourgeoisie.

5 Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Scribner's, 1930), 341.

6 PWW, LXVI, 154.

7 PWW, XLV, 522–24.

Until they did so, he wrote, Russian revolutionaries were in a “besieged fortress, waiting for other detachments of the world socialist revolution to come to our relief.”⁸ The Soviets hoped these detachments would arrive in 1919, as revolutionary insurrections sprang up in Bavaria, Vienna, and Budapest. The wait, however, would be long indeed; by year’s end, the revolutionary tide in the West had subsided, leaving Russia’s Bolshevik regime global in principle but isolated in practice.

In 1921, the Comintern belatedly acknowledged that the 1917 revolution had not led to the overthrow of world capitalism, and concluded that different tactics were in order. Revolutionaries, it declared, must turn their energies to supporting Soviet Russia, which alone was carrying the socialist banner. The imminence of the revolution was a particular problem for American Communists; as the most advanced capitalist economy, the United States should theoretically have been closest to revolution. Lenin acknowledged the complexity, though, in his letters to American workers: a socialist revolution in the United States was not imminent, and thus socialism and capitalism would coexist for a time. The many defeats for American labor and radicalism in the 1920s made the *a priori* logic of an imminent revolution seem even less suitable. American Communists debated the “American exception” from Marx’s laws of revolution. The Comintern’s American Commission adjudicated the dispute; its head, Stalin, criticized those Americans who ignored the fact that the principal features of capitalism were identical in all countries. Marx’s laws of revolution allowed no “American exception.”

In the decade after the Bolshevik Revolution, then, the implications of Soviet ideology became clear: aspiring to world revolution, it sought to unite progressive forces in the developed world under its control. Since the USSR was the beacon of revolution, the long-term goal of world revolution came with a short-term goal of building up the USSR. Anything that strengthened the bastion of world revolution, therefore, would advance world revolution.

American leaders, meanwhile, saw the Russian Revolution as a threat to liberty. The strands of American liberalism – formal liberty, gradually attained; popular sovereignty; racial hierarchy; and market-based individualism – shaped American responses to Russian events. Understanding Bolshevik power as mob rule, American leaders decried Bolshevism alternately as a catalyst of murder and repression and as an inevitable descent into anarchy. President Wilson saw Russians as guided by irrational impulses rather than detached rationality; as with his encomiums to the founding fathers, popular

8 *Lenin on the United States* (New York: International, 1970), 348.

sovereignty was orderly. Thus, Wilson's praise of Russia was tinged with condescension; his famous war address in April 1917 praised Russians' "natural instinct" for democracy – not their rational hopes for it.⁹ Wilson and his administration spent more time, however, describing baser Russian instincts, ones that revealed Russia's political immaturity and danger to the advance of liberal democratic civilization. From the point of view of American policy-makers, then, the Russian Revolution had two problems: it was Russian and it was a revolution.

Wilson also saw the Russian problem in a broader ideological context, in which the Bolsheviks were interfering with human progress. "Bolshevism is a mistake," he told one interlocutor, "and it must be resisted as all mistakes are resisted. If let alone it will destroy itself. It cannot survive because it is wrong."¹⁰ He also opposed Allied intervention in Soviet Russia – though only months later he reluctantly approved American actions against Bolshevik rule. Wilson convinced himself that only American military aid and troop deployments in Russia would keep history on the proper path. The United States, then, fought Soviet Russia in the name of ordered liberty, national sovereignty, and gradual progress.

Wilson's messianic liberalism appeared not only in the White House but also among some of its sharpest critics in the 1910s. A circle of writers and diplomats led by Progressives were such firm believers in historical progress that they could imagine only a bright future for Russia, in spite of all the available evidence. Bolshevism, in this analysis, was a necessary phase before the inevitable normalization of the country. No evidence to the contrary could shake American liberals' conviction that Russia would soon conform to the American model.¹¹

Interwar to World War II: searching for convergence

Barring any changes in the USSR, though, the United States adopted an official policy of nonrecognition. The announcement came in 1920, only months after the troops had departed. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby declared that the US government could not recognize Soviet Russia because of the Comintern's aim of world revolution. A lack of diplomatic relations, however,

⁹ *PWW*, XLI, 524.

¹⁰ *PWW*, LXVI, 154.

¹¹ Christopher Lasch, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

did not impede an increasing range of American–Soviet interactions in the 1920s, interactions which revealed Americans’ hopes that the Soviet Union could become a liberal state like the United States. American observers optimistically greeted Lenin’s announcement of the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) in March 1921. NEP reduced state control of the economy to the “commanding heights,” allowed market forces freer play, and encouraged the use of economic concessions with foreign firms.

Soviet agreements with American firms during NEP revealed both ideologies in action. American governmental officials saw no contradiction between diplomatic nonintercourse and unofficial economic relations; what made free markets free, after all, was their distance from governmental authority. At the same time, many observers saw NEP as proof that the Soviet Union was quickly evolving toward capitalism. One business periodical celebrated NEP-era Soviet Russia as “a great capitalist experiment – perhaps the greatest of modern times.” Henry Ford expressed this aspect of American market ideology most succinctly: Communist theory, he declared upon opening a Ford plant in the USSR in 1929, “makes little difference ... for in the long run facts” – economic facts – “will control.”¹² By recognizing the need for markets, the Soviet Union was heading the American way. At the same time, Soviets celebrated the economic agreements as proof of the iron laws of capitalism; Lenin boasted to a comrade that they showed how capitalists contributed to “the preparation of their own suicide.”¹³ American relief during the Soviet famine of 1921–23 revealed similar ideological dispositions. Many American officials hoped that their efforts would reconstruct Russia right out of Bolshevism; aid would be a crucial step in the transformation of Soviet Russia into a normal capitalist system. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw the relief program as an opportunity to learn American economic and industrial techniques – even from committed anti-Bolsheviks like Herbert Hoover.

By the late 1920s, as the Soviet Union abandoned NEP for its first Five-Year Plan, Americans remained captivated by the Soviet experiment but for different reasons. They celebrated the application of American technology, even if used to catch up with and surpass the United States in industrial production. American enthusiasts embraced the plans because they represented an effective if brutal means of transforming a backward agricultural economy into a modern industrial nation. The stock-market crash of 1929 only spurred further

12 Cited in Peter Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), III, 118, 121.

13 Iu. Annenkov, “Vospominaniia o Lenine” [Recollections of Lenin], *Novyi zhurnal*, 65 (1961), 147.

interest in Soviet planning, sending hundreds of fact-finders and thousands of American engineers and workers to the USSR in the early plan era (the 1930s). Most enthusiasts celebrated Soviet practices, not Communist doctrine. New Dealer Stuart Chase, for instance, lauded Soviet economic planning but dismissed the relevance of Marxist theory; John Dewey did the same for Soviet education.

The Depression that wracked the capitalist world in the 1930s gave further hope to those looking for signs of American–Soviet convergence. The New Deal in the United States represented a step away from the individualist and free-market orientation that had defined American liberalism. As New Deal agencies moved toward “organized capitalism,” with a stronger government role in the economy, their operatives looked with envy at the Soviet central-planning apparatus. At the same time, the Soviet turn toward “socialism in one country” suggested to many observers that the USSR was abandoning its global aspirations in favor of “normal” economic development within its own borders. Nor was the convergence solely economic; Americans saw Stalin’s social policies in the mid-1930s as a rejection of revolution and a return to normality – what one sociologist termed the “Great Retreat” from ideology. Ambassador Joseph Davies led the charge in claiming that Communism had given way to human nature and common sense under Stalin; he was not the only American searching desperately for normality in the increasingly repressive Stalinist system.

The Soviet vision of the interwar United States was a perfect inverse. Irrespective of the 1920s boom, the Comintern announced the arrival of Communism’s “Third Period,” which took as its central premise that the revolution was nigh. Under such circumstances, Communists needed to be especially vigilant against other leftist parties that might mislead the proletariat. The practical effects of this policy were minimal outside the precincts of the far Left, which were roiled by Communist obstreperousness. The 1929 crash bolstered Comintern claims, as the Soviets interpreted the growing economic crisis in the West to mean that the capitalist system was on its last legs. Stalin gleefully contrasted the economic fortunes of the USA and USSR. In 1928, there had been a “halo around the United States” amidst “triumphant hymns of prosperity.” Two years later, economic crisis reigned in the capitalist world. “Things,” Stalin gloated, “have turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would.”¹⁴ Given capitalism’s crisis, Soviet leaders reasoned,

14 Iosif Stalin, *Sochineniia* [Works], 16 vols. (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1946–49 and Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1967), XII, 235–37.

companies would be looking to new markets, including the USSR, to sell their goods. Stalin was right. Many American business leaders promoted diplomatic recognition as the first step toward increasing commerce with the Soviet Union; liberal ideas, they argued, would follow free trade.

Not just economic but also geopolitical concerns led to US–Soviet diplomatic recognition in 1933. Adolf Hitler’s ascension in Germany that year initiated a sequence of events that would have a profound effect on the American–Soviet relationship. Hitler’s rise demonstrated the vigor of supposedly archaic forces of racial nationalism; the old order continued in spite of liberal (Wilsonian) and radical (Leninist) challenges. The Soviet Union used a variety of diplomatic tools against Nazism, seeking a collective security agreement that would isolate Germany by uniting Western powers against it. The Comintern promoted a “Popular Front” against Fascism, with the aim of uniting once-reviled leftists (including even some New Dealers) against the Nazi threat. Germany responded in kind, signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan and Italy (1936). The United States and the Soviet Union also shared concerns over Japanese expansion into Manchuria. The United States, meanwhile, remained neutral in European conflicts through the 1930s. The threat on the Right brought together – temporarily at least – liberal (American) and radical (Soviet) challenges to the old order, deferring direct confrontation.

Before the war against Nazi Germany began, however, another Soviet reversal created international upheavals. The August 1939 Nazi–Soviet Pact quickly replaced the Popular Front against Fascism with a new strategy, a nonaggression pact (along with a secret division of Poland). Soviet leaders defended the agreement on ideological grounds; since capitalism led inevitably to Fascism, the argument went, there was no reason to single out Fascism. Soviet leaders claimed instead that the cause of world revolution was best served by treating all capitalist countries with equal disdain and by seeking advantage (in this case, buying time for a military buildup) in whatever alliances it could establish. The next two years were difficult ones for Western Communists; the post-pact party line that all forms of capitalism – Fascist or not – were a threat did not play well with the many radicals attracted to the Popular Front against Fascism. The Soviet foreign minister defended the pact by reminding the world’s radicals that the interests of the USSR were identical to the interests of world revolution, but few Western radicals were convinced. As a result, the pact amounted to an earthquake: the structures of the Popular Front were flattened and radical intellectuals fled the scene in droves; few such refugees ever returned. The pact also increased Western doubts about Soviet ideology, even among those once sympathetic to the

Soviet cause; how could an ideology be capacious enough to promote a broad alliance against Fascism (the Popular Front) at one moment and a nonaggression pact with the most dangerous Fascist power the next? Many such doubts were rendered moot by Nazi Germany in 1941.

The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, followed by the German declaration of war on the United States in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor that December, brought the USA and USSR together. The Grand Alliance, as Stalin noted, did not deny ideological differences, but sought to work together on common aims. By 1943, the Comintern, the Soviet organ of world revolution, closed its doors, a sign that world revolution was not imminent. The CPUSA (Communist Party of the United States of America) followed Moscow's cue, changing its name to the Communist Political Association and softening its rhetoric. Indeed, Soviet authorities played up national and even nationalistic themes over internationalist ones during the war, suggesting perhaps that the alliance, however grand, was primarily tactical. American optimism about the USSR – and its ostensible similarities to the United States – also ran high. Pitirim Sorokin, a Russian émigré sociologist at Harvard, wrote *Russia and the United States* (1944), which pointed toward a future convergence between his birthplace and his current residence. While Sorokin's book did not represent official opinion, President Roosevelt cited approvingly the notion of American–Soviet convergence. This illusion would not survive long past the war itself.

From bipolar to global conflict

The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 cleared the stage for the expansion of American–Soviet ideological conflict into a global cold war. Each side concluded, according to its own ideological dispositions, that the specter of Nazism outlasted Hitler. Americans saw the Soviet Union as totalitarian – just like Nazi Germany. And the Soviets, who saw Fascism as the logical outcome of capitalism, saw the United States as moving on the path toward Fascism most recently trodden by Germany. The resounding defeat of Nazi Germany represented, furthermore, a broader defeat for the old order of nationalism and imperialism that Wilson and Lenin had so powerfully (but unsuccessfully) attacked in the aftermath of World War I. With the final defeat of a conservative alternative, the radical and liberal visions of world order faced off against one another.

The factors making the Cold War a *war* related to longstanding ideological differences combined with common features of the two ideologies (universalism,

messianism, and determinism). Believing itself the end of history, and believing that historical progress was itself inexorable, each side expected to conquer the other and the rest of the world. But what made the Cold War *cold*? The Cold War did not center on direct conflict between the two superpowers because the two were not focused on the immediate transformation or conquest of the other. Of course, other chilling factors went beyond the ideological: a desire to avoid total war after the devastating experience of World War II and the development of atomic weapons. But even in the earliest years of the Cold War, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, it did not seriously contemplate an attack. And, even at their most reckless, Soviet leaders never came close to contemplating a nuclear first strike.

The emergence of two distinct worlds – the “Free World” and the “Socialist Bloc” – represented not a rejection of messianism, only the temporary reduction of its sphere of operation. While each side maintained its belief that history would eventually create the ideal global society, each side also acknowledged that such a society might be a long time in coming. Soviet authorities continued fulminating against capitalism but held few serious thoughts that the United States would soon go Communist. Recognizing the short-term viability of the capitalist world economy did not mean that Marx’s “locomotive of history” had been derailed or was running on the wrong track; it would just make an extended station stop so far as the United States was concerned. For its part, the American foreign-policy apparatus had given up, for the time being, on converting the USSR to capitalism.

World War II loomed large in American and Soviet views of each other. First, the defeat of Nazism contributed to the decline of racial nationalism and imperialist expansion as international forces. Second, the military victory of the Soviet Union over Germany demonstrated that it had become sufficiently modern and powerful to repel the Nazi war machine. The dream that the USSR was evolving toward liberal capitalism seemed all the more unrealistic after the hard-won victory in World War II. “Totalitarian” societies such as the Soviet Union, scholars argued, had reached the end of internal historical development; they were no longer susceptible to internal transformation according to the laws of history. Totalitarianism could be dislodged only through military defeat. Soviets, too, rethought the future of the capitalist world, as Eugen Varga, the influential Soviet economist, suggested that capitalism had won a temporary reprieve from imminent crisis as a result of the New Deal and the war. These modifications did not affect the ultimate ideological goals, only the timeframe for their fulfillment. Each of the two

universalist ideologies still maintained the assumption that the other would end up in the dustbin of history – but also the expectation that victory would be only in the distant future.

With no hopes of transforming the antagonists themselves, the American–Soviet conflict became a bipolar one in which the poles themselves were off-limits. Cold War conflict took place over membership in the “Free World” and the “Socialist Bloc,” but not over who would lead each side. Thus the story of the Cold War was the story of boundaries, establishing the outer limits of each sphere of influence and competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other. This situation did not make the Cold War less ideological, but more so. The conflict was ideological precisely because the two sides measured their own positions in terms of their ability to replicate their social systems around the world. Yet, at the same time, the superpowers pursued ideological aims in the broadest possible terms. They tended to see every conflict as black and white – or perhaps as red vs. red-white-and-blue – and thus to give a great deal of leeway to allies who did not fit their ideological precepts. Soviet leaders worked with “bourgeois” or military regimes in the name of furthering Communism and world peace, while American leaders supported dictators and cartels in the name of democracy and free trade. The world became a sort of oversized scorecard measuring the relative success of each social system. The Cold War was fought on neutral ground or, more precisely, to make neutral ground less so.

As an ideological conflict, the Cold War would be defined by four features. First, it would be marked by competition to win new adherents to one or the other economic and social system. Both sides maintained empires, as John Lewis Gaddis noted, but of a very different sort. In Europe, the United States led an “empire by invitation” while the USSR ruled an “empire by imposition.”¹⁵ Second, the principal locus of American–Soviet conflict would undergo geographic shifts from one region to another, as nations committed themselves to one camp or the other. The Cold War first divided Europe and then moved on to Asia, Latin America, and eventually Africa. As it did so, the distinction between empires of invitation and imposition blurred; the Soviets were often more “invited,” and the Americans more “imposing,” in the Third World. Third, economic production and technological advance would be key instruments in American–Soviet competition. Direct economic competition between the superpowers underwrote the expansion of influence around the world, but also demonstrated the superiority of an economic system. Finally,

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 284–86.

the Cold War revolved around understandings of the enemy (and the world) that were deeply rooted in each ideology. Soviet leaders, believing imperialism to be the highest stage of capitalism, saw American globalism as a desperate effort to stave off collapse. For their part, most American officials explained Soviet expansion as a single-minded ambition for world revolution. And with this mutual projection came the conviction, strongly held on both sides, that the antagonist was denying present realities and interfering with a future that would inevitably lead to its own demise.

From war to Cold War

These features of ideological conflict took shape in the crucial years of 1946 and 1947. The winter of 1946 was a long and cold one – not just in terms of European weather, which made the reconstruction of that war-ruined continent all the more pressing, but in the climate of international relations as well. In February 1946, Stalin struck a confident tone during a speech in the “Stalin Electoral District” in Moscow during the sham election campaign of 1946. In this unconventional campaign speech – how could he lose in a district named after him? – Stalin drew lessons from World War II. Like incumbents everywhere, Stalin recited accomplishments under his rule, extolling the USSR’s new status as a modern economic and military power; the war demonstrated that “the Soviet social order” is “superior to any non-Soviet social order.” Yet, Stalin continued, the USSR could not rest on its laurels; it must prepare for future conflict. The recent war had been the “inevitable result” of the capitalist system, proving once again Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism’s iron law: capitalism meant war.¹⁶ The speech attracted wide attention in the United States; Justice William O. Douglas called it a “declaration of World War Three.”¹⁷ This sharp reaction revealed as much about American predispositions as it did about Soviet dispositions. Stalin waved neither an olive branch nor an unsheathed sword at the United States; he wanted the USSR to prepare for war by increasing production – not just of military materiel, but also of consumer goods. Economic strength would mean not just military power but also an improved standard of living. Both would be essential tools in the upcoming ideological struggle.

Stalin’s speech marked a new phase of American–Soviet relations. The mood of this new era was best articulated by US diplomat George F. Kennan, then working in the Moscow embassy. His famous “Long

¹⁶ Stalin, *Sochineniia*, XVI, 6–7.

¹⁷ Cited in Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 134.

Telegram” simplified Soviet postwar politics to a version of two camps. Kennan quoted Stalin’s statement that there were only “two centers of world significance,” adding that the Soviet leader was “committed fanatically to the belief” that there could be no “permanent *modus vivendi*” between them. The gravest danger, the American warned, came in the ideological nature of Soviet power; it seems “inaccessible to considerations of reality,” instead preferring to select “arbitrarily and tendentiously” a few facts “to bolster an outlook already preconceived.”¹⁸ Yet the gloomy Kennan sounded a few notes of optimism. He described Soviet leaders as opportunistic, ready to exploit weakness but not to overpower strong resistance. American strength and vigilance would prevent the expansion of Soviet power; this view provided the kernel for Kennan’s notion of containment of the Soviet Union. The flipside of containment was integration – bringing the Free World together – and here too Kennan called for American leadership.

The next month Winston Churchill coined a new term for the dividing line between the two worlds: the Iron Curtain. Churchill sounded an alarm for the 1940s based on Britain’s errors in the 1930s. Nazi Germany had grown larger and stronger while Western powers stood idly by; they must not make the same mistake with the USSR. In the past, statesmen could count on the balance of power to maintain world peace; that outmoded doctrine, he argued, could not counteract the Soviet threat to Anglo-Saxon civilization. The enthusiastic American response to this speech, in both the policy and public arenas, showed how it resonated with American ideology. Stalin rebutted the “Iron Curtain” speech the following week, opening with the statement that Churchill and his allies in the United States were little different from Hitler. Each side claimed to find the Nazi specter in the other.

Soviet assessments of the postwar world similarly emphasized conflict, especially within the capitalist world. In September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, N. V. Novikov, sent an alarmist telegram to Moscow; it attributed American foreign policy to “the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism.” The Americans would seek global domination through an expanding network of military bases and the spread of American capital in economies all over the world. Yet Novikov’s dispatch, representing the Foreign Ministry’s views, foresaw intercapitalist rivalry – USA vs. UK – as

¹⁸ Kenneth M. Jensen (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 18–19.


the main threat. The postwar world would be divided, but the sides were not yet entirely clear.¹⁹

That same September, presidential advisers Clark Clifford and George Elsey took Kennan's alarms about the USSR and linked them more specifically to Soviet ideology. Soviet leaders keenly believed Marx's theory that capitalism would ultimately destroy itself. Given the Soviet propensity to expand its influence and control wherever and whenever possible, Clifford and Elsey argued, the United States should come to the aid of any nation threatened by Soviet expansion. The United States should orient its diplomacy and military toward the prevention of Soviet expansion, not toward the elimination of the Soviet Union itself. Even dissenting voices envisioned two worlds. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, for instance, lost his job for condemning American bellicosity toward the Soviet Union – but he, too, imagined spheres of influence.

The year 1946 saw both the United States and the USSR move toward acceptance of a bifurcated world. Each side believed that it would ultimately prevail – the laws of history dictated its victory – but the time horizon for this victory receded into an ever-more-distant future. In the meantime, there would be little direct effort to create an American SSR, or to destroy the Soviet regime. The remaining task, in 1947, was to define the two worlds as ideological, not national, opponents, and to give the American–Soviet conflict its final shape as a conflict between different social systems each intent on expansion. The American case was made, most prominently, by President Harry Truman in March 1947. Responding to Britain's retreat from the eastern Mediterranean, Truman announced his doctrine that the United States would intervene in the name of freedom in Greece, and wherever else freedom was threatened. In defining the Cold War as a battle of freedom against totalitarianism, Truman invested the two worlds with ideological content while striking what would be a common refrain about the Cold War as a battle between different ways of life.²⁰ Like Churchill, he drew an explicit parallel between the rising conflict with the USSR and the conflicts that gave rise to World War II.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰ *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 176–77; Anders Stephanson, "Liberty or Death: The Cold War as US Ideology," in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 81–99.



2. A popular American cartoon published by the Catechetical Guild Educational Society of St. Paul, Minnesota, 1947, showing an imagined future of the United States.

Soviet authorities, after emphasizing national themes in World War II, quickly assimilated the Cold War as an ideological conflict. Because Marxist ideology privileged material conditions over ideological motives, Soviet ideologues tended to blame American expansion on its capitalist economy rather than its liberal ideology. Yet changed attitudes toward world capitalism in general and the United States in particular were visible in 1947. The economist Varga argued that World War II had changed capitalism; bourgeois governments, he theorized, might act in the interests of preserving the capitalist system as a whole (stabilizing consumption as they had during the Depression, for example) and thus slow the inexorable march of capitalism into crisis, revolution, and eventually

Communism. Though Varga faced stringent criticisms for these views, within a few years his vision of capitalist stabilization would take hold. And even as Varga wrote, Soviet economists placed less emphasis on intercapitalist rivalry and envisioned a capitalist world united against the USSR. Senior Communist Party official Andrei Zhdanov, in September 1947, offered a similar message to foreign Communists. He compared postwar American expansion to Germany in the 1930s; the rising tide of anti-Communism was only a cover for its expansionist designs. Soviet foreign policy, in contrast, accepted that capitalism and socialism would coexist for the foreseeable future. Zhdanov's speech neatly encapsulated the postwar Soviet posture: he compared American capitalism to German Fascism and expressed a Soviet acceptance of a world divided in two.

Back in Washington, Kennan authored the single most important article of the 1940s. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (by a certain "X") revised his Long Telegram, placing ideology at the center of Soviet behavior. Soviet foreign policy, Kennan concluded, was shaped by two tenets of Marxism-Leninism: the "innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism" and "the infallibility of the Kremlin." His famous article described the American-Soviet conflict as an ideological one; the Soviet Union was not a nation in the traditional sense, but the terrestrial incarnation of an ideology. The task of the United States, then, was to limit the range of Soviet action: "no mystical, Messianic movement – and particularly not ... the Kremlin – can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself ... to the logic of that state of affairs."²¹ To change Soviet policy, the United States needed not to eliminate the Soviet Union – only, famously, to contain it. A contained Soviet Union, the logic went, would be less aggressive internationally and less stable domestically; it would ultimately collapse of its own internal contradictions.

Kennan offered an elegant exposition of the United States' task for the postwar world. It merited a fourteen-part response from the country's most influential commentator on foreign affairs, Walter Lippmann, who challenged Kennan's basic premise; the sources of Soviet conduct, the columnist wrote, were Russian, not Marxist. Lippmann argued that Stalin was the heir not of Marx but of Peter the Great, continuing the tsar's efforts to expand Russia's influence. Though the American chattering classes favored X's ideological explanation over Lippmann's national one, the columnist had at least one lasting impact. When his columns appeared in book form in early November 1947, they bore a title that outlasted its arguments: *The Cold War*. Three decades to the week after the Bolsheviks took power, American-Soviet conflict now had a new form and a new name.

21 X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (1947), 566–67.

The remainder of the late 1940s focused primarily on the division of Europe. The American Marshall Plan (announced in 1947) sought to reconstruct Europe and integrate Western Europe while containing Soviet influence to the eastern and southeastern portions of that continent. The establishment of the Cominform (1947) amounted to a belated and impoverished Soviet effort to integrate its own European sphere – by imposing tighter Soviet control backed up with military force. At the center of the early Cold War was Germany, under four-power military occupation (by Britain, France, the USSR, and the United States) in the late 1940s; the occupation of Berlin, deep in the Soviet zone, was similarly divided. The Soviet Union challenged this division, in 1948 blockading ground transportation between the western zones of Germany and Berlin. Rendering West Berlin a “Free World” island in the middle of a Red Sea, the blockade prompted a strong Western response – but not a military one. The airlift of supplies to West Berlin indicated Western resolve to contain the Soviet Union; the United States was not in a position to roll back Soviet power, but would act assertively to limit its expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949) provided a military component to earlier forms of economic integration of Western Europe under American leadership and the American nuclear umbrella. When the Soviets ended the blockade a year later, the map of Cold War Europe had been drawn. Both sides repeated their ideological claims that the continent would eventually turn to their own way of life; in practice, though, the Iron Curtain separated the two realms.

The most influential American policy document of the early 1950s expressed the two-world concept in language bristling with ideological confidence. NSC 68, an official doctrine approved in April 1950, opened with the messianic claim that “the idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history.” The contrast with the Soviet system was total: “No other value system is so irreconcilable with ours.” The American response must be firm, though it would not entail, for the foreseeable future, direct military engagement. Instead, the United States must “place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power.” The immediate goal was not the elimination of the USSR but instead the “emergence of satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.”²² Following NSC 68, American foreign policy directed significant resources to psychological warfare but avoided direct military confrontation.

Soviet pronouncements expressed similar confidence. In his last statements on foreign policy, Stalin insisted that intercapitalist rivalry was inevitable; it

22. Cited in Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War* (New York: NYU Press, 1999), 2, 79.

would eventually destroy capitalism from within and leave Communism victorious. “Eventually” was a key qualifier here; in other writings, Stalin counseled patience to those economists who wanted to move too quickly toward Communism. The transition to Communism, he scolded, was a “difficult trick.” Communism’s victory was inevitable, but not imminent.²³ When the architects of the Cold War, Truman and Stalin, both left the scene in 1953, the ideological orientations were firmly in place for their successors.

In its next phase, American–Soviet ideological conflict expanded into Asia. While neither Lenin nor Stalin had evinced serious hopes for a colonial revolution, the facts on the ground – most notably Mao Zedong’s establishment of the People’s Republic of China in late 1949 – showed the power of Communist appeals outside Europe. Asia became all the more important to the Cold War as decolonization, starting with British India in 1947, replaced European empires with a welter of new states. While the Clifford–Elsey and Novikov memoranda of 1946 worried about a third world war, the 1950s gave rise instead to a Third World war.

The rapidly expanding Third World would remain contested terrain for the remainder of the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence in the newly independent nations, measuring their progress on a global scorecard. The Soviet Union had two distinct advantages in the so-called battle for the hearts and minds of this Third World. American support for its European allies – up to and including Marshall Plan aid – put that nation, in the eyes of most anticolonial leaders, on the side of empire. They had a point; American policymakers saw the transition from colonies to independent nations as a gradual process under the tutelage of Western powers. The USSR’s economic system gave it a second advantage. Having recently transformed itself from a backward nation into a modern industrial society, the Soviet Union was an inspiration for former colonies too impatient for the gradualist approach promoted by American development agencies.

The American effort to bring Third World nations into the Free World had its own advantages. First, the American economic record was far stronger than the Soviet Union’s. True, the Soviet economy grew much faster than the American one – but mainly because it was at such a low relative level to begin with. Even as the two superpowers squared off as supposed equals, the United States economy dwarfed the Soviet Union’s – two to three times the GNP in 1960, even more by other measures. The sheer size of the American economy,

23 Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 205.

not to mention the rapid spread of American popular culture around the postwar world, advertised the country's cornucopia. The image of American democracy attracted the attention and sympathies of many Third World intellectuals and leaders – though this was often undercut, as recent scholars noted, by growing attention to racial inequality in the United States. The Third World became the site of numerous military battles but also the center of a hotly contested ideological struggle.

Instruments and ends of ideology

The ideological nature of the Cold War conflict played out not just in the shape of the Cold War but in the instruments used to fight it. Both sides undertook massive military buildups, with as much as one-third of the Soviet economy devoted to military production. But armaments were far from the only weapons used in the Cold War. Since both sides stressed the importance of economic production as proof of their own system's superiority, both used economic growth – the ability to “deliver the goods” – as a key indicator of their own success.²⁴ The focus on growth applied not only to the superpowers themselves but also to the other nations in each camp. Thus, Americans celebrated the German “economic miracle” and its Japanese counterpart, while Soviet officials did the same for its major development projects in the Third World – India's Bhilai steel plant, Egypt's Aswan dam, and other high-profile efforts. Finally, each side relied heavily on information/propaganda operations, further suggesting the ways in which the Cold War was a battle for influence. As such, it took place on an ideological plane, seeking persuasion over conquest – but when necessary using conquest as a tool for persuasion. As historian Frank Ninkovich noted wisely, international conflicts in the twentieth century were predicated on the idea of an international audience.²⁵ The notion of global public opinion showed the ways in which modern conflicts – and the Cold War in particular – were fundamentally ideological in their origins and operations.

Yet the ideological vigor of the early Cold War did not survive the first two decades of the conflict. Two existential crises in the early 1960s challenged some of the fundamental premises of the ideological Cold War. The first – the

24 Charles Maier and Charles Kindleberger, “Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review*, 86 (April 1981), 360.

25 Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

erection of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 – ratified the division of Europe dating back to 1949. The inability of the East German economy to match the economic miracle of its western neighbor grew increasingly problematic, as Berliners sought to flee the East for the West in steady (and steadily increasing) numbers. Khrushchev eventually acceded to the East German proposal to separate East and West Berlin, ostensibly to protect the East from Western infiltration but in fact to reduce the exodus of East Germans; the Wall became the final line drawn in Europe during the Cold War. Though it was the target of President Kennedy’s fierce rhetoric, he took few direct actions. Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962 revealed the dangers to both sides of escalating and militarizing the Cold War in the Third World, showing how proxy competition in a nuclear age could endanger the superpowers themselves. Changes in personnel and ideas also changed the nature of American–Soviet relations. The ouster of Khrushchev – in large part for his failings in Cuba – marked the changing of the guard in the USSR. His successor, L. I. Brezhnev, moved away from the ideological paradigm that had motivated his predecessors. At home, he favored actually existing socialism over the bright future. Historian Vladislav Zubok argues that Soviet elites, generally, had traded in some of their ideological fire for improvements in standards of living and employment opportunities, and for a more stable existence than was possible in the quarter-century of Stalin’s rule.²⁶ Internationally, the Soviet Union chose its allies on the basis of strategic alliances, focusing less on bringing about socialist revolutions. The death of Kennedy, who had viewed the Cold War as a battle between different ways of life, similarly left American leadership without an energetic proponent of ideological struggle. As President Lyndon B. Johnson dealt with one product of American ideology – the deepening US involvement in Vietnam – he wrestled with the notion that Americans should “pay any price” to spread liberalism around the world. But it would take Richard Nixon to bring American–Soviet relations to focus on interests rather than ideas, an underlying principle of détente.

American–Soviet relations had begun in 1917 with each nation’s efforts to transform the other. By 1964, though, each side had accepted the existence of the other and its sphere of influence. They would still compete, but in ever-more-marginal areas – and what, after all, could be more marginal to superpower

²⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

interests than Vietnam and Angola? At the same time, the superpowers sought more measures of coexistence and, to a surprising extent, normalized the Cold War. American–Soviet conflict would continue for another quarter-century, but it would never be the same.

The ideological battles that dominated the middle decades of the twentieth century left many important and disturbing legacies. The universalism of both the American and Soviet ideologies turned a bipolar conflict into a global conflagration, with devastating results. The Third World suffered from superpower embrace, which turned areas of domestic dispute into geopolitical hotspots. The brief but intense focus on Third World countries – Iran, Guatemala, Egypt, Taiwan, Indonesia, Lebanon, and Cuba in short succession – left nations with despotic rulers who served the needs of their superpower sponsors or themselves rather than their own nations' interests. Civil wars became superpower proxy wars, multiplying the length, complexity, and destructive fallout of heretofore-local conflicts. In the name of appealing to a prosperous future, the world of the present suffered mightily.

The ideological nature of American–Soviet conflict marked its protagonists as well. Citizens on both sides, whether voluntarily or otherwise, would (in Kennedy's famous words) "pay any price and bear any burden" in the name of victory. President Dwight D. Eisenhower enumerated some of the American costs as early as 1961. His farewell address bemoaned the rise of a "military-industrial complex" that had come into being under his watch and had distorted the politics, culture, and economy of the United States. The price borne in the USSR was much greater, but its public recognition much later; not until Mikhail Gorbachev took the reins in 1985 were there serious efforts to reduce the defense burden, restructure the economy, and open up a new public sphere. Gorbachev's reforms failed, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; a country that for seventy-some years had declared itself a harbinger of the future was itself relegated to the dustbin of history. Within the United States came signs of triumphalism; it was not just neoconservative Francis Fukuyama who declared the "end of history," but a wide swath of the American policy elite that declared ideological victory.²⁷ That confidence, bolstered by the universalism at the root of American liberalism and the military might acquired during the conflict with the Soviet Union, might be the Cold War's most durable legacy.

27 Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 53–57.

The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century

CHARLES S. MAIER

Vice President Richard M. Nixon boasted about American color television to Nikita Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during their famous “kitchen debate” of July 1959, but the early Cold War was fought in black and white. The issues were monochrome and so were the images: stacks of Marshall Plan flour on an Italian wharf, C-47s approaching Tempelhof airport over the ruins of Berlin during the blockade, films of blast furnaces with white sparks emitted against a night sky, and the photos of the American vice president and the Soviet first secretary debating the path to household affluence in a Moscow exposition hall. At stake in that model American kitchen was consumer affluence or collective prowess, suburban dreams of the Eisenhower years versus Khrushchev’s cocky promise from 1956, “We will bury you,” rendered plausible a year later by the trail of Sputnik in the night sky.¹

Still, when Nixon and Khrushchev debated their societies’ respective achievements, they agreed that peaceful competition was preferable to ruthless military or political confrontation. Peaceful competition meant primarily economic competition: the rivalry between capitalism and state socialism. Divergent economic systems should not be so menacing that they compelled a strategic arms race; the two sides had not organized extensive alliances just to defend private or state ownership of capital, the market or the plan. Nonetheless, distinctions between socialism and capitalism seemed fundamental to ideological identity and to bloc cohesion in the 1950s, as they would again in the 1980s when the state socialist economies showed evident signs of decomposition. Neither were the distinctions just a source of

¹ For a transcript of the kitchen debate, see www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/14/documents/debate/; “We will bury you” – perhaps too harsh in English translation – was uttered to Western ambassadors in November 1956, reported *Time*, November 26, 1956. In this chapter I do not cite from archival sources directly; references can be found in the essays and books listed.

ideological identity, no more than the stake of economic rivalry was just household appliances. The two economic systems had to provide the resources to sustain the military confrontation and subsidize allies. National power depended on economic achievement – a point the American vice president recognized when he conceded that the Soviets still led in getting payloads into orbit.

Economics, therefore, was crucial to the history of the Cold War. On the Soviet side, domination meant constructing an economic bloc of centrally planned economies that was designed to resist the seduction of the Marshall Plan and a reemerging West European capitalism. In the case of the United States, leadership meant helping to modernize its allies' economies and to integrate as much as practical the residues of older imperial economic zones – German and British above all – into a sphere of trade and exchange that posed no barrier to United States economic doctrines or ambition. National Socialist Germany's economic domain had been shattered with Hitler's defeat, but as much of it as feasible had to be reintegrated into the West. The Cold War's division of Europe would facilitate the transformation of West German industry from a threatening prewar and wartime rival system into a major asset of an integrated Atlantic economy. With respect to the British system of imperial trade preferences, Washington faced a different choice. United Kingdom finances were strained by the great debts London had accumulated to fight the war, including those owed to its Asian dependencies, its "white dominions," and to Washington. To what degree the United States should compel Britain to liquidate its remaining international assets or help keep them intact for the sake of postwar partnership was an open issue, to be repeatedly debated in the administration and Congress.

American readiness to replace German and British international economic domination raised implicitly the parallel question of future American leadership in Asia. Washington had been drawn into the Pacific war by its unwillingness to surrender China to Japanese imperial control. With the defeat of Tokyo, Washington was potentially in a position to assume regional economic leadership in East Asia. US policymakers were concerned (as were Japanese conservatives) about the possible rise of a Marxist Left in defeated Japan and would soon seek to limit economic restructuring, just as they wanted to buttress the Chinese Nationalist regime against Mao's movement in North China. But whereas a thorough integration of Japan and South Korea was to be achieved, any voice in postwar China was lost with the advent of the Communist regime.

Even if Washington policymakers did not envisage the expansion of American economic reach in imperial terms, the exhaustion of earlier economic hegemony – regional in the instance of Germany and Japan, transoceanic in Britain’s case – militated for a reorganization of global economic relations, which subordinated allies as well as opposing the emerging Soviet adversary. Believing the alternative to be the extension of Communist power, a bipartisan coalition in Washington repeatedly took on commitments from 1945 into the 1960s that consolidated a territorially extensive, though hardly universal, zone of trade, payments, and investments conducive to liberal capitalism. All these pressures – ideological, technological, and geopolitical – interacted to shape the economy of the Cold War, and this chapter will follow them in turn.

Ideas

As Nixon and Khrushchev agreed in the Moscow model kitchen, the Cold War invoked a competition over models of economic organization. The Soviets stressed the virtues of public ownership and central planning; Americans, the capacity of the market, private ownership, and entrepreneurial control. Still, the Communists’ economic program varied greatly over time. Ideology remained important, but its interpretation was malleable. Over the longer term, Communists professed belief that after successive crises of capitalism their vanguard party would seize authoritative power, allegedly on behalf of the industrial working class, and transfer economic assets from private to public control. Social democratic reformist or “revisionist” versions of Marxism in the Soviet Union and Western Europe might advocate incremental economic change, but earned only contempt from Lenin after 1914 and then from Stalin as he consolidated power in the late 1920s. By the end of that decade Stalin and his allies unleashed a campaign against peasant smallholding agriculture, embarked on collectivization, and introduced the first of many Five-Year Plans. The rise of Fascism and the threat of Nazi expansion led Stalin to shift course anew in the mid-1930s and seek broad alliances with the social democrats and even non-Marxian liberal democrats. From the Kremlin decisions of 1935 to encourage popular fronts until the formation of the Cominform in 1947, the Soviets soft-pedaled their earlier aspirations for single-party dictatorship and collectivization wherever it might be opportune. Instead, the Comintern, itself dissolved in 1943, called merely for “progressive” coalitions that would defeat Fascism and institute “people’s democracies” in the countries liberated from the Germans. The ultimate form of the economy

was adjourned as an issue for the future. Western socialists and British Labour Party leaders remained more insistent on old ideas of nationalization. They believed, along with a now-rather-forlorn New Deal Left marginalized during the war, that political power would be based on control of economic institutions. The Soviets understood that economic structures would depend, conversely, on political control. Hence they wished to maintain a substantial share of power in the West, and increasingly total domination in Eastern Europe.

Non-Communist political leaders possessed no unified anti-Bolshevik economic ideology between the wars. Catholics clung to a vision of diffused property. Fascists wanted a vigorous program that combined state-led modernization, rearmament, and coordination of interest-group bargaining. They were defeated, but economic mobilization during the Depression and then World War II brought far more state intervention even to liberal economies. Given the sacrifices demanded from civilian populations, expanding welfare-state policies and sometimes nationalization of basic industries seemed a foreordained imperative for postwar social policy in many European societies. The balance of political forces changed – the Labour Party unexpectedly won the 1945 election in Britain. Coalitions based on resistance forces defeated Fascists and collaborationists on the continent and were prepared to enact the enshrined goals of their socialist participants. Labor union and anti-Fascist political party leaders worked together on “charters” of the resistance or national solidarity pacts that provided for initial wage restraint but more social security, greater protection against unemployment, and further nationalizations of infrastructure. In Britain and the United States, “Keynesian” deficits were accepted as possible fiscal weapons to prevent a return to prewar unemployment. In occupied West Germany, both the Social Democrats and the labor-oriented wing of the Christian Democrats spoke out against any reinstitution of a powerful capitalist industry.²

Call all these latter concepts the ideas of 1945. They enjoyed significant but limited success until the end of the 1970s. The upshot was a social compromise in the West and in Japan. Welfare states were largely instituted, but they coexisted with a return of private enterprise and ownership. The American occupying authorities in Germany helped postpone irrevocable decisions for nationalization until left-wing energies dissipated after 1948–49. Nonetheless, trade unions and the Social Democratic Party sought and achieved a fundamental voice in corporate governance by winning the right of co-determination – that is, parity representation on boards of directors. In

2. See Hans Peter Schwarz's chapter in this volume.

Japan, following extensive debate, American occupation authorities supervised a “reverse course” that helped conservatives to rein in union activism and patiently reconstruct corporate control. Whereas German unions managed to institute co-determination, the Japanese unions worked to forge a system of lifetime job security for their workers. Fascism ended as a political discipline but left its habits and networks: entrepreneurs and political leaders wanted to recover a framework of social discipline and political conservatism. Whether in Italy, Germany, or Japan, labor and management fought to a draw, as American policies both restrained workers’ new strength and assured their new voice. In other countries, conservatives returned to the governing coalitions after 1948 and through the 1950s, which became in general a decade conducive to economic growth under capitalist auspices.

Indeed, as Cold War confrontation congealed at the end of the 1940s, the economic “ideology” that came to play the greatest role in the non-Communist world was the idea of sustained economic growth – both as high theory and in the applied form that I have earlier termed the “politics of productivity.”³ Ideas of progress and enrichment had marked earlier economic analysis from the eighteenth century. But the new formalized notions of sustained economic growth as measured by increasing national income could be traced to young Anglo-American economists on the eve of World War II, who assimilated John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*. But they went beyond Keynes’s concern with using government spending to recover high employment and defined economic goals in terms of achieving a continuous expansion of output. Early growth literature stressed how difficult it was to achieve the delicate equilibrium between consumption and saving so as not to veer off into inflation or recession.⁴ By the late 1940s, however, New Deal economists and the Truman administration promised that technological innovation would assure continuing expansion year after year. Such steady enrichment would allow simultaneous gains for capital and labor. They were not locked into a class war – a

3 Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity,” originally in *International Organization*, 1977; reprinted in Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 121–52.

4 For early discussions, see R. F. Harrod, “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” *Economic Journal*, 49 (1939), 12–33, 377, who used the term “knife edge view”; and Evsey Domar, “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment,” *Econometrica*, 14 (1946), 137–47. See also Moses Abramovitz, “Economics of Growth,” in Moses Abramovitz, *Thinking about Growth and Other Essays on Economic Growth and Welfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 80–124.

message that American labor delegates as well as entrepreneurs and government officials delivered throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.

Applied to the less-developed countries – then called more frankly “backward” or “undeveloped” – the idea of sustained quantitative growth was reshaped as a template for qualitative and structural change, that is, for economic development, which would be enshrined as an official program in Point IV of Truman’s January 1949 inaugural address. The promise of the vast dam or steel complex attracted intellectuals and policymakers in Asia and Africa, who asked, however, whether their societies might industrialize without replicating the class divisions of the West. Each camp dangled development projects before the nonindustrialized world in an effort to marginalize the influence of the other. The Point IV aid requested, however, remained about 1 percent of Marshall Plan funding and tended to be extended as an adjunct of trade negotiations on behalf of American firms. Even had sums been larger, development would have remained elusive as even well-funded European areas such as the south of Italy persistently demonstrated.

Specific ideologies aside, the Cold War exerted a profound behavioral impact on economic habits in general. In effect, the protracted confrontation replaced the role of ascetic Protestantism to which Max Weber had ascribed so important a function in Western economic development. Envisaged as a long and enduring commitment, the unremitting vigilance that Cold War leaders invoked naturally reinforced the tradeoff between present and future that is always at the heart of economic progress. As George Kennan signaled in his famous long telegram and anonymous article (signed by “X”), Cold War victory, like economic reconstruction, would take a long time and demand continuing discipline. So, of course, did economic progress. Until the mid-1960s, socialism and capitalism both prioritized the future. Reconstruction required dreams deferred. Remarkably enough, each side did impose that discipline on itself – and this after the most costly war in history had already demanded so much sacrifice. Still, the overarching adversarial contest evoked a capacity for deferred gratification that economic aspirations alone might not motivate. The confrontation between “East” and “West” and the need to rebuild industries and urban centers led to a decade of extraordinary public cohesion. So, too, did the diffuse commitment to reconstituting traditional family and gender roles and the unavowed determination to repress the memory of wartime violence and occupation, complicity, and even betrayal. This extraordinary psychosocial discipline lasted until the mid-1960s. Then the claims of the present, of consumption and of social welfare, of youth culture and expressivity – of *détente* – reclaimed the present against the future; and

the great societal self-discipline – freely chosen or imposed – began to weaken and fray. Music and missiles, rockets and rock and roll began to pull in separate directions.

The Fordist zenith

Social theorists, such as Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell, argued that both Communist and capitalist economic systems constituted varieties of a common “industrial society.” Given the bureaucratic logic of industrial organization, liberal intellectuals explained as the Soviet regime began to “thaw” after Stalin’s death, the contending systems might “converge” on a mild sort of planned economy with a developed welfare state. Underpinning this prognosis was a form of industrial structure interwar European business leaders had termed “Fordism,” a concept that subsequently migrated into postwar social theory. Fordism envisaged that the mass-production factory was at the heart of the modern economy, an impression reinforced by national industrial mobilization during wartime. As of the 1950s, Fordism entailed deploying mass factory labor at highly mechanized factories that were involved above all with the transformation of steel. For both sides in the Cold War this process seemed crucial, and annual steel tonnage measured relative success. The continuous broad-band rolling mill, developed in the United States, became the iconic component of postwar modernization for German Ruhr firms, the Italian steel industry, and the French Commissariat du plan. Until the later 1960s, Cold War economic rivalry remained a Fordist competition that seemed to turn on winning the hearts and minds of the laboring masses who were yoked to the machines and assembly lines that worked the metal.

Nonetheless, industrial relations still remained adversarial into the 1950s. Employers felt they had to restore a discipline to the factory that had been undermined after 1945; unions believed that employers were trying to reimpose the harsh authority they had enjoyed before the war. Into the mid- to late 1950s employers benefited from a robust supply of factory labor as mechanization and fertilizers massively increased the productivity of the European countryside and workers moved into urban areas – from southern Italy to the country’s north, from French and Dutch farms into the greater urban areas, then from the southern peripheries of Europe into Germany. In France, Italy, and Belgium, employers recovered the power to lay off workers who had been hired during the triumphant days of the anti-Fascist Resistance. Under the impetus of American ideas, and by means of a series of monetary reforms that ended a decade of prevalent inflation and sometimes hyperinflation,

employers amended pay schemes by reducing the cost of living increases or indexation that over time leveled wage differentials. They reintroduced piece-work and bonuses for production. Trade unions affiliated with the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties largely concurred in this effort because they tended to represent skilled or white-collar workers whose relative wage position had been eroded by inflation and fixed-increment indexation. Communist industrial federations, in contrast, sought to speak for the less-credentialed masses and resisted wage differentiation. But while they retained working-class loyalties, they did not win more general victories.

Elsewhere, there was less resentment. Britain and Scandinavia rewarded their working-class parties with political power or shares in power; in West Germany, employers and workers made common cause in the late 1940s against industrial dismantling for reparations. Moreover, one encompassing trade-union federation, the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (DGB) spoke for almost all industrial workers. The Communist regimes allowed no scope for independent trade-union action, and relied on state planning mechanisms to impose more demanding “norms” or productivity demands from above. Calculating the norms branch by branch in terms of hourly effort, work time, and wage premiums became a continual activity under the socialist planned economies. But precisely because the norms might provoke resistance if screwed too tight (as they did in East Germany in June 1953 and as Moscow warned East Berlin they would), the Communist regimes often left a lot of room for waste and slack, relying instead on Stakhanovite campaigns of socialist “emulation.” Despite implicit negotiations, increasing subsidies, and assured employment, they still faced restive workforces: after East Germany in 1953, labor protests shook Poland in 1956 and again in 1970.

The balance of power in the Western workplaces began to erode in the 1960s as labor markets tightened, and there was upward pressure on wages and renewed working-class militancy. Two decades into the postwar era, the priority of reconstruction became less urgent, the demand for present rewards more compelling. Dutch workers in 1964 and German unions in 1966 went out on major strikes; French workers briefly joined student protestors in 1968; Italian labor boiled over in its “hot autumn” in 1969. African-American labor pressed for civil rights gains in the cotton South in the mid-1960s. By this time, another great transition in the organization of work was under way. Costly coal mines and steel smelters – initially the shared achievement of reemerging Europe, the vanguard of the Common Market – would enter a period of overproduction and decline; the miners would troop dispiritedly to employment centers and no longer to the pits.

The classic European proletariat was, in effect, dissolving as Europeans groped toward a post-Fordist economy. The peasant of the Third World or the North American Black Panther replaced the industrial worker as the heroic protagonist of revolutionary change. Even as industrial labor seemed to lose its salience for Western economic progress, the lingering disputes over Berlin and East Germany seemed to be settled by Social Democratic "Ostpolitik" and Soviet-American détente at the beginning of the 1970s. The dramatic sites of Cold War rivalry moved to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. "North-South" struggles subsumed the formerly "East-West" division and helped to reignite radical aspirations in Europe and North America among those not yet safely integrated into the capitalist labor force. These included such diverse groups as the recent migrants from the Italian south to the factories of Turin, the vastly expanded cohort of university students in Europe and Latin America, and the antiwar protesters and the African-American populations of the United States. The result was a decade of destabilization between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, as the volatility in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, as well as the racial and student conflict in the Atlantic world, undermined the stalemate earlier achieved in East-West relations.

It was historically fitting that by the end of the 1960s the hearts and minds of peasants in the Third World seemed to emerge as the most dramatic ideological battleground of the Cold War. The years of Cold War antagonism coincided not just with the zenith of Fordism, but also with the final stage in the long agonizing global transformation of rural life. Just as Communism and capitalism represented different principles for ownership and control of the industrial economy, so they proposed rival policies for transforming the world's farmers and peasants. This transition managed to frustrate each system but in different ways. Socialist prescriptions for collectivization tended to keep farmers inefficient and a source of chronic shortages more than plenty. Only opening new "virgin land" or importing grain from the West overcame their own deficiencies. Capitalist agriculture, on the other hand, with its mechanization and consolidation of holdings, made farmers so efficient that their family incomes had to be maintained by subsidy, while their surpluses were sold to the East or to less-developed countries whose subsistence agriculture was yielding to monoculture exports.⁵

5 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, *Histoire des agricultures du monde: de néolithique à la crise contemporaine* (Paris: Seuil, 1998), 457-73.

Looking ahead a decade and more, though, we can see that the intractable difficulties of global agricultural transition and even the dramatic resurgence of peasant revolution did not spell defeat for either side in the Cold War. Rather, the transition out of Fordism proved ultimately disabling for state socialism, even as a revived market capitalism rode out the difficulties. Stalin's successors had sought to loosen the yoke of a system that had become increasingly paranoid and repressive. They were prepared to envisage an effort to accommodate market forces in the 1960s – half-hearted compromises with planning known as Libermannism or *khozraschet* (autonomous firm accounting) in the Soviet Union, identified with Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia, and introduced by Walter Ulbricht's New Economic System in East Germany. East German and Soviet planners became interested in cybernetics – both as an area to which technology might be applied and as an approach to social planning in general. In practice, however, the reforms of the 1960s ran into difficulty as the freedom to set prices or retain profits created shortages in other sectors. Moreover, they were ultimately discredited in Leonid Brezhnev's eyes by the infectious political reforms that soon thereafter swept over Czechoslovakia.

Yet without market-based reforms – above all without the freedom to redeploy labor from older Fordist to post-Fordist employment – the state socialist economies were doomed to lag. Layoffs and, in effect, enterprise closures were excluded under socialism, which ultimately contributed to its undoing. What its major analyst has called the soft-budget constraint – never really facing a bottom line – always deferred facing up to inefficiency, redundancy, and waste and, ironically, produced constant scarcity.⁶ Until the mid-1970s, both social “partners” in Western Europe also tended to accept the policy imperative of assuring reasonably full employment. It was part of the postwar social contract that had secured a quarter-century of economic growth. Still, there were reality checks on economic behavior under capitalism that did not exist under socialism – preeminently a functioning price system and the presence of the market with its continuing transformative dynamic, its constant rewarding of innovation, and its unremitting constraint on a mass of employees who might otherwise believe they should continually seek a greater share of national income.

So the Cold War, which began in an age when coal and steel were the base of industrial power, continued into an era when these underlying elements – and

6 János Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), esp. 129–59, 203–61.

the industrial structures based on them – no longer seemed crucial for progress. It began preoccupied by East–West issues, but concluded with problems we shorthand as North–South. (In fact, the North–South aspect was never absent from the Cold War, for stabilizing East–West tensions required reshuffling North–South exchanges and power as well.) These changes did not spell the end of American economic preponderance. The United States would extricate itself from Vietnam; accept counterrevolutionary regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean; reorganize its overextended financial leadership around a flexible dollar still necessary as an international means of exchange; and eventually by the 1980s roll back many of the remaining elements of nonmarket regulation that had emerged out of World War II. As in the 1950s, Washington would do so in a partnership with a weaker Britain, whose ideological and occasional military support still remained legitimating.


Even as these transformations took place, postindustrial society undermined the emphasis on labor and production that had characterized what the Italian sociologist Aris Accornero has written would be remembered as the century of work.⁷ New lifestyles, the expansion of consumption, new migrants: all dissolved this once heroic austerity. Even the shiny kitchen appliances Nixon had brandished a decade before were no longer enough – all the more since they came burdened by gender typologies that a new generation sought to transcend. The Cold War began in black and white, but ended in color. We cannot finally comprehend its totality unless we see it within the context of that half-century advent of mass prosperity based originally on a mass-production industry, but destined to fragment into a kaleidoscopic society shaped by migrations, job evolution, ideological reassessment, and insecurity.⁸

Restructuring global economic space

Cold War rivalry was territorial as well as ideological. Influence was sought in particular territories and regions – Europe at first, but then Asia and Africa. This was not really rivalry over resources or raw materials despite many statements to the contrary. Each side was plentifully endowed with strategically important commodities, including oil. What the Soviets and their dependants could tap within their vast land mass, the Western allies

7 Aris Accornero, *Era il secolo del lavoro: come era e come cambia il grande protagonista del '900* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), esp. 62–73.

8 See Matthew Connelly's chapter in volume III.



1. The Cold War as a Fordist competition: crude steel output, 1945–1970 (in thousands of metric tons)

Note: Steel tonnage was widely considered as a proxy indicator of industrial prowess, as well as being a basic input into industrial products. Polish data suggests the partial industrial transformation of Eastern Europe. During successive decades, steel output moved to newly industrializing countries and stabilized in Europe and North America. Global steel output in 2006 was 1,250 million metric tons, over twice the world total of 595 million tons in 1970, of which China produced over a third (422.3 million tons), India 50 million tons, and South Korea 48.5. Sources: B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970*, abridged ed. (London: Macmillan, 1978), 223–28; American output from *Historical Statistics of the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. IV, 636 (converted from short tons to metric tons); 2006 data from *Steel News* of the Iron and Steel Statistics Bureau (London), and special assistance from Arnulf Grubler of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.

effectively controlled in areas of former colonial dependency or longstanding special access. The confrontation between the Soviets' coalition and the Americans' developed rather as a struggle for territorial and political control in the wake of German and Japanese military collapse in Europe and Asia.

The urgent economic task facing both sides in the postwar era was recovery from the damage of World War II. But this was an asymmetric task. The Soviet Union had lost 20,000,000 or more of its 1939 population of about 170,000,000. While a great deal of economic plant had been moved to the Urals, western Russia was physically devastated. The estimate of real national output in 1945 was about 80 percent of the 1940 gross national product.⁹ In

⁹ B. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970*, abridged ed. (London: Macmillan, 1978), 7 (population), 415 (GNP).

contrast, the United States economy had grown during the war; it had mopped up the 15 percent unemployment that still idled so many workers as late as 1940. Insofar as the Soviets wished to maintain any sort of legitimacy in the East European nations where their armies were to remain, the Kremlin had also to assure these countries some prospect of recovery.

In the European arena Germany appeared the key to the job for both sides. As a political conflict, the Cold War originated as a struggle against the postwar exclusion of non-Communist political leaderships in Poland and Eastern Europe. As an economic contest, the Cold War originated as a struggle for Germany. Under the inter-Allied reparations program discussed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, German industry beyond the minimum needed for survival was set to be dismantled and its productive resources distributed to both East and West. This would allegedly avoid the protracted annuities that Versailles had stipulated and which had remained a source of continued friction throughout the 1920s. But reparations proved a wedge for conflict after World War II as well. At Yalta, the Allies named a reparations sum of \$20 billion, half of which could be claimed by the Soviet Union, but at Potsdam in July the new US president – less moved than his predecessor by the emotional tug of the joint war effort – claimed the old figure had never been binding and sought to fix a new total of \$10 billion. The compromises finally worked out stipulated that German productive capacity would be rolled back to the level of 1932 and that excess industrial plant would be dismantled for reparation. Each occupying power would draw 75 percent of its reparations from these surpluses in its own zone, which left the Soviets a free hand in the East. Additionally, the Western powers would provide 10 percent of their reparation assets to the Soviets free and clear, and a further 15 percent in return for agricultural commodities to be provided from the East. Critics of reparation and dismantling – in the United States increasingly business leaders and Republican senators – complained that the projected ceilings on German output would permanently hobble its economy. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reassured a German audience at Stuttgart on September 2, 1946, that Washington had no intent to prevent their economic recovery – the first major public revision of strict occupation guidelines.

By this time, the reparation agreement was disintegrating in any case amidst recriminations on each side. In May 1946, General Lucius Clay ordered a stop to reparation deliveries to all recipient countries, and the Americans sought to gain a greater voice in policy in the industrial regions of western Germany administered by the British. The British likewise found paying for their zone a growing strain and agreed to the creation of a joint economic

administration – “Bizonia” or the Bizone – to come into effect at the beginning of 1947. Germans were put in charge of its rudimentary economic administration, and its Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat) would become the predecessor of the West German parliament. The French opposed American efforts to relax the constraints on German production. At the Moscow and London meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of April and December 1947, the Americans refused to make any further concessions on constructing the unified German institutions that the Soviets pressed for – fearing they were intended to serve only as a fulcrum for Communist influence in the West.

Thus the united economic area that Germany had once constituted disintegrated, and two economic realms would emerge. The UN’s Economic Commission for Europe to be headed by Gunnar Myrdal would seek to counter the trend and to preserve a united economic space, but Myrdal tended to be held in contempt by policymakers in Washington and London. The Allies had supposedly acted on behalf of a reunited Europe at Yalta, but the reparation agreement at Potsdam left each zone to be milked by its respective occupying power. Growing distrust about political intentions – Washington’s conviction that the Soviets wanted to dominate all of Germany; Moscow’s conviction that Washington preferred to partition Germany – turned out to be well founded.

The division of Germany meant the economic division of Europe more generally. A whole series of incremental decisions from 1945 through 1948 led to that result, but the most dramatic and far-reaching was American organization of the European Recovery Program (ERP), or the Marshall Plan, announced after the failure of the spring 1947 Moscow Conference. By that time, it had become evident that Europe’s dollar deficit, which meant its need for United States commodities, remained an urgent problem despite the effort to assure postwar liquidity by the Bretton Woods agreements negotiated in the summer of 1944 and significant relief payments through UNRRA (the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). Britain could not sustain anti-Communist assistance in Greece; the French, Belgian, and Italian Communist Parties were making inroads among a working class whose standard of living seemed threatened; Germany’s currency was no longer serving to coax goods into the market.

What was the magnitude of American assistance? Over four years, the ERP authorized almost \$14 billion of assistance. When it began in 1948, the first authorization (comprising first so-called Interim Aid, then assistance under the European Recovery Program *per se*) amounted to about 2% of US gross domestic product; by 1951, it was closer to 1%. This was a significant transfer of

resources, but not at all disabling. (Americans had already been spending 40 to 45 percent of GDP on war-related expenses by 1944–45.) As for the recipient countries, the sums received had a qualitative more than a quantitative impact: they alleviated balance-of-payments or budgetary constraints. The national income of European countries tended to recover the levels of 1938 or 1939 by 1948. Getting back to prewar levels of national income, however, did not mean that national wealth destroyed, damaged, or depreciated in wartime was reconstituted in five years. Infrastructure had to be rebuilt and, after that, housing needed to be repaired; ruins, shabby transport, and makeshift accommodation persisted for years afterward. Long-accumulated private savings held as monetary assets often for the next generation (bank accounts, bonds) were diminished either deliberately in monetary reforms, as in Belgium, West Germany, and Eastern bloc countries, or by living with inflation. Perhaps most farsightedly, Washington agreed to help finance the dollar pool needed to let the Europeans return to partial currency convertibility through the European Payments Union (EPU) during the 1950s. By the time EPU was wound up in 1958, it was becoming clear that, against all expectations, the international dollar shortage was becoming a dollar glut. The era of a weakening but tethered dollar from 1958 to 1973 – at which latter date the Nixon administration accepted a regime of floating exchange rates – may have contributed to the unprecedented length of real economic expansion throughout the non-Communist world. At the same time, the outflow of dollars helped set the stage for the decade of inflation in the 1970s and ultimately discredited the neo-Keynesian assumptions that had justified the welfare-state policies and monetary expansion of the previous quarter-century.

All in all, the economic initiatives on both sides of the Iron Curtain profoundly changed Europe's economic geography and its economic institutions. The European Recovery Program helped confirm the division of Europe, but placed the major onus on Moscow for this result. In theory, Marshall Plan aid was offered to all European states that might join in a cooperative effort to increase international trade and output. Moscow planners felt this must undermine their own central planning and domination of East European economies and quickly withdrew cooperation. Only the Czech coalition government would stay until the fall of 1947 and pay for this autonomy with a Communist takeover in February 1948.

Within Western Europe, the Recovery Program – organized through the new autonomous European Cooperation Agency (ECA) – became an agency for transformative thinking, especially from the fall of 1949 on when Paul Hoffman – facing a congressional fight for renewed authorizations and

seeking a dramatic initiative – called for an admittedly ill-defined “integration” among the West European recipients. The ECA’s Washington economists, trained just before the war as interventionist ideas flourished, continually urged a more coordinated and even planning-type intervention on the Europeans. The ECA itself spurred recipient countries – organized initially as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), then as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – to develop common Western criteria for measuring economic performance, including better national income statistics. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) that succeeded the Recovery Program pressed statistical coordination even further when the NATO Temporary Council Committee of the fall of 1951 began to measure members’ military expenses as a ratio of their gross national product in order to overcome lagging rearmament.

In a long-run perspective, the postwar transformation of European economic space served also to restructure two major prewar trade and investment relationships: the German–Russian and the British–American exchanges. East Germany ended up taking on most of the burden involved in reconstructing the first of these relations. It was a territory to be stripped for so-called war booty, then for reparations. As the East–West rift deepened, however, the Soviets decided to take East German industrial output as reparations, rather than its equipment, perhaps up to 40 percent during 1947–48. Throughout its existence, East Germany and later the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would remain the major supplier of machine tools to the Soviet Union. Moscow further sought to establish an integrated state socialist economic bloc that could dispense with imports from the West, and the countries they controlled zealously replicated Soviet-style central planning and collectivized industry and land, with Polish farms remaining the great exception.

The Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and East Germany and the multi-year American program for West European aid meant that there would be no socialism in just one country – and no capitalism either. Within the two blocs, participating states strove for greater amounts of trade and exchange. Just as the Marshall Plan would seek to reconstruct multilateral Western trade, the Soviets would establish the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA) for the planned economies. In effect, the Comecon was designed to offer an alternative for the economies to which Moscow denied access to Marshall Plan aid; it thus had to establish its own intrabloc trade in lieu of dollar purchases, but it was to remain a region of second-class

manufactures, at times exploited by the Soviet Union and at times subsidized with inexpensive oil and raw materials.

British–American economic relations also changed profoundly. While the Soviets could treat Germany as a defeated power, Britain and the United States were victorious allies. London, moreover, retained a privileged relationship with its imperial dependencies and dominions. Nor was London alone in drawing on such vestiges of empire. British–American economic relations before the war had been troubled by the 1931 Ottawa Agreements that had put the Commonwealth countries, including Canada, behind new tariff walls. Lend-lease assistance had been granted under the condition that after the war such trade discrimination would be dismantled. But Britain faced acute balance-of-payments strains. The country had fought its East Asian war by levies on its Suez-to-Singapore dependencies (or the businesses and plantations within them). In return for materiel, the Exchequer had credited its suppliers with sterling accounts in London. After the Bretton Woods agreements and the negotiation of the American loan, these balances were supposed to be made convertible into dollars. United States officials tended to believe that British pretensions outweighed its real economic resources and that London should ultimately shed the imperial privileges or monetary immunity it sought to retain. Accepting convertibility of sterling (that is, ending what UK policymakers described as a two-world system) would compel the British, so the Americans were convinced, not without reason, to strengthen their own industrial resources. Still, pressure from Washington was only intermittent. Britain retained an important voice in the reorganization of Ruhr resources, was fighting putatively Communist guerrillas, briefly in Greece and then in Malaya, and might help stabilize Iran and Arab lands. The British had friends among the State Department and other elites, but Republican congressmen, who controlled the House after 1946, fretted about the supposed indulgence of a semi-socialist welfare state.

Were the powers partners or rivals? The answer, repeatedly vouchsafed but only after episodes of hard bargaining, was partners of a kind.¹⁰ Thus, the United States extended assistance first by a postwar credit of \$3.75 billion and then by granting Britain the largest single share of Marshall Plan

10 I borrow the title of Christopher Thorne's valuable book on British–American wartime relations, *Partners of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). Joyce and Gabriel Kolko captured the ambiguities of the economic relationship in *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968) and *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper, 1972).

authorizations. Simultaneously, however, American Treasury officials pressed Britain toward a quickly rescinded attempt in July 1947 to restore the convertibility of sterling, and two years later toward significant devaluation of the pound in September 1949. On the other hand, ERP and State Department officials put less pressure on London; they envisaged Britain as an important partner in containment; neither did they object so viscerally to expensive welfare-state commitments. The ECA agencies that administered the ERP authorized Britain to use its Marshall Plan allocations to reduce its overall debt burden. Similar considerations led Washington to tolerate the French use of Marshall Plan funds to help balance their budgets, lest fiscal austerity increase the domestic role of the Communists and undermine the French military effort in Indochina.

The upshot of all these arrangements between 1944 and 1973 was that Washington first funded, then replaced, British and French imperial commitments, often in the cause of containing Communist challenges in the Third World. Direct loans to London and Paris, then Marshall Plan aid and military assistance, helped Paris and London pay for their forlorn wars in Asia and Africa. Increasingly, Washington intervened directly without intermediaries. In effect, the United States became the *de facto* heir to the “Third World” empire, now exercised through economic influence and selective military or covert action. Some sites were new, such as Iran, some old, as in Central America.

From 1950 on, nationalists throughout the Middle East would be seeking to claw back the profits of Western oil companies. The US Arabian-American consortium, ARAMCO, its position reinforced by Franklin Roosevelt’s cultivation of Ibn Saud, conceded the Saudi claim to half their oil revenues, in part because the American firms were entitled to claim equivalent tax deductions at home. The British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with its great offshore refinery at Abadan Island, enjoyed no equivalent tax exemption and resisted an equivalent bargain. When the leader of the nationalist party coalition, Muhammed Mossadeq, successfully urged Iranian nationalization of the industry as of May 1951, the Truman administration initially dissented from London’s ideas for a military response. But the Republicans who took power in 1953 had different sympathies, and sponsored a Central Intelligence Agency intervention that ousted Mossadeq and restored the young Reza Shah Pahlavi from his brief exile. Although the nationalization remained in effect, marketing of the oil was turned over to an international consortium in which American firms now participated. The new status quo lasted for another twenty years – providing cheap energy for the West, guaranteeing profits

for the oil firms, confirming Iran's pro-American orientation, and reining in any British dreams of reexerting imperial methods – at least until London faced the next nationalization crisis over Suez two and a half years later.

Rivalries over oil are often identified as a major stake in the Cold War. But the politics of oil perhaps exerted less impact as a stake in the Cold War than as a major resource that the two superpowers used to organize their respective blocs. In 1973–74, when the era of cheap energy threatened to end, and the control of prices was at stake, another Republican administration managed to reassert American interests through monetary hegemony which, though weakened after 1971, could not easily be replaced. Since payment to members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries was collected in dollars, Americans did not face the exchange constraints their allies did. American firms collected oil revenues for Middle Eastern producers who held them in dollarized assets. Similarly, as the global price of oil rose sharply in 1974, the Soviets used their vast reserves to subsidize their Comecon partners and assure their continued adherence to the Communist economic bloc. Control of oil and scarcity of oil thus served the primacy of each superpower.

Raw materials were hardly the only stake in the Third World. Certainly American and British oil firms had powerful interests in the Middle East, as did the United Fruit Company in Guatemala, where Americans worked to unseat the reformist Guatemalan premier, Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954. So, too, did the Belgian Union Minière, which supported the secessionist Moïse Tshombe in Katanga province of newly independent Zaire in 1960–61, while Washington helped to eliminate the radical premier Patrice Lumumba. But the stakes in the regions described successively as “backward,” then “underdeveloped,” then “less developed,” then just as “developing,” transcended their commodities. From Lenin on, Communist leaders envisaged that the colonial regions would be a decisive arena of ideological conflict. North–South contention would influence East–West outcomes. As the Cold War became global, each side sought to forestall the influence of its adversary from becoming decisive in the postcolonial world.

Hence, alongside the colonial wars that would ravage successive societies, a system of competitive aid structures would emerge by the 1950s. The Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, would turn to the Soviets to help build the Aswan dam (and nationalize the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company) when the West walked away from the project in 1955. After West Germany recovered formal foreign-policy autonomy in that year, the two Germanies would offer assistance to the Third World, the Federal

Republic in large part to keep quarantining the GDR as its “Hallstein Doctrine” stipulated. China entered the arena in the 1960s in large part to contest the Soviet Union. As for the African states, no matter how inclined toward socialism, they also sought to balance their suitors. The Western powers, moreover, had the capacity to vastly outweigh the credits and grants that their Eastern rivals offered. From 1954 through 1963, the Soviet Union opened credits of \$4.94 billion to the “developing world” and made payments of \$1.62 billion; OECD payments reached almost \$23 billion.¹¹

Looking back at the economic results achieved, it might be asked in what respects the recipient countries benefited from the aid received. Funds poured into mines and extractive industries did not advance manufacturing capacity; ambitious leaders could use the aid to reinforce systems of personal rule that reinforced tribal loyalties and clientelism; the big projects that donors assisted often misallocated resources; farming could be discouraged as agricultural prices were held down to subsidize the new industrial labor forces. Too often, despite the well-meaning effort of so many individuals who labored to improve the health and welfare and progress of Africans and others on the margins of subsistence, the stake of aid was not welfare but control.

Costs and benefits

Since this is an inquiry into the economic aspects of the Cold War, which so dominated global international relations for almost half a century, it is fitting at the end to inquire into its costs and benefits even if the gains and losses of any grand national project, such as a war or an arms race, can never be fully determined. If there are benefits – perhaps employment levels maintained at a higher level than might otherwise be the case, or stimuli for innovation – it is impossible to attribute them unambiguously to the conflict. Conversely, the levies imposed on a society represent not just what was actually spent, but the opportunity costs of postponed or discarded alternatives; and it is hard to price even plausible counterfactual paths of development. Perhaps we can compare the societies caught on different sides of the Iron Curtain – East and West Germany, North and South Korea, in which case the indices of economic welfare clearly favor the non-Communist side. Between 1936 and 1955, East German GNP rose 10.4% while West German GNP increased 80.3%. The East Germans did relatively better from 1950 to 1955, when their GNP rose 40.6%

11 See Sara Lorenzini, *Due Germanie in Africa: la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia* (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2003), 148.

while the West German went up 63.5%.¹² To be sure, West Germany had received Marshall Plan aid while East Germany had paid heavy sums in reparation; nonetheless, even at the time of reunification almost four decades later, East German productivity and per capita national income were probably about half those of West Germany. The toll taken by a cumbersome state socialism is not the same as the costs imposed by the rivalry between the systems. Communism and the Cold War were not the same, but the Cold War helped to congeal the differences between systems as well as being in part their consequence.

We should question, I believe, one popularly held hypothesis, namely that in the West, at least, the military rivalry imposed a great burden on civilian investment and general progress. Western defense-related expenditures in the Cold War were highest for Britain and the United States; the UK was spending roughly 10% of GDP on defense in 1947, almost twice the US ratio of 5.25%, and, in 1948, 7.26% or 1.5 times the US share. The Korean War and the NATO rearmament effort brought US expenditure to almost 15%; Britain's peaked at about 10.5%; and France hit its maximum – even higher than before World War II – of about 12% in 1952. Other Western societies did not approach this level. The most careful study of the economic impact on Britain concludes correctly, I believe, that even allowing for indirect costs, such as the higher interest rates for civilian expansion, and for short-term strains, no major economic drag intervened. France's war in Indochina was largely funded indirectly by the Americans, according to the best study we have. The demands of defense probably stimulated research and development in what would prove to be the most advanced sectors of the civilian economy – namely computers and related electronic and software industries – beyond what civilian demand alone might have encouraged. NATO forces also continued to lower Europe's current account constraints. On the other hand, Soviet expenditures may have been 20 percent of GDP, and probably did contribute to the difficulties of its economy.¹³

12 Wolfgang F. Stolper, *The Structure of the East German Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 417.

13 Till Geiger, *Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945–1955* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 38–44, 121 n. 3. As Geiger argues, Britain may have made some unfavorable tradeoffs within the defense budget, but consistently from 1947 through 1957 spent between 54 and 66 percent of its public expenditure on defense and accepted a “warfare state” without really stinting. See also Hugues Tertrais, *La piastre et le fusil: le coût de la guerre d'Indochine 1945–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Économique et Financière de la France, 2002), 356–96.

What impact, one might finally ask, did the Cold War have on the global environment that was its arena? The emphasis on industrialization and economic growth, the privileged access to minerals, fossil fuels, and hydrocarbons, either by Western companies or state socialist governments, probably increased the rapid exploitation of these resources. Of course, this toll would have been even higher if, absent the Cold War, economic growth had been even more rapid. Still, it makes sense that insofar as each side felt it must press industrial and military output to a maximum, it would sacrifice ecological and even safety considerations. The East Germans, for example, expanded brown coal production, dirty chemical firms, and an exploitative use of their once-extensive forests. The emphasis on heavy industry, whether in the Soviet paradigm of socialist planning or the American encouragement of import substitution, spurred industrial construction that had grave impacts on the environment.

Without the competitive pressures of the Cold War, according to John McNeill, the “green revolution” might have been far slower to make its effects felt in Mexico or India. On the other hand, in Third World regions where the superpowers competed, their prescriptions for import substitution and industrialization encouraged the sacrifice of subsistence agriculture, and the abandonment of farms for shantytowns. The Chinese regime embarked on the reckless “Great Leap Forward” in the late 1950s and helped produce one of the most disastrous famines of its history. But a megalomaniacal leader, not Cold War competition per se, motivated this policy, and China drew appropriate lessons. Old-fashioned national economic competition would probably have been intense even without the Cold War. Brazil and Africa incurred deforestation without extensive Cold War motives; *barrios* and *favelas* have continued to spread after the Cold War ended. And even state socialism brought to its lands public goods – literacy and access to basic health care – that might otherwise have lagged. And of course the environmental costs were not produced by one side alone: the American consumerism that Nixon vaunted in that Moscow kitchen, with the personal auto as its centerpiece, has played its role in global warming and other externalities that have yet to be tallied.¹⁴

Should we not also assign some cost to the fact that at many moments hundreds of millions of men and women and children and the accumulated monuments of their many civilizations were hostage to atomic destruction? Would humankind not collectively and individually have paid a substantial

¹⁴ For the impact of the Cold War on the environment, see John McNeill’s chapter in volume III.

premium to have that very real danger removed? Or was the danger itself, as deterrence theory suggested, the premium we had to pay so that these weapons were never used? Alternatively, the danger could be construed as the premium that political leaders on both sides claimed was needed to avoid political subjugation. Could we have developed a less risky and more rational premium? Or was its rationality ultimately demonstrated by the fact that the wager was never called? With such inquiries, however, we reach the limits of history and of political economy.¹⁵

¹⁵ For additional assessments of the Cold War and the world economy, see the chapters by Wilfried Loth and Richard N. Cooper in volume II and Giovanni Arrighi in volume III.

The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952

MELVYN P. LEFFLER

On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt died. His vice president, Harry S. Truman, assumed the leadership of the United States of America. He had been in office only a few months, and knew little about his predecessor's diplomacy and strategy. He felt "like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had fallen" on him. "Pray for me now," he whispered to friendly reporters the next day.¹

Challenges and aspirations

Truman presided over the greatest military and economic power the world had ever known. War production had lifted the United States out of the Great Depression and had inaugurated an era of unimagined prosperity. Gross national product increased by 60 percent during the war, total earnings by 50 percent. Despite social unrest, labor agitation, racial conflict, and teenage vandalism, Americans had more discretionary income than ever before. Simultaneously, the US government had built up the greatest war machine in human history. By the end of 1942, the United States was producing more arms than all the Axis states combined, and, in 1943, it made almost three times more armaments than did the Soviet Union. In 1945, the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, and half of its manufacturing capacity. Its GNP was three times that of the Soviet Union and more than five times that of Britain. It was also nearing completion of the atomic bomb, a technological and production feat of huge costs and proportions.

Yet Truman and his advisers did not feel secure. They feared that the United States would again sink into depression. They understood that

¹ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 293.

wartime government demand had boosted production, and they wondered what would replace it at the war's end. They were convinced that they needed an open world trading environment to sustain demand. High tariffs, quotas, and exchange restrictions had sundered the global trading system during the 1930s as had the trading blocs established by the Nazis, the Japanese, and even the British. Now, as the war approached an end, the appeal of national planning and statist controls to many people in Europe and Asia, coupled with the popularity of social-welfare programs, posed new challenges to the world's foremost champion of free enterprise, private property, and individual rights.

The desire for an open world trading system merged economic, ideological, and geostrategic lessons of the interwar era. The greatest military lesson of the late 1930s and the early 1940s was that potential adversaries must never again be allowed to gain control of the resources of Europe and Asia through economic practices, political subversion, or military aggression. The acquisition of such resources allowed potential foes to augment their fighting capabilities, encouraged them to spread their influence to the Western hemisphere, tempted them to wage war against the United States, and enabled them to fight a protracted struggle. The United States, said Roosevelt in 1940, must not become "a lone island in a world dominated by the philosophy of force."²

Truman's task, therefore, and that of his advisers, as World War II came to a close, was to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the American way of life. The new president believed that the United States was God's country, the city on a hill, the exemplar of a superior civilization based on personal freedoms, private property, entrepreneurial opportunity, and limited government. He grasped that this way of life had been endangered by the rise of German Nazism and Japanese militarism. The isolationist policies of the interwar years had been a grave error, allowing time for hostile adversaries to gain control of the preponderant resources of Europe and Asia. Hence, Truman wanted to follow Roosevelt's policies. He wanted to forge a new world order based on nonaggression, self-determination, equal access to raw materials, nondiscriminatory trade, and participation in an international organization.³

2 Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 261.

3 Truman's address to the UN Forum, January 17, 1944, in *Appendix to the Congressional Record*, vol. 90, pt. 8 (78th Cong., 2nd sess.), A265-66.

What this meant in terms of actual strategy, however, was a mystery to Truman and his advisers in the spring of 1945. What this meant in terms of the future of the great wartime coalition was no clearer to them. The new president wanted to get along with the leaders of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. But he had no great reverence for Winston Churchill, Britain's wartime leader, nor any special antipathy toward Iosif Stalin, the Soviet Union's Communist dictator. He expected them both to defer to American leadership. Compromises, Truman knew, he would have to make. But American power and American righteousness, in his view, placed the United States in a special position. When he talked about concessions, he meant that he expected to get his way 85 percent of the time.⁴

Once Germany surrendered in May 1945, Truman faced two overriding foreign-policy questions: how to bring about the end of the war with Japan and how to deal with Stalin and the Soviet Union. These questions themselves were interrelated. Stalin had promised Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within three months of Germany's surrender. Should he do so, Soviet troops would engage large numbers of Japanese divisions on the Asian mainland, thereby reducing American casualties. In return, Roosevelt had promised Stalin that he could gain control of Manchurian ports and railroads and other Far East territories, such as Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands that Japan had seized after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. In his desire to nurture postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union, this deal made sense to Roosevelt, especially if Stalin recognized the Chinese Nationalists and withheld aid from the Chinese Communists, which the Soviet leader promised he would do.

But Truman's advisers and friends were deeply divided about how the United States should deal with Stalin, and their attitudes shaped the recommendations they gave to the new president. Some advisers, such as W. Averell Harriman, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William Leahy, the president's chief military aide, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, wanted the president to take a hard line against the Soviet Union. They feared the growth of Soviet power as troops marched toward Berlin through Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the eastern parts of Germany. They were disgusted by Stalin's imprisonment and murder of selective non-Communist leaders, especially in Poland, and they objected to the provisional governments he was establishing throughout Eastern Europe. Other advisers and friends, such as Secretary of

4 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, 1945: Year of Decisions* (New York: Signet, 1965), 87.

War Henry L. Stimson, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's envoy to Stalin, Henry A. Wallace, the secretary of commerce and former vice president, and Joseph C. Davies, the former US ambassador to Moscow, encouraged Truman to tolerate Stalin's transgressions, understand his security imperatives, and craft acceptable compromises.

As he pondered what to do, Truman was greatly affected by the rapid development and successful secret testing of the atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert in mid-July 1945. Only a few of his closest advisers knew about this new technological wonder that promised to have such a huge impact on the configuration of power in the postwar world. But for some of those who did know about it, such as James F. Byrnes, Truman's newly selected secretary of state, the atomic weapon offered the leverage to shape the peace according to American desires. The atomic bomb, Byrnes said, "had given us great power, and ... in the last analysis, it would control."⁵ Truman was inclined initially to think along similar lines. When he elliptically told Stalin at the Potsdam Conference about the powerful new weapon that the United States had just tested, Truman was thinking that it would serve as his trump card to get Stalin to be more amenable about the composition of the provisional governments in Eastern Europe and the occupation of Germany. The president did not decide to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to shape the diplomacy of the postwar world, but he certainly believed that it would enhance US power and augment his ability to elicit concessions from the Soviets. He even dared to hope that the atomic bomb might force the Japanese to surrender before the Soviets declared war on Tokyo and seized the territories promised them at Yalta. "Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in," Truman jotted in his diary. "I am sure they will when Manhattan [the atomic bomb] appears over their homeland."⁶

Yet neither Truman nor Byrnes, the man Truman now relied on more than any other person, wanted a showdown or a cold war with Stalin. After meeting him at Potsdam, Truman wrote his wife, "I like Stalin. He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he can't get it."⁷ But dealing with Stalin, in Truman's view, meant that the Soviet dictator would need to comply with American thinking about the

5 Diary of Joseph Davies, July 28 and 29, 1945, box 19, Joseph Davies Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, DC).

6 Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 54.

7 Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Dear Bess: Letters from Harry to Bess Truman* (New York: Norton, 1983), 522.



3. From left, Winston Churchill, Harry S. Truman, and Iosif Stalin at Potsdam.

configuration of the postwar international order, however vague and inchoate that thinking was. In broad terms, Truman laid out his conception in his Navy Day speech of October 27, 1945. The president championed self-determination and national sovereignty. He ridiculed territorial changes that were forced upon peoples against their will. He championed open trade, freedom of the seas, unrestricted access to raw materials, and international economic cooperation. He embraced pan-Americanism and the United Nations. He said the United States would hold the atomic bomb as a “sacred trust” for all mankind. He made clear in a variety of speeches and statements that he was not averse to negotiating agreements governing the control of atomic energy, but he emphasized that he would not relinquish the United States’ superior power.⁸

But after Japan officially surrendered in September 1945, the United States quickly demobilized its armed forces. The air force struggled tenaciously to become an independent entity, and the army and the navy fought one another

8 Address, October 27, 1945, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945* (hereafter PPP: *Truman*, with year) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 431–38.

bitterly over roles, missions, and a shrinking military budget. Secretary of State Byrnes did little to assuage the sensibilities of colleagues either in his own department or the military services as he moved quickly to gain control of the nation's foreign policy. Truman's initial instinct was to allow Byrnes to shape the nation's diplomacy, but the president realized very quickly that his secretary of state was offending powerful legislators without achieving any notable diplomatic successes. American foreign policy seemed to be floundering, engendering the contempt of potential adversaries in the Kremlin without garnering much sympathy from potential friends in London, Paris, and elsewhere.

At the end of 1945, Truman grew frustrated with the performance of his secretary of state and embittered by the actions of the Soviet Union. He wanted a tougher policy. He ridiculed the "police states" that the Kremlin was forming in Bulgaria and Romania and condemned the Soviets' refusal to withdraw their troops from Iran. "There isn't any doubt in my mind," Truman wrote, "that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean ... I do not think we should play compromise any longer ... I'm tired of babying the Soviets."⁹

What this meant in terms of policy and strategy was far from clear. The expansion of Soviet power needed to be contained, but neither George F. Kennan's "long telegram" from the US Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 nor Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March provided the specificity that was needed to design a concrete strategy or a set of priorities. Kennan's message and Churchill's address simplified the myriad problems of the postwar world in terms of a threat from another totalitarian power intent on unlimited expansion. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic," Churchill warned, "an iron curtain has descended across the continent." Not only were Soviet occupation authorities imprisoning potential foes and supporting their local minions in Eastern Europe, but Communist Parties beyond the reach of Soviet armies in Western and Southern Europe were angling to win power legally or to seize it illegally. With "Christian civilization" endangered, the former British prime minister recommended that Anglo-Saxons unite to withstand the new totalitarian specter.¹⁰

⁹ Ferrell, *Off the Record*, 79–80.

¹⁰ For a discussion of Churchill's speech, see Fraser Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 185–91.

Kennan's telegram was widely circulated throughout US policymaking circles because his analysis accorded with Truman's instincts and the thinking of many of his advisers. Stalin's view of the world, wrote Kennan, was "neurotic," based as it was on a "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." Kremlin leaders conjured up a hostile, evil world. They sought to foment disunity in Western Europe, promote dissension among capitalist nations, and erode links to the colonial dependencies of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. "We have here," Kennan concluded, "a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] United States there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*." Yet Kennan was not pessimistic about the future. Soviet expansion could be contained. Soviet leaders were "impervious to logic of reason," but "highly sensitive to logic of force ... If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns."¹¹

Embracing containment

Truman and his advisers embraced the idea of containment, but they had little idea of how to apply it. They did toughen their rhetoric. They told Stalin to pull his troops out of northern Iran, as he was obligated to do. Several months later, in July and August 1946, they rebuffed the Kremlin's overtures to renegotiate Soviet rights and expand Soviet privileges in the Turkish straits. Truman's military planners began to design war plans should US efforts to contain Soviet power peacefully falter and should war erupt as a result of miscalculation.

But Truman and his aides did not expect war. Their war plans were rudimentary and their military expenditures paltry. They were determined to contain the further expansion of Soviet power and Communist influence, but they still labored with Soviet diplomats to finish the peace treaties regarding Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and Italy. Nor had they relinquished hope that they might agree with the Kremlin on a German settlement. In Japan, they had won Stalin's grudging acceptance of US control of the postwar occupation. In China, General George C. Marshall, the renowned wartime leader of the US Army, was seeking to mediate a resolution to the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists while Soviet troops were pulling out of Manchuria. The Kremlin looked like a formidable adversary and the specter of Communist power loomed large, but Truman

¹¹ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs (1925–1950)* (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), 594–95.

had not forsaken hope that Stalin would exercise self-discipline and accept the postwar status quo.

But the American perception of threat grew. This had less to do with fears of premeditated Soviet aggression than with worries about postwar social, economic, and political conditions in Western Europe and in the occupied parts of Germany and Japan. As the war came to an end in the spring of 1945, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy visited Europe and reported back to Truman and Stimson: "There is complete economic, social and political collapse going on in Central Europe, the extent of which is unparalleled in history." The situation in Germany, he stressed, "was worse than anything that ever happened in the world." Stimson had expected the chaos, he wrote in his diary, "but the details of it were appalling." There will be "pestilence and famine in Central Europe next winter," he wrote President Truman on May 16, 1945. "This is likely to be followed by political revolution and communist infiltration."¹²

Assistant Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, soon to become the president's most trusted adviser, spoke even more apocalyptically when he testified before a Senate committee in July 1945. "There is a situation in the world," Acheson emphasized, "very clearly illustrated in Europe, and also true in the Far East, which threatens the very foundations, the whole fabric of world organization which we have known in our lifetime and which our fathers and forefathers knew." In liberated Europe, Acheson explained, "you find that the railway systems have ceased to operate; that power systems have ceased to operate; the financial systems are destroyed. Ownership of property is in terrific confusion. Management of property is in confusion." Not since the eighth century, Acheson maintained, when the Muslims had split the world in two, had conditions been so frightening. The industrial and social life of Europe "had come to a complete and total standstill."¹³

A year later conditions seemed no more auspicious, and they worsened even more during the winter of 1946–47. Heavy snows and frigid temperatures exacerbated a terrible coal shortage, forcing factories to close and spreading unemployment, hunger, and despair. Famine stalked the zones of Germany

12 Memo for the President, by J. McCloy, April 26, 1945, box 178, President's Secretary's File (PSF), Harry S. Truman Papers (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO); Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, box 157, *ibid.*; Stimson Diary, April 19, 1945, Henry L. Stimson Papers (Sterling Library, Yale University).

13 Acheson testimony, June 12, 1945, US Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Bretton Woods Agreements Act*, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1945), esp. 19–21, 48–49.

occupied by American and British troops. Germans were living on 1,200 calories a day. Without additional food, US Army officials warned, they would lose “the great struggle ... to prevent [Germany] going communistic.” Writing from Rome at about the same time US ambassador James C. Dunn warned: “All the indications we receive ... show that the Communists are consistently gaining ground and that our policy to assist the development of a free and democratic Italy is losing ground.” When Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton returned from his own trip to Europe in May 1947, he wrote that he had underestimated the problems besetting the economy of the Old World: “Europe is steadily deteriorating ... Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving ... Without further and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social, and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe.”¹⁴

Truman was alarmed. Financial stringencies forced British officials to curtail their presence in Greece, Turkey, and the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the shortage of dollars in European treasuries meant that European governments could no longer afford to purchase the coal and grain they desperately needed to keep their factories running and their peoples fed. These governments hoarded their gold and dollar reserves, imposed quotas on imports, and regulated the flow of trade. The international economy was becoming more and more constricted. Communists were finding more and more opportunities to capitalize on domestic turmoil and internal unrest. In countries such as France and Italy, they were capturing more than a third of the vote and competing actively for control of legislative assemblies.

Yet it was not easy for Truman to determine what should be done. In November 1946, the Republicans won a smashing victory in the congressional elections. They blamed the administration for high prices and high taxes. They promised the American people that they would cut deficits, end the work stoppages, bring down taxes, and curb inflation. They assailed Truman for his incompetence, and clamored for smaller and more effective government. Yet to deal with the worldwide crisis that loomed in front of him, Truman had to send more aid abroad, boost US military capabilities, and postpone tax reductions. Should he do so, he knew, he would ignite a political firestorm.

¹⁴ Howard C. Petersen to Robert P. Patterson, June 12, 1947, box 8, General Decimal File, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Record Group (RG) 107, National Archives (NA) (College Park, MD); James C. Dunn to George C. Marshall, May 3, 1947, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. III, 891 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number); Clayton to Acheson, May 27, 1947, *ibid.*, 230–32.

Should he not do so, and should Communism spread, he would also be vilified for his indifference to the red menace. Although Truman's conservative critics were not eager to bear the burden of containing Communism abroad, they were intent on exposing domestic subversives and destroying the New Deal at home.

Truman faced grave decisions. In March 1947, he decided to ask Congress for \$400 million for assistance to Greece and Turkey. In what became known as the Truman Doctrine, he told senators and congressmen that "At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one ... Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world ... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching."¹⁵

The stark language was purposeful. "There must be no hedging in this speech," Truman insisted. "If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic communist parties in such European countries as France and Italy, where there were already significant threats. Inaction ... could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them."¹⁶

Truman's anti-Communist rhetoric resonated deeply in the American polity. Religious fundamentalists, segregationists, anti-union businessmen, patriotic organizations, and conservative politicians had been red-baiting for years, shrilly warning the American people that their basic institutions and core values were endangered by Communists, atheists, racial integrationists, and New Dealers. How could these right-wing critics be concerned with Communists at home yet do nothing about the expansion of Soviet power around the globe? Truman's rhetoric locked many Republicans and Southern Democrats into supporting an internationalist foreign policy.

The Truman Doctrine identified Greece and Turkey for aid, and the president implied that he might ask Congress for additional funds for other areas of the globe threatened by internal subversion or external aggression. But it was not clear where the United States should focus its attention. Truman asked General Marshall, arguably the most revered man in the

¹⁵ Special Message to Congress, March 12, 1947, PPP: *Truman*, 1947, 176–80.

¹⁶ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Signet, 1965), 128, 123–25.

country, to become his secretary of state and to sort out priorities. Marshall established a Policy Planning Staff and placed it under the direction of the nation's foremost Kremlinologist, George F. Kennan. Kennan and his subordinates immediately began writing a series of brilliant policy papers that helped to define priorities. Gradually, a strategy emerged, not simply for containing Soviet power, but also, eventually, for winning the Cold War.

Setting priorities

The overriding priority was to keep the power centers of Europe and Asia outside the Soviet orbit and linked to the United States. Western Europe, the western zones in Germany, and Japan had to be revived economically. They had to become self-supporting, capable of earning dollars to pay for their required imports. Otherwise, they might be lured into the Soviet orbit, or Communist Parties and their supporters might win power legally or seize it illegally. For the moment, Japan was firmly in the grasp of US occupation authorities under General Douglas MacArthur. Attention, therefore, was focused on Western Europe. The greatest peril to the United States, said Kennan, was the prospect that the manpower and resources of the Soviet Union might be united with the technical skills and advanced industries of Western Europe.¹⁷

On June 5, 1947, in a commencement address at Harvard University, Secretary of State Marshall announced the administration's readiness to provide substantial assistance for a European Recovery Program (ERP). The purpose of the program was to revive the world economy and nurture "the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."¹⁸ The place to begin, almost everyone in the Truman administration agreed, was in the coal-producing areas of the Ruhr and the Rhine Valleys.¹⁹

Truman's advisers believed that they should focus on economic initiatives rather than military rearmament. The principal Soviet threat was not military; it was political and psychological. The Soviets would not risk war; they were too weak. "I was conscious," Kennan wrote, "of the weakness of the Russian

17 One of the clearest statements of Kennan's strategic thinking was his speech, "Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy," September 17, 1948, box 17, George F. Kennan Papers, Seely G. Mudd Library (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ); see also Acheson's speech, May 8, 1947, *Department of State Bulletin (DSB)*, 16 (May 18, 1947), 991–94.

18 Remarks, by Marshall, June 5, 1947, *DSB*, 16 (June 5, 1947), 1159–60.

19 Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, July 3, 1947, box 3, Safe File, Patterson Papers, RG 107, NA.



4. George Marshall (left) and Dean Acheson.

position, of the slenderness of the means with which they operated, of the ease with which they could be held and pushed back.”²⁰ So long as the United States could “outproduce the world,” control the seas, “and strike inland with the atomic bomb,” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal said, the United States could “assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable.”²¹

The initiative had to be seized because the nation’s vital interests seemed imperiled. If Communist Parties capitalized on the economic disarray or if economic autarchy grew, the Soviet Union would be able to advance its power and reach. The disappearance of the “free community of Europe,” Marshall warned Congress, “would be a tragedy for the world. It would impose incalculable burdens on this country and force serious readjustments in our traditional way of life. One of our greatest freedoms – freedom of choice in both domestic and foreign affairs – would be drastically curtailed.”²²

²⁰ Kennan, “Notes on the Marshall Plan,” December 15, 1947, box 23, Kennan Papers.

²¹ Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 350–51.

²² Statement, by Marshall, US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Emergency Foreign Aid*, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 10.

The international environment was fraught with risk, and US officials knew they needed to act. No task was more important than reviving western Germany, establishing self-governing institutions there, and preserving its alignment with the United States. “Without a revival of German production,” Marshall emphasized, “there can be no revival of Europe’s economy.”²³ But reviving the power of Germany posed dangers of its own. Kennan succinctly stated the challenge: “We have to nurse our recent enemies, the Germans, back to economic strength without instigating them to renewed aggression or making them the masters of our recent allies.” This was a task of immense complexity. But it could not be evaded. With the help of old allies such as France and Britain and with the help of ex-enemies such as the west Germans, Kennan declared, “we have to maneuver this Russian bear back into his cage and keep him there where he belongs.”²⁴

US officials were not surprised when Stalin forbade the participation of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the ERP, formed the Cominform, tightened the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, and orchestrated a campaign of riots and demonstrations against the Marshall Plan throughout Western Europe.²⁵ These were logical developments, Kennan explained. “Subject to a squeeze play,” the Communists were making a final effort to thwart the ERP before it became a reality.²⁶ But the United States could not be deflected from its purpose. Western Germany, Marshall insisted, must participate in the Recovery Program. Its potential power had to be coopted and integrated into a Western alliance system; that goal was now more important than reaching agreement with the Kremlin. No arrangements would be countenanced, he said, that “would leave [western Germany] defenseless against communist penetration.”²⁷

A great showdown was approaching as Truman and his advisers pressed Congress in early 1948 to appropriate the money to support the Marshall Plan. In February, Stalin orchestrated a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. American officials were stunned by Stalin’s audacity, but did not think that it altered the prevailing balance of power. What they did fear was its demonstration effect on the European neighborhood. The ease with which Czech

23 Marshall speech, November 18, 1947, DSB, 17 (November 30, 1947), 1028.

24 Kennan, “Contemporary Problems,” September 17, 1948.

25 For Soviet policies, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s and Norman Naimark’s chapters in this volume.

26 Kennan to Robert Lovett, October 6, 1947, box 33, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59, NA.

27 For the quotation, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 330–31.

Communists seized power in Prague might empower their counterparts in Rome and Paris and demoralize their adversaries. The Czech coup spurred a Republican Congress to pass the legislation to implement the Marshall Plan, notwithstanding its adverse impact on the budget, tax cuts, and the inflationary outlook. The Czech coup also catalyzed a full-scale covert effort by the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency to ensure the defeat of the Italian Communists in the April 1948 elections.

Germany, however, remained the focal point of the emerging Cold War. Truman, Marshall, and their subordinates were determined to reform the currency, merge the French zone of occupation with the British and American zones, and form a provisional German government that would be amenable to the wishes of Western occupational authorities yet command the support of the people in the western zones. Stalin warned that if the United States, Britain, and France proceeded with their plans, the Soviets would interdict traffic from the western zones of Germany to the western parts of Berlin. The French were terrified that British–American initiatives might trigger a war that nobody wanted. The French, moreover, were scared of revived German power. They demanded more extensive controls over the Ruhr and more constraints on German trade. Most of all, they wanted security guarantees against the immediate prospect of Soviet retaliation and the protracted specter of German aggression.²⁸

Washington would not back away from its commitment to rebuild and coopt West German power. When the Soviets blockaded Berlin at the end of June 1948, the United States responded with an airlift of supplies to Berlin. If the Soviets had interfered with the airlift, hostilities could have erupted. But US officials did not expect war. “It is our view,” wrote General Lucius Clay, the head of the US military government in Germany, “that [the Soviets] are bluffing and that their hand can and should be called now. They are definitely afraid of our air might.”²⁹ The Soviets might have overwhelming superiority in numbers of conventional troops and weapons, US analysts concluded, but their transport system was in disarray and their petroleum industry was underdeveloped. Their economy was still in shambles and their people were demoralized. Their satellites in Eastern Europe were unreliable. They had no real navy, no strategic air power, and no atomic bomb. Stalin might feel provoked by US initiatives in the western zones, but he would not go to

28 For policies in Germany, see Hans Peter Schwarz’s chapter in this volume.

29 Jean Edward Smith (ed.), *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974), vol. II, 708.

war. “The present tension in Berlin,” Marshall told his Cabinet colleagues, “is brought about by loss of Russian face in Italy, France, Finland ... It is caused by Russian desperation in face of success of ERP.”³⁰

What the United States most needed to do was to reassure its allies that their security and interests would not be endangered by the ongoing initiatives in western Germany. The French desperately wanted guarantees of their own security.³¹ The Americans said their troops would remain in Germany for the indefinite future. Washington would also provide military assistance to the French, and US military planners were authorized to coordinate war plans. But this did not suffice to allay anxieties in Paris, and the French continued to find ways to obstruct the formation of a west German government and to interfere with US plans for handling reparations and rebuilding German industry.

British foreign minister Ernest Bevin kept pressing the Americans to sign an Atlantic pact that would guarantee the security of France. When Truman was reelected in November 1948 and asked Dean Acheson to become his secretary of state, Acheson embraced the security treaty as the best means of reconciling the legitimate fears of the French with west Germans’ aspirations to recover their sovereignty and solve their economic woes. A treaty, Acheson told wavering US senators, “would give France greater sense of security against Germany as well as the Soviet Union and would materially help in the realistic consideration of the problem of Germany.”³² He wanted to integrate western Germany into Western Europe, and bind a united Western Europe to the United States. He and President Truman were not eager to abandon 150 years of political isolation. But strategic obligations were the price Americans had to pay to consummate their economic and political goals. The North Atlantic Treaty was the capstone of a grand strategy that envisioned the cooption of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany (or West Germany) into a healthy Atlantic community led by the United States and committed to the values of democratic capitalism.

Simultaneously, in 1948–49, US officials focused their attention on Japan. “Any world balance of power,” Kennan stressed, “means first and foremost a balance on the Eurasian land mass. This balance is unthinkable as long as Germany and Japan remain power vacuums.”³³ Conditions inside Japan had to

30 Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, July 23, 1948, box 1, Matthew J. Connelly Papers, Truman Library.

31 For developments in Western Europe, see William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

32 Memorandum of conversation, by Acheson, February 14, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. IV, 109.

33 Kennan, “Where We Are Today,” December 21, 1948, box 17, Kennan Papers.

be ameliorated so that the Japanese would want to remain aligned with the United States over the long run. Once the occupation ended and Japan regained its autonomy, poor economic conditions might play into the hands of Japanese leftists or might impel a Japanese government to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union or with China, now rapidly falling under the control of the Communists. "Japs," wrote Secretary of State Acheson, "will either move toward sound friendly relations with non-commie countries or into association with commie system in Asia."³⁴

US officials throughout 1949 and early 1950 focused attention on resuscitating the Japanese economy. They became convinced that the Japanese could not recover economically and would not stay tied to the West unless they were assured of markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US security in the Far East hinged "upon finding and securing an area to complement Japan as did Manchuria and Korea prior to World War II."³⁵

Forging a grand strategy

The grand strategy of the Truman administration focused on binding the industrial core areas of Western Europe and Northeast Asia to the United States. But officials increasingly realized that success in these core areas depended on containment in the underdeveloped periphery. Just as Western Europe depended on access to the petroleum of the Middle East and the natural resources of former and current colonial possessions in Asia and Africa, so, too, did Japan's rehabilitation depend on supplanting its former ties with Manchuria, North China, and Korea with new markets and raw materials in Southeast Asia.

When Mao Zedong consolidated Communist power on the Chinese mainland and when Congress allocated new funds to thwart the spread of Communist influence in the area around China, US Army and State Department officials agreed that they should use the money to fight Communists and revolutionary nationalists in Southeast Asia.³⁶ Stalin's pact with Mao in January 1950 and his recognition of Ho Chi Minh's government in Indochina appeared portentous. Acheson deemed Ho a mortal enemy of the

34 Acheson to certain diplomatic officers, May 8, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. VII, 737.

35 JCS 1721/43, "Assistance for the General Area of China," January 20, 1950, P & O, 091 China Top Secret, Records of the Army's Plans and Operations Division, RG 319, NA.

36 For the Chinese Civil War, see Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

United States. Although the secretary of state knew that Ho had the support of the majority of the Vietnamese people, the United States established formal diplomatic ties with Bao Dai, the French-backed puppet emperor. Linking the United States to the remnants of French colonialism was not something that Truman and Acheson wanted to do, but they felt they had little choice given the trend of events. “From our viewpoint,” Acheson said in May 1950, “the Soviet Union possesses [a] position of domination in China which it is using to threaten Indochina, push in Malaya, stir up trouble in the Philippines, and now to start trouble in Indonesia.”³⁷

Acheson’s perception of threat in the periphery was greatly influenced by the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in August 1949. Heretofore, US officials had believed the Soviets would back down should a grave confrontation occur. The Berlin crisis appeared to confirm the veracity of this assumption. Now, with the atomic bomb, the Soviet penchant for risk-taking might increase. Stalin might even become bolder if the Soviets developed a hydrogen bomb, potentially many hundreds of times more powerful than the atomic weapons the United States possessed. The “blackmail” potential of the hydrogen bomb, US officials concluded, was “tremendous.” Should the Soviets develop it, the Americans might hesitate to take the steps necessary to rebuild and integrate West Germany, sign a peace treaty with Japan, or contain Mao’s attempts to support Ho’s Communists in Vietnam. In other words, atomic and hydrogen weapons were critical for the shadows they cast in peacetime. Truman resolved that the United States should develop its own hydrogen bomb, and requested a study of the nation’s goals and strategy in view of the Kremlin’s new capabilities.³⁸

George Kennan opposed the growing stress on strategic weaponry, but his influence waned as Acheson gathered stature and asked Paul Nitze to take charge of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze conducted the comprehensive reexamination of US strategy that the president had requested. In the most renowned strategic paper of the Cold War, NSC 68, Nitze reiterated many of the axioms that had guided US policy in the first years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union, he wrote, was animated by a “new fanatical faith, antithetical to our own.” The Kremlin, he claimed, wanted to impose its “absolute authority over the rest of the world.” Nitze, like Kennan, did not anticipate that Stalin would engage in overt aggression. But he did think that the Kremlin would

37 US delegation to Webb, 11 May 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. III, 1038.

38 Report of the Special Committee of the National Security Committee to Truman, 31 January 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. I, 513–22 (quotation on 515).

use its growing military prowess and atomic arsenal to neutralize US diplomatic initiatives. This was portentous when Washington still faced formidable challenges. It had to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, link West Germany to NATO, preserve stability in the Middle East, and thwart the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. To move ahead on these matters, Nitze emphasized, the United States had to have "an adequate military shield." "Without superior aggregate military strength," he argued in NSC 68, "a policy of containment – which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion – is no more than a policy of bluff."³⁹

The goals of US strategy, as outlined in NSC 68, were not different than those Kennan had stated in the document he penned eighteen months before, NSC 20/4. In both documents, the aim was not containment. US goals were far more ambitious: "to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations" and "to bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter." What distinguished NSC 68 was its stark delineation of threat and its pronounced stress on rearmament. "Only if we had overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might the USSR be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we progressed toward the fulfillment of our objectives," Nitze wrote in NSC 68.⁴⁰

President Truman embraced the strategy of NSC 68 in May 1950, but hesitated to say how much it would cost. He knew it would stir a contentious debate at home when he was already being vilified for his failures in China and for his alleged indifference to internal espionage. Conservative critics, led by Republican senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, assailed the president for losing China and harboring Communists inside his administration. Actually, Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and Kennan had weighed intervention in China carefully and calculated that direct military intervention would be too costly and unlikely to succeed. They had no illusions about Mao, but in their view China was too poor, too fractious, and too unstable to add materially to Soviet strength. Hence, they had eschewed intervention, but had not abandoned their global struggle against Communism.

39 NSC 68, "US Objectives and Programs," April 7, 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. I, 235–92 (quotations on 237–38, 282, 253).

40 *Ibid.*, 287–89, 268.

Acheson's chief concern in Asia was not the loss of China. He was concerned that Mao would aid Ho in Indochina, thereby endangering Japan's access to the markets and resources of Southeast Asia. In a famous speech in January 1950 to the National Press Club, Acheson talked about the United States' strategic perimeter and stressed the importance of retaining Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. He did not include South Korea, Indochina, and Southeast Asia. But he was not indifferent to their fate. The strategic perimeter encompassed the areas that were deemed essential to wage war. Yet Acheson was far more interested with winning the peace and achieving preponderant power without war. As for the funds that Congress allocated in early 1950 for the containment of Communism in Asia, Acheson wanted to use them in Indochina, South Korea, and Southeast Asia rather than Formosa.

Waging limited war, gaining global predominance

When the North Koreans attacked South Korea at the end of June 1950, Truman and Acheson immediately deployed US troops to defeat the aggression and asked the United Nations for its support. US officials were surprised by the invasion, but had no doubt that it was orchestrated in the Kremlin. Truman and Acheson believed that it was a test case of their will. If the United States did not respond, American credibility would be shattered and more important friends and prospective allies, such as the Japanese and West Germans, would lose faith in US power. Certainly, if they did not respond, Republican critics at home would condemn them for their timidity in the face of aggression.

The North Korean attack confirmed the suspicions of Truman, Acheson, and Nitze that the Soviets were becoming bolder as they gained strategic might.⁴¹ The United States, therefore, not only had to thwart the attack, but also needed to reestablish the aura of military superiority that was deemed critical for the success of their diplomacy and their strategic vision. Truman asked Congress for funds not simply to wage the war in Korea but to support the concepts enumerated in NSC 68. The aim was to contain and roll back Soviet power without risking all-out war.

Truman, Acheson, and their advisers were convinced that the Kremlin, while bolder, still did not seek conflict with the United States. Hence when General Douglas MacArthur launched a successful invasion at Inchon and drove North Korean troops back to the thirty-eighth parallel that had divided

⁴¹ For the Korean War, see William Stueck's chapter in this volume.

North and South Korea, Truman decided that the United States and its allies should cross the prewar border, liberate North Korea, and unite the peninsula as part of the free world. Betting that the Chinese and the Soviets would not intervene because they would not risk hostilities with the United States, they allowed MacArthur to move to the Yalu River on the Chinese–Korean border. The impending defeat of their North Korean friends and the specter of a hostile United States on their very border triggered the intervention of the Chinese Communists in November 1950.

The escalatory spiral profoundly worried officials in Washington. They still did not think Stalin would intervene directly, but their confidence was shaken. They wanted to dissuade Stalin from even thinking about initiating hostilities in Europe. They were determined to build superior power and capitalize upon it. Truman deployed four US Army divisions to Western Europe and helped transform the North Atlantic Treaty into a viable defensive organization. The president also approved gigantic new defense expenditures. During fiscal years 1951 and 1952, Truman planned to spend the staggering sum of about \$140 billion to pay for national security programs. Compared to June 1950, by mid-1952, the US Army would have 1,353,000 troops rather than 655,000; the navy would have 397 major combatant vessels rather than 238; the air force would have 95 wings rather than 48. Since only \$3–\$5 billion per year was being spent in Korea, the vast majority of the money was allocated to cast the shadows necessary to support US diplomacy.

Now was the time, Acheson and Nitze were convinced, to take the initiatives that were fraught with risk, but that were essential to preserve long-term strategic predominance. They authorized plans to rearm and link West Germany to NATO. When the French reacted with consternation, US officials embraced a French plan to establish a European Defense Community that would include German troops, but no German general staff. The overarching design of the Truman administration was to lock West Germany and Japan into permanent association with a Western alliance system spearheaded by the United States. To do this, additional risks had to be taken to cede more sovereignty to the West Germans and the Japanese in return for their promises to stay aligned with the West and to allow the United States to use their territories to enhance its strategic reach. The Kremlin remonstrated against these actions, but Truman, Acheson, and Nitze gambled that Stalin would avert war. “It was felt,” said Nitze, “that the risk of provocation had to be taken, otherwise we were deterred before we started.”⁴²

42 Memorandum of conversation, by R. Gordon Arneson, June 14, 1951, *FRUS*, 1951, vol. 1, 847.

At the same time, Truman, Acheson, Nitze, and their associates did not forget the importance of the periphery in relation to the industrial core areas of Eurasia. The United States increased its strategic reach in the eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Asia. The United States championed the incorporation of Greece and Turkey into NATO. It established the ANZUS alliance with Australia and New Zealand. It worked with Britain, Turkey, Egypt, and others to design a Middle East Command. It provided vast sums of money to support French efforts to defeat Ho Chi Minh's Communist forces in Indochina. Acheson and Nitze did not want US policymakers to be self-deterred in the future as they felt themselves to have been in Korea when they hesitated to attack China directly lest they trigger the intervention of the Soviet Union. In the future, Nitze emphasized, the United States "must be willing to face the danger of war with the Soviet Union." In the future, Acheson emphasized, freedom of choice must remain "with us, not the Russians."⁴³

From an inchoate beginning, Harry Truman and his advisers had transformed the strategic posture of the United States in the postwar world. Their overriding priority was to prevent a totalitarian adversary from conquering or assimilating the resources of Europe and Asia and using them to wage war against the United States, as the Axis powers had done during World War II. Even if the United States were not attacked, as it had been at Pearl Harbor, the United States could not be indifferent to Soviet aggression or Communist subversion. "If communism is allowed to absorb the free nations," President Truman explained, "we would be isolated from our sources of supply and detached from our friends. Then we would have to take defense measures which might really bankrupt our economy, and change our way of life so that we wouldn't recognize it as American any longer. That's the very thing we're trying to keep from happening."⁴⁴

The strategy evolved from vague talk about an open world and an international organization to more concrete ideas about the need to rebuild western Germany, reconstruct Western Europe, and rejuvenate Japan. Reviving former enemies, however, posed dangers. Although the Truman administration accepted unprecedented strategic commitments, these military guarantees could not assure success. West Germany, Western Europe, and Japan could not prosper and could not be secure if the periphery gravitated into the hands

43 For Nitze's views, see Memorandum of discussions, January 16, 1952, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. XII, 30–31; for Acheson's views, see US Minutes, August 4, 1952, *ibid.*, 182–83.

44 Radio and television address, March 6, 1952, *PPP: Truman, 1952–1953*, 194–95.

of revolutionary nationalists and Communists. Risk-taking in the Third World in places such as Indochina, Iran, and the Middle East was the price US officials felt they had to pay for the successful rehabilitation and integration of Northeast Asia, Northwest Europe, and North America into a thriving capitalist community based on democratic values.

The strategy of the Truman administration was never limited to deterrence and containment. The strategy was to wage a cold war and win it. "I suppose," said Truman in his "farewell address" on January 15, 1953, "that history will remember my term in office as the years when the 'cold war' began to overshadow our lives. I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing struggle – this conflict between those who love freedom and those who would lead the world back into slavery and darkness. And always in the background there has been the atomic bomb. But when history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also say that in those 8 years we have set the course that we can win it."⁴⁵

Victory was Kennan's goal from the outset. Both in the "Long Telegram" and in his even more famous X article in *Foreign Affairs*, he stressed that prudence, perseverance, and determination would allow the West to triumph, provided it successfully nurtured its own institutions and values. In the strategy papers that he authored and that his successors wrote, the overall objective of US policy was more than containment. The aim was to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union and induce a basic change in the Kremlin's approach to international affairs. Truman articulated this notion well in his last "state of the union" message. If "the communist rulers understand they cannot win by war, and if we frustrate their attempts to win by subversion, it is not too much to expect" that they might change their "character, moderate [their] aims, become more realistic and less implacable, and recede from the cold war they began."⁴⁶ The strategy, as it evolved over the decades, had its strengths and weaknesses, but it prevailed.

45 Farewell address, January 15, 1953, *ibid.*, 1199.

46 Annual message, January 7, 1953, *ibid.*, 1127.



1. Soviet territorial expansion at the end of World War II.

The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953

VLADIMIR O. PECHATNOV

By mid-1944, the end of the war was finally within sight. After the great battle of Kursk and the D-Day invasion of Normandy, the Axis powers were in retreat. Soviet leaders began to look ahead, sorting out their agenda and priorities for the postwar period.

The war losses of the USSR were staggering: the country lost at least 27 million people and about a quarter of its reproducible wealth; over 1,700 cities and towns were destroyed and more than 31,000 industrial enterprises demolished. With its human resources depleted and much of its productive capacity destroyed, the country faced a huge task of postwar reconstruction. Yet there was also a new sense of optimism and self-confidence among the populace justly proud of defeating the Nazi juggernaut which the rest of the world could not stop. The Stalinist system survived the test, having proved its ability to concentrate resources, maintain internal discipline, and act decisively under enormous pressure. The Great Patriotic War (as World War II came to be called in the USSR) endowed the Communist regime with broader legitimacy and brought Iosif Stalin to the peak of his popularity.

Externally, the Soviet position was also marked by contradictions. On the one hand, the coming victory was bound to bring the USSR to new heights of strategic and political influence. Its two mortal enemies – Germany and Japan – laid prostrate; its military predominance over the Eurasian landmass seemed assured along with a new status as a great power and a key member of the victorious Grand Alliance. The Soviet model gained new prestige, while the growth of Communist and Left parties in Europe and national liberation movements in Asia opened new avenues for expanding Soviet influence. On the other hand, the war graphically exposed the country's critical strategic liabilities: easily penetrable borders, lack of ready access to key seaways, and the absence of power-projection capabilities. The narrow escape from a shattering defeat at the hands of a much smaller but technologically more advanced Germany was the best proof of the regime's vulnerability and backwardness.



5. Ruins of the northern Soviet city of Murmansk, June 1942. The war devastated large areas of the Soviet Union; a herculean task of reconstruction lay ahead.

“Lenin left us a great estate and we made shit out of it,” was Stalin’s dictum to his lieutenants in the first weeks of the war.¹ No wonder security concerns remained paramount in the Kremlin’s thinking about the postwar world.

Postwar plans and intentions

In Bolshevik strategic culture, shaped by Stalin’s concept of “socialism in one country,” the Soviet state was surrounded by a hostile world and its survival and enhancement were overriding goals to which all other interests – those of temporary allies, foreign Communists, and its own people – were to be subordinated. This fusion of Soviet national interests with those of the world revolution freed the Kremlin’s hands for the most cynical Realpolitik, justified, ultimately, by allegedly *noble* utopian ends. Having identified himself with the system of his creation, Stalin was determined not “to make shit out of it” again; his aim was to turn the USSR into an invincible fortress against foreign enemies. Now was the time to restore Russia’s historical rights, lost in the previous ill-fated wars of the twentieth century, and to convert the gigantic losses and victories into lasting security for the Soviet Union and its ruling circle.

¹ Anastas Mikoian, *Tak Bylo* [That Is How It Was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 390.

One key precondition for so doing was building up its national military-industrial base. The other had to do with space. Quite conventional in his geopolitical rationality, Stalin, as Maxim Litvinov observed, had “an outmoded concept of security in terms of territory – the more you have got, the safer you are.”² Inherited from the Russian tsars, this concept was given extra credence by the experience of the war, which had proved the importance of defense in depth. Bolshevik ideology reinforced this “defensive expansion.”

Haunted by the “Barbarossa syndrome,” Stalin and his circle were determined to keep Germany enfeebled and to extend the Soviet borders to the line of 1941 (i.e., to retain control over the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, and Belorussia, plus Bessarabia, all of which Russia had lost after World War I and repossessed in 1939–41, as well as Northern Bukovina). To further increase the depth of its defense, a glacis of “friendly states” was envisioned along the USSR’s western borders. In addition, postwar plans of Soviet diplomats and navy commanders mapped out a chain of strategic strongholds along the seaways adjacent to Soviet borders in the northwest: Bornholm and Spitzbergen, as well as Bear Island.

The same logic applied in the Far East where twice in the twentieth century Japan had gravely threatened Russia’s security. There, in addition to enfeeblement and demilitarization of the old enemy, Soviet planners wanted to regain territories and privileges lost to Japan in 1904–05: southern Sakhalin and control over strategic railroads and seaports in Manchuria, plus the militarily important Kurile Islands (see map 1, p. 89).

In the southwest, the Kremlin’s tentative agenda included building up a Soviet enclave in northern Iran, along with acquiring a controlling influence over the Turkish straits, and strongholds in the Mediterranean via trusteeship over former Italian colonies. This expanded version of the old tsarist aspirations was to protect Russia’s “soft underbelly,” a region that also contained most of the known Soviet oil deposits.

Although this very ambitious program was not conceived in absolutist terms of world revolution or global hegemony, it was in line with traditional Russian imperial policy. The leading Soviet diplomats involved in policy planning – Litvinov, Ivan Maisky, and Andrei Gromyko – believed that vital security interests of their country were largely compatible with those of the United States and Britain. This optimism was based in part on a revised image of Western democracies which during the war came to be seen as staunch opponents of German Fascism and Japanese militarism and respectful of the USSR’s newly gained status, interests, and rights.

2 *Washington Post*, January 23, 1952.

Another assumption behind this optimism was a traditional notion of the United States as a distant giant, posing no direct military threat, and likely to withdraw from Europe after the war. Thus, postwar Europe, in Maisky's words, would "have only one great land power – the USSR – and only one great sea power – England" which would help "to prevent the formation in Europe of any power or combination of power, with powerful armies."³ Besides, the Bolshevik theory of imperialism led the Soviets to expect a new round of "interimperialist contradictions" which would pose a rising United States against a declining Britain, and would incline both Anglo-Saxon powers to keep Germany and Japan weak. If discord existed between Britain and the United States, and if Japan and Germany were enfeebled, the likelihood of a hostile Western coalition – fear of which had haunted Soviet leaders since the October Revolution – would be minimized.

Thus Soviet planners could hope to reach some *modus vivendi* with the Western allies based on mutually demarcated spheres of influence. The United States would dominate the western hemisphere and the Pacific, while Britain and the Soviet Union would (in Litvinov's words) reach "an accord," based on an "amicable separation of security spheres in Europe according to the principle of geographic proximity."⁴

Stalin and Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov were hardly prone to the "revisionism" about the West that affected their more impressionable diplomats. The wartime experience of cooperation did not change their basic Bolshevik view of the bourgeois allies as selfish and cunning hypocrites, anti-Soviet at heart. Britain's and the United States' procrastination on the second front and secretly developing atomic weapons helped to sustain this view. The Kremlin's general ideological vision – of a hostile capitalist world, aggressive but inherently unstable, doomed to repeated cycles of depression, war, and revolution – also remained intact, along with a belief in the need for the Soviet Union to gather strength for an inevitable new showdown.

Yet a "survival strategy"⁵ also prompted Stalin to keep the option of postwar cooperation alive. Soviet diplomats were instructed to play an active role in founding the Bretton Woods system and creating the United Nations.

3 I. Maisky to V. Molotov, January 11, 1944, Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVP RF), fond 06, opis' 6, papka 14, delo 147, list 8.

4 M. Litvinov, "On the Prospects and Possible Basis of Soviet-British Cooperation," November 15, 1944, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 6, p. 14, d. 149, l. 54.

5 Silvio Pons, "Conceptualising Stalin's Foreign Policy: On the Legacy of the Ideology/Realism Duality," in Geoffrey Roberts (ed.), *Stalin: His Times and Ours* (Cork: IAREES, 2005), p. 18.

In 1942–43, Stalin was so impressed with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “four policemen” idea that he vainly tried to flesh it out at the Teheran Conference. During the war Stalin also refrained from direct interference in the western sphere. In 1943, he grudgingly accepted British–American dominance in the occupation of Italy, while in 1944–45, he restrained French and Italian Communists from attempting to seize power. He also refused to support actively Communist military campaigns against the British-backed government in Greece and the American-backed Nationalist government in China.

Even within his own sphere Stalin was in no rush to impose the Soviet system. His “popular front” strategy boiled down to an incremental buildup of Soviet influence behind a façade of multiparty parliamentary democracy and a mixed economy. Whether this strategy was from the outset a cynical cover-up for creeping Sovietization, or whether Stalin had real hopes for a “peaceful” and “national” road to socialism, is still a matter of historical debate. But, in any case, the strategy served both options by developing the sinews of Sovietization (especially inside the military and security apparatus) as insurance should the “peaceful” way falter. No less importantly, this strategy, as Eduard Mark argues, “was the vehicle for temporarily harmonizing” the conflicting goals of preservation of the Big Three alliance and consolidation of the Soviet sphere of influence.⁶

Stalin wanted to preserve stable relations with the West for a number of reasons, including preventing the resurgence of German and Japanese power as well as legitimizing the new borders of the Soviet Union and confirming its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. In Stalin’s view, an amicable division of war spoils was clearly preferable to a confrontation with his wartime allies. In addition, cooperation was necessary to secure economic assistance for reconstruction and allowed time for British–American differences to surface. Finally, because Stalin and his aides were fully aware of the military-industrial preponderance of the British–American world, they wanted to prevent a conflict they could not win at that point, or postpone it until shifts in overall correlation of forces were forthcoming. In short, the Kremlin hoped to combine its geopolitical agenda with cooperation from the West – at least for a transitional period during the settlement of postwar problems – but between these two tasks the former clearly assumed a priority.

6 Eduard Mark, *Revolution by Degrees: Stalin’s National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 31 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), 29–30.

This agenda, in Stalin's view, was a moderate interpretation of his country's security requirements. What was strategically justifiable also seemed morally right to Soviet leaders, who saw their demands as a just distribution of the spoils of war, a war won by great sacrifice from the Soviet people. This sense of entitlement was reinforced by a deeply felt need to be recognized as a legitimate great power.

Stalin realized that it would be difficult to achieve his goals. Well versed in Russian history and mythology, he expected sinister Western imperialists to follow their usual pattern of behavior: use Russians as cannon fodder, lure them with promises of major strategic gains, and then leave them empty-handed in the end. In his words, cited by Molotov at the war's end, tsarist Russia used "to win wars but was unable to enjoy the fruits of its victories ... Russians are remarkable warriors, but they do not know how to make peace: they are deceived, underpaid."⁷ Stalin knew that he had been deceived by Hitler, with whom he had tried to strike a similar deal in 1939–40. Determined not to be outsmarted again, Stalin and Molotov braced for tough bargaining with their allies. They were determined to seek their primary security agenda with their allies' consent, if possible, and without it, if necessary.

Toward the policy of "tenacity and steadfastness"

The sudden death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 – Stalin's favorite Western partner – dealt the first blow to Soviet calculations. The Kremlin's misgivings about Harry S. Truman were soon confirmed by his pointedly cool reception of Molotov during their April 23 meeting. This change of mood was also evident at the San Francisco Conference, where Molotov and his Western counterparts clashed over the admission of Poland and Argentina. With his armies conquering Berlin, Stalin fully approved Molotov's combative stand. "I must say that you [are handling] the conference very well," he cabled his foreign minister on May 2.⁸

A few days later, the White House abruptly terminated lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. In Moscow this step was perceived as an act of political pressure. The Kremlin's real feelings were apparent when Molotov instructed the Soviet trade representative in New York "to stop ... begging American authorities for deliveries; if Americans want to end deliveries, so

7 *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [140 Talks with Molotov: From F. Chuev's Diary] (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 78.

8 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, May 2, 1945, Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter PA RF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 770, l. 3.

much the worse for them.”⁹ In his talks with Harry Hopkins, Truman’s personal envoy, in June 1945, Stalin condemned this “insulting and brutal” act.

From the Soviet perspective, the reasons for this American “toughening” were obvious. Once Germany was defeated, Stalin believed, the Americans would think that the Soviets were no longer necessary. The dictator had a point, but the tension was eased when Truman sent Hopkins to Moscow to resolve the contentious issues regarding the recognition of the provisional Polish government and the voting procedures in the UN Security Council. In June, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius agreed in principle to the Soviet request for a share in the trusteeship over the former Italian colonies. Kremlin leaders were also encouraged by the initial American response to Soviet requests for German reparations and for the internationalization of the Ruhr.

But, as the appetite of the Kremlin grew, the Americans and the British became more intransigent. At the Potsdam Conference, the Allies rebuffed Soviet reparation demands as well as Soviet requests for internationalization of the Ruhr, for a trusteeship in the Mediterranean, and for bases in the Turkish straits. Yet Soviet leaders were able to achieve much of what they wanted regarding the occupation regime in Germany, the new borders of Poland, and the preparations of the peace treaties for Germany’s European satellites. Stalin also succeeded in blocking Western attempts to monitor elections in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Talking to Georgi Dimitrov, Molotov said that this step “in effect recognized the Balkans as a [Soviet] sphere of influence.”¹⁰ So the overall balance of the Potsdam agreements looked quite satisfactory.

The Kremlin’s satisfaction did not last long, however. The US decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted a dramatic new challenge to Soviet strategic assumptions. It shattered the previous image of the United States as a distant power unable to present a direct military threat to the USSR. It also foreshadowed a shift in the global balance of power in favor of the United States. Finally, it endangered Soviet hopes of acquiring a sizable role in the occupation of Japan and of retaining the strategic and territorial gains in the Far East that it thought it had secured at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

The United States, in fact, began to squeeze the Soviets out of the area: Truman rebuffed Stalin’s request to accept Japan’s surrender on Hokkaido,

9 V. Molotov to the Soviet ambassador, May 16, 1945, PA RF, f. 3, op. 66, d. 296, l. 13.

10 Georgi Dimitrov, *Dnevnik (9 mart 1933–6 fevruari 1949)* [Diaries, 9 March 1933–6 February 1949] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Ohridski,” 1997), 492.

demanding basing rights in the Soviet-occupied Kuriles, and secretly ordered his military to capture the port of Dalian where the Soviet side was to enjoy special rights according to the Yalta decisions. There is little doubt that Stalin saw these actions as an American effort both to lock the Soviet Union out of Japan and to penetrate the Soviet sphere in the Far East.

At about the same time, Washington and London vowed not to recognize Soviet-sponsored governments in Bulgaria and Romania until they included pro-Western candidates from the opposition parties. In the Kremlin's eyes, this challenge to Soviet control in the crucial security zone on their western frontier, coupled with the events in the Far East, constituted a new American offensive, supported by atomic leverage. Stalin's response was to accelerate his country's own atomic project and to demonstrate new toughness in negotiations.

The dictator's main priorities at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers were to consolidate Soviet control over the Balkans and to acquire a foothold in Japan. Molotov was instructed "to stand firm and make no concessions to our allies on Romania." Supporting local anti-Soviet forces, added Stalin, was "incompatible with our allied relations." The categorical refusal of the United States to consider the Soviet proposal on a control mechanism for Japan, Stalin called "the height of impudence," which demonstrated that the Americans lacked even "a minimal sense of respect for their ally."¹¹ The same fate befell the Soviet request for Tripolitania, even though Molotov strictly followed Stalin's instructions "to remind Americans about their promise." This retraction could only confirm the Soviet impression of American drift away from Yalta–Potsdam. But the most revealing glimpse into Stalin's thinking was contained in his assessment of Secretary Byrnes's proposal on Germany's demilitarization, which in Stalin's view had the following hidden agenda: "First, to direct our attention from the Far East, where the United States assumes a role of tomorrow's friend of Japan ...; second, to receive from the USSR a formal acceptance of the United States' playing the same role in European affairs as the USSR, so that the United States may hereafter, in league with Britain, take the future of Europe into its own hands; third, to devalue the treaties of alliance that the USSR has already reached with European states; fourth, to pull the rug out from under any future treaties of alliance between the USSR and Romania, Finland, etc."¹²

Stalin was clearly beginning to see the United States as a potential rival for hegemony over the European continent. As a grand strategist, he realized that

11 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, September 26, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 218, l. 84.

12 I. Stalin to V. Molotov, September 22, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 247, ll. 57–58.

American dominance in both Europe and Japan would mean a drastic shift in the global balance of power. Also, Stalin did not intend to withdraw his troops from the lands they occupied in exchange for accepting a problematic US proposal to demilitarize Germany; if he did so, he would lose his main geo-strategic ace – the Red Army's presence in the heart of Europe. He was, moreover, concerned with the corrosive effect such a treaty might have on building a system of bilateral security guarantees with his clients in Eastern Europe, since the specter of German revanchism bound them together. Faced with firm Western resistance, Stalin preferred to disrupt the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 rather than make concessions.

Internal developments also complicated Stalin's efforts to balance his desire to preserve East–West relations with his determination to fulfill his geopolitical agenda. The Red Army was in ferment; a crime wave was spreading through urban centers; workers and peasants, exhausted from the war, wanted the regime to soften its demands on them; even Stalin's own lieutenants, having tasted greater authority during the war, were displaying more autonomy. Yet in the dictator's view the country had to be mobilized for a gigantic new effort to reconstruct its economy and its military-industrial base. The external threat calling for discipline and sacrifice seemed to justify the goal and the specter of such a threat was credible enough, given growing Western obstructionism.

By the fall of 1945, Soviet propaganda began to remind people about "capitalist encirclement" and "reactionary tendencies" in the West. In November, Stalin sternly rebuked Molotov for relaxing censorship of foreign correspondents and summoned his Politburo colleagues for the "tooth and nail struggle against servility before foreign figures." To amplify his message, Stalin staged a humiliating indictment of Molotov before the Politburo for his alleged "liberalism" and for "placating the Anglo-Americans."¹³ The lesson for top Soviet officials could not be clearer: the time for pandering to the Allies was over and from now on the premium was on anti-Western toughness.

Yet Stalin still kept his options open. In China, he avoided any direct conflict with American forces; he subsequently withdrew Soviet troops from Manchuria. In December 1945, the Red Army left Czechoslovakia, much to Truman's surprise. Soviet propaganda described the outcome of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a temporary setback. Stalin clearly saw the London meeting as an exploratory operation and wanted to

13 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, *"The Allies Are Pressing on You to Break Your Will ...": Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946* (translated by V. Zubok), CWIHP Working Paper No. 26 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999), 13–14.



6. Viacheslav Molotov (left) and Iosif Stalin at the Yalta conference.

continue bargaining from a position of strength in order to restrain the overconfident Western Allies.

The success of pro-Soviet forces in Bulgaria's and Yugoslavia's parliamentary elections and Byrnes's initiative to hold a meeting of the Big Three foreign ministers seemed to confirm the efficacy of Stalin's tactics. That, at least, is how he himself saw the situation in a message to his Politburo colleagues on the eve of the Moscow conference: "We won the struggle in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia ... It is obvious that in dealing with such partners as the United States and Britain we cannot achieve anything serious if we begin to give in to intimidation or to betray uncertainty. To get anything from such partners, we must arm ourselves with the policy of tenacity and steadfastness."¹⁴

¹⁴ I. Stalin to V. Molotov, G. Malenkov, L. Beria, and A. Mikoian, December 9, 1945, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 771, l. 3.

The outcome of the Moscow conference was quite positive in the Kremlin's view. "At this meeting," concluded Molotov in a circular letter to his staff, "we managed to reach decisions on a number of important European and Far Eastern issues and to sustain development of cooperation among the three countries that emerged during the war."¹⁵ The Kremlin was still hopeful about future deals with the West.

The Soviet drift toward the Cold War

The spring of 1946 was an important turning point in the unraveling of the Grand Alliance. In his speech on February 9, Stalin presented his mobilization strategy: since capitalism remained a main source of wars, the Soviet people must steel themselves for a new and strenuous effort to insure their hard-won security "against any eventuality." That insurance was to be provided by accelerated economic development with the emphasis on heavy industry envisioned in the new Five-Year Plan. Targeted at a domestic audience, the speech was interpreted in the West as a call for a renewed ideological struggle and for revolutionary expansion. When Western policies hardened, for example, demanding that the Soviets leave Iran – as they were obligated to do – and when former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered a stinging attack on Soviet policies in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, Stalin was further angered. Churchill's speech – given with Truman at his side – sent a powerful signal to the Kremlin conveying the impression that the United States was, at best, conniving and, at worst, plotting with Churchill in a new anti-Soviet ideological offensive. The Soviet people now needed to be more vigilant than ever, and, accordingly, Stalin launched his famous propaganda campaign to guard against Western encirclement.

Stalin's efforts to prevent further British–American collusion against the USSR were undermined by his own actions in Iran and Turkey. Determined to strengthen his vulnerable southern flank and get access to Iranian oil, he went to great lengths to create a pro-Soviet enclave in northern Iran, an area occupied by the Red Army and populated by ethnic Azeris and Kurds. By delaying the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and by instigating a local Communist-led separatist movement, Stalin hoped at a minimum to wrest a favorable oil deal from Teheran. Faced with firm resolve on the part of the Iranian government, backed by the United States and Britain, he settled for a compromise (troop withdrawal followed by an oil deal), only to be outfoxed

15 V. Molotov to Soviet ambassadors, January 2, 1946, PA RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 234, l. 229.

in the end by the Majlis's refusal to approve it. Moscow did nothing to defend its Azeri clients in northern Iran as Teheran forces brutally crushed their resistance. Giving up this very expensive and promising investment while running no risk of serious military resistance from Iran and the West could be explained only by the dictator's inner caution and reluctance to turn the British and the Americans against himself too soon.

The crisis regarding Turkey followed a similar pattern. Doubtful of Western support for Russia's historical claim to the straits, Stalin first demanded their "joint defense," coupled with a request to regain small chunks of territory in Kars and Ardahan that had belonged to Armenia and Georgia before 1921. In August 1946, this scheme was repackaged into a proposal to secure control over the straits for the Black Sea powers. The Soviet position in this war of nerves was backed up by troop concentrations along Turkey's northern borders. The Kremlin's calculation that Ankara would yield to Soviet pressure while the Allies would stand aside proved to be wrong. Both crises revealed a lack of long-term strategic planning on the part of Stalin, who essentially was "knocking at the doors" in search of weak points around the Soviet periphery. He provoked the consolidation of an British-American bloc against the USSR and pushed Iran and Turkey toward the West.

By the summer of 1946, Stalin and his aides had made the key decisions about Soviet national priorities that would shape Soviet foreign policy for years to come. Postwar reconstruction was to be combined with massive rearmament, which included the acceleration of the atomic project plus crash programs in rocketry and air defense. Their achievement had to be a bootstrapping operation since all potential sources of outside assistance (except for industrial dismantling in the occupied territories) had failed to materialize. Greater reparations from Germany were blocked by the Allies. The Soviet request for a reconstruction loan was at first "lost" in Washington and then became encumbered with unacceptable political conditions. Soviet membership in the Bretton Woods system was ultimately prevented by the Kremlin's own fears of opening up the Soviet economy. As a result, economic incentives to cooperate with the West were reduced to almost zero, making it much easier for latent ideological and political hostility to take hold. With its returns diminishing, the Big Three alliance was losing its former attraction to Stalin and his subordinates.

In Soviet internal assessments, the United States began to emerge as the main adversary, set on an aggressive course: resurrecting Russia's old enemies, surrounding the Soviet state with military bases, and threatening it with atomic bombs. A vivid example of this new thinking was apparent in a long

analytical report written by the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, and supervised by Molotov himself. The essence was that the United States was pursuing "world supremacy."¹⁶ High-ranking officials in Moscow who did not share this black-and-white picture of the world lost influence. Maisky's departure in 1946 was soon followed by the expulsion of Litvinov, who had the nerve to criticize Soviet policy (in an interview with a US news correspondent) as being overly offensive and ideological.

Growing international tensions provided a fitting background for tightening screws at home. The official campaign against "fawning" on the West, launched in August 1946, was a crude but effective way to extinguish the residual respect for Western culture and ideas by appealing to Russian national pride and a traditional sense of moral superiority over the "rotten West." The anti-Western ideological indoctrination was accompanied by a crackdown on British-American propaganda, curtailing subscriptions to foreign books and periodicals, and banning informal contacts with foreigners.

Busy with erecting the Iron Curtain at home, Stalin was still engaged in pragmatic bargaining with his former allies over a peace settlement in Europe. At the Council of Foreign Ministers sessions in Paris and New York, hard-nosed Soviet diplomacy was able to achieve most of its aims. The peace treaties with former German satellites confirmed the new Soviet borders with Finland and Romania, provided reparations to the USSR and its new allies (or eased their burden), and in general contributed to Soviet dominance over the Balkans and Eastern Europe. At the same time, Molotov failed to get a foothold in the Mediterranean; he also had to compromise on the status of Trieste and the Italy-Yugoslavia border – much to the frustration of Moscow's new ally, the government of Josip Broz Tito. The latter concession was personally approved by Stalin who instructed Molotov "not to derail the conference because of the issue of Trieste."¹⁷

There could be adjustments on secondary issues, but not on the main ones. Creating a glacis of pro-Soviet states along the western border remained at the top of the Kremlin's agenda. Stalin's overt strategy in Eastern Europe was to support "people's democracies," a framework that postulated peaceful ways to socialism pursued by coalition governments in the various countries of the region. In Poland, through 1946, Stalin instructed local Communists to tolerate a legal opposition and not to alienate the country's Roman Catholic Church. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Moscow continued to deal with

¹⁶ "On the USA's Foreign Policy," AVP RF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 45, d. 759, ll. 21–39.

¹⁷ Druzhkov (Stalin's alias) to V. Molotov, June 23, 1946, PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 219, l. 1.

non-Communist leaders. Communist control was more obvious in Romania and Bulgaria, but even there non-Communist political parties continued to function. Yet the "people's democracy" formula faced mounting difficulties: harsh methods of "creeping Sovietization" were setting local populations against the USSR and its indigenous agents; Western-backed nationalist opponents would not give up; and local Communists were increasingly resentful of having to put up with their opponents, which Moscow instructed them to do. At the same time, diminishing returns of cooperation with the West were loosening external constraints on Soviet policy regarding compliance with democratic appearances. In early 1947, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began to prepare plans for a forcible imposition of the Soviet model.

Germany was another top priority for the Kremlin, and the situation there did not look promising either. Soviet diplomats perceived the consolidation of the American and British zones as a means to undermine the influence of the USSR in Germany and to resurrect its power on a reactionary basis. Denial of reparation transfers from the American zone in 1946 reinforced this impression.

Stalin's plans for postwar Germany still arouse considerable historical debate, but he appears to have pursued several contradictory options at the same time. The most tempting one was a united pro-Soviet Germany. He told Georgi Dimitrov, "All of Germany must be ours, Soviet."¹⁸ He also directed German Communists to merge with the Social Democrats to establish a nationwide Socialist Unity Party and to expand their influence westward, even with the help of former rank-and-file Nazis. But making the whole of Germany "ours" was too problematic, considering the Allies' firm control over its larger and richer part. The middle option could be a demilitarized and neutral Germany serving as a buffer between Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Finally, there was always a minimum program designed to set up a client state in the Soviet zone of occupation which would at least preserve the Soviet presence in the heart of Europe. Stalin was establishing the material preconditions for this scenario by secretly Sovietizing the eastern zone, but he did not abandon his larger aims.

Growing international tensions notwithstanding, the USSR was not preparing for a major showdown with the West. By 1948, the Red Army was reduced to one-quarter of its 1945 strength, and the military budget of 1946-47 was only

¹⁸ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (London: Hart Davis, 1962), 139.

half of its wartime peak. The scarce documentation available on Soviet military planning reveals that, contrary to American assumptions, Soviet contingency plans did not envision any offensive operations in Western Europe, concentrating instead on holding the line of defense in Germany.¹⁹ Soviet naval commanders' requests for a major buildup of an ocean-going navy were rejected by Stalin as too expensive and unnecessary for coastal defense.

Rediscovering the enemy

While the Soviet reaction to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine was rather muted, Moscow's response to the Marshall Plan proved to be much more consequential. Originally, the overture by the US secretary of state was met with a mixture of mistrust, interest, and uncertainty, but the main Soviet line was to gather more information from its former Western partners and to use the proposal to Soviet advantage. Soviet diplomats were instructed to clarify the scale and conditions of the proposed plan and to insist that it be organized on a national basis and not as an integrated program, which the Kremlin feared would come under US control. Neither did the Kremlin want German resources to be used in the program unless outstanding Soviet demands for reparations and for supervision of the industries of the Ruhr were met. What the Soviets feared most was that Eastern Europe would fall under the West's economic hegemony and that Germany would become integrated into a US-led orbit.

Those fears were quickly confirmed at the very beginning of the Paris Conference. The British and the French insisted on an all-European plan using German economic resources. They displayed little desire to modify the American proposal. Molotov wrote Stalin that it was clear that the Western partners "are eager to use this opportunity to break in to the internal economies of European countries and especially to redirect the flows of European trade in their own interests."²⁰ The Soviet leaders knew only too well that in an open competition they stood little chance against US economic power, and that Western economic penetration would soon be followed by political inroads. The Marshall Plan, in the Kremlin's view, would prove to be a Trojan horse, designed to undermine the centerpiece of its postwar strategic desiderata – the security zone in Eastern and Central Europe.

19 Vojtech Mastny, "Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning," in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 16.

20 V. Molotov to I. Stalin, June 29, 1947, PA RF, f. 3, op. 63, d. 270, ll. 43–44.

After Molotov's unsuccessful attempts to hamstring the Marshall Plan, Stalin rejected it and forced his allies to do the same. These developments triggered a further revision of Soviet strategic guidelines. The Kremlin concluded that the United States had decided to rebuild Western Europe (including the western part of Germany) as a junior partner in a transatlantic bloc against the USSR. Instead of a multipolar system, in which the Kremlin could play off capitalist powers against each other, it now had to reckon with an American-led anti-Soviet global coalition. All the unsettling signs of American policy now merged into a single threat that seemed to endanger the very existence of the Soviet Union and its allies. Frustrating this design became the overriding Soviet goal.

On the operational level, the Kremlin tried to disrupt the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and to consolidate its own control over Eastern Europe. The Cominform was created in September 1947 as the principal vehicle through which to achieve these goals. Its ideological underpinning – the concept of “two camps” – provided a rationale for strict discipline among Europe's Communist Parties and for their unconditional support of Soviet policy.

Moscow directed Western Communists to destabilize “the capitalist economy” and to abort implementation of the Marshall Plan by general strikes, militant demonstrations, and even underground preparations for armed resistance. This radical departure from the earlier “people's democracy” strategy contributed to the isolation of West European Communist Parties, but Stalin was not concerned about this consequence. Yet, even while seeking to thwart the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin calibrated its steps carefully to avoid American overreaction. Fearing US military intervention in Italy, Moscow cautioned Italian Communists against trying to take power through armed insurrection. The Italian Communists' subsequent electoral defeat in April 1948 ended the Kremlin's hopes for Communist takeovers in Western Europe.

In Eastern Europe, Stalin tightened the screws within his orbit. The intensification of the Cold War terminated any lingering restraints on the full-scale Sovietization of the region. The Kremlin gave the green light to its Communist clients in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to crack down on their opponents. The new agenda was to intensify the class struggle, monopolize political power, establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, and launch a crash program of industrialization. The establishment of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe was accompanied by the negotiation of new security arrangements between Moscow and its clients. Identical treaties of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” were signed in early 1948 with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, providing for mutual assistance in case of aggression from Germany and its associates.

The Soviet camp's weakest link remained Czechoslovakia, where Communists still shared power with other parties. In the post-Marshall Plan environment, this exception could not be tolerated, and in February 1948 Moscow exploited a political crisis to orchestrate a final showdown. As Czechoslovakia was being transformed, Stalin dissolved the Soviet–Yugoslav alliance. He was infuriated by Tito's unsanctioned preparations for military intervention in Albania and by the signing of a separate treaty with Bulgaria. When, in addition, Yugoslavia refused in March 1948 to share sensitive information about its economy with Moscow, the Soviet government recalled its military and civilian advisers, declined to grant Belgrade a loan, refused to sign a trade treaty, and launched a vitriolic campaign against Tito's leadership. Stalin wanted to remove or intimidate Tito, thereby teaching his other new allies an important lesson about deference to the Kremlin's leadership. Failing to achieve this, Stalin used the conflict to tighten his grip over other countries in Eastern Europe. Purges took place everywhere in the region, deepening the alienation between the Communist regimes and the peoples they governed.²¹

The political unification of the Soviet bloc called for similar steps in the economic sphere. The growing economic integration of Western Europe impelled the Kremlin to increase the coordination of trade and economic policies throughout Eastern Europe and to promote its dependence on the Soviet Union. Moscow also curtailed trade and economic ties between those countries and the West. In December 1948, the Politburo laid the basis for the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (formally established in January 1949).

But the most dangerous crisis of the early Cold War arose over the crucial issue of Germany. The Soviets were alarmed by the decisive turn of Western policy in late 1947–early 1948. Western decisions to unify the French and British–American zones, end de-Nazification, rebuild German industrial power, and establish a separate West German state were seen in Moscow as a threat to the very existence of the Soviet state – a resurrected lethal enemy, backed by the world's strongest economy. Analyzing developments, the Soviet Foreign Ministry concluded that “the Western powers are transforming Germany into their stronghold and including it in the newly formed military-political bloc, directed against the Soviet Union and the new democracies.”²²

²¹ See Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

²² A. Smirnov to V. Molotov, March 12, 1948, in G. Kynin and J. Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949* [The USSR and the German Question], vol. II (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), 601.

In a desperate attempt to stop what was happening, Stalin struck back at the Allies' weakest point – their positions in West Berlin, deep inside the Soviet occupation zone. When Stalin closed the communication routes between the western zones of Germany and the western zones of Berlin, his main aim was to force the allies to reverse their decisions regarding western Germany. Yet, even while undertaking such a dangerous gamble, Stalin was careful to avoid a direct military confrontation. There were no troop movements or other signs of military preparations, and when the allies introduced a massive airlift to West Berlin there was no attempt to disrupt it. Faced with the failure of his strategy, Stalin was ready to negotiate, but the Western powers took this as a sign of weakness and refused to bargain. Again, as with Turkey and Iran, Stalin's heavy-handedness proved to be counterproductive and he was forced to retreat. The Berlin blockade provided a stronger impetus than had ever existed for the Western powers to establish a separate West German state and to effect closer military cooperation.

Soviet diplomats and intelligence analysts closely followed the negotiations in Washington that led to the North Atlantic Treaty. Particularly troubling from the Soviet viewpoint were US plans to expand its strategic reach by including Italy and Portugal in the emerging alliance, along with at least one Scandinavian country. Still, there was little Moscow could do other than verbally protest and instigate Communist-led anti-NATO campaigns in countries such as Italy and France.

Inside the Soviet Union, there were also mounting tensions in 1948–49. The earlier postwar trends of demobilization and defense cuts were reversed. The anti-Western xenophobic campaign was intensified and turned into a witch-hunt against “rootless cosmopolitans” – mostly Jewish professionals and other allegedly disloyal individuals. In so doing, grassroots anti-Semitism was fomented to eliminate the remnants of Western influence and to rally the Soviet mob against foreign enemies as well as their “domestic agents.”

While being cynically manipulative, this mania also reflected the Kremlin's real anxieties. Stalin and his lieutenants were certain that the West would redouble its efforts to organize a “fifth column” inside the Soviet bloc, and there was enough evidence to feed those suspicions – covert operations by the newly established Central Intelligence Agency, the use of émigré groups to prepare anti-Soviet revolts in Eastern Europe should war erupt, growing contacts between anti-Soviet Russian immigrants and US government officials, and American usage of the former Nazi intelligence network specializing in Soviet affairs.

Among ordinary Soviet citizens, the official anti-Western propaganda found some resonance. For them, the “hostile encirclement” was recognizable in US military bases around the Soviet Union, its atomic monopoly, its publicized war plans, and the saber-rattling rhetoric of American officials. The aggressive US posture, designed to destabilize the Soviet system, produced, at least in the short run, the opposite effect. It made Stalin’s charges more credible, allowing him to blame the West for his country’s postwar economic troubles; it also brought the regime and its people closer together instead of setting them apart. No less importantly, the hostile challenge from abroad provided a powerful catalyst for the system to develop its awesome mobilization potential and to justify unending sacrifices from the Soviet people.

Cheerfully fighting imperialism

The creation of NATO and a formal division of Germany solidified the split in Europe, leaving little room for further diplomatic bargaining. Yet there were two events in the fall of 1949 potent enough to change Soviet strategic calculations and the general Cold War stalemate. The first one was the end of the US atomic monopoly, publicly acknowledged by President Truman on September 23. The Kremlin was greatly relieved by this breakthrough, which provided much-needed reassurance against the American atomic ace, but the bomb was neither integrated into Soviet military doctrine nor assigned to troops until after Stalin’s death.

The second critical development of 1949 that redounded to the strategic advantage of the Kremlin was that it secured a giant new ally in the East. In 1945–47, Stalin carefully kept his options open, maintaining close contacts with both sides in the Chinese Civil War. This caution was in line with his general skepticism about revolutionary prospects in Asia. For Stalin, local Communists were too nationalistic, too immature, and too independent to be trusted. He paid little attention to their liberation struggles. Stalin’s constant message to Communist leaders of Indochina and Indonesia was to go slow, avoid revolutionary goals, and concentrate instead on an agenda for national liberation. But, as the tide in China’s Civil War turned against the Nationalists and as Soviet–American relations deteriorated in Europe, Stalin moved to a closer partnership with Mao Zedong. The establishment of Communist control over mainland China laid the basis for institutionalizing a new relationship between the two most populous Communist regimes on earth. Stalin ultimately agreed to annul the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek,

admitting to Mao that “for us it entails certain inconveniences and we will have to struggle against Americans. But this we have already learned to live with.”²³

The new Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, signed on February 14, 1950, after tense bargaining, provided for military assistance in case of aggression from Japan and its associates, along with a mutual pledge not to take part in coalitions hostile to either party. According to other agreements, the Soviet Union was to yield control over the Chinese Eastern railroad with its entire huge infrastructure, to transfer to China all its property in Dalian, and to evacuate its Port Arthur (Lüshun) naval base with no compensation for construction costs incurred prior to 1945. These big concessions were reciprocated by secret agreements providing for Soviet special rights in Xinjiang and Manchuria, which in effect preserved this area as a Soviet buffer zone. Overall, in Stalin’s eyes, the benefits of a Sino-Soviet alliance clearly outweighed any substantial concessions. China’s incorporation into the socialist camp promised not only to serve Soviet security interests in East Asia and the Far East, but also to change the overall correlation of forces in the Cold War.

The momentous events of late 1949 and early 1950 prompted Stalin to endorse North Korea’s attack on South Korea. The main Soviet interest in the area was to prevent Japan and the United States from using the Korean peninsula to attack Manchuria and the Soviet Far East as Japan had done in the 1930s. Until the end of 1949, Moscow restrained Kim Il Sung from attempting to unite the country by military force. Such an attempt, warned Soviet diplomats, was likely to result in US military intervention under UN auspices and a renewed American occupation of the South.

But on January 30 – a week after his decisive meeting with Mao – Stalin changed his mind. Most likely the dictator was tempted to make up for the Soviet retreat in Europe and enlarge a territorial springboard from which to threaten Japan. Second, the emergence of the new ally in Asia with its huge manpower resources made it possible, if necessary, to assist Kim Il Sung and in the process to lock China firmly into the Soviet orbit by setting it against the United States. Finally, a continued denial of Kim Il Sung’s request in the presence of comrades from the new Communist China might have endangered the Kremlin’s leadership in the Communist world and encouraged Mao’s pretensions to that role.

²³ PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 331, ll. 29–32.

During his talks with Kim Il Sung, Stalin gave a new estimate of the situation: the victorious Chinese Communists were now free to assist the North; furthermore, the Americans would have no stomach to fight China after it became a Soviet ally and would be reluctant to interfere in Korea now that the USSR had acquired the atomic bomb. Stalin's miscalculations became obvious early on: the Americans intervened under the UN flag, the Chinese equivocated, and the North Koreans were soon on the run. By early October, Stalin contemplated a total defeat of Kim Il Sung rather than a direct clash with the United States, but after intensive arm-twisting managed to encourage Mao to send his armies into battle. Pledging Soviet help in case of an American attack on China, Stalin hoped that the United States would not risk an all-out war against his main ally and did everything he could to avoid a direct superpower confrontation.

This hope proved to be justified once the war became stabilized. Stalin, then, was in no hurry to stop the bleeding of his "main enemy." "This war poisons Americans' blood," was his blunt remark to Zhou Enlai in August 1952. "Americans realize that the war is detrimental for them and will have to stop it."²⁴ Until he died in March 1953, Stalin encouraged Mao and Kim Il Sung to stall ceasefire talks. But while the outcome of the Korean War looked like a draw, its long-term consequences were very negative for the Soviet Union. The conflict led to a massive rearmament of the United States and NATO's transformation into a full-fledged military alliance; it also boosted the United States' long-term military presence in the region.

Faced with a militarization of NATO, Moscow began to flesh out its own military alliance in Europe. During a January 1951 meeting with party leaders and defense ministers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, Stalin laid out a crash program for building up their national armies and defense industries. To increase defense cooperation within the Soviet bloc, a Military Coordination Committee was set up. Participants' accounts of that meeting point to a defensive rationale: Stalin wanted to repel any "aggression from the West," which now looked increasingly likely to Moscow.²⁵ By 1953, the Soviet military budget had doubled from its 1948 level.

Preparing for the worst, Stalin still tried to block the final moves toward West Germany's integration into a West European army. The famous Soviet notes of March–April 1952 were a desperate last-minute attempt to torpedo

²⁴ PA RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, l. 67.

²⁵ Leonid Gibiansky, "The Formation of Soviet Bloc Policy," in N. Egorova and A. Chubarian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina 1945–1963: istoricheskaiia retrospektiva* [Cold War 1945–1963: A Historical Retrospective] (Moscow: Olma Press, 2003), 178.

Western agreements that envisioned the creation of a European Defense Community to include West Germany. Whether Stalin was truly ready to sacrifice his puppet state in East Germany for a neutral, united, and demilitarized Germany, or whether he pushed this scheme mostly for propaganda purposes, remains unclear. But the West did not test his intentions; their rejection of his *démarche* cleared the way for the final Soviet steps to set East Germany on a course of socialist construction, rearmament, and rapid integration into the Soviet bloc.

Stalin and the Cold War

Assessing the results of Soviet postwar strategy at the end of his life, Stalin must have had mixed feelings. On the one hand, he had managed to rebuild Soviet power and achieve his core security goals – expanded borders and control over Eastern Europe – without provoking a major war with the West. In 1953, the “socialist camp” encompassed one-third of the world’s population and territory. “Fighting imperialism has become more cheerful,” Stalin quipped at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952.²⁶ On the other hand, Moscow was now faced with what it had feared and had tried to avoid: a hostile Western coalition under US auspices that embraced both old and new enemies of the USSR. From now on, the likely results of this confrontation were either a direct military collision between the two power blocs or, at best, a Cold War of attrition. Stalin and his circle entangled their worn-out country in a long twilight struggle against the preponderant West that the Soviet Union could not win. But, given the nature of the Soviet regime and external threats to its existence, they could hardly have done otherwise.²⁷

²⁶ *Pravda*, October 15, 1952.

²⁷ For additional assessments of Stalin’s policies, see the chapters by Svetozar Rajak and Norman Naimark in this volume.

Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955

ANNE DEIGHTON

In 1945, Britain was an activist world power. It possessed the world's second-largest national navy, and its Empire–Commonwealth was genuinely global. The Dominions stretched from Canada to Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; it had colonial possessions from the north to the south of the African continent, to the east of Suez, in South and Southeast Asia, as well as many scattered, and often strategic, island outposts. The 'jewel in the crown' of the Empire was India.

On VE Day, 8 May 1945, Britain and its loyal Empire–Commonwealth had 4 million troops serving overseas for the Allied cause. Wartime summit meetings had reinforced both the reality and the image of a Britain as a world power as Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States parleyed with the Soviet leader, Iosif Stalin, while the tide of fighting brought them all towards victory. It was therefore inevitable that the British would have a large role in shaping the untidy transition that was to come, and that would transform the world from war to an uncertain peace.

Leading British decision-makers assessed early on that they would have to base postwar foreign policy both on the threat from Communist ideology and on the consequences of the arrival of the Soviet Union as the new great power on the world stage. Britain would have to take a leading role to ensure that at least the western part of Germany – the motor of the European economy – was secured against Communism. It could then be revived for the Western and capitalist part of Europe through the Marshall aid programme. The British were also to play a major role in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) which was to bind the other great global power, the United States, to the defence of the West against the Soviets and their allies. By 1955, the British had committed themselves to a military presence on the ground in West Germany.

Sustaining great power status in the face of these new ideological and power-political threats took other forms, too. First was the expensive but most secret decision to go nuclear. This was made less than two years after the end of the war, with a second generation of atomic weaponry then being developed by 1955. On the 'home front', a necessary part of the emerging Cold War strategy was to secure the hearts and minds of the population in Britain and the Empire against the baleful tenets of Communism. This strategy can be seen as an echo of the domestic politics of the Second World War that had successfully secured the British 'home front' against Nazism.

So for Labour (1945–51) and Conservative (1951–55) governments, the defining trait of foreign policy was to maintain Britain's place as a major global and imperial power in a rapidly changing period of fresh ideological and power-political challenges. It is fair to argue that this priority would still have existed in Britain even if the Soviet Union had withdrawn from active international politics immediately after the war. The quest to sustain the image and the reality of great powerdom through leadership, influence, and 'punching



7. Ernest Bevin (left) and Clement Attlee, Labour's foreign secretary and prime minister, at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in London, 1946.

above our weight' was part of the *mentalité* of British planners, the military, and the politicians.

Yet this was not a straightforward policy, because Britain's own weak financial position would now force an extraordinarily rapid process of decolonisation. Over this period Britain retreated from India, Ceylon, Burma, Palestine, Ireland, and the Suez Canal zone in Egypt, while preparations for the end of imperial management were begun in Malaya and in West, Central, and East Africa. While the nature of imperial rule varied from country to country, and each country presented different challenges and possible solutions, the fear always remained that the Soviet Union might move in to fill a power vacuum or to disrupt a defensive base. So British imperial policies did not come to an end just because Britain had divested itself of some of its possessions.¹ The Middle East and Far East remained key bastions of empire, and Britain committed large numbers of troops to many areas, including Palestine, Malaya, and Kenya, over the decade. Indeed, the ending of empire was conceptualised and presented as a necessary modernisation. Adaptation to the new concept of commonwealth was conceived as nothing less than a 'world wide experiment in nation-building'. It was an attempt to create a set of global partnerships with new Commonwealth countries that would shore up the West, and that would be part of a 'global resistance to the "onrush" of communist influence', which was as much feared as was indigenous nationalism and communal violence.²

Britain's Cold War strategy emerges

Well before the war ended military planners were determining the elements of this reasonably clear Cold War strategy. The first priority was the extent to which British national interests could be protected and perhaps even advanced after the war. What was to be its global strategy?

Strategic thinking involves not only geography, but also ideas. The British had wrestled – literally as well as intellectually – with both German nationalism

1 Wm. Roger Louis, 'Introduction' and 'The Dissolution of the British Empire', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29, 329–42.

2 United Kingdom National Archives (UKNA), CO537/5698, May 1950; CAB 129/37/3, CP (49) 245, annex A, 'The requirements of national defence', October 1949. See also Ronald Hyam (ed.), *British Documents on the End of Empire*, Series A, Vol. II, *The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945–1951*, Part I, *High Policy and Administration* (London: HMSO, 1992), 334, doc. 72. There were also extensive development programmes for the colonies, a process much favoured by Bevin.

and Communism in the first half of the twentieth century: how to live with Bolshevism had concerned Whitehall even as the First World War was coming to a close (the choice between the 'Boche or the Bolshie'). The effort of trying to compare the threat of Communism from 1917 onwards with that of the rise of Nazism and fascism had played havoc with traditional 'balancing' notions that dominated British thinking about the European continent and had contributed to the scarring debate about appeasement in the 1930s. The period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact between 1939 and 1941 confirmed Whitehall's distrust of both Germany and the Soviet Union, a distrust that was in reality not much mitigated by the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Thus anti-Communism and anti-Soviet thinking were already firmly part of the British cultural landscape in the 1940s.

It was the military chiefs and intelligence officers who were the main driving force of Britain's future Cold War strategy. New evidence confirms the extent to which intelligence, and those with access to intelligence material, played a central role and generated a mindset about Soviet intentions that was to dominate thinking for the next fifty years.³ The Joint Intelligence Committee was at the apex of the intelligence-gathering system, and was chaired by a senior Foreign Office official with a membership drawn from the Chiefs of Staff. In 1943, a Post Hostilities Planning Committee was established; its work was overseen by a ministerial Armistice and Postwar Committee, chaired by the deputy prime minister of the coalition government, Labour's Clement Attlee. This committee was at the centre of intense arguments about the extent to which the Soviet Union should be considered a postwar threat.

These committees were examining Soviet capabilities as well as behaviour. Assessments were based upon a mixture of ideological predisposition to distrust Soviet intentions, as well as geostrategic analyses, although some thought that such radical debates should be off-limits while the war was still being fought, as any leaks to the Soviets might create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet planning had to be concerned with the balance of power rather than with nebulous indications of goodwill to the Soviet Union.⁴ An anti-Soviet mindset can be detected in the intelligence community from 1943 onwards, with racist

3 Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2002), 8–19, xiv; Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), 43–63.

4 Julian Lewis, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post War Strategic Defence, 1942–1947*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), xcvi, 338.

attitudes towards the 'semi-oriental' Soviet forces, and an appreciation on the ground of how the Soviets behaved which was confirmed from the very top of the military hierarchy, chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke himself.⁵ The Foreign Office was more ambivalent about seeing the Soviet Union as the next great challenge for British interests while the war was still on and while the Soviets remained an important military ally, although there was still considerable apprehension about Europe's postwar future. In a revealing exchange of minutes as early as mid-1942, it was observed that the current trend of Soviet policy would amount to the extension of exclusive Soviet influence over the whole of Eastern Europe. Britain could not stop 'the establishment of Russian predominance in Eastern Europe if Germany is crushed and disarmed and Russia participates in the final victory'. In this case, it would seem that the worst fears of 'the Poles, Yugoslavs, Greeks & Turks are justified, and their only hope for the future lies in a Germany strong enough to counteract Soviet predominance'.⁶

As the war drew to a close, strategic planning for the postwar world became more intense. Although Britain had gone to war in 1939 in defence of Poland, Poland's fate was not now the primary concern of British decision-makers. British national interests centred, first, on Germany, as it remained the fulcrum of the European continental balance of power; and, second, on the future of Britain's imperial holdings, particularly in the Mediterranean region. Ostensibly, the coalition government sought a four-power plan and a United Nations; however, the military were sceptical about both ideas. They did not see how Britain could work constructively with the Soviet Union, did not like the idea of a United Nations, and thought China was 'rather a joke'.⁷

Yet this change was an uneven process. Churchill's lack of serious consideration of postwar planning, and the uncomfortable coexistence of his own anti-Communism with his personal respect for Stalin, meant that wartime planning exercises within Whitehall were often incoherent. Opportunism rather than ideology framed Churchill's attitude towards the Communists, although he wrote to his foreign secretary Anthony Eden in April 1944 that, though 'I have tried in every way to put myself in sympathy with these Communist leaders, I cannot feel the slightest trust or confidence in them.

5 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 43. Agencies also did not stop their work on Soviet code breaking after 1941.

6 UKNA, FO371/30834, R. Makins minute, 7 May 1942, W. Strang minutes, 12 and 14 May 1942, O. Sargent minutes, 13 and 14 May 1942. I am indebted to Vit Smetana for these references.

7 Lewis, *Changing Direction*, 69.

Force and facts are their only realities.⁸ So, as the Soviet armies began to move west, it was becoming clear that an expansionist Soviet Union possibly controlling a communised Germany would require a very different kind of peace settlement from anything envisaged during the early part of the war. The Soviet Union's own wartime experience would mean that it would never co-operate in any revival of Germany that it could not control. So the question became one of how Britain could build a coalition to contain the power of the Soviet Union, by working with France and maybe even Germany itself. As the Soviet Union could threaten British interests worldwide, American balancing support would also be required. Indeed, as the war ended, and knowing of the impending US test of the atomic bomb, Churchill even asked for plans – Operation Unthinkable – to be drawn up for an immediate non-nuclear-based invasion of the Soviet Union. These plans left officials – even Brooke – aghast.⁹

Finally, the strategists were all too well aware of the financial disaster that could descend upon the country as the war ended. Britain was bankrupt. The costs of war had emptied British coffers, and had also placed a huge strain on its imperial creditors. Yet even this was seen as only a temporary phenomenon: it was the price of victory, and a price that the Americans would surely help to pay. National retreat from global status after military victory was entirely counter-intuitive for both British bureaucrats and politicians.¹⁰

Yet, for the British electorate in 1945, it was the domestic agenda that was most important. The Labour Party had promised to implement the ambitious Beveridge Report of 1943 and to create a genuine welfare state. This would ensure that the postwar traumas of the 1920s and 1930s became nothing more than a distant memory. So, flushed with its success in the 1945 general election, Labour now had to balance Britain's overseas interests with the demand for domestic reconstruction. They had to manoeuvre through uncharted waters, between the commitment to reconstruction, the tough geostrategy required to sustain British global and imperial interests, and the containment of Communism and the Soviet Union. This had to be done in spite of the noisy opposition that came from the left wing of the Labour Party itself.

8 David Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (London: Allen Lane, 2004), 407–20, quote on 416.

9 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 58–59; Lewis, *Changing Direction*, xxxvi–xlvi.

10 David Reynolds, 'Great Britain', in David Reynolds (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 78–79; on the American loan negotiations, see Robert Skidelsky, *John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain*, vol. III (London: Macmillan, 2001).



8. Housewives queuing for potatoes in London, 1947. Domestic priorities competed with Cold War imperatives.

Britain's Cold War abroad: the 1940s

It is not surprising that the tough three-power Potsdam Conference was seen as a watershed in the politics of the wartime Grand Alliance.¹¹ The British negotiators were reminded that Britain had earlier failed to heed warnings about Hitler's intentions and should not now repeat the error of appeasement, but should instead confront Stalin's 'ideological Lebensraum'. If the German question – what Germany would do next – had dominated the interwar years, now it was the question of what to do with a defeated and occupied Germany.¹² For Germany was the geostrategic and economic powerhouse

¹¹ Gill Bennett, *The End of the War in Europe, 1945* (London: HMSO, 1996), 97–98.

¹² Rohan Butler and Margaret E. Pelly (eds.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series I, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1984), No. 102, 11 July 1945; Noel Annan, *Changing Enemies: The Defeat and Regeneration of Germany* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 146: 'Bevin hated the Germans ... [But he] had no illusions about the Soviet Union, or about communists'; Anne Deighton, "'Minds, Not Hearts": British Policy and West German Rearmament', in Christian Hasse (ed.), *Debating Foreign Affairs: The Public and British Foreign Policy since 1867* (Berlin: Philo, 2003), 78–96.

of Europe. If the Soviet Union was to be successfully contained, US support in securing the West German zones would be vital even if most of Eastern Europe was 'lost'. Worse, if proper attention was not given to western Germany, a new Rapallo mentality might emerge as Germans turned once again towards the Soviet Union.

Soon after the war, senior Foreign Office officials extrapolated from what they could see of Soviet behaviour in postwar Germany as well as in the Soviet Union itself, and they shifted closer to the Chiefs of Staff's wartime line of argument, accepting an anti-Communist Soviet agenda as the organising principle of British postwar foreign policy, arguing that 'in seeking a maximum degree of security Russian policy will be aggressive by all means short of war'.¹³ The diplomat Christopher Warner, who had been optimistic about the postwar world, now concluded that the UK had been chosen by the Soviets for a political and diplomatic onslaught. They 'have decided upon an aggressive policy, based upon militant communism and Russian chauvinism. They have launched an offensive against social democracy and against this country ... The Soviet Government makes coordinated use of military, economic, propaganda and political weapons and also of the Communist "religion". It is submitted, therefore, that we must at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these, and that we should not stop short of a defensive-offensive policy.'¹⁴

Labour's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, was confronted with these perceived new realities in Soviet policy, and, in May 1946, Bevin himself warned the Labour Cabinet of the new dangers. A Russia Committee to lead policy was established in the Foreign Office.¹⁵ A rear-guard attempt by Prime Minister Clement Attlee at the end of the year to argue that the eastern Mediterranean was now essentially undefendable was overridden by Bevin, himself backed by the Chiefs who threatened to resign *en masse* if Attlee got his way.

This important row indicated that it was a Cold War mindset that now dominated Whitehall, even if some politicians were slower to grasp this: now 'Communism [was] the most important external political menace

13 UKNA, CAB 81/132: JIC (46) 1 (o) (Final) (Revise), 1 March 1946. Recent Russian research reveals the uncertainty of Soviet policy at this time, and that UK planners also thought that the Soviet Union might fear an 'impending penetration by the Western Allies', but nevertheless based their assessments on worst case analysis.

14 UKNA, FO371/56832, C. Warner memo, 2 April 1946. Warner was now head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

15 UKNA, FO371/56885, 12 April 1946. The Archbishop of Canterbury was invited to join the committee.

confronting the British Commonwealth and Western democracies and [was] likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.’¹⁶ The new mindset was also shaped by the dispatches of the Foreign Office diplomat, Frank Roberts, who thought that Britain had to show it was the champion of a progressive faith and way of life ‘with an appeal to the world as least as great as those of the communist system’.¹⁷ The Communist menace was not yet simply or even primarily military, but was driven by a Marxist ideology that assumed expansion, caution, and the use of every political and economic trick. Communism was a form of religion that placed ideology even above national loyalty, so how the Soviets organised Communist Parties abroad – including that in Britain – was also of great importance. In short, as well as being a potential long-term challenge to territorial defence, the Cold War was conceived as a war of ideas, of loyalty to beliefs, and of all political mischief short of war.

The shift in Whitehall towards a Cold War mindset was momentous, if not unexpected. Now, suspicion of the Soviet Union, and of Communism in the UK, in Europe, and the Empire–Commonwealth would dominate policy planning and implementation for the next fifty years. But, over the next two years, while working out how to manage the new threat, the British government was also simultaneously involved in efforts to plan collectively for the postwar world through a United Nations organisation and the Bretton Woods institutions. This was the public, optimistic, and co-operative face of British diplomacy. The failure to establish effective institutions of collective security, and the retreat of the United States into isolationism during the interwar period were powerful reminders of the public responsibilities that the British had to bear to ensure that international institutions worked this time round. In the peace treaty talks, they also worked hard to retain their influence in the eastern Mediterranean in particular, where imperial and trusteeship interests were at stake, while access to oil and to strategic land and sea routes gave the area a special importance that continued to shape British policy. There was also some early optimism about the potential of France to act as a European and imperial partner in the creation of a third world force that would balance both US and Soviet power, but,

¹⁶ UKNA, CAB 130/17, JIC (46) 70 (C) (Final), 23 September 1946, ‘The spread of communism throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow’. This was used as a reference text for the Cabinet working party on subversive activities (GEN 168) in early 1947.

¹⁷ UKNA, FO371/56763, F. Roberts to FO, 18 March 1946. He and his distinguished counterpart George Kennan were both reporting from Moscow in 1946.

although this notion was not formally abandoned until 1949, it seemed an increasingly weak strategic response to the new realities.¹⁸

However, the logic of bipolarity became increasingly potent. Negotiations in the torrid atmosphere of successive Council of Foreign Ministers meetings brought to fruition a Cold War policy that predicated the need for a viable West Germany with first US, and then later French, backing to balance Soviet power in Central Europe.¹⁹ Then, over the summer of 1947, the outline of the Marshall Plan was laid down.

In British eyes, the Marshall Plan was an indication that the United States had finally realised that incremental help through loans to Britain and France was not of itself going to bring the economic revival of the western zones of the defeated Germany, or the wider West European economy. While some may have hoped for an all-Europe recovery programme, most people in the UK and the United States were by now working on the principle that an East–West breakdown was inevitable, but wanted to put the blame fairly and squarely upon the heads of the Soviet leaders, even as aid was given to the capitalist countries of Europe. As Bevin whispered to his principal private secretary, Pierson Dixon, in the crucial Paris meeting of June–July 1947, ‘we are witnessing the birth of the Western bloc’.²⁰ Shortly after this the Soviets stormed out. Britain’s role was crucial in ensuring this breakdown, and then in persuading the United States that the organisation of the programme should meet UK expectations, and certainly not be the first step to a more politically integrated Western Europe. The Marshall aid programme did stimulate the wider West European economy and also served to assist domestic restructuring in Britain. Britain’s financial problems were vast, however, and the quest for resources and the constant sterling crises were an uncomfortable backdrop to activist policies at home and overseas. Most important aid eventually provided a psychologically comforting basis from which to build ‘the West’.

Within this seam of Cold War politics lay the issue of British–American relations. From 1945, it had been clear that the United States was essential to all Britain’s international diplomacy. Without US leadership nothing would happen. Relations were frequently very close in areas such as intelligence, and informal contacts based upon Joint Service operations during the war were sustained into the postwar era by British–American co-operation

18 Anne Deighton, ‘Entente Neo-Coloniale? Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17, 4 (2006), 835–52.

19 Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990/1993).

20 Pierson Dixon diary, 2 July 1947, read with kind permission of Pierson Dixon.

over access to materials and the sharing of staff.²¹ However, tensions between the UK and the United States were considerable: they covered the management of Germany (the United States had even volunteered to swap German zones in 1946, if the British felt they could not do the job), bases, and nuclear politics, as well as aid and reconstruction funding. Indeed, the secret decision to build a British nuclear bomb had been in part the result of a breakdown between the British and the Americans over access to nuclear technology.

Part of the reason for the difficulties in the British–American partnership in the early postwar years resulted from suspicion about US intentions and its reliability that was widely held in the UK. While some Conservatives wanted to base British foreign policy upon old imperial precepts, others – particularly on the left of the Labour Party – feared that Bevin’s hard line against Communism revealed him to be some kind of American lackey. In November 1946, some members of the Labour Party even sought in the House of Commons to bring a vote of no confidence in Bevin.

Yet 1947 saw a sea-change in British politics, in which the voices of opposition to its Cold War strategy were drowned out by evidence of the threatening behaviour of the Soviets in Eastern Europe and over Germany, and the real prospect of American financial aid for Western Europe through Marshall aid. However, the path to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty was not easy, although after its signing Marshall aid and NATO were conceived of as the two halves of the same walnut, delivering economic and military security, as the response to the Berlin blockade was already showing. Yet, in 1948, Bevin had hoped instead for US backing for a security grouping that was West European, which would have given the British greater freedom of manoeuvre. The five-power Brussels Treaty of 1948 was, however, soon overtaken by the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in April 1949 by twelve powers, including the United States itself and to which Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.²² It fulfilled Britain’s need for an American guarantee to Europe against an outside threat, and met the obvious new reality of the late 1940s – the new balance of power was global, not just European.

²¹ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 207–11.

²² The original members of the Brussels Treaty were Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were the five Brussels Treaty signatories plus Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. For the impact of the Marshall Plan, see also William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

Britain's Cold War at home

Recently released archives now show that the Cold War 'home front' was also an integral part of Britain's Cold War history, and domestic institutions were, in some respects, put back on to a war footing, as Communism represented a critical and ongoing threat to British values in particular and to Western democracy in general. In other words, Britain was at war, domestically and overseas, in the same way that it had been between 1939 and 1945 – militarily, economically, and spiritually.²³ Cold War exigencies required efforts to monitor Communist activity and weed Communists out of public services and trades unions at home and abroad, given the perception of the menace to the interests and safety of the whole British Commonwealth.²⁴ Assessments suggested that there could be Communist manipulation of domestic affairs, espionage, and fifth-column activity. The government had therefore to counter infiltration in the trades unions, and the influence of the Communist Party in industry, the armed forces, the police, and the civil service. Although the party itself was not banned, by the early 1950s those applying for public service appointments were vetted for their political affiliations, while Cabinet committees on home and overseas Communism were established to monitor these ongoing efforts.²⁵

Yet, it was not until the end of 1947 that the Labour government was ready to go public with an assault upon Communism at home. After Cabinet meetings in early January 1948, Bevin launched his social democratic crusade in the House of Commons.²⁶ His career as a trades unionist in the 1920s and 1930s had left him with a deep-seated dislike of Communists in the unions; and in 1946 he had worked with trades union leaders to ensure that senior posts within the movement were denied to Communist Party members where possible. He would have agreed with the Joint Intelligence Committee analysis of 1947 that 'the Soviet leaders were especially hostile to "reformist socialism" which they regard as a competitor for working-class support in many countries'.²⁷

23 This was the view of the Colonial Office Information Committee, UKNA, CAB 130/37/ August 1949; GEN 231/4, 16 June 1949.

24 UKNA, CAB 130/17, JIC (46) 70 (C) (Final), 23 September 1946, 'The spread of communism throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow'.

25 UKNA, CAB 130 series; Hennessy, *Secret State*, 77–119.

26 House of Commons, Hansard, 5th series, vol. 446, cols. 383–409, January 1948.

27 UKNA, CAB 158/1, JIC (47) 7/2.

A senior ministerial committee then was convened to oversee the implementation of anti-Communist measures at home.²⁸ While it was agreed that Britain in 1948 was not in a state of war, quite extraordinarily, the committee then debated on how to use the Labour Party as a means for countering Communist activity at home and abroad. The British Council, the Central Office of Information, and the Foreign Office's Information Research Department were to be important players, tasked to promote a British way of life through social propaganda, and thereby encourage their audience to infer that the democratic way of life was to be preferred to the Communist way of living.²⁹ Ministers wanted the full panoply of films, exhibitions, international conferences, and national and international youth groups to be used to promote social democracy, and this would be supported by 'white' and 'grey' propaganda initiatives and supported by the British film industry.³⁰ The BBC itself was the focus of much discussion, and although Bevin sought not to undermine its famed independence, he did also note that there were already very close informal contacts between the head of the BBC Overseas Service and the Foreign Office. Trades unions were seen as being in the front line in the struggle against Communist influence. The committee also assessed ways of drawing the churches into what was seen as a common action in defence of Western civilisation.³¹

The nature of the Cold War and the level of fear about Communism at home as well as abroad are historically highly significant. If Britain managed to avoid the extremes of US McCarthyism, it is nevertheless clear that the means used came close to undermining the very way of life that was being protected, although Bevin was at pains to rein in the more extravagant proposals of his advisers. Yet it has to be said that, by the mid-1950s, such activity no doubt contributed to the creation in Britain of a remarkable elite and working-class consensus about Britain's place and role in the world. It has been argued that

28 UKNA, CAB 130/37. It was called first the European Policy, and then the Anti-Communist Propaganda Committee, 1948. It was chaired by C. Attlee, and E. Bevin, H. Morrison, S. Cripps, A. V. Alexander, J. Chuter Ede, and G. Isaacs were members.

29 UKNA, CAB 130/17, GEN/168, 3 February 1947.

30 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, *Britain's Secret Propaganda War* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 105–15; Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda, and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 1–5, 193. Films were an enormously popular medium in the mid 1940s, and at least half of the adult population visited the cinema once a fortnight.

31 Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 105–07; Dianne Kirby, 'The Church of England and the Cold War Nuclear Debate', *Twentieth Century History*, 4, 3 (1993), 250–83.

this consensus was largely manufactured by the government to manage public opinion.³² This may overestimate both the competence and the cohesion of the covert agencies and of government departments. The notorious cases of the upper-middle-class ‘Cambridge Spies’, Kim Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean, were deeply embarrassing for the government, although the Americans, too, had had their own spy scandals. There were deep disagreements between government departments, and even between ministers, on how to deal with the Cold War as a domestic as well as a foreign-policy issue. Foreign Office minister Kenneth Younger, for example, deeply disagreed with the ‘virulent anti-Soviet slanging match’ that typified the propaganda work under the management of his fellow Labour Party office holders Christopher Mayhew and the reactionary Hector McNeil.³³ It is also hard to measure the effectiveness of propaganda.³⁴ Yet, it remains the fact that a fairly sustained public consensus did emerge on the subject: domestic dissent about Soviet policy was muted throughout the 1950s, and, for example, there was virtually no criticism of NATO in Britain throughout the Cold War.

Into the 1950s

Although it is an oversimplification, British foreign policy over this whole period can be characterised by Churchill’s iconographic ‘Three Interlocking Circles’ concept of Britain as the only country that acted as a link between the Empire–Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe. Yet in the 1950s the formula was challenged, and found to be wanting, for the UK could not secure leadership of the kind of Europe it wanted while at the same time preserving its leading role in the Empire–Commonwealth and all the while persuading the United States of the accuracy of the British position.

By the early 1950s, Britain had effectively abandoned its role as the principal partner of the United States in Europe. Marshall aid had generated considerable disagreement between the United States and the UK over European integration, for the British were not prepared to pursue economic and political

32 Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 189–229; Jonathan Schneer, *Labour’s Conscience: The Labour Left, 1945–1951* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988). For developments in the United States, see the chapter by Laura McEnaney in this volume.

33 Quoted in Geoffrey Warner (ed.), *In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger, February 1950–October 1951* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41, 70.

34 Hugh Wilford, ‘Calling the Tune? The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War, 1945–1960’, in Giles Scott Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 49.

policies that extended beyond an intergovernmental, Commonwealth-type approach, although the United States had had early expectations that Britain would lead a West European grouping.³⁵ British governments had also been unimpressed by continental European efforts to create a quasi-federal Council of Europe between 1948 and 1949, and were likewise hostile to the Schuman Plan proposals of June 1950 for a Coal and Steel Community that would be managed by a supra-national High Authority. They were prepared to support the October 1950 Pleven Plan project for a European Defence Community, which would have brought West German troops (rather than the West German state) into the Western defence equation, but neither Labour nor Conservative governments considered that Britain should join these French-inspired projects. Meanwhile, after the signature of the important North Atlantic Treaty, American policy-makers now struggled with Britain's attitude to Europe and turned to France, which was willing and increasingly able to play a stronger 'Western' role, and to support the newly created West German government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.³⁶

Yet by 1955 the British still thought they had secured a good compromise between the United States and Western Europe, with the transformation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation into the Western European Union, with Italy and West Germany as new members, and with a token commitment of British forces to German soil, but with West Germany also in NATO. They thought that this settlement ensured that a 'Western Europe is now emerging, which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent ... will reinforce the Atlantic Community'. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was able to reassure his Conservative Party MPs that the United States now had new confidence in the 'stability of her European allies under British leadership', and was hopeful that the settlement had put an end to supra-national initiatives that would disrupt the agreement.³⁷

This was an aspiration about British identity and its role in the world, as well as about the Cold War balance of power, and the way in which European

35 William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 108.

36 Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), chs. 4, 5. An account of the UK response to the Schuman Plan is to be found in Alan S. Milward, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-1963* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), ch. 3. This is the first volume of the British Official History on Britain and Europe since 1945.

37 Cmnd 928 (London: HMSO, 1954), 11; Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford, CRD2/34/7, FACO (54)8, brief for debate on London and Paris Agreements, 15 November 1954.

supra-national integration was related to Cold War politics. The British thought that the military and psychological results of US membership in NATO were sufficient to ensure a favourable balance of power on the European continent. Institutions for continental West European integration could be useful, but they were not more than ‘nested’ institutions under the military security umbrella. It would not be necessary or even helpful for the UK to participate in them. The UK remained a global power with imperial responsibilities that extended well beyond the West European landmass.

Yet, ironically, by the 1950s Britain had also lost some of these imperial responsibilities, including India, Ceylon, and Burma. The link between the Cold War and decolonisation was not one of cause and effect; far from it, for by the turn of the decade both the British and the Americans had come to see Britain’s imperial possessions as having strategic utility for a global balance that was favourable to the West. Indeed, in strategically valuable areas the bogey of Communism could be invoked, even if it was not already present.³⁸ Thus, the developing Cold War environment actually pointed to the continued utility of imperial possessions and strategic bases for British and American foreign policy, although the economic burden of empire was becoming intolerable.

Bevin had also invested considerable energy in the Middle East with efforts to construct a new set of defence and associative relationships in the region because of its strategic and resource value and the fear of Soviet penetration. However, the infamous ‘scuttle’ from Palestine had sullied Britain’s reputation not only in the Arab world, but also with the United States, too. In East Africa, an attempt to establish a new base in Kenya failed, when Whitehall decided that the strategic threat from the Soviet Union was greater in the Middle East. The importance of this latter area also meant that the United States was playing an increasingly significant role.³⁹ Malaya, an early success story for the flexibility of British imperial policy, then witnessed an insurrection in 1948 which was seen in London as part of a larger Communist-inspired challenge in Asia. It required more than 40,000 troops to be deployed there to sustain a British presence in the region with the co-operation of like-minded Malays, and to convince the

38 John Kent, ‘The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 165–83; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914–1990* (London: Longman, 1993), 265; Susan Carruthers, *Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media, and Colonial Counter Insurgency, 1944–1960* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995).

39 Roger Louis, ‘The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 43–72.



9. British troops moving through Port Said, Egypt, during the 1956 Suez crisis.

Americans that Britain was still pulling its weight in the Cold War.⁴⁰ Likewise in the Gold Coast, the Accra riots of 1948 had been seen as evidence of the spreading influence of Communism to Africa, and were harshly suppressed. By 1955, pressures for decolonisation had nevertheless grown and this challenged Britain's position as an imperial power, although it was not until after the Suez fiasco that Britain's weakness became blatantly evident.⁴¹

The 1950s were also marked by increasing alarm in Britain about the United States, the third of Churchill's Three Interlocking Circles. US Cold War policy was becoming increasingly belligerent and provocative, and the British now

⁴⁰ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 499–500; L. J. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post Imperial World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 118–19.

⁴¹ David Goldsworthy, *Documents on the End of Empire*, Series A, Vol. III, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951–1957* (London: HMSO, 1994), xl.

struggled to contain the policy gap over how the Cold War should be fought. In 1950, war broke out over Korea, and it was here that cold war turned to an unwanted and unwelcome hot war. Although Korea was a UN operation, the war marked the clear arrival of the United States as a global Cold War actor and, with this, the relative diminution of the UK's role. Early on, the war had been presented as a chance to show the Americans the UK's 'capacity to act as a world power with the support of the Commonwealth', and thereby to convince them not to reduce Marshall aid grants to the UK as part of the Anglo-American spat about European integration.⁴² Yet British decision-makers soon found a number of worrying aspects to the United States' pursuit of the Korean War. There was concern that the Soviets might overreact to American pressure and destabilise Europe while all eyes were focused upon Asia. There was a panic that the Americans might use nuclear weapons: this impelled Attlee to visit Harry S. Truman in December 1950 to plead for a more temperate approach. Fears that the war might spill over into other parts of the region were increased when the United States insisted on branding China as an aggressor in early 1951, after UN troops had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and headed towards the Chinese border. The war meant a huge rise in British defence expenditures (which rose to nearly £1,500 million), and this inevitably brought sections of the Labour Party into open revolt about the priorities of the government.

To make matters worse, joint planning and intelligence operations also indicated that the United States was taking a path that was alarming to senior decision-makers in Britain: some in the United States were increasingly contemplating 'winning' the Cold War, and doing this by force if necessary. 'Roll-back' and talk of a preventative war could spell disaster for the territorial status quo that the British thought they had secured with the NATO pact. A general world war was not one that could be won in any meaningful sense, and British decision-makers also knew that the country would be very exposed if there was ever to be a Soviet nuclear attack, both because of geography and because of the presence of US atomic weapons in the UK.⁴³

The response in Britain to the blatant arrival of American power and activism on the world stage was a cautious one. It was not considered appropriate to push the Soviets too roughly into a diplomatic corner; so, conforming to all aspects of US policy, in particular those relating to controls on exports from OEEC countries to the Eastern bloc, was resisted, even if this

42 UKNA, FO371/84081, P. Dixon memo, 28 June 1950; FO371/81655, FO to Washington, 30 June 1950; Kenneth Morgan, *Labour in Power, 1945–1951* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 422ff.

43 On US plans to launch an atomic attack from British bases in the event of war, see UKNA, DEFE32/1, CoS to A. W. Tedder, 28 July 1950.

seemed like a revival of an appeasement mentality.⁴⁴ How to manage the coming of age of an activist American Cold War policy also affected the politicians. Churchill returned to office in 1951, although he was by now ailing, and not really suited to the demands of high office. After the death of Stalin in 1953, Churchill made it his personal crusade to reinvent the summitry of the war years. If, by 1955, the Geneva Summit was projected as a serious step away from the first years of the 1950s, its achievements were actually limited.⁴⁵

Interpreting Britain's Cold War

Historians have moved on from the debate about who started the Cold War. Yet it is inadequate to talk of the Cold War simply as just one phase of foreign policy, or as a period of history from roughly 1945 to 1989. Since the end of the Cold War, more archival access and fresh, often interdisciplinary thinking that is taking place in a new political environment have transformed the ways in which we understand the Cold War. The Cold War emerged in different ways in each country and its characterisation is still essentially shaped by national political environments. For this reason, the rise of interest in the importance of Commonwealth and colonies, decolonisation, and the 'Third World' in the Cold War is especially relevant for the UK, whose own imperial footprint lay across the world, and whose Cold War arena was genuinely global.

The intelligence strand of the Cold War was also more important than was previously realised. Intelligence information was vital for both domestic and foreign policy, and it also became a very expensive subset of a Cold War game in itself.⁴⁶ Information was at a premium. Much work remains to be done on how intelligence was fed into specific Cold War decisions: some intelligence assessments were wrong; other assessments did not exist when they should have. Intelligence sources failed to anticipate the explosion of the first Soviet bomb in 1949; the Malaya crisis was not well served by intelligence information; neither the Berlin crisis of 1948–49 nor the invasion of South Korea were accurately

44 Ian Jackson, *The Economic Cold War: America, Britain, and East-West Trade, 1948–1963* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

45 Geoffrey Best, *Churchill: A Study in Greatness* (London: Penguin, 2002); John W. Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Saki Dockrill and Günter Bischof, 'Introduction', in Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

46 In 1948, intelligence is estimated to have cost 7.1 per cent of GNP: Michael Dockrill, *British Defence since 1945* (London: Blackwell, 1988), 151–52. The huge popularity of the novels of John Le Carré is evidence of British fascination with this dimension of the Cold War.

anticipated; and British and American estimates on the size of the North Korean army were wildly inaccurate.⁴⁷ Yet the steady drip-feed of intelligence material formed an important environment in which spending, planning, and operational decisions were made in the UK. Peter Hennessy calls this the creation of a 'Secret State' within existing structures in Whitehall. Democratic control, such as there was, came only from ministerial decisions, not parliament.⁴⁸

Another interpretation of Britain's Cold War is more sociological, investing it with a domestic and social dimension that historians can unearth by reconstructing its 'lived experience'. In this interpretation, understanding the institutions of civil society, including trades unions, churches, and private networks, and their penetration by domestic and US intelligence becomes part of the fabric of a new history. This allows for a different kind of historical narrative that spills into hitherto-unexplored aspects of the Cold War, but which is also linked to the study of the rise of new forms of mass communications, and of national and transnational networks.⁴⁹

The prosecution of the Cold War was very effectively carried out in Britain. There are many reasons as to why a Cold War mentality became so successfully internalised: the validity of the cause perhaps; but also a deeply rooted reflex of activism and international leadership that still dominated Whitehall and Westminster during these years, despite the privations that this might mean for the general public.⁵⁰ These reasons were reinforced by the positive experiences of victory gleaned from the Second World War, for the wartime mentality that had delivered victory in 1945 did not then disappear completely. As they changed enemies, decision-makers saw that the intelligence and manipulative propaganda in domestic as well as overseas strategies were necessary to counter Communism, in the same way that they had been deployed against Nazism.

47 Aldrich, *Hidden Hand*, 500–03, 272.

48 Hennessy, *Secret State*. Recent scholarship has been possible only because of the changes in British legislation relating to hitherto-unreleased primary documents about intelligence and security: David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 195–201.

49 Christian G. Appy, *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 3; Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, 'East Is East and West Is West?: Towards a Comparative Socio-cultural History of the Cold War', in Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cultural and Social History* (London, Frank Cass, 2004), 1–23. On American cultural influences, see Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); W. Scott Lucas, 'Mobilising Culture: The State–Private Network and the CIA in the Early Cold War', in Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (eds.), *War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 92–94.

50 Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security and the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 285–86.

Party-political dissent was kept to a minimum, as there was also fairly robust political bipartisanship that dominated foreign policy making and minimised public disagreement if the national interest was said to be at stake. British elite groups were socially and ideologically coherent, not diverse, while intelligence monitoring and white propaganda encouraged the public notion of Britain as a responsible and moral great power. It remains the case that, as Britain settled down for the long haul of the Cold War, there was virtually no sustained questioning or opposition from the British masses or elites about British relations with the Soviet Union and Communism.

It is therefore impossible to disagree with the remark of the former permanent under secretary of state at the Foreign Office, Sir Michael Palliser, that 'the cold war is a thread that has run through everything'.⁵¹ The sense that there was an emerging Soviet and Communist threat obliged successive British governments to keep their people on an expensive semi-war footing at home and abroad.⁵² At home, vigilance and controls were nevertheless combined with welfare reforms and a greater state role in the management of the economy. Abroad, Britain had again to play a major part to create a favourable balance of power. As the Soviet Union was both a European and a global power, the support of the United States was also essential.⁵³ Going nuclear strengthened Britain's world power position and image, and it also helped the UK to deal with the United States as more of an equal partner, at least in the short term. By 1949, NATO was also in place to provide the security that would allow Communism to be contained at least behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet encroachment in the eastern Mediterranean and Iran, as well as in Asia, had to be stalled. A defence barrier across strategic parts of the Empire-Commonwealth was essential and, with American support, and despite early postwar decolonisation, this allowed 'the British Empire to revive before it collapsed'.⁵⁴ These were policy objectives that were perceived to be both necessary and of strategic benefit to Britain. They quickly became Cold War policy imperatives that were continually to trump the debilitating economic weakness of Britain itself.

⁵¹ Quoted in Hennessy, *Secret State*, 4.

⁵² In 1946, over 16% of GNP was being spent on defence; in 1956, it was near 10%, while over three-quarters of a million men were still under arms. See Frank Heinlein, *British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 73, n. 4; Butler, *Britain and Empire*, 100.

⁵³ Geoffrey Warner, 'Ernest Bevin', in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1939-1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103-35.

⁵⁴ Louis, 'Dissolution of the British Empire', 330.

The division of Germany, 1945–1949

HANS-PETER SCHWARZ

“The future of Germany was the question of questions and had to be looked at in its own terms. It was Germany that twice in a quarter-century had generated world war,” wrote Walt W. Rostow in 1972, when he analyzed the unfolding of the Cold War in Germany.¹ Rostow, national security adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s, had been personally involved in the planning of American policies toward Germany in 1946. He was aware of the fear, the despair, and the hatred that German warfare, German occupation of Europe, and German atrocities had stirred up. But by 1947 most American decisionmakers had shifted their worries from Germany to the Soviet Union.

How did this change come about? Why did the insoluble questions of joint occupation lead directly into the Cold War in Germany? And how should we assess this historical event from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century? These are the leading questions of this chapter.

The German problem

“Germany is our problem,” wrote Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau in 1945. The measures to curb German power were many and they seemed justified: military government and an unlimited period of occupation; abolition of the German armed forces and elimination of the country’s industrial war potential; de-Nazification and punishment of all Germans involved in Nazi crimes; reparations to the Soviet Union on a gigantic scale as well as to the Western countries in order to restore – at least partly – the damages caused by Germany. In addition to occupation and security controls, radical structural changes seemed necessary. All sorts of recipes were on the table: “dismemberment” of the German Reich that, since its founding by Bismarck, in 1866 and 1871, had played a semi-hegemonic role in Europe and had ruled

1 Walt W. Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: 1957–1972* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 9.

Europe from 1940 to 1944; the annexation of large portions of eastern and western Germany; a sharp reduction in the economic potential of this industrial giant; international control of the Ruhr; deep, perhaps revolutionary, reforms in many realms of economy, society, and administration; elimination of the economic, cultural, and administrative "old" elites that had joined up with Hitler's party; reeducation.

Yet, upon closer inspection, it was much easier to draw up a list of draconian policies than to agree upon them. The joint occupation of a defeated, still potentially powerful great nation by a coalition of victorious but heterogeneous great powers was a unique historical experiment. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see why the system of joint occupation was doomed to fail.

This failure of joint occupation had a multitude of causes. Five primary factors can be singled out: the breakup of Germany into zones of occupation; the power vacuum in Central Europe; the ideological incompatibility of the wartime Grand Alliance; the controversies over reparations; and the interdependence of the German economy with the economies of continental Western Europe.

For practical reasons, each of the four powers had to appoint a military governor to supervise its own zone of occupation and to act as the highest authority in his zone. Yet in order to ensure coordination "in matters affecting Germany as a whole," the commanders-in-chief were supposed to act "jointly" in the Allied Control Council (ACC), established in Berlin.² Decisions of the ACC would require unanimity. Thus the concept of the joint occupation of Germany that was agreed upon in the winter, spring, and summer of 1945 was based on a contradictory dualism. The ACC could evolve into the nucleus of a joint administration of Germany in order to ensure the necessary economic and political unity, or it could degenerate into a cumbersome multilateral body. In the latter case a bureaucratic nightmare as well as an inherent tendency to postpone common decisions was inevitable. By agreeing that each military governor should have a veto in the Allied Control Council, the occupying powers had made clear that in case of nonagreement their own national policies should prevail in their respective zone. More or less insoluble conflicts were unavoidable. In the case of the Allied Control Council, it took

2 Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, November 14, 1944, in: US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 124.

only a year for the attempts at joint decisionmaking to come to an effective standstill.

The second factor was also more or less natural. The collapse of Germany had created a power vacuum in Central Europe. "Germany is no longer the dominating power of Europe, Russia is," wrote Britain's chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke, on July 27, 1944, when the defeat of Germany was already a certainty. And he continued: "Therefore foster Germany, gradually build her up, and bring her into a federation of Western Europe. Unfortunately this must all be done under the cloak of a holy alliance between England, Russia and America."³ Such a hard-nosed analysis of the postwar world was not only confined to British decisionmakers. Everywhere, in London, Moscow, Washington, and Paris, it was no secret that the policies toward Germany would determine the structure of the new international system that would emerge from the rubble of devastated Europe.

In addition to the tensions engendered by the vacuum of power, these uncertainties led to the third factor. In Europe, a deep ideological schism had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. It had been patched up by the Grand Alliance. During the war, in Western eyes, Germany was much more frightening than Iosif Stalin's Soviet Union; by the same token, in Soviet eyes, Fascist Germany was perceived as a much greater danger than the capitalist democracies. But how long could this strange alliance endure? When the hostilities ended on May 8, 1945, the joint occupation had to be made operative. In the beginning, there were compelling reasons for each of the Allied victors to make it a success. But the revival of ideological conflict between Western democracies and the Soviet Union made cooperation difficult. The Western democracies, sooner rather than later, had to decide whether they could attempt to build democratic structures and, if so, when and together with which German political parties. And the Soviet Union, for its part, had to work out policies to thwart the attractiveness of Western pluralism and freedom.

One of the most divisive factors relating to the treatment of Germany concerned reparations. For victorious powers, it is always tempting to compensate for wartime damage by imposing heavy reparations on the conquered adversary through dismantling existing industrial plants or taking the goods produced. The Soviet Union, in particular, whose industrial regions to the

3 Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries 1939–1945*, ed. by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001), 575.

west of Moscow were destroyed by the German armies, was determined not only to bring about a massive dismantlement of German factories in the Soviet zone of occupation, but also to secure large quantities of reparations from the western zones. Yet American and British planners knew that the densely populated and highly industrialized zones of western Germany even before World War II had had to import roughly 20 percent of their food. This requirement significantly increased when large parts of agrarian eastern Germany were transferred to Poland. Western occupation authorities then faced a dilemma: allow millions of West Germans to starve or spend large sums for food imports; or, alternatively, permit the reconstruction of west German industry and the export of industrial commodities to pay for the food and other indispensable raw materials. In any case, London and Washington did not want indirectly to finance German reparations to the Soviet Union.

A final factor making cooperation difficult related to the restoration of the shattered economies of Europe. Among Western economists, businessmen, and diplomats, it was common knowledge that the economies of Western Europe were indissolubly linked not only to the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr, but also to the chemical, electrical, and machine-tool industries of Germany. Economic interdependence, in fact, had been reinforced during the war, when Germany ruled all of continental Western Europe. It seemed unlikely that the shattered economies of France and the Benelux countries could be rebuilt without resuscitating the industrial life of occupied Germany. To Soviet planners, the Western insistence on a certain amount of German industrial recovery for the sake of the economies of Western Europe smacked of a silent cooperation between the capitalists of the Western powers and those of western Germany. Thus, the contradiction between Soviet demands for reparations and US and UK desires for a reasonable level of industry in their zones was a great impediment to the joint administration of Germany.

To defeat Germany had been a difficult task. But to administer the destroyed country and to incorporate it into a viable peace structure seemed even more difficult. One may rightly speak of two quite different divisions of Germany. The first occurred in 1945, when the four occupying powers built up their respective zones of occupation as autonomous units with sharply divergent policies regarding politics, economics, education, and culture. In the spring of 1946, a second phase began. Two factors shaped events. The dramatic worsening of the economic situation called for a rapid economic merger of the zones. At the same time, the growing mistrust between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union poisoned attempts to agree on a German peace treaty. Germany was regarded as a pawn in the evolving Cold

War, vividly illustrated by the failures to reach an agreement on a peace treaty at the Moscow and London conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947. Then, from the winter of 1947/48 until the fall of 1949, came the last phase. The three western zones were merged into a viable economic and political entity, a demarcation line arose between the western and eastern zones, two German states emerged, symbolizing a divided Europe, and Berlin became a powder keg in the center of Europe that might ignite a third world war. During subsequent decades, the failed attempts to achieve a cooperative joint occupation haunted East–West diplomacy until Germany was reunified in 1990.


Who was to blame for partition? While Germany was divided, this question engendered endless political and historical controversies. To address it in the aftermath of the Cold War, it is best to examine why and how the four powers pursued divergent policies, policies that had their roots in wartime planning.

The four powers and Germany: from joint occupation to partition

British policies had a considerable impact upon the division of Germany. From the Teheran Conference (November 28 to December 1, 1943) to the Yalta Conference (February 4 to 11, 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2, 1945), the British government greatly influenced the planning of the postwar occupation of Germany. Some of the most far-reaching decisions originated in a Cabinet committee presided over by Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee.

In the fall of 1943, when German armies were still fighting deep within the Soviet Union and six months before the successful invasion of France, the British government decided to assign to the Soviet Union an occupation zone comprising 40 percent of German territory within the Reich's borders of 1937 (including East Prussia, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Saxony, and Thuringia). These proposals were submitted to the European Advisory Commission (EAC), composed of the British, American, and Soviet ambassadors in London. They were gladly accepted by the Soviet Union and, ultimately, in February 1945, adopted by Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, and Iosif Stalin.

Thus, the Soviet Union was offered strategic positions on the banks of the Elbe, putting its tank divisions just sixty miles from Frankfurt and the River Rhine, where they were to remain until the final Soviet withdrawal from Germany in 1994. Likewise, Attlee's Cabinet committee did not object to the joint administration of the Reich's capital, Berlin, although it lay deep inside



2. The division of Germany into occupation zones.

the Soviet zone of occupation. This would become one of the most crucial decisions, shaping more than forty years of the Cold War in Europe.

Britain also accepted the zone of occupation in the northwestern part of Germany (with roughly 22.3 million inhabitants), including the Ruhr area, the Cologne basin, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and the important port of Hamburg. To London, control over the Ruhr seemed a priceless asset. During the first years of occupation, the British doggedly ward off all French and Soviet attempts to have a say in the control of the Ruhr. But the occupation of some of the most important industrial centers of Germany had its price: London had to foot the bill for food imports in order to feed many starving Germans and, therefore, felt obliged to ask for help from the United States, whose zone of occupation was in the south.

Another fateful British initiative took place at the Yalta Conference. Prime Minister Churchill spoke vehemently in favor of allowing France to become a fourth occupying power. Reluctantly, President Roosevelt handed over the southern and western part of the US zone to France. Thereafter, the United States had to govern 17.1 million Germans while the small and largely agrarian French zone had 5.7 million inhabitants. Decisions in Whitehall profoundly shaped the new map of Germany, which would endure for much of the Cold War.

The British did not wish to be left alone in Germany. At Yalta, the British delegates blanched when Roosevelt said the US occupation was likely to end just two years after the war. They, therefore, wanted France as a fourth occupying power in order to provide a West European counterweight to the Soviet Union. But the British failed to see the unwelcome consequences of this decision. In fact, the French looked to the USSR to control Germany. And London overlooked the fact that the French wanted to dismember Germany, a policy that Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were tacitly abandoning in the spring of 1945. As soon as France was formally admitted to the ACC, it vetoed the installation of central German administrative agencies, thereby thwarting the economic unity of Germany. In the fluid period of 1945/46, when the British, Americans, and Soviets were still entertaining the idea of joint economic management of Germany, the inclusion of France had a most counterproductive effect.

In the first year after the war, Britain tried to make the best of the system of joint occupation. But already in the spring of 1946 skepticism prevailed at the headquarters of the British military government as well as in Whitehall. There were significant fears in London: apprehension about Soviet and French efforts to participate in the control of the Ruhr; concern about the failed

attempts to agree on common economic policies for Germany as a whole; alarm about the rapid deterioration of the economy; anxiety over the financial burden of feeding a starving population in their overpopulated zone; and a general fear of Soviet expansionism. In 1945, Churchill and Attlee had worried about a revengeful and resurgent Germany. By the spring of 1946, British apprehensions took a different turn: their worst fear was not a revived Germany. "The worst situation," wrote Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in May 1946, was "a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia."⁴

With increasing intensity, the British tried to bring about an economic, political, and military alliance with the United States and with the democracies of Western Europe.⁵ In Germany, one step followed the other. On August 23, 1946, the British military governor established the large, though initially highly artificial, state of North Rhine-Westphalia. It included the Ruhr, the British-occupied Rhineland, and large rural districts of eastern Westphalia. This decision was partly a reaction to French and Soviet attempts to put an isolated Ruhr under joint Allied control. At the same time, London gave the green light to the merger of the British and American zones. "Bizonia," initially an expedient initiative with an economic motive, subsequently became the nucleus of a new political entity, the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the spring of 1947, the United States assumed leadership in West Germany. But Britain was not yet merely a weak junior partner of Washington. From 1946 to 1950, London often initiated steps to integrate the western zones of Germany into the emerging bloc of Western democracies. But given the evolving Cold War, the British often had to wait for the United States to shoulder the costs and bear the risks.

Compared to the straightforward British approach to the occupation of Germany, American policies were far more complicated. During the war, Roosevelt had been the chief advocate for patient cooperation with Britain as well as with the Soviet Union. He wanted to keep the Grand Alliance together to conquer Germany and, subsequently, to secure Soviet help to defeat Japan. However, when Roosevelt died, on April 12, 1945, a few weeks before the surrender of Germany, it soon became clear that his unflinching commitment to the Grand Alliance with Stalin might be a passing phenomenon.

The new president, Harry S. Truman, did not share Roosevelt's strong commitment to perpetuating the Grand Alliance after the war. Nevertheless, for the next two years, Roosevelt's legacy still shaped US policy toward

4 Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 267.

5 See Anne Deighton's chapter in this volume.

Germany. When he died, Germany's defeat was so imminent that there was no alternative to joint occupation. And that meant trying to compromise with the Soviets. Thus, President Truman brushed off Churchill's last-minute attempts to rearrange the prior agreements regarding occupation zones. When the president and his secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, met Stalin at Potsdam, there was one overriding American motivation: to install, as quickly as possible, the control apparatus for Germany and to work out some essential compromises, particularly over reparations. The main motive of US decision-makers was to postpone the German question. Other issues seemed more urgent: to end the Pacific war, to demobilize the American armies in Europe, to "bring the boys back home," and to convert the war economy to peacetime purposes. The phrase "policy of postponement" aptly summarizes American policies in the early period of occupation.

Many American experts knew that the compromises of Potsdam were contradictory and full of loopholes. In the wings, there were already those who predicted that the joint occupation of Germany was doomed to fail. One of them was George F. Kennan at the American Embassy in Moscow. In the summer of 1945, he cabled: "The idea of Germany run jointly with the Russians is a chimera ... We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany ... to a form of independence so prosperous, so secure, so superior, that the East cannot threaten it ... Better a dismembered Germany in which the West, at least, can act as a buffer to the forces of totalitarianism than a united Germany which again brings these forces to the North Sea."⁶ That was a precise outline of American policies after mid-1947. Yet, in 1945, Kennan and those who shared his opinions were still marginalized.

The top ranks of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) – namely, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, until December 1945 Supreme Commander in Europe and Military Governor of Germany, and his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay, who subsequently became the military governor in charge of OMGUS – were determined to make the joint occupation a success. Eisenhower had developed a liking for the Soviet military governor, General Georgi Zhukov. He was also favorably impressed by Stalin, whom he described to a *New York Times* correspondent as "benign and fatherly."⁷ Eisenhower cabled Clay in October 1945 to "move instantly to meet the Russians always at least half way." But that was not necessary: Clay, too, was favorably disposed toward his Soviet counterparts.

6 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 258.

7 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, vol. I (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 430–31.

From the very beginning, Clay and his economic advisers believed that the strict curtailment of German industry was madness, because it would hamper the recovery of Western Europe. Nevertheless, he was determined to carry out the punitive policies of the basic directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of April 1945 while hoping to convince his superiors in Washington (as well as the Soviet and British representatives) that a more reasonable course of action was more likely to produce better results. Clay personified the "can-do" attitude of US occupation officials. Initially, he used all his administrative and political talents to overcome the problems besetting the joint occupation. Subsequently, when his attempts failed and when his superiors in Washington shifted policy, he worked arduously and successfully to bring the West Germans into the Western bloc.

In the early days of the occupation, when Eisenhower and Clay were on friendly terms with the Soviets, they made a major mistake by failing to conclude water-tight agreements on the access routes to the western sectors of Berlin. Another mistake was Clay's acquiescence to the Soviet wish that the Western allies assume the obligations to provide food and fuel for the German population in their sectors. These decisions were made in a few hurried meetings in June and July 1945, and they were to have lasting consequences.

For many years, historians have debated various aspects of the American policy in the Allied Control Council just as vigorously as officials did at the time. But it is undisputable that until the spring of 1947 General Clay's policy was characterized by a basic willingness to compromise with his Soviet counterparts. Yet the limits of American patience became increasingly clear: "no" to the Soviet and French wish to internationalize the Ruhr; "no" to the continuation of the economic and human misery in the American and British zones; and "no" to Soviet proposals to create a centralized Germany.

In addition to disputes over reparations and the level of industry, Western ideas of democracy engendered acrimony. Like all the other occupation powers, the Americans established political structures in their zone that they hoped would serve as models for the political and economic organization of Germany as a whole. Free elections were held locally in the American zone in early 1946. The Americans wanted federalism to prevail; the *Länder* (states) should be the starting point for the building of national institutions.

In 1946, at the highest level of decisionmaking in Washington, the question of the long-term treatment of Germany became more and more urgent. For more than a year and a half after the end of hostilities in Europe, the Truman administration had been reluctant to open the most difficult negotiations on a German peace treaty. Well into 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes pursued his

policy of postponement. But when the American delegation under the new secretary of state, General Marshall, went to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow (March 10 to April 24, 1947) for the first serious negotiations, the international as well as the domestic scene in the United States had fundamentally changed. The mid-term elections in November 1946 had brought about the 80th Congress, dominated by a vocal anti-Communist Republican majority. Britain's admission that it could no longer stabilize the situation in the eastern Mediterranean had convinced the Americans that they had to fill the vacuum there. On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked Congress to give aid to Greece and Turkey, and declared his famous doctrine that the United States would not allow totalitarianism to spread. At the same time, there was a growing awareness that the reconstruction of Western Europe would be set back if recovery did not accelerate in the western zones of Germany.

After two years of economic stagnation under the joint occupation, many issues remained unresolved: where should the borders of Germany be? Should Germany be centralized or largely federal? How should it be organized politically and institutionally? Should it be neutral, linked to the Western democracies, or allowed to serve as a bridge between East and West? What sorts of controls should remain over Germany in the long term and how long should occupation troops stay in the country? How much should Germany pay in total reparations and to what extent should its industries be allowed to revive? Should the Ruhr be internationalized, or should its industries and resources be linked to the economies of Western Europe? And how should a provisional, representative, and democratically responsive government of Germany be established?

These and many other difficult questions could not be solved at a single conference. Stalin was right when he remarked to Marshall at the end of the Moscow Conference: "We may agree the next time, or if not then, the time after that."⁸ Yet protracted negotiations in Moscow convinced the American decisionmakers that time was running out. Thereafter, Kennan's earlier beliefs became US policy: the western zones of Germany were to be incorporated into plans for the reconstruction of Western Europe. This became the core concept of the Marshall Plan.⁹ Washington conceived the integration of the western zones into Western Europe as a central element of its Cold War policies, and General Clay ultimately became the founding father of the Federal Republic of Germany.

8 Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 263.

9 See William I. Hitchcock's chapter in this volume.

And what was the French contribution to the division of Germany? To put it briefly: in 1945 and early 1946, it used its veto to thwart the attempts to establish joint economic administration under the Allied Control Council. When Britain and the United States sought to merge the western zones, Paris hesitated until the last moment. And when the founding of the Federal Republic was under way, the Quai d'Orsay did its best to hamper the establishment of a strong federal government.

French policies were understandable. In spite of the strict provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had emerged after 1933 as a formidable foe. The Germans had crushed the French armies in 1940, and followed their victory on the battlefield with a humiliating occupation. Because of these experiences, along with the obvious weakness of postwar France, its insecurity, and its desire for reparations, the harsh policies of French governments had strong support among the French people.

During the war, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had talked about the complete dismemberment of Germany. But in the spring of 1945, Moscow, London, and Washington silently abandoned this idea in favor of a joint occupation of a unified Germany. France objected. From 1944 to 1947, Paris called for the dismemberment of Germany: transformation of the Saar and of the western Rhineland into autonomous political entities; the cession of part of East Germany to Poland; the internationalization of the Ruhr (with a decisive French influence); and the dismemberment of the remaining Reich through the creation of a large number of small, autonomous, loosely connected German states. French officials also wanted to steer a middle course between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union in order to be in the best position to maximize their own goals.

Yet, of the four occupation powers, France held the weakest cards. Their obstructionist policies led nowhere, and they wrecked any slight possibility of working out common policies in the ACC. Reluctantly, in 1947 and 1948, when France had to take sides, the Quai d'Orsay decided to support Anglo-Saxon policies. The French extracted significant concessions from the United States and the UK: promises to receive cheap coal from the Ruhr, to incorporate the Saar area, with its rich mining and steel industry, into a French protectorate of sorts, and to allow France to participate in the international regime supervising the Ruhr and to have equal rights in the High Commission that would oversee the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, in separate negotiations, the French received assurances that their security would be guaranteed by a new North Atlantic Treaty.

From the vantage point of Paris, the control of West Germany by a more integrated Western alliance entailed fewer uncertainties than the continuation of the failed joint occupation. Moreover, the French were witnessing a partial dismemberment of Germany between the three western zones on the one hand and the eastern zone on the other. A united Germany, composed of the four zones of occupation, would have had 68 million inhabitants with an enormous industrial potential, much larger than France's. Instead of that united Germany, two Germanies were emerging: the Federal Republic (FRG) had 49.8 million inhabitants (including the western sectors of Berlin) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) contained 18.7 million (including the eastern sector of Berlin).¹⁰ Two German states, integrated into the rival camps of the Cold War, were more acceptable to the French than a united Germany, whose future trajectory could not be assured.

And how shall we assess the Soviet Union's policies toward Germany? Contrary to a widely held belief, in the spring of 1945, Soviet actions were not particularly consistent. The Kremlin's policies, even more than those of the Western powers, were plagued by inherent contradictions. Stalin, who obviously kept policies in Germany under his personal control, made even more mistakes than his Western counterparts.

In spite of new archival sources on Soviet policies that have become available since 1990/91, historians still do not agree about Moscow's short-term and long-term goals. In Vladimir O. Pechatnov's view, for example, Stalin vacillated between three conflicting options: "a united pro-Soviet Germany" ("all of Germany must be ours," as he told Georgi Dimitrov); a "demilitarized and neutral Germany serving as a buffer between Western and Soviet spheres of influence"; and "a client state in the Soviet zone of occupation which would at least preserve the Soviet presence in the heart of Europe."¹¹ Not surprisingly, other historians argue that Stalin, openly or secretly, pursued one or another of these options, but not all three of them at the same time.

Instead of trying to speculate about the ulterior motives of the inscrutable Soviet dictator, it may be more rewarding to ask simply what he did in practical terms. In the heat of the war, Stalin, like Roosevelt and Churchill, wanted to break up the dangerous Reich once and for all. He was the first of the statesmen of the Grand Alliance to conceive, as early as November 1941, an

¹⁰ Figures are for 1950; see *Deutschland Jahrbuch 1953*, ed. by Klaus Mehnert and Heinrich Schulte (Essen: Rheinisch Westfälisches Verlagkontor, 1953), 67–68 and 370.

¹¹ See Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume, 103.



10. Soviet soldier directing traffic in bombed-out Berlin, 1945.

elaborate program of dismemberment.¹² Yet in the spring of 1945, when the Western allies had obviously moved away from dismemberment and when he had become aware that the great bulk of German industry and a large majority of the German population would be overseen by the Western powers, Stalin changed tack. With customary opportunism on May 9, 1945, when the German high command had capitulated, he declared that "The Soviet Union will celebrate victory, yet it is not prepared to dismember or annihilate Germany."¹³ From the spring of 1945 until the end of his life in March 1953, he remained committed to preserving German unity – of course, on conditions favorable to the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1945, the overall position of the Soviet Union in Germany weakened when the Kremlin transferred large regions of its original zone of

12 V. Molotov to I. Maisky, November 21, 1941, in Georgij P. Kynin and Jochen Laufer (eds.), *Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), I, 11–12. See also Eden to Churchill, January 5, 1942, in Winston S. Churchill, *The History of the Second World War*, vol. VI, *War Comes to America* (London: Cassel, 1964), 228.

13 "Ansprache des Genossen J. W. Stalin an das Volk, 9.5.1945," in Josef Stalin, *Über den Großen Vaterländischen Krieg der Sowjetunion* (Berlin: n.p., 1946), 218–19.

occupation east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers to Poland. Stalin's decision, taken without consulting his British and American allies, had far-reaching consequences – the occupation zone of the Soviet Union shrank considerably (from 40% of the territory of the Reich in its 1937 borders to a meager 16%, with only 28% of the population). Thus, the United States, Britain, and France occupied the richest and most populous part of Germany (84% of the territory with 72% of the population). Although the Soviets boasted that they had made the major contribution to the victory over Germany, Stalin nevertheless remained the *demandeur* toward the Western powers. He wanted reparations from their zones and he called for Soviet participation in a four-power supervision of the Ruhr. He also wanted to influence political evolution in the western zones. Overall, he wanted to make sure that a final German peace treaty met Soviet strategic and economic requirements, but he had to pursue his objectives from a position of relative weakness.

Stalin tried to employ parallel strategies to overcome this weakness. But the strategies contradicted one another and backfired. First, there was the contradiction between the initial Soviet willingness to preserve the economic unity of Germany by cooperating in the ACC and the insatiable Soviet thirst for reparations. Most contemporary experts in the West, and many historians afterwards, were convinced that Stalin's entire German policy was largely dictated by reparation requirements. And in this respect Soviet and Anglo-Saxon short-term interests were incompatible, making it very difficult to implement joint economic policies. This was especially the case because at the Potsdam Conference Moscow had been given a free hand to take reparation deliveries from its own zone, thereby deepening the rift between the economy of the Anglo-Saxon zones and that of the Soviet zone.

There was a second contradiction in Stalin's policies. Very early, the Soviets discovered the utility of a centralized German party system. Even before the Western allies started to move into their sectors in Berlin, the Soviet military governor not only licensed, but also encouraged, the founding of four political parties in Berlin and in the Soviet zone: Communists (the KPD), Social Democrats (the SPD), Liberals (the LDPD), and Christian Democrats (the CDU). These parties had their headquarters in Berlin, inside the Soviet zone, yet all their leaders sought recognition in the western zones and wanted to speak for all of Germany. It quickly became apparent that the Soviet Military Administration of Germany (SMAD) had a hidden agenda: to bolster the leading role of the Communists. When the political weakness of the SPD and the KPD became obvious in the spring of 1946, Soviet authorities arranged a forced merger of the two parties (under the new name Sozialistische

Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) in the Soviet zone. But in the western zones, a strong SPD, under the determined anti-Communist leadership of Kurt Schumacher, reacted against the SED and its Soviet masters. The CDU and the Free Democratic Party were likewise motivated by deep-rooted anti-Communism. Jakob Kaiser, chairman of the popular CDU in the eastern zone, steered a compromise course. On the one hand, he tried his best to operate freely in the face of Soviet pressures; on the other hand, he said he wanted Germany to be "a bridge between East and West," hoping to avoid taking sides in the incipient Cold War. But when he hailed the Marshall Plan, he was forced to resign in December 1947. Neither the German Communists in Berlin nor their Soviet overlords were willing to accept Western pluralism. Thus, Soviet attempts to influence the German parties in the western zones by stressing the need for German unity were doomed to fail.

This leads to a third contradiction in Soviet policy. In the ACC, SMAD called for joint occupation policies in all four zones, but reserved for itself a free hand in the eastern zone. In addition to curtailing non-Communist parties, land reform was decreed, large-scale enterprises were nationalized, the traditional high school was marginalized, and children were required to take Russian-language classes after the fourth year of elementary school. By the spring of 1946, one year after the establishment of SMAD, society and the political system in the eastern zone of Germany increasingly conformed to the model of "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe. The Soviets achieved their goal of transforming the eastern zone into a relatively solid base for unchallenged Communist power. Yet to the Germans in the West, the Soviet zone was anything but a shining model of progressive policies; it was a nightmare of repression and brutality.

Then, in June 1948, the Soviet Union made its worst mistake. In reaction to the Western military governors' offering to convene a constitutional assembly for their zones and carrying out a separate currency reform (in June 1948), Stalin ordered the blockade of the roads and waterways to Berlin. The Western powers had to decide whether to abandon their plans to establish a Western government or pull out of their sectors in Berlin with a tremendous loss of prestige. The blockade risked war and was a desperate gamble. It convinced Western public opinion of the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. And the determination of the Germans in West Berlin to resist Soviet pressure had another significant impact in the West. For the first time since the war, West Germans appeared ready to opt voluntarily for the West and become reliable allies in the Cold War. When President Truman, supported by London and Paris, decided to break the blockade with a huge Allied airlift,

Stalin dared not to interfere, and his German policies were shattered. Nobody could have devised a better plan to convince the West Germans of the need to accept a provisional division of their country.

In the fall of 1949, after the establishment of the West German government, Stalin permitted the formation of the GDR, thereby sealing the division of Germany, although he had always been against it. In the great game for Germany, the Soviet Union was the loser. But, although the Soviet Union lost its chance to attract Germany into its orbit or, at least, to neutralize a united Germany, it won a crucial strategic position in the heart of Europe. The GDR served as a reliable “iron wall” that separated Poland from the West. Thereafter, the exposed western sectors of Berlin always reminded Western statesmen and FRG leaders that they were highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

The role of the Germans: coming to terms with partition

After the unconditional surrender, the Germans were merely the objects of Allied policy. From 1945 to 1948, they had only a minor role in a play that was staged by politicians, generals, diplomats, and economists from the occupying powers. When George Kennan, in March 1949, on the eve of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, took part in a meeting between the three Western military governors and the top German representatives, he commented: “To me, the spectacle of these ... meetings, the unlimited power of the one side and the abjectness of the other, was distasteful.”¹⁴ Even in the western zones, not to mention the Soviet zone, the Germans had no real choice of their own.

Nevertheless, as the rift between the West and the East deepened, it became a matter of primary importance which side in the Cold War the West Germans would choose or if they would want to stay “uncommitted” at all costs. In this respect, during the entire period of occupation the overwhelming majority of the population was strongly against the Soviet Union and its Communist German supporters. When an OMGUS poll asked in October 1947 about the German attitude toward the four Allies, 63% trusted the United States to treat Germany fairly, 45% placed their trust in the British,

¹⁴ Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950*, 433.

only 4% in the French, and none in the Soviets.¹⁵ During the years 1946–48, the German Communists proved to be unable to garner more than 5–12 percent of the vote in local or *Länder* elections in the western zones. And in one of the politically decisive local elections in all four sectors of Berlin a few months after the enforced merger of the KPD and SPD, on October 20, 1946, the SED won only 19.8 percent of the vote.

The anti-Communist feelings had many sources: traumatic experiences caused by the atrocities of the Red Army when it occupied East Germany and Berlin, the fresh memories of the refugees or of Germans expelled from East Germany, and the bad reputation of Soviet occupation policies. To a large extent, Soviet Communism was associated with rape and plunder.¹⁶ The anti-Communist fervor of the political leaders in the West also played an important role. Kurt Schumacher, the charismatic leader of the Social Democrats who had suffered nine years in Hitler's concentration camps, called the German Communists "red-painted nazis." At an executive meeting of his party on August 1, 1946, Konrad Adenauer, chairman of the CDU in the British zone, who would become the first chancellor of the Federal Republic three years later, had recognized that Stalin sought to exploit German nationalism and use it for Soviet purposes.¹⁷ Starting with this assumption, Adenauer did his best to turn his party toward the United States and the democracies of Western Europe. Although West Germans possessed grievances against the Western occupation powers, they were to a large extent united in their anti-Sovietism. Thus, Communist propaganda campaigns for national unity and against the founding of a German state in the western zones were an exercise in futility.

Yet, in the western zones, political leaders and voters were not willing to accept the permanent division of Germany. They regarded the founding of the FRG as an expedient. After all, the German Reich had existed for seventy-four years. In spite of all the catastrophes and crimes of the recent past, most Germans still regarded the Reich and German unity as supreme political values. Even in the East, neither Stalin and his followers in the ranks of the SED, nor the silent majority of suppressed Germans, ceased to call for the restoration of German unity. For the moment, Germany was divided. But

15 Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 180–81.

16 See Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.

17 Hans Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, vol. I, *From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 580–81.

how and when the division could be overcome became one of the main issues of the Cold War in Germany.


Perhaps now, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, it is time to change our historical assessment. There were, of course, the obvious negative aspects to the division of Germany. From 1949 until the collapse of Communism in the GDR, both German states were exemplary protagonists in the Cold War. In spite of many attempts at *détente*, they could never overcome their fundamental ideological, political, economic, and cultural conflict. Twice, in 1948/49 and from 1958 to 1962, diplomatic crises over Berlin threatened to lead to an outright military confrontation. For the German people, the division was a national tragedy. After August 13, 1961, 17 million East Germans were locked behind the Wall. Most of them felt their lives were impoverished by a dysfunctional socialist economy forced upon them by the Soviet Union. And from the perspective of the captive Polish and Czechoslovak peoples, the Soviet-occupied GDR appeared as a barrier to their access to the Western democracies.

Small wonder that the negative consequences of the division of Germany have deeply influenced historical writing. For many historians the main question has been: who is to blame for the partition? The Soviets, the Americans, the British, the French? Or all four to a certain extent? When the partition was already under way, from 1945 to 1949, the controversy over responsibility for the division had been an issue of paramount importance. As is often the case, the subsequent controversies among historians have mostly recycled the political controversies of a previous era.

The antitotalitarian Cold War school in the West insisted that the division had been unavoidable since the Soviet Union was not prepared to concede human rights, true political pluralism, and a decent standard of living in the GDR. Soviet and East German historians, for their part, have criticized the integration of the western zones into the camp of aggressive Western capitalism and insisted that this was the main reason for the failure of joint occupation policies in Germany. Since the mid-1960s, in the ranks of the scholarly community of the West, a certain self-flagellation about Western policies has been conspicuous. Revisionists in the United States, Germany, and France have ridiculed the selfishness of the West: instead of giving the Soviets a fair share of reparations and of keeping the guilt-ridden Germans under strict joint control (maybe with a neutralized and demilitarized status), the United States, Britain, and, very reluctantly, France decided to give priority to West European recovery, to the return of West German capitalists, and to the establishment of a West German

state as bulwark of anti-Soviet containment. Thus, historical controversies on responsibility for the division of Germany have been as irreconcilable as the arguments that took place in the ACC or in the Council of Foreign Ministers between 1945 and 1948.

Today, two decades after the end of the Cold War, verdicts are blurred. There were four great powers – each with contrasting ideas about the shape of Europe and all with conflicting national interests – jostling over authority within a vanquished fifth great power; it is therefore not surprising that each bears some responsibility for the division of Germany. But one should not overlook the benefits, one might even say miracles. First, West Germany helped propel the economic reconstruction and political integration of Western Europe and laid a foundation for unprecedented peace and prosperity. As a result of the integration of West Germany into the framework of the Atlantic world, Franco-German rivalries were overcome, and a second miracle occurred: the conversion of most West Germans to democracy, to peacefulness, and to Western values. These outcomes, of course, had a price: the Cold



11. West German leader Konrad Adenauer.



12. East German leader Walter Ulbricht.

War and the division of Germany, with all their tensions and human tragedies. But nevertheless a third miracle also took place: in a long, tortuous, often dangerous process, the division became manageable: East and West worked out a peaceful *modus vivendi*. Eventually, in 1989/90, the four occupation powers, driven by events inside Germany, allowed for its reunification into a more integrated and peaceful Europe. From this vantage point, the initial failure of joint occupation appears in a more favorable light.¹⁸

¹⁸ For events at the end of the Cold War, see John Young's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in volume III.

The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

WILLIAM I. HITCHCOCK

Few US government programs have had so good a press as the Marshall Plan, which delivered some \$12.3 billion in aid to Europe between 1948 and the end of 1951. The fiftieth anniversary of the plan, in 1997, produced a flood of studies and conference reports that all shared the view, as one Marshall Plan official put it in his memoir, "that Marshall Plan dollars did save the world."¹ Calls for subsequent "Marshall Plans" for troubled regions such as the Balkans, post-1990s Russia, the Middle East, and Africa reveal the talismanic quality the very name has attained. For some decades now, scholars have been working to historicize the Marshall Plan and to take this legendary program out of the realm of myth and submit it to historical analysis. In doing so, they have significantly revised early accounts that saw the Marshall Plan as a beneficent rescue plan for war-torn Europe. For example, the economic impact of the plan has been significantly downgraded as scholars concluded that the crisis of 1947 in Europe was less grave than American policymakers had thought. Furthermore, the role of the Marshall Plan in exacerbating, perhaps precipitating, the division of Europe is now recognized, despite Marshall's initial claim that his offer of aid was not directed against any country or doctrine. The role of the Marshall Plan in promoting European economic integration has been questioned, and the demise of the plan in 1951, at a time when European economies were again facing economic crisis, inflation, and budget deficits, suggests a less-than-perfect performance. These critiques must be taken seriously. Yet in focusing narrowly on the short-term impact of the plan, they often fail to capture its historical significance. It was far more than a foreign aid program. It represented the first stage in the construction of that community of ideas, economic links, and security ties between Europe and the United States we know simply as "the West."

1 Charles Kindleberger, *Marshall Plan Days* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 247.

Origins

Though it grew into an ambitious project for European recovery, the Marshall Plan emerged primarily from the evident failures of American policy in occupied Germany. At the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union had agreed to govern defeated and occupied Germany as a single economic unit, even though they also agreed that Germany was to be divided into four zones (the fourth going to France). This contradiction, obvious even then, nonetheless was accepted as a workable program to guide a slow and carefully constrained German economic recovery while also ensuring that no central German administration would emerge to threaten the peace of Europe again. The problem with this plan was that German economic growth was vital to European economic recovery as a whole; without German coal, steel, manufacturing, and trade, the whole European network of industrial life did not have a remote chance of revival. How could the United States square the need for German economic growth with the geopolitical requirement that Germany be occupied, divided, and controlled? Until the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in March–April 1947, American administrators in Washington and Germany tried to find a middle ground between punishment and reconstruction. They failed, not least because two of their partners, the Soviet Union and France, insisted on a harsh occupation arrangement that was designed to hobble German industry permanently, while their British ally, with whom the United States fused its zone of occupation into a jointly run bizon, was calling for an easing of industrial restrictions so as to lower the costs that the overstretched British Exchequer was paying for the occupation. Between these two competing views, the Americans themselves were torn between a desire to impose a tough occupation regime and a growing anxiety that to do so might make Germany vulnerable to political instability, Communist subversion, and Soviet machinations.

By the beginning of 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, prodded by a number of his immediate advisers, notably Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Policy Planning Staff director George F. Kennan, and Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton, began to see the need for a clear break with the ambivalent policies that the Potsdam agreement had generated. This was not only because Germany's own fate seemed to hang in the balance, but also because the overall European picture was threatening to American interests. The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 had announced an aid policy to Greece and Turkey in defiant tones: the

United States must be willing, President Harry S. Truman told the US Congress, “to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.”² This assertion echoed across the continent. In France and Italy, powerful Communist Parties organized strikes and protests against the reigning centrist governments, while the economic health of these European states had not apparently improved since the end of the war. Foodstuffs and coal were in short supply throughout Europe, and the piecemeal aid the Americans and British had offered through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and short-term grants had failed to generate self-sustaining recovery. It was time, Marshall believed, to use Germany as an engine to power a broader European recovery. “The recovery of Europe,” he told the American people in his radio address of April 28, 1947, upon returning from the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, “has been far slower than expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay.”³

Bolstered by reports from his Policy Planning Staff and Under Secretary Clayton – whose May 27 memorandum to the secretary declared that “we grossly underestimated the destruction of the European economy by the war” – Marshall decided to go public.⁴ On June 5, 1947, Marshall delivered a brief speech at the commencement exercises at Harvard University. What is notable about this address is its emphasis on an integrated, coherent solution to Europe’s economic problems. “The remedy,” Marshall said, “lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole.” Carefully avoiding the specific issue of Germany, he said that the United

2 President Truman’s address to a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947, can be viewed at www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100.

3 Quoted in John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 199.

4 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. III, 230–32 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

States' purpose was "the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist." The Americans wanted to "find a cure rather than a palliative"; and to this end would help Europeans in drafting a Europe-wide plan for recovery.⁵

Marshall had already concluded that Germany would have to be mobilized in the effort of European recovery; and he anticipated that the only way to persuade France and other Europeans to accept this strategy was to create new institutions that would oversee and shape a balanced European recovery. An integrated approach, involving European cooperation, was also the best way to persuade Congress to increase funding for European recovery. Obviously, the Soviet Union would object; Marshall knew this because the Soviets had objected steadily to American proposals for an upward revision of German industrial activity and to the creation of any central German political institutions. Marshall could have had no illusions that the Soviet Union would perceive his European aid plan as an affront and an open break with four-power policies in Germany, which it was. Potsdam was dead; the Marshall Plan era had begun.

Of course, a number of crucial battles remained to be fought, both international and bureaucratic. Marshall's ideas had to be presented to the Europeans; they had to take up his invitation to act; and Congress had to create legislation giving life to Marshall's proposals. These multiple lines of action occupied the period from July 1947 to April 1948. In a hastily arranged conference in Paris in late June, British foreign minister Ernest Bevin, French foreign minister Georges Bidault, and Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov convened to discuss a European response to Marshall's June 5 speech. Bevin and Bidault were eager to make Marshall's plan work, even though they each had concerns about precisely what "integration" meant. But Molotov was wholly, indeed ideologically, opposed to the underlying premise of economic integration, common purpose, and transparency in his dealings with capitalist states. After a few days of trying to divide the French from the British, Molotov realized the Soviets were facing a common front: the Europeans wanted American help, and were willing to let Washington lead. Molotov and his legions of advisers withdrew from the Paris meetings and, in a massive strategic blunder, announced that the Soviet Union would not participate in the plan.

5 Quoted in Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955), 34–35.

Molotov's withdrawal opened the way for Bevin and Bidault to arrange a meeting of sixteen European nations that did wish to participate in a European recovery plan.⁶ Opening on 12 July, the meeting quickly created the Committee on European Economic Cooperation (CEECE). The CEECE was a cockpit of competing national economic interests, as the major states began to fight over precisely how much aid they needed, and how their own national recovery programs would deploy that aid in the common cause of European recovery. Nonetheless, throughout the summer of 1947, Europeans were talking openly and passionately about a plan for continental recovery in which CEECE states would work together: this marked a major turning point in the history of postwar Europe.

The CEECE final report requested \$19.3 billion in aid over four years; the Truman administration in turn sought \$17 billion; but Congress in the end appropriated \$5.3 billion for the first year and asked the administration to return for subsequent requests on an annual basis. This came only after a good deal of bargaining between the Truman administration and Congress, in which a small but vocal band of critics, on both Left and Right, assailed the plan. The Economic Cooperation Act of April 1948 authorized the European Recovery Program (ERP) and created the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to implement it. The European participants were grouped together in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEECE), designed to coordinate progress toward the goals of the ERP. It is worth noting the language of the act that authorized the Marshall Plan, because it contains nomenclature that would become part of the fabric of postwar international relations, thanks to Marshall's initiative. The act stated that "the restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence rests largely upon the establishment of sound economic conditions, stable international economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance." European recovery required a "strong production effort, the expansion of foreign trade, the creation and maintenance of internal financial stability, and the development of economic cooperation, including all possible steps to establish and maintain equitable rates of

6 The countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, and the US-UK bizonc of Germany.

exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers.”⁷ What had begun as a short speech at Harvard in June 1947, calling for a plan for European recovery, had emerged by April 1948 as a massive undertaking: in Michael Hogan’s words, the United States now undertook “nothing less than a major reorganization of the European state system into a more viable framework for controlling the Germans, containing the Soviets and putting the continental countries on the road to economic recovery and multilateral trade.”⁸

The economic impact of the Marshall Plan

If the narrative of events leading up to the announcement of the Marshall Plan is largely uncontested by historians, the plan’s impact remains a subject of serious debate. The question can be phrased simply: as Alan Milward put it, “was the Marshall Plan necessary?”⁹ Dean Acheson wrote in his memoirs that he and Will Clayton and Secretary Marshall had all concluded that Europe in 1947 was on the brink of “headlong destruction,” and that, unless something were done, “millions of people would soon die, creating a chaos of bloodshed and disorder.”¹⁰ This view of the European economic situation in 1947 was, we now know, overstated. In fact, thanks to the detailed research of Milward and numerous other scholars working in the archives of West European states, it is evident that the Marshall Plan was not, strictly speaking, necessary to restart the European economies. Despite the anguished prognostications of Clayton and Acheson, by the end of 1947, both Britain and France had reached or surpassed their prewar levels of industrial production. Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, among others, would do so by the end of 1948. Even when the slower performance of divided and occupied Germany is factored in, Europe had matched its prewar industrial production by mid-1948. Since the ERP did not become law until April 1948, and since Marshall Plan aid did not start arriving in Europe until May and June of that year, Marshall aid cannot be said to have restarted European economic growth.

7 *United States Statutes at Large, 1948* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), vol. 62, 137.

8 Michael J. Hogan, “European Integration and German Reintegration: Marshall Planners and the Search for Recovery and Security in Western Europe,” in Charles Maier and Günter Bischoff (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (New York: Berg, 1991), 116.

9 Alan Milward, “Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?,” *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (1989), 231–53.


10 Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department*, (New York: Norton, 1969), 231–32.

Furthermore, once Marshall aid began, it remained a small fraction of the total gross national product of the recipient countries. In its first year of operation, from July 1948 to June 1949, Marshall aid represented 2.4% of Britain's GNP, 6.5% of France's, 5.3% of Italy's, and only 2.9% of West Germany's. The country with the highest figure was Austria, where Marshall aid amounted to 14% of GNP in that year. Marshall aid was essential, however, in addressing Europe's serious dollar shortfall in 1947, which was created, as Milward definitively showed, by Europe's sudden resurgence: in restarting production, Europeans began to draw in products and raw materials from overseas that they could not yet pay for, their dollar reserves having been long depleted. This shortfall of dollars threatened to halt Europe's recovery, and it was with this fairly narrow problem in mind that American planners in the State Department framed the idea of a large American aid program to Europe.

This argument, however, in no way demeans the impact of the Marshall Plan. It only obliges us to be more precise: Marshall aid did not restart European economic growth, but it allowed European states to continue along a path of industrial expansion and investment in heavy industry upon which they had already started, while at the same time putting into place a costly but politically essential welfare state to which all West European governments were committed.¹¹ Marshall aid allowed European governments to move with some confidence to effect a transformation in Europe's economic life, away from the cautious, deflationary 1930s to the Keynesian, high-investment strategies of the 1950s. In this sense, Marshall aid gave Europeans choices that they might not otherwise have had.

The economic impact of the Marshall Plan varied from country to country. France probably provides the best example of a country in which Marshall aid had an extremely advantageous "knock-on" effect. France used Marshall aid to support the Monnet Plan, an ambitious program of industrial investment and expansion that had been outlined by Jean Monnet in 1946. It was a state-designed scheme to channel investment into key sectors of the economy such as steel and coal production, railway and transport, cement, housing, and agriculture. Marshall aid allowed France to cover its yawning dollar deficit, which in turn allowed the French government to continue to invest in the Monnet Plan. Some 67 percent of Marshall aid in France was used to obtain raw materials vital for continued industrial production, such as coal, oil, and

¹¹ Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 54.



2. Industrial production in countries receiving Marshall aid, 1947–1950 (1938 = 100).

Source: United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950* (Geneva, 1951), 30–31.

cotton, as well as for purchasing machinery and vehicles. As a result of this strong commitment to heavy industry, French industrial output continued to climb throughout the Marshall Plan period: in 1951, it exceeded by 42 percent the level of 1938. Exports began to pick up, so that, by 1950, France was exporting almost as much as it was importing (though it continued to have a large deficit with the United States). Marshall aid was also used in France to help cover some of the national debt, which because of an inefficient tax system France could not do by internal revenues. This eased, though it did not cure, the constant inflationary problems that France faced in this period by limiting the amount that the Treasury had to borrow to cover the debt. On strictly economic grounds, then, the Marshall Plan experience in France proved a major success.

In Britain and Italy, the record was more modest. Britain received the largest amount of Marshall aid, at some \$2.8 billion. Yet the British economy was much larger than that of any other recipient, and Marshall aid amounted to no more than 2 percent of GNP overall. It was even smaller than the American loan of 1946. By 1948, the British economy was well on its way

toward viability, with exports having recovered well thanks to the heavy demand in Europe and the colonies for British manufactured goods. By 1948, Britain had reached a current account balance. Unlike France, Britain did not have an urgent political need for aid, as it was not facing a Communist challenge from within. Nonetheless, British officials still wanted Marshall aid, and felt it would provide the critical margin during a time of economic fragility. Because the government had pursued such a severe restriction of imports, the British people were constantly short of foodstuffs. British officials thus planned to spend much of the Marshall aid on staples such as wheat, tobacco, maize, barley and oats, meat and bacon, cotton, and edible oils and fats. Overall, 30% of Marshall aid in Britain was spent on foodstuffs, compared with only 10% in France. A large portion of the remaining sum was spent on paying down the national debt. Such was the basic health of the British economy that Marshall aid was stopped in December 1950.

Italy's experience in the Marshall aid period was altogether different from that of Britain and France. Italy, after all, was a former enemy and a defeated power. The effort to regain international standing and domestic legitimacy preoccupied the Christian Democratic governments that dominated Italian politics after the expulsion of the Communists in May 1947. The government of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi therefore sought to distance itself from the statist, interventionist economic policies of the Fascist period, and from the sharp inflation that Italy had suffered in the last years of the war. De Gasperi outlined no urgent, state-financed program of national recovery, as Monnet had done in France. Instead, De Gasperi followed the lead of his ultra-orthodox budget minister Luigi Einaudi in attacking inflation first and restoring the stability of the currency. Einaudi wanted to balance the budget and trade deficit not through increased production but with sharp cuts in government expenditure – precisely the opposite approach taken in France. For De Gasperi, this was smart politics: it appealed to the middle and upper classes in Italy, who were gratified at the appearance of sound money policies and now rallied firmly to the Christian Democrats. The working class, which bore the brunt of these deflationary policies in the form of higher unemployment, were in any case already hostile to the De Gasperi regime.

The Italian government therefore looked upon American aid with some caution. Of course, the aid itself was welcome, especially the large quantities of bread grains, oil and coal, cotton, and machinery that the ERP provided from 1948 to 1951. At the same time, however, Einaudi steadfastly refused to accept American advice on using Marshall aid to “kick-start” the Italian economy. Fearful that a large state-financed investment program would

aggravate inflation, the Italian government during the Marshall Plan period undertook to finance only reconstruction efforts, and put little investment into new manufacturing capacity. This they left to the private capital markets, which were still moribund. Unlike the French government, which had pumped huge sums into heavy industry – and was suffering high inflation because of it – Italy restricted public investment, a policy that slowed expansion and contributed to unemployment. Large quantities of the “counterpart” funds – the lire that the Italian government earned from selling Marshall Plan goods in Italy – were merely put in the bank to bolster Italy’s reserves and strengthen the currency; too little of the aid made its way to industrial modernization. Only after two years of wrangling with the Americans did Italian officials agree to begin shifting counterpart funds into public-works projects, industry, and agriculture. Moreover, Italy did not lay out a long-term plan for recovery until 1955 – three years after the end of the Marshall Plan. Italy during the Marshall Plan period offers little support to the legend of an American rescue of postwar Europe. Italians took the aid but failed to use it well – and the Americans discovered to their surprise that they had little leverage to compel Italy to do so.

The dramatic postwar recovery of the Federal Republic of Germany seems at first sight to offer a clear case for the benefits of Marshall aid. In the ten years from 1948 to 1958, West Germany passed through a transformation so great, so swift, that it soon came to be called the *Wirtschaftswunder* – “economic miracle.” In the 1950s, industrial production tripled and unemployment sank from over 10% to less than 4%. Exports increased so much – sixfold – that, by 1960, the FRG was responsible for 10% of the world’s total exports, more than Britain and second only to the United States. From 1950 to 1960, the GNP increased at an average annual rate of 7.9%. Surely, this swift recovery owes something to Marshall aid?

The answer is not clear-cut, and there has been some considerable debate about the role of Marshall aid in German postwar recovery. Germany, it would seem, profited from a convergence of positive trends that opened the way for a swift economic expansion after 1948. The German economy was not entirely shattered by the war, and still had significant industrial stock intact at its end; Germany also profited from an immense pool of labor, the product of the postwar migration from the eastern zone at the end of the war. But the real trigger for German growth was the currency reform of June 1948. During the war, the Nazi leadership pumped Reichsmarks into the economy with heavily inflationary effects. By 1945, with German industry at a standstill, there were far too many old marks chasing very few goods. The currency’s value

collapsed and Germans fell back on bartering and the black market. In 1948, the Western powers – the Soviets would have none of it – agreed to withdraw all the old bills and replace them with a new Deutsche Mark at about a ten-to-one ratio. Thus, some 90 percent of the currency was withdrawn from circulation overnight. The new bills, printed in the United States and secretly shipped to Germany, were introduced on June 20, 1948. The effect was immediate. The new currency had genuine purchasing power. Workers returned to their jobs, absenteeism dropped, and productivity surged. The black market disappeared, as those who had goods to sell would now exchange them for the new currency. Shops filled up with goods that hitherto had been hoarded or stashed away. Factory managers could now look forward to earning hard currency for their goods instead of the worthless Reichsmarks. Economics minister Ludwig Erhard took the bold step of abolishing rations and price controls on most consumer goods, demonstrating his strong faith in the power of the free market to meet consumer demand.

If the currency reform was a sort of starting pistol for the takeoff of the German economy, Marshall aid played a crucial role in clearing a path down which the Germans could run. Just as in Britain in 1946 and France in 1947, Germany's sudden recovery in mid-1948 triggered a payments crisis, as Germans went on a buying spree and began drawing in large amounts of imports. Marshall aid, and earlier American grants, both covered a great deal of Germany's import needs: 70% in 1946–47, 65% in 1948, and 43% in 1949. In addition to helping Germans pay for their imports, the Marshall Plan gave a kick-start to industrial recovery through the use of counterpart funds. The German government sold US-financed goods to consumers, and then placed those marks in a separate account. These funds, still controlled by Washington officials, were then reinvested in industries that badly needed an influx of capital, such as electricity, coal-mining, agriculture, housing, railways, and shipping. Once new US-backed capital started to flow in to certain industries, the private capital markets in Germany soon followed suit. German money followed American money, and the result was a swift restoration of German industrial production – so swift in fact that the Germans were running a trade surplus by 1951. US aid, though modest in size – Germany received only half the aid given to Britain and France – kept German recovery moving. As historian Charles Maier put it, Marshall aid acted “like the lubricant in an engine – not the fuel – allowing a machine to run that would otherwise buckle and bind.”¹²

12 Charles S. Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe,” *American Historical Review*, 86, 2 (April 1981), 342.



13. Marshall Plan freight cars arrive at the German town of Furth im Wald, near the Czech border.

In France, Britain, Italy, and Germany, Marshall aid was deployed by national governments in a context framed by national politics and priorities: Washington could cajole, and sometimes insist, but the real decisions on how to deploy the aid were left to European governments. With respect to economic policy, Marshall aid was, as one historian has written, Washington's "feeble weapon."¹³ But this was precisely part of the genius of the scheme. In restoring economic choices to Europeans, the Marshall Plan also restored political choices. American aid helped boost economic activity and gave the parties of the center-right that had won this generous support credibility and

13 Chiarella Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

legitimacy. Marshall aid gave the Christian Democrats (and their Socialist allies) in France, Italy, and later West Germany a chance to bring home the bacon. This they did, and a grateful electorate in turn rewarded these centrist parties with success at the ballot box, thereby ushering in an era of close ties between the United States and the reviving West European states.

Ripple effects: the Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

While the precise economic achievements of the Marshall Plan remain contested, historians nonetheless agree that the plan's political, strategic, and even cultural impact was enormous. Like a series of concentric circles rippling outward from a central node, the impact of the plan carried far beyond the narrow scope of the aid package so vaguely outlined in Harvard Yard in June 1947.

The most immediate political-strategic impact of the Marshall Plan was visible in the United States' German policy. The Harvard speech did not focus on Germany explicitly, but behind that message lay a sharp break with what had come before; the policy of Potsdam and the slow, heavily constrained German economic recovery it implied was now discarded. At the heart of the Marshall Plan lay an argument that European recovery as a whole could not proceed without a vibrant German economy as its engine. The corollary was true as well: the western part of Germany would not long remain quiescent and pliable unless it was given a role in the broader process of European revival. Marshall's proposal laid bare – and repudiated – the central contradiction of American policy up to June 1947, and acknowledged that there could not be a European recovery without Germany to underpin it. From a political point of view, then, Marshall's speech marked the birth announcement of a West German state, though in fact that achievement lay two years in the future.¹⁴

The implementation of this strategy had a number of overlapping stages: the upward revision of Germany's level of industrial production in the summer of 1947; the inclusion of the British–American bizone (the French, for the time being, kept separate control of their own zone) in the emerging Europe-wide agreements on trade and payments that were outlined at the CEEC; the expansion of powers given to German political authorities within the bizone in January 1948; and the inclusion of the bizone in the establishment

¹⁴ For further analysis of Germany's position, see Hans Peter Schwarz's chapter in this volume.

of the newly formed OEEC itself in April 1948. Of the OEEC, General Lucius Clay, the military governor, noted that “for the first time since surrender, western Germany was a participant in an international undertaking.”¹⁵

The new American emphasis on placing Germany at the center of a Europe-wide recovery plan was most evident at the London Conference in 1948, where the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg convened to discuss a long agenda of European issues. From February to March, and then again from May to June, the conferees negotiated precisely how the new Germany was to be *both* controlled and granted some political and economic autonomy. Secretary Marshall and his lieutenants pushed the argument that German recovery could bring security and prosperity to Western Europe; without it, Western Europe would continue to live in fear of an unstable, mercurial Germany, nursing grievances and playing a middle game between East and West. Using the Marshall Plan as a stick as well as a carrot – the Congress passed the ECA in April, right in the midst of the London Conference – the Americans demanded the fusion of the bizon with the French zone of occupation, and agreement on a plan to allow a Constituent Assembly in Germany draw up a federal constitution. As a concession, the Americans accepted the creation of an International Authority that would oversee and control coal and steel production in the industry-heavy Ruhr Valley – a vital French demand – though even this authority would be largely advisory, with no real power. By the end of the London meetings in June 1948, the United States had brought Britain, France, and the nascent German leadership toward a consensus on creating a West German state, partially sovereign, and linked to the West by economic integration.

Can it be said then that the Marshall Plan effectively started the Cold War? No; the chapter in this volume by Vladimir O. Pechatnov makes it clear that US–Soviet relations had already worsened severely during 1946.¹⁶ Yet the Marshall Plan surely marked a point of no return. It demonstrated that the Americans had made a clear choice to favor a strong German recovery as the engine of a West European recovery favorable to US interests. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw the plan as part of an American bid for economic and strategic hegemony that required a swift reaction. Moscow insisted that its own satellite states in Eastern Europe reject Marshall aid, and ordered West European Communist Parties to ratchet up their demonstrations, propaganda, and strikes. Within the Soviet sphere of influence in the East, Stalin

15 Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1950), 216.

16 See Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapter in this volume.

became far less accommodating to any ideological deviation from the rigid line laid down by the Cominform, the Soviet-dominated association of Communist Parties, in September 1947. This played into the hands of the hardliners throughout Eastern Europe and culminated in the Prague coup of February 1948, when Stalin's Communist allies in Czechoslovakia engineered the overthrow of the last multiparty government in Eastern Europe. The Soviets radicalized their German policy as well. They denounced the London accord of June 1948 as a breach with wartime and postwar accords, which of course it was. Using the currency reform in the western zones as an excuse, the Soviets cut off land access into and out of the western sectors of Berlin. The Berlin blockade and subsequent airlift completed the transformation of the American role in Germany from occupier to protector. Progress toward fusion of all three zones, the creation of German government institutions, and the promulgation of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949 was swift. It may be too much to state that the Marshall Plan started the Cold War, whose many roots reached back across a wide acreage of wartime and postwar distrust and rivalry. But from June 1947 on, the United States set a course for a western German state and a capitalist European economic revival that confirmed the division of Europe.

Just as the Marshall Plan led directly to the creation of a western German state and the division of Europe, so too did it spur new European security plans that would lead directly to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁷ The principal architect here was not, however, Secretary Marshall, but the able British foreign minister Ernest Bevin. Bevin, who described Marshall's plan as "a lifeline to sinking men," had played the key role in getting the CEEC up and running. Yet he also saw immediately the security implications of the plan. If Washington was now committed to a western German revival and perhaps an independent state, Bevin wanted to be sure that Washington would also deal with any adverse consequences, especially mounting Soviet threats to Western Europe. On December 15, 1947, Bevin told Marshall he wanted to see the formation of "a western democratic system comprising the Americans, ourselves, France, Italy, etc., and of course the Dominions. This would not be a formal alliance but an understanding backed by power, money, and resolute action. It would be a sort of spiritual federation of the West." In a formal paper, Bevin proposed the creation of a Western Union, including not just the core West European countries but old

17 For further analysis of the origins of NATO, see the chapters by Anne Deighton and Melvyn P. Leffler in this volume.

foes such as Germany, Spain, and Portugal, as well as all the Scandinavian countries. This, he believed, was the only way “to call a halt to the Soviet threat.”¹⁸ This proposal was well in advance of American ideas. The State Department, then seeking a Congressional commitment of many billions of dollars for Europe, did not want to begin lobbying for a military alliance as well. The Americans responded by giving Bevin their blessing, but refusing any outright support for his alliance scheme. This came as a blow to Bevin, who realized that, without American membership, any European security system would be a hollow shell.

Bevin’s vision for a Western alliance was given a huge and quite unintentional boost by the Prague coup, which galvanized West European leaders. On March 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact, a mutual defense agreement, and Bevin again urged the United States to join in a broader Atlantic security system to “inspire the necessary confidence to consolidate the West against Soviet infiltration.” The alternative, Bevin pointedly declared in a memo to the US State Department, “is to repeat our experiences with Hitler and to witness the slow deterioration of our position.”¹⁹ In what has become a case study of “empire by invitation,” Bevin and Bidault were positively begging for an assertion of US military power into Europe to defend them from what they perceived to be a determined Soviet campaign of expansion.²⁰ If there were any doubts about the Soviet menace, the Berlin blockade quickly dispelled them. The blockade was a massive miscalculation, for it gave Bevin yet another opportunity to plead for a formal military commitment from the United States. In mid-July 1948, the Western powers began exploratory talks on the creation of a Western alliance. The chief obstacle to the alliance was hesitation in the US Congress over weakening the constitutional authority of that body to engage the United States in a war on behalf of an ally. This issue was gradually resolved, and the result, in April 1949, was NATO, composed of twelve members.²¹ It would not have been created without Bevin’s determination and the bungling tactics of the Soviets; but NATO also sprang from a shared belief that the economic community being created by the Marshall Plan would be strengthened by a mutual defense pact alongside it. Like the ERP, NATO was an expression of

¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1948, vol. III, 1, 4–6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 32–5, 46–8.

²⁰ This term was coined by Geir Lundestad, in “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 23 (1986), 263–77.

²¹ The twelve original members were Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.

transatlantic solidarity, a pact between the United States and Western Europe that underscored a common set of values and governing principles.

The Marshall Plan's long-term ripple effects reached out beyond Germany and US alliance policies. The plan also shaped the evolution of internal European politics, the process of European integration, and, by legitimizing a particular economic model of production and consumption, opened the way to the Americanization of Europe.

The Marshall Plan clearly impacted the internal political dynamics in a number of recipient states. In France and Italy, the powerful Communist Parties were obliged by Stalin's Cominform to align their policies with the Soviet bloc, which proved politically disastrous for them. By championing strikes and disruptions of American shipments of grain, tractors, and aid, the Communists put themselves at odds with a needy population; they also pushed away the moderate socialist parties which, in 1945, had been eager to carry a broad left-wing alliance, Popular Front-style, into the period of reconstruction. American tactics could sometimes be crude, as in the manipulation of the Italian elections of 1948, where covert funding of anti-Communist parties may have tipped the balance toward the Christian Democrats; but usually such measures were not necessary. The Marshall Plan forced European parties to choose between Moscow and Washington: all but the Communists chose Washington. By 1948, the Left was decisively split, with the Communists in opposition everywhere and the socialist parties firmly enlisted in the pro-Western camp. The beneficiaries of this leftist strife were the Christian Democrats and affiliated liberal parties, whose right-leaning, often Catholic leaders such as Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault in France, Alcide De Gasperi in Italy, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard in West Germany, and Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands held power and key Cabinet posts well into the 1950s. Marshall aid helped create a cadre of Atlanticist leaders who shaped postwar Europe.

The Marshall Plan also had a catalytic effect on the process of European integration. The ERP, by placing Germany at the forefront of Europe's recovery, compelled France, Germany's perennial rival, to seek out new methods of international control that would block the emergence of a dominant Germany inside Europe. To France's dismay, the OEEC, on which the Americans had initially placed such high hopes, never evolved into a Europe-wide control authority. The British, eager to defend the integrity of the sterling bloc and their global network of financial and imperial controls, blocked any serious integration of Britain's economy with the European continent. The OEEC remained a talking shop, with no powers to compel

trade liberalization or currency stabilization. The French therefore felt somewhat bereft: Germany was recovering at a dramatic rate, but the hoped-for “web” of transnational controls was nowhere to be found. Still worse from the French point of view, the Americans and British were by the start of 1950 beginning to think about ways to enroll Germany into the Western alliance. The French greatly feared the rearmament of Germany and its entry into the alliance. Not only might such a policy provoke an armed response from the Soviets, but it would also tilt the balance of power in Europe in Germany’s favor; in addition to having a powerful economy, the Germans might soon possess a new, American-supplied army as well. What use would Germany have then for European cooperation? The Americans seemed determined to place West Germany at the center of its Cold War strategy, while Britain was unwilling to provide any counterweight to Germany inside a unified Europe.

Monnet, the creative, energetic director of the French economic recovery agency, suggested a solution to French foreign minister Schuman: France and Germany, and any other willing state in Western Europe, should pool their coal and steel industries, placing them under the international, binding control of a High Authority. In a stroke, Monnet believed, the long wrangle over Germany’s coal and steel production would be swept away. Germany would enter on equal terms into a novel arrangement with France, signifying a joint partnership in a program of industrial expansion. French anxieties would be eased because German industry, should it expand rapidly, would pull France and the rest of Europe along with it. The High Authority would contain Germany: by controlling coal and steel – the sinews of power in the 1950s European economy – it would in effect preside over a new balance of economic power in Europe. But it would do so in a constructive framework rather than through a humiliating military occupation. It would offer an olive branch to Germany while placating French anxieties over German recovery; and it would please the Americans, who had been urging Schuman to take just such a bold step.

On May 9, 1950, Schuman announced a proposal for the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, which in due course became the cornerstone of the new Europe. The divergent reactions in Washington and London to Schuman’s plan reveal how far apart these two governments had drifted with respect to European integration. The US ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, hailed the plan as “the most constructive thing done by the French government since the Liberation.” The response in Britain, by contrast, was hostile and peevish. Bevin seethed with anger at having been ambushed in this way; the Foreign Office felt France had “behaved extremely

badly in springing this proposal on the world at this juncture without any attempt at consultation.” The British feared that France and Germany were reviving an old dream of a Franco-German cartel in Europe, one with profound implications for Britain’s own economy. Britain refused to join subsequent talks on the plan, in principle opposed to a scheme in which decisionmaking would be placed in the hands of a supranational body that was, as Prime Minister Clement Attlee put it, “utterly undemocratic and responsible to nobody.”²²

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had six founding members: France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries. The ECSC placed the coal and steel sectors of these states under a common, supranational authority whose purpose was to rationalize and modernize production, making the industry more efficient while removing decisionmaking from the hands of national governments. It started operations in August 1952, headquartered in Luxembourg, and with Monnet as its first chairman. The Marshall Plan did not author the Coal and Steel Community; rather, the ECSC was called into being precisely because the American plan for continental integration through the OEEC had stalled, while German economic recovery was surging ahead. But American officials took enormous satisfaction in the fact that France had become an advocate of the principles behind the ERP: that a Europe bound together by trade and coordinated economic policy would be prosperous and peaceful.²³

By promoting the rise of centrist political leaders and laying the groundwork for new international mechanisms of trade, modernization, and industrial growth, the Marshall Plan also contributed, perhaps decisively, to the Americanization of Europe. This term suggests more than simply the exchange of “productivity teams” of European and American industrialists, the screening of films about American factories, or sending traveling caravans into the French countryside to extol the virtues of American productivity – all of which were projects undertaken through the ERP. In the years during and after the Marshall Plan, on a broad front, European governments moved to change the way their peoples worked, produced, and consumed. They lowered tariff barriers to trade within Europe; they adopted American management style in

22. Bruce and Bevin cited in William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 129; Attlee cited in Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe* (London: Longman, 1991), 46.

23. For further discussion of European integration, see N. Piers Ludlow’s chapter in volume II.

their businesses; they joined in the creation and expansion of multinational corporations, developed higher productivity standards, and eventually began to adopt American-inspired antitrust, deregulation, and privatization policies. The fact that Europeans also began to drink Coca-Cola, wear blue jeans, and watch American films were only symptoms of a deeper convergence among Western states of their habits of production and consumption. Europe and the United States, so different from one another before 1939, began to merge into a genuine transnational community that valued economic growth, security, high standards of living, and mass consumption. These had been the ideas promoted explicitly by the original missionaries of the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan in history

In a narrow sense, the Marshall Plan was not long-lived. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the American political establishment began a swift rearmament program and pushed the Europeans to do the same. Prices of commodities soared and the hard-pressed Europeans once again found themselves facing dollar shortfalls, budget deficits, and inflation – the very conditions the ECA had been designed to fix. The internal political environment in Washington also changed: Republicans gained seats in Congress and launched an attack on the multilateralist conceptions of Marshall aid. Congress created the Mutual Security Agency to replace the ECA, which it did at the end of 1951, and insisted that military rearmament be made the United States' chief foreign aid goal.

For the next three years, the diplomacy between Europe and the United States focused on securing a German contribution to European defense. Only after a bitter dispute was agreement reached and in 1955, ten years after the end of World War II, West Germany was brought into the NATO alliance. The officers who had served in the ECA and had promoted economic integration as a solution to European recovery were saddened and alarmed to see how the ERP had become militarized. But in the end, Germany's enrollment in NATO served the cause of European solidarity well: Germany turned out to be a vital partner in NATO, and the alliance knit European militaries closely together. Meanwhile, the Marshall Plan had helped generate momentum on a parallel track, toward genuine European economic integration, which took concrete form in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. It would take another thirty-five years before anything like a "united" Europe would be realized; and even today intense national rivalries over economic policy persist within Europe. Indeed, the construction of the West has not been easy or

swift. What can be said is that the vision of a Europe closely bound together in common purpose, premised on democratic governance, the free exchange of goods and services, and enduring transatlantic ties to the United States has been more fully realized than anyone could conceivably have imagined when George Marshall sketched out a plan to help Europe at the Harvard commencement on June 5, 1947.

The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953

NORMAN NAIMARK

The great Soviet victories at Stalingrad (January 1943) and Kursk (July 1943) reversed the tide of the war against the Nazis and made it likely that Soviet armies would occupy vast stretches of territory in Europe. Allied conferences at Teheran in November 1944 and Yalta in February 1945, and the notorious “percentages agreement” between Iosif Stalin and Winston Churchill in October 1944, confirmed that Eastern Europe, initially at least, would lie within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Communists in the region also assumed that their countries would fall under Soviet sway in one form or another. Milovan Djilas famously recorded Stalin’s assertion during a wartime conversation: “This war is not as in the past: whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”¹ Georgi Dimitrov, head of the Soviet Central Committee’s Department of International Information, noted in late January 1945 that Stalin expected a war with the capitalist world within two decades of the Nazi defeat, and therefore it would be necessary to maintain a strong alliance among the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe to counter that aggression.²

Yet there is very little evidence that Stalin had firm notions in 1944–45 about developing some sort of Communist bloc in Eastern Europe after the war. Instead, he probably shared many of the suppositions of two of the major policy-planning documents to emerge from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during World War II, Maxim Litvinov’s “Memorandum” of January 11, 1945, and Ivan Maisky’s “Note” of January 10, 1944. The Litvinov document was prepared in association with the Yalta Conference and explored the possibility of establishing an agreement about three spheres of influence on the continent. Linked to

1 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962), 114.

2 Georgi Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 357–58.

the Soviet Union would be a zone in the east and north, including Finland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. A second zone would be dominated by Britain and would include the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Most interesting was the “neutral” sphere, which included Germany as well as Denmark, Norway, Austria, and Italy. In this sphere the great powers would share responsibility for the security of the area, cooperating on issues of reparations and trade.³ According to the Maisky note, continental Europe would inevitably transform itself into a series of socialist states, but, barring armed conflict, it would take somewhere between thirty and fifty years for this evolution to take place. Meanwhile, cooperation with the United States and Britain was critical for setting up democratic regimes and functioning economies in formerly Fascist and Fascist-occupied countries.⁴

To those East European Communists who spent the war years in Moscow, the advance of Soviet armies into Eastern Europe meant that they would have the opportunity to vie for political leadership in their homelands. They did not take it for granted that they would instantly come to power as a result of Soviet victory and occupation. Instead, in Moscow, in the underground, and in prison camps, East European Communists developed strategies to cooperate with other anti-Fascist parties of the Left and center to form national fronts to liberate their countries and to build new and “truly democratic” political systems. They would cooperate with socialist, populist, and democratic parties to bring about an anti-Fascist democratic revolution.

This was also Moscow’s line at the end of the war, which was implemented by Dimitrov and his staff of mostly foreign-born Communists.⁵ Broadcast over radio and communicated by telegrams, brochures, and newspapers all over Eastern and East Central Europe, the policy was unambiguous. There would be no Communist revolution in Eastern Europe and no dictatorship of the proletariat; no workers’ councils (soviets) were to be formed. Instead, the East European revolution would see the completion of the 1848 bourgeois democratic revolution, bringing to an end the remnants of feudalism in the region. Free of the influence of the landholding class and big capital, the will of the people would be expressed through democratically elected parliaments. The rights of peasants and workers would be guaranteed by constitutional law.

3 G. P. Kynin and I. Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskoi vopros 1941–1949* [The USSR and the German Question 1941–1949], vol. I, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996), 595–96.

4 T. V. Volokitiina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v vostochnoi evrope, 1944–1953* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999), vol. I, 23–48.

5 For Stalin’s foreign policies, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapter in this volume.

Communist Parties would operate in coalitions with agrarians, socialists, and true democrats to bring about a new stage in these countries' histories, that of "people's democracy."

The beginnings of "people's democracies"

The initial period of the foundation of the people's democracies, 1944–45, was one of the most important in the entire history of postwar Eastern Europe.⁶ But it is also one of the most difficult to categorize, since the Soviet Union followed flexible policies in establishing its influence. Given their geopolitical importance and the traditionally anti-Soviet and anti-Communist traditions of their political elites, Poland and Romania were fated to be controlled and manipulated by their Soviet occupiers. Here, Soviet involvement was absolutely central to the development of people's democracies. The same could be said of Hungary, though its geographical position was not as critical to Moscow as that of Poland and Romania and its political opportunities were more open-ended. Eastern Germany (the SBZ, or Soviet Zone of Occupation) was fully controlled by Soviet military and political authorities, but Soviet insistence on the unity of Germany prevented concrete moves toward building a people's democracy in this period.

Soviet involvement was also important in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but this was coupled with the significant and sometimes equally important influence of purely internal social and political factors. Although to different degrees, the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Communist Parties cooperated with other resistance forces during the collapse of Nazi rule, which portended decent relations with non-Communists in the postwar period. Still, it was the entry of Soviet troops into both of these countries and Moscow's support for their native Communist Parties that facilitated their eventual Sovietization. The success of the Communist-led September 9, 1944, coup in Bulgaria and the subsequent domination of the country by the Communist Party would not have occurred without Soviet help and encouragement. During the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Communists, urged on by Moscow, promoted Edvard Beneš and the left-liberal forces he represented as partners in the formation of a new Czechoslovak government.

6 Some of the material in this and subsequent sections is taken from a draft report: Leonid Gibianskii and Norman M. Naimark, "The Soviet Union and the Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1956: A Documentary Collection," National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, contract number 817 16.

In Yugoslavia and Albania, the creation of people's democracies took place predominantly due to internal social and political causes rather than to Soviet influence. The local Yugoslav and Albanian Communist Parties had successfully resisted the Axis occupation of their countries, leading large, popular, and effective left-oriented national liberation movements and, eventually, armies, which freed their respective countries. To be sure, Soviet foreign policy aided their efforts. In Yugoslavia, the Red Army provided important, though not essential, military support. In Albania, Yugoslav advisers and military aid were significant in the outcome.⁷

The earliest and most blatant case of Soviet involvement in East European politics occurred in Poland, where the so-called Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) was secretly formed by Stalin from the ranks of former Polish Communists living in Moscow. According to plan, the PKWN accompanied Red Army troops as they poured into Poland in late July 1944. Then, the Soviets arranged for the PKWN to form a Polish national government in Lublin, which was formally recognized by Moscow. Polish Communists, organized in the Polish Workers' Party (the PPR), and other Polish leftists, including the socialists in the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), enjoyed the support of only a very small fraction of the Polish population. They were nevertheless called upon by the Soviets to serve as leading personnel in the PKWN, which increasingly asserted its power over those parts of Polish territory liberated from the Nazis by the Red Army. Already at the beginning of 1944, Stalin created a Central Bureau of Polish Communists from the ranks of the leading Polish émigré Communists residing in the USSR. This secret organization became a key instrument in guaranteeing that the Kremlin controlled the political platform of Polish Communism in these years.⁸ After the liberation of the country from Nazi occupation and the formation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PPR in early September 1944, the Soviets made sure that the majority of its members previously belonged to the Central Bureau. This way, Stalin was able to ensure that the "Muscovite" segment of the Central Committee held the upper hand over those "native" PPR members, like Władysław Gomułka, who had participated in the resistance in Poland and tended to follow their own political inclinations.

Soviet military forces and special services protected the new postwar Polish government and administration from opponents in the Polish underground.

7 See Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

8 Gennadii Bordiugov, et al. (eds.), *SSSR-Pol'sha: mekhanizmy podchineniia 1944-1949 gg. Sbornik dokumentov* [The USSR and Poland: The Mechanisms of Subordination, 1944-1949. A Collection of Documents] (Moscow: AERO XX, 1995), 13-15, 24-25.

Soviet forces eliminated groups attached to the London Polish government-in-exile, which had earlier fought against their Nazi occupiers.⁹ NKVD (secret police) units were extremely active in attacking, killing, and arresting underground activists. On August 23, 1944, Red Army troops were also ordered to take “urgent measures” against Home Army units in areas occupied by the Soviets. These units were to be immediately arrested and disarmed, thus preventing them from making their way to Warsaw to aid the ongoing uprising.¹⁰ This signifies, as does other evidence, that Stalin preferred that the uprising, which was organized by the émigré government, be put down by the Nazis, which indeed happened in September–October 1944, rather than achieve success and serve as an impediment to the imposition of Moscow’s authority in Warsaw and in Poland as a whole.

The Kremlin followed similarly forceful tactics in Romania. During the breakthrough of Soviet troops into Romania on August 20, 1944, the royal court and a number of Romanian generals staged a coup, removing General Ion Antonescu’s regime and joining the Allied cause. Even when the country was fully occupied by the Red Army, the king, his military allies, and his administration stayed in power. However, as early as the fall of 1944, the Communist Party, at the head of a Left coalition – the so-called National Democratic Front (FND) – unleashed a Soviet-approved campaign to move the government further to the Left. The FND leaders went so far as to demand that the government transfer power to themselves, even though they could muster very little support from the Romanian population as a whole. The Soviets also applied considerable pressure within the Allied Control Council in Romania, through their chief representative Andrei Vyshinskii, insisting on concessions to the “democratic forces” of the country, which meant the Communist-led FND. Continuing intimidation of the government culminated in a Communist-inspired coup in February–March 1945, which was backed by the Kremlin’s ultimatum to the king. King Michael had no choice in these circumstances but to appoint a new government on March 6, one that relied primarily on the FND and its Communist leaders.

9 John Micgiel, “‘Bandits and Reactionaries’: The Suppression of the Opposition in Poland, 1944–1946,” in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 93–111.

10 A. F. Noskova (ed.), *Iz Varshavy. Moskva. Tovarishchu Beriia ... : dokumenty NKVD SSSR o pol'skom podpol'e 1944–1945 gg.* [From Warsaw. Moscow. Comrade Beriia ... : Documents of the USSR NKVD about the Polish Underground] (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 2001), 345–46.

During these dramatic events, Soviet military commanders and representatives of the Soviet administration in the Allied Control Council countered attempts by Romanian government troops and police to prevent FND-led demonstrations. In Bucharest, where skirmishes between FND protesters and Romanian government forces signaled the beginning of an acute political crisis, Soviet representatives intervened to support the FND. In collusion with the Romanian Communist Party, the Soviet special services made ready to create an FND government on their own should Vyshinskii fail to bully the king into proclaiming it himself. Additional Red Army units were moved toward Bucharest, including, on Stalin's orders, two divisions of NKVD troops.¹¹ In the end, there was no need for the direct application of force. Vyshinskii's relentless pressure on King Michael broke his resistance and the coup was accomplished under the veneer of royal legitimacy.¹²

The Soviets formed three German Communist "initiative groups" in Moscow to follow Red Army troops into occupied Germany in April and May of 1945: one led by Walter Ulbricht, the second by Anton Ackermann, and the third by Gustav Subbotka. Although some German Communists, most notably Ulbricht, played an important role in building a pro-Soviet political base in eastern Germany, this task fell primarily to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and in particular to the head of its Propaganda Section, Colonel Sergei Tiul'panov, and to its political adviser and representative of the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Semenov. Tiul'panov was responsible for the political development of the SBZ and instituted a series of political initiatives favoring the Communists. But Soviet policy in Germany was characterized by a combination of restraint and control, which reflected the Kremlin's ambivalence toward the future of Germany. As long as there was the possibility of negotiating an agreement with the West over the future of Germany, Moscow held back efforts by Tiul'panov, Ulbricht, and others to go ahead with the Sovietization of the SBZ.¹³

In Hungary, the German overlords removed the wartime government of Admiral Miklós Horthy, who had tried to conclude a last-minute truce with the members of the anti-Hitler coalition, and replaced it on October 15, 1944, with the Arrow Cross leader, Ferenc Szalasi. Meanwhile, the Soviets created

11 T. A. Pokivailova, *et al.* (eds.), *Tri vizita A. Ia. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest, 1944–1946 gg.* [Three Visits by A. Ia. Vyshinskii to Bucharest, 1944–1946] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), 86–87, 106–08, 123–24.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 100–01, 105.

13 Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 298–301.

a provisional government that was to take power in the wake of the Red Army's advance into Hungary. Stalin was satisfied with placing Hungarian Communist Party members in prominent positions in the new government. The Communists were a minor political force in Hungary and the Soviets sought allies from anti-Nazi and anti-Szalasi Hungarian parties of the Left and center, and even some pro-Horthyite groups which offered to cooperate with the Soviet side.¹⁴ Stalin's policies toward Hungary seemed more pragmatic and flexible than those he promulgated in Poland and Romania.¹⁵

There is relatively little evidence that the Soviets directly interfered in the postwar political development of Czechoslovakia. In negotiations between Beneš and the Soviets in March 1945, there was general agreement that the Czechoslovak Communists would play an important, if not decisive, role in the new government after the liberation of the country from the Nazis.¹⁶ The Soviets neither pressured the new Prague government to engage in violence against its non-Communist opponents nor insisted on specific domestic policies. This did not mean, of course, that the Soviets were without influence. The very fact of the Red Army's entry into Czechoslovakia changed the situation on the ground. But the withdrawal of Soviet troops in late 1945 gave Beneš and his allies unusual latitude within Moscow's developing "sphere of influence."

The national road to Communism

The Soviets and their East European Communist allies understood that they could win over the local populations only by paying attention to their national goals and needs. Similarly, in their foreign policy, the Soviets tried to reinvigorate ideas of Slavic brotherhood by reviving nineteenth-century pan-Slavic ideas. The Poles were as suspicious of Stalin's pan-Slavism in the postwar period as they had been of the tsarist original in the late nineteenth century. But among the Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, and Yugoslavs, the ideas about a greater Slavic community of peoples, led by the great Slavic Russian brother

14 T.V. Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov 1944–1953 gg.* [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1997), vol. I, 86–87, 94–98, 102–04, 111–13; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 109–16, 118–22, 167–72, 195–204.

15 Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 4–6.

16 Jerzy Tomaszewski, *The Socialist Regimes of East Central Europe: Their Establishment and Consolidation*, trans. Jolanta Krauze (London: Routledge, 1989), 27–28.

to the east, found considerable resonance as the Red Army marched into Eastern Europe.

In the mix of slogans involving Slavic unity and anti-Fascist democratic revolutions, the Soviets encouraged Communists to pursue their own “national roads” to Communism, meaning they should adjust their demands to local conditions and share political power with other “patriotic” socialist and democratic parties. This program served Soviet aims in two ways: first, it contributed to good working relations with Western Allied governments, and, second, it helped build a popular following for what were – in the prewar period – very small and very insignificant Communist Parties. National roads meant that the individual Communist Parties could unambiguously bear the shields of patriotic causes, while vying with populist and social democratic parties in claiming to represent the best interests of the “nation.” In this spirit, Stalin supported the plans of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments to expel Germans from their countries.¹⁷ Communist Party promotion of ethno-nationalist causes, at least when they did not damage Soviet interests, were generally welcomed by the Kremlin.

Part of the rationale for supporting patriotic causes was to win the support of the mass of voters in electoral contests. The Soviets took these elections deadly seriously, in some cases more seriously than the East European Communists themselves. As a consequence, they were bitterly disappointed with the results. In Austria and in Hungary in November 1945, and in the eastern zone of Germany and Berlin in the fall of 1946, Soviet-sponsored Communist Parties suffered unexpected setbacks. Even with all the pressure applied by the Polish Communist forces against Stanisław Mikołajczyk and the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) in the crucial nationwide referendum of June 1946, including outright falsification of the returns, the Poles managed to register their displeasure with the Communists by voting “no” on the symbolically crucial first question. The Czechoslovak party did well in the elections of May 1946, garnering 38 percent of the vote. But its popularity noticeably receded thereafter, which no doubt played a role in the planning of the February 1948 coup. It is unlikely that the Soviets would have allowed Communists to be voted out of positions of power in Eastern Europe. In that sense, the anti-Fascist democratic revolution, as understood by many non-Communists, would have been hard-pressed to succeed.

¹⁷ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 109–11.

The electoral defeats of the Communists were in part the result of the Soviets' own actions. There was considerable receptivity to socialism and even to Soviet liberation and occupation at the end of the war. But the combination of the miscreant behavior of the Red Army soldiers in foreign lands and the rapaciousness of Soviet reparations officials responsible for dismantling factories and seizing agricultural products for the army and home front led to anger and resentment on the part of local populations. In Hungary and Germany, the liberators were seen as thieves and rapists. In Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Germany, the Soviets dismantled factories as reparations and seized grain from farmers. Even in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the behavior of Soviet troops created "great disillusionment" among the common folk, who earlier had genuinely admired, even idolized, Soviet Red Army soldiers.¹⁸

Electoral "campaigns" aside, everywhere in Eastern Europe Communists seized control of the interior ministries and their police functions, especially those having to do with secret police and armed internal police units. Working in tandem and sometimes at the behest of the Soviet NKVD (after 1946 MVD) and NKGB (after 1946 MGB and later still KGB), domestic secret police pursued alleged counterrevolutionaries and Fascists, and arrested, tortured, exiled, and sometimes executed democrats and socialists who opposed growing Soviet influence.¹⁹ If in 1945 and 1946 one could not talk about a Communist seizure of power in what were formally parliamentary democracies, Communists used their control over the secret police apparatus to make sure that there would be no serious internal opposition to their policies. In this sense, the timing of the Great October Revolution was reversed; in postwar Eastern Europe, the civil war, where it existed, was fought and won by the secret police and its Soviet backers before – rather than after – the Communists actually seized power.

The Sovietization of Eastern Europe

After the initial formation of the people's democracies in Eastern Europe in 1944–45, the next stage of Sovietization involved the establishment of Communists' predominance. This process varied from country to country and differed significantly in its pace. It is also important to note that there was

18 Irwin Sanders, *Balkan Village* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1949), 196, 207. See also Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 68–140.

19 Andrzej Albert [Roszkowski], *Najnowsza historia Polski*, [The Recent History of Poland], vol. II (London: Puls, 1994), 33–50.

considerable fluidity between these periods within individual countries. Still, the task of Sovietization was essentially completed in all of them by the end of 1947 and 1948.

The regimes in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and the SBZ developed mixed political systems in which the Communists accepted non-Communist parties as junior partners in multiparty coalitions. Controllable opposition parties were also sometimes acceptable in this schema. In Bulgaria, non-Communist parties that participated in the government were allies of the Communists within the Left bloc. In Poland and Romania, the allied parties in the Left bloc supplied the overwhelming majority of the government ministers. Some centrist forces also took part in the political life of these countries, but they were insignificant minorities in their respective governments. In Poland, this was the case of the Polish Peasant Party under Mikołajczyk. In Romania, the centrist forces were represented by the National Liberals, headed up by Gheorghe Tatarescu; but they soon abandoned their oppositional stance and joined with the FND.

In the SBZ, as well as in Poland and Romania, there can be little question that the leftist governments and the leading position of the Communists in them resulted primarily from Soviet military and political domination rather than from internal developments. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the leadership of the Left bloc with the Communist Party at its head enjoyed substantial popular support. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, coalitions were formed between the Communist Parties and their leftist allies on the one hand and the democratic and even some conservative parties on the other. The coalitions were more genuine than the ones in Romania, Poland, and eastern Germany, and were based on a rough parity between leftist and center/rightist parties. Despite the growing pretensions of Josip Broz Tito, Moscow tended to be quite satisfied with the evolution of the Yugoslav regime and its Albanian client.²⁰

In most of Eastern Europe, Moscow opted for a strategy that emphasized the gradual evolution toward a socialist order. This meant gradually increasing the role played by the Communist Parties in the national governments and eliminating or marginalizing opposition forces in or outside the ruling coalitions. The Communists complemented these policies with the subordination of their partners on the Left. Meanwhile, the Communists strengthened their control over the economic and social spheres, expanding the realm

20 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 705–06.

of government-owned industry, taking over transportation, finance, and trade, and implementing radical land reform. Still, on Soviet instructions, they stopped short of fully nationalizing industry and collectivizing agriculture. The façade of democracy was to remain in the form of political coalitions, multiparty systems, and parliaments. The idea, which Stalin articulated in discussions with a number of leaders of East European people's democracies, was for these countries to move toward socialism without going through the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.²¹

Stalin was far less specific about the length of time it would take for the East European states to reach the stage of a socialist order by this non-Soviet route. Nor did he indicate how long a multiparty and parliamentary system should be preserved, including a legitimate opposition and elements of genuine coalition politics. Some historians maintain that the Soviets intended to drop the democratic façade as soon as possible and replace it with a transition to socialism on the Soviet model. Others contend that Stalin seriously considered the possibility that the countries of the region could develop democratic paths to socialism, distinct from the Soviet example.²²

The argument about the Kremlin's long-term intentions aside, the documents made available in Russia and Eastern Europe over the previous decade make it apparent that the means by which socialism would be built had little to do with democratic politics and parliamentary procedures. On the contrary, the implementation of socialist policies by the Communist Parties and their Soviet mentors relied from the beginning on administrative pressure, subversion, and direct repression, including attacks on the opposition and leftist allies if they proved too independent. At the end of 1944 and beginning of 1945, the Bulgarian government persecuted the leader of the Agrarian Union, Georgi Dimitrov (Gemeto), who was not only removed from his post as a result of behind-the-scenes Communist pressure but was subsequently arrested and brought to trial. Also in Bulgaria, Stalin ordered that the defense minister and a leader of the Zveno (Link) Party, Damian Velchev, be removed from power.²³ In Poland and Romania, the security organs arrested and interrogated opposition leaders and subjected others to restrictions and intimidation. To these actions in Poland and Romania should be added the black-mail, threats, and falsified results that accompanied the Polish referendum of

21 Dimitrov, *Diary*, 358, 413–15; Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 457, 511, 579.

22 Norman M. Naimark, "Post Soviet Russian Historiography on the Emergence of the Soviet Bloc," *Kritika*, 5, 2 (Summer 2004), 561–80.

23 Dimitrov, *Diary*, 405, 406–07.

June 1946 and the parliamentary elections in Poland in January 1947 and in Romania in November 1946.

Having falsified the Polish parliamentary elections of January 1947, Communist authorities set out to destroy Mikołajczyk's PSL through force and repression. This produced a crisis within his party, which ended when Mikołajczyk and other PSL leaders fled for their lives to the West in October 1947, leaving control of the party to those members who opted to side with the Communist authorities.²⁴ In Bulgaria and Romania in June 1947, based on fabricated accusations of plotting against the government, the chief leaders of the opposition were arrested, accused of a variety of crimes in a series of show trials, and sentenced to long prison terms.²⁵

At the turn of 1946/47, the Hungarian Communist-controlled secret services initiated a campaign against the leaders of the Smallholder Party, which held significant positions in the government and in the parliament. (In the 1945 elections the party had received 57 percent of the vote.) The Smallholders were accused of fomenting an antigovernment conspiracy. As a result, the Soviet military authorities arrested the party's general secretary, Béla Kovács, in February 1947 and, in the course of the investigation, produced materials regarding the alleged participation in the plot of several party leaders, including the prime minister, Ferenc Nagy. The Hungarian Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi used these allegations to force the Smallholders to transfer the party's leadership and the post of prime minister to Left-leaning members connected with the Communists. As a consequence of splits within the opposition engineered by Rákosi (his so-called *salami tactics*), in August 1947 new parliamentary elections were held in which the leftist bloc collected 60 percent of the vote. Communist Party members officially held a third of the positions in the new government but, counting secret members and sympathizers who nominally represented other parties, they controlled more than half of the government posts. Relying on their strengthened position in the government, the Communists used well-tested police methods of accusing opposition politicians of engaging in antistate activities to eliminate political dissidence altogether.²⁶

Similar methods were used in Czechoslovakia. During the second half of 1947, the Communist-controlled secret police leveled accusations of

24 Albert, *Najnowsza historia Polski*, vol. II, 108–09, 118–23.

25 Mito Isusov, *Stalin i Bulgariia* [Stalin and Bulgaria] (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 1991), 184–92.

26 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 561–62, 606, 613–14, 619, 641–46, 691–93, 713; Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 425.



14. Hungarian election posters, 1947.

antigovernment conspiracy against several non-Communist parties in the ruling coalition. This offensive concluded with the February 1948 coup, which was orchestrated by the Czechoslovak Communists themselves and led to the destruction of all of the other parties.²⁷ In Bulgaria and Romania, the legal opposition was entirely eliminated in 1948; in Hungary, this process extended until the beginning of 1949.

In most of the East European countries, the domination of the Communist Parties over their social democratic “allies” was an important part of achieving

²⁷ Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 19–24.

total control over the domestic political situation. In the SBZ, this process began already in the spring of 1946, when the forced “unification” of the KPD and SPD produced the new, Communist-dominated SED (Socialist Unity Party). By 1948, the elimination of social democratic parties by merging them forcibly with the Communist Parties, often heralded by noisy “unity” campaigns, was completed in all of the countries of the region. The Communists reorganized and eliminated the other parties of the Left bloc during 1947–48, merging some into new formations, splitting others, and leaving some to survive as “stage props,” which unreservedly supported the preeminent role of the Communist Party in the building of socialism. Now all of the countries of Eastern Europe essentially had Communist one-party systems like Yugoslavia and Albania. The monopoly on political power was combined in all of the East European countries, including the SBZ, with corresponding measures in the social, economic, and cultural spheres.

Soviet representatives were involved in virtually all of the political machinations described above. Soviet advisers shaped electoral campaigns, selected government ministers, and approved secret police actions. Stalin sent a team of Soviet Interior Ministry experts to Poland to provide “technical advice” about the legal and extralegal methods to achieve the appropriate results in the elections of January 1947.²⁸ Stalin also personally approved political trials, unification campaigns with the social democrats, and important government appointments. East European Communists fully expected to work with the Soviets on political matters.

The East European comrades were also closely watched and sometimes carefully micromanaged by Moscow. Communist functionaries expected to be instructed, and they learned to ask their Soviet patrons for permission to undertake initiatives or for directives regarding even trivial internal or external policy questions, including appointments to positions in the party and government. Competing factions within the East European Communist Parties played out their rivalries in Moscow, providing alternative policy or appointment suggestions to their Kremlin patrons. One can see this in particularly sharp relief in the competition between Gheorghiu-Dej and his group in the Romanian party and their rivals Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Teohari

28 Volokitina, *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 365–70; N.V. Petrov, ‘Rol’ MGB SSSR v sovetizatsii Pol’shi’ [Role of the USSR MGB in the Sovietization of Poland], in A.O. Chubar’ian, *et al.* (eds.), *Stalin i kholodnaia voina* [Stalin and the Cold War], (Moscow: IVI RAN, 1998), 114–18.

Georgescu.²⁹ The conflicts between Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe in the Albanian Communist Party were similarly articulated in their alternative presentations to Moscow.³⁰ In these cases and others, internal party rivalries on the one hand, and Stalin's unwillingness to make an unambiguous choice on the other, often left the East Europeans with a measure of autonomy. Differences between Soviet advisers in the region also left room for maneuver.³¹

Where Stalin allowed the East Europeans very little autonomy was in the realm of foreign policy. Instructive in this connection were the measures taken by Moscow at the end of June and beginning of July 1947 to ensure the desired response of the people's democracies to the Marshall Plan. In a little over two weeks, the Soviet leadership changed its directives three times in encrypted telegrams sent to the leaders of the East European Communist Parties.³² Initially, the instructions stipulated that all the people's democracies should express interest in the plan. Later, the Soviets suggested that their representatives should participate in the conference of European states convened to discuss the plan, but should disagree with its substance and withdraw, trying to persuade the other small European states to leave with them. Finally, Moscow directed the people's democracies not to participate at all in the conference or in the implementation of the plan. The East European Communist leaders accepted seriatim all of these directives without question. The only serious complications emerged with the Czechoslovak government, which had a non-Communist majority. Beneš and his associates were completely committed to the Marshall Plan process. But at a meeting in Moscow on July 9, 1947, Stalin ruthlessly pressured the Czechoslovak government delegation, forcing them to reject outright the Marshall Plan and refuse participation in the upcoming conference.³³ Jan Masaryk wrote: "I went to Moscow as a Foreign Minister of an independent sovereign state; I returned as a lackey of the Soviet Government."³⁴

29 Robert Levi, *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 194–219; Volokitina, et al. (eds.) *Vostochnaia evropa*, vol. I, 760–63.

30 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 267–70; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 340–45.

31 Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 349–52.

32 Scott Parish, "The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations, and the Division of Europe," in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes*, 274–2.

33 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. I, 672–75.

34 Bruce Lockhardt, *My Europe* (London: Putnam, 1952), 125.



3. Europe divided, 1949.

The Stalinization of Eastern Europe

The Soviets countered the perceived threat of the Marshall Plan by calling a meeting of European Communist Parties in Poland at Szklarska Poręba in September 1947. A new organization was set up, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), ostensibly to share information among Communist Parties, but in fact to monitor compliance with Soviet directives. Stalin's deputy for ideological questions, Andrei Zhdanov, delivered his famous "two camps" speech, in which he insisted that Communist Parties line up with and, by implication, mimic the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.³⁵ This brought to an end the period of "the anti-Fascist, democratic revolution" and the idea of national roads to Communism. Soon after the Cominform meeting, Soviet officers took a more active part in the development of East European armies. Economic relationships between the East European countries and Moscow were tightened, symbolized by the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA; also known as the Comecon) in January 1949. The Communist Parties were also instructed to intensify the struggle against so-called kulaks in their countries and to emulate the Bolshevik model of rooting out the bourgeoisie. Those Communist politicians who thought otherwise and were wedded by conviction to ideas of national Communism were soon removed from their posts and purged from their parties.

After Szklarska Poręba, the policies of the Soviet Union were to serve as the policies of the Communist Parties of all of Europe. The Italian and French Communist Parties, severely criticized at the Cominform meeting for meekly succumbing to their respective partners in democratic coalitions, were enjoined to radicalize their programs and destabilize the bourgeois governments of the West. The Yugoslav Communists were pleased by the call for the sharpening of the "class struggle" in Western Europe and for vigilance against alleged counterrevolutionary forces within Eastern Europe indicated by the discussions of Szklarska Poręba.³⁶ By the spring of 1948, however, the Yugoslavs learned that Moscow's demands for conformity in the bloc included Stalin's insistence that they rein in their own aspirations, which they were

35 Anna Di Biagio, "The Establishment of the Cominform," in G. Procacci *et al.* (eds.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli Foundation, 1994), 32–34.

36 See the attack by Milovan Djilas on the French Communist Party in Procacci *et al.* (eds.), *The Cominform: Minutes*, pp. 253–63.

unwilling to do.³⁷ The subsequent Soviet–Yugoslav split in the summer of 1948 heightened tensions within the East European parties, as Soviet fears of the spread of “Titoism” led to denunciations and arrests throughout the region.

If the Cold War was born in the tensions surrounding the development of the Marshall Plan, its angry rejection by the Soviets, and the establishment of the Cominform, it was accelerated by the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the Berlin blockade in June 1948, and the eruption of the Soviet–Yugoslav split in the summer of 1948.³⁸ Stalin’s worries about enemies within the East European Communist Parties grew exponentially as it also became clear in late 1948 that the Yugoslav deviation was turning into heresy and defiance. Discipline in the newly emerging Soviet bloc would have to be ensured by the traditional Stalinist means of purges and show trials. Communist Parties “of the new type,” meaning Bolshevik and Stalinist, would be forged in the fires of denunciation, interrogation, self-criticism, and purges. Stalin and Beria dispatched NKVD “advisers” to the capitals of all the people’s democracies in order to quicken the hunt for “enemies of the people.”³⁹

The conflict with the Yugoslavs also intensified Stalin’s determination to maximize Soviet control over the other East European countries. With a new level of ruthlessness, the Soviets urged their East European satraps to crush non-Communist opponents and purge the Communist Parties of dissidents. The “case against Gomulka” constitutes one of the emblematic moments in this struggle. Gomulka had already been identified in the spring of 1948 as belonging to a faction of the Polish Politburo that was chauvinistic and prone to anti-Soviet statements and attacks. He was accused of holding an indifferent attitude toward the Soviet experience and of being a nationalist. Although Gomulka was unable to protect his position in the party and government, he cleverly used the politics of anti-Semitism with Stalin to bolster his case against the Polish party leadership.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the Polish secret services continued to build a case against Gomulka and others in his so-called clique. In 1951, Gomulka was arrested and was fortunate to escape with his life. Stalin died

37 L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Forsirovanie sovetskoi blokovoï politiki” [The Imposition of Soviet Bloc Politics], in N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voïna, 1945–1963* [The Cold War, 1945–1963] (Moscow: OLMA Press, 2003), 137–41; Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 125, 145.

38 See William I. Hitchcock’s and Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapters in this volume.

39 See the documents on Soviet interference in: “Delo Slanskogo” [The Slansky Case], *Voprosy istorii*, nos. 3 and 4 (1997), 3–20 and 3–18.

40 Bordiugov, et al. (eds.) *SSSR–Pol’sha*, 271–77; Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor*, vol. I, 549–60.

before there was enough evidence (and/or desire) to bring him and his associates to trial.

Communist leaders in other parts of Eastern Europe who fell from favor with Moscow did not fare so well, especially those of Jewish origin. Everywhere else in the region except for Poland there were show trials, which were meant not only to punish alleged offenders but to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist authorities. (In the German Democratic Republic [GDR], analogous trials of Paul Merker and others were held in secret.) Much as Lev Trotskii was the main defendant in absentia of the Moscow show trials, so was Tito the phantom defendant of the East European trials. This was particularly apparent in the May 1949 trial of former Albanian Politburo member and minister of interior, Koçi Xoxe. Xoxe was convicted as a Titoist and executed. László Rajk, the important Hungarian Communist and former minister of the interior, was similarly condemned as a Titoist and a Western spy and executed. Leading Hungarian Communists, many of Jewish origin, were tried and hanged. In December 1949, Traicho Kostov, an important Bulgarian Communist figure and economic specialist, was accused together with a number of his comrades of participating in a Titoist plot against the government and was executed. Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, former Politburo member and minister of justice in Romania, was the central figure in a plot concocted by Gheorgiu-Dej against alleged Titoists and spies. Because he refused to confess, he could not serve as the center of a show trial. He was later condemned to death and shot.⁴¹

The increasingly open manifestations of Soviet anti-Semitism in the early 1950s lent the October 1952 show trial of Rudolf Slánský, former general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, an ugly anti-Jewish aspect. Many of his alleged Zionist co-conspirators were also of Jewish background. They were accused of having dealings with the American Central Intelligence Agency agent Noel Field, who figured in many of the East European trials.⁴² For this and other alleged crimes, the accused Czechoslovak Communists were sentenced to death and hanged.

The show trials victimized not only Communist Party leaders who had fallen from favor, but also non-party government specialists and military leaders. In every case, Soviet “advisers” helped prepare and mastermind the purge trials, a job at which they were ostensibly expert. They sometimes

41 Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 43.

42 Igor Lukes, “The Rudolf Slansky Affair: New Evidence,” *Slavic Review*, 58, 1 (Spring 1999), 160–88; Hermann Field and Kate Field, *Trapped in the Cold War: The Ordeal of an American Family* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

directly participated in the interrogations and drew up lists of those to be arrested. The East European parties, as well as security and judicial administrations, asked for advice from the Soviets and expected directions. Because historians still do not have access to the archives of the Soviet secret police, there is a lot that remains unknown about direct ties between the Soviet and East European security organs. Certainly, Soviet preferences during the trials, sentencing, and execution of alleged traitors made a difference. But domestic Communist politics, in which one rival group or leader attempted to remove opponents, dominated the calculus of political repression.⁴³ The result of the purges was that "Little Stalins" emerged throughout the region, Communist Party chiefs such as Bolesław Bierut (Poland), Rákosi (Hungary), Gheorgiu-Dej (Romania), Ulbricht (GDR), Klement Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), Hoxha (Albania), and Vulko Chervenkov (Bulgaria). Although their powers and domestic images resembled that of Stalin, their persons and policies were strictly subordinated to the Kremlin.

The Soviets used a host of other means short of repression and political manipulation to impose their will on the East European parties and states. Soviet participation in the organization of the power structures of these countries, in cadre politics, and in implementing economic, cultural, and social policies all served the cause of the successful Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Soviet advisers in the region – ranging from guest professors of philosophy in the universities to artillery specialists in the militaries – also played a crucial role in developing institutions that would mirror the supposedly superior Soviet counterparts. Soviet advisers were also important when the East Europeans undertook special projects, whether currency reform, the revocation of the rationing system, the launching of important economic projects, or the building of cultural institutions. Since in Stalinist Eastern Europe the "Soviet way" was the only right way to do things, the East Europeans often found it easiest to import Soviet specialists to show them how to accomplish concrete tasks. All the countries of Eastern Europe, from the most highly industrialized, such as Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the least developed, such as Albania, imported Soviet advisers for an astonishing variety of purposes. Moscow often provided them with instructions on how to transform parts of the government apparatus, judicial and police systems, and educational and economic institutions, according to the Soviet model.⁴⁴

43 George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

44 Volokitina, et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa*, vol. II, 688–89.

Equally important to the penetration of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was the explicit transfer of Marxist-Leninist(-Stalinist) ideology. In the era of “high Stalinism” at the end of the 1940s and beginning of the 1950s, the Soviets demanded thoroughgoing ideological imitation, to ensure conformity in Eastern Europe as well as to confirm their superiority over and the subordination of the East Europeans.⁴⁵ They closely monitored East European ideological developments, whether in local party journals or in the arts, education, and the mass media. Local Soviet representatives sent “report cards” back home on how well the East Europeans matched up in their understanding of Marxism-Leninism. They discussed ideological questions with members of the local intelligentsia and nomenklatura, constantly harping on the need for the complete adoption of Soviet cultural norms and political ideas. Reporters from various agencies in Moscow emphasized not only the need for locals to learn better from their Soviet teachers but also the critical importance of countering the ideological influence of the West.

Sovietization or self-Sovietization?

Some scholars criticize the concepts of Sovietization or Stalinization because they overly simplify the complex processes of give-and-take between the Soviet Union and its East European subordinates.⁴⁶ They prefer the idea of “self-Sovietization” or “self-Stalinization,” terms that capture the fact that the East Europeans adapted and used Soviet models themselves without direct instructions or coercion. John Connelly is right to note that both processes were at work. The Soviets, given their exaggerated security concerns, “kept channels of information to Eastern Europe narrow, and left communists there no choice but to discover and implement the Soviet system themselves.”⁴⁷ Thus there was plenty of room for East European leaders to set their own

45 Andrew Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 237.

46 See T. V. Volokitina, et al., *Narodnaia demokratiia: mif ili realnost'?* [People's Democracy: Myth or Reality?] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 4–6, and T. V. Volokitina, et al., *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa: stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov sovetskogo tipa, 1949–1953. Ocherki istorii* [Moscow and Eastern Europe: The Creation of Political Regimes of the Soviet Type, 1949–1953. Historical Essays] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 17–18.

47 John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 55.

priorities and initiate their own policies, but only within the contours dictated by Stalin and the Soviets.

A related question that suffuses the historiography, both traditionally and more recently, has to do with Stalin's original objectives in Eastern Europe. Was he, from the very beginning, interested in the development of Soviet-style regimes throughout the region, or did other factors, such as the interests of East European Communists themselves or threats from the West in the increasingly menacing atmosphere of the Cold War, prompt Stalin to clamp down on his East European allies? Most examples of recent Russian historiography tend to take the latter view.⁴⁸ But many historians in the West and a few in Russia think that Stalin developed his programs for anti-Fascist fronts and people's democratic governments as so much eyewash for the British and Americans and as a sop to the electoral sensitivities of the East Europeans.⁴⁹ The next stage, a fully Stalinist Eastern Europe, was the inevitable result of his political planning, with or without the Cold War.

The arguments by Soviet foreign-policy specialists Vojtech Mastny and Vladislav Zubok tend to support this latter view, though they attribute Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe to his pragmatic understanding of the spread of Communism within the traditional framework of spheres of influence. As acceded to by the Allies during the war, Stalin sought to nail down a belt of dependent countries on the Soviet European borders, while essentially turning over Western Europe and Greece to the British and Americans. Mastny emphasizes Stalin's fears and exaggerated needs for security as the motivating factors in constructing what came to be known as the "Soviet bloc."⁵⁰ Zubok places the primary weight on what he and Constantine

48 See, for example, Volokitina, *et al.*, *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa*, 35–36. See also Norman M. Naimark, "Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945–1953: Issues and Problems," *Journal of Modern European History*, 1, 2 (2004), 31–45. Geoffrey Roberts states that he supports the general view of Volokitina and her coauthors in his recent *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 411, n. 54.

49 Eduard Mark, *Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001); Donal O'Sullivan, *Stalins "Cordon Sanitaire": die sowjetische Osteuropapolitik und die Reaktionen des Westens 1939–1949* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); L. Ia. Gibianskii, "Problemy vostochnoi Evropy i nachalo formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka," [The Problem of Eastern Europe and the Beginning of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc], in Egorova and Chubar'ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina*, 105–37.

50 Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 93.

Pleshakov call the “revolutionary-imperial paradigm,” which conforms to traditional Russian proclivities to control Eastern Europe.⁵¹

The argument about Stalin’s intentions and motivations will not be easily resolved. There can be little question that the Soviets imposed their will on Eastern Europe in a gradual and carefully calibrated fashion. But the evidence is not conclusive that Stalin planned this process, rather than reacted to a variety of domestic and international stimuli along the way. As Vladimir Pechatnov has shown in his contribution to this volume,⁵² Stalin was constantly adjusting and resetting his plans and priorities, as prompted by shifts in American foreign policy and the international situation. From the perspective of more than a half-century later, the Sovietization of Eastern Europe can easily seem to have been designed from the very beginning of the Soviet occupation and even earlier. Appearances can be deceptive, especially when scholarly hindsight is at work, a consistent story needs to be told, and archival evidence can be mustered for opposing arguments.

In the immediate postwar period, both Communists and non-Communists in Eastern Europe assumed that the struggle for political mastery of their countries was open-ended and could lead to a variety of results. They thought that their policies – sometimes more and sometimes less “radical” than those generally proffered by the Kremlin – fulfilled the needs of their parties and of Stalin. It is unlikely that they missed something that we can clearly see today. That they were wrong about their ability to determine the ultimate fate of their countries was less a product of their political blindness to Stalin’s real intentions than of their inability to predict a future in which the growing intensity of the Cold War increasingly dominated Moscow’s view of the world.

51 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 4. See also Zubok’s *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 19.

52 See Vladimir O. Pechatnov’s chapter in this volume.

The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956

SVETOZAR RAJAK

During the first ten years after the Second World War, events in the Balkans contributed significantly to the shaping of the Cold War world. The outbreak of fratricidal bloodshed in Greece in December 1944, which later escalated into a full-scale civil war, became the first major conflict of the Cold War. In May 1945, even before the German capitulation, an ideologically induced confrontation over control of Trieste threatened to draw the Communist Yugoslav People's Army and the British and American forces into an armed conflict. As the Second World War ended, a fault line between ideologically opposed groupings was emerging in the Balkans.

Three years later, as a result of the conflict between Moscow and Belgrade, and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet 'camp', the region witnessed the first strategic re-alignment between the two blocs. The ensuing five-year confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR and its allies created a schism that destroyed forever any view of the Communist movement as a monolith. Furthermore, the split encouraged Yugoslavia's leader, Josip Broz Tito, together with India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, to search for a multilateral Third World alternative to the bipolar Cold War world and, eventually, help create the Non-Aligned Movement of states. Finally, as recently opened East European archives have confirmed, the tentative Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation that followed the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953 had a significant impact on the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence

The Normandy invasion in 1944 ended the prospect that the Western Allies might land in the Balkans and fight the German-led Axis there. The absence of Western forces decisively shaped the postwar settlement and the political composition of the region. By the end of the summer of 1944, the Romanian



4. The Balkan states after World War II.

and Bulgarian governments, members of the Axis coalition, collapsed in the face of the advancing Soviet Red Army.¹

There is no evidence suggesting that Iosif Stalin possessed a blueprint for the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans. Its origins lay in the distribution of the 'spoils of war' among the ideologically opposed victorious superpowers. Moscow used 'people's' or 'popular front' governments as tools to establish its political influence, while slowly securing the

¹ For more on Romania and Bulgaria, see Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.

deferential obeisance of the new regimes through ideological affinity. Local political circumstances shaped the pace and manner of growth of Soviet hegemony. In Romania and Bulgaria, countries under Soviet military occupation, Moscow simply installed 'popular front' governments. Yugoslavia and Albania, however, already under local Communist control, had to be pushed by Stalin to accept the same model. The 'popular front' governments consisted of representatives of both pre-war parliamentary parties and Communists; the latter held key posts, such as the Interior and Justice Ministries.

On the one hand, given the initial popularity and war record of the Communist parties, the Kremlin believed that its 'popular front' strategy would generate enough support to enable local Communists to launch socialism with the assistance of their non-Communist coalition partners. On the other hand, Moscow also hoped that this framework would allow the continuation of its wartime alliance with the United States and Britain, while securing friendly regimes in its periphery. During the first year and a half after the war, Stalin was generally careful not to undermine relations with the Western Allies. In the autumn of 1945, following British-American criticism during the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, Stalin, for example, did curb the revolutionary terror of the Bulgarian Communists against their political opponents.

Led by local Communists, the partisan armies that liberated Yugoslavia and Albania swept pro-Soviet regimes into power, enabling Moscow to shape developments in those countries, with the result resembling something of an 'empire by invitation'. Unlike Romanian and Bulgarian Communist leaders who arrived with the Red Army, the new leaders of Yugoslavia and Albania were heroes of national liberation struggles. Tito's partisans were by far the strongest home-grown anti-Nazi resistance movement in occupied Europe. As a result of their considerable contribution in the fight against Hitler's armies, they received formal recognition and material support from Britain from the summer of 1943. The Red Army was involved in operations around Belgrade in September and October 1944, after which it left the country to fight in Hungary. German and Italian occupiers and the puppet regimes they set up, in particular the genocidal Ustashe regime in Croatia, had fostered the form of fratricidal carnage that would recur during Yugoslavia's breakup in the 1990s. At the same time, the war of liberation in Yugoslavia was a social revolution that set Communist-led partisans against more conservative forces, such as the Chetniks, Serbian guerrillas backed by the royal Yugoslav government in exile. The Chetniks' focus on destroying the partisans had led to periods

of collaboration with the Germans and Italians. Armed with a popular mandate and much left-revolutionary zeal, the Yugoslav Communists were sometimes oblivious to wider European realities and to Stalin's geopolitical considerations.

When he entered Belgrade, on 20 October 1944, Tito, the undisputed leader of the country, commanded the fourth-largest army in Europe, consisting of partisans fiercely loyal to him. Responding to British and American pressure, Stalin soon forced Tito to accept a coalition with the exiled royal government in London. With Communists firmly in control, however, Yugoslavia's industry was quickly nationalised. In August 1945, a major land reform was enacted but without immediate collectivisation, presumably in recognition of the peasants' crucial support for the resistance movement during the war. On 11 November 1945, the Communists won an overwhelming victory in a general election. Two months later, a new Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created and Tito became its first prime minister.

In Albania, Enver Hoxha, the Communist Party and Albanian National Liberation Front leader, became the head of the new government. During the war, Tito's envoys had acted as advisers to the Albanian Communist Party and had assisted with the command co-ordination of partisan military operations. Within months after the November 1944 liberation of Tirana, Hoxha managed to eliminate most of the opposition, often through summary executions. The general election in December 1945 legalised Communist control. Three months later, the new constitution, emulating the Soviet Constitution of 1936, declared Albania a people's republic. With almost all of its industry and resources nationalised by the end of that year, Albania became fully incorporated into the Soviet sphere.

The manner in which the Soviets were marginalised in the Allied Control Commission in Italy in 1943 and the December 1944 British military intervention in Greece undoubtedly shaped Stalin's approach to the creation of a Soviet sphere of influence in the Balkans. To the Soviet leader, it seemed as if Britain and the United States justified their behaviour by assuming that they had a right to impose solutions within their zone of occupation. Stalin did not seriously challenge them; moreover, he instructed local Communists not to engage in insurrectionary action. In Stalin's mind, the behaviour of Washington and London affirmed the precept that imposition of control over their respective spheres of influence was a natural right of the victors. The often-quoted observation he made over dinner with Tito and Milovan Djilas in April 1945 that 'this war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system' can be understood only

within this context.² Made only weeks after the meeting in Yalta – at which Stalin believed the Big Three had defined spheres of influence – the remark was not Stalin's admission of a blueprint for a Communist take-over of Eastern Europe; it acknowledged the post-Second World War settlement between ideologically opposed victors. Stalin saw Britain, at least, as having been ready to acknowledge most of the Balkans as part of a Soviet sphere of influence since the talks during Winston Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944.

The emergence of an ideological fault line in the Balkans provoked the first major confrontation of the Cold War. On 30 April 1945, Tito's army liberated and occupied the strategically important Italian port city of Trieste. Afterwards, the Yugoslav leader flatly rejected British–American demands for a withdrawal, provoking a dangerous stand-off between the Allied armies that threatened a full-blown military confrontation. A month later, Stalin forced Tito to withdraw and sign a provisional agreement with the Western Allies, leaving the final settlement to the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, however, the Trieste question became one of the most contested issues. It also provoked possibly the first act of dissent within the Communist bloc. In September 1946, unhappy with the Soviet concessions over Trieste, the Yugoslav delegation threatened to walk out of the Paris conference.³ Tito, nevertheless, bowed to Stalin's authority. The conference, in the end, extended the earlier provisional agreement, leaving the Trieste issue a dangerous flash-point. In October 1953, a unilateral British–American decision to hand the administration of Trieste to Italy, contrary to the provisions of the existing agreement, brought Yugoslavia and Italy within hours of a military confrontation.⁴ A year later, a Washington-brokered agreement settled the Trieste question, with the city itself being awarded to Italy, while Yugoslavia retained the southern areas.

With the end of the Second World War in sight, the Soviet Union had set out to establish its sphere of interest in the Balkans. Romania and Bulgaria were incorporated into this sphere as a result of Red Army advances and consequent Soviet military occupation. In Yugoslavia and Albania, indigenous resistance movements established Communist regimes that were Moscow's natural allies. Turkey, as a neutral during the war, remained outside the Soviet sphere. Only in Greece did the form of the postwar settlement appear

2 Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 90.

3 Vladimir Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948* [Documents on 1948] vol. I (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), 134.

4 V. Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], vol. III (Belgrade: Izdavačka radna organizacija Rad, 1984), 629.

open-ended, as the Communists and the pro-Western government in Athens prepared for a showdown.

The Greek Civil War and the Turkish crisis

The origins of the Greek Civil War lay in the character of the anti-Nazi resistance in the country during the Second World War. In the autumn of 1944, when the German army retreated from Greece, most of the country was controlled by partisans of the National People's Liberation Army (Ellinikos Laïkos Apeleftherotikos Stratos, ELAS), the military wing of the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo, EAM), established in September 1941 by the Greek Communist Party (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE). Some areas, however, were controlled by smaller resistance movements of pro-Western and anti-Communist orientation. From the outset of the anti-Nazi struggle, fratricidal in-fighting had been taking place between the left- and right-wing resistance movements.

During the summer of 1944, alarmed by the prospect of a Communist takeover after the war, Churchill successfully lobbied Franklin D. Roosevelt and Stalin and obtained support to sideline the EAM.⁵ In September, the EAM was forced to accept an agreement recognising the authority of Georgios Papandreou's royal government in exile. Furthermore, ELAS units were placed under the command of the British general Ronald Scobie. Developments in Greece certainly played a role in prompting Churchill to initiate the 'percentage agreement' on spheres of influence in the Balkans when he met Stalin in October 1944. During the same month, a British contingent landed in Athens, followed a few days later by the royal Greek government. An uneasy stand-off ensued between the Communist-led forces controlling the countryside and the government, backed by British troops in and around Athens. Shots fired by police during an EAM rally in Athens on 3 December triggered an open civil war. The British government urgently deployed reinforcements from bases in Italy. Within a month, a combination of British military muscle and Churchill's political cunning had forced ELAS out of Athens and its immediate surroundings.

The EAM's failure to take control of the country in late 1944 can be attributed to Stalin's refusal to authorise it to do so. When the British contingent landed in Athens, Stalin ordered the withdrawal of Bulgarian

⁵ Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 17.

troops from northern Greece, thus honouring, as he saw it, the inter-alliance agreement on Balkan spheres of influence.⁶ At the climax of the fighting in Athens, in mid-December 1944, Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist leader and head of the recently disbanded Comintern, communicated a stark message to the KKE leadership that the 'current international situation' did not permit other Communist states to support any offensive by the Greek Communists.⁷ On 10 January 1945, in front of Dimitrov, Stalin accused the KKE leadership of acting against his advice 'not to start this struggle', cynically adding that they probably 'expected the Red Army to descend to the Aegean'.⁸

Deprived of Moscow's support, the EAM ceased fighting over Athens and signed an agreement with the Greek government on 12 February 1945. This agreement effectively signalled the EAM's military defeat in the first round of the Greek Civil War. Under the terms of the agreement, ELAS and other paramilitary forces were disarmed and disbanded in return for a promise of a referendum on the fate of the monarchy and general elections. ELAS's demobilization allowed the Right, now in full control of the Greek army and the police, to unleash a 'white terror' campaign of persecution and murder against the Communists and their sympathisers. Many on the Right saw this as a retribution for Communist excesses perpetrated during the December fighting in Athens.

The KKE's decision to boycott the 31 March 1946 general elections, because of the widespread intimidation of its sympathisers, led to an overwhelming victory by the anti-Communist parties. The momentum created by this victory would, six months later, help the government and anti-Communist parties secure majority backing for King Georgios's return to Greece in a national referendum on the future of the Greek monarchy. The outcome of the elections and continued persecution of the Left provoked a series of spontaneous actions of ELAS veterans against government forces. Without Moscow's clear authorisation, the KKE leadership, in particular its general secretary, Nikos Zachariadis, escalated sporadic clashes into another round of civil war by the end of 1946.⁹ In December, the left-wing forces were unified into the Greek Democratic Army (Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, DSE).

6 J. Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self-Defence?: Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 3 (Summer 2005), 3–33.

7 Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 52.

8 Thanasis D. Sfikas, 'Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945–1949', *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 17 (1999), 209–27.

9 Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self-Defence?.'

Organised into small guerrilla units, the DSE attacked government forces and outposts and then retreated into mountains or bases in Yugoslavia and Albania.

By the autumn of 1946, a consensus had been reached in Washington that the escalation of the Communist insurrection in Greece, coupled with Soviet pressure on Turkey, was proof of Moscow's expansionism and a threat to vital Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, the British government, preoccupied with problems in Palestine and India and its dire economic situation at home, was increasingly unable to fulfil its role as regional *gendarme*. Washington thus began preparations to step in and provide necessary military and economic assistance to the Greek and Turkish governments.¹⁰ This explains how on 12 March 1947, barely three weeks after the British had informed him of their inability to continue supplying arms to Greece, President Harry S. Truman was able not only to request from the US Congress a substantial military and economic assistance package to Greece and Turkey but also, more importantly, to promulgate a comprehensive doctrine of containment of the Soviet and Communist global threat – the Truman Doctrine.

By mid-1948, decisive US military and economic assistance to the Athens government, in the absence of Moscow's commitment to the DSE, tipped the scales of war against the Communists. Besides arms, Washington provided crucial assistance in military training, air support, and command co-ordination. In addition, substantial US economic aid helped turn the peasant population, exhausted after seven years of war, away from the Communists. The change in the DSE's military tactics to large-scale operations from the autumn of 1947, in particular the DSE's disastrous attack on Thessaloniki on 10 February 1948, haemorrhaged its human and material resources without any military gains in return. In addition, divisions and purges within the KKE caused by the Tito–Stalin split further diminished its effectiveness and its ability to wage war. In the summer of 1949, the Greek government army, under the newly appointed commander-in-chief, General Alexander Papagos, launched a series of successful offensives. The retreat of the last DSE units into Albania in October 1949 signalled the end of the civil war in Greece.

10 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh), Washington, October 15, 1946, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946*, vol. VII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 235–37; Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs – Memorandum Regarding Greece, Washington, October 21, 1946, *ibid.*, 240–45.



15. Communists shot by the government during the Greek Civil War, 1949.

Some historians have mistakenly attributed the end of the Communist insurgency in Greece to Yugoslavia's decision to close its border in July 1949. Between 1945 and July 1948, the Yugoslavs had supported the Greek Communists and often acted to promote their cause with Stalin. The closing of the border with Greece was a desperate concession to the West, at a time when Belgrade had become convinced of an imminent Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. By the summer of 1949, however, the outcome of the Greek Civil War had already been decided. The final offensive of the government's army had inflicted a fatal blow on the remaining Communist units, by then at a fraction of their strength in 1947.

Arguably, it was Stalin himself who decisively contributed to the Communists' defeat in the Greek Civil War. The Soviet leader repeatedly denied assistance to the Greek Communists and often deliberately undermined their policies. Available evidence suggests that Stalin never seriously contemplated a pro-Soviet regime in Greece because he was fearful that it would encroach on what he understood to be an area of vital British and American interests.¹¹ At the Yalta Conference, he never raised the question of Greece. The only time Stalin offered military assistance to the Greek Communists was during his May 1947 meeting with Zachariadis in Moscow. But even then he recommended that Zachariadis seek arms from Tito,

¹¹ Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 168–85.

knowing full well that Yugoslavia's stockpiles were at the time depleted and that it would not be able to deliver anything like the requested quantities. A few months later, Stalin excluded the KKE from the formative meeting of the Cominform, citing as justification the danger of provoking the Americans.¹² On 10 February 1948, Stalin angrily reprimanded Dimitrov and Tito's deputy, Edvard Kardelj, for aiding the Greek Communists, insisting that he had never believed in their victory.¹³

Turkey, although it was the only Balkan state that had remained neutral during the Second World War, emerged as an overwhelmingly underdeveloped country, with deep social divisions, and governed by an authoritarian regime based on a monopoly of power held by the Republican People's Party (RPP), which saw itself as custodian of Atatürk's political legacy. Building on what he thought was the Turkish state's internal weakness, Stalin in the summer of 1946 demanded shared control of the Bosphorus straits. Encouraged by the United States, Turkey resisted Moscow's demands and, together with Greece, provoked the Truman Doctrine and the West's emerging containment strategy.

Improved relations with the United States prompted a slow democratisation of Turkey's political life. The first postwar elections in July 1946 instigated a process of transition from twenty years of dictatorship to multi-party democracy. Elections in 1950 and 1954 and the victories of the former opposition Democratic Party under Adnan Menderes represented the culmination of this process. As a beneficiary of Marshall Plan aid, between 1949 and 1954 the Turkish economy also underwent substantial modernisation, which strengthened the central state further.

During the 1950s, Ankara received more than \$2 billion of Western, mostly US, military assistance that helped transform Turkey into a major regional military power. In February 1952, after participating in the Korean War on the side of the United Nations with a 25,000-strong contingent, Turkey was rewarded with full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).¹⁴ By the mid-1950s, Turkey had become the linchpin of US-backed regional military alliances. A treaty of military co-operation with Pakistan was concluded in August 1954. A similar treaty with Iraq, signed in February 1955, was a precursor to the Baghdad Pact, a regional alliance also joined by Iran and the United Kingdom, with the United States as an 'observer'. In the years that

¹² Iatrides, 'Revolution or Self Defence?.'

¹³ Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 168–85.

¹⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 235–39.

followed, Arab states in the Middle East increasingly perceived Turkey as an American Trojan horse and a regional policeman. After a radical coup in Baghdad in 1958 led to Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, a new Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) was formed, with the United States as a full member. In August 1954, Turkey, encouraged by Washington, created a military alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia – the Balkan Pact – the only formal Cold War military alliance with ideologically antagonistic members. Ankara thus played a very important role in the US strategy of encircling the USSR with pro-Western regional military alliances. In turn, it was rewarded with continuous access to Western economic aid and financial assistance.

With the Communists defeated in the Greek Civil War and Greece and Turkey firmly ensconced in NATO, the Americans and the British preserved a foothold in the Balkans, securing the vitally important rim of the eastern Mediterranean from Soviet penetration. As Europe began to split into antagonistic blocs, Stalin recognised the need for deeper cohesion inside the Soviet 'camp'.

The Tito–Stalin split

Until 1946, Stalin believed that the cautious building of his sphere of influence in the Balkans and Eastern Europe would avoid an all-out confrontation with Britain and the United States. But, after Churchill's Fulton speech in March 1946 and after Molotov wrangled with the British and Americans during the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Paris Peace Conference in the months that followed, the Soviet leader began to recognise the making of his worst geostrategic nightmare – an anti-Soviet alignment of the two strongest capitalist states and global powers.¹⁵ On 1 January 1947, the US and British occupation officials in Germany unified their zones into a single economic unit – Bizonia. In March, President Truman delivered his famous address calling for the containment of Soviet 'expansionism'. In June, US secretary of state George Marshall announced an unprecedented American economic aid package to Europe. By the time European foreign ministers assembled at a conference in Paris in late June 1947 to discuss the European response to the American initiative, Stalin had become convinced that the Marshall Plan was aimed at consolidating the British–American sphere of influence in Western Europe against the Soviets.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume.

¹⁶ For more on the Marshall Plan, see William I. Hitchcock's chapter in this volume.

Many historians have pointed out that the Marshall Plan changed Stalin's strategies, moving him towards 'confrontational unilateral action to secure Soviet interests'.¹⁷ As explained in Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume,¹⁸ consolidation of a Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe became Stalin's priority; the first major step was the creation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in September 1947 at Szklarska Poręba in Poland. The new organisation included all East European and major West European Communist parties. Moulded on the Comintern, its task was to achieve 'unity of action and co-ordination' under Moscow's control and guidance. Chairing the Cominform's formative meeting, Stalin's ideologue, Andrei Zhdanov, announced for the first time the existence of the 'two camps'.

By the autumn of 1947, the Kremlin exerted full control over its area of influence in the Balkans as well as throughout Eastern Europe. The Romanian opposition was politically eliminated after a series of staged trials. Left-wing parties were merged with the Romanian Communist Party into the Romanian Workers' Party. On 30 December 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate. The Communist-dominated People's Democratic Front won almost 100 per cent of the vote in the fraudulent elections of March 1948. In Bulgaria, the purges and harassment of political opponents were renewed during the summer of 1946. After general elections in October, Dimitrov formed a government with Communists firmly in charge. In a staged trial in September 1947, Nikola Petkov, the leader of the opposition, was pronounced guilty of treason and executed, signalling the end of political opposition in Bulgaria.

In the first postwar years, Belgrade was considered Moscow's most trusted ally. Tito, the most popular European resistance leader and a veteran of the pre-war Comintern, enjoyed a certain freedom of action from Stalin, unlike any other East European leader. The Yugoslav Communist Party, which unaided by Moscow had carried out a victorious war of liberation and a successful socialist revolution, commanded special respect among European Communist parties. The Kremlin chose Yugoslav party representatives to spearhead the attack on the Italian and French Communist parties at the meeting that established the Cominform, and Belgrade was given the honour of hosting the new organisation. Thus, Tito and his comrades were shocked when they first began to observe a change in the mood of the Kremlin in January 1948. A Yugoslav delegation seeking Soviet military and economic assistance was badly treated.

17 Scott D. Parish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, *New Evidence of the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports*, Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994).

18 See Norman Naimark's chapter in this volume.



16. Josip Broz Tito (third from right), the leader of Yugoslavia, dancing with people in Dalmatia, 1950. His popular support empowered him to resist Stalin.

At the same time, *Pravda* dismissed Dimitrov's statement on the prospects of an East European and Balkan federation as a 'concoction'.¹⁹ Ominously, Stalin summoned both Tito and Dimitrov. Instinctively cautious, Tito instead dispatched his second-in-command, Kardelj.

During the meeting that took place on 10 February, Stalin viciously attacked the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs for failing to consult Moscow on foreign-policy issues. As evidence of their sins, he singled out the idea of a Balkan federation, the deployment of two Yugoslav army divisions in Albania, and continuing assistance to Greek Communists. The following night, Kardelj was unceremoniously summoned to the office of Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov and required to sign a formal agreement compelling the Yugoslavs to consult Moscow on all foreign-policy issues. Soviet actions gravely worried Tito and his associates, witnesses to the 1930s purges in Moscow.²⁰ On 18 and 19 March, true to their foreboding and only weeks after Kardelj's return, Moscow ratcheted up the pressure, advising Belgrade of the withdrawal of all Soviet military and civil advisers from Yugoslavia.²¹

19 Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 167–68.

20 *Ibid.*, 168–87.

21 *Ibid.*, 196–97.

A letter dispatched to Belgrade on 27 March, signed by Stalin and Molotov, accused the Yugoslav leadership of the gravest 'sins' in the Communist vocabulary. They were assailed for slandering the USSR, repudiating Marxism-Leninism, and abandoning the principles of class struggle and the leading role of the party. After receiving a resolution of the Hungarian Communist Party of 8 April supporting Moscow's accusations, the Yugoslav leadership understood that Stalin was orchestrating a campaign against them.²² On 12 and 13 April, Tito convened a closed session of the Yugoslav Central Committee. All but two of its members approved a response to the accusations drafted by Tito himself; it repudiated 'the false accusations and a veiled hegemonic assault of one state against the sovereignty of the other, hidden behind an ideological veneer', and invited Stalin to send a Soviet party delegation to Yugoslavia to convince itself of the absurdity of accusations.²³

During the next two months, still in absolute secrecy, Moscow and Belgrade continued to exchange accusations and denials. The Kremlin suggested that the case be handed over to the next Cominform meeting to be held in Bucharest in June. Tito refused to attend, convinced that he and his party would be subjected to a staged trial with a predetermined verdict. Indeed, the Cominform resolution, publicised at the end of the Bucharest meeting on 28 June 1948, decreed the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party and exhorted 'true Marxist elements' within the party to remove Tito.²⁴ It came as a bolt from the blue to the Communist world and to the West. The resolution was never officially presented to Belgrade; in fact, the Yugoslav leadership learned of its contents from press reports.

Within weeks of the Cominform meeting, the USSR and its satellites initiated a total economic blockade, bringing Yugoslavia to the verge of collapse and causing outbreaks of famine in parts of the country for several years afterwards. The impact of the blockade was exacerbated by the fact that Yugoslavia had emerged from the Second World War in economic ruin and with a death toll of 2 million. Furthermore, from 1945 to 1948, the Yugoslav economy, subordinated to the 'division of labour' within the socialist 'camp', had become dependent on assistance and trade with the USSR and East European people's democracies.

However, the biggest danger to Tito's regime was the possibility of a Soviet military invasion. Immediately following the Cominform resolution,

²² *Ibid.*, 252.

²³ *Ibid.*, 225–49.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 299–306.

Yugoslavia faced armed hostilities on its borders on a daily basis as the Kremlin's satellites infiltrated armed saboteurs. According to Yugoslav figures, from 1948 to 1953 there were 7,877 border 'incidents', of which 142 were substantive clashes. These 'incidents' continued even after Stalin's death, until full Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation in 1955. Moscow and its allies also unleashed a fierce propaganda war against the regime in Belgrade, disseminating disinformation and encouraging Yugoslavs to liquidate Tito and his 'clique'. The near life-and-death struggle against Stalin was responsible for a trauma that weighed on Yugoslav society for decades afterwards. During this period, Tito created a concentration camp, located on the Adriatic island of Goli Otok. Almost 32,000 political prisoners passed through the camp, most of them accused of supporting the Cominform and Stalin; about 3,200 died there.²⁵

During the Cold War, historians mistakenly attributed the Soviet–Yugoslav split to Tito's 'national Communism' or to his foreign-policy aspirations. They cited his decision to deploy Yugoslav troops to Albania or his plans to create a Balkan federation with Dimitrov. The archives tell a different story. At the July 1955 plenum of the Soviet Party Central Committee, the president of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Nikolai Bulganin, echoed by Nikita Khrushchev, confirmed that the 'sins' purportedly perpetrated by Tito had been Stalin's fabrications.²⁶ Prior to 1948, Tito had always bowed to Stalin's authority, even over the final settlement of Yugoslavia's borders around Trieste and with Austria. Moreover, in 1946 and 1947, when the Greek Communist leader Zachariadis came to Belgrade to solicit support for the escalation of operations in Greece, Tito dutifully sent him to Moscow. And, furthermore, Tito's alleged unauthorised deployment of two Yugoslav divisions to Albania was nothing more than Belgrade's willingness to consider Albania's request for military assistance. After being expelled from the Cominform, Yugoslav leaders became convinced that Hoxha's request was a conspiracy, hatched in Moscow, to substantiate subsequent accusations against Tito.²⁷ Contrary to prevailing interpretations, the Balkan federation never even came close to implementation. At the end of their meetings in Yugoslavia in August 1947, and a few months later in Bulgaria, Tito and Dimitrov officially dismissed the issue as premature. Stalin's harassment of Dimitrov and Kardelj during the

25 Dedijer, *Novi prilozi*, vol. III, 461 and 478.

26 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; Bulganin's address, transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; RGANI (Russian Government Archive of Contemporary History, Moscow), fond 2, opis' 1, rolík 6228, delo 158, listy 90–100.

27 Dedijer, *Dokumenti* 1948, 177.

February meeting can be understood only as part of the lead-up to an orchestrated campaign against Tito.²⁸ The Yugoslav leader embarked on his 'own road to socialism' and independent foreign policy only *after* the break with Stalin.

Historical evidence suggests that the Yugoslav–Soviet rupture was the result of Stalin's belated and flawed efforts to create a monolithic Communist 'camp'. Not by accident, the attacks on Tito coincided with the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. As detailed earlier, Stalin embarked upon creating a Soviet bloc after the autumn of 1947. The expeditious way to accomplish it, in his view, was through the process of Sovietisation. Stalin did not enjoy the good fortune of the British and Americans, who shared common cultural, religious, and ideological values with West European elites. Some of the countries inside his sphere of influence, such as Hungary and Poland, were deeply Catholic and Russophobe.

By Sovietising within his sphere of influence, Stalin sought to achieve several goals. On the one hand, he wanted to subordinate these countries by imposing a socio-economic and political system that was a replica of the one he had created in the USSR. On the other hand, he aimed to secure cohesion of the Soviet bloc by restraining these countries into a uniform ideological framework. To ensure this uniformity, he authorised the purging of 'internal ideological enemies', as he had done in his own country in the 1930s. The more prominent the personality, the better; if the most trusted comrades could be hidden enemies, anyone could. The presence of an 'enemy within' demanded permanent vigilance, which justified the temporary suspension of state and party institutions and the delegation of their functions to the security apparatus – the essence of Stalin's repressive state. The removal of Tito – the enemy within – initiated and justified the witch-hunts throughout Eastern Europe that followed the split with Yugoslavia; in Stalin's view, it mobilised popular support behind satellite regimes. This explains why Moscow portrayed the attempt to subjugate the regime in Belgrade as an ideological confrontation with Tito. Unfortunately for Stalin, the plot to remove the Yugoslav leader did not go according to script; thereafter, the complete rupture of Yugoslav–Soviet relations had a long-term corrosive impact on the Soviet bloc.

Following Yugoslavia's banishment from the Cominform, the Soviet satellite regimes staged show trials against 'Titoists'. During 1949, prominent political figures, such as Albania's Defence and Interior Minister Koçi Xoxe, Hungary's Foreign Minister László Rajk, and Bulgaria's Deputy Prime

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179–82.

Minister Traicho Kostov were tried, sentenced to death, and executed. From 1948 to 1955, forty high-profile anti-Yugoslav trials were organised in the people's democracies. Thousands of party members and ordinary citizens were tried on fabricated charges and interned or executed. Many others were liquidated outside the judicial process. In Albania, for example, 142 people were executed without a trial.²⁹

As part of the Sovietisation process, USSR intelligence agents penetrated the political, economic, and security institutions of the satellite countries. Army officers attending military schools in the USSR were recruited by Soviet intelligence agencies. Members of the local police and security apparatuses were supervised by Moscow's intelligence officers, erasing distinctions between Soviet and local security services. Soviet technical advisers, attached to government ministries and commercial enterprises, acted as recruiters for the KGB. Most of those targeted did not dare protest, fearing loss of employment or arrest. Others, especially old Communists who were previously affiliated with the Comintern and who were now in prominent positions, believed working for Soviet intelligence was their 'internationalist duty to the first country of socialism'. Without such widespread infiltration, the Sovietisation of the Balkans would have been much harder, if not impossible.

The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture had important geostrategic implications. It created a new flashpoint along the still-unstable demarcation line in Europe; a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia might have escalated into a global confrontation of the blocs. Tito, however, rightly calculated that Stalin would not contemplate an invasion of Yugoslavia if convinced that it would trigger a war with the Western bloc. He sought and received Western security guarantees. From 1950 to 1955, Yugoslavia, previously a member of the Soviet bloc, became effectively incorporated into NATO through defence co-ordination, arms deliveries, and other military assistance. Thousands of US military advisers were attached to Yugoslav army units. This improved NATO's strategic position – the defence line against a possible Soviet attack in Southeastern Europe was moved a couple of thousand miles further to the north, from the southern tip of Italy to the Ljubljana pass in northwestern Yugoslavia.

Tito, however, consistently resisted Western pressure to join NATO formally. He feared, on the one hand, that it would destroy chances of reconciliation with the international Communist movement and, on the other hand, he worried that it would help the United States topple his regime. To avoid the risk of losing the vital protection offered by the Western defensive umbrella,

29 AJB Tita [Archives of J. B. Tito, Belgrade], KPR, I 3 a, SSSR.

Tito initiated a military alliance with two Balkan NATO members, Greece and Turkey. In Ankara in February 1953, the three countries agreed to co-ordinate their defensive capabilities, paving the way for the signing of the Balkan Pact on 9 August 1954. Although the pact was short-lived, due to Yugoslav–Soviet normalisation in 1955 and the deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations over Cyprus, it remained a unique feature of the Cold War – the only formal military alliance between ideological foes.

The West, especially the Americans, continued to provide Tito with vital economic and military assistance. Without this support, the regime in Belgrade would have found it much more difficult, even impossible, to resist Stalin's pressure. The West's eagerness to 'keep Tito afloat' was far from altruistic. Yugoslavia, the most loyal of Stalin's disciples until 1948, quickly became one of most valuable assets in the global propaganda war against the Soviet Union. Tito's defiance undermined the cohesion of the Soviet bloc, and the Communist movement. By becoming part of NATO's defence planning, Yugoslavia also closed the last European loophole in the military encirclement of the Soviet bloc. From 1949 to 1955, Tito's regime received approximately \$1.5 billion worth of Western economic and military aid.³⁰

The Tito–Stalin confrontation destroyed the ideological uniformity of Stalinism. Yugoslavs, eager to prove their Communist credentials, felt compelled to conceptualise and publicise their interpretation of 'authentic' Marxism. They revived Marx's early theses, which Stalin had buried in order to create a monstrous hybrid of a system. The Yugoslavs offered their 'road to socialism' as an alternative to Stalin's dogma. They introduced 'self-management' in the economy and in state organisations as a precursor to the waning of the state under socialism, and to the transformation of the party's role, from its commanding position to one of 'leading by example'. In promulgating these 'true socialist postulates', as they saw them, the Yugoslavs introduced 'workers' councils' in factories and enterprises as early as 1950. Within several years, the market assumed an enhanced role in the economy, effectively dismantling the administrative-command system. Workers' councils became the most potent symbol of Tito's anti-Stalinist socialism and Belgrade's chief ideological export to Eastern Europe; they mushroomed throughout Poland and Hungary during the short-lived liberalisation of 1956. As early as 1952, the Yugoslav party changed its name to the League of Communists to stress its changed role. In January 1953, it abolished collective farms; in fact, collectivisation had been introduced only

30 AJ, ACK SKJ [Archive of Yugoslavia, Archives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Belgrade], 507/IX, 119/1 56.

after the Tito–Stalin split in 1949 as part of Belgrade’s effort to prove the falsehood of Moscow’s accusations that the Yugoslavs had abandoned the ‘construction of socialism’.

The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture also inspired Tito to seek a ‘third way’ and to play a crucial role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Having resisted hegemony within the Communist camp, Tito would not allow Yugoslavia to be ensnared by the capitalist West. As early as 1951, he began searching for allies for an alternative foreign-policy strategy. His attention focused on newly decolonised countries, particularly those in Asia. On the eve of the Bandung Conference in November 1954, Tito went on a three-month trip to India and Burma, with a stop-over in Suez, during which he established an exceptional rapport with Nehru and Nasser. Their tripartite meeting in Brioni, in July 1956, heralded the ‘Third Way’. In September 1961, twenty-five heads of state met in Belgrade and institutionalised the Non-Aligned Movement. During the 1960s and 1970s, it became the largest gathering of nations outside the UN – the conscience of the developing world and the only challenge to the bipolarity of the Cold War.

Soviet–Yugoslav normalisation

The ‘New Course’ of Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death in March 1953 at first hardly reverberated among the Kremlin’s Balkan satellites. Local leaders, nicknamed ‘little Stalins’, in particular Hoxha of Albania and Vulko Chervenkov of Bulgaria, paid only lip-service to the role of collective leadership and to the separation of state and party organs. Although the brutal repression was somewhat relaxed, the Stalinist system remained largely intact in these countries long after a wave of liberalisation swept Eastern Europe in 1956. Even the removal of Chervenkov by Todor Zhivkov in April 1956 changed little in Bulgaria. In Romania and Albania, Gheorghiu Gheorghiu-Dej and Hoxha, both confirmed Stalinists, remained in power until their natural deaths in 1965 and 1985, respectively.

But Tito had a significant impact on the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Following Soviet intelligence chief Lavrentii Beria’s removal in June 1953, Khrushchev and his colleagues came to believe that bolder policy changes were necessary to extricate the Soviet Union from Stalin’s legacy. In this respect, a change of policy towards Belgrade became a measure of the new leadership’s readiness to step out of Stalin’s shadow. Still, it took Khrushchev more than a year to overcome the opposition of Molotov and other Kremlin hard-liners.

On 22 June 1954, Khrushchev dispatched a secret letter to Yugoslav leaders. It proposed normalisation of relations between the two countries and the two Communist parties.³¹ The Soviet initiative came as a shock. For two weeks, Tito chose not to show the letter to members of his Central Committee, fearing yet another Soviet ploy to discredit him. In a cautious response, sent almost two months later, Tito agreed only to re-establish state relations; the renewal of party relations was to follow once normalisation had become irreversible and only after the Kremlin acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the 1948 split. The exchange of letters continued in utmost secrecy for almost a year. Despite strong disagreements, both sides were careful not to jeopardise the opportunity that had been created. A significant change of pace happened after Khrushchev demoted his rival, Georgii Malenkov, in January 1955. The Soviet leader then boldly proposed to Tito that they meet face to face in Belgrade.

The Soviet delegation landed in Belgrade on 26 May 1955, causing a sensation around the world. Upon arrival, Khrushchev delivered a speech expressing regret for what had happened between the two countries. After several days of intense talks and open exchanges, Khrushchev and Tito signed the 'Belgrade Declaration' on 2 June. For the first time, the USSR officially and publicly accepted that relations with Yugoslavia – and with other socialist countries – should be guided by the principle of equality.³² But the visit failed to bridge the ideological chasm created after 1948. Yugoslav leaders rejected Soviet invitations to rejoin the socialist 'camp' and to re-establish party relations. Still, the implications of the Belgrade meeting went beyond bilateral relations between the two countries. The visit ended a seven-year confrontation that had threatened the peace and stability of Europe. Yugoslavia was also allowed to re-establish its presence in other satellite countries. Awareness of Yugoslavia's independent socialism subsequently encouraged the liberalisation tide in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

Khrushchev's Belgrade visit also forwarded the process of de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union. For the first time in their lives, Soviet leaders who met Tito heard criticism of Stalin from a fellow Communist. As Khrushchev would admit later, 'I realized the falsehood of [the Soviet leadership's] position [regarding Stalin] for the first time and in earnest when I arrived in Yugoslavia and spoke with Tito and other comrades there.'³³ During the

³¹ AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1 48.

³² AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1 56.

³³ N.S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniia: vremia, liudi, vlast'* [Reminiscences: Times, People, Power], vol. IV (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), 189.

concluding session of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), held in Moscow from 4 to 12 July 1955, Khrushchev reported on the visit to Belgrade. The discussion that followed represented a true landmark in the post-Stalin transition in the USSR. Using Yugoslavia as a pretext, Khrushchev managed to isolate Molotov and to re-assert his leadership credentials. By reviewing the causes of the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948, Khrushchev and his supporters for the first time presented Central Committee members with evidence of Stalin's despotism, thus initiating the destruction of the *vozhd's* myth. The plenum resolution also called for equality in relations between the socialist countries and between Communist Parties. It is doubtful whether Khrushchev's 'secret speech' would ever have happened had he and his supporters not passed the first hurdle at the July plenum. The dismantling of Stalin's legacy thus began a full eight months before the Twentieth Congress.³⁴

In his report on Stalin's personality cult, the 'secret speech', delivered at the end of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Khrushchev acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the 1948 rupture with Yugoslavia. Following this admission, Tito agreed that party relations be officially normalised during his visit to the USSR in June 1956. To appease the Yugoslav leader, Moscow timed the announcement of the dissolution of the Cominform and Molotov's replacement as foreign minister to coincide with Tito's visit. Khrushchev exerted enormous pressure during these talks in the Kremlin to persuade Tito to rejoin the socialist 'camp'. The situation in Poland and Hungary was increasingly worrying the Soviet leadership, and Khrushchev, as the main architect of de-Stalinisation, was under growing pressure from Kremlin hard-liners. Given his enormous prestige among East European reformists, Moscow hoped that Tito's return to the 'fold' would defuse tensions in Poland and Hungary. The Yugoslav leader, however, managed to resist the pressure. The 'Moscow Declaration', a document signed at the end of Tito's visit, represented his victory. It reaffirmed the principle of equality between Communist parties. The Soviets agreed to the declaration barely an hour before the scheduled formal signing ceremony. They understood that a collapse of the talks would further underline their impotence at a time when Moscow's authority was being challenged in Poland and Hungary.³⁵

34 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; transcripts, accompanying documents, and resolutions; RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, r. 6225, 6227, and 6228 (microfilms).

35 AJB Tita, KPR, I 2/7 1, 732–801.

Soviet pressure on Tito continued after the Moscow meetings. Khrushchev launched a last-ditch effort to bring Tito into the ‘camp’ in the second half of September and, once again, failed. In 1956, Tito actively supported reformers in Poland and Hungary in their efforts to topple Stalinist regimes, and he played an important role during the Soviet intervention in Hungary in November of that year.³⁶ After suppressing the Hungarian uprising, Soviet leaders abandoned attempts to win Tito over and focused instead on undermining his influence in Eastern Europe.

The Balkans and the origins of the Cold War

The Balkan peninsula became a contested area among the emerging Cold War superpowers even before the Second World War officially ended. The Red Army’s advance into Bulgaria and Romania brought these countries into the Soviet sphere of influence. In Yugoslavia and Albania, indigenous Communist regimes, which enjoyed popular support, indirectly yet effectively served Moscow’s interests.

Stalin’s understanding of his deal with the West placed Greece within the Western sphere of influence. Nonetheless, in 1946, in an attempt to change the status quo, the Greek Communists instigated a civil war against the Western-backed government in Athens – the first armed conflict of the still-undeclared Cold War. However, deprived of Moscow’s decisive support, their futile effort ended in total defeat in the autumn of 1949. The Truman Doctrine, prompted by the Greek Civil War and Soviet pressure on Turkey, catalysed the American and Western strategy of containment and defined the basic precepts of the Cold War that would be in place until its very end.³⁷

Faced with an effort by the British and Americans to consolidate their own sphere of interest in Western Europe, Stalin embarked upon creating a monolithic Soviet bloc of Balkan and East European countries through their Sovietisation. As part of this process, the attempt to remove Tito backfired and prompted a monumental Soviet–Yugoslav rupture in 1948, thereby creating the first schism within the international Communist movement.

Within a year after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev and the new Soviet leadership tried to normalise relations with Yugoslavia. These efforts added momentum to the process of de-Stalinisation in the USSR and allowed Yugoslavia to play an important role in the process of liberalisation that swept Poland and

36 For more information on the 1956 revolution, see Csaba Békés’s chapter in this volume.

37 See Melvyn P. Leffler’s chapter in this volume.

Hungary in 1956. In November of that year, following the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and its Balkan satellites deteriorated once again. However, by the end of the 1950s, Yugoslavia was firmly pursuing a new role as a leader of the non-aligned countries.

During the 1960s, Albania closely allied itself with Mao Zedong's China. The country would remain isolated as the lone unreformed Stalinist regime until Hoxha's death in 1985. Hailed as the only country within the Soviet bloc with an independent foreign policy, Romania would suffer under Nicolae Ceaușescu's dictatorship until his bloody overthrow in December 1989. Bulgaria followed a less eventful existence as a faithful Soviet satellite until 1989.

Although the Balkan peninsula was an amalgamation of small nations with diverse cultures and religions, with only a modest proportion of the world's population, its geostrategic position and its complex politics led it to play a large part in the formative years of the Cold War. As often before in its history, such as in 1914 and 1939, the region found itself in the mainstream of global historical developments from 1945 to 1955. The role the Balkan states played in the early Cold War helps us fully appreciate the ways in which the dynamics of the superpower competition were distorted and were critically influenced by regional political forces and distinct historical legacies.

The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War

NIU JUN

The international order in East Asia changed dramatically following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945; the two most consequential events of this period were the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, and, one year later, the PRC's entry into a three-year military contest against the United States in the Korean War, 1950–53. These developments confirmed the spread of the Cold War to East Asia and determined the long-term pattern of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. For China, the decision to ally with the USSR and enter the Korean War meant that there was no alternative but to man Asia's Cold War frontier against US encroachment. All developments accompanying the birth of the PRC and its choice of foreign policies – especially the decision to enter the Korean War – were deeply rooted in China's domestic politics, and it can be safely concluded that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made coherent choices when confronted with international crises. Yet the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union rapidly grew into the most significant characteristic of the postwar international system, and greatly influenced the future of China. From 1945, it was the interaction between four actors – the United States, the USSR, the Guomindang (GMD), and the CCP – that constituted the fundamental interface between Chinese domestic politics and the international system. It was also this dynamic that pushed China into deeper and deeper involvement in the Cold War.

A fragile peace

Toward the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the political situation in China was chaotic. GMD–CCP relations were enmeshed with Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations and with the conflicts between the United States and the USSR over their China policies. Two important international agreements influenced

China's internal political situation. One was the secret Yalta agreement of February 1945 reached by the American and Soviet leaderships; the other was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed by the Soviet Union and the GMD-controlled Republic of China in August 1945. A history of diplomatic maneuverings among the United States, the USSR, and the GMD government lay behind these two agreements, and through them the United States and the USSR attempted to coordinate their China policies. Meanwhile, both superpowers attempted to make acceptable to each other their arrangements for China's political development after World War II.

In 1941, once war had broken out in the Pacific, US leaders had been temporarily convinced that, were China to emerge as a pro-American power in East Asia, this would not only help to defeat Japan, but also serve as a shield to contain the USSR and limit the revolutionary trend in the region.¹ The problem was that the United States conflated the success of its China policies with the maintenance of Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) leadership, and Jiang was facing a series of grave domestic crises by the end of the war. The press in the Allied countries also frequently criticized the Nationalist government's financial corruption and military shortcomings. Further complicating the matter for the United States, since the summer of 1943, were the struggles between the GMD and the CCP, wherein new military conflicts loomed.

The United States did not want a large-scale Chinese civil war for a number of reasons. Washington believed that Chinese military forces should concentrate on fighting the war against Japan, not least since the Soviets had yet to be persuaded to commit troops in that war. Facing a worsening of the political and military situation in China, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration searched for ways to maintain Jiang Jieshi's position and, by doing so, to avoid a civil war. This objective later led to direct and active American intervention in the GMD-CCP conflicts through the missions of Generals Patrick Hurley and George C. Marshall to broker peace in China.

Iosif Stalin seems to have anticipated several potential problems once the USSR entered the war against Japan. In his estimation, what mattered most for Soviet policy in postwar East Asia was balancing Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US

1 "Outline of Long Range Objectives and Policies of the United States with Respect to China," January 14, 1945, "Unity of Anglo-American Soviet Policy toward China," January 14, 1945, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1955), 352-54, 356-58 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number); Summer Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper, 1951), 186.

relations with a mind to achieving and protecting Soviet strategic interests in the Middle Kingdom, and he was much less interested than Washington in resolving China's internal problems. Stalin thought that the United States and Britain would not allow the CCP to gain absolute political power, and thus felt that the USSR could not support any radical ambitions held by the Chinese Communists. Moreover, in Stalin's mind, it was uncertain whether the CCP conformed to Soviet ideological standards, and the GMD seemed plainly to be in a more powerful position than the Communists. By all accounts, for Stalin, relations with the CCP were a lower priority than those with the United States and with Jiang Jieshi's regime. From the summer of 1944 to some time after the war's conclusion, Soviet leaders told almost every American representative visiting Moscow that they would support US policies in China and US efforts to mediate the GMD-CCP conflict. They also told the Nationalist government that "there could only be one government in China, led by the GMD."²

Up to the summer of 1945, the United States and the USSR attempted to coordinate their China policies based on the assumption of "peace under Jiang Jieshi," which they both believed to be a reasonable outcome. This premise set two objectives. The first was to support Jiang's political standing in postwar China, and specifically the Nationalist government's legitimacy and Jiang's leadership position within that government. The second was to avoid a civil war between the GMD and the CCP.

Both the United States and the USSR enjoyed considerable influence in China, but the GMD and the CCP still played the key roles in the country's political development. After Japan announced its surrender on August 14, 1945, the Nationalist government immediately faced the major problems of restoring its rule in China, recovering control of most of east and north China – including those areas occupied by the CCP forces – and taking back Manchuria, which Soviet forces had occupied after Stalin declared war on Japan in the last days of the Japanese empire. The main difficulty for Jiang was the speed with which he had to carry out these operations: the GMD could not amass enough forces in the time available for all these tasks.

2 Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 140–41; "The Meeting between General Hurley and Molotov," "Meeting between Hurley and Marshall Stalin," April 15, 1945, Shijie zhishi chubanshe (ed. and comp.), *Zhongmei guanxi ziliao huibian* [Collection of Documents on Sino American Relations], 3 vols. (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1957), vol. I, 139–41, 159–61.

Jiang Jieshi needed – and received – American support. Yet he must also have known that the United States did not want him to use force against the CCP, and that the USSR would never accept the extermination of the Communists by the GMD. Jiang had at least to demonstrate his willingness to attempt a political settlement. On the day of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty in August 1945, Jiang Jieshi telegraphed the CCP chairman Mao Zedong and invited him to “please come to the war-time capital” for a GMD–CCP summit.

After the US diplomatic mission under George C. Marshall arrived in China in late December, Jiang agreed to accept US mediation and to resolve GMD–CCP conflicts through renewed political talks. His reasons for these decisions were essentially no different from those behind his earlier invitation extended to Mao to come to Chongqing. After the military confrontations in north and northeast China in mid-October, Jiang again determined that the GMD forces lacked the resources necessary to eliminate the CCP militarily. The next steps that Jiang took showed that he was temporarily retreating from using force. He limited military activities, resumed GMD–CCP negotiations, and reduced Sino-Soviet tension.

Since the outbreak of war against Japan in the summer of 1937, the CCP’s approach to relations with the GMD had been characterized by efforts to avoid a large-scale civil war and to use political means to push the GMD toward a settlement. So long as the USSR remained allied with the United States and Britain, CCP leaders believed that they could not carry out a radical revolution, but Mao also felt reassured that the GMD would not try to eradicate the CCP by force.³ This situation benefited the CCP, as it occupied a weaker position at the time.

In light of the Nationalist government’s military defeats against Japan and the failed negotiations mediated by Patrick Hurley in late 1944 and early 1945, CCP leaders had for a while contemplated adopting more radical policies. However, Mao’s speech at an internal meeting of the Seventh CCP Congress in the spring of 1945 revealed that CCP leaders had many alternative visions regarding the specific form of a so-called coalition government. One of them was very close to the basic US plan: that is, establishing a government headed by Jiang with the participation of other parties, including the CCP.⁴

3 Mao Zedong’s telegram to Liu Shaoqi, July 9, 1942, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi (comp.), *Mao Zedong wenji* [Collected Works of Mao Zedong], 8 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1993), vol. II, 434.

4 Mao Zedong, “Explanations of the Coalition Government,” March 31, 1945, *Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianghua ji* [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Reports and Speeches at the Seventh CCP Congress] (hereafter *Mao Zedong zai qida*), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1995), 102–03.

CCP leaders had been convinced before the end of the war that the USSR would not assist them as it had the East European countries.⁵ They paid more attention to the possibility of armed US intervention than to Soviet policies. Mao certainly felt disgruntled by the Soviet leaders' demand that he go to Chongqing for negotiations, but what caused his gravest concerns was more likely Stalin's pessimistic prediction of China's impending civil war, that "the Chinese nation faced the risk of destruction."⁶ Not only was Stalin warning the CCP Central Committee, but the Soviet embassy in China and the Soviet army in Manchuria all believed that it was very likely the United States would intervene militarily in China in case of a civil war.

Influenced by Soviet thinking, Mao believed at the time that "the United States would necessarily intervene" if the CCP were to occupy big cities such as Nanjing and Shanghai. Clearly, this belief was one of the main reasons why the CCP Central Committee decided to resume negotiations with the GMD; this view also determined the party's basic position that it should participate in a government headed by Jiang Jieshi. Mao described the arrangement as "dictatorship plus some democracy."⁷

Soon after the Chongqing negotiations began and even after the signing of an agreement on October 10, the GMD and the CCP began major military operations in north and northeast China. Yet, the CCP Central Committee still maintained that the fighting was temporary, and that the following six months would be a transitional period from civil war to peace.⁸ After President Harry S. Truman summed up his policy toward China on December 15, and after the Council of Foreign Ministers Moscow Conference and the start of the Marshall mission, the CCP decided to resume negotiations with the GMD. The Communist leadership thought that the political agreement brokered by Marshall was acceptable, and even that the plan to integrate the two armies

5 Mao Zedong, "Conclusions at the Seventh CCP Congress," May 31, 1945, *Mao Zedong zai qida*, 197; Wang Ruofei, "Records of Comrade Wang Ruofei's Reports," August 3, 1945, 6442/1.4, Archive of the Department of CCP History, People's University, Beijing.

6 *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 5 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997), vol. V, 286.

7 Hu Qiaomu *huiyilu bianxie zu* (ed. and comp.), *Hu Qiaomu huiyi Mao Zedong* [Hu Qiaomu's Recollections of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Renmin, 1994), 396–98.

8 "The CCP Central Committee's Instructions regarding the Situation and Tasks of the Transitional Period," October 20, 1945, in *Zhongyang dang'anguan* (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee] (hereafter ZZWXJ), 18 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1989–92), vol. XV, 371–72.

was quite commendable. They believed that “a new period of peace and democracy [had] begun.”⁹

Judging from the outcome of its participation in the negotiations, the CCP’s political plan reflected the prognostications of the Seventh Congress. The CCP leaders were notably consistent in their thinking regarding the issues at hand. For some time after the Sino-Japanese War, they were still convinced that “the central problem in the world now was the struggle between the United States and the USSR, which, reflected in China, was the struggle between Jiang Jieshi and the CCP.”¹⁰ Since both the United States and the USSR deemed the Nationalist government to be legitimate, and since they demanded the peaceful resolution of GMD–CCP conflicts, as the weaker side, the CCP had to compromise.

The GMD and the CCP conducted a series of negotiations from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to June 1946. Regardless of their reasoning, they at least tried to look for political solutions and to achieve their goals through discussion rather than civil war. This peace held as long as both Chinese parties believed that some form of US–Soviet cooperation would survive. In these circumstances, neither the GMD nor the CCP had the capability to eliminate the other by force, each therefore had to accept a political solution mandated by the two superpowers.

The Cold War and the Civil War

After ten months of off-and-on negotiations between the GMD and the CCP, a full-scale civil war finally broke out in June 1946. The timing of the conflict was very much determined by the Cold War. In fact, the tenor of GMD–CCP negotiations had been fluctuating directly in tune with that of US–USSR relations. As the Cold War set in – in part because of the suspicions the two sides had about each other’s East Asian policies – both the GMD and the CCP saw opportunities to take advantage of the contradictions and tensions that became increasingly evident as the superpowers pursued their overall goals.

After the Sino-Japanese War, the United States began sending troops to China – 110,000 at their peak. Most of these troops were stationed in the north

9 Liu Shaoqi, “Report on the Current Situation,” January 31, 1946, in Department of CCP History, People’s University of China (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao: jiefang zhanzheng shiqi I* [Reference Materials of CCP History: Liberation War Period I], 8 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1981), vol. VII, 120.

10 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions,” November 28, 1945, in ZZWXJ, vol. XV, 455–56.

of the country. Even if unintended, the presence of the American forces, who assisted the Nationalist government with logistics and airlifting GMD troops to Manchuria, resulted in an intensified atmosphere of confrontation. In addition, American units had frequent skirmishes with CCP forces in northern China. It seemed clear to the CCP leadership that the US forces would risk getting involved in a Chinese civil war in order to help Jiang Jieshi recover his control. General Marshall typified Washington's concerns. He was convinced that if China were to be riven by civil war, and if the Soviets profited by controlling Manchuria, then the United States would have failed to achieve its "major goal of entering the Pacific war." If the United States wanted to save Jiang Jieshi, on the other hand, it would have to take over China's government and "shoulder endless duties."¹¹ Ultimately, the Truman administration chose to mediate GMD–CCP conflicts as Roosevelt's administration had before it.

Large numbers of Soviet troops had entered Manchuria once the USSR declared war against Japan in August, creating tension with US troops that had come into northern China. The USSR began withdrawing its forces from Manchuria that October, but the following month, when Jiang Jieshi shut down his northeast headquarters in Manchuria and ordered attacks on CCP forces in and around Shanhaiguan, Soviet troops quickly returned south and seized the major cities and traffic routes. The Red Army occupied the main ports in Manchuria and forbade US ships transporting GMD forces from docking there, but the Soviets also moved quickly to ease tensions with the GMD government in other areas and asked that economic issues in Manchuria be resolved through negotiation. The Soviets also limited their aid to CCP forces (while denying in public that any aid was given at all) and reiterated their position that GMD–CCP conflicts should be solved through negotiations.¹² At the Moscow Conference, Soviet foreign minister Viacheslav Molotov again supported democratic unification "under the Nationalist government," and promised that the Soviet army would withdraw as planned.¹³

11 "Memorandum of Conversation, by General Marshall," December 11, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945: *China*, vol. VII, 767–69.

12 "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Stalin and Jiang Jieshi's Personal Representative Jiang Jingguo," December 30, 1945, in A. M. Ledovskii, trans. Chen Chunhua and Liu Cunkuan, *Si Dalin yu zhongguo* [Stalin and China] (Beijing: Xinhua, 2001), 24–25.

13 History Department of Fudan University (ed. and comp.), *Zhongguo jindai duiwai guanxishi ziliao xuanji* [A Selection of Documents on Modern China's Foreign Relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1977), 322–23.

The United States and the Soviet Union seemed to move toward a new compromise at the end of 1945. However, US strategic worries about Soviet troops in Manchuria remained, as did Stalin's anger over having been shut out of any role in Japan. The Truman administration had followed Soviet moves in Manchuria very closely, and Marshall considered forcing the Soviets out of Manchuria to be his primary task. But the Truman administration was not ready to pull the chestnuts from the fire for Jiang in Chinese domestic politics. Marshall asked Jiang to make political concessions, and urged the Nationalist government to accept the CCP's request for a total ceasefire in northern China. The main objective of Marshall's efforts was to permit Jiang to dispatch more troops to take over Manchuria.

Jiang Jieshi adopted the tactic of using political concessions to obtain Marshall's support for the destruction of the CCP's military potential. He also wanted to exploit the Americans' suspicion of the Soviets to change US policy in the longer term. Jiang did not yet intend to commit his best troops to Manchuria. By improving relations with the Soviets, he hoped for their assistance in taking over the region. During the Sino-Soviet negotiations over Manchurian economic questions, the Nationalist government tried to win from the Soviets the promise of a trouble-free occupation of Manchuria in exchange for certain concessions. During his visit to Moscow in December 1945, Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Jieshi's Soviet-educated son, further promised the Soviets that Manchuria would never become an anti-Soviet base and that no Chinese troops would be stationed on the Sino-Soviet border.¹⁴ With such efforts from both sides, Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of improvement. The Soviets concentrated on these negotiations. They did not intervene in Marshall's mediation mission, but they did try to persuade the CCP to propose a ceasefire.

Sino-Soviet relations experienced a reversal after February 1946. With the GMD-CCP negotiations making some progress, the situation in north China stabilized. Marshall then wanted to apply more pressure on the USSR over Manchuria. He encouraged the Nationalist government not to make further concessions to the Soviets, and also recommended in a report to President Truman that more measures should be taken to force the Soviet troops out of Manchuria.¹⁵ On February 9, the United States told the USSR and China that it opposed handling Japanese property in Manchuria exclusively

14 "Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Stalin and Jiang Jieshi's Personal Representative Jiang Jingguo," 15-23.

15 "General Marshall to President Truman," February 9, 1946, *FRUS, 1946: China*, vol. IX, 426-29.

through negotiations between China and the USSR. Soon afterward the terms of the Yalta agreement were made public and the American and British press began to criticize Soviet behavior in Manchuria.

There is no doubt that American support encouraged Jiang Jieshi to change his policy of cooperation with the USSR. In February, anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out in Chongqing and other cities, instigated and assisted by the GMD, but reflecting anti-Soviet sentiment among parts of the public. These demonstrations added to the pressure on the government. Since he now believed he had US backing for sending GMD forces into Manchuria after the ceasefire, Jiang no longer wanted to yield to the Soviets. On March 5, the Nationalist government rejected Soviet demands on Manchurian economic issues.

The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations coincided with increasing tension between the GMD and the CCP in Manchuria. Not only did Jiang notice the changes in US–Soviet relations, he also believed that Marshall was increasingly leaning toward the GMD in intra-Chinese mediation efforts. He thus took an increasingly hardline stance on all matters relating to Manchuria. At the critical moment of the battle of Siping in April 1946, Jiang rejected Marshall's suggestion for a ceasefire. Even so, Marshall agreed to transport more troops to Manchuria for the GMD. Having made up his mind to completely destroy the CCP in Manchuria, Jiang took advantage of US efforts to constrain the USSR. Marshall at first acquiesced and then gave reluctant support to Jiang's strategy. Gradually, the strategic visions of the United States and the GMD converged in Manchuria.

At the same time, the CCP's policies in Manchuria were also changing. CCP leaders believed that a favorable strategic position in Manchuria was vitally important. Mao in particular wanted a secure position there in order to break fundamentally with the CCP's perennial state of being under siege.¹⁶ Soon after the Chongqing negotiations in the fall of 1945, the CCP Central Committee mapped out a plan to seize all of Manchuria with Soviet support.¹⁷ But with the improvement of GMD–Soviet relations and the obstruction of the Soviet troops, the CCP had to abandon this plan. During the first two months of 1946, CCP leaders still adhered to the agreements reached at the GMD–CCP negotiations, and they told party members that “the tendency

16 Mao Zedong's telegram to Liu Shaoqi, July 9, 1942, 434–45; Mao Zedong, “Conclusions at the Seventh CCP Congress,” 218–19.

17 “The CCP Central Committee's Telegram,” October 28, 1945, in *ZZWXXJ*, vol. XV, 388–89.

towards peace was now firm.”¹⁸ In this context, they reluctantly decided in late January to “strive for a peaceful resolution” of the Manchuria issue.¹⁹ The Soviets’ warning that a civil war in Manchuria would “provoke American involvement” deepened the worries of CCP leaders who thought that, even if their army defeated the GMD, the United States would still send its troops into Manchuria.²⁰

However, the CCP had its own precondition for any peaceful resolution of the Manchuria issue – that the Nationalist government should recognize the legitimacy of the CCP’s presence in Manchuria. If that were not accepted, the CCP would have lost all of its hard-won gains from the war against Japan. In reality, Jiang Jieshi did not accept the CCP’s position and, after taking Jinzhou in western Liaoning in January, GMD forces constantly attacked and occupied areas controlled by the CCP. The CCP already had a substantial strategic interest in the protection of Manchuria, which the Central Committee insisted would be threatened by repeated concessions, leading to “discord within the party.”²¹ Indeed, there had always existed hardline voices in the CCP army that could not be silenced.

The Soviet army began its quick withdrawal in early March, but no agreement could be reached between the GMD and the CCP over Manchuria. The CCP Central Committee decided to begin implementing a strategy of controlling northern Manchuria in late March, that is, seizing major cities such as Changchun and Harbin as well as the Eastern China Railway.²² Certainly, the CCP’s policy had the support of the Soviet army in the northeast; its rapid withdrawal provided the opportunity for the CCP to implement this strategy in the north of Manchuria. In early April, GMD forces launched large-scale attacks on CCP troops in Siping. On April 18, CCP troops seized Changchun as

18 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions,” December 19, 1945, “The Central Military Commission’s Deployment for Guarding Zhangjiakou and Chengde,” December 29, 1945, *ibid.*, 494–95, 526.

19 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” January 26, 1946, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 57–58.

20 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” December 7, 1945, *ibid.*, vol. XV, 465–66; “Peng Zhen guanyu youren jinggao dongbei jue buneng da” [Peng Zhen’s Remarks on Our Friend’s Warning against Fighting in the Northeast], January 26, 1946, Central Archive, Beijing.

21 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau and CCP’s Delegation in Chongqing regarding the Principle of the Negotiations,” March 13, 1946, in ZZWXXJ, vol. XVI, 89–91.

22 “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to the Northeast Bureau,” March 24, 1946, “The CCP Central Committee’s Instructions to Lin Biao and Peng Zhen,” March 25, 1946, *ibid.*, vol. XVI, 100–03.

planned, and later took Harbin and Qiqihaer. Akin to lighting a powderkeg, the CCP–GMD military conflicts in Manchuria quickly set off a nationwide civil war.

The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War marked the end of a distinct period of international politics concerning China. On one hand, both the United States and the USSR subordinated China with respect to their broader agendas, and both powers withdrew their troops from the country. On the other hand, in the northeast, strategic cooperation between the CCP and the Soviet Union had begun. Soviet troops not only provided the opportunity for the CCP to take over the north of Manchuria, but also furnished weapons and equipment to CCP forces. At the same time, the CCP had concluded that the United States was their primary external enemy. In this manner, the future patterns of the Cold War in East Asia had already begun to appear.

Alliance and confrontation

The event that truly determined China's foreign relations in 1947 and 1948 was the CCP's decisive victory in the civil war. In the face of this radical change, the responses of both the United States and the Soviet Union were gradual and passive. As the revolutionary movement developed, US influence in China steadily declined, until it finally disappeared completely. In contrast, Soviet political influence grew to the point that the USSR and the new Communist-dominated state, the PRC, came together in a formal alliance. After the CCP-led People's Liberation Army (PLA) seized Shenyang in November 1948, CCP leaders started to formulate the foreign policy of their new government. The CCP's cognitive framework, based on revolutionary theory, and the leadership's fundamental attitude to the growth in international tensions at that time largely influenced this change in CCP policy. Mao and his colleagues were Communist revolutionaries; they were deeply convinced that the Chinese revolutionary movement was a part of a worldwide Communist revolutionary movement. Regardless of the Cold War, this approach roughly determined the CCP leaders' attitude toward the United States and the USSR. Mao's concept of "leaning to one side" vividly revealed the basic tendency and choice of the CCP's leaders.

Nevertheless, one must note that the lean-to-one-side policy was really more like a broad statement of principle. Since it expressed only the CCP's general principle of managing foreign relations within the framework of US–Soviet confrontation, it obviously gave rise to few specific policies for managing foreign relations. In reality, the choices – of what kind of alliance with the



17. The Chinese Civil War left behind a devastated economy. Here people in Shanghai line up to exchange depreciated paper money for gold in 1948 – ten people were crushed to death in the melee that followed.

Soviet Union or which confrontations with the United States there were to be – were both the results of more complex decisionmaking processes.

At the end of 1947, when CCP leaders formed their strategy of overthrowing the GMD regime by force as soon as possible, Mao thought that relations with the Soviet Union would be the key to the new Chinese state's foreign policy and would serve as a model for its domestic development. He wanted to visit Stalin in Moscow to discuss these matters. Even if this proposition was never realized during the civil war, it did underscore the Chinese leadership's urgent wish to bolster relations with the USSR.

The CCP's gestures were not unrequited. In fact, beginning in the spring of 1948, Soviet aid to the CCP notably increased. After the PLA took over Manchuria in early November, Stalin deemed it necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the CCP's internal situation and its policies in various areas. He again assumed personal responsibility for the USSR's China policies. However, some of Stalin's policies met with staunch resistance from the CCP leadership. On January 10, 1949, Stalin telegraphed to the CCP Central Committee his suggestions for peace talks between the CCP and the GMD. Even if that was not his intention, Stalin's suggestions could have led to a division of China and, consequently, Mao categorically refused to follow his advice. Stalin had to backtrack.²³ This incident demonstrated to Soviet leaders

23 See Niu Jun, "The Origin of the Sino Soviet Alliance," in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino Soviet Alliance 1945–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), 64–65.

that they needed to study more intently the implications of the CCP's victory, as well as its domestic and foreign policies.

From early 1949 to the summer of that year, a number of top-level secret exchange visits occurred between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CCP. On January 31, 1949, Anastas Mikoian visited the CCP Central Committee's headquarters at Xibaipo, and for three days held extensive talks with Mao and other CCP leaders. As a result of these talks, the two sides reached broad agreement on the CCP's domestic and foreign policies. Disagreements regarding future bilateral relations were left for later discussion. Mikoian's visit had a very positive impact on CCP-USSR relations. Mao praised Soviet aid to the CCP at its Central Committee meeting in March 1949, where he also essentially dictated the lean-to-one-side policy for the new regime.²⁴ This event marked the establishment of the CCP's policy of a formal alliance with the Soviet Union for the new Chinese state.

In late June, Liu Shaoqi led a senior delegation to visit Moscow, where it concluded agreements with Stalin on the substance of the CCP's domestic and foreign policies following the founding of its regime. This visit completed the CCP's preparations for an alliance with the Soviet Union; the only outstanding issues were how to deal with the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945, and whether a new treaty ought to take its place.

CCP leaders saw the 1945 treaty as problematic. When they were young, they had all gone through a process of committing themselves first to the patriotic cause *before* becoming self-avowed revolutionaries and being drawn to Communism. In their mind, "following the path of the Russians" signified not only the elimination of an exploitative social structure, but also the creation of a new international order wherein the first item on the agenda was to abolish all of the unequal treaties China had previously signed. In this light, the CCP leaders were dissatisfied with the August 1945 treaty and, during Mikoian's visit to Xibaipo, they explicitly questioned some of its basic features. Subsequently, when Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, he proposed to Stalin three alternative solutions: first, that they preserve the treaty, which would be recognized by the new China; second, that they abolish the treaty and create a new one; or, third, through an exchange of notes, that the two countries agree to keep the status quo temporarily while preparing themselves for a new treaty. Stalin prevaricated on the issue, and this meant that the

²⁴ Mao Zedong, "Report Delivered at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Seventh CCP Congress," March 5, 1949, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. IV, 1434-35.

question of the treaty was left to become the focus of the Stalin–Mao conversations after the founding of the PRC.

On December 16, 1949, having just arrived in Moscow, Mao held talks with Stalin on the treaty question. Stalin at first claimed that the time was not right for changing the old treaty. He suggested instead that a statement on the issue of Port Arthur would suffice. Only after Mao insisted on the complete termination of the old treaty did Stalin agree to make major revisions to it, though only after two years.²⁵ Clearly, Stalin was not ready to renounce the benefits that the Soviet Union itself had reaped from the old international order.

After Mao stood fast for another couple of weeks, and after several meetings between Stalin and his closest advisers, the Soviet leader's view began to change. During his talk with Molotov and Mikoian on January 2, 1950, Mao proposed three options: to sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty; alternatively, to have the official news agencies of the two countries issue a succinct communiqué announcing that agreements had been reached on the important questions; or, lastly, to issue a joint statement on the major points of bilateral relations. Molotov thought that the first option was the best. Mao immediately telegraphed Zhou to ask him to get ready for negotiations and to visit Moscow.²⁶

Zhou Enlai arrived in Moscow on January 20. On January 22, Mao and Zhou talked with Stalin and determined the basic contents of the new treaty. After that, negotiations passed to the specifics, where the two sides took up key issues such as the use of the ports of Port Arthur and Dalian. In the end, the Soviets mostly agreed with the suggestions from the Chinese side but, citing the issue of military aid, Stalin insisted on a “supplementary agreement” that prohibited other countries from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed on February 14, 1950, and marked the formal birth of the Sino-Soviet alliance. From that point on, the Soviet Union began to supply economic, financial, and military assistance to the PRC on a grand scale.

The story of CCP–US relations mirrors that of its relations with the USSR. As was the case with the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations, the fundamental ideological attitudes of CCP leaders prompted them to opt for confrontation

25 Pei Jianzhang (ed.), *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1949–1956* [History of the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1956] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1994), 17–18. See also Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 310–15.

26 “Mao Zedong's telegram to the CCP Central Committee,” January 2 and 3, 1950, in *Zhonggong zhongyang yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [A Selection of Important Documents since the Founding of the People's Republic of China], 17 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), 95–96, 97.

with the United States. The Communist leadership also believed that the United States had become the major external threat to their final victory. During the last stage of the civil war and the founding of the PRC, the CCP lived in constant dread of various forms of US intervention, including a direct military intervention, schemes to sow division in the Chinese revolutionary camp, an embargo against the new China, or the obstruction of the final reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.²⁷

Concerning the domestic environment, after more than two years of political mobilization, the CCP had cleansed both party and army of “US-fearing” or “US-admiring” thinking. Two events – the takeover of the US consulate after the seizure of Shenyang in November 1948 and the searching of US ambassador John Leighton Stuart’s residence after seizing Nanjing in April 1949 – highlighted the prevailing anti-American sentiment among lower-rank PLA cadres and soldiers. The Central Committee had to take forceful measures to prevent overly zealous actions that might have triggered major international conflicts.

On the other hand, the CCP was also under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders distrusted the CCP’s relations with the United States. Because the CCP leaders treated their relationship with the USSR as their top priority from the very beginning, it followed naturally that they would do everything required to dispel the doubts of their Soviet counterparts, even at the cost of any chance of developing relations with the United States. Although Stalin had said, before the PLA crossed the Yangtze River, that the CCP could establish relations with the United States and other Western countries, particularly trade relations, the Chinese Communist leadership doubted that such relations would do them any good.²⁸ It is likely that the CCP leaders did not want to take any chances when they were at a sensitive stage in the formation of their alliance with the Soviet Union.

The CCP’s interactions with the United States during the period from late 1948 to the summer of 1949 came to have a significant influence on its US policy. These events included the arrest of US consulate staff in Shenyang in the winter of 1948 and the CCP representatives’ covert contacts with US ambassador Stuart after the PLA took over Nanjing in April 1949. While the CCP arrest of US consul Angus Ward and his staff produced intense

27 “The Military Commission’s Plan for Taking Over the Whole Country,” May 23, 1949, “The Military Commission’s Countermeasures for the Prevention of Imperialist Intervention in the Chinese Revolution,” May 28, 1949, in ZZWXJ, vol. XVIII, 292–93, 308–09.

28 “Stalin’s Cable to Kovalev,” March 15, 1949, “Stalin’s Cable to Mao,” April 1949, as cited in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 230–31.

resentment in Washington, the talks between Ambassador Stuart and Huang Hua, the CCP representative in Nanjing who was Stuart's former student, had no positive results. It could even be said that the interactions with Stuart disabused the top CCP leaders of any notion of developing normal relations with the United States, if they indeed had one at that time. On June 30, Mao Zedong published "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in which he publicly announced that the new government would "lean to one side" in favor of the Soviet camp. Significantly, on the same day, the Central Committee telegraphed the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee to say that "we entertain no illusions that the US imperialists will change their policies [toward the Chinese revolution]." ²⁹ When, during the summer of 1949, the United States withdrew all of its diplomats from China, Mao wrote in response:

The war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the US imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The US policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia, and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, US imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. US imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug overall calculations of the US aggressors. ³⁰

The CCP's victory overturned the existing postwar international order in East Asia, which was based on the Yalta agreement and the ensuing 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. The new state of affairs was based on the *new* Sino-Soviet treaty signed in February 1950. Through its alliance with the USSR, the PRC now staked its initial position in the Cold War on standing alongside Moscow in confrontation with the United States.

Crossing the Yalu River

The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. Previously, Chinese leaders had concentrated their attention on domestic matters, and the major tasks of the PLA had been to accelerate its entry into Tibet and to prepare for the takeover of Taiwan. Chinese leaders already regarded the United States as a major menace, but they did not believe that any American military threat was

29 "The CCP Central Committee's Telegram to the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee," June 30, 1949, Central Archive, Beijing.

30 *Selected Works of Mao Tse tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 434–35.



18. The chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.

impending. At this time, both the Korean peninsula and Indochina were regions of tension. Of the two, China clearly saw the latter as more important. On the Korean peninsula, China hoped it would not have to intervene. From July 1949 to March–April 1950, three divisions of the Korean army (or more than 30,000 soldiers) that had fought in the Chinese Civil War were allowed to return, armed, to North Korea. Chinese leaders made this decision in part because they were concerned that North Korea might be attacked by South Korea, with possible Japanese assistance. On the other hand, these troops no longer had important duties in China. Allowing them to return to Korea was a logical component of disarmament at a time when the Chinese army was already being demobilized on a large scale.

In May 1949 – even as China made the decision to provide aid to North Korea – Mao explicitly told North Korean leaders that he did not approve of an attack on South Korea, and he continued to hold this position for some time.³¹

31 “Kovalev’s Telegram to Stalin,” May 18, 1949, in Academia Sinica (comp.), *Chaoxian zhan zheng: Eguo dang’anguan jiemi wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Russian Archives] (here after *Chaoxian zhanzheng*), 2 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2003), vol. 1, 189–90.

Probably because he knew Mao's attitude, Stalin did not ask Kim Il Sung to consult Mao on North Korea's military plans until shortly before Stalin finally approved North Korea's attack in April 1950. On May 13, when Mao learned from Kim of the joint proposal by the USSR and North Korea, he first verified it with the Soviets, and then decided not to oppose Kim's planned offensive in South Korea, as he knew that China was in no position to challenge Stalin's decision.³² Nevertheless, Chinese leaders did not really focus on the situation on the Korean peninsula during the early stages of the war, immediately after June 25, 1950, because they saw it as a Soviet responsibility.

In addition to the basic solidarity that existed between Chinese and Korean Communists, the main reason behind the Chinese leaders' decision to enter the Korean War in the fall of 1950 was their reevaluation of the overall situation in East Asia after the success of the American military intervention. The military deployments undertaken by the Truman administration were extensive; the United States not only used force on the Korean peninsula, but also strengthened its military presence in the Taiwan Strait and in Southeast Asia. These actions led Chinese leaders to think that the United States was about to engage in a strategic expansion against China. At a Politburo meeting on August 4, Mao said that "if the US imperialists were to succeed, they would be complacent, and would threaten us."³³ Zhou's talk in the August 26 meeting on national defense highlighted the Chinese leadership's concern with a possible "domino effect" caused by US intervention.³⁴

In terms of the specific decisionmaking process, two events made a Chinese entry into the Korean War highly likely. First, when the United States dispatched troops to Korea, it also imposed a blockade of the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, the civil war in China had been a war for the reunification of the country, and the US presence in the Taiwan Strait therefore directly contradicted the final goals of the CCP. To Chinese leaders, the blockade constituted intolerable aggression. In fact, the American blockade of the strait forced the PRC to abandon a campaign to take over Taiwan and, in doing so, facilitated the redeployment of several PLA army corps to the Korean border where they would confront the United States. On July 7, the Central Military Commission

32 "Stalin's Telegram to Mao Zedong," May 14, 1950, in *Chaoxian zhanzheng*, vol. I, 384.

33 Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [Reflections on Several Important Decisions and Events], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1991), vol. I, 43.

34 Zhou Enlai, "Prepare Adequately for Immediate Victory," August 26, 1950, in the Central Documents Research Institute and the Military Science Academy (ed. and comp.), *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], 4 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997), vol. IV, 43–45.

decided to form an army for border defense in the northeast. Marshal Su Yu, who had been the intended commander for the invasion of Taiwan, was now appointed commander-in-chief and political commissar of the border defense army. The Ninth Corps, previously assigned to the attack on Taiwan, and the Nineteenth Corps, previously scheduled for demobilization, were instead concentrated along the Long Hai and Jin Pu railways in order to be transferred quickly to the northeast.

Second, the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by US troops finally prompted Chinese leaders to enter the Korean War. When the war took a dramatic turn after the Inchon landing on September 15, Chinese leaders began sending warning signals to Washington that US troops should not cross the thirty-eighth parallel. On October 3, Zhou Enlai sent an ultimatum via the Indian ambassador to China, saying that if the American troops crossed the parallel "we would not just be by-standers; we would intervene."³⁵ The US leadership never took Zhou's warning seriously, and on October 7 their troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. From that point on, in fact, it was inevitable that Chinese troops would, in some form, cross the Yalu River.

Although hostility to the United States played the key role in China's decision to enter the Korean War, the decisionmaking process was complicated by considerations of how to handle Sino-Soviet relations. After the North Korean reverses, Stalin asked for China's assistance in Korea, and leaders in Beijing found it difficult to say no because of China's subordinate role in the alliance. Proponents of a massive Chinese intervention – first and foremost Mao Zedong himself – could not have persuaded their comrades to intervene if it had not been for Stalin's willingness to meet Mao's minimum preconditions in terms of Soviet aid, including a guarantee that the Soviets would prevent the war from being expanded into China.

On October 1, after being asked to do so both by the Soviets and the North Koreans, Mao made the decision to enter the war. Yet because he did not have majority support, he did not send the telegram that he had drafted to that effect. He explained to the Soviet ambassador on October 3 that some policy-makers did not support China's entry into the Korean War out of concern that direct Sino-American confrontation would set back China's plans for peaceful reconstruction. They were also worried, he said, that disaffection might arise within China.³⁶

35 "Zhou Enlai's talk," October 3, 1950, *ibid.*, vol. IV, 67–68.

36 "Rochshin's Telegram to Stalin," October 8, 1950, in *Chaoxian zhanzheng*, vol. 2, 380–81.

At the beginning of the war, Stalin had kept China in the position of a limited participant. But at the decisive juncture of North Korea's failure to repulse US troops, he urged China to send troops, and tried to sway the Chinese leaders as best he could. In an October 5 telegram to Mao, Stalin cited the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. He said that the United States had not made adequate preparations for a large-scale war and that, if the Americans were to carry the war into China itself, the USSR would assist in repelling them. He also noted that China's entry into the war would force the United States to make concessions, and that Washington would "have to abandon Taiwan." If China did not send troops, in contrast, then it would not "even get Taiwan back."³⁷ At about the same time that Stalin sent this telegram, the CCP Central Committee took the final decision to send troops to Korea. It is unclear whether Mao had yet received Stalin's telegram at that point, but Stalin's reaffirmation of the promises in the Sino-Soviet treaty certainly played a role by encouraging Chinese leaders to overcome their fears that war might spread into their own country.

Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao left Beijing for Moscow on October 8. In discussions on October 11, Stalin agreed to provide any military aid necessary to China. Yet, on the issue of Soviet air cover for China's troops as they entered the Korean peninsula, he stated explicitly that it would be impossible for the Soviet air force to enter the war immediately. What it could do, Stalin said, was to help bolster air cover for China itself.³⁸ Stalin's promise was very significant because it convinced the Chinese leaders that the PRC would not have to worry about US air assaults in China proper while its troops fought on the Korean peninsula.

However, Stalin's reluctance to provide air cover for Chinese troops in Korea undoubtedly made some of the preparations extremely difficult for China. Mao telegraphed Zhou many times, instructing him to urge the USSR to make a resolute and explicit promise to provide military equipment and to enter the war itself within two months. At this time, some Chinese leaders also envisaged that their troops would be engaged primarily in a defensive strategy, and would not launch attacks on US forces.³⁹

37 "Stalin's Letter to Kim Il Sung," October 8, 1950, in *ibid.*, vol. II, 386–88.

38 See Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Si Dalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin, 2003), 239–40.

39 "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 13, 1950, "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 14, 1950, "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 15, 1950, in *Dang de wenxian* [CCP Documents], 5 (2000) 7–8, 10.


Around October 14, Chinese leaders essentially finalized their strategic plan and war objectives. They wanted to prevent the Korean War from expanding into China proper, to stop the United States from occupying the northern regions of Korea close to the Chinese border, and to help the North Korean regime survive. According to Mao's instructions, once Chinese troops entered the Korean peninsula, they were to be deployed in suitable positions so they could set up defensive lines. They were not to undertake offensive operations for six months. As Mao said on October 14, he meant "to push the national defense line toward Deokcheon, Yeogwon as well as south of them – assuring this will be of great benefit [to us]."⁴⁰ On October 18, based on Zhou Enlai's reports from the negotiations with the USSR, Chinese leaders again reviewed their decision to send troops to Korea, and gave the go-ahead for troops to enter. The following day Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River.

After finding conditions on the ground in North Korea to be to their advantage, China's army launched its first offensive campaign on October 25, 1950. From that time until July 27, 1953, China fought a large-scale regional war against the United States. This war – the PRC's first – had major consequences for the new state's international orientation.

The Korean conflict immediately brought the newly founded PRC to the forefront of the Cold War in East Asia. China's alliance with the USSR was strengthened and broadened, creating a much closer relationship between the two parties than had ever existed in the past. Equally important, China's antagonism toward the United States was deepened and made more permanent. The realities of war created perceptions among CCP leaders of a much more ominous world outside their region. The parameters of the Cold War in Asia, thus established, would remain unchanged for a long time to come.⁴¹

⁴⁰ "Mao Zedong's Telegram to Zhou Enlai," October 14, 1950.

⁴¹ For additional information on the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet alliance, see the chapters by William Stueck and Shu Guang Zhang in this volume.



5. Cold War East Asia and the Korean War (inset).



Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960

SAYURI GUTHRIE-SHIMIZU

On August 14, 1945, still reeling from the aftershock of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese government accepted the Allied powers' Potsdam Declaration, and World War II came to an end in the Asia-Pacific. Stripped of all of its colonial possessions acquired since 1895, Japan faced, for the first time in its history, occupation by foreign troops and reconstitution of its government at the behest of external authorities. As the nominally Allied occupation of the vanquished empire began, US general Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), stood atop the Allied military command and administrative structure in Japan. At this moment, the post-World War II histories of the United States and Japan became inexorably entwined. The atomic blasts, which killed 40,000 of Hiroshima's 350,000 inhabitants and 70,000 of the 270,000 people in Nagasaki, ushered in the nuclear age and Japan's quest for redemption in the postwar world where visions of the "American century" now reigned supreme. This symbiotic genesis foreshadowed the knotting of Japan's antinuclear pacifism and the United States' investment, both material and metaphorical, in a nuclear arsenal as the bedrock of international peace and security during the Cold War.

In this braided history, it was the United States' self-assigned mission to remold Japan into a stable democracy conforming to the Western and capitalist rules of the game. But within months of the war's end, the confrontation with the Soviet Union began to color American strategic thinking and foreign policymaking, and the task of refashioning Japan came under the added and accumulating weight of the developing Cold War between the two superpowers. Officials in Washington and the American proconsul in Japan became determined to minimize Soviet influence in occupied Japan. By early 1946, the effective exclusion from the Allied Council and the Far East Commission – the inter-Allied institutions overseeing the occupation – of Soviet, and to a lesser extent British, voices infused another source of rancor into the former

Grand Alliance. The implementation of occupation policies became in all vital respects an American enterprise, with a small contingent of British Commonwealth forces, mostly Australian, sharing peripheral military tasks.

In the early postwar years, American policies for Japan were contingent on other strategic imperatives the United States found in the smoldering debris of the now-defunct Empire of the Sun. The Chinese Civil War, which resumed in the immediate wake of Japan's surrender, unfolded alongside early signs of American–Soviet geopolitical irreconcilability regarding Europe and the Middle East. Despite a yearlong mediation effort by the United States, the Communist–Nationalist split became irreversible by early 1947, and the Communist forces gradually emerged triumphant in the internecine military conflict. The flight of the Nationalist forces of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) to Taiwan and proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 introduced an additional layer of complication in American plans for postwar East Asia.¹ The hot war in which the United States became mired on the Korean peninsula, another zone of contention recently liberated from Japanese colonial rule, compounded the task of reordering its strategic priorities in East Asia and destabilized its agenda for occupied Japan.²

The dissolution of Japan's colonial empire and its democratic makeover proceeded alongside parallel historical developments in Asia. In the 1950s, the United States as a global hegemon found itself amidst the gathering torrents of nationalism and the retreat of European colonialism in Asia. On this shifting political terrain, the United States began searching for a way to harness decolonization to American advantage and, perhaps, to that of its newly christened ally, Japan. But the challenge was not Americans' alone. As the ranks of newly independent nations grew and anticolonialism became a rallying banner among them in the 1950s, Japan faced anew its historical challenge of defining its place in Asia and somehow reconciling it with the niche in the Western world it so coveted. This conundrum in the face of decolonizing Asia appeared all the more daunting in the early Cold War years because Moscow and Beijing, armed with revolutionary ideology and propagating alternative visions of social organization, appeared to hold an advantage in the competition for the hearts and minds of recently decolonized nations in Asia and elsewhere. From 1945 to 1960, it was under this composite overhang of the global superpower rivalry and the process of decolonization

1 See Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

2 See William Stueck's chapter in this volume.



19. General Douglas MacArthur of the United States and Emperor Hirohito of Japan meet in the US embassy in Tokyo, September 1945. Until the previous month, the Japanese regime had promoted the worship of the emperor as a god, and he had rarely been seen in public.

that the United States and Japan had to readjust their relationship and maximize their respective interests.

Allied occupation: phase I (1945–1947)

In contrast to the aftermath of World War I, the United States launched into post-World War II occupation of enemy territories equipped with fairly well-crafted blueprints. In the case of Japan, committees of experts set up within the State and War Departments began discussing postwar plans within six months of the Pearl Harbor attack. By early 1945, the coordinating committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments formulated SWNCC 150/2 as the basic policy toward postsurrender Japan. The occupation's objective, as stated in

the document, was to ensure “that Japan [would] not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world”; a reformed Japan was to be readmitted “as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of nations.” Voicing these lofty goals, the United States set out to cleanse Japan of militarism and strengthen what “Japan hands” in the State Department, such as former ambassador Joseph Grew, believed to be that nation’s innate democratic tendencies that had been temporarily suppressed by the hex of militarism in the 1930s.³

SCAP’s most immediate task was to dismantle Japan’s war machine. This was to be done not only by disarming troops and impounding munitions factories, but also, starting in January 1946, through “purges” of officials, journalists, educators, and businessmen who had collaborated with the prewar militarist state. Before the program’s end in May 1948, over 200,000 individuals were affected. Next, those identified as war criminals were brought before an international military tribunal convened in Tokyo. Between May 1946 and November 1948, twenty-eight Japanese leaders were put on trial for planning and initiating an unjust war of aggression, but the emperor’s name was conspicuously absent from the indictment. MacArthur opposed any attempt to bring the emperor to trial on the grounds that it would turn the local populace against the United States and eliminate all chances of peaceful administration of the occupied land. Seven defendants, including former prime ministers Hideki Tojo and Koki Hirota, were condemned to death by hanging.⁴

SCAP governed Japan through the nation’s existing political institutions, including the emperor. The burden of direct military rule that was being felt in Germany led American generals and civilian officials to decide not to duplicate the experience in Japan. Nor did Japan’s sooner-than-expected surrender allow training of the manpower needed for direct military rule. Many of the members of the complex occupation bureaucracy had little knowledge or experience of the country they had to govern and reform. The lack of knowledgeable personnel at times resulted in improvisation and uncritically transplanting American institutions to Japan. Some programs aimed at converting

3 For a biographical sketch of “Japan hands” involved in the occupation of Japan, see Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985). For the full text of this directive, see Edward M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948), 122–50.

4 Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 15–16.

Japan to “American democratic ideals,” such as land and electoral reforms, were successfully implemented through Japanese initiatives and by relying on indigenous expertise. Yet defeat acted as a catalyst for radical changes in Japan’s social and political institutions. Mandated by a victor who professed democratic principles and visions of an open world order, reforms materialized that perhaps would have been impossible with indigenous forces alone. Changes ran a wide gamut, from female suffrage and the revision of the gender-repressive Civil Code, to the abolition of licensed prostitution, the adoption of a pacifist constitution renouncing in Article IX the use of military force as an instrument of national policy, the abolition of the peerage, the encouragement of labor unionism, the liberalization of education, and economic deconcentration.

But the transformative nature of occupation-era reforms should not be overstated. Once the initial shock of defeat wore off, Japanese officials began to take charge of their own affairs and devised ways to subvert the intent of policies mandated by the occupier. The reorientation of US occupation policy after 1947 put a tailwind behind those Japanese officials who sought to reinstate elements of the old governing regime. Once the nation regained independence in April 1952, some of the reforms instituted over the previous seven years, like antimonopoly enactments, were reversed or eviscerated. A result of this binational collaboration in political backsliding was that, as historian W. G. Beasley once observed, “one can trace today [1995] a far greater continuity with the recent past than would at one time have seemed possible.”⁵

The occupation period was a bridge linking the old and the new in another way. It refueled the Americanization of Japanese mass culture, a permutation of the phenomenon commonly seen during the Cold War wherever American forces were stationed.⁶ In the interwar period, American-style consumerism had made major inroads into Japan, particularly among the urban middle class. Jazz, cafés, dance halls, movie theaters, and American youth apparel and accompanying free-spirited and individualistic social mores became familiar fixtures of urban life. American household amenities and lifestyles were envied and coveted as emblems of “modern life.” The Japanese fascination with things American had been temporarily buried during the national

5 William G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan* (London and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 214.

6 Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

mobilization and forced austerity that began in the late 1930s, but the arrival of occupation forces and their dependents ignited its postwar revival. Consumer goods and electrical appliances displayed in PXes (post exchanges, stores operated by the US Army on its bases) fed the acquisitive fantasy of the battered and impoverished local population and established the attainment of material comfort as the legitimate goal of a peace-loving and “democratic” citizenry. Food, music, sports, and other forms of popular entertainment came under heavy American influences, due in no small part to the presence of US troops.⁷ This resumed cultural adaptation would become a fortifying ingredient of the social and cultural underpinning of the Cold War partnership and helped the bilateral relationship withstand the wear and tear of divergent national priorities in high politics.

Allied occupation: phase II (1947–1951)

By early 1947, the Cold War in Europe and the Near East induced a major reorientation in American occupation policy. The first harbinger of what became known as the “reverse course,” in which the emphasis shifted from punishment and reform to political stability via economic reconstruction, came with a reappraisal of reparations policy. In 1946, the survey team headed by Democratic oilman Edwin Pauley proposed a punitive program built around the massive removal of Japan’s heavy and chemical industry facilities and their transfer to countries victimized by Japan’s wartime aggression. This draconian scheme was replaced in January 1947 by the Strike Commission Report, which recommended more lenient terms and highlighted the need for assisting Japan’s economic rehabilitation and self-support.

By this time, key policymakers, chief among them the American proconsul ensconced in Tokyo, began to emphasize the importance of Japan’s industrial recovery and resulting political stability. In a press conference on March 17, 1947, MacArthur declared that the occupation’s central objectives, demilitarization and democratization, had been largely achieved, and that SCAP’s next task was economic rehabilitation. In order to facilitate this transition, the general suggested, it was time to consider a peace treaty and the withdrawal of Allied troops from Japan. For its economy to grow,

7 Sayuri Guthrie Shimizu, “Baseball as a Vehicle of Soft Power in US–Japanese Relations: A Historical Perspective,” in David McConnell and Yasuyuki Watanabe (eds.), *Softpower Superpowers* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2008), 133–36.

Japan needed to engage in normal market-based trade free from SCAP's regulations.⁸

MacArthur's remarks, made without prior consultation with Washington, were largely motivated by his ambition for the 1948 presidential election. Coming five days after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, they nevertheless stirred strong reactions in Washington and in other Western capitals. Within the US government, vocal opposition came from George Kennan, the newly appointed first director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Viewing Japan along with Western Europe as a key laboratory of his containment policy, Kennan argued that granting Japan independence before the nation had achieved political and economic stability would compromise the United States' global strategic position. Shortly thereafter, once the Marshall Plan had been launched, Kennan became actively involved in Japanese affairs and lobbied vigorously to block what he believed to be a premature peace with Japan.⁹

As the Cold War took shape in Europe, officials in Washington came to agree on the importance of Japan's industrial recovery. In a revised policy statement (NSC 13/2) in October 1948, the Truman administration articulated its new vision. Democratization and demilitarization now took a backseat to economic growth and political stability. Labor strife had to be restrained, the economy had to be stabilized and reintegrated firmly into the Western capitalist world, and purges of undemocratic persons had to end, especially if they possessed proven administrative and technocratic credentials. Thereafter, occupation authorities began to crack down on Communists and their suspected sympathizers (the "red purge") and released nineteen suspected Class A war criminals, including Nobusuke Kishi, a prewar munitions minister and the future prime minister. That the three prime ministers who served in the latter half of the 1950s were all former purgees speaks volumes about the effects of the Cold War-induced "reverse course" on postoccupation Japanese politics. The return and entrenchment of conservative political forces, albeit in reconfigured postwar permutations, was a not-so-unwitting byproduct of American Cold War policy.¹⁰

8 Takeshi Igarashi, "Tainichi kowa no teisho to tainichi senryoseisaku no tenkan" [A Call for a Peace with Japan and a Turning Point in US Occupation Policy], *Shiso*, 12, 3 (October 1976), 1481–1503.

9 For Kennan's view on Japan, see his memorandum dated October 14, 1947, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 537–43 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

10 For a portrait of Nobusuke Kishi as a politician, see Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke: kensei no seijika* [Kishi Nobusuke: Politician of Power] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shisho, 1995).

The new US orientation was mirrored in the economic realm as well. In December 1948, Washington sent SCAP a nine-point directive for Japanese economic stabilization featuring a balanced budget, stricter lending criteria, more efficient taxation, wage and price controls, and increased regulation of trade and foreign exchange. The man charged with implementing this austerity program was Joseph Dodge. The former Detroit banker, experienced in handling a currency crisis in occupied Germany, arrived in Tokyo in early 1949 as economic adviser to SCAP. He instituted sweeping changes that shaped Japan's economic development. Working closely with finance minister (and future prime minister) Hayato Ikeda, Dodge formulated what was dubbed "a super balanced budget" featuring a surplus of 156.9 million yen. A local-currency counterpart fund for American aid materials was established to be used for internal economic infrastructure development; credits were tightened and wages frozen; and, perhaps most importantly in the long term, Japan's currency exchange rate was set at 360 yen to the dollar – the rate that would remain until the "Nixon shock" in 1971. The undervalued yen was expected to facilitate Japan's export trade while helping to embed the Japanese economy in the Bretton Woods system through the now-almighty US dollar.¹¹

The San Francisco Peace Treaty

When, in March 1947, MacArthur called for an early peace with Japan and the withdrawal of US and Allied troops, he assumed there was no immediate danger of a Soviet attack on the island nation and that Japan's security could be adequately guaranteed by the United Nations' collective defense mechanism. But army strategic planners and some civilian policy planners valued bases in Japan and Okinawa, and killed the drive to end the occupation. Unsure about the Chinese Communist regime's future orientation, US officials initially hoped that Mao Zedong, driven by a hybrid of Marxist ideology and Chinese nationalism, would become a Tito-like renegade force within international Communism. However, when Mao signed a military alliance with Moscow in February 1950 and when he intervened in the Korean War in the fall of that year, he removed uncertainties lingering in Washington about Beijing's intentions and thereby rearranged the geopolitical and ideological configuration of East Asia. In this radically altered picture, Japan's importance in American strategic thinking skyrocketed almost overnight. Upgraded from the status of a former enemy in need of reform, Japan was now a crucial

¹¹ Shonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 198–235.

rearguard base for US forces fighting in Korea under the UN banner. Given its industrial capacity, population, and geographical location, Japan's credentials as the United States' new partner in the containment of Communism in the Far East now appeared self-evident.

Among the benefits of this enhanced status was a renewed, and this time irresistible, call for a peace treaty, a lenient one at that. To ensure bipartisan congressional support, President Harry S. Truman – then being hounded by the nagging question, “Who lost China?” – appointed John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican with proven expertise on foreign policy, to head the negotiations with Japan. Entering into negotiations in Tokyo, Dulles insisted on the retention of American bases in Japan, with no time limits or restrictions on their use, for the duration of the Korean War. By early 1951, the Japanese government, particularly Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, had already decided to entrust Japan's postindependence security to the Americans and accepted the continued presence of US forces within its sovereign territory. Pro-American and wily, Yoshida knew the provision of bases to the United States was a price Japan had to pay for the restoration of sovereignty. He did not object to the idea that Japan's future security and interests would be most efficiently safeguarded through cooperative relations with the Americans. And yet he still maneuvered to extract as lenient a peace as possible from the Allies by playing the “base” card with Washington.¹²

On September 8, 1951, Japan signed a peace treaty in San Francisco with forty-eight nations. No severe restrictions were placed on Japan's economy or future political orientation. While Article 11 stated that the Japanese government accepted the Military Tribunal for the Far East, there was no direct reference to Japan's war responsibility. While Asian signatories worried about Japan's resurgence as a military power, the treaty contained no provisions restricting Japan's rearmament. Under American pressure, key belligerents renounced their claims to reparations. Southeast Asians, who refused to do so, were left to negotiate bilaterally with Japan at a separate venue.¹³

Besides its leniency, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was also notable for its truncated nature. In Japanese parlance of the day, it gave Japan only a “partial peace” (*katamen kowa*). Among those invited to the conference, Yugoslavia, India, and Burma refused to attend. The Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia participated but refused to sign the treaty. Representatives

12 Kazuya Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei no kizuna* [The Bonds of the US-Japanese Alliance] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000), 26–38.

13 Sayuri Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 179–83.

of China, the nation on which Japan inflicted the most extensive destruction and human suffering from the time of the Manchurian incident in 1931 until the end of World War II, were not at the peace conference. This abnormality reflected a laboriously crafted compromise between Britain, which recognized the PRC in January 1951, and the United States, determined to ostracize Beijing. Dulles flew to London in June to iron out British–American differences over China, and the result was an agreement with British foreign secretary Herbert Morrison that neither of the claimants to the governance of China would be invited to San Francisco.¹⁴

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was not without heavy cost for Japan, however. One price paid was a bilateral security agreement it had to sign with the United States concurrent with the peace treaty. Going into force with the ratification of the peace treaty in April 1952, the security accord gave the United States the continued and fundamentally unrestricted use of bases in Japan proper and total administrative control over Okinawa until “peace and security” were achieved in the Far East. Okinawa, the keystone of US military operations in Asia, thus remained detached from Japanese sovereignty. The security treaty also relegated postindependence Japan to the status of military dependant by giving the United States the right to intervene militarily in the event of internal disorder in Japan, and by depriving Japan of the right to provide bases to a third country without US consent. In negotiating the peace treaty, the Japanese government sought to avoid being locked into this kind of bilateral military bondage to the United States. Reflecting their belief in postwar multilateralism, Japanese officials initially preferred to place the nation’s security arrangements with the United States explicitly under the umbrella of the collective self-defense mechanism sanctioned by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. But Dulles rejected this option.¹⁵

From Tokyo’s standpoint, another problem of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was that the Soviet Union and the PRC remained outside its framework. The incomplete nature of the peace caused a deep division within Japan, a schism reflecting dueling visions of Japan’s place in the postwar world. Those Japanese who desired “a whole peace” (*zenmen kowa*), including the country’s two Communist neighbors, envisaged a Japan that was not a mere appendage to American Cold War policy. Spearheaded by leftist intellectuals, oppositional journalists, and the Socialist and Communist Parties, this political

14 Chihiro Hosoya, *San Francisco kowa heno michi* [The Road to the San Francisco Peace] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1984), 232–45.

15 Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei*, 76–79.

coalition argued that Japan could safeguard its security through diplomatic neutrality and the unarmed pacifism that, they believed, was required by Article IX of the postwar constitution. Their ideological rivals – those who accepted a partial peace with the United States and its allies – either resigned themselves to, or actively sought, a Cold War alliance with Washington. For them, the best guarantee of Japan's security was a continued US military presence in Japan and Okinawa, perhaps coupled with Japan's own incremental rearmament, with or without a constitutional revision in the future.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty thus catalyzed an ideological debate inside Japan and shaped party alignments for most of the Cold War. The peace achieved only with the non-Communist world and the quasi-military dependency Japan accepted vis-à-vis the United States placed foreign-policy questions front and center of postoccupation Japan's political debate. In this ideologically charged political environment, the United States and its Cold War dictates came to play an inordinately far-reaching and symbolic part.¹⁶

The ideological nature of the national debate over the peace treaty was most salient with regard to China. The Dulles–Morrison agreement left unresolved the question of an independent Japan's diplomatic relations with China, the problem over which Yoshida and Dulles had fiercely dueled. Desiring to restore Japanese trade with the vast Chinese mainland market, Yoshida sought to leave open the possibility of establishing governmental ties with the Communist regime. Yoshida's ideological pragmatism regarding China reflected his belief in the likelihood of a future PRC–Soviet estrangement. Until his semi-forced political retirement at the end of 1954, Yoshida preached indefatigably to American officials that Japan's capitalist penetration of the China market would help reorient the PRC and hasten a split between Moscow and Beijing. But Yoshida's nascent two-Chinas policy did not persuade Dulles. To keep the China lobby in the United States from derailing Senate ratification of the peace treaty, Dulles pressed Yoshida to sign a separate peace accord with Jiang's Republic of China in Taiwan. The choice Japan was forced to make regarding China in exchange for regaining its national sovereignty illustrated the narrow parameters within which Japan was able to conduct its relations with the rest of Asia during this phase of the Cold War.

16 Akio Watanabe, "Kowa mondai to nippon no sentaku" [World War II Peacemaking and Japan's Choice], in Akio Watanabe and Seigen Miyasato (eds.), *San Francisco kowa* [San Francisco Peacemaking] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 20.

Rearmament versus economic growth

The Korean War not only prompted an Allied (half-) peace with Japan, it also primed Japanese rearmament. Given the shortage of US manpower in the region, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to create a paramilitary 75,000-strong National Police Reserve (NPR) and to augment the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000 men. A US military advisory group trained the NPR; it, in turn, provided support for US forces in Japan. Initially, Yoshida did not intend to transform the NPR into a bona fide military force. Yet, during the peace negotiations, he grudgingly agreed to create a 50,000-man National Safety Force. In August 1952, the Japanese government established the National Safety Agency (NSA), comprising 110,000 ground troops and a 7,590-man maritime force. Its mandate implied more than domestic police duties.¹⁷

The Truman administration's desire to prompt Japanese rearmament shaped its first policy statement toward postindependence Japan, NSC 125/2. It called for a ground troop buildup to ten divisions and "appropriate levels of air and sea power," and claimed that these measures were necessary for Japan's self-defense and for its contribution to the common security of the free nations in the Far East and Pacific. In November 1952, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined a plan to establish an air force, a move that made it extremely difficult to argue that Japan's postwar military would be charged with self-defense only. These initiatives, moreover, necessitated major US assistance in terms of financial resources and equipment.¹⁸

The push for Japanese rearmament had thus begun before Dwight Eisenhower entered the White House. Dulles, now secretary of state for the Republican administration, did not get directly involved in this question. In testimony before Congress on behalf of the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) program, however, he envisioned a ten-division ground force for Japan, amounting to 325,000–350,000 men. Yoshida's intent was to extract maximum financial aid from the United States under MSA while agreeing only to token rearmament. The United States, however, made its potential aid strictly proportionate to Japan's defense buildup.¹⁹ Hence the two sides were worlds apart when negotiations began in 1953.

17 Hideo Otake, "Yoshida naikakunoyoru saigunbi" [Rearmament by the Yoshida Cabinet], *Hogaku* [Legal Studies], 50, 4 (October 1986), 37–50.

18 Joint Chiefs of Staff to Clark, March 10, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, 1390.

19 J. Allison to Department of State, July 6, 1953, *ibid.*, 1445–47; Fred Dickinson, "Nichibei anpo taisen no henyō" [The Transformation of the US–Japan Security System], *Hogaku Ronso* [Legal Treatise], 121, 4 (December 1987), 76–77.

Yoshida sent his protégé Ikeda to Washington in October to negotiate with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson. During the month-long diplomacy, Ikeda tried to counter the US desire for a large ground force with a more modest proposal to build a force of 180,000 men over three years. In March 1954, the United States and Japan reached an agreement that provided Japan with military equipment amounting to \$140 million, another \$100 million in offshore military purchases, and US agricultural surpluses for sale within Japan. In exchange, Japan agreed to increase its ground troops to 110,000–140,000 during the initial aid period. Soon thereafter, the Japanese Diet adopted two defense bills. In July 1954, the National Safety Force was renamed the Self-Defense Force, to be administered by a Defense Agency under a director holding Cabinet rank.²⁰

Many historians have portrayed these developments in a Manichean way. Supposedly, Dulles demanded Japanese rearmament, but Yoshida, concerned with economic recovery and cognizant of the depth of pacifism in postwar Japan, resisted the American pressure. But recent studies based on Japanese sources reveal a more complex picture. They suggest that Yoshida essentially accepted moderate rearmament as a necessary price for membership in the non-Communist world. His challenge was to decide how resources should be allocated between the military and the economy. Similarly, Dulles conceded, privately at least, that there was only so much Americans could do to push Japan into rearming under its pacifist constitution – the one they had imposed on it.

By early 1954, the pressure from Washington for Japanese rearmament abated, and this question began to recede in US–Japan diplomacy, not so much because of Japan’s resistance as because of a change in American policy. The armistices in Korea in July 1953 and in Indochina in July 1954 drastically reduced military tensions in Asia and produced a new emphasis in US Cold War policies. The Eisenhower administration now concluded that rearmament should be pursued in a way that neither harmed Japan’s economy nor impaired its internal political stability and diplomatic allegiance to the United States. The new US ambassador to Tokyo, John Allison, was at the forefront of this strategic reassessment, which was approved as NSC 5516 in April 1955.²¹

²⁰ Sakamoto, *Nichibei domei*, 80–105.

²¹ NSC 5516/1 “US Policy toward Japan,” April 9, 1955, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 57. For an example of such recent Japanese scholarship, see Shintaro Suzuki, *Nichibei domei no sijiishi: Arison chunichi taishi to “1955 nen taisei” no Seiritsu* [The Political History of the Japan–US Alliance: Ambassador Allison and the Making of the “Year 1955 System”] (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2004).

Economic growth and trade with Asia

The Korean War also reshaped Japan's postwar trajectory by igniting its economy. In early 1950, Dodge's austerity program had caused a sharp economic downturn. Many small businesses went bankrupt, unemployment soared, and economic difficulties threatened to radicalize labor unions now under socialist and Communist stewardship. But massive US military procurements generated by the Korean War resuscitated the anemic Japanese economy. Not only producers of consumables but also mining and heavy industrial companies reported major gains in profits. The war boom enabled Japanese manufacturers to invest in research and development and to benefit from the transfer of industrial technology from the West. Equally important, US military procurements were paid in dollars, building Japan's foreign exchange reserves. By the time the US occupation ended in April 1952, Japan was well on its way to economic recovery, readying itself for high-speed growth in the 1960s. Its economic rebirth during the Cold War was thus partially fueled by a hot war in Asia.

From the beginning of the occupation, American policymakers understood the importance of foreign trade to the resource-poor island nation. That was why they tolerated Japanese trade with the Chinese mainland even after the proclamation of the PRC, as long as it did not threaten the multilateral strategic embargo system then being put in place. After November 1950, however, Beijing became the main target of American economic warfare against the Communist bloc. Capitalizing on Japan's desperate desire to be accepted into the Western world's institutional network, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the UN, the United States forced Japan to join the multilateral mechanism that was charged with enforcing embargoes against the PRC, trade sanctions that were even harsher than those imposed against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

For officials in Tokyo, this economic straitjacket became another example of the unjust restrictions the United States placed on Japan's relationship with China. Resenting US interference, Japanese business groups and their patrons in politics resorted to various subterfuges to contact the PRC and to promote trade. Between 1952 and 1958, four "private-sector" trade agreements were signed between a coalition of Japanese businessmen and the Chinese Communist Party's foreign-trade agency. Yoshida's successors, Ichiro Hatoyama and Tanzan Ishibashi, tacitly approved these maneuvers, which also received popular support. Believing that the Japanese were using these commercial contacts to move closer to formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, US officials fretted over the perceived disloyalty.

An alternative for the China market now controlled by the Communist regime might be Southeast Asia. By 1950, the idea of linking Japan's industrial economy with resources and markets of Asia's southeastern tier was nothing new in American policy circles. Eisenhower's own words lent credence to the putative Japan–Southeast Asia economic nexus. While pondering a possible military intervention in the Indochinese conflict in April 1954, the president, in his famous speech on the domino theory, warned that Indochina's fall to Communism might spill over to all of Southeast Asia and ultimately force Japan to seek accommodation with the Communists. This alarmist hyperbole was partially directed at protectionists in Congress who were threatening to block Japan's accession to GATT. But this compelling metaphor, as well as the notion of the economic symbiosis between Japan and Southeast Asia, took on a life of its own.²²

The president's reference to falling dominoes particularly stoked Japanese expectations. From Yoshida on, a succession of Japanese governments urged Washington to translate this intense strategic concern into a large-scale regional aid program. When Yoshida traveled to Washington in late 1954 – as the first Japanese prime minister to visit the United States – he called for a \$4 billion “Marshall Plan for Asia,” and was openly rebuffed. In 1957, Prime Minister Kishi presented to the Eisenhower administration a blueprint for a Southeast Asia development fund, including a regional finance corporation with \$3 billion in reserves to facilitate intraregional trade. But Washington again flatly rejected the Japanese proposal. Ironically, Japan's need for trade, unrealized in Southeast Asia, was met by a phenomenal increase in sales to the Western industrial world, especially the United States, after Japan's accession to GATT in September 1955.

Specters of neutralism

Following Yoshida's exit from power, American officials became alarmed by signs of Japan's drift toward neutralism. Part of the problem came from the difficulty in drawing lines between diplomatic impartiality, an amorphous anti-Americanism fermenting in Japan at the time, and popular discontent with the government closely associated with the overpowering presence of the United States in Japan's postwar life. But it was hard for Washington to deny the link between anti-Americanism and Japan's resilient pacifism, rooted in the nation's firsthand experience with nuclear weaponry. The *Lucky Dragon*

22. Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty*, 23–28.

incident in March 1954 dramatically illustrated this connection. While operating in the high seas off the Bikini atoll, the Japanese tuna trawler was exposed to a US hydrogen bomb test, and a member of its irradiated crew later died.

Japan's second direct encounter with a nuclear blast exposed a deep chasm between American and Japanese perceptions of thermonuclear warfare and the meaning of the US–Japan alliance. For American officials and strategists, the hydrogen bomb was an integral part of the strategy of nuclear deterrence and, as such, contributed vitally to the defense of the free world. Barely a decade after the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese did not see such redemptive qualities in the bomb. The incident inaugurated the organized antinuclear movement in Japan, culminating in the formation of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) and the Japan Confederation of A-bomb and H-bomb Sufferers' Organizations (Hidankyo). In this nationwide grassroots mobilization, revulsion toward nuclear weaponry also fused with disparate agendas of nonpartisan oppositional politics, such as the quality of life around American military bases, feminist opposition to prostitution in base towns, and the sincerity of the Sino-Soviet peace offensive. US policymakers realized that the spike in anti-Americanism, often couched in the language of universal humanitarianism, could not be simply attributed to socialist and Communist agitation. Washington also worried about the symbolic weight of its key ally hoisting the banner of international antinuclear citizen activism and drawing on its credentials as the sole victim of the nuclear destruction and suffering.²³

In the mid-1950s, Japan's grassroots anti-Americanism was paralleled by government policy. Yoshida's successors, drawn from within conservative ranks, wanted to reverse his legacy of perceived obsequiousness to American wishes. Hatoyama, who replaced Yoshida in December 1954, trumpeted "autonomous diplomacy" as the hallmark of his Cabinet. In the context of Japanese politics, this meant reaching out to the "other side," particularly China. Hatoyama appeared to condone the Japanese business community's flirtation with PRC trade officials, which resulted in the third Sino-Japanese private-sector trade agreement in May 1955. The trade accord included

23 Allison to Department of State, May 20, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XIV, 598; Memorandum for J. F. Dulles, May 26, 1954, *ibid.*, 1948–50. For a good survey of the *Lucky Dragon* incident, see Roger Dingman, "Alliance in Crisis: The *Lucky Dragon* Incident and Japanese–American Relations," in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 187–214.

provisions for transactions between national banks and the establishment of a trade representative's office from each country in the other's capital. From the perspective of Washington, these proposals came close to quasi-diplomatic relations. Ishibashi, whose illness ended his premiership after only two months in early 1957, vocally supported trade with the PRC. In fact, when he was the minister of international trade and industry in the Hatoyama Cabinet, he appeared willing to undermine the Western embargo system by permitting Japanese shipments of strategic materials to mainland China in exchange for commodity imports.²⁴

These independent-minded leaders also sought closer relations with the rest of Asia. In the early postwar years, a sense of alienation from the Western industrial world still created a psychological need to find a comfortable niche in the nonwhite world. Japan's claims of brotherhood with Asians sometimes dangerously resembled the prewar "Asia for Asia" rhetoric. Hatoyama's "independent diplomacy" identified with the anticolonial fervor in Asia and the Non-Aligned Movement emerging in many parts of Asia and Africa. Since Japan, a military ally of the United States, was obviously a misfit in this movement, Japanese officials were both mystified and delighted to receive an invitation from the conveners of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement's inaugural meeting. The occasion was all the sweeter because Taiwan and South Korea were not invited. It was not that Japan was suddenly trusted by the Asians: the invitation came only because Pakistan, wanting to neutralize India's influence in the movement, decided to use Japan as a counterweight.²⁵

Japan sent a massive 31-member delegation to Bandung, but the delegates' experience in the Indonesian city revealed that Japan, despite its aspirations for autonomous diplomacy and partnership with Asia, could go only so far as long as it remained a US ally. Initially, the United States was ambivalent about the Bandung Conference and its principal organizer, Jawaharlal Nehru. Dulles, in particular, suspected that the Indian prime minister was attempting to erode US influence in Asia. The US secretary of state also feared that the participation of the PRC in the conference would enhance its international prestige. Once Japan received an invitation, Washington encouraged Tokyo to attend and act as spokesperson for the industrial West. The Japanese Foreign Ministry promised to restrain extremist elements at the conference, counter

24 Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty*, 123–29.

25 Taizo Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi to Nippon no ajia fukki* [The Bandung Conference and Japan's Return to Asia] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2001), 43–46.

anti-American diatribes, and frustrate any Communist peace offensive that might unfold in this international forum.²⁶

The Foreign Ministry's promise notwithstanding, chief Japanese delegate Tatsunosuke Takasaki, director of the Economic Deliberation Agency and a known advocate of Sino-Japanese trade, tried to use the Bandung Conference as a venue to contact Zhou Enlai, the Chinese foreign minister. At a prearranged meeting, Zhou offered to arrange future talks on economic matters and on the repatriation of Japanese nationals from the Chinese mainland. When the sensitive issue of Taiwan came up, however, worried Foreign Ministry officials in Takasaki's entourage tipped Washington off. Dulles promptly issued a stern warning to Tokyo, and the Japanese delegation in Bandung quickly fell back into the American fold. In the end, Japan even refrained from speaking up for a ban on nuclear weapons out of deference to Washington.²⁷

Dulles's warning also proved decisive at a critical juncture in Japan's efforts to resolve postwar problems with the Soviet Union. As part of his "autonomous diplomacy," Hatoyama placed normalization of relations with Moscow at the forefront of his diplomatic agenda. Rapprochement with the Soviets also held the key to Japan's membership in the UN. In December 1955, the Soviet Union vetoed Japan's accession to the world forum, in retaliation for the Republic of China's veto of the admission of Mongolia.²⁸ Japanese sensibilities were badly bruised by Japan's placement in the same category as Mongolia, and Dulles exhorted Tokyo not to accept this slight and to stand up to the Soviets in the ongoing negotiations for a peace treaty.²⁹ By then, US officials had begun to regret having made Japan renounce, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, its claims to the Kurile Islands. A recent US military survey mission to Hokkaido had revealed that the Soviets had built substantial military installations in the Kuriles, deploying fifty MiGs to the islands closest to Hokkaido.³⁰

26 "Ajia Afurika kaigini Nippon sanku kata shinsei ni kansuru ken" [On the Invitation to the Asia-Africa Conference], from Wajima to M. Shigemitsu, December 31, 1955, Japanese Foreign Ministry Records, B'0049, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, Tokyo; "Memorandum of a Conversation: Various Japanese Problems," January 28, 1955, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, 14; Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi*, 76–77.

27 Takasaki-Chou Memorandum of Conversation, April 22, 1955, Foreign Ministry Records A'0133, Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives; Miyagi, *Bandon kaigi*, 136–38, 156.

28 Rekishigaku kenkyukai (ed.), *Nippon dojidaiishi* [The Contemporary History of Japan], vol. III (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1990), 173–74.

29 "Memorandum of a Conversation," March 18, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, 156–59.

30 Wada Haruki, *Hoppon ryodo mondai wo kangaeru* [Considering Japan's Territorial Questions] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990), 139.

In the final stage of the Soviet–Japanese talks in the summer of 1956, Japanese foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu initially demanded the return of all four northern islands off Hokkaido seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The Soviets offered to return only two islands, Habomai and Shikotan. When Shigemitsu appeared ready to accept this deal, shock waves pulsed through Japanese governing circles. Meeting with Dulles in London, Shigemitsu explained that the Soviets would never relinquish the southern Kuriles (the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu) and that Japan had to settle for what it could get. Dulles warned that, should Japan recognize Soviet sovereignty over the southern Kuriles, the United States would claim full sovereignty over Okinawa on the basis of Article 26 of the peace treaty.³¹

Historians have puzzled over why Dulles suddenly intervened in the Japanese–Soviet negotiations and linked the Kuriles and Okinawa. Some have argued that he was not trying to sabotage the negotiations but wanted only to dissuade Japan from unnecessary concessions over the northern territory. Others have claimed that Dulles’s outburst reflected his frustration with the increasingly recalcitrant Japanese.³² Whatever the reason, after Dulles’s warning, the Japanese–Soviet negotiations over the islands stalled. Hatoyama decided to shelve the territorial issue and signed a joint declaration with Moscow on October 19, 1956, ending the state of war between the two nations. The signatories also agreed to exchange ambassadors, repatriate Japanese detainees from the Soviet Union, and complete a long-overdue fisheries treaty. Japan’s admission to the UN became a reality two months later.

The revision of the security treaty

Japan’s neutralist tendency seemed to abate after Hatoyama’s retirement and Ishibashi’s sudden illness and resignation. In February 1957, the United States gained a reliable junior partner in the person of Kishi. After years of fractious politics and party realignment in Japan, Kishi had helped engineer the merger of conservative parties into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in October

31 Suzuki, *Nichibei domei*, 189, 198–99; “Memorandum of a Conversation between Dulles and Shigemitsu,” August 19, 1956, *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, 202–04.

32 Kazuya Sakamoto, “Nisso kokko kaifukukosho to Amerika: Daresu ha naze kainyu shitaka” [Japanese–Soviet Rapprochement and America: Why Did Dulles Intervene?], *Kokusai Seiji* [International Relations], 105 (January 1994), 155; Marc Gallicchio, “The Kuriles Controversy: US Diplomacy in the Soviet–Japan Border Dispute, 1941–1956,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 50, 1 (February 1991), 100.

1955. In American eyes, the new prime minister appeared capable of achieving a long-awaited stability in Japan's electoral politics. Better yet, this conservative leader did not challenge United States Asian policy. After being "de-purged" and returning to politics, Kishi consciously used Soviet–American enmity as a way to advance his career and cultivated Washington's good graces.³³ The appointment in the same month of Douglas MacArthur II (the general's nephew) as the new US ambassador to Japan created a binational team that for the next three years worked closely together on a number of issues, not least of which was the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty.

One of Kishi's prime attractions for the United States was his staunchly pro-Taiwan position. After the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with the PRC emerged as the next piece of unfinished business in Japan's public-policy discourse. Although public sentiment favored opening diplomatic relations with Beijing, Kishi visited Taiwan in June – the first Japanese prime minister to do so – and applauded Jiang's unconcealed intent to reconquer the mainland. This diplomatic grandstanding earned him a severe rebuke from Beijing, but Jiang reciprocated Kishi's support by endorsing the Japanese prime minister's Southeast Asian economic development scheme, even when the Southeast Asians themselves were skeptical about the Japanese initiative. By the time Kishi visited the United States in July, top administration officials considered him not simply the "best bet, but the only bet," in Japan for the foreseeable future.³⁴

This American trust carried a big payoff for Kishi. Washington heeded his call for renegotiating the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty, which had been condemned by the Japanese as one-sided. The treaty's unilateral features – the US right to intervene inside Japan to suppress internal disorder, the US freedom to deploy American forces inside and outside Japan without consulting Tokyo, and the absence of a specified end date to the treaty – showcased the inequality of the alliance and undercut Japan's sovereignty. But perhaps the most unpopular feature of the treaty was that obligations were not mutual: while Japan was required to provide bases to the United States, there was no explicit guarantee by the United States to defend Japan. Leftist critics of the treaty argued that the arrangement only turned Japan into

33 Yoshihisa Hara, *Kishi Nobusuke*, 122–30.

34 Record of a Meeting between Dulles and Nash, June 5, 1957, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, vol. XXIII, 339; Ota to Ishii, May 23, 25, 1957, Marota to Osjoo, May 26, 1957, Yuki to Ishii, June 1, 1957, Kishi Sori Daiichiji Tonan Ajia Homon Kankei [First Kishi Tour of Southeast Asia], A'1.5.1.3.1, Japanese Foreign Ministry Records.

a launching pad for American military operations, including nuclear attacks, against its Cold War enemies and made the nation vulnerable to reprisals.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu first broached the modification of the treaty into a more mutual arrangement when he visited the United States in 1955. He was rebuffed by Dulles, who asked sarcastically whether Japan, shackled by Article IX of its constitution, could send troops overseas to defend the United States. But several years later, when Kishi asked for an adjustment of the treaty, the US government was much more receptive. Washington valued his staunch allegiance to US Cold War policies in Asia. Moreover, Japan's diplomatic leverage was mounting now that relations with the Soviet Union had been reopened and Japan was a full-fledged member of the UN and GATT. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that the antibase sentiment cresting in Japan and leftist Diet members' move to sponsor restrictive legislation would endanger the use of bases in the Japanese main islands and Okinawa.

The impediment to making the treaty more mutual was the Vandenberg Resolution, which authorized the United States to enter into mutual defense agreements only with countries capable of providing self-defense and contributing to the security of the United States. But Eisenhower decided to accept Ambassador MacArthur's recommendation that the United States not wait for Japan to revise its pacifist constitution, and he concurred that Japan's provision of bases to the United States to maintain peace and security in the Far East should be considered an acceptable equivalent. In order to retain the guaranteed use of bases in Japan, the United States made a calculated choice: not to demand the elimination of the war-renouncing provision of the Japanese constitution as a precondition of treaty revision.³⁵

Signed in January 1960, the new security treaty included many of the changes desired by Japan as a sign of more equal partnership. It barred US military intervention inside Japan and eliminated prohibitions against providing bases to third countries without US approval. It also mandated consultation before American forces were deployed into or out of Japan. Additionally, the treaty contained provisions for economic cooperation similar to those in the North Atlantic Treaty. It had a time limit of ten years and explicitly stated that the United States had an obligation to defend Japan. In a supplementary *aide-mémoire*, specific restrictions were placed on how the bases could be used, and it was agreed that nuclear deployments to Japan also came under

35 For the ways in which Kishi and MacArthur worked closely together on treaty revision, see Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 127–42.

the requirement for prior consultation. Okinawa, however, remained outside these updated security arrangements, allowing the garrisoned island to be fully mobilized in the service of the new American Cold War agenda in the vaguely defined “Far East” – Vietnam.

Japan and the Cold War

Signed in the midst of the Korean War, the San Francisco Peace Treaty gave Japan a truncated peace and limited latitude to deal with the Communist world. Despite their professed commitment to an open international order, US officials restricted Japan’s engagement with its Communist neighbors and channeled its relations to that part of the world where Americans exercised decisive military, political, economic, and ideological influence. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, Japan’s postwar conservative leaders maneuvered within these structural constraints. There were occasional challenges and minor revolts, but in this period Japan did not break free of the dual “protective” umbrella of US nuclear superiority and dollar hegemony. The Bretton Woods system delivered to Japan capitalist plenty and consumer affluence, as Washington promised it would, and Japan quickly evolved from a militaristic empire to a modulated democracy with increasing political pluralism. But, because Japan failed to hold itself accountable to the victims of its wartime aggression in Asia and because the United States placed an overriding priority on Japan’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of conservative rulers, Japan’s full reconciliation with Asia remained a distant dream. In reaching out to the newly independent and non-aligned nations of Asia in the mid-1950s, Japan had an opportunity, however tenuous, to bring together the two parts of the continent rent asunder by the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance and the 1951 US–Japan Security Treaty. In the end, however, Tokyo elected to stay in its alliance of convenience with a powerful United States and chose the path to economic prosperity.

The Korean War

WILLIAM STUECK

The Korean War was a seminal event of the early Cold War, both regionally and globally, and of Korean history. The conflict militarized international politics far beyond previous levels, but, in part due to the better-defined superpower commitments that emerged in Europe and Northeast Asia, it also produced a relatively stable military balance, making less likely a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the war solidified China's division, escalated American involvement in Indochina, and ensured the prolonged estrangement of the United States and the People's Republic of China. Those developments, in turn, increased the likelihood of future conflict in Southeast Asia. For the short term, the war tightened the Sino-Soviet alliance, but it also sowed the seeds of future animosity between the Communist giants. Finally, while the fighting during the war did not extend beyond Korea's boundaries, it led to massive destruction on the peninsula and deepened the country's division.

Origins

The war emerged from an array of Korean and international factors. During the century prior to the outbreak of war on 25 June 1950, Korea was rent by division and foreign encroachment. Contending indigenous groups usually derived their identity from a combination of internal forces and ties to foreign powers. When in the 1880s Korea opened its gates to the Western world, pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, pro-Russian, and pro-American factions all emerged, each drawing on the ideas and/or maneuvers of the great powers. Internal turmoil joined with the ambitions of more powerful neighbors to produce two major regional conflicts between 1894 and 1905. Japan emerged victorious in both, annexing the peninsula in 1910. Korean activists seeking to end foreign rule looked to other nations for inspiration and support. With the rise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia in 1917 and the emergence of the struggle

between Nationalists and Communists in China in the 1920s, Korean exiles inevitably took sides, with traditionalists of a Confucian stripe looking to the Nationalist Chinese, liberals of a capitalist, democratic bent appealing to the United States, and radicals casting their eyes toward the Soviet Union and/or the Communist Chinese. Affiliations were also influenced by regional or family origin in Korea and a foreign power's or party's geographic proximity to the peninsula, or hopes of their assistance against the Japanese. Group commitments were not always rigid, and because before World War II no major power had openly challenged Japan in Korea, independence forces operated in a frustrating, disconnected world that encouraged factions. Adding to the mix were the vast majority of Koreans who remained in their own country during Japanese rule. A few actively sought to undermine Japan and were killed, jailed, driven underground, or exiled. The others, to degrees ranging from sullen acquiescence to active endorsement, participated in the prevailing power structure. The struggle in Korea that emerged after liberation from Japan in 1945 grew out of divisions among Koreans that had developed over the previous two generations and were often partly defined by the relationships of individuals to a foreign power or powers. If Korean nationalists often used past affiliations of some of their countrymen with the Japanese colonial regime as weapons in the internal struggle for power, they themselves usually depended to some degree on foreign support based on contacts made during previous periods of exile.

Despite a major uprising in 1919 and sporadic guerrilla activity in extreme northern Korea after that, Koreans proved unable to undermine Japanese rule. A Korean provisional government emerged in China in 1919, but it never bridged the gap between Right and Left, nor did it consistently pull together all groups even on the Right. During World War II, some Korean exiles served in Chinese Nationalist armies, some with the Chinese Communists, some with the Soviets, and a few with the United States; but more fought on the Japanese side. At the Cairo Conference in the fall of 1943, Allied leaders of the United States, China, and Britain agreed that, after the war, Korea should "in due course ... become free and independent."¹ Yet US president Franklin D. Roosevelt believed Korea incapable of governing itself without a period of tutelage. Divisions among Korean independence forces plus their inability to provide significant aid in the struggle against Japan left Roosevelt and his advisers concerned primarily about preventing Korea from again becoming

1 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 449.

a source of great power struggle. To Roosevelt this meant creating a multi-power trusteeship including the United States, the Soviet Union, China; and perhaps Britain.

At the end of the Pacific war in mid-August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union alone sent troops to Korea, leaving the two great powers to determine events. The Grand Alliance against Germany and Japan was already showing cracks, as the victorious powers turned attention from their common enemies to their otherwise-divergent views and interests. Over Korea, Soviet and American aims were bound to clash, as Moscow sought traditional goals of defense in-depth of its Northeast Asian frontier and warm-water ports, while Washington feared uncontested Soviet expansion in the vacuum created by Japan's defeat and China's weakness. Soviet intervention in the war against Japan on August 8, 1945, which the United States had solicited, magnified such fears, as Soviet armed forces now thrust into Manchuria and Korea in the extreme northeast. American forces remained south of the Japanese main islands, several hundred miles from Korea, and immediate plans focused on occupying Japan. Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula seemed a prospect. Under the circumstances, US president Harry S. Truman proposed to his Soviet counterpart, Premier Iosif Stalin, that the thirty-eighth parallel, which split Korea roughly in half, be designated the demarcation line between Soviet and American occupation forces. Stalin agreed.

The Americans and the Soviets bypassed the Koreans in deciding to occupy their country and in choosing a boundary between their occupation forces, but they could not ignore them once on the peninsula. While Koreans celebrated Japan's demise and interpreted "in due course" as meaning early independence, they were far from united on the future of their country. In the days before Japan's surrender on August 15, Japanese authorities in Seoul, fearful of mass uprisings against their countrymen, sought out, as historian Allan R. Millett puts it, "a native elite with sufficient nationalist credentials to command popular obedience" until the new occupiers assumed control.² Yo Un-hyong, a leftist with contacts among Korean independence forces both at home and abroad, emerged to form the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. This group established affiliates in cities and towns throughout Korea, but its demand for confiscation of Japanese property left

2 Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: Regents of Kansas Press, 2005), 43.

colonial officials and moderate Koreans worried that a social and economic revolution was on the horizon.

Such fears worsened on September 6, 1945 when some members declared establishment of the Korean People's Republic. Two days later, as American soldiers began to disembark at Inchon, the port for Seoul, conservative Koreans countered by forming the Korean Democratic Party. By this time hundreds of local people's committees had been established nationwide, sometimes in conjunction with the national preparatory committee, sometimes not. US occupation forces under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, already wary of leftist groups and under orders not to recognize an indigenous regime, refused to work with the People's Republic, discouraged the people's committees, and favored contacts with members of the colonial apparatus or Korean conservatives. Led by Colonel Ivan M. Chistiakov, Soviet authorities north of the thirty-eighth parallel worked with the people's committees but did not recognize the People's Republic, despite the prominent role in its formation of Pak Hon-yong, the leading domestic Communist.

The Soviets treated their zone as a sphere of influence. With the national capital of Seoul and two-thirds of the population in the American zone, the Soviets set about consolidating their position in the north, which included maneuvering reliable native Koreans into positions of authority. Initially, the Soviets tried to include non-Communists, most notably Christian leader Cho Man-sik. But Cho proved too independent and in early 1946 was arrested and jailed. Meanwhile, a former guerrilla fighter in Manchuria, Kim Il Sung, had emerged as the Soviets' favorite. Born in 1912 near Pyongyang, Kim spent most of his early years in Manchuria, where in the 1930s he joined anti-Japanese partisans affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. In 1941, he fled to the Soviet Union, enlisting in a brigade that included members of the Chinese, the Soviet, and the Kapsan factions of Korean Communists. Kim returned to Korea in a Soviet army uniform in September 1945 and early on sought establishment of a separate North Korean branch of the Communist Party. In December, he became the secretary-in-chief of that party; in February 1946, he became chairman of the new Korean Provisional People's Committee (NKPPC), in effect a provisional government under the Soviet occupation.

The occasion for creation of the NKPPC was a controversy over trusteeship. In December 1945, the United States and the Soviets agreed to create a joint commission between the occupation commands that would submit proposals to the governments at home for establishment of a provisional Korean government and later "a four-power trusteeship for a period of up to



20. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.

five years.”³ Announcement of the agreement produced outrage among conservatives in the American zone, led by Kim Ku, formerly head of the provisional government in China, and Syngman Rhee, who prior to liberation had lived for decades in the United States. In response, the US occupation command suggested that trusteeship might be avoided, while the Soviets persuaded Communists to support the agreement. In February, virtually simultaneously with creation of the NKPPC, the Americans created the Representative Democratic Council dominated by the outspokenly anti-Soviet Rhee. Thus, in March 1946, the Joint Commission convened in Seoul in an acrimonious atmosphere. It adjourned in May without agreement.

³ US Department of State, *The Record of Korean Unification, 1943–1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Documents* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 47–48.

By summer, politics in Korea had become polarized. The Soviets had turned toward consolidating Communist factions under Kim Il Sung's leadership rather than establishing a coalition that included non-Communist groups. The Americans strove for a coalition of Korean rightist and centrist forces while adopting repressive measures against the Communists. Whether from the perspective of relations between the occupying powers or those between indigenous political groups, the prospects for national cohesion were at best unpromising, at worst hopeless.

Meanwhile, economic conditions deteriorated in the US zone. From the start, the American occupation mishandled rice distribution and, unlike the Soviets in the North, it held back on implementing a broad land reform program. The influx since liberation of over a million Koreans into South Korea from the North, Manchuria, and Japan created shortages of food and housing just as the South's dependence on the North for electric power and coal produced shortfalls in heating, lighting, and transportation. Brutal acts of the national police, manned primarily by Koreans who had served under the Japanese, magnified resentments among the civilian population as did the insensitive behavior of American soldiers.

In the fall of 1946, strikes among railroad workers in Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu proved the beginning of what would become known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Mobs of industrial workers, farmers, students, and the unemployed appeared in cities throughout the zone. Disturbances lasted into November and were suppressed by the national police only with the assistance of US troops and a new South Korean constabulary. Deaths and casualties on both sides numbered well into the hundreds. Although the role of Communists from within or outside the American zone remains uncertain, the makeup, timing, and location of the riots suggest coordination rather than spontaneity.

American troops hoped that improvement of economic conditions and the building of a coalition of rightist and centrist forces in their zone would persuade the Soviets to return to the Joint Commission and accept unification on US terms. The fall disturbances indicated that the economy was a long way from becoming a source of strength, and simultaneous efforts at coalition-building showed limited success. In October, the occupation conducted elections for an Interim Legislative Assembly, and the Right emerged victorious in a process compromised by violence and other irregularities. In pursuing acceptance by centrists and moderates on the Left, General Hodge appointed many of them to the new body. Rhee, the most influential rightist, was furious and Yo, the leading figure on the moderate Left, still refused to serve in a body in which his allies remained a minority.

In early 1947, the Truman administration moved to reconvene the Joint Commission and develop a plan for economic assistance. The Joint Commission resumed meetings in May, but congressional opposition stymied expanded economic aid. In March, President Truman asked Congress for \$400 million in economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. In June, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed massive aid for the economic recovery of Europe. These initiatives reflected the emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union. Though sympathetic, Congress had limited tolerance for expensive foreign-aid programs. The legislature even cut military spending, making the Korean occupation more difficult to sustain. So the United States hobbled along in Korea with economic conditions worsening and agitation rising against the American occupation among Korean politicians, who continued to squabble bitterly among themselves.

The Soviet Union showed no interest in easing US discomfort. Unwilling to permit a unified government unless under Communist control, the Soviets were unaccommodating in the Joint Commission and finally proposed that the occupying powers withdraw to permit Koreans to resolve conflicts on their own. That was a recipe for civil war and eventual Communist control, as the North was more stable than the South and possessed a more substantial indigenous armed force. The United States was unwilling to depart without a final effort to establish a viable independent government, if not for the entire peninsula at least south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The chosen instrument for this effort was the US-dominated General Assembly of the United Nations.

The United States placed the Korean issue before that body in September 1947 and, two months later, pushed through a resolution calling for national elections on the peninsula, supervised by a United Nations commission and aimed at creating an independent government. The Soviets opposed the measure and threatened to block its implementation in the North. In 1948, they carried out this threat, but the United States persuaded the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to endorse supervision by the UN commission of elections in the south alone. Amidst considerable turmoil, including a widespread boycott, elections occurred on May 10, 1948. Right-wing forces led by Rhee, long a proponent of an independent government in the South, emerged victorious. A divided UN commission endorsed the outcome as "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate."⁴ The new legislative assembly drafted a constitution for the "Republic of Korea" (ROK)

4 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974), vol. VI, 1229–30.

and elected the 73-year-old Rhee its first president. Inauguration ceremonies took place in Seoul on August 15. The Soviets followed in their zone with creation of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (DPRK), with Kim Il Sung at its head. Korea was finally independent, but its division into hostile regimes augured ill for its peaceful development.

From the beginning, the ROK was unstable. To some historians the Korean War had already begun, with the April 1948 revolt of Communist-led partisans on Cheju-do, an island off the south coast of Korea.⁵ Sporadic partisan action on the mainland accompanied the uprising. Then, in October, a revolt occurred in a regiment of the ROK constabulary stationed at Yosu on the south coast. Action spread to the populace and soon rebels had seized both Yosu and Suncheon forty miles to the north. Loyal elements of the ROK police and constabulary took nine days to restore control and hundreds of the rebels fled to nearby mountains, where they organized guerrilla operations against authorities. From April 1948 through the spring of 1950, unconventional warfare waxed and waned throughout much of South Korea, with fatalities estimated at between 30,000 and 100,000. Reinforced by infiltrators from North Korea, the guerrillas garnered support from thousands of South Koreans discontented with the ROK government. ROK army and police campaigns of the winter of 1949/50 removed prospects for its early overthrow, setting the stage for the largely conventional and much more destructive conflict.

In March 1949, with Soviet troops having departed the previous December, Kim Il Sung proposed to Stalin a large-scale North Korean attack on the South to unite the country. Stalin demurred, as 7,500 American troops remained south of the thirty-eighth parallel and the North Korean army lacked a decisive advantage over that of South Korea. The Soviet dictator told Kim to increase his effort to undermine the ROK through infiltration of guerrillas and materiel to reinforce southern partisans. In September, with the American military presence reduced to 500 advisers to the ROK armed forces and after continued indecisive guerrilla operations in the South and conventional skirmishes along the thirty-eighth parallel, Kim again proposed an attack. Again, Stalin said no. He did not change his mind until late January 1950. Early the next month he approved a request to give North Korea the heavy arms necessary to equip three new army divisions.

By this time, the Communists in China had driven the Nationalists off the mainland to Taiwan and established the People's Republic of China (PRC).

⁵ See, most recently, Millett, *War for Korea*, 2.

Communist leader Mao Zedong was in Moscow negotiating a treaty of alliance.⁶ US secretary of state Dean Acheson had recently defined the American defense perimeter in the Pacific as extending from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines, thus omitting South Korea and Taiwan. With the guerrilla war stalled in South Korea, Kim was impatient. Although much in debt to the Soviets, he suggested that, if Moscow refused to give the green light, he would turn to Beijing, which was in the process of returning to North Korea tens of thousands of Korean soldiers seasoned by years of combat on the Communist side in the Chinese Civil War.

Kim visited Moscow in late March, staying for nearly a month. Stalin explained to him that, for the reasons above plus the Soviet explosion of an atomic device, the international situation had improved. The time was ripe to initiate a military offensive to unite the peninsula, but with three qualifications: first, Mao must approve the venture; second, it must appear as a counter to a South Korean move north; third, Kim must recognize that, in case of trouble with the Americans, he would depend on China, not the Soviet Union, to send troops to save him.

Kim went to Beijing in mid-May and received Mao's reluctant approval. Although the Chinese leader would have preferred that his plans to attack Taiwan be given priority, he was in a weak position to resist given Stalin's approval of the venture, however conditional, and North Korea's past support for him in his own civil war. The Soviets went on to provide heavy artillery and T-34 tanks and assisted in drawing up an operational plan. At the last minute, Kim claimed that the ROK might have discovered the plan, so he requested permission from Moscow to speed up the main attack, which Stalin gave, thereby reducing the plausibility of the claim that it was a counter to ROK action. When North Korea moved across the thirty-eighth parallel before daylight on June 25, it achieved virtually total surprise.

North Korean forces advanced rapidly, capturing Seoul in three days. On June 29, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of US forces in the Far East, visited the battlefield south of Seoul. The next day he proposed to Washington dispatch of a US army regimental combat team to Korea. The United States was already providing air support for ROK troops and bombing and strafing north of the thirty-eighth parallel. At American behest, and with the Soviet delegate absent, the UN Security Council had passed two resolutions, the second calling on members "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to

6 See Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.



21. President Syngman Rhee of South Korea and US general Douglas MacArthur.

restore international peace and security in the area.”⁷ President Truman had announced that the US Seventh Fleet would prevent attacks from mainland China on Taiwan and vice versa, plus an increase in US aid to the Philippines and the French in Indochina. Now, he approved MacArthur’s recommendation to send American ground forces into combat in Korea. The United States was committed to the defense of the ROK.

Why did the United States fail to take greater action prior to June 25, 1950, to deter a North Korean attack? In the face of such an attack, why did the United States commit its armed forces to repulse it? The answer to the first question rests, on the one hand, in the interaction of public opinion, executive-legislative relations, and maneuvering between the State Department and the Pentagon in Washington and, on the other, in the ambivalent feelings of American officials toward the Rhee regime in Korea. Korea lacked a powerful constituency in the United States and, among the four American occupations,

⁷ United Nations Document S/1508, Rev. 1, June 27, 1950.

was the least desirable place for US soldiers to be stationed. With military spending in decline, the service chiefs sought to reduce the US presence abroad. In September 1947, they determined that the United States had “no strategic interest” in maintaining troops in Korea and pressed for an early withdrawal from the peninsula. The State Department resisted, believing that, because of the confrontation there with the Soviet Union, US credibility was at stake. The diplomats finally acceded to Pentagon pressure in mid-1949. The internal situation in South Korea had improved somewhat since the previous fall, and intelligence reports indicated that North Korea would continue its efforts to subvert the ROK from within rather than through overt attack. Short of a dramatic incident, the State Department had too many irons in the fire elsewhere to persist in its resistance to the final troop withdrawal. Reinforcing the predisposition for withdrawal was the lack of enthusiasm in Washington for the volatile, autocratic Rhee, who threatened to mobilize his troops and march north.

The State Department believed that the United States had an important stake in the survival of the ROK, however, and North Korea’s attack focused attention on the peninsula as never before. American leaders regarded the attack as Soviet-inspired aggression. Once it became clear that ROK survival was in jeopardy and that no other attacks were in the works along the Soviet periphery, the commitment of US ground forces, readily available in occupied Japan, was virtually automatic. As Secretary of State Acheson put it, decisive action was necessary “as a symbol [of the] strength and determination of [the] west.” To do less would encourage “new aggressive action elsewhere” and demoralize “countries adjacent to [the] Soviet orbit.”⁸

Intervention of US troops under a UN umbrella prevented a quick North Korean victory and ensured broad international involvement in the struggle to come. Intervention in the Taiwan Strait by the United States, its stepped-up aid to the French in Indochina, and its use of Japan as a launching pad for operations in Korea added a critical regional dimension to the conflict. While the United States and the Soviet Union showed an inclination to avoid a direct military confrontation, heightened tension in East Asia had a clear impact on Europe, where a divided Germany and a divided Berlin within the Soviet zone possessed some similarities to Korea. The potential for escalation of the fighting beyond Korea was obvious to all.

8 D. Acheson to Ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow, June 28, 1950, Record Group 84, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.

Stages

The Korean War may be divided into four stages. The first constituted the period of North Korean offensive, which lasted from June 25, 1950, until the middle of September of the same year when the military balance on the peninsula changed dramatically. During this time, DPRK forces pushed southward to a perimeter around the southeastern port of Pusan, nearly driving units under General MacArthur's UN Command (UNC), established in early July, out of Korea. Yet, major uprisings within South Korea in support of North Korean troops failed to materialize as anticipated, and extended supply lines made them increasingly vulnerable to UNC airpower. Moreover, by early August, the North Koreans were outnumbered by the combined ground forces of the ROK and the United States.

Meanwhile, beyond Korea, governments made plans and took actions that set the stage for future developments locally, regionally, and globally. In China, Mao commenced a "hate America campaign," focused on US intervention in the Taiwan Strait and ordered a large-scale buildup of his armies in Manchuria in preparation for a possible move into Korea. At the beginning of August, the Soviet Union returned to the UN Security Council to block further US action in that body. In the United States, which had initially defined its objective in Korea as restoration of the thirty-eighth parallel, the Truman administration began considering the possibility of a military campaign to unite the peninsula under the ROK. It also commenced plans for a military buildup at home and in Europe that, pending approval by North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, would include West German rearmament. In Japan, with US forces departing rapidly for service in Korea, MacArthur implemented plans for a 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force, in effect commencing rearmament of the enemy in the Pacific war. In Washington, officials resolved to move forward with negotiations for a peace treaty that would permit American forces to remain on Japanese territory. Finally, in New York, the United States succeeded in getting commitments from twenty-nine UN members for military, economic, or medical assistance for the Korean venture.

The second stage of the war constituted the period of UN counteroffensive, which began on September 15, with MacArthur's flanking operation at Inchon. By the end of the month, North Korean forces were in a disorganized retreat across the thirty-eighth parallel and UN troops had authorization from Washington to destroy them through operations north of the old boundary. The UN General Assembly endorsed a move to unite Korea on October 7. As

UN forces advanced rapidly northward, however, Mao, under pressure from the DPRK and the Soviet Union to save the day, fearing the threat posed by US forces poised on China's border, and sensing an opportunity to advance his developing revolution at home, sent nearly 300,000 Chinese troops across the Yalu River into Korea. In late November, as overextended UN troops commenced a reckless advance to clear the peninsula of enemy forces, Chinese armies launched a major counteroffensive of their own, thus bringing the war into its third and most dangerous stage.⁹

During the second stage, potential cracks in the Western alliance appeared, first over the US proposal for West German rearmament and then over the US decision to continue offensive operations in Korea after Chinese troops first made contact with their UN counterparts in late October and early November. Although NATO allies supported US intervention in Korea, they feared it would result in American overcommitment to Asia, a secondary theater in the Cold War, thereby increasing Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet aggression. The Chinese counteroffensive in Korea magnified this concern, as pressure skyrocketed in the United States to expand the war beyond the peninsula. This pressure became particularly acute after China pushed its forces southward below the thirty-eighth parallel at the beginning of 1951. In the midst of a Soviet scare campaign to prevent West German rearmament, allied governments mobilized politically to restrain the United States.

The focal point for diplomatic action in late 1950 and early 1951 was the UN General Assembly in New York, where US allies joined with neutrals, led by India, to delay American pressure for sanctions against China. That pressure reached a peak in mid-January, by which time Chinese troops in Korea had captured Seoul and had advanced in some sectors as much as fifty miles further south. In early February, the General Assembly finally passed a resolution condemning China as an aggressor in Korea, but delayed sanctions. By this time, UN forces in Korea had regrouped and were engaged in limited offensives northward. With UN evacuation from the peninsula no longer an early prospect, pressure for expanding the war in the United States temporarily subsided.

That pressure escalated again in April, when on the eleventh Truman fired MacArthur from all his commands, and eleven days later, when the Chinese commenced the first of two spring offensives in Korea. After UN forces recaptured Seoul in mid-March and moved to positions for the most part

9 See also Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

slightly north of the thirty-eighth parallel, Truman had wanted to explore the possibility of a ceasefire. Yet MacArthur had objected to any end to the fighting short of unification, and he took his case to the public. The president feared that the imperious general would unnecessarily expand the war by attacking Manchuria, where hundreds of Soviet airplanes positioned themselves for possible intervention in Korea, action that would threaten UNC domination of the air. While Truman's move against MacArthur set off a firestorm at home, the Communists did not challenge UNC control of the air and UN forces successfully repulsed enemy offensives, inflicting huge casualties. By early June, the battlefield had stabilized, the General Assembly had imposed limited economic sanctions on China, and the United States had sent signals to the Soviets and the Chinese of a willingness to negotiate an end to the fighting. The Soviet Union returned the signals later in the month and, on July 10, talks began between the military commands on both sides in Korea at Kaesong along the thirty-eighth parallel.

Thus began the fourth stage of the war, that of stalemate, which lasted until an armistice was finally signed on July 27, 1953. During this time neither side attempted a major alteration of the stalemate on the battlefield. Despite Kim Il Sung's initial desire to fight on in pursuit of unification, Chinese forces had taken enough of a pounding from superior UN airpower and heavy artillery to believe that, unless they could persuade Stalin to provide more air support and more modern equipment, the effort was not simply likely to be in vain but might actually lead to further loss of territory. Since the UNC had resisted the temptation in early June to mount a sustained counter-offensive against badly mauled Chinese units, Mao believed negotiations appropriate. Stalin agreed.

For their part, and against the urging of Syngman Rhee, the Americans had little stomach for another military effort to unify the peninsula. During the third stage of the war, the United States had made considerable progress in building the NATO alliance by creating a command structure in Europe under the leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, by exercising flexibility on the timing of West German rearmament, by sending two more divisions to Europe, by championing the case for the admission of Turkey and Greece to the organization, and by negotiating with allies for the rational distribution of raw materials in the process of rearmament. The United States had also moved forward on a peace treaty and military alliance with Japan. The two parties had concluded preliminary agreements and the United States had gone far in persuading its allies, in the Pacific and Europe alike, to accept relatively generous terms for a settlement that did not include either China or the Soviet

Union. Just as important, the United States had done much to stimulate economic recovery in Japan through its military operations in Korea. Japanese firms in sectors from textiles to shipping, automobiles, communications, and chemicals received large contracts from the US government, initially for Korea but eventually for military aid programs to other countries in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia. To the Truman administration, a settlement in Korea that was close to the territorial division of Korea prior to June 25, 1950, represented an adequate outcome, as it would greatly reduce US expenditures in an area of peripheral strategic significance and remove a source of tension with allies as well as at home.

Why, with relative balance achieved on the battlefield and with both sides willing to accept an end to the fighting far short of total victory, did it take over two years to conclude an armistice? Part of the answer is that, since neither side was willing to invest the resources or take the risks required to alter the military balance fundamentally, no one had a compelling motive to make the concessions necessary for an early end to the fighting. Each side understood that the struggle in Korea represented but a small portion of the global Cold War; yet they also recognized that the conditions under which the shooting stopped on the peninsula had implications locally, regionally, and worldwide. With neither side having achieved total victory, each sought tactical advantage through the negotiating process.

Reinforcing these circumstances were a series of deep divisions separating the two sides, which magnified the normal feelings of distrust and hostility that exist between contestants in war. First, there was the ideological division between Marxist-Leninists intent on promoting world revolution and liberal capitalists determined to build international stability and order. Then came the material division, that between on the one side the United States, the richest, most powerful nation on earth, and on the other the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, only one of which had industrialized and all three of which could barely imagine achieving the level of material comfort enjoyed by the enemy. Finally, there existed the historical divide between the Chinese and the Korean peoples just emerging from several generations of encroachment by other nations and the Americans, who had been among the encroachers. Among Americans, these last two differences bred a sense of superiority, even occasionally contempt; among the Communists, they produced extreme sensitivity to potential slights and a determination to hide any weakness, often with belligerent behavior. The opportunities for such behavior were increased by the setting of the talks, a neutral area surrounded by heavily armed units of the two sides.

Given the above circumstances, it should come as no surprise that it took four and a half months of acrimonious, intermittent talks to agree on an armistice line, namely the line of battle with a three-kilometer demilitarized zone separating the ground forces on both sides. Initially, the Communists had insisted on the thirty-eighth parallel, but since that line was indefensible and since the UNC held more territory north of the line than the other side occupied south of it, the United States demurred. In limited offensives during the fall, the UNC pushed its positions slightly farther north in the central and eastern sectors of the front, which persuaded the Communists to concede the point.

From December 1951 through March 1952, the two sides resolved the issues of postarmistice inspections and reinforcement of forces, leaving the return of prisoners of war (POWs) as the remaining stumbling block. With the UNC holding more than ten times the number of prisoners as the Communists, the United States insisted on the principle of no-forced-repatriation while the latter held to the traditional principle of an all-for-all exchange. The issue brought to the fore the ideological dimension of the Cold War, with the American position representing freedom of choice for the individual while the Communist stance reflected a statist approach. Since over 20,000 of the UNC-held prisoners were Chinese, the issue also had implications regarding the continuing conflict in China between the Communists and the Nationalists. In April, the UNC reported to the Communists that more than 15,000 of the Chinese prisoners intended to resist repatriation. Communist negotiators suspected that they had been coerced and, in any event, it took little imagination to realize that if the UNC had its way these prisoners would wind up in Taiwan. This result, in turn, would strike a serious blow to the PRC's claim to be the sole legitimate government of China. By this time, Kim Il Sung, having endured for nearly two years the brutal pounding of his territory by UNC bombers and seeing no chance for early unification, showed a willingness to compromise. With Stalin's encouragement, Mao decided otherwise. Since the agreement on an armistice line, the UNC had halted offensive operations on the ground. In addition, Mao's forces in Korea had been bolstered by an increased supply of heavy weapons from the Soviet Union and they had dug several layers of tunnels behind the battlefield to better protect themselves against UNC airpower and artillery. With no indication that the United States intended to escalate in Korea on a major scale, there was much reason to hold firm.

The stalemate showed no sign of ending until late March 1953. On the twenty-eighth, the Communists in Korea agreed to a UNC proposal for the

exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Two days later, China wired the president of the UN General Assembly proposing that negotiations in Korea, which had been suspended since the previous October, resume immediately to expedite execution of the exchange and then to resolve the POW issue in its entirety. Stalin had died earlier in the month, and in subsequent meetings in Moscow, his successors and high-level Chinese officials attending the old dictator's funeral resolved to revise the Communist position on POWs so as to achieve an armistice. Even so, it took until April 26 to restart the talks in Korea, and it was not until June 4 that the Communists finally accepted the essentials of the US position on POWs.

The death of Stalin probably contributed to resolution of the issue, both because he had been one of the roadblocks to a settlement and because his passing created uncertainties in the Communist world that dictated a period of relative stability on the international front that could not be ensured without an end to the shooting in Korea. January 1953 had brought a changeover in Washington with Eisenhower replacing Truman in the White House, a shift that increased the prospect of military escalation on the peninsula and quite possibly beyond. By early March, the new president had announced that the United States would no longer prevent Nationalist forces in Taiwan from attacking the mainland and several other US officials had suggested that a more belligerent course in East Asia was on the horizon. In mid-May, after the Communists had advanced a new but still unacceptable proposal on POWs, the UNC began air attacks on several irrigation dams in North Korea, which previously had been among only a few targets in the DPRK that were off-limits. Two weeks later, the UNC presented its own proposal on POWs, noting that if it was not accepted the talks would be terminated and earlier agreements on neutral areas around the negotiating site would be voided. The pressure also appears to have included a threat to escalate the fighting beyond Korea and to use atomic weapons.

By the middle of June, details on the precise location of the armistice line had been resolved and an end of the fighting appeared to be only days away. On the eighteenth, though, Rhee created one final roadblock by releasing over 25,000 anti-Communist Korean POWs who were under the control of the ROK army. The Communists expressed outrage, but the reality was that they wanted an armistice. As for the ROK president, his dependence on US aid for survival put him in a weak position to defy Washington, which had already considered the possibility of a coup against him. During the weeks that followed, Chinese armies launched tactical offensives against ROK forces, now manning 70 percent of the UNC front lines, pushing them back as much

as six miles in some sectors. Meanwhile, the United States granted several face-saving concessions to Rhee, including the promise of a military security pact and huge amounts of military and economic aid over the next several years in return for assurances that he would not disrupt an armistice. The actions on both sides finally set the stage for the signing of the armistice on July 27.

Impact

After over three years of fighting and two years of on-and-off negotiations, the shooting finally stopped. Much of Korea lay in ruins. Koreans killed, wounded, or missing numbered approximately 3 million, a tenth of the population. Another 5 million became refugees and perhaps double that saw their families permanently divided. Although civil strife and guerrilla warfare never affected the overall balance, they combined with US air action to produce massive civilian casualties. Each side suffered destruction of over a half million homes and the bulk of their industrial plant. Yet the country remained divided and, despite the advance of plans for reunification on both sides, that division was bound to last indefinitely, a fact confirmed by the Geneva Conference on Korea in May 1954.

Nothing could compensate the Korean people for the death and destruction suffered, but by thrusting the peninsula into the limelight as never before in the Cold War, the war had its compensations. It ensured that the United States would never again let its guard down in Korea. In the war's aftermath, Washington quickly concluded a military defense pact with Seoul. It maintained in South Korea tens of thousands of its own troops as well as substantial air-power, and it provided massive aid for augmentation of the ROK Army. The ongoing American commitment to the ROK made unlikely the resumption of war by the Communists, and Washington's clear message to Rhee that support would end if he initiated a new conflict served to discourage adventurism by the ROK. A replay of June 25, 1950, by either side was a remote possibility.

Another compensation was greatly expanded economic assistance for reconstruction and development for both Korean governments. The ROK became the largest recipient of American largesse for the remainder of the 1950s and, as Charles K. Armstrong has recently written, the DPRK became "the most ambitious multilateral development project ever undertaken by the socialist countries during the Cold War."¹⁰ The Korean governments, though

¹⁰ Charles K. Armstrong, "'Fraternal Socialism': The International Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953–1962," *Cold War History*, 5 (May 2005), 161.

bitter enemies, held in common their dependence on outside powers, just as they had before the war and just as had exiled independence groups during the era of Japanese rule, but now the material benefits were far greater.

Although China did not become a scene of the fighting and thus avoided huge destruction to its property and civilian population, the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea – the euphemism for PRC armies – suffered nearly 400,000 casualties, including over 148,000 dead. They fought tenaciously in Korea, but their inferiority to US forces in the air and in firepower and mechanization on the ground cost them dearly, eliminating any chance of decisive victory and leading eventually to Chinese concessions on the armistice line and POWs. The Soviets provided major materiel assistance, but it was slow in coming and air support was limited to areas near the Manchurian border. The experience could not help but whet Mao's appetite to develop nuclear weapons, the shortest route to closing the gap with the United States.

Closing that gap was important not only for defensive purposes. When Mao intervened in Korea, he had hoped to use success there to achieve a favorable settlement regarding Taiwan. Success had been limited, and by 1953 the United States was in no mood to bargain on the last stronghold of the Nationalists. Indeed, if in early 1950 the Communist government on the mainland stood an excellent chance of capturing Taiwan within the next year, by July 1953 the United States was all but committed to defending the Nationalist position there, a commitment that became formal less than two years later.

The PRC did derive positive advantages from its Korean venture. At home, Mao used the war to mobilize the people and solidify his and his party's position. The war forced postponement of a first five-year plan for economic development, but China built up credit with the Soviets that paid important dividends in financial and advisory assistance later on. Stalin's successors eventually assisted Mao in a nuclear-weapons program that led in 1964 to a successful test of an atomic bomb. Further, PRC success in fighting the United States to a stalemate in Korea greatly elevated China's stature abroad. Less than a year after the armistice, China played a critical role in mediating the end of the first Indochina war and in 1955 it emerged as the star player at the Bandung Conference of African and Asian states. Whereas prior to the war China had played a secondary role to the Soviet Union in North Korea, it now was all but a coequal there. After generations of humiliation, China had returned to major power status in East Asia.

China's accomplishments served immediate Soviet interests, as they removed any chance for Sino-American rapprochement, protected the DPRK, and kept the United States deeply engaged militarily in a country of limited

strategic interest and far distant from Europe. For the long term, however, the rise of the PRC gave Beijing the self-confidence to define its own revolutionary agenda, both at home and abroad, and set the stage for the Sino-Soviet split, which proved a huge strategic setback in the Soviet Union's struggle with the United States.

What is more, the Korean War added immeasurably to Moscow's international burdens, as both North Korea and China became greater drains on Soviet resources; so did the arms race with the United States, which quadrupled its defense expenditures and assisted in the rearmament of Western Europe, including eventually West Germany. The arms competition was also a burden to the United States, but the greater economic capacity of the West made it far more bearable. Indeed, Japan's economic recovery was advanced exponentially by the sudden demand for industrial goods needed to prosecute the war in Korea, while the economies of the United States and its West European allies all emerged stronger in 1953 than they had been three years earlier. In contrast, the war led Stalin to push harder than ever for the rapid industrialization of Eastern Europe, one result of which was a decline in consumer goods and, in the aftermath of his death, the first signs of widespread unrest in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The Soviet Union would have been better off had the war never occurred and perhaps even had Korea been united under the ROK in late 1950.

Although through much of the war the Western alliance seemed in crisis, at its end the United States had four more divisions in Europe than when it began, Greece and Turkey had joined NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community was under way – signaling a major advance in cooperation between West Germany and France – and the potentially acrimonious issue of distribution of raw materials had been contained. Much carping continued back and forth across the Atlantic, to be sure, but US flexibility on such issues as escalation in Korea, rearmament of West Germany, and economic issues related to the military buildup of NATO countries helped solidify the alliance, as did Soviet scare tactics.

The war was far from an unqualified victory for the United States. While it achieved its initial objective of saving the ROK, its reckless campaign in North Korea in the fall of 1950 led to embarrassing setbacks at the hands of the Chinese and tied down hundreds of thousands of US troops in a country that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had long considered of marginal significance. The crisis of late 1950 and early 1951 led to a rebellion against US leadership in the UN General Assembly that, for the short term, reduced risks of the expansion of war beyond Korea, but later on discouraged the Truman administration

from applying the kind of sustained if limited military pressure on the enemy that might have induced the Communists to accept an armistice at a much earlier date. During the third and fourth stages of the war, India emerged as a clear leader among Third World neutrals, who were increasingly assertive in staking out their own course in the General Assembly. With the United Nations about to explode in numbers as a result of the achievement of nationhood by former colonial territories, majorities for US positions in that body were bound to become more and more difficult to obtain.

Of course, South Korea was an emerging nation as well, but for the moment its survival in the war was as much a liability as an advantage to US diplomacy in the Third World. The war solidified Rhee's position at the head of the ROK and, due to the clear US commitment to the ROK's defense and economic reconstruction, increased his capacity to manipulate Washington. Outside the United States and South Korea, Rhee was a most unpopular figure and American support for him had its price, especially among Third World neutrals such as India and Indonesia. If the war helped solidify US leadership in Western Europe and Japan, it left the contest between Communism and liberal democracy up for grabs among the emerging nations of the underdeveloped world. In fact, by tying the United States more tightly than ever to the colonial powers and by alienating it from and empowering China, the war complicated Washington's task in adjusting to the tide of change in Asia and Africa.

The position of the United States regarding Japan is especially revealing of the difficulty in balancing interests between First World allies and Third World areas. The Korean War had smoothed the path toward peace and security treaties between the two powers, ratified in 1952, and provided a great stimulus to the Japanese economy. Yet despite the sharply increased production of materiel for use in Korea and American aid programs in Southeast Asia, Japan continued to have a sizable balance-of-payments deficit. A possible solution to the problem was to reestablish pre-1945 levels of trade with China, but Washington adamantly opposed this approach for fear that it would lure Tokyo into the Communist sphere. That left as options either increased Japanese exports to North America and Western Europe, which would create domestic controversies in the nations involved, not to mention animosity toward the United States among European allies for promoting the idea, or increased Japanese exports to Southeast Asia, a process well advanced by 1953.¹¹

11 For more on US-Japanese relations, see Sayuri Guthrie Shimizu's chapter in this volume.

Two problems existed with this latter option, however: first, Southeast Asian markets were of limited size and alone were unlikely to enable Japan to erase its deficit; second, the region was highly unstable, especially given the ongoing French struggle against Communist-dominated nationalist forces in Indochina. Between 1950 and 1953, US support to the French had increased by leaps and bounds, in no small part because of concerns about Southeast Asia's perceived importance regarding Japan's economic well-being and diplomatic orientation and the view that if Indochina fell to the Communists, so would the rest of the region. Yet the French campaign showed no sign of success, largely because France proved unwilling to grant real power to anti-Communist nationalists. The Korean War did not create this problem, but the heightening of polarization between the United States and the Communist world that it ushered in served to compound Washington's difficulties in balancing the needs of leading allies with Third World realities.¹²

In the end, the Korean War was a clear-cut victory for no one, but it helped to stabilize the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States at a level below direct combat. The war sparked major rearmament in the United States, thus narrowing the gap in conventional forces between it and the Soviet Union, and solidified US commitments to and presence in Western Europe and Japan. These developments, in turn, made less likely than before a Soviet-initiated or -backed probe in a key area that would provoke an unanticipated American response and escalate into a global conflagration. Yet the war left a legacy that would exacerbate conflict in other areas. It may have helped avert a global bloodletting like that of 1914–18 or 1937–45, but its cost remained tragically high.

¹² For a more detailed analysis of developments in the Third World, see Mark Philip Bradley's chapter in this volume.

US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy

ROBERT J. McMAHON

US grand strategy during the presidencies of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy derived, in the broadest sense, from the same, deep-seated fear: that the Soviet Union's combination of implacable hostility, mounting military strength, and positive ideological appeal posed a fundamental – even existential – threat to US national security. The emergence of an equally hostile China as a military power in its own right deepened the perception they shared of an unusually menacing external environment. Eisenhower and Kennedy each accepted the basic goals of the containment strategy developed during the Harry S. Truman presidency, to be sure. But differing assessments about the precise nature and extent of the Communist threat, coupled with divergent judgments about how best to check it and what resources were available for the task, generated quite distinct tactical approaches to national security policy during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Eisenhower's Cold War

Long before he assumed the presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower had been giving serious and sustained thought to questions of strategy. As a West Point cadet, he had imbibed the fundamental precepts of Carl von Clausewitz's classic nineteenth-century treatise on warfare. Later, of course, he gained invaluable practical experience in the formulation and implementation of strategic plans as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War II. One of Eisenhower's deepest core beliefs held that national security encompassed much more than the physical defense of the homeland; it meant to him, in the broadest sense, protecting the nation's basic values, its economic system, and its domestic institutions. In that respect, Eisenhower was firmly convinced that the greatest threat to national security emanated less from the potential for military defeat than from excessive government spending; striking an appropriate balance between the cost of an adequate

defense and the need to maintain a healthy, solvent economy constituted, accordingly, a crucial aspect of strategy.

Eisenhower expressed that viewpoint with great consistency, both publicly and privately, during his pre-White House years. In a private diary entry of January 1952, for example, he wrote that "it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives. As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect."¹ This "Great Equation," as Eisenhower sometimes called it, found expression in several of his public addresses during the 1952 presidential campaign. In one, he criticized the steady rise in the Truman administration's defense budget over the previous two years, and questioned whether the nation could afford to sustain this elevated level of government spending. "We must achieve both security and solvency," he insisted. "In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle."²

Eisenhower accepted many of the central premises of Truman's national security policy. Like top-level decisionmakers in that administration, Eisenhower believed that US security in the Cold War required the establishment of a preponderance of American power across the Eurasian heartland. He, too, accepted that the US stake in postwar Western Europe remained vital, and that an integrated Western defense effort, one that utilized and harnessed West Germany's latent economic and military power, formed an essential component of any such effort. As well, Eisenhower appraised the Soviet threat as exceedingly grave and recognized as imperative the containment of further Soviet territorial expansion. He also appreciated the corresponding need to maintain both a powerful American nuclear arsenal and adequate conventional forces so as to deter Soviet adventurism.

Eisenhower dissented, however, from the view of Truman administration policy planners that an escalating US military buildup was needed to meet a time of maximum danger. That time had been pinpointed in NSC 68 and other policy documents as arriving in 1954, when the Soviet Union would presumably attain sufficient nuclear capability to menace the United States and its

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower diary entry, January 22, 1952, in *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. by Robert Ferrell (New York: Norton, 1981), 210.

² *New York Times*, September 26, 1952.

Western allies. Instead, he visualized US–Soviet competition as more of a long-term proposition, rejecting the time-of-maximum-danger hypothesis. Eisenhower considered it highly unlikely that Soviet leaders would court a conflict that would surely bring ruin on their country and likely break their own hold on power. He reasoned that the preservation of the regime would temper the behavior of Kremlin policymakers, whom he saw as essentially rational men intent on self-preservation. Accordingly, Eisenhower believed that greater efficiency and economy in defense spending could, and must, be achieved.

Immediately following his electoral triumph of November 1952, Eisenhower initiated the complex process of translating that vision into a concrete and cohesive national security strategy. After assembling an advisory team that mixed experienced foreign-policy and defense experts, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, with staunch fiscal conservatives, such as Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, he encouraged a remarkably wide-ranging series of intra-administration debates about Cold War grand strategy. At the first meeting of Eisenhower's reconstituted National Security Council (NSC), which became the key sounding board and policymaking instrument of his administration, the new chief executive remarked that the "great problem" facing the council was to decide upon an appropriate defense posture "without bankrupting the nation." To that end, he authorized a broad-based reconsideration of the national security priorities established by the Truman administration. NSC 141, approved by Truman during his final weeks in office, had recommended substantial, though unspecified, increases in defense spending. Eisenhower called for a reexamination of the threat perceptions that lay behind those valedictory recommendations as well as a careful assessment of the suitability, and affordability, of current programs.³

What ensued was the first of many debates throughout the Eisenhower presidency about the appropriate balance between national security needs and fiscal solvency. During the course of the meeting, the president revealed his intent to cut several billion dollars from Truman's projected defense expenditures, stoutly resisting the military's pressure for increased defense spending. He achieved that goal by overturning the Joint Chiefs' focus on a so-called D-Day in 1954–55 and replacing it for planning purposes with an indeterminate, or "floating," D-Day; that allowed a reduction in the force objectives of

3 Memorandum of discussion, February 11, 1953, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), vol. II, 236–37 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).



22. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (right) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles meet to discuss foreign affairs.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Along with the elimination of some waste and overhead and other cost-saving steps, Eisenhower thus demonstrated from the outset of his presidency his utter seriousness about reversing the trend toward upwardly spiraling defense expenditures.⁴

Although those initial budget-cutting moves laid down an important marker regarding Eisenhower's intentions, the task of defining and forging a consensus behind a new, integrated national security strategy remained. Eisenhower's core beliefs derived partly from an optimistic view about the ability over time of the freedom, openness, and pluralism of the American system to prevail over what he invariably disparaged as the tyrannical, freedom-denying depravities of Communism. At the same time, they

4 Memorandum of discussion, March 4, 1953, NSC Series, Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas). For the early strategic planning of the Eisenhower administration, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

emanated from a deeply pessimistic view about the civilization-destroying horrors of a general, nuclear war. Others, including chief foreign-policy adviser John Foster Dulles, at first took a more dire view of Soviet strength and harbored a less restrained view about the feasibility of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy.

During an informal meeting among senior policymakers on May 8, 1953, some of those differences in perspective surfaced. "It is difficult to conclude that time is working in our favor," Dulles observed. Insisting that "the Reds" held "the better position" throughout the world at the present moment and that the European allies remained irresolute and undependable, he advocated a more assertive, active, and risk-tolerant US policy. Otherwise, Dulles cautioned, "we will lose bit by bit the free world, and practically break ourselves financially." While agreeing that "present policy was leading to disaster" and hence needed to be changed, Eisenhower disagreed that time favored the United States' adversaries. He had long believed that the overall assets of the West – military, economic, political, psychological, even spiritual – were far superior to those of the Soviet bloc. Time, consequently, was the United States' friend, not its enemy. Displaying characteristic confidence about the inherent strengths of the West, he insisted that the momentum in the Cold War would eventually shift to the United States as people on both sides of the East–West divide came to "see freedom and communism in their true lights." In other words, a patient, long-term strategy was the one best designed to win the Cold War.⁵

"Operation Solarium," a unique exercise in the annals of American Cold War planning, grew out of that Eisenhower–Dulles colloquy and set the stage for the formulation of the administration's basic statement of national security policy, NSC 162/2. The president proposed that three separate teams of foreign-policy experts examine, refine, and present to the NSC for consideration three quite distinct strategic options for prosecuting the Cold War. Task Force A was charged with making the case for continuation of the Truman containment strategy; Task Force B with making the case for a more assertive policy that would precisely specify, and make clear to the Soviets, those areas that the United States would automatically defend in case of attack; and Task Force C with developing an aggressive plan for "rolling back" Communism. The completed task force reports, delivered and debated at a lively NSC meeting on July 30, succeeded in laying out some stark alternatives. While Task Force A, headed by former policy planning chief George F. Kennan,

5 All quoted in Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 124–25.

contended that the prospects of a general war with the Soviet Union were highly unlikely for the foreseeable future, Task Force C identified a steadily growing Soviet threat that made the outbreak of general war a clear and present danger. The latter report rather ominously stated that the United States and the Soviet Union could no longer peacefully coexist and that the Soviet Union therefore “must and can be shaken apart” through the adoption of “a forward and aggressive political strategy in all fields and by all means.” Despite those, and other, fundamental differences in outlook, Eisenhower insisted that the three task forces combine their various analyses and recommendations around areas of common agreement.⁶

The New Look

The report the three task forces created constituted one of the foundation stones of NSC 162/2, the formal statement of US national security policy that Eisenhower approved at the end of October 1953 and that set forth the broad outline of his administration’s “New Look” defense strategy. Undergirding the New Look was a set of assumptions about the indispensability of nuclear weapons: as the most reliable deterrent to Soviet expansion; as critical instruments of offensive power that, in the event of hostilities, would be considered “as available for use as other munitions”; and as an essential substitute for ruinous spending on larger conventional forces. Under Eisenhower, the rapidly expanding American nuclear arsenal became the central element in its overall defense posture. “The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe,” observed NSC 162/2, “is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked.” By redefining the role of nuclear weapons in US national defense strategy, Eisenhower believed he had unlocked the key to the most cost-efficient approach to waging – and ultimately winning – the Cold War.⁷ In his famous “massive retaliation” speech of January 12, 1954, Dulles called public attention to this central plank of the administration’s new strategy. The psychological calculus of deterrence – not just the possession of nuclear weapons but the *credible* inclination to use them – thus assumed center stage in US defense planning.⁸

6 Memorandum by Robert Cutler (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), May 9, 1953, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. II, 323–28; memorandum of discussion, 30 July 1953, *ibid.*, 435–40.

7 NSC 162/2, *ibid.*, 577–97.

8 *US Department of State Bulletin*, 30 (January 25, 1954), 107–10.

Other emphases of the New Look approach also derived in substantial measure from Eisenhower's search for more efficient, cost-saving means of conducting the Cold War. One of those featured an increased reliance on the role of espionage, sabotage, and covert operations in the implementation of policy. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), headed by Eisenhower appointee Allen W. Dulles, the secretary of state's brother, became a favored instrument of New Look strategy since it promised efficient, cost-effective actions that could forestall the need for utilizing conventional armed forces. Moreover, covert operations, such as those that helped topple Left-leaning governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, could plausibly be denied even if the veil of secrecy was breached. Those early successes, however, bred an unwarranted degree of overconfidence in the CIA's ability to manipulate events overseas, setting the stage for later problems – including major failures in Syria in 1957 and Indonesia the following year, each of which proved wholly counterproductive to US policy goals.

Eisenhower's national security strategy also attached greater value to the role of allies than had Truman's. A simultaneous strengthening and expansion of US bilateral and multilateral alliances would, in the conviction of Eisenhower, Foster Dulles, and other top decisionmakers, help compensate for the conventional force reductions they sought – reductions necessitated by ever-present fiscal constraints. The "pactomania" associated especially with the peripatetic secretary of state, which helped produce the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), and new security alliances with Pakistan and Taiwan, among others, flowed logically from such calculations. A network of global alliances enabled the United States to encircle the Soviet Union and China with nations formally committed to the West, thereby discouraging Soviet or Chinese aggression against any of them. Perhaps most important, though, alliance systems held out the prospect of local manpower being deployed for wartime and peacetime needs, which would thereby lessen the pressure on US forces. Eisenhower wanted gradually to substitute allied for US manpower in such key areas as Western Europe. In broad terms, he envisioned an evolving division of responsibility between the United States and its regional partners in which the United States provided the nuclear umbrella considered imperative for deterring Soviet aggression, while allies bore the principal burden of supplying ground forces for regional defense.

The Eisenhower administration also accorded much greater weight to the place of psychological warfare, public diplomacy, and propaganda within overall Cold War strategy. Convinced that the political, psychological,

cultural, and ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had become as pivotal as the military-economic struggle, Eisenhower directed that a concerted effort be made to court world public opinion. In initiatives ranging from the president's idealistic sounding "Chance for Peace" speech, after the death of Iosif Stalin in 1953, and his "Open Skies" proposal of 1955 to various international cultural exhibitions and touring troupes, Radio Free Europe broadcasts aimed at Eastern Europe, the manifold activities abroad of the ubiquitous US Information Agency, and much more, the United States vied to seize the moral high ground in the Cold War. This objective pervaded nearly all aspects of Eisenhower's foreign policy. A global public relations campaign aimed at highlighting the strengths and appeal of the American system and exposing the deficiencies of Communism thus came to occupy, for the first time, a central place in American grand strategy.

Threat perception invariably plays a large role in the formulation of any national security strategy. That certainly proved the case during the Eisenhower years. NSC 162/2 essentially codified the president's decision to abandon "fixed dates of maximum danger" – which he considered completely unknowable and hence unrealistic – as a basis for making and funding defense commitments. Instead, as Eisenhower explained in his January 21, 1954, budget message to Congress, his administration aimed for "a strong military position which [could] be maintained over the extended period of uneasy peace."⁹ Since careful threat assessment always comprises the appraisal of enemy *intentions* as well as enemy capabilities, it bears emphasizing that NSC 162/2 operated from the assumption that the Kremlin's rulers remained more cautious than reckless in their international behavior. Secretary of State Dulles used those exact words in offering his personal analysis of Soviet intentions to the NSC. "The verdict of history," he observed, "was that the Soviet leaders have been rather cautious in exercising their power. They were not reckless, as Hitler was, but they primarily rely not on military force but on the methods of subversion."¹⁰ Intentions aside, however, it was the projected growth of Soviet *capabilities*, especially in the nuclear sphere, that constituted the critical backdrop for the implementation, as well as the formulation, of the Eisenhower administration's strategic design.

The former general believed that the Kremlin's swelling arsenal of nuclear weapons transformed the nature of the Soviet–American conflict. With the

9 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1954), 272–73.

10 Memorandum of discussion, December 21, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. II, 841.

emergence of hydrogen, or thermonuclear, weapons that were a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the prospect of a future nuclear exchange between the Americans and the Soviets deeply unsettled – indeed, frightened – the man who had so much intimate experience with war. Although the United States enjoyed vast superiority over its principal rival in both nuclear warheads and delivery systems throughout the 1950s, Eisenhower realized that rough nuclear parity between the two superpowers was just a matter of time. He also recognized that neither side could “win” a nuclear war in any meaningful sense. At an early NSC meeting, he stated that “there would be no individual freedom after the next global war,” just appalling chaos.¹¹ Following the stunning results of the powerful Bravo tests of 1954, Eisenhower mused: “Atomic war will destroy civilization. There will be millions of people dead ... If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate.”¹² Similarly, he urged his colleagues on the NSC in January 1956 to keep in mind that “No one was going to be the winner in such a nuclear war. The destruction might be such that we might have ultimately to go back to bows and arrows.”¹³

In view of the frequency and passion with which Eisenhower delivered such warnings about the certain devastation, for both sides, of a nuclear conflict, it might at first glance seem surprising that he insisted that all war-fighting plans be based on the expectation that the United States would attack the Soviet Union “with all available weapons.”¹⁴ Eisenhower’s disdain for the concept of limited nuclear war helps explain the seeming paradox. The president considered limited nuclear war, an alternative backed by some military experts within his administration, to be a fatuous contradiction in terms. He was convinced that any general war between the United States and the Soviet Union would quickly and inevitably become a nuclear war, with each side using all weapons at its disposal. Ample evidence suggests, consequently, that Eisenhower insisted on planning only for total war because he believed that to be the best way to preclude any war from erupting – despite serious opposition within his own administration to the all-or-nothing policy. That approach, later decried by President Kennedy and his top defense advisers, can be seen then as the product of Eisenhower’s determination to

11 Memorandum of discussion, July 16, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. II, 397.

12 James Hagerty diary, July 27, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. XV, 1844–45.

13 Memorandum of discussion, January 12, 1956, NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers.

14 NSC 5422/2, August 7, 1954, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. II, 718.

avoid a nuclear holocaust that would assuredly destroy everything he held dear about American society.

Yet Eisenhower was willing to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, as he did on several occasions during his tenure in the White House, when he thought such threats served larger strategic purposes. In the opening months of his presidency, Eisenhower alluded indirectly but unmistakably to the possible use of nuclear weapons against the North Koreans and Chinese as part of his effort to hasten the end of the Korean War. When Beijing began shelling Nationalist Chinese-controlled islands in the Taiwan Strait, in 1954–55 and again in 1958, Eisenhower relied upon the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter the regime of Mao Zedong from launching an attack upon Taiwan. In the 1958 crisis, he went so far as to put the US military on full alert, rush a formidable naval armada to the Taiwan Strait, and authorize the dispatch of nuclear-equipped forces to the region. Planning documents suggest he was willing to launch nuclear weapons against Chinese military installations in retaliation for any military move against Taiwan or the offshore islands it claimed. Had Mao chosen to call Eisenhower's bluff, the latter would have had one of two unwelcome choices: either risk a major foreign-policy defeat, and the loss of credibility that would have resulted from a failure to follow through on earlier threats; or risk the likely international revulsion that would greet another crossing of the nuclear threshold, one virtually certain in this case to cause millions of civilian deaths. In retrospect, a strategy based on the use of heavy-handed threats to alter the behavior of a regime as radically unpredictable as Mao's seems, at best, excessively risky.

The United States and Europe

Implementation of the New Look strategy in Europe proved no less daunting and, in certain key respects, even less successful. Eisenhower, like Truman, considered the presence of US combat forces in Western Europe an essential requirement to deter the potential threat posed by superior Warsaw Pact forces. But Eisenhower, ever since his stint as NATO supreme commander, believed that stationing US troops on European soil was merely a temporary expedient. From his earliest days in the Oval Office, Eisenhower made clear his determination to withdraw US troops from Europe as quickly as possible by persuading Europeans to accept the principal responsibility for their own defense. Achieving that objective required that European troops be mobilized much more fully; it also necessitated a greater reliance on nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

Yet each of those prescriptions just exacerbated underlying allied tensions. The tensions arose especially from the discomfort of West European nations with their overdependence on the United States and from their corresponding unease about the prospect of their homelands becoming the principal battlefield in any Soviet–American military confrontation. As Secretary of State Dulles confided to the NSC on December 10, 1953: “While we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded the atomic capability as the gateway of annihilation.”¹⁵ Following the Bravo tests of March 1954, the secretary of state voiced concern that a “wave of hysteria” was “driving our Allies away from us. They think we are getting ready for a war of this kind. We could survive, but some of them would be obliterated in a few minutes.” He worried, consequently, that allied fears of nuclear war “could lead to a policy of neutrality or appeasement.”¹⁶

The European Defense Community initiative had, since the end of the Truman administration, offered the prime US hope for an expansion of allied military capabilities. Its rejection by the French National Assembly, in 1954, compelled an “agonizing reappraisal” of US policy, in Secretary of State Dulles’s memorable phrase. In line with a British proposal, the Eisenhower administration and its Western allies agreed upon the alternative solution of a West Germany rearmed within the constraining fabric of NATO. The subsequent assumption of sovereignty, in 1955, by a rapidly rearming Federal Republic of Germany helped resolve the key riddle of how to assimilate German power for European defense, while at the same time preventing Bonn from developing a fully independent military force. The broader problem for the Eisenhower administration, however, remained: how could Washington induce its NATO partners to accept a much larger share of the collective security burden, thus reducing the enormous costs being borne by the Americans?

Annoyed that the Europeans were “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam,” as he once put it, Eisenhower decided, early in his second term, that the only way to induce Europeans to assume more responsibility for their own defense was to grant them *de facto* control over tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁷ The controversial nuclear-sharing concept also grew out of Eisenhower’s desire to treat

15 Memorandum of discussion, December 10, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. V, 452.

16 Memorandum of telephone conversation, March 29, 1954, *ibid.*, vol. II, 1379–80.

17 Memorandum of conversation, November 5, 1959, *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. VII, 516.

European allies as full partners rather than as “stepchildren.” The question of whether overall US security would be enhanced, or compromised, if certain NATO partners – including West Germany – gained control over nuclear weapons proved intensely controversial among US defense planners and within the Western alliance. This critically important issue remained unresolved as Eisenhower’s tenure in office came to a close. By then, however, the president had gravitated to a more restrictive policy centered around the possible development of a multilateral nuclear force. Plainly, none of the administration’s various initiatives had brought the goal of a US troop withdrawal from Europe any closer to realization, leaving a cornerstone element of Eisenhower’s New Look strategy unfulfilled.

Eisenhower’s Third World policies

The New Look’s assumption that alliance-building would enhance overall US Cold War strength also fell well short of expectations. Pakistan, for example, which signed a mutual security pact with the United States in 1954 and then joined SEATO that same year and the Baghdad Pact the following year, pursued an agenda sharply at odds with the geopolitical calculations that drove US policy. It valued an alliance with the United States primarily as a form of protection against its regional rival, India, rather than from some amorphous Communist threat. As did many American allies, Pakistan thus frequently worked at cross-purposes with its superpower patron, all the while providing a negligible contribution to collective defense efforts. Similar patterns can to some extent be identified in the cases of Taiwan, Thailand, Iran, and Iraq, among other Third World allies. Each was eager to reap the bounty of formal ties with the United States, especially in terms of increased military and economic assistance, but remained much less enthusiastic about committing manpower to regional defense.

Nor did multilateral alliances, at least those outside NATO, add appreciable muscle to the containment strategy. They frequently did, on the other hand, alienate neighboring, non-Communist states. SEATO serves as an illustrative case. The defeat, in 1954, of the American-supported French at the hands of the Chinese-supplied and Soviet-supported Viet Minh in Indochina prompted the Eisenhower administration to cast about for ways of shoring up the crumbling Western position in Southeast Asia. At an August 12, 1954, NSC meeting, foreign-aid chief Harold Stassen lamented that the French defeat once again demonstrated that “a gain to the communists was a loss to us, no matter where it occurred.” Eisenhower concurred, adding that “some time we must

face up to it: We can't go on losing areas of the free world forever."¹⁸ What the administration feared, in particular, was unchecked Chinese expansion into the Southeast Asian region. Its response, though, amounted to little more than playing midwife to a weak grouping pledged vaguely to block Communist aggression, with no military force at hand to achieve that objective. In the end, SEATO emerged as a mere paper alliance, its capacity for dealing with either overt aggression or internal subversion well nigh invisible. The alliance did no more than signal a US commitment to the region – though it did, in keeping with the budgetary strictures of the New Look policy, limit the direct military costs to be borne by Washington.

In the Middle East, the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact of 1955 represented another deeply flawed response to perceived Western weakness. It brought together some of the region's pro-Western states – Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan – while leaving out all but one of the Arab states, most of whom staunchly opposed the pact. The alliance also pushed Egypt, the most important of those, to turn to the Soviet bloc for aid in order to counter its regional rival Iraq, now fortified by Western military support. The bitter chill in US–Egyptian relations that followed arguably owed much to the Eisenhower administration's misguided efforts to build strength through a Western-constructed defense pact that threatened, from Cairo's perspective, to upset the prevailing regional order.

Those flawed alliances bespoke a broader conceptual problem that plagued Eisenhower's grand strategy throughout his presidency: namely, the administration's persistent failure to gauge accurately and adapt effectively to Third World nationalism. The emergence of vigorous, broad-based, and assertive nationalisms throughout the developing world constituted the single most dynamic new element in international affairs during the Eisenhower years. On occasion, the president and other top officials displayed some keen insights about the challenges, and opportunities, this posed. "There is abroad in the world a fierce and growing spirit of nationalism," Eisenhower wrote British prime minister Winston S. Churchill in 1954. "Should we try to dam it up completely," he emphasized, "it would, like a mighty river, burst through the barriers and could create havoc. But again, like a river, if we are intelligent enough to make constructive use of this force, then the result, far from being disastrous, could redound greatly to our advantage, particularly in our struggle against the Kremlin's power."¹⁹ Eisenhower's conviction that the West

¹⁸ Memorandum of discussion, August 12, 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XII, 698.

¹⁹ Quoted in Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91; for developments in the Third World, see the chapter by Mark Philip Bradley in this volume.

derived a substantial measure of its overall economic strength from its access to crucial Third World resources – not least the fabled oil reserves of the Middle East – also lay behind his fixation on the developing world's crucial importance. He appreciated the economic interdependence of the global economy and repeatedly expressed concern about growing American dependence on Third World countries for a wide range of important raw materials.

Yet, the Eisenhower administration never found appropriate means for achieving the goals it sought. Instead, it frequently confused nationalism with Communism, sided with European allies in their disputes with colonies or former colonies, and alienated non-aligned states with its harsh condemnations of neutrality and its destabilizing alliance-building policies. In a wider sense, the administration reflexively wedded American interests to the status quo in areas undergoing fundamental social, political, and economic upheaval.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union began to turn the United States' Third World problems to its own advantage. Using generous aid and trade offers, Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev launched a broad-based campaign to win Third World allies for Moscow. This new departure in Soviet policy sparked genuine alarm in Washington. A CIA report of November 1, 1955, warned that a "grave danger" existed that the new policy "will create an even more serious threat to the Free World than did Stalin's aggressive postwar policies."²⁰ John Foster Dulles solemnly proclaimed to the NSC that "the scene of the battle between the free world and the Communist world was shifting."²¹ For his part, Eisenhower fretted that because the Soviets were now challenging the United States not with military pressure but with economic weapons, they held a distinct strategic advantage. "This is the selectivity and flexibility that always belong to the offensive," the president pointed out in a private letter to Dulles. "The defensive must normally try to secure an entire area, the offensive can concentrate on any point of its own selection."²²

The Soviet economic offensive in the Third World, in the appraisal of top administration strategists, carried serious implications for US security. Eisenhower voiced the fear that this new Soviet challenge might prove just as difficult to meet as the military challenge. He authorized increases in US economic assistance programs to offset Soviet aid offers. A budget-conscious Congress balked at even those modest increases, however, slashing the

20 NIE 100-7 55, "World Situation and Trends," November 1, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XIX, 24-38.

21 Memorandum of discussion, November 21, 1955, *ibid.*, vol. X, 32-36.

22 D. D. Eisenhower to J. F. Dulles, December 5, 1955, *ibid.*, vol. IX, 10-12.

president's proposed foreign-aid budgets in 1956, 1957, and 1958. The self-imposed spending restraints of the New Look, in conjunction with the additional restraints imposed by Congress, produced, in the end, a remarkably tepid response to what the administration's own analyses identified as a dire threat.

This mismatch between strategic goals and resource allocations lays bare a significant shortcoming of the Eisenhower approach. In early 1956, the president commissioned a revision in the government's statement of "Basic National Security Policy" for the express purpose of reassessing the gravity of external threats in light of the recent shift in Soviet tactics. NSC 5602/1, approved by Eisenhower that March, warned not only that the movement of any additional country into the Communist camp would harm US security – a standard, long-held assumption – but emphasized that the resultant damage "might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory involved."²³ This blurring of the distinction between vital and peripheral interests, so reminiscent of Truman's NSC 68, undercut a key assumption undergirding the New Look. How could the United States now distinguish between areas that needed to be defended and those that did not if the "loss" even of territories possessing minimal economic or strategic value could cause disproportionate harm to national security? Given such a worrisome prospect, how could the administration retain the flexibility and selectivity, along with the budgetary savings, that Eisenhower thought an asymmetrical containment strategy would bring? He never resolved those complex issues.

Eisenhower's legacy

Despite the shortcomings and contradictions emphasized above, Eisenhower's grand strategy displayed some marked strengths and was predicated on a number of keen insights. Eisenhower correctly grasped the long-term nature of the Cold War and began to plan accordingly. His administration's focus on the nonmilitary dimensions of Soviet-American competition led to a shrewd emphasis on the importance of public diplomacy and targeted propaganda initiatives designed to shape and influence world opinion. Perhaps most important of all, the president recognized more clearly than almost any of his contemporaries in the American policymaking elite that nuclear war could not be won and hence must not be fought. He displayed uncommon wisdom

23 NSC 5602/1, 15 March 1956, *ibid.*, vol. XIX, 242–68.

in comprehending that central reality of international relations in the middle of the twentieth century. Measured on its own terms, furthermore, the Eisenhower approach to national security did succeed in reining in defense spending, reducing the defense budget as a percentage of gross domestic product, and slashing the number of troops under arms. All the while, Eisenhower managed to ensure that the United States' overall military strength far surpassed that of the Soviet Union, a fact largely confirmed for him by the secret U-2 overflights of Soviet territory that began in 1956, and by the satellite reconnaissance missions that commenced in 1960.

In view of the above, it seems deeply ironic that, during his last several years in office, Eisenhower was hounded by criticisms about the presumed inadequacy of the US strategic posture, about declining American technological prowess, and about the Kremlin's rising capabilities. Technical breakthroughs by Moscow of an undeniably significant character triggered the complaints. The Soviets followed the first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the summer of 1957 with the launch, in October, of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite sent into orbit. Those achievements prompted widespread concern on the part of ordinary citizens as well as many defense experts that the United States might actually be falling behind in the arms and technological races. A political culture shaped by the relentless assaults of McCarthyism, moreover, conferred a certain legitimacy on those who would accuse Washington officialdom of laxity and malfeasance – a political fact of life that not even a Republican White House could escape. Partly to quell fears about a developing “missile gap,” Eisenhower appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the actual state of the nuclear-arms balance. To his great frustration, the Gaither Commission's highly classified report, completed in 1958, found that such a gap did, indeed, exist – and some of the commission's more politically damaging conclusions were soon leaked to the press. Although the reality was the exact opposite, the imaginary missile gap became an effective political rallying cry. Democratic presidential aspirant Kennedy used it to good effect in his 1960 race against Eisenhower's vice president, Richard M. Nixon.

Kennedy and flexible response

During the presidential campaign and throughout his foreshortened presidency, Kennedy articulated a strategic vision that differed from Eisenhower's in key respects. Operating from the assumption that the purported missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States was real – the evidence, in

fairness, was not yet conclusive that it was not – he pounded away in stump speeches about the need to bolster US defenses. This conviction formed an instrumental part of Kennedy's broader plea for the United States to prosecute the Cold War with greater vigor. He wanted to regain the initiative that he thought the Soviets had seized from the Americans, and he believed that spending additional dollars to enhance both the nation's conventional military capabilities and its long-range missile forces was imperative.

Like Eisenhower, the Democratic chief executive personally harbored a deep unease about the sure-to-be horrific consequences of any nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Quite unlike Eisenhower, however, Kennedy was convinced that expanding the full range of the nation's nonnuclear capabilities would reduce that threat by allowing the United States to tailor its responses appropriately to each kind and level of threat: from limited war to conflict on the periphery to insurgency to subversion. Such enhanced flexibility would eliminate, in his view, the all-or-nothing straightjacket imposed by the Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation, a policy he had blasted during his senatorial years. Kennedy's counterdoctrine of "flexible response," perhaps his administration's most distinctive innovation in the national security sphere, flowed directly from that supposition. The increased defense spending that the new president set as his highest priority was made possible by a Keynesian-influenced economic philosophy that, in sharp contradistinction to Eisenhower's conservative orthodoxy, held that the American economy was more than capable of absorbing increased defense expenditures – without suffering the deleterious effects that so exercised his predecessor. In that important respect, Kennedy's embrace of Keynesianism freed him from the tight budgetary constraints within which Eisenhower operated. Kennedy also advocated a more innovative, tolerant, and activist policy toward the Third World. Convinced that the primary scene of the struggle between the United States and its Soviet–Chinese adversaries had shifted to the developing areas, he elevated the battle for the Third World to a first-order priority in overall Cold War strategy.

The distinctive features of Kennedy's national security strategy emanated mostly from a heightened perception of the dangers posed to US security by the Soviet Union and China. Certain that the United States' adversaries were growing both stronger and more adventurous, he and his chief foreign-policy advisers considered a more activist US approach essential to meet the rising external threat those adversaries presented. "I think there is a danger," he declared in one campaign speech, "that history will make a judgment that these were the days when the tide began to run out for the United States.



23. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk (middle), and President John F. Kennedy.

These were the times when the Communist tide began to pour in.”²⁴ Those concerns dominated the president’s first state-of-the-union message of January 1961. In it, he implored Congress to provide sufficient funds for “a Free World force so powerful as to make any aggression clearly futile.” Neither the Soviet Union nor China, he said, “has yielded its ambitions for world domination.” He offered an exceptionally bleak vision of the global situation in the address, noting that he spoke “in an hour of national peril” and declaring it “by no means certain” that the nation would endure. “Each day the crises multiply,” Kennedy stressed. “Each day their solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger as weapons spread and hostile forces grow stronger.”²⁵

Kennedy and the Third World threat

That heightened perception of threat can be traced to the analysis, accepted by virtually all senior Kennedy administration planners, that the United States

²⁴ *New York Times*, August 25, 1960.

²⁵ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1962), 19–22 (hereafter PPP: *Kennedy*, with year).

now found itself on the defensive – not only in relationship to the inflated number of ICBMs that they mistakenly thought the Soviets possessed, but throughout the Third World. A steady stream of troubling international developments fed that view. In January 1961, to the disquiet of Kennedy and his top advisers, Khrushchev boldly vowed to support wars of national liberation across the developing world. The success of the Fidel Castro-led revolution in Cuba, the subsequent establishment of close ties between Moscow and Havana, the raging Communist-directed insurgencies against US-supported governments in Laos and South Vietnam, the postcolonial turmoil and resultant anti-Western upsurge in the Congo – all seemed to lend credence to the rambunctious Khrushchev's boasts that international trends were moving in a decidedly pro-Communist direction. To make matters even worse, leading foreign-policy analysts within the administration viewed China as a veritable outlaw state that was becoming an increasingly hostile and militant enemy. As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, American policymakers feared that Chinese policy might actually become even bolder and more aggressive, especially in Asia. They worried, relatedly, that the intense ideological competition with their Chinese rivals might in turn encourage the Soviets to become more adventuresome in the developing world.

Kennedy, who as a senator had championed anticolonial nationalism while blasting the Eisenhower–Dulles approach to the Third World, was determined to reverse those worrisome trends. He tried to do so, from the outset of his presidency, by pursuing a more tolerant, tactful, supportive, and generous policy toward key non-aligned countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana. Kennedy believed such an approach essential in order to undo the damage caused by his predecessors' overemphasis on military alliances and hostility to neutralism. "We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutral to join the Communist bloc," Kennedy lectured the NSC. If we "lose" the neutrals, "the balance of power could swing against us."²⁶ The president and his senior foreign-policy advisers saw generous economic aid, tailored to the specific needs of individual national aspirations and development programs, as the most effective tool available to the United States in its bid to win favor with the non-aligned nations.

He feared as well that the balance of global power could shift away from the United States if it were not more attuned to the underlying socioeconomic

²⁶ Remarks by J. F. Kennedy to the NSC, January 22, 1963, NSC Files, National Security File (John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts).

conditions that fueled Communism's appeal across the Third World. In the wake of the Cuban revolution, that peril seemed particularly acute in Latin America; indeed, Kennedy tagged Latin America "the most dangerous area in the world."²⁷ The Alliance for Progress, the administration's boldest and most ambitious Third World program, sought to use economic largesse to spur modernization, alleviate poverty, and address pressing educational and health needs. For all the idealistic rhetoric that surrounded its launch, the alliance was designed for the overriding purpose of undercutting the appeal of Communism within the hemisphere. The Peace Corps program, perhaps the most idealistic and most popular of Kennedy's global initiatives, served similar goals. Kennedy believed that young, idealistic Peace Corps volunteers serving selflessly in many of the world's least-developed countries would help counter the negative image of Americans being propounded by the nation's enemies. It, too, sprang from a wider strategic vision that emphasized the need to wage the Cold War in the Third World with greater imagination and effectiveness.

Defeating revolutionary insurgencies formed another cornerstone of that plan. The president worried that wars of national liberation, from Southeast Asia to Latin America to various points in between, were being inspired and led by radical nationalists, or Communists, allied with Moscow, Beijing, or both. In order to defeat the insurgencies, Kennedy pushed hard for the development of sophisticated, counterinsurgency techniques. Counterinsurgency became a virtual obsession for Kennedy; he took great pride in elevating Special Forces units, including the much ballyhooed Green Berets, to a prominent place within an expanded American tool box for combating the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao, and other popular guerrilla movements. In fact, General Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's top uniformed military adviser, identified Indochina as a "laboratory" for the employment of counterinsurgency tactics.²⁸ Kennedy fully concurred. Indeed, his decision, late in 1961, to commit rising numbers of US combat advisers to the war against Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam proved one of the most significant, and fateful, of his presidency.

The implementation of these new Third World initiatives rarely proceeded as smoothly or as efficaciously as administration strategists hoped. The embrace of, and actual tilt toward, certain non-aligned states brought the predictable cry from Third World allies of the United States that the benefits

27 Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 19.

28 Quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.

of formal alliance with the superpower were rapidly eroding. Unwilling to embitter allies and disrupt alliances, which a wholesale policy shift might have entailed, Kennedy backtracked; he recognized that the United States simply could not tilt too far toward the non-aligned without paying a steep cost elsewhere in the Third World. The Alliance for Progress, for its part, never lived up to Kennedy's high hopes. Funding limitations, the durability of the prevailing social structure, the sheer magnitude of the modernization project, and the inability of external capital to spur growth rates higher than a dismal 1 percent per annum during Kennedy's tenure combined to doom the touted alliance. Nor did counterinsurgency efforts provide the magic bullet craved for the fight against popular guerrilla movements in Indochina and elsewhere. By the final months of his presidency, Kennedy faced a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam in particular, despite the infusion of over 16,000 military personnel.

Kennedy and the Atlantic alliance

Implementation of the flexible-response strategy in Europe proved equally frustrating. Since that strategy called for a marked enhancement of the options for limited war available to the United States and its chief allies, it demanded a strengthening of NATO's conventional deterrent. That, in turn, meant inducing European partners to make a greater contribution to NATO's active-duty forces. Two problems immediately ensued. First, NATO allies proved unwilling to bear the expense of additional troop commitments. Second, they displayed apprehension about the future implications of the new administration's push to lessen NATO's dependence on nuclear deterrence. Although Kennedy had no intention of reducing the US commitment to European security, leading continental statesmen, always wary about American reliability, sensed a move in that direction. After all, if NATO's conventional forces grew, would the American nuclear deterrent not become less central in NATO defense plans? Could they be sure, then, that the United States, in a crisis, would treat an attack on Bonn, Paris, or London as they would an attack on New York or Washington? The overriding specter that haunted the United States' NATO partners, in short, was that the Kennedy initiatives might set in motion the long-dreaded decoupling of the United States and Western Europe.

The president tried to reassure European leaders that his concept of flexible response signified no diminution whatsoever in the American security commitment. In June 1961, he told French president Charles de Gaulle that, if the

Soviets ever appeared poised to overrun Europe, the “US must strike first with nuclear weapons.” An attack on Europe, Kennedy stressed, “would be physically and automatically an attack on us.”²⁹ Those reassurances could not, however, allay European fears about Washington’s newfound emphasis on scenarios for fighting limited wars.

Some of the inherent difficulties with the application of the limited-war concept to specific arenas of confrontation were brought to a head by the Berlin crisis of 1961. Following a tense summit meeting with Kennedy in Vienna that June, Khrushchev renewed earlier threats that he had made to cut off allied access to West Berlin. The first phase of the Berlin crisis had erupted in 1958 after Khrushchev issued a blunt ultimatum to the West, in effect threatening to sever West Berlin’s all-important transit links. Recognizing that vulnerable West Berlin simply could not be defended by conventional means, and yet could not be abandoned without severely diminishing US credibility, Eisenhower held firm. He accepted, and so signaled, that nuclear weapons would be used to defend West Berlin if needed. In light of the city’s weighty symbolic value, Eisenhower was willing to run the risk of general war to retain its current status.

Kennedy quickly, if reluctantly, reached the same conclusion. Concerned that backing down in West Berlin would deal a severe blow to American credibility and simply invite aggression elsewhere, he adopted an equally tough policy. In a public speech of July 25, 1961, the president declared: “We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.” Kennedy offered a chilling depiction of the stakes in play. “In the thermonuclear age,” he warned, “any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of human history.”³⁰ Fortunately for him, Kennedy was not faced with the prospects of a nuclear showdown. Khrushchev once again backed away from his threats and helped defuse the crisis – this time with the erection of the soon-to-be-notorious Berlin Wall. US vulnerability in Berlin rendered anything less than a willingness to employ nuclear weapons impracticable. “It is central to our policy,” Kennedy conceded as the crisis began to ease, “that we shall have to use nuclear weapons in the end, if all else fails, in order to save Berlin, and it is fundamental that the Russians should understand this fact.”³¹

29 Quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 292.

30 PPP: Kennedy, 1961, 533–35.

31 Kennedy to General Lucius Clay, October 8, 1961, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XIV, 484–86.

Mutual deterrence

On broader issues of nuclear strategy, as on Berlin, a surprising convergence can be detected between Kennedy's evolving views and policies and those of the predecessor he initially sought to distance himself from. By September 1961, satellite reconnaissance yielded unmistakable confirmation that no missile gap existed between the Soviets and the Americans. In fact, according to an authoritative National Intelligence Estimate, the Soviets possessed not the 140–200 operational ICBMs originally suspected, but a mere 10–25. Needless to say, Eisenhower's cool confidence in superior American strength began to appear more prescient than the caricature promulgated by the Kennedy campaign of a complacent commander-in-chief asleep at the switch. The chief architect of Kennedy's security policy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, had his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, publicly reveal the marked US advantage in all three legs of nuclear force structure – strategic bombers, ICBMs, and nuclear-armed submarines – to send a clear message to the Soviets while reassuring the American people.

An early proponent of developing limited-nuclear-war options as a less gruesome alternative to Eisenhower's all-or-nothing stance, McNamara gradually grew disillusioned with the notion that any nuclear conflict with the Soviets could stop short of all-out war. Kennedy, McNamara, and other top officials arrived at the conclusion, by no later than the end of 1962, that the only alternative to a savagely destructive nuclear war was to harp constantly on the horrors of such a conflict and rely on mutual deterrence as the safest preventative measure. By the end of the Kennedy administration, mutual deterrence – or mutually assured destruction, a more graphic term for the concept – had virtually acquired the status of official doctrine.

The movement toward that doctrine was hastened by the sobering lessons learned during the climactic Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. At the height of the crisis, Kennedy acknowledged that even though Soviet ICBMs might not be completely reliable, they almost certainly possessed sufficient firepower to hit American cities and cause between 80 million and 100 million casualties. "[Y]ou're talking about the destruction of a country!," he exclaimed.³² After having come closer to a nuclear holocaust than at any point during the entire Cold War, US and Soviet leaders recognized the need to avoid future Cuba-type confrontations and began to take some significant

32. Sheldon M. Stern, *Averting "The Final Failure": John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 127.

steps in that direction. These included the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, a signal achievement. At American University in Washington, DC, in June of that year, Kennedy delivered the most conciliatory speech of his presidency, urging that more attention be directed “to our common interests and to the means by which differences can be resolved.”³³

Scholars will long debate the relative efficacy of the national security policies crafted by Eisenhower and Kennedy during this exceptionally dangerous phase of the Cold War. Working within a broad consensus on strategic goals, they plainly adopted different tactical priorities. Those tactical shifts distinguished the two administrations from each other in significant respects – while distinguishing both from the Truman administration that preceded them. Yet the fundamental continuities that obtain between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations are perhaps more striking. Each saw the Cold War as a long-term struggle that encompassed not just military competition but political, economic, social, cultural, and ideological competition as well. Each, moreover, was committed not just to waging the Cold War but to *winning* it.

³³ PPP: *Kennedy, 1963*, 462–63. For more on the Cuban missile crisis, see the chapter by James Hershberg in volume II.

Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962

VOJTECH MASTNY

The decade between the death of Iosif Stalin and the Cuban missile crisis was one of great promise and great peril. The promise consisted in the possibility of reversing the Cold War confrontation, the peril in its turning into real war. This chapter attempts to explain why the promise remained unfulfilled and why the peril, despite an initial turn toward *détente*, subsequently increased rather than diminished. Soviet foreign policy, to be sure, is only a part of the explanation, but it is an indispensable one. Rather than divert attention to other countries, the discussion that follows aims to assess the policy on its own merits. Benefiting from inside evidence that was not available at the time but is now, it will focus on what policymakers wanted to accomplish and what they actually did accomplish.

As Soviet leaders always proudly emphasized, their foreign policy was unlike any other, as was their state. The policy was unique in the extent to which their Marxist-Leninist beliefs determined their perception of why other states behaved the way they did. The unique feature of the Soviet state most relevant to foreign policy was the vast power wielded by the supreme leader, which made its exercise highly personalized. As the following discussion will show, the post-Stalin decade abounds in vivid, and sobering, examples of what a difference a man and a system could make to foreign policy.

A missed chance?

Stalin's legacy left a formidable challenge to his successors, none of whom could hope to fit into his oversized shoes. They inherited from him a sullen empire, which he had acquired by extending his power to Eastern Europe as the main safeguard of Soviet security as he understood it. His manner of doing so, however, had precipitated confrontation with the world's most powerful nation, the United States, thus making the Soviet Union more insecure. As the Cold War became militarized, the buildup of nuclear weapons, whose



24. Soviet leaders at Stalin's funeral: in this heavily doctored photo we see, from left, Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrentii Beria, Georgii Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich.

supposed utility was but dimly understood, added to the challenge. Tantalizing fragments of evidence suggest that the despot's timely demise may have saved not only most of his entourage but also much of the outside world from possible destruction because of the far-fetched military schemes he may have been entertaining in the twilight of his life.

Stalin's successors acted with a palpable sense of emergency. Premier Georgii M. Malenkov tried swiftly to reassure the West by proclaiming that there were no international problems that could not be resolved peacefully. As their first foreign-policy priority, the new men in the Kremlin decided to terminate the potentially explosive Korean War, which Stalin had preferred to keep festering, and subsequently brokered an armistice. How much farther were they willing, or able, to go in winding down the East–West confrontation? On the answer to this question hinges the claim that a unique opportunity to terminate the Cold War was lost because of a lack of Western response at this critical time.

The return to the Foreign Ministry of Viacheslav M. Molotov did not inspire confidence. He had been a most conscientious executor, rather than creator, of Stalin's policies, which had brought the country into the Cold War, during which time he gave scant evidence of independent thinking. In acting now to improve relations with Yugoslavia, Molotov tried to undo one of Stalin's most egregious mistakes, in which he had been deeply complicit. To an internal party audience, he explained his "so-called peace initiative" as a tactic to sow "confusion in the ranks of our aggressive adversaries."¹ This was vintage Stalin.

1 "Delo Beriia (Plenum TsK KPSS, iul 1953 goda: stenograficheskii otchet)" [The Beriia Affair: Stenographic Record of the July 1953 Plenary Session of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee], *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, January 1991, 171.

Another member of the new ruling team, Nikita S. Khrushchev, later vividly described its predicament: "Terribly vulnerable, we went on as before, out of inertia. Our boat just continued to float down the stream, along the same course that had been set by Stalin, even though we all sensed that things were not right."² He was alluding to the interdependence of their foreign and domestic policies, in which the internal and external dimensions of their insecurity were intertwined. Their overriding priority of preserving the system that kept them in power while cautiously moderating its excesses was not conducive to embarking upon risky initiatives abroad.

In May, one such initiative nevertheless caused a commotion in the ruling party presidium in connection with its debate on a "New Course" of controlled reform the leadership was trying to introduce in Eastern Europe. Lavrentii P. Beriia, the head of the Soviet security services, floated the unorthodox idea that the creation of a unified and neutral Germany by sacrificing Communism in its eastern part would be in the Soviet Union's best interests. Such a way of tackling the crucial German question would have altered radically the premises on which the Cold War was being fought – the reason for Beriia's retrospective reputation as a statesman allegedly capable of bringing about a breakthrough that might have led the conflict to an end.

A person less qualified to accomplish such a feat can hardly be imagined. He was the most blood-stained of Stalin's former henchmen, justly feared even by his peers for his ruthlessness and utter lack of principles. His position as the nation's top spymaster, steeped in deceit and suspicion, was a hindrance rather than an advantage in his trying to gain the confidence of Western interlocutors. In any case, there is no evidence that he ever tried to do so before an uprising in East Germany intervened in June.

The revolt was not of Western making but was instead the consequence of the kind of system Moscow had imposed upon the country and was now belatedly trying to rectify. No sooner did the uprising break out than Beriia closed ranks by joining the rest of the presidium in a unanimous decision to crush it, thus showing that his deviation from orthodoxy did not go very far. The reversal did not save him from being arrested a few days later in a plot devised by his colleagues to strip him of the arbitrary power he had acquired within the Soviet system; he was subsequently tried on trumped-up charges and summarily executed.

2 Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), 220; Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990), 73.

Among those charges, any blame for the East German crisis was conspicuously missing. The responsibility for it, as well as for Beria's downfall, lay ultimately with the workings of the system. The emergency highlighted the vulnerability of the embattled Kremlin leaders, making them even more reluctant to take risks in foreign affairs than they had been before. The fleeting chance for winding down the Cold War thus disappeared before it could even emerge.

Molotov's blunders

The conduct of foreign policy under Molotov was Stalin's without Stalin. Molotov resurrected Stalin's abortive proposal for the unification of a neutral Germany from March 1952. That proposal had differed from Beria's by not envisaging the liquidation of Communist East Germany but rather the creation of a united "democratic" Germany built upon the foundations of the regime in its eastern rather than its western part. Molotov's amended version was not an improvement. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, but only after a peace treaty had been signed with an all-German government, formed by following procedures Moscow deemed necessary to ensure its "democratic" character.

Such a prescription for the future of Germany was grist to the mill of West Germany's staunchly anti-Soviet chancellor Konrad Adenauer, ensuring his electoral victory in September 1953, which Moscow had badly wanted to prevent. Undeterred, Molotov continued to insist on unification through negotiations between the two German states as equals – known to be anathema to both West Germany and the United States. He made the solution of the German question on Soviet terms a precondition for ending the four-power occupation regime in Austria as well. Given such positions, the failure of the January 1954 Berlin meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was a foregone conclusion.

Molotov's policies followed from the doctrinaire assumption that inherent contradictions among capitalist states would make it possible for the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between Washington and its allies, split the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and expel the United States from Europe. The durability of that assumption despite recurrent disappointments may be explained by a development that gave reason to believe that it would ultimately be proven right. The spreading perception in Western Europe of a diminishing threat made Washington's pursuit of the European Defense Community (EDC) – the centerpiece of its policy aimed at West Germany's rearmament – an uphill struggle.

Molotov's truly original response was his "Monroe doctrine in reverse," proclaiming the Soviet Union to be Europe's benevolent protector from outside interference. He called for a European security conference, to which the United States and Canada would not be invited. Ignored, he followed up with a proposal that NATO prove its peaceful intentions by admitting the Soviet Union as a member. Only the belief that the Western alliance was on its last legs could justify such proposals.

Having attended the Geneva conference on Indochina in July 1954, Molotov came to believe there was growing discord within the capitalist camp. The rejection next month of the EDC project by the French National Assembly seemed to corroborate that impression, and vindicate the soundness of Soviet policy. Moscow rushed to congratulate the French on their "patriotic" decision, reiterating the proposal for the security conference as the blueprint for Europe's future. (Ironically, it would become such a blueprint twenty years later in the form of the Helsinki conference that would ultimately help terminate both the Cold War and the Soviet Union.)

Had the Kremlin shown a conciliatory face at that moment of American distress, Washington would have found it difficult not to respond in kind. That, however, could have happened only if the person in charge of foreign affairs in Moscow had not been a product of the Soviet system as Molotov had been. In any case, the chance passed, and two months later the bankruptcy of his policy was laid bare. For the failed EDC, the West ingeniously substituted the Paris Agreements that provided for German rearmament within NATO. The date set for West Germany's admission into the alliance – May 1955 – also set the timeframe within which the Soviet Union would either have to reverse this unexpected development or else start cutting its losses. Only now was the stage set for a substantive change in Soviet foreign policy, and the results were little short of spectacular.

Khrushchev's innovations

The setback precipitated the next stage in the Kremlin power struggle, of which Malenkov – the spokesman for peaceful resolution of East-West conflicts – became the main victim. He had broken with Stalinist orthodoxy by proclaiming that a nuclear war would be an unmitigated disaster not only for capitalism but also for socialism, although he had subsequently recanted. British prime minister Winston Churchill considered him the best hope

for a rapprochement with Moscow, but Khrushchev more aptly described Malenkov as a good Bolshevik but without “backbone.”³

The shakeup marked a victory for hardliners such as Molotov and Khrushchev, but in the longer term ensured the ascendancy of the latter and gradual demise of the former. Khrushchev held the key position of party secretary but had no experience in foreign affairs although, having been the one who had brought down Beria, proved to be an accomplished schemer. Otherwise, he had given no more signs of independent thinking than Molotov, but in responding to the Western challenge in the aftermath of the Paris Agreements Khrushchev displayed a much more innovative mind.

At first, Molotov tried to deal with the challenge in the old way. Hoping to sow discord in the enemy camp, he convened a “European” security conference in Moscow, but only Soviet allies came. Reluctantly, he began to collaborate with Khrushchev on reversing policy, leading to the conclusion in May 1955 of the state treaty with Austria on less favorable terms than those Molotov had previously opposed. It provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country and the recognition of its neutrality. “If you are for war then it would be right to stay in Austria,” Khrushchev pointedly admonished the rival. “It is a strategic area, and only a fool would give up a strategic area if he is getting ready to go to war. If we are against war, we have to leave.”⁴

The novelty of Khrushchev’s thinking derived from his belief that the Soviet Union could afford to reduce its reliance on military power and benefit from a demilitarization of the Cold War. Once West Germany’s admission to NATO became certain, Moscow put forward on May 10 its most credible disarmament proposal to date. Incorporating most of the previous Western demands, the document had been drafted in the expectation that it would lead to negotiations. This appeared incongruous with the proclamation four days later of the Warsaw Pact as the Soviet bloc’s new military alliance, designed on the NATO model. That design, however, conveyed in its own way a desire to negotiate as well.

May 1955 was the most eventful month in Soviet diplomacy since the onset of the Cold War. Khrushchev stirred up movement in different places, hoping that in the end the Soviet Union would emerge as the winner. This

3 Record of party plenum, January 31, 1955, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (CWIHPB), 10 (1998), 34–35.

4 Record of party plenum, July 12, 1955, *ibid.*, 42–43 (retranslated from the original).

was a vision rather than a strategy, and did not always work. Khrushchev's sensational visit to Yugoslavia, intended to placate its independent Communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, deny the country to NATO, and lure it back to Moscow's fold, fell short of expectations. Soviet forays into the Third World, however, exceeded them, beginning to compensate for Soviet setbacks in Europe.

Secret Soviet arms sales to Egypt with Czechoslovakia as an intermediary and the Soviet leader's triumphant tours of India, Burma, and Indonesia played well on those countries' anti-Western sentiments. Although the long-term consequences of deepening involvement in areas where Moscow could not control events the way it could in Eastern Europe remained to be seen, the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World positioned Khrushchev to turn the tables on the West in a nonmilitary competition amidst diminishing rather than rising East-West tension.

The fruits of détente

Among the top Soviet leaders, Khrushchev was the last true believer in the ideals of Communism. He sincerely believed his country could beat its capitalist foes because of its system's supposed ideological assets, political strength, and superior economic performance. Such a belief may seem naïve in retrospect, but at the time even sophisticated Western intellectuals, of both the left-wing and the right-wing variety, were prepared to believe that the West could not compete with a system capable of mobilizing seemingly inexhaustible human and natural resources. Khrushchev expected the capitalists to realize eventually that they had no future and to start making concessions out of necessity. He tried to induce them by taking the lead to demilitarize the Cold War, thus making possible what came to be known as the "first détente."

In July 1955, détente flowered when Khrushchev met President Dwight D. Eisenhower in Geneva at the first summit conference since the beginning of the Cold War. The Soviet Union resubmitted its disarmament proposal, which the United States opposed on the well-founded suspicion that it might be meant seriously. The Kremlin also submitted an ambitious draft of a collective security treaty, designed to lead to the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Although the proposals were not accepted, Khrushchev considered the summit a success. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting that followed, the Soviet delegation proposed the collective security treaty again, with no better results.

The “indefatigable dynamism” and “patent self-confidence of the Soviet leaders” impressed Western diplomats in Moscow.⁵ Khrushchev responded to West Germany’s entry into NATO by inviting Adenauer for talks in the Soviet capital, luring him with promises of lucrative trade and the prospect of the release of remaining German prisoners of war. He bested Adenauer by inducing the seasoned politician to reluctantly agree to the establishment of diplomatic ties while the status of East Germany remained unaffected, thus undermining West Germany’s claim to speak on behalf of all Germans.

Playing on neutralist feelings in the Nordic countries, Khrushchev outlined his vision of a peaceful Soviet conquest of Western Europe to the visiting Norwegian prime minister, Einar Gerhardsen: “How far do you want us to pull our forces from our common borders in the North? Just tell us, and we’ll do it; we’ll establish zones with control posts ... In this way we’ll safeguard yours and Sweden’s position, and then Denmark, Holland, and Belgium will follow suit. France will then say to [it]self that [it] cannot fail to do something similar.”⁶ Without asking anything in return, Moscow relinquished its military and naval base near Helsinki, ensuring the election of its favorite as Finnish president. Soon the Icelandic parliament would ask for the closure of the American air base in that country, too.

This was demilitarization in deeds rather than merely words. In the Far East, the Soviet Union returned to the Chinese Communists the base at Dairen that the military-minded Stalin had considered it necessary to keep. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev wanted foreign Communists to recognize Moscow’s primacy because of ideological affinity rather than superior power. He did not see international Communism as mere handmaiden of Soviet foreign policy. He dissolved the Cominform, created by Stalin to secure the unquestioning obedience of European Communists, and encouraged those in Western Europe to work with social democrats as potential allies. Some of them were ready to respond in kind.

In Khrushchev’s historic denunciation of Stalin in February 1956, foreign policy did not figure prominently. His pronouncements nevertheless fatally undermined it in two critical ways. The condemnation of Stalin’s crimes

5 William G. Hayter to John Selwyn Lloyd, January 18, 1956, FO 371/122, 782, Public Record Office, London; Maurice Dejean, quoted in Elena Calandri, “La détente et la perception de l’Union soviétique chez les décideurs français: du printemps 1955 à février 1956,” *Revue d’histoire diplomatique*, 1993, 2, 189.

6 Note on N. Khrushchev’s statements at Norwegian embassy reception, November 14, 1955, in Sven G. Holtmark (ed.), *Norge og Sovjetunionen, 1917–1955* [Norway and the Soviet Union] (Oslo: Cappelen, 1995), 521.

infuriated Stalin's Chinese disciple, Mao Zedong, encouraging him to bid for the leadership of international Communism against Khrushchev, thus leading to the Sino-Soviet split. The repudiation of Stalin's practices also emboldened the restive peoples of Eastern Europe to test what they regarded as a sign of Soviet weakness rather than strength, thus paving the road to the eventual demise of the empire he had created at their expense.

The challenge in Eastern Europe

Khrushchev faced his moment of truth in October 1956, when revolts against Moscow's subservient regimes in Eastern Europe cast doubt on his key assumption of an irreversible progress toward Communism. From the evidence available now of what was going on behind the scenes, the Soviet response appears in a very different light than it did at the time. Once a nationalist leadership had taken control of the Polish Communist Party in the aftermath of workers' riots, and gained widespread support in the country, Khrushchev's instinctive reaction was to consider using force against "counter-revolutionaries." The main reason force was not used was the timely support for the Polish party's independent course from Beijing, communicated to Moscow in no uncertain terms – striking evidence of the Chinese Communists' rising role as strategists of international Communism as well as of disarray in the Kremlin.

The Soviet leaders had not entirely ruled out the military option when the Polish situation became overshadowed by the incipient collapse of Communist rule in Hungary. Moscow's declaration on October 30 proclaiming its readiness to treat foreign Communist parties as equals and respect their countries' sovereignty was a landmark in Eastern Europe's transition from an appendage of the Soviet Union to an object of its foreign policy. The critical issue of the time was the possibility of Hungary following the example of Austria by choosing neutrality and other Communist countries following suit.

It was a measure of Soviet distress that the Kremlin did not rule out such a possibility. Even Molotov was briefly inclined to let Hungary go its own way, while Khrushchev was undecided. This time, however, the Chinese made clear their preference for intervention to save the country for Communism, and the Soviet decision not to intervene was reversed overnight. Even so, before troops actually moved in, Khrushchev found it advisable to consult with East European leaders and even undertake a grueling trip to Yugoslavia to solicit approval by Tito – a far cry from the self-confidence he had radiated earlier.

The coincidence of the intervention with the wrongheaded decision by British and French governments to invade Egypt in their dispute over the Suez Canal has encouraged speculation that the Western intervention made possible the Soviet one or at least justified it retrospectively. In reality, the connection between the two developments was quite different. The crack-down in Hungary was already in full motion when the attack on Egypt was called off in response to an American ultimatum. At this point, Moscow chose to issue its own ultimatum, demanding that the attack cease immediately and threatening to destroy London and Paris with nuclear missiles, which the Soviet Union did not possess.

Here was a new, and disturbing, face of Khrushchev – the author of the ultimatum. Not only did he claim credit from his colleagues for having turned back Western aggressors, but he also convinced himself that he actually did. To visiting Egyptian officials, he expressed his conclusion that the one “with the strongest nerves will be the winner.”⁷ This was a dangerous self-delusion. Having proved a poor manager of the crisis he had unexpectedly had to face in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev showed a propensity for gratuitously creating an unnecessary crisis to divert attention from his shortcomings.

“Lacking confidence and bluffing”

In diagnosing what was wrong with Soviet leaders in the aftermath of Hungary, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai got it right. While their “arrogance and self-importance have not been completely eliminated,” he wrote to Mao, “an atmosphere lacking discipline and order is spreading ... They appear to lack confidence and suffer from inner fears and thus tend to employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in handling foreign affairs.”⁸ Nonetheless, Kremlin leaders kept behaving as if nothing had happened.

Even while Soviet tanks were rolling into Hungary, Moscow once again called for disarmament talks, tentatively accepting President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal it had previously rejected. It proceeded with an array of further disarmament and nonaggression proposals, though none was sufficiently attractive to be acted upon. By April 1957, high-ranking party officials in Moscow were telling visiting comrades that “things are now settling down,”

7 Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 211; quote from Mohamed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 128.

8 Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, “My Observations on the Soviet Union,” *CWIHPB*, 6–7 (1995–96), 154.

and that the time for resuming détente had come.⁹ While publicizing his view that Washington and Moscow could come to terms, Khrushchev simultaneously escalated his bellicose rhetoric.

Khrushchev later berated the “capitalist countries” for having instigated the “putsch” in Hungary, accusing them of wanting to do the same in East Germany and warning them that “we will rap your knuckles.” He tried to intimidate Denmark and Norway – the countries he had previously tried to charm – by threatening them with nuclear annihilation if they allowed US forces on their territories. He boasted of having “a bomb so big ... that we cannot even test it inside the vast area of the Soviet Union. If we set it off on the North Pole it would melt the ice-cap and send the oceans spilling over the world.”¹⁰

In June, at the secret party plenum at which Khrushchev routed an intra-party plot to unseat him, the record of his foreign policy was scrutinized in a characteristically Soviet way. The defeated Molotov chided him for not doing enough to exploit divisions in the capitalist camp and for undermining Soviet prestige by undignified behavior, such as spending hours naked in a sauna with the president of Finland. In backing the winner, the otherwise perceptive Anastas A. Mikoian claimed that, in exploiting “the contradictions of imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has never been such a broad practice, such rich results,” as under Khrushchev’s skillful leadership.¹¹ In fact, initiatives to integrate Western Europe, culminating in the March 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the Common Market, signified the opposite.

Nor was Khrushchev’s management of the growing contradictions within Communism’s own camp very skillful. He tried to ostracize the Polish Communists, whose foremost ambition was to be recognized by Moscow as its most valuable clients. In courting Tito’s Yugoslavia, Khrushchev withdrew Soviet troops from neighboring Romania, thus making it easier for its devious rulers subsequently to shake off Soviet tutelage with impunity. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia did not last, but was enough to further antagonize the Chinese, despite the rash promise of Soviet assistance in the development of their nuclear program. More than ever before, Khrushchev needed a success.

⁹ *New York Times*, April 17 and 19, 1957.

¹⁰ Statements by N. Khrushchev, March 19 and April 1957, collected in USSR Biographical Files (Marshal Georgii A. Zhukov), p. 4, box 136, HU OSA 300-80-7, Open Society Archives, Budapest.

¹¹ Record of party plenum, June 24, 1957, *CWHPB*, 10 (1998), 55.

The Sputnik effect

It was a godsend when Soviet scientists in October 1957 launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite of the Earth. Although their feat was unrelated to military technology, it added to US perceptions of a “missile gap” in favor of the Soviet Union. In trying to exploit the misperception for what it was worth, Khrushchev ran the risk of overdoing it. This became apparent in his handling of the German question, which remained his top priority as the increasingly influential West Germany became NATO’s key European member and the United States expressed a readiness to share its nuclear weapons with its European allies.

Outsiders have been too willing to take at face value Moscow’s professions of alarm at the prospect of West German “militarists” getting hold of the weapons – whose control Washington was clearly determined to keep in its own hands and which the increasingly antimilitaristic German society did not want. In reality, Khrushchev was not as obsessive about the supposed German threat as Stalin had been. According to the perceptive Soviet diplomat Oleg Grinevskii, “The idea of nuclear weapons in German hands frightened neither him nor the Soviet military, whose huge arsenal of nuclear missiles filled them with pride and conceit. But in order to shake up the West Europeans with a possible nuclear threat by the Federal Republic to try to break up their alliance ... Khrushchev was ready to unleash the most furious propaganda campaign.”¹²

Any Soviet leader, however, had to be concerned about the political and economic impact of West Germany’s thriving democracy on the stability of the artificial East German state. Its leader, Walter Ulbricht, assiduously cultivated Soviet resentment of the disruptive influence of West Berlin, surrounded by East German territory, and clamored for the elimination of the enclave. Having tried to blockade it in 1948–49 and failed, Moscow was not to be pushed by an impetuous underling. In the summer of 1958, however, its calculations began to change in view of two unrelated developments, neither of which was of Soviet making while both had the potential of growing into military conflict.

The first was the coup by left-wing military officers in Iraq; the United States seemed initially inclined to respond with armed intervention, but then decided against it. While the decision was still pending, the Soviet Union

12. Oleg Grinevskij, *Tauwetter: Entspannung, Krisen und neue Eiszeit* (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), 36.

staged military maneuvers in the country's vicinity and Khrushchev sent a threatening message to Eisenhower, urging him to desist. When no US intervention ensued, he convinced himself – much as in the aftermath of the Suez affair – that the threat had worked. As his son's mixed metaphor would have it, "In a dogfight, father felt like [a] fish in water."¹³

The second development was the crisis provoked, primarily for domestic reasons, by the Chinese Communists' shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy (Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), controlled by the Nationalist government in Taiwan. The provocation came on the heels of Khrushchev's attempt to placate Mao at a disastrous meeting in Beijing, during which the Chinese strongman exquisitely humiliated his hapless guest. Although Khrushchev had previously signaled his approval of Beijing's attempt to seize Taiwan, the way Mao went about it, without prior consultation with Moscow and daring the United States to step in to save its protégé, alarmed Khrushchev. As the Communist invasion of the islands seemed to be imminent in early September, he publicly warned Washington not to move, while privately trying to prevent the Chinese from acting without appearing to them as less daring than they.

This was the setting in which Khrushchev started moving toward confrontation over Berlin. In mid-August, Moscow had already commissioned a proposal from East Germany for four-power talks on a German peace treaty that the West was certain to reject. Once it did, Khrushchev still took several weeks before deciding to force the issue, reportedly against the advice of experts in the Foreign Ministry. According to one of them, Georgii M. Kornienko, what clinched the decision to test the West's resolve was the public warning by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Quemoy and Matsu mattered to the United States as much as Berlin did. "Let the Chinese do their thing with their shitty islands; for us the time has come to scare the hell out of Dulles in Berlin," was the Soviet statesman's compulsive reaction.¹⁴

The making of the Berlin crisis

Khrushchev launched the confrontation in accordance with the maxim attributed to Napoleon: "First engage, and then see." His ultimatum of November 11 threatened to cut the Western powers' access routes to the divided city unless they agreed to sign a peace treaty with Germany on Soviet terms within

13 Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower*, 396.

14 Georgii M. Kornienko, "*Kholodnaia voina*": *svidetelstvo ee uchastnika* [The "Cold War": A Testimony by a Participant] (Moscow: Olma Press, 2001), 89.

six months. As he confided to the Polish party chief Władysław Gomułka, squeezing the allies out of Berlin “like an ugly pimple out of the nose” was but the beginning of the struggle for a larger goal. He did not specify what this was, but admitted that it would require “a great deal of cold blood” although “war [would] not result from it.” He just assumed that “the leaders of the United States [were] not such idiots as to fight over Berlin.”¹⁵

As the clock set by the ultimatum kept ticking, without a clear Western response, Khrushchev vacillated. He first treated British prime minister Harold Macmillan rudely on his mission to Moscow to negotiate, and then proposed the seemingly conciliatory interim solution of making West Berlin into a “free city.” Since its freedom would be hostage to Soviet goodwill, the proposal was a nonstarter. Khrushchev finally pinned his hopes on a personal meeting with Eisenhower.

At the meeting, which took place in September 1959 at the presidential retreat at Camp David, Eisenhower was genial but noncommittal, but Khrushchev chose to believe what he wanted to believe, namely, that American concessions on Germany were forthcoming. During his grand tour of the United States, he was carried away by the attention he received, dismissing the hostility he encountered as the last gasps of capitalism in decline. Under the influence of the “spirit of Camp David,” he fielded yet another radical disarmament proposal at the United Nations before proceeding to Beijing to convince Mao that détente was working.

Mao listened contemptuously to the upbeat account of the rapport Khrushchev believed he had established with the commander-in-chief of the leading capitalist power. It was a measure of Khrushchev’s incurable optimism that soon after his return home he initiated the deepest unilateral troop reductions the Soviet Union had ever undertaken (at least until the end of the Cold War). In justifying them to the party presidium, he cited the need to convince the world of his country’s peaceful intentions. “Should we have such a big army as we have now?” he asked rhetorically. “This doesn’t make sense ... We have powerful armaments ... What country or group of countries in Europe would dare to attack us?”¹⁶

This was Khrushchev’s finest hour, but it was short-lived. He had only himself and his ideology to blame for misjudging American readiness to surrender on Germany. Seen as a capitulationist by the Chinese, he took it

15 Quotes from minutes of N. Khrushchev–W. Gomułka conversation, November 10, 1958, *CWHPB*, 11 (1998), 202, and Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Knauer, 1993), 336.

16 Memorandum by N. Khrushchev to party presidium, December 8, 1959, *CWHPB*, 8–9 (1996–97), 418.

personally when Eisenhower failed to deliver what Khrushchev had expected. Although Khrushchev was looking forward to another summit, scheduled to meet in May 1960 in Paris, he prejudged its outcome. He threatened to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the kind of agreement he wanted on Berlin was not reached at the summit.

The summit was thus doomed even before the accidental shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory wrecked it. Since the pilot was alive in Soviet hands, Khrushchev had the choice of how best to turn the incident to his advantage. Instead, he turned it to his disadvantage by deliberately embarrassing Eisenhower and breaking up the summit, without knowing what he would do next. In Mikoian's retrospective judgment, by indulging in "inexcusable hysterics," he became "guilty of delaying the onset of détente for fifteen years."¹⁷

Khrushchev decided to postpone further action on Berlin until the next US administration took office six months later. In the interval, he behaved petulantly. At the UN General Assembly, he banged his shoe on the desk and proposed to take the organization out of New York, to be entrusted to



25. Nikita Khrushchev showing the Supreme Soviet photos of Soviet military installations taken by the US U-2 spy plane before it was shot down in 1960.

¹⁷ Quoted in William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 468.



26. Nikita Khrushchev angered at a press conference in Paris during the 1960 summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

a “troika” of Soviet, Western, and Third World caretakers. As tensions continued to rise, the Soviet military began to substitute an offensive plan for war in Europe for Stalin’s defensive one – a telling counterpoint to Khrushchev’s hopes five years earlier to conquer Western Europe peacefully by demilitarizing the Cold War.

To the brink of war

Having scuppered negotiations with a Republican administration, Khrushchev had every reason to show a friendly face to the incoming Democratic one. From the intelligence he received about John F. Kennedy, the new president was much more disposed to making concessions than his predecessor. In

anticipation of a forthcoming summit, Khrushchev assured a closed gathering of East European leaders in March 1961 that he “really wanted to achieve an improvement of relations” with the United States and would “not needle without reason.”¹⁸ Yet this was precisely what he was going to do at the summit with Kennedy in Vienna in June.

Before that, in April, Khrushchev saw a display of the new administration’s ineptitude, as Washington first supported the abortive invasion of Cuba by anti-Communist exiles and then left them to their fate by ruling out the use of US forces in a prime area of American strategic interest. Having gained the impression that Kennedy “is not very smart,” Khrushchev decided to intimidate rather than conciliate the president. In outlining his plan to the party presidium at the end of May, he revealed his intention to go ahead with the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany that would terminate allied rights in West Berlin. “If we want to carry out our policy, and if we want it to be acknowledged, respected and feared, it is necessary to be firm,” he explained. “The risk that we are taking is justified. If we look at it in terms of a percentage, there is more than a 95 percent probability that there will be no war.”¹⁹

This was the only time during the Cold War that a responsible leader is known to have embarked upon a policy he estimated ran as much as a 5 percent risk of leading to a war that could escalate to a nuclear disaster. In a more open system of government, there would have been a discussion, and he would most probably have been stopped. In the Soviet system, only one member of the ruling group, Mikoian, dissented, rating the risk higher, but his opinion did not matter. On his way to Vienna, Khrushchev reiterated his estimate when he shared his plan with a select group of high-ranking Czechoslovak party officials as well, none of whom voiced a critical opinion either.

Kennedy, though ill-prepared for Khrushchev’s aggressiveness, did not behave at the summit like a weakling. He made it clear that the probability

18 Speech by N. Khrushchev, March 28 or 29, 1961, AÚV KSČ, 02/2, 303, 387, Central State Archives, Prague; also at “Records of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, 1955–1990,” www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/.

19 Quotes from records of N. Khrushchev’s meeting with Czechoslovak party leaders, June 1, 1961, in “‘Lenin tozhe riskoval’: nakanune vstrechi Khrushcheva i Kennedi v Vene v iunie 1961 g.” [“Lenin Took Risks, Too”: On the Eve of the June 1961 Khrushchev–Kennedy Meeting in Vienna], *Istochnik*, 1998, 3, 89, and of presidium meeting, May 26, 1961, in Aleksandr A. Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964* [Presidium of the CC CPSU, 1954–1964], vol. I, *Chernovyye protokolnye zapisi zasedanii: stenogrammy* [Draft Minutes and Stenographic Records of Meetings] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 503.

of a war provoked by unilateral Soviet action might be greater than Khrushchev estimated, but he stood his ground. He seemed to confirm Khrushchev's belief that US policy was unpredictable, presumably because of the influence of "certain groups" that could lead to decisions "not based on logic."²⁰ It was, however, the logic of his own decision to proceed toward the separate peace treaty that determined what would happen as long as the decision remained in effect.

Moscow prepared plans for a military contingency before Kennedy's announcement on July 26 of the dispatch of US reinforcements to Europe. Since the contingency would be triggered by Soviet rather than by American action, however, Soviet armed forces did not go on high alert. The American move did not alter Khrushchev's intention to proceed toward the treaty, although it must have influenced his estimate of the risk involved. Moscow finally authorized the insulation of West Berlin from the surrounding East Germany while the manner and timing of the measure apparently remained open.

When Khrushchev disclosed the imminence of this operation at a special secret meeting with East European leaders in Moscow on August 3–5, plans had been drawn both to sign the treaty and to deal with its likely consequences. They allowed for the possibility of not only a negotiated settlement but also military conflict. Once the work on sealing off West Berlin started on August 11, the Soviet Union thus moved closer to the brink of war. How close can now be reconstructed in considerable, though not full, detail.

The Wall and its aftermath

The sealing off proceeded in stages – first with barbed wire and only later by the construction of a concrete wall, all on Soviet-controlled territory. The procedure initially served to test the West's reaction to the violation of the agreements that allowed Berliners free movement through the whole city. Thereafter, steps were planned to block the allies' right to move freely in and out of their sectors. For them, however, it was the boldness of the challenge rather than its residual caution that mattered, all the more so since it caught them by surprise.

Available evidence disproves the common belief that the Wall had a stabilizing effect. Moscow let its East German clients plan on the assumption that a separate peace treaty would be signed. The possibility of a Western military response continued to be taken into account. The nature of the

²⁰ Record of presidium meeting, May 26, 1964, in Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium*, 503.

conflict expected to follow may be gleaned from the Warsaw Pact exercise, codenamed "Buria," organized in deepest secrecy at the headquarters of the Soviet forces in Germany in the second half of September.

The starting point of the exercise, whose codename meant "nuclear war," was the putative signing of the treaty on October 1, to which the allies would then respond by demonstrative displays of their military power. Moscow knew what form the displays might take because it was privy to their "Live Oak" secret contingency plans, spirited out by a French officer on the NATO staff. The options ranged from an attempt by the Western Allies to force their way through the Berlin autobahn by using armor to a demonstrative detonation of a nuclear bomb in the air above. The next step, according to the Buria scenario, was to be a massive thrust by Warsaw Pact forces into Western Europe, with extensive use of nuclear weapons, ending with the seizure of most of the continent within a few days.

Whatever the absurdity of such a scenario, it was believed to be feasible by its architects and remained the core of Soviet strategic planning as late as 1987 – the most disconcerting long-term legacy of the Berlin crisis. In the short term, however, uncertainty about the West's reaction continued to exercise a restraining influence on Khrushchev, postponing his final decision unilaterally to "normalize" the Berlin situation.

On the one hand, Moscow's ostentatious resumption of nuclear testing on September 1 may have been designed to discourage Western military response to the impending conclusion of the crucial treaty. On the other hand, the blasting, which climaxed in the detonation in the Arctic of the most powerful, if otherwise useless, nuclear device ever built, could also be seen as a cover-up of Khrushchev's incipient retreat from the brink of war to which he had been maneuvering himself.

Most probably, Khrushchev was still undecided. A document prepared for, though never submitted to, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union some time in September stated revealingly: "The draft of a peace treaty with the [German Democratic Republic] is essentially ready, but it would be appropriate to return later to make precise the provisions of this treaty by taking into account discussions with the Western powers."²¹ No such discussions were forthcoming; instead, what resulted was a showdown with the Chinese, who regarded Khrushchev's handling of the Berlin issue as more proof of his incompetence as a Communist leader. The manner in which the

21 Copy of the undated document from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation at the National Security Archive, Washington, RusSEE Data #2175.

China factor increasingly influenced his foreign policy at critical times would become an ongoing feature of how the Soviet system operated.

On October 17, Khrushchev finally announced the cancellation of his deadline for the signing of a German peace treaty at the same gathering of Communist parties in Moscow at which the Sino-Soviet rift first came into the open. To the unhappy Ulbricht, he later explained that “we achieved the maximum of what was possible.”²² The erection of the barrier that prevented access to the western sectors by East Germans, but allowed it to Westerners, resolved the Berlin question in practice; the solution of the larger German problem, however, would have to wait until the end of the Cold War.

The Cuban adventure

Khrushchev’s repeated attempts to reopen the issue of the peace treaty showed how unhappy he, too, was with the outcome that fell short of the high expectations he had entertained when he had first instigated confrontation over Berlin three years before. Meanwhile, Washington added to his distress by publicly announcing that the “missile gap” in favor of the Soviet Union did not exist; the gap was actually to Washington’s advantage. At the same time, the dénouement of the Berlin crisis coincided with tiny Albania’s brazen defiance of Soviet authority and its defection to the Chinese side – the first, though not the last, attack on the integrity of the Warsaw Pact.

As in 1955, Khrushchev tried to compensate for Soviet setbacks by expanding the geographical horizons of the Cold War – only this time by employing military force. Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov, who advocated breaking US maritime supremacy, went to Egypt to establish a base for the Soviet navy’s permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Moscow also meddled in the civil war in the faraway former Belgian Congo. And it responded to pleas by Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had recently declared himself a Communist, for Soviet arms to help protect his country from another US-backed invasion. In February 1962, Soviet intelligence confirmed that the Pentagon was planning to overthrow Castro by October – which was accurate as regards intentions, but no plan had yet been approved.

Enough evidence has filtered out of Russian archives to conclude that the main motive behind the Soviet decision to install offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba secretly was the desire to save the Cuban revolution from an American

22 Quoted in Douglas Selvage, “The End of the Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962: New Evidence from the Polish and East German Archives,” *CWIHPB*, 11 (1998), 221.

attack genuinely believed to be looming. Khrushchev himself made the decision, and it was endorsed in May by the inner core of the Kremlin leadership. Only afterward was it communicated to Castro, who approved enthusiastically. That Khrushchev could make such a weighty decision, and receive unanimous support from his colleagues, attested to the sway ideology held over all of them. The aging Bolsheviks were both captivated by the youthful Cuban revolutionaries and impelled to refurbish their own faded revolutionary credentials because of the growing pressure from the Chinese.

Even so, the idea of surreptitiously placing the deadly weapons in the United States' backyard was so far-fetched that no Washington official imagined that it could be seriously entertained. True to form, Khrushchev did not consider what he would do after triumphantly announcing the presence of the missiles during a projected visit to Havana in November. Nor did he have a backup plan in the likely event the deception would be exposed.

The operation, incongruously codenamed "Anadyr," after the capital of the Chukotka region in easternmost Siberia, started on July 4, the US national holiday. Astonishing in its magnitude and complexity, it eventually entailed transporting to Cuba 42,000 Soviet military personnel and 230,000 tons of materiel on 86 ships making 183 voyages. To conceal the main goal, the missiles and the troops to service them went last. Contrary to expert advice, however, four submarines, armed with nuclear torpedoes, left early and were all but certain to be detected by US sonar while sailing through the only channel they could take to Cuba.

Having set the risky operation in motion, Khrushchev was remarkably negligent in managing it. The United States was carefully monitoring Soviet movements by aerial surveillance and on September 4 warned the Soviet Union not to deploy any significant offensive capability there. Although Khrushchev suspected that the Americans had an inkling of what was going on, he did not desist. He went ahead not only with the installation of strategic missiles, which could be used for bargaining, but also with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, whose sole purpose was use in combat.²³

The precautions Moscow took against a potentially catastrophic release of the nuclear-armed missiles that were already in place were woefully inadequate. The Defense Ministry wanted to authorize the local Soviet commander in Cuba to fire them on his own responsibility in case of an emergency. The written order, however, was never sent. Whether the

23 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "The Pitsunda Decision: Khrushchev and Nuclear Weapons," *CWHPB*, 10 (March 1998), 223–24.

communication was transmitted orally and, if so, how it was understood, will probably never be clarified.

The discovery of the strategic – though not the tactical – missiles by US aircraft and the announcement on October 22 of Kennedy's imminent public address understandably threw Soviet leaders into a panic. The record of their emergency session shows Khrushchev lamenting the predicament he had gotten himself into: "The point is that we do not want to provoke war; we wanted to frighten the United States and deter it with regard to Cuba. The problem is that we have not focused on all that we should have done and have not made public an agreement. What is tragic is that they might attack, and then we will respond. This might lead to a major war."²⁴ How the tragedy was avoided is discussed elsewhere in this *Cambridge History*.²⁵

The tragedy of Soviet foreign policy

There was a deeper tragedy in the trajectory of Soviet foreign policy from Stalin's death to the Cuban drama. If his immediate successors could not afford to risk accommodation with the West because of their weakness within the Soviet system, Khrushchev dared to risk détente because of his belief in the system's fundamental strength. He went further than his predecessors in attempting to loosen Soviet dependence on military power abroad and on instruments of terror at home. In trying to demilitarize the Cold War, he was more farsighted than his Western adversaries, but the system ultimately let him down. When the upheaval in Eastern Europe exposed its vulnerability, he reverted to reliance on force.

Unlike the cynical and calculating Stalin, Khrushchev was an impatient improviser and compulsive schemer; if Stalin often calculated badly, Khrushchev often did not calculate at all. The Berlin crisis, gratuitously provoked by him and then aggravated by his mismanagement, was in an important sense even more dangerous than the later Cuban crisis. Neither side realized how close they came to a military conflict that could have occurred because of Khrushchev's disregard of the likely consequences of his actions. The perilous situation was an indictment less of his personal flaws than of those of the system that had brought him to power, allowing him to act the way he did. That peril would not pass with the passing of Khrushchev but only with the passing of the Soviet Union.

²⁴ Record of presidium meeting, October 22, 1962, in Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium*, 617.

²⁵ See James G. Hershberg's chapter in volume II.

East Central Europe, 1953–1956

CSABA BÉKÉS

During the period following Iosif Stalin's death, the fate of the East Central European region was determined by, on the one hand, the political status quo worked out at Yalta in 1945, and on the other hand, by the unstable and undefined New Course in Soviet policy under the dictator's successors.

The framework for ensuing developments in Eastern Europe was established at the end of World War II. Both superpowers attributed a pivotal importance to the tacit agreements reached by the Allies at the end of the war to recognize each other's spheres of interest. This mutual consent came to function as an automatic rule of thumb even in the chilliest years of the Cold War era, and in the coming decades it was to be demonstrated by the West's continuous inaction whenever the Soviets suppressed sporadic internal conflicts within their bloc. After Stalin's death, preserving the status quo remained a top priority for Moscow. Even though the incoming administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower launched a propaganda campaign for the "liberation of the captive nations," the new Soviet leaders never contemplated the surrender of the East Central European Communist states.

The two main elements of the post-Stalin New Course were a strategy of peaceful coexistence and some modification of the Soviet model. The former meant a more flexible foreign policy and the deepening of political and, especially, economic cooperation with the West, with the aim of improving the Soviet Union's chances of surviving the intensifying competition between the two blocs. At the same time, in addition to fostering East–West rapprochement, Moscow made efforts to penetrate the Third World and to restore the unity of the Soviet bloc by working toward a reconciliation with Yugoslavia. Within this post-Stalinist vision of a new international order, Moscow endeavored to create a special role for its European allies in which they would act as emancipated and sovereign actors that the West – especially Western Europe – and the Third World could accept as legitimate partners.

Modification of the Soviet model reflected specific local historical and economic factors as well as the geopolitical location of the East Central European region. The crises that occurred soon after Stalin's death in some of these countries reinforced the new leadership's belief that significant changes ought to be introduced in both the domestic life and the foreign policy of the empire. Remarkably, crises or semi-crisis situations occurred in the *relatively more developed* countries of the bloc – the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – which demonstrates that these societies, and particularly the working class and the intelligentsia, were far less tolerant of the experience of Sovietization than peoples in the other parts of the Soviet empire with significantly different economic, political, social, and cultural traditions. In Bulgaria, for instance, significant problems for the regime were seen only in the most developed branches of industry, as evidenced by the strikes in tobacco plants in 1953. Thus, boosting the political stability of East Central Europe by introducing economic and political reforms and by transforming the nature of cooperation with its allies became a top priority for Moscow.

There was a remarkable difference between the first uprisings that took place just after Stalin's death and the revolts of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. The first crises in 1953 stemmed from the Stalinist experience; that is, the people taking part in mass movements were motivated by essentially *economic* concerns. The revolts of October 1956, however, were the product of the de-Stalinization process directed from Moscow, and they can be regarded as predominantly *political* actions. The events in Poland and Hungary also clearly demonstrated the limits of the Soviet new course. The radically different means of handling the two crises illustrated the real boundaries of Soviet tolerance: Polish reforms preserving Communist rule and the unity of the Soviet alliance system were still tolerable, but the Hungarian revolution, which was rightly seen as the transformation of the regime into a Western-type democracy, had to be crushed. This pattern shows clearly that Moscow deemed the orderly political and economic functioning of these frontier states as vital to the Soviet empire.

The first crises

With the implementation of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, the Communist system was built up within a few years, but an extremely rapid pace of investment in heavy industry, especially in armaments and agricultural collectivization campaigns, soon exhausted the economies of these countries.

Omens of a potential crisis appeared as early as 1952, so an intervention by the Soviet Union in order to consolidate the economic situation and maintain political stability would have been necessary even if it had not been for the crisis that Stalin's death produced. By late 1952 or early 1953, bleak assessments of the deteriorating economic situation and the growing dissatisfaction of the population of East Central Europe had reached Moscow via the network of Soviet advisers that existed at every level of the local administrations. In Hungary, during the summer of 1952, there were the first cases of mass resistance to the system of compulsory agricultural deliveries then in effect. Strikes, refusals to meet quotas, and even acts of violence occurred.¹

By the spring of 1953, the Communist regimes of East Central Europe had fallen into a state of persistent economic and political crisis. In the months following Stalin's death, a series of events took place in the region that exposed the dubious stability of the governments established on the Soviet pattern. The most striking feature of the revolts was that the demonstrations generally started with predominantly economic grievances, but that then the slogans quickly assumed an openly political and anti-Communist character, including calls for the resignation of the government and the holding of free elections.

On May 3, 1953, workers in tobacco factories near Plovdiv and Khaskovo in the southern part of Bulgaria, the country seen as most loyal to the Soviet Union, went on strike and organized a demonstration against inflated productivity demands. On-the-spot negotiations led by a top-ranking Communist official soon put an end to the unrest, but the organizers were severely punished nevertheless.² Shortly afterwards, in Czechoslovakia, a revolt took place that revealed the existence not only of popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation, but also of doubts as to the legitimacy of the Communist regime itself. In April–May 1953, strikes and protests took place in more than a dozen cities on news of an imminent monetary reform that might severely endanger the public's savings. Then, on June 1, a genuine anti-Communist uprising broke out in Plzeň where workers and citizens seized the city hall and took local power in their own hands. They demanded that the

1 János M. Rainer, *The New Course in Hungary in 1953*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 38 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), 1.

2 For a contemporary Bulgarian report on the events, see Christian F. Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001), 86–89.

government step down, that Communist rule cease, and that free elections be held. Internal security and the armed forces cracked down on the revolt very severely; thousands of participants were arrested and sentenced to lengthy imprisonment.³

Less than two weeks later, social unrest exploded in East Germany as well. Moscow was keenly aware that the economic situation was on the verge of crisis. East Germany's mounting social unrest was vividly demonstrated by the burgeoning refugee crisis during the spring of 1953.⁴ Having fruitlessly urged the Socialist Unity Party to enact reforms in April and May, the Soviets summoned East German leaders to Moscow for consultations on June 2–4, where they instructed them to introduce a New Course of more liberal and flexible political direction and to terminate immediately the forced program of "Socialist Construction" that had originally been launched on Stalin's order in the summer of 1952.⁵ The new political line was announced in an unexpected government communiqué on June 11. The new approach reduced production in heavy industry and correspondingly boosted the output of consumer goods, but it also reduced restrictions on foreign travel, suspended the collectivization of agriculture, and ended constraints on religious practices. The Soviets intended all these concessions to alleviate social discontent and, additionally, to foster a better climate for future negotiations with the West on the potential reunification of Germany.

Despite all these precautions, the Berlin uprising in June 1953 erupted because GDR leaders were reluctant to follow instructions from Moscow and also because their significant concessions were announced without any preparatory propaganda. People saw it all as a sign of the regime's weakness. When it turned out that the leadership – contrary to expectations – was unwilling to revoke the almost 10 percent increase in labor quotas introduced at the end of May, workers in the construction industry went on strike. The revolt soon spread to the entire country, and there is reason to believe that it would have led to a rapid collapse of the Communist system if not for the presence and intervention of Soviet troops.

The demonstrations began as protests over economic conditions, but very soon evolved into an anti-Communist uprising that demanded the resignation

3 Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany*, 113–27 and 128–32.

4 Mark Kramer, "The Early Post Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East Central Europe: Internal–External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making," part I, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1999), 12–15.

5 For the records of the meeting of the GDR and Soviet leaders, see Ostermann, (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany*, 137–38.

of the government, the creation of non-Communist parties, and free elections. Protestors opposed the formation of an East German army and called for a general strike. News of the events in Berlin quickly spread to the whole country, particularly through newscasts by Western radio stations. According to some estimates, about half a million people took part in often rather violent incidents in 560 cities of the GDR.⁶ The revolt, which endangered Communist rule and might well have resulted in its total collapse, was emphatically quelled by the tanks of the Soviet army.

Soviet leaders were well aware of the economic situation in Eastern Europe since the spring of 1953, and they understood the meaning of events in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. What might have been especially worrying for them was how the demonstrations had started out as demands of an economic nature, but had evolved in a matter of hours into widespread protests calling for the elimination of the Communist system by the industrial working class, a segment of the population that should have been the ideological base of the regime.

In order to avoid such developments and maintain political stability, Moscow believed that radical changes needed to be introduced in the East Central European countries. The model for these changes was the New Course imposed on the GDR by the Soviets, the implementation of which was made obligatory first for the Hungarian and then for the Albanian leaders at a Moscow briefing in June 1953. Similar consultations with Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Bulgarian leaders were also scheduled in Moscow, but were canceled amidst the uncertain situation following Beria's arrest at the end of June.⁷ Instead, the leaders of these countries received their respective directives on how to introduce the new political line through conventional channels. Accordingly, from July to September the New Course was also announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. The reform package generally featured the following policies: the lightening of repressive measures against the people, a reduction in mass terror and violence, a qualified amnesty for political prisoners (starting with imprisoned Communists), a general "restoration of socialist lawfulness," significant cuts in heavy industrial output, drastic reductions in the hitherto-prioritized defense industry, significant output increases in light industry – especially in the production of consumer goods that could provide the supplies necessary to raise living

⁶ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁷ Kramer, "The Early Post Stalin Succession Struggle," 31.

standards – and, lastly, the termination of forced collectivization in agriculture or, at least, a decrease in the pace of establishing cooperative farms.

Thus, at least some elements of the New Course appeared in one form or another in each country. Local political conditions had a significant influence on the process; the formerly Stalinist leaders were willing to apply the new policy in a selective fashion, with most of their decisions subordinated to the goal of retaining political power at any cost.

In most cases the Soviets delegated implementation of the new policy to the very same local leaders who had until recently been in competition with each other for the title of Stalin's best student. Fundamental changes in the leadership personnel occurred only in Hungary, where the Soviets ordered Mátyás Rákosi to relinquish the office of prime minister to Imre Nagy, who had previously been criticized as a nationalist deviationist. Moscow's expectation of a successful implementation of the new policy by the old cadres can largely be attributed to the fact that these leaders had always eagerly executed every order without hesitation. They had been willing to allow their economies to be exploited by the Kremlin to help expedite the overall rearmament of the Eastern bloc and to hasten reconstruction within the Soviet Union. Consequently, when the time came to introduce relief measures, the Soviets hoped that Stalin's minions in Eastern Europe would be just as eager to implement policies aimed at improving the general conditions of their people. In several cases, Moscow's reasoning proved to be flawed: some of these local leaders actually preferred to preserve the Stalinist mechanisms of power.

Nevertheless, the Soviets did try to reduce the concentration of power that was so strongly reminiscent of the Stalinist era. The main way to achieve this goal was to promote the Soviet practice of collective leadership in each country. The Soviets made it a habit to deal with a group of senior partners in each of the satellite states rather than the official leader of each country alone. On the basis of the new Soviet model, the position of prime minister, and the role of the state administration more generally, was reevaluated. Since the Soviets believed that removing the head of a ruling Communist Party was too risky, no such attempt was made until the summer of 1956. However, in the spirit of collective leadership, there were changes in the top echelon of almost every country in the course of 1953–54. Whereas previously the offices of party leader and prime minister had typically been filled by the same person, they were now usually separated.

During 1953–54, the most notable developments took place in Hungary. Following Moscow's directives, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party passed a secret resolution in June 1953 that severely criticized

the former leadership for its Stalinist policies and called for several important changes of personnel.⁸ Subsequently, the newly appointed prime minister, Nagy, announced an ambitious reform program with main points that were roughly in accordance with the original Soviet concept of the New Course. The implementation of the plan began in the fall of 1953 and, although no structural changes were introduced in the system, these reforms significantly ameliorated living conditions and raised public support for the regime. However, a struggle for power soon unfolded between Nagy and the Stalinist Rákosi. With the fall of Soviet premier Georgii Malenkov, the Soviet leadership eventually took the side of the latter. In April 1955, Nagy was relieved of his responsibilities.

Soviet–East European relations in transformation

The permissible pace and scope of post-Stalin political reform in East Central Europe depended greatly upon which faction happened to have the upper hand in the incessant power struggles within the Soviet leadership, but there was never any question in Moscow that the satellite states should remain inside the Soviet empire. At the same time, Soviet leaders were ready to figure out and employ a more flexible and reliable model of cooperation, a model which would be more predictable for both parties in the course of normal, day-to-day relations between Moscow and the East Central European states. While previously this had generally meant direct and exclusive contact between Stalin and the top leaders of each East European country – the local “little Stalins” – the Soviet leaders now did their best to strengthen the local collective leadership in each country and to maintain contact with them. Another new feature was that the occasional ad hoc consultations that formerly had occurred were replaced by regular bilateral and multilateral meetings at a senior level.

As early as June 1953, during talks with the Hungarian leadership, the Soviets explicitly stated that they wanted to rejuvenate their relationship with their allies in Eastern Europe. According to Lavrentii Beria, the relations had not evolved in a productive fashion. “In the future we will create a new kind of relationship, a more responsible and serious relationship,” he promised. Malenkov said that the paradigm would be entirely different from that

8 For the text of the resolution, see Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002), 24–33.

of the past, and Beria added that Moscow would keep its allies informed, hinting at the preparation of a special memorandum containing new directives.⁹ While no such document emerged until October 30, 1956, interactions with the allies did change remarkably between 1953 and 1955. However, this did not mean any radical adjustment of the subordinate status of the East European satellite states; the changes merely regulated and rationalized the established hierarchy. When Soviet leaders believed they could achieve their goal only by brutal political intervention, they sharply rebuked the leaders of East European countries in tones that often outdid even Stalin. In January 1955, when the Hungarian leaders were again summoned to Moscow for consultations, Khrushchev practically threatened Nagy with execution.¹⁰ In perceived emergencies, when Soviet imperial interests seemed at risk, the men in the Kremlin did not shrink from using the most drastic means possible. In October 1956, they threatened to intervene militarily in Poland, and in November they invaded Hungary and put an end to the revolution there.

Nonetheless, Moscow hoped to improve relations. The Warsaw Pact, established in May 1955, was designed to promote unity and also to strengthen Soviet dominance within the bloc. But this political-military alliance gradually came to be the catalyst for a new era in Soviet–East Central European relations. The Warsaw Pact imitated the organizational framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in theory was a voluntary alliance of sovereign and equal states. The scheduling of multilateral and regular meetings constituted a qualitative change with respect to former conditions. Previously, only bilateral consultations were held regularly, and they were normally initiated by the Soviets; likewise, multilateral discussions and interbloc summit meetings could be instigated by Moscow alone. Thus, in interesting ways, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact increased the international reputation of the allied states, heretofore referred to as “Soviet satellite states” in the West. Thereafter, Moscow encouraged its allies to use their diplomatic stature for the benefit of the entire Eastern bloc. Their task was to promote the success of Soviet goals in Europe and, even more so, in the Third World, especially in Asia, the Arab states, and Latin America. In Europe, they were supposed to develop economic ties with

⁹ *Ibid.*, 22; quoted from the Hungarian document in Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle,” 40.

¹⁰ “You are not without merits. But then again, Zinovyev and Rykov were not without merits either, perhaps they were more meritorious than you are, and yet we did not hesitate to take firm steps against them when they became a threat to the party”: Békés, Byrne, and Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 63.

West European states; in the Third World, their job was to facilitate Soviet economic and political penetration, and to ensure the Kremlin's lasting influence.¹¹

At the beginning of January 1956, hardly a month before the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), leaders of the European Communist countries participated in Moscow's most important summit since Stalin's death. At the meeting, Khrushchev stressed the importance of the new "active foreign policy" doctrine, by which the socialist camp was to strengthen its international position. "It is true that the Soviet Union is the great force of our camp," said Khrushchev, "but if we organized our work in a more flexible way, the Soviet Union would not always have to be the first to take action. In certain situations one or another people's democracy could take action and then the Soviet Union would support that country."¹²

Although no initiatives had yet been taken, this strategy became the model for cooperation among the states of the Soviet bloc, especially from the mid-1960s until the collapse of the Communist regimes in East Central Europe. From 1954 on, Moscow kept its allies informed on matters of international politics, often outlining actions that the Soviets planned to take in the area of East-West relations. This practice meant radical change: between the last session of Cominform in November 1949 and Stalin's death in March 1953 only one such meeting seems to have occurred, but seven summits took place from November 1954 to January 1957.

Nikita S. Khrushchev wanted to remake the basic foundations of intrabloc relations essentially by modifying the terms of those relations from those of *colony* to *dominium*. In formal terms, the position of the allies was even more promising: they could now participate in shaping bloc policies as equal partners in the Warsaw Pact and in the Comecon (which was roused from dormancy in the spring of 1956). It was an important element of Khrushchev's thinking that the Eastern bloc enjoy at least ostensibly equivalent capabilities and conditions in its peaceful competition with the West.

11 For the text of a complex policy paper on the future role of the Soviet bloc in world policy, prepared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry for the summit meeting of European Communist leaders in Moscow in early January 1956, see *ibid.*, 106–15.

12 Speech by N. S. Khrushchev at the meeting of the European socialist countries' leaders, Moscow, January 4, 1956, Hungarian National Archives, M KS-276.f. 62/84.ő.e., quoted in Csaba Békés, "The Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process, 1965–1970," in Wilfried Loth and Georges Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 216, n. 3.

De-Stalinization and destabilization

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in February 1956, brought fundamental changes to the East Central European countries. The principle of peaceful coexistence, which was articulated by the Soviet leadership as early as 1953, now acquired the status of long-term doctrine, and would be in force until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This principle, based on the thesis that war between the socialist and capitalist camps was *not* inevitable, enabled the countries of the Soviet bloc to concentrate their resources on internal development to a much greater extent than before.

This was a promising development from the point of view of East–West relations in general, and it also led to significant changes within the Soviet bloc, both in terms of the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies (as mentioned above) and in terms of the internal development of each East European country. Khrushchev's vision for the Soviet bloc was to ensure sustainable political stability through a general process of de-Stalinization, in which each state could maintain economic growth and provide sufficient food supplies and tolerable living conditions *without* changing the basic structure of the Leninist–Stalinist Communist system.

The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 created the necessary conceptual preconditions for this move. Although party leaders in Eastern Europe were not invited to the meeting at which Khrushchev delivered his secret report on the crimes committed by Stalin, they were subsequently sent the full text of the speech. In Poland, against the wishes of Soviet leaders, the speech was circulated for three successive weeks in April 1956 to a much wider audience, including nonparty members.¹³ Nor did the Kremlin anticipate that the text would fall into the hands of Western intelligence services. The US State Department then published the full text on June 4, and, thereafter, it was broadcast on Radio Free Europe in the various languages of the region.

Just as the original process of Sovietization between 1944 and 1949 was different in each Eastern bloc state, de-Stalinization took a significantly different course in several of these countries. Seeking to maintain political stability at any cost, the Soviets did not impose truly radical changes, so they left de-Stalinization mostly in the hands of “local Stalins.” In turn, the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania claimed that their countries did not

13 Pawel Machcewicz, “Social Protest and Political Crisis in 1956,” in A. Kemp Welch (ed.), *Stalinism in Poland 1944–1956: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies*, Warsaw, 1995 (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 102–04.

need any new, significant changes because they had been evolving since 1953. Nevertheless, large numbers of political prisoners were granted amnesty in the spring and summer of 1956 in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.¹⁴

The attitude of the leaders in Bulgaria was very similar, although they could not avoid sacrificing some of their colleagues. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian dictator, was forced to hand over leadership of the party to Todor Zhivkov as early as 1954, and in April 1956 he lost the office of prime minister as well. A revised outcome to Trajcho Kostov's show trial in 1949 transpired soon after. However, Chervenkov kept his position in the leadership with the dual role of deputy prime minister and member of the Politburo, and he was quite successful in sabotaging the process of de-Stalinization until 1962. Nevertheless, since Chervenkov was the first top-level victim of de-Stalinization in the Soviet bloc, his downfall had an important impact in the whole region and inspired hope for similar changes in other countries, especially in Hungary.

In Poland, the situation was also unique. Bolesław Bierut, the leading Polish Stalinist, fell ill while attending the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and died in Moscow. Khrushchev nominated his successor, Edward Ochab, who appeared to be the optimal candidate to implement the Soviet policy of de-Stalinization. In April, in the spirit of controlled liberalization, a general amnesty liberated and rehabilitated several thousand political convicts, and in the same month the parliament engaged in a real discussion of important national issues.¹⁵ Władisław Gomułka, the former head of the party who had managed to survive the Stalinist show trials that befell his counterparts elsewhere in the region, emerged from prison, raising the question of whether he might return to the country's leadership. From the beginning of 1955, ferment spread in the party and the larger society. After the publication of Khrushchev's speech, people not only ridiculed the most extreme aspects of the Stalinist system and the mass terror, but they also clamored for more political freedom and national sovereignty.

In Hungary, Rákosi managed to muster Soviet support to stay in power until July 1956, although conditions for an anti-Stalinist turn had been ripening since the fall of 1955. Writers, journalists, and other intellectuals exerted pressure for change, especially after Rákosi had been forced to admit his personal responsibility for some of the worst show trials of the late 1940s.

14 François Fejtő, *A History of the People's Democracies*, 2 vols., translated by Daniel Weissbort (New York: Praeger, 1971), 68–70.

15 Machcewicz, "Social Protest and Political Crisis," 107.

Within the Petőfi Circle, founded as the official discussion forum of the party's youth organization, opposition to the established leadership began to surface, and Nagy emerged as the reformers' choice for the top leadership post.

Meanwhile, communications and interactions within the Soviet bloc also began to change. Since 1949, the citizens of "fraternal" countries were almost hermetically closed off from one another, but in the summer of 1956 the obligatory visa system was partially abolished. Officials passed other measures to promote tourism and freer movement. Easier contact and direct communication between the societies of East Central Europe were to play important roles in the revolutionary events that broke out in the fall.

The normalization of relations with Yugoslavia – suspended in 1948 – was an element of the change taking place.¹⁶ The rapprochement took place under continuous Soviet leadership, since for Khrushchev it was very important to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Eastern bloc. Apart from reestablishing the unity of the Communist camp and dissolving the Cominform, Soviet leaders hoped to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia, however, did not imply that Moscow was prepared to accept the Yugoslav model of socialism for its East Central European allies. In fact, the Kremlin was wary of Yugoslavia's growing influence in the region, most notably in Poland and Hungary. Soviet officials suspected that the Yugoslav socialist model – with an active popular front, extensive workers' self-management, and a record of attentiveness to local and national concerns – might prove more appealing than the Soviet system. Thus, the Kremlin's main purpose for convening a Soviet bloc summit in late June 1956 was to inform the allies about Tito's recent two-week visit to the Soviet Union and to insure they did not misinterpret the evolving relationship. Later in July, the presidium of the CPSU sent a secret communiqué to the leaders of the allied countries, cautioning them that the Soviet Union would take a dim view of any exaggerated promotion of the Yugoslav model.¹⁷

At the same time, the Soviet leadership started worrying about the course of internal developments in East Central Europe. Their concerns were not without foundation, for on June 28, 1956, an armed uprising broke out in the industrial city of Poznań in Poland, in the course of which the workers fought a real battle with Polish military and state security troops. The events unfolded along the lines of the pattern seen before in Plzeň and East Berlin: a mass demonstration began with demands of an economic nature, but quickly turned

16 On the Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement, see Svetozar Rajak's chapter in this volume.

17 Békés, Byrne, and Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 136–42.

into an anti-Communist uprising. The insurgents seized the police headquarters, armed themselves, and then broke into the public prosecutor's office. They stormed prisons, freed prisoners, and then assaulted the headquarters of the security forces. The violence claimed the lives of seventy-three civilians and eight members of the armed forces, while several hundred people were wounded.¹⁸

Following the Poznań uprising, the Soviets were eager to avoid further outbreaks of social discontent in the region and decided upon political intervention as their method. They decided to replace Rákosi as the head of the Hungarian party in July 1956, thereby hoping to ease political tensions in the country. CPSU presidium member Anastas Mikoian went to Budapest, and advised the reluctant Hungarian Workers' Party Central Committee to elect Ernő Gerő, another leading Stalinist, as first secretary of the party. This displeased the Hungarians who – since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU – had been expecting a more flexible and reformed Communist system. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Mikoian informed local leaders that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to assist the Hungarian party.¹⁹ Khrushchev passed a similar message to Tito through Veljko Micunovic, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, informing him that, should conditions deteriorate, the Soviet leadership was prepared to use all possible means to deal with the situation in Hungary and prevent a breach in the socialist camp.²⁰

October 1956: revolts in Poland and Hungary

Immediately after the Poznań uprising, events moved swiftly in Poland. Social ferment grew, and people began calling openly for reform and change. With patriotic fervor and nationalist sensibilities soaring, there was a genuine danger that the existing leadership of the party, distracted by internal factionalism, might fail to diffuse the situation. In mid-October 1956, to coopt public sentiment, the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party decided to elect the once-discredited Gomułka as first secretary and to exclude the most discredited Stalinist officials from the top levels of the party. These radical personnel changes were approved by the Eighth Plenum of the party's Central

18 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, translated by Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), 202.

19 Mikoian's report to the CPSU CC, July 14, 1956, published in Vjacseszlav Szereda and Alekszandr Sztikalin (eds.), *Hiányzó lapok 1956 történetéből: dokumentumok a volt. SZKP KB levéltárából* [Missing Pages from the History of 1956: Documents from the Archives of the Former CPSU CC] (Budapest: Móra, 1993), 40.

20 Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary, 1956–1958*, translated by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 86 (July 15, 1956).

Committee (CC) that began on October 19. Since Gomułka's election evoked enthusiasm across the country, these decisions meant that the reformist forces within the party had achieved a real victory, offering the possibility that they could ease social discontent and pacify the country.

However, Soviet leaders were not consulted about this fundamental change, an unprecedented occurrence in the Soviet camp. They feared that it might be a prelude to the collapse of the entire Communist system. Khrushchev and a top-level Kremlin delegation quickly made a surprise visit to Warsaw on October 19 and confronted Polish authorities. They also prepared to authorize the Red Army to intervene, if necessary. Soviet troops, already stationed in Poland, began to move toward Warsaw. Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate power, but his actions threatened to initiate armed conflict between the Soviet Union and its biggest East European ally.

Eventually, in a dramatic faceoff between the two men, Gomułka convinced Khrushchev to accept the leadership changes in Poland in return for assurances that the political reforms would threaten neither local Communist rule nor the unity of the Soviet bloc.²¹ This agreement made a peaceful solution of the crisis possible, thereby avoiding a social explosion and a military clash.

Poles expressed their support for Gomułka in thousands of mass rallies and demonstrations all over the country. The acclaim constituted a notable achievement for the party because the majority of people shared an anti-Soviet and basically anti-Communist attitude. Nonetheless, Poles believed that Gomułka was protecting the "Polish path to socialism," and inaugurating a bold anti-Soviet move.²²

At the same time, Gomułka cleverly played a nationalist card of a different sort. Although Poles had taken to the streets calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops (as many Hungarians would also do, several days later), Gomułka convinced the people that "Polish state interests" required the Red Army to guarantee the country's western borders. At the end of World War II, Poland had acquired German territory in the west as compensation for territory lost to the Soviet Union in the east. However, no peace treaty guaranteeing Poland's territorial integrity had been concluded. Thus, just a decade later, fear of West German revanchism was widespread in Poland, and Gomułka sought to allay these apprehensions and placate the Kremlin at the same time.

21 For contemporary Polish accounts of the talks with the Soviet delegation, see L. W. Gluchowsky, "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomułka and the 'Polish October,'" *CWIHP Bulletin*, 5 (1995), 40–43.

22 Machcewicz, "Social Protest and Political Crisis," 116–18.

In Hungary, the situation had been extremely tense since the summer of 1956 because party leaders were reluctant to make significant concessions even after Rákosi's replacement. In early October, at the reburial ceremony of László Rajk and his companions, who had been executed after a show trial, more than a hundred thousand people silently demonstrated against an inhumane system. On October 16, at a mass rally, university students in Szeged established an independent student organization, and on October 22, at another rally, their fellow students in Budapest listed their demands in sixteen points. In addition to wanting the appointment of Nagy as prime minister and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress – desires shared by the party's internal opposition – the students' sixteen points included more radical demands, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and fair multiparty elections.

In Budapest, on October 23, these university students began a peaceful pro-reform demonstration to declare their solidarity with reformers in Poland. The demonstration escalated into an armed revolt by evening. To repress the uprising, the leadership requested the intervention of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary. After much hesitation, the CPSU presidium agreed. But the decision produced unintended results: instead of rapidly pacifying the situation, sporadic armed incidents evolved into a widespread anti-Soviet battle for liberation.

While the use of local forces, as Mikoian had suggested in the meeting of the CPSU presidium, might have offered a slim chance of a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the Soviet intervention radicalized the Hungarian population and exacerbated the situation. In a few days the revolution spread across the country, a general strike took place, and all over Hungary workers' councils and revolutionary committees snatched power from local authorities.

Although Nagy was appointed prime minister on October 24 in the hope that he would be able to calm the crowds, there was little chance he could do so under prevailing conditions. Nagy realized that the fate of the revolution was entirely in the hands of the Soviet Union. From the very outset of negotiations with a high-ranking Soviet delegation led by Mikoian and Mikhail Suslov, he endeavored to convince them that with adequate support he could stabilize the situation.²³ But, rather than suppressing the armed resistance, he argued that the most effective way to bring it under control

23 The Soviet delegation that arrived in Budapest on October 24 consisted of Politburo members A. I. Mikoian and M. A. Suslov, KGB head I. Serov, and deputy chief of staff M. S. Malinin.



27. Hungary 1956: a man burning a picture of a statue of Lenin.

was to place the party at the head of the mass social movement that undergirded the revolution.

Events during the following days seemed to vindicate Nagy's policy. Pledging to stabilize the situation in Hungary, he sought to extract further concessions from the Soviets. On October 28, Moscow agreed to the new government's program, calling events in Hungary a "broad national movement," instead of a "counterrevolution," promising to dissolve the secret police, legalize the revolutionary organizations, and withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest. On October 29, Red Army units began to pull back from the capital. The next day, the Soviet government issued a declaration with an explicit promise to lay a new foundation for relations between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries based on mutual equality and

noninterference in domestic affairs. In addition, the declaration promised to consider the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary entirely, a core demand of the revolutionary groups since the beginning of the revolt.

The Soviet leadership was serious about all this: on October 30, the presidium – under pressure from a Chinese delegation that had been sent to Moscow – unanimously decided that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary.²⁴ But the possibility of such a withdrawal did not mean the Kremlin was willing to “give up” Hungary. It was in fact the maximum political concession that Soviet leaders were willing to make in order to avoid a recourse to military intervention, an action they knew was the worst possible solution. In fact, had Nagy’s government been able to consolidate the situation, *without jeopardizing the Communist regime and the integrity of the Soviet bloc*, the Kremlin would not have intervened militarily.

The Malin notes of the discussions at meetings of the presidium make clear that the withdrawal would have been considered only if the Hungarians had satisfied Moscow’s two conditions. Foreign Minister Shepilov explained: “With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops. We’ll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.”²⁵ Even Mikoian, who consistently represented the most liberal viewpoint among Soviet leaders, said at a session of the presidium on November 1: “We simply cannot let Hungary be removed from our camp.” Meanwhile, however, he did try to convince the others that a political solution was still possible and that they should wait another ten to fifteen days before invading.²⁶

While considering the withdrawal of troops, Soviet leaders never intended to allow the restoration of the capitalist system. Instead, they hoped to restore a situation akin to that in Poland. They were prepared to accept a reformed Communist system, displaying more independence internally, but remaining loyal to Moscow and within the confines of the Soviet bloc.

Yet, on October 31, one day after taking the decision to pull out their troops, the Kremlin abruptly reversed its position. Soviet leaders canceled their previous order and decided to mount an even more massive military operation. Alarming news from Hungary explains this radical aboutface, news that

24 For the ambiguous role of the Chinese leadership in the Polish and Hungarian crises in 1956, see Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 145–62.

25 “The ‘Malin notes’ on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997), 392.

26 *Ibid.*, 394.

suggested a general disintegration of the regime: the installation of a multi-party system, the dissolution of the secret police, the collapse of the party leadership, the passivity of the armed forces, the freedom of the press, and violent acts against Communist officials. The Kremlin realized that Communist power in Hungary was on the verge of collapse, and this assessment led Soviet leaders to conclude that the possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the crisis had been exhausted.

Inside Hungary, signs of Moscow's prospective intervention multiplied at an alarming rate: on October 31 came the first reports that fresh Soviet troops were entering the country and occupying all the important strategic locations. It was at this point, when it became clear that a Soviet invasion was imminent, that the Cabinet decided to make a heroic last-ditch effort to preserve the revolution. On November 1, it announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and declared the country's neutrality. At the same time, Nagy sent an appeal to the secretary-general of the United Nations requesting that the four great powers assist in the defense of Hungary's neutrality and that the matter be urgently placed on the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly.

On November 4, the Soviets launched a massive invasion and crushed the revolution in a few days. A countergovernment led by János Kádár was installed, while Nagy and his associates temporarily took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. After this second Soviet intervention, some 200,000 people fled the country to the West. During the revolution, 2,700 people were killed. Communist reprisals and terror led to the detention of 13,000 people, the imprisonment of over 20,000, and the execution of 230 – including Prime Minister Nagy and several of his closest associates.

The legacies of the Polish and Hungarian revolts

The most obvious outcome of the failed revolution in Hungary for international politics was that the Western states, by not intervening, had proved once and for all their unconditional acceptance of the postwar European status quo. Despite all their propaganda about the "liberation of the enslaved nations," it meant nothing. This was a great consolation for the Soviet leadership: beyond any previous agreement they had had with the Western states, the noninterference of the West in November 1956 reassured Kremlin officials that, should any future conflict occur within the boundaries of their empire, they would have a free hand.

Western condemnation of the Soviet intervention was limited to the arena of propaganda and to debates in the United Nations General Assembly.

Nevertheless, after several years of ineffectually condemning Soviet behavior, the United States adopted a more pragmatic policy. In secret talks between US officials and the Kádár regime, Washington agreed to remove the Hungarian question from the General Assembly's agenda in December 1962 in exchange for which the Hungarian government in 1963 granted a general amnesty to the majority of those who had been imprisoned because of their participation in the 1956 revolution.

In the decades following 1956, the Hungarian revolution yielded several legacies in East Central Europe. The leaders of the various regimes learned from Hungary's example that attempts at radical party reform could easily lead to the collapse of the Communist political monopoly. They also learned that in such cases the Soviets would not hesitate to restore order by any means necessary, including the most brutal ones. Conversely, however, the Hungarian revolution also demonstrated that East Central European leaders ignored social demands and public opinion at their own peril. Even though they had seen that any threatened regime could rely on Soviet help in the event of some political crisis, local leaders could also expect to be held responsible and to be replaced.

In these ways, the Hungarian revolution largely contributed to the success of the effort to build a post-Stalinist Communist order in the Soviet Union and throughout East Central Europe. The October 1956 Polish crisis, with its contrasting positive outcome, also strengthened the same trend. The Polish example demonstrated that a limited campaign of moderate reforms which did not imperil the political system, or threaten the security of the Eastern military bloc, could be implemented even against the will of the Soviet leadership. More than anything else, this Polish precedent motivated the Czechoslovakian Communist reformers in 1968.²⁷

The final lesson of the events of 1956 was that they ended any hopes in East Central Europe that the Soviet yoke could be thrown off by active revolt. The inaction of the West, the brutality of the Soviet intervention, and the broad scope of retaliatory measures combined to dispel that illusion. In the course of the decades that followed, this understanding undergirded all reform activities in Eastern bloc states. While consciously taking the security interests of the Soviet Union into account, those wishing for change worked gradually but effectively to liberalize the Communist system. They no longer aimed to overthrow it.

27 For 1968 and its aftermath, see the chapter by Anthony Kemp Welch in volume II.

The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962

SHU GUANG ZHANG

The superpowers' competition for allies constituted a large part of the Cold War in Asia. The alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in February 1950 seemed to be a major diplomatic victory for Moscow. How to maintain the alliance proved a serious challenge. Conventional wisdom dictates that the commonalities in ideological, economic, political, and security interests between the two Communist powers would sustain the compact. Along with the personal idiosyncrasies of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev, cultural, racial, and domestic factors, nevertheless, eroded the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet alliance. This chapter aims to reconstruct how Beijing and Moscow tried to maintain the alliance, and how the corrosive Sino-Soviet partnership affected the course of the Cold War in Asia.

From the Korean War to the Hungarian uprising

From the outset, the Sino-Soviet alliance was loaded with expectations and aspirations. When the alliance treaty was signed, China wanted more than the Soviet Union was willing to give: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders aspired to secure Moscow's commitment to defending China, not only to thwart a perceived threat from the United States, but also to ensure that the Kremlin would be a more reliable partner in the future than it had been in the past. They still remembered Stalin's reluctance to support the CCP fully during China's anti-Japanese war (1931–45) and his making deals with Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) during the civil war (1945–49).¹ Ideologically, however, Mao had mixed feelings toward Stalin-style Communism. Although

¹ Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese–American Confrontations, 1948–1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 13–33; Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944–1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 32–36.

identifying himself as a Marxist, Mao aimed to apply Marxist-Leninist principles to Chinese realities. His open proclamation to “lean” to the Soviet side in 1949 was more a political move – intended to contain calls within and outside his party for taking a “third road” rather than following Soviet or American models – than an ideological requirement.² For economic reconstruction, Beijing intended to learn from the Soviet experiences but without necessarily relying on Soviet assistance. Although trying to avoid expected Soviet interference, Mao found it unrealistic to be completely self-reliant, given China’s war-torn economy and political instability.³

The Korean War was the first serious test of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Soviet military aid – materiel and personnel – supporting China’s intervention in Korea was evidence of Moscow’s will to keep its promise. Mao’s decision to confront the United States in Korea was in part to prove to Stalin that the former was not an “Asian Tito” but a trustworthy partner.⁴ After the conflict came to a halt in July 1953, Beijing began to amend its expectations of the alliance. With the security situation in East Asia more stable, the CCP was filled with anxieties, wanting to expedite economic reconstruction, upgrade defense capability, and minimize the impact of the Western economic embargo on China. To these ends, it expected Soviet economic and technological aid to play a crucial role.⁵ By sacrificing itself to save North Korea on the Soviet Union’s behalf, Beijing expected Moscow to reciprocate with favors.

Khrushchev’s Kremlin did not disappoint Beijing in the immediate post-Korean War years. In May 1953 (only two months after Stalin’s death), Anastas Mikoyan and China’s Vice Premier Li Fuchun signed an agreement in Moscow that the Soviet Union would provide technology and equipment to build up to ninety-one defense-related projects.⁶ A large number of Soviet experts began to arrive in China, and even larger numbers of Chinese students were

2 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 63–64. See also Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

3 Di Chaobai, “The Great Implications of the Sino-Soviet Agreement on Loans,” *Renmin ribao* [People’s Daily], March 2, 1950, 2.

4 Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 17–20; Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 55–84.

5 Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 59–68.

6 *Dangdai Zhongguo duiwai maoyi* [China Today: Foreign Trade], vol. II (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo, 1992), 258–59 (hereafter DDZGDWY).

accepted to study advanced science and technologies in top Soviet universities. Mao, in turn, supported Khrushchev's political position in the USSR.⁷

Once Khrushchev's control over the Kremlin was more secure, there was substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev visited China from September 29 to October 16, 1954. He and Mao met several times while others conducted comprehensive negotiations on further Sino-Soviet cooperation at different levels. The two leaders then issued two communiqués to declare their common assessment of and policy toward the current international situation as well as toward Japan. Khrushchev also confirmed that the Soviet Union would assist in China's economic reconstruction so as to "defeat" the "imperialist" economic sanctions.⁸ Moscow's aid to China consequently increased. In late 1954, the Soviet Union financed fifteen new projects to aid China's energy and raw and semi-finished materials industries.⁹ In March 1955, sixteen more projects to upgrade China's defense and shipbuilding industries were aided by the Soviets.¹⁰ Moscow also helped Beijing to construct 116 industrial plants with complete sets of equipment and 88 plants with partial equipment – from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.¹¹

A significant portion of Soviet and East European aid to China comprised industrial and military technology. With the Sino-Soviet agreement on technology transfer signed in October 1954, Beijing obtained similar commitments from East European countries. These agreements enabled China to acquire more than 4,000 technical devices and inventions. While East European governments focused on providing agriculture and forestry technologies, the Soviet Union supplied advanced technologies such as smeltery, ore dressing, petroleum prospecting, locomotive manufacturing, hydraulic and thermal power plants, hydraulic turbine manufacturing, machine tools, high-quality steel manufacturing, and vacuum apparatus. Not liable to pay for the patent rights, Beijing obtained these technologies practically for free.¹²

7 Soviet Embassy in Beijing to Chinese Foreign Ministry, March 24, 1954, K109-10500-01, Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing (hereafter FMA); Ministry of Higher Education, "On the Dispatched Students in the Soviet Union," April 2, 1954, K109-10500-01, *ibid.*; Foreign Ministry to Ministry of Higher Education, "On the Fees Related to the Dispatched Students in the Soviet Union," May 19, 1954, K109-00500-01, *ibid.*

8 *Renmin ribao*, October 12, 1954, 1.

9 *Dangdai zhongguo jiben jianshe* [China Today: Capital Construction] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Press, 1989), 52–53 (hereafter DDZGJBS).

10 *Ibid.*, 53.

11 Chinese Embassy in Warsaw to Foreign Ministry, "On Zhou Enlai's Visit to Poland," August 20, 1954, 32–89, K117 00385 02, FMA; Mao's talk with a Polish delegation, September 28, 1954, 1–9, K109-00409 01, *ibid.*

12 DDZGJBS, 56–57.



28. A Soviet engineer conferring with Chinese colleagues, Wuhan, 1956.

Moreover, to help the Chinese to master the new techniques, the Soviet and East European states dispatched more than 8,000 advisers to China and hosted as many as 7,000 Chinese for advanced training through the end of the 1950s.¹³

What pleased Beijing was that Khrushchev appeared more sensitive than Stalin had been to Chinese national sentiment. Understanding the CCP's sensitivity about its sovereignty, during his October 1954 trip Khrushchev proposed that four Sino-Soviet joint adventures established in 1950–51 – oil and nonferrous metal manufacturing plants in Xinjiang and civil aviation

¹³ *Ibid.*, 54.

and shipbuilding companies in Dalian – be turned over to sole Chinese ownership and operation. Khrushchev also accepted China's request to withdraw Soviet forces from naval bases in Lüshun (Port Arthur) and promised that an infantry division and several hundred military advisers would leave before May 31, 1955. China could then resume its authority over these bases.¹⁴

The Sino-Soviet collaboration was also effective on the diplomatic front. A much-celebrated case was the Geneva Conference of 1954. From the start of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Berlin on February 8–12, Moscow not only kept Beijing informed of the talks, but also pushed to have China invited as “an equal partner” to a five-power conference on conflicts in Asia.¹⁵ In early April, V. M. Molotov met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in Moscow to strategize how to negotiate at the conference.¹⁶ In May, he passed to Zhang Wentian, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, a Soviet proposal regarding the agenda, North Vietnamese representation, the appropriate number of Chinese delegates, transportation, safety, press relations, and activities outside the meeting rooms. The Soviet Foreign Ministry even ran a training program on protocol for Chinese diplomats.¹⁷

At Geneva, Molotov and Zhou collaborated with one another. They persuaded North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh to accept the conditions set by the Mendès-France government of France, including a temporary partition of Vietnam and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.¹⁸ Such arrangements paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on July 21, providing for an immediate ceasefire in Indochina, a partition of Vietnam, and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia.¹⁹ Although

14 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian* [Together with Historic Giants: Shi Zhe Memoirs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991), 570–71. See also Soviet Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, “The Schedule for the Soviet Armed Forces to Withdraw from Port Lüshun and Transfer Material to the Chinese Government,” February 2, 1955, K109-00593-01, FMA.

15 Soviet ambassador in Beijing to Chinese Foreign Ministry, February 17, 1954, K109-00396-01, *ibid*.

16 Zhou to Mao, “On the Talks with the Soviet Leaders [on Geneva],” April 7, 1954, 206-Y0054, *ibid*.

17 Ambassador Zhang's meeting with Molotov, May [undated] 1954, 1–9, K109-00496-02, *ibid*.

18 Zhou to Mao, July 10, 1954, *Zhou Enlai nianpu* [The Chronicle of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), vol. II, 396–97 (hereafter ZELNP); Zhou to Mao, July 12, 1954, *ibid.*, 397; Zhou to Mao and Liu Shaoqi, “On Revised Positions of the Soviet and Vietnamese Leaders,” July 15, 1954, 206 Y0051, FMA; Zhou to Mao and Liu, July 22, 1954, 206 Y0051, *ibid*.

19 Xiao Donglian, *Wushinian guoshi jiyao: waijiao juan* [Fifty Years of State Affairs on the Record: A Volume on Diplomacy] (Changsha: Hunan renmin, 1999), 125.

achieving no final settlement of the Korean conflict, CCP leaders were encouraged that, with Soviet support, they could play a respectable and responsible role in multilateral diplomacy.

Although these developments were very encouraging, the long-sustained suspicion and hard feelings on the Chinese side were persistent. During Khrushchev's visit to China in 1954, Mao bluntly dismissed the possibility that China would be part of the Soviet economic system. After listening to Khrushchev's proposal that China could develop faster by joining the East European economic community, Mao replied that he saw "no need" for such an arrangement. In his view, China would be better off if it were self-reliant and established its own way of development.²⁰

Mao suspected that the Soviets might want to take advantage of China. The first half of the 1950s saw a rapid increase in Soviet manufactured exports to China, which convinced the Chinese that Soviet industries depended on China's market.²¹ More importantly, over 30 percent of China's exports to the USSR were raw materials, especially those of "strategic importance" including tungsten, tin, antimony, lithium, beryllium, tantalum, molybdenum, magnesium, and sulfur mineral ore and pellets. More than 70 percent of the annual yield of rubber manufactured in China's Hainan Islands was being sold to the Soviets at "preferential prices." The Chinese believed that these strategic materials were indispensable to Soviet military programs.²² Given its special relations with Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, and other Asian countries, China had also been acquiring materials that the West had been seeking to embargo to the Communist bloc, and had been carrying on an *entrepôt* trade on behalf of the Soviet Union. Between 1953 and 1957, China imported goods for the Soviet Union worth a total of \$330 million from third countries. Moreover, the Chinese leaders believed that China's agricultural products, which made up more than 48 percent of China's exports to the Soviet Union, proved essential to Soviet efforts to survive the Western trade embargo. Meanwhile, China paid back Soviet loans with gold and hard currency. Understanding that the Soviets were short of US dollars, Beijing paid Moscow a total of \$156 million in cash.²³

Unhappy about this Sino-Soviet trade, Beijing initiated negotiations with Moscow in July 1956, requesting that the Soviets rectify the "unreasonable" pricing system and "inequitable" payment. CCP trade authorities even

20 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian*, 580–81.

21 DDZGDWMY, vol. II, 259.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*, 260.

criticized Moscow for failing to comply with the principle of mutual respect and equality in treating fraternal socialist countries, and expressed “serious” concerns over Soviet “chauvinism.”²⁴ To placate the Chinese, Moscow returned the money it had allegedly overcharged China in trade and agreed to an “equitable” pricing system.²⁵

Chinese leaders, however, remained unhappy when the Soviets were not supportive of China’s nuclear program. Moscow had sent a group of geologists to China to prospect for uranium early in 1950. Partly because of that, in his 1954 talk with Khrushchev, Mao requested Soviet assistance for China’s atomic weaponry program. To the Chinese leader’s disappointment, Khrushchev refused and stressed that, as long as China was under Soviet nuclear protection, it would be “a huge waste” for China to build its own bomb. If China wanted to develop a nuclear-energy industry, Khrushchev told Mao, the Soviet Union could consider providing a small atomic reactor but purely for scientific research and education.²⁶

While refusing to aid China’s atomic program, Moscow kept asking for access to China’s uranium mines. When Soviet scientists discovered uranium in southwestern China in late 1954, the Kremlin pushed for “a joint effort” to mine uranium, but with the Soviets taking the lead. The CCP leadership then responded that it would accept the Soviet request if Moscow changed its mind on aiding China’s nuclear program.²⁷ After several rounds of negotiations, Soviet leaders agreed in April to provide technology and equipment to China in order to construct a high-water-moderated reactor and a cyclotron accelerator. They also promised to help the Chinese to build a laboratory for nuclear research. Moscow, however, stipulated that Soviet nuclear technology would be “for peaceful use” only.²⁸

While becoming increasingly skeptical about Soviet support, Mao by the mid-1950s began to change his perspective on China’s development.

24 Office of Soviet and East European Affairs, Foreign Ministry, “Some Major Events concerning Soviet Internal and External Policies and Sino-Soviet Relations: As Background for Premier Zhou’s Visit to the Soviet Union,” December 24, 1956, K109-00788-01, FMA.

25 *Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao* [China Today: Diplomatic Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui Kexue, 1987), 31 (hereafter DDZGWJ).

26 Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian*, 572–73.

27 Shu Guang Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds.), *Cold War Statesmen Confronting the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 202–05.

28 *Dangdai Zhongguo hegongye* [China Today: Nuclear Industry] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui Kexue, 1987), 20–21 (hereafter DDZGHGY).

Although endorsing the first Five-Year Plan (1953–57) with an emphasis on building heavy industry, he believed that the CCP's priority should be to elevate agricultural productivity.²⁹ Noting differences with the Soviet experience, he thought that China's farm collectivization could and should move faster than Soviet leaders had advised. Between September and December 1955, Mao personally drafted more than 104 instructions to expedite "a high wave of socialism" in villages nationwide. He believed that the CCP needed to hasten the country's socialist transformation in order to defeat conservative impulses within the party, consolidate national unity, and prepare for contingencies.³⁰

One such contingency was Khrushchev's de-Stalinization move at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956. Upset at not being consulted in advance, CCP leaders protested. Khrushchev rebuffed their concerns and claimed that he had no need to consult Beijing or others.³¹ Not prepared to sever the relationship and himself highly critical of Stalin, Mao at first endorsed Khrushchev's de-Stalinization. He was subsequently pleased when the Kremlin suddenly changed its attitude toward the CCP by admitting "errors" in its China policy and promised more aid to China.³² Chinese Communist leaders then supported Khrushchev's crushing of the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956.³³ At the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in November, Mao advocated tolerance of "small-scale democracy" to cope with domestic criticism, "resolute opposition to 'Great-Han'ism" in treating ethnic minorities, and "firm objection to Great Nation chauvinism" in international relations.³⁴

From dissonance to crisis

Khrushchev's and Mao's efforts to accommodate one another were short-lived. The already fragile alliance was tested by a series of Beijing–Moscow

29 For the first Five-Year Plan, see *Jianguo yilai zhongyaowenxian xuanbian* [Collected Key Documents since the Founding of the PRC], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1993), vol. VI, 405–571 (hereafter JGYIZHYWXXB).

30 Mao's instructions, September and December 1955, *Jianguo yilai Maozedong wengao* [Mao's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC] (Beijing: Central Archives and Material Press, 1991), vol. V, 488–547 (hereafter JGYIMZDWG).

31 Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 212.

32 Office of Soviet and East European Affairs to Zhou Enlai, December 24, 1956, 109-00788-01, FMA.

33 Jin Chongji (ed.), *Zhou Enlai Zhuan* [Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998), vol. III, 1274–78, 1282–87 (hereafter ZELZ).

34 Mao's speeches, November 1956, JGYIMZDWG, vol. VI, 245–47.

interactions over domestic and external affairs in 1957–58. Again, hard feelings, strong beliefs, erroneous perceptions, and historical memories proved more difficult to overcome than policy differences.

The first encounter was economic. China's first Five-Year Plan seemed successful. In 1957, production of steel reached 5.35 million tons, iron 5.8 million tons, electric power 19.3 billion kWh, and coal 131 million tons, each exceeding the aims of the plan (which stood at 4.12 million tons for steel, 5.75 million tons for iron, 15.9 billion kWh for electric power, and 113 million tons for coal).³⁵ The success made the CCP more anxious to implement industrialization quickly. Toward the end of the plan, Mao had declared his "firm belief" that it might take just three "Five-Year Plans" to "build a powerful socialist country" in China. He anticipated that China, already not too far behind the United States in iron and steel production, would soon catch up with other industrial countries.³⁶

Moscow, however, doubted Beijing's aspirations, and the CCP felt disgruntled. In an economic development review in early 1957, the Soviet Far East Economic Committee was very critical of China's economic policies. After seeing the report, the PRC Foreign Ministry protested and singled out every "error" the Soviet report contained. Refuting the Soviet claim that Chinese peasants opposed collectivization, for example, Chinese officials argued that the pace of China's "agricultural collectivization" was welcomed nationwide. The Foreign Ministry then pointed out that Soviet experts "deliberately distort and obliterate" China's achievements simply because they were unhappy with the CCP's not following their model.³⁷

Mao, in particular, was bothered by Soviet skepticism about China's success. He believed that Moscow harbored an unnecessary fear that an industrialized China would seriously challenge Soviet leadership in the international Communist movement. Some Soviet leaders, Mao said to a Yugoslav delegation in September 1957, wanted "China's socialist construction ... to fail." They wildly imagined that China might become "an imperialist state," reviving the adventures of Chinggis Khan, and resulting in another "Yellow

35 Bo Yibo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu* [My Recollections of Decisionmaking on Several Important Policies and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1993), vol. I, 295–96; JGYIZHYWXXB, vol. VI, 291–92, 297.

36 Mao's speech, June 14, 1954, JGYIMZDWG, vol. IV, 505–06; Huang Xiangbing, "How the Policy of 'Overtaking Britain and Catching up with America' Was Formed in the Late 1950s," *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* [CCP History Study Materials], No. 4 (1988), 22.

37 PRC Foreign Ministry to the USSR Embassy in Beijing, March 13, 1957, fond 100 (1957), opis' 50, papka 423, delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, Moscow (hereafter RFMA).

Peril." Their real intention, he asserted, was to discredit the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party.³⁸

Soviet skepticism in part prompted Mao to aim unrealistically high for China's development. During a high-profile visit to Moscow in November 1957, he boasted at a meeting of world Communist leaders that China would overtake Britain in iron, steel, and other heavy industries in the next fifteen years and would soon beat the United States in these areas as well.³⁹ In April 1958, he proclaimed that it might not take fifteen years for China to overtake Britain and the United States. CCP leaders began to plan to surpass Britain in seven years and to catch up with the United States in eight or ten years.⁴⁰ The result of Mao's dreamlike aspirations was the Great Leap Forward campaign, calling for a 19% increase in steel production, 18% in electricity, and 17% in coal output for 1958. Buoyed by unrealistic optimism, the CCP leaders kept raising the production goals in hopes of achieving an unprecedented rate of growth.⁴¹

Interestingly, Moscow tried to adapt itself to Beijing's quest for quick economic success. In its report to the presidium dated July 26, 1958, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that it felt "very positive" about China's economic performance. "The sharp rise of the PRC economy," it stated, "creates the conditions for a significant shortening of the time necessary to liquidate China's economic backwardness." It was not unrealistic for China to catch up with Britain in industrial production within fifteen years. If China's second Five-Year Plan was as successful as the first, the report predicted, China could even realize this aim in some areas "in the next 2–3 years."⁴² China welcomed this changed Soviet attitude and subsequently expected more aid from Moscow.

The CCP, however, was disappointed at no significant increase in Soviet aid and dismayed, in particular, by continual Soviet reluctance to help with China's atomic project. In September 1957, Marshal Nie Rongzhen – in charge

38 Mao's conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist union delegation, Beijing, [undated] September 1957, *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian and Shijie zhishi, 1993), 251–62 (hereafter MZDWJWX).

39 Huang, "How the Policy of 'Overtaking Britain and Catching up with America' Was Formed in the Late 1950s," 22. See also Bo, *Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu*, vol. II, 691–92.

40 Bo, *Ruogan zhongda, juece yu shijian de huigu*, vol. II, 692–98.

41 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 655–57.

42 S. Antonov to the presidium, July 26, 1958, Document 16, in David Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 30 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), 49–51.

of China's nuclear program – led a mission to Moscow to secure Soviet nuclear assistance. Nie's trip ended with the signing of another protocol in October, in which the Soviets agreed to provide a model of an atomic bomb. But the Soviets did not specify exactly when it would be delivered and what it would entail. When Nie pressed, the Soviet leaders said they were not yet ready.⁴³ Even when Moscow dispatched 102 Soviet missile specialists to China with two Soviet P-2 short-range ground-to-ground missiles late in 1957, and when it sent another delegation to Beijing to talk about transferring atomic technology in August 1958, the Chinese leaders were under the impression that the Soviets were trying “to find all possible excuses not to help us.”⁴⁴

Although aspiring to acquire Soviet nuclear technology, Beijing did not want the USSR to build a missile base in China. Early in 1957, Khrushchev remarked to a Chinese news delegation that if the United States “openly” installed missiles in Taiwan, the USSR would do the same in China. Meeting with Soviet ambassador to Beijing Pavel F. Iudin on May 22, Zhou Enlai rejected the Soviet offer on the grounds that a US missile base in Taiwan served only to tighten Washington's control over Jiang with “no intention” to provoke a large-scale war. As “a counterthreat,” he said, a Soviet missile base on the mainland would “intensify the situation.”⁴⁵ What Zhou did not state was his concern that Moscow would exploit such an arrangement to control China. Later, Beijing became even more alarmed when it noted that some Soviet officials “casually” suggested that the Chinese should consider a “two-China” solution to the Taiwan problem. Calling in Iudin for a meeting on October 22, Zhou demanded that Moscow must firmly support China's “opposition to a two-China scheme.”⁴⁶

What transformed Chinese leaders' attitudes from suspicion to anger was Moscow's “intention” to incorporate China's coastal defense into its East Asian security system. In an April 18, 1958, letter to Peng Dehuai, Soviet minister of defense Marshal Radion I. Malinovskii suggested that they jointly build a radio communications station linking the Chinese navy with the Soviet navy in East Asia. Malinovskii said that the USSR would provide the technology and finance the construction.⁴⁷ Meeting with Mao on July 21,

43 DDZGHGY, 19–22.

44 Premier Zhou's meeting with P. F. Iudin, June 15, 1957, 109-00786-14, FMA; Zhou to Liu Xiaohua and Peng Dehuai, December 2, 1957, 109-00791-03, *ibid*.

45 Zhou's meeting with Iudin, May 22, 1957, 109-00786 13, *ibid*. It is interesting to note that an entire paragraph right after Zhou's explicit rejection of the Soviet offer remains classified.

46 Zhou's meeting with Iudin, October 22, 1957, 109 00786 18, *ibid*.

47 P. I. Malinovskii's letter to Peng Dehuai, April 19, 1958, cited in DDZGWJ, 112.

Soviet ambassador Iudin also proposed that the Soviet navy would like to form a joint fleet of nuclear-powered submarines with China in the Far East. Although the Soviet coastline was not appropriate for the Soviet navy's newly developed submarines, Iudin explained, China's "harbor conditions" were suitable for them.⁴⁸

Moscow's proposals led Chinese leaders to believe that the long-suspected Soviet intention to control China was becoming real. Should China agree to build a joint radio station, Mao insisted on June 6, 1958, it would finance the project itself in order to ensure Chinese ownership; otherwise, there would be no deal. Should the USSR agree to provide technological help, Mao stressed, China would be willing to negotiate with Moscow about using its facilities.⁴⁹ Six days later, Mao urged Defense Minister Peng to stick to these principles in his response to Malinovskii, allowing no compromise on China's sovereign rights.⁵⁰

In response to Iudin's "joint submarine flotilla" suggestion, Mao decided to call in the Soviet ambassador for a private meeting on July 22, 1958. He bluntly told Iudin that he was angered by the proposal because the Soviet Union intended to control China through a joint Sino-Soviet ownership scheme. To him, such an attitude was racial: "[To you] the Soviets are the first-class [people] whereas the Chinese are among the inferior who are dumb, careless," and untrustworthy. Should the Soviet Union continue in this vein, Mao said that Moscow might as well take control of China's army and economy, leaving the CCP "only to maintain a guerrilla force."⁵¹

Driven by Russian chauvinism, Mao explained to Iudin, the Kremlin had long ordered the CCP around. An unforgettable example was Stalin's demand to turn the northeast of China and Xinjiang into Soviet "spheres of influence" and insistence on joint ownership and operation of four newly built plants. It was all because Stalin regarded the CCP as "the Second Tito," and treated China "as a backward nation"; other Soviets followed the example by "looking down upon the Chinese people." The Sino-Soviet relationship, Mao asserted, had become a "father-son or cats-mice" one, and the CCP had to accommodate the USSR. Thus, the CCP "never openly" challenged Khrushchev's

48 Mao-Iudin meeting, July 21, 1958, *ibid.*, 113. Mao clearly stated that "first of all we ought to establish a principle; that is, we will be mainly responsible for the program only with your assistance" (*ibid.*).

49 Mao's instruction, June 7, 1958, *MZDWJWX*, 316-17.

50 Peng to Soviet Ministry of National Defense, June 12, 1958, *DDZGWJ*, 113.

51 Mao-Iudin meeting, July 21, 1958, *DDZGWJ*, 114; minutes, conversation between Mao and Iudin, July 22, 1958, *MZDWJWX*, 322-33.

peaceful-evolution idea; it had been consistently backing the Kremlin whenever there was a dispute among the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe. To assist Moscow in resolving the Polish crisis of 1956, Mao told Iudin that he personally tried to persuade the Polish leaders not to challenge Soviet dominance.⁵²

This time, Mao declared, the CCP would stand up against Russian chauvinism. It was his determination that China “won’t get entangled with you.” It was all because Khrushchev’s Kremlin intended to extend Soviet influence to China’s coast with the two proposals. Although bitterly angry with Moscow, Mao did not seem prepared to break the alliance. “It still is possible,” he assured Iudin, that the two governments could “cooperate in many other areas.” Finally, Mao requested that the Soviet ambassador should report back “exactly what I have remarked without any polishing,” which would remind Khrushchev that “he has criticized Stalin’s policies but now adopts them himself.”⁵³

Mao’s protest alarmed the Kremlin. Coming to Beijing on July 31, 1958, Khrushchev affirmed that Moscow would provide only loans and technology for building the radio station, which China would completely own. He also explained to Mao that the Kremlin never intended to establish a joint nuclear submarine force in China, and that Iudin’s proposal was the result of a “misunderstanding.” Although apologetic, Khrushchev reminded Mao that it was Soviet economic power and “rockets” that were “holding back” the United States, implying that China would still need Soviet protection and assistance. Mao conceded that China still needed to rely on the alliance.⁵⁴

Whether or not Beijing would still need Soviet protection was soon tested. Late in August 1958, shortly after Khrushchev’s visit, the PRC began shelling the Nationalist-held offshore islands (Jinmen), initiating the second Taiwan Strait crisis.⁵⁵ Worried about the US reaction, Khrushchev asked the Soviet embassy in Beijing on September 5 to request an urgent meeting between Mao and his personal envoy, Andrei A. Gromyko, who planned to visit Beijing secretly. Intending to draft a letter to Washington to warn the United States not to overreact, Moscow needed to know the CCP’s view. Beijing appreciated Moscow’s offer but suggested the insertion of stronger words in the letter which, it believed, would help to “compel” the United States to talk

52 MZDWJWX, 333.

53 *Ibid.*, 333.

54 Mao–Khrushchev talks, July 31, 1958, DDZGWJ, 114; the Russian version of the minutes is in Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events*, 51–56.

55 For Mao’s decision to shell Jinmen, see Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 233–37.

with Beijing about a solution to the Taiwan problem.⁵⁶ Assured that China's bombardment of Jinmen was not a prelude to an attack on Taiwan, Khrushchev wrote to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 that any nuclear attack on China would result in a Soviet nuclear retaliation. Late that month, to reinforce his stance, he sent another letter – which was preapproved by Mao and slightly edited by Zhou – urging Washington to negotiate with Beijing.⁵⁷ When Khrushchev suggested sending a third letter to propose multilateral talks on resolving the Taiwan issue, Beijing declined because the CCP did not want to appear “so anxious” that it might give “the impression of weakness.”⁵⁸ Khrushchev gave in to the Chinese.⁵⁹

But Soviet attitudes toward the CCP remained in flux. PRC ambassador to Moscow Liu Xiao reported on October 20, 1958, that Khrushchev on several occasions stated the Chinese were right “that war must not be feared and peace cannot be begged for.” Other Soviet leaders willingly admitted that China could be a major player in international politics. Khrushchev, moreover, began to stress the need to speed up Soviet economic performance in the “race against time” to prevent general war. These changes, Liu asserted, were positive, but future developments were still uncertain. The Kremlin still “lacked” an accurate understanding of Chinese strategy and tactics for socialist transformation, doubted the People's Commune program, and disagreed with Beijing's anti-imperialist propaganda.⁶⁰

Uncertain of Moscow's reliability, Mao and his colleagues, again, stressed self-reliance as a basic principle of CCP policies. What China had learned in its nationbuilding experience, Mao told two Brazilian journalists in September 1958, was to do away with “blind faith in foreigners.”⁶¹ At the fifteenth session of the Supreme State Conference that same month, he declared that growing “international pressure” compelled the Chinese people to “rely on themselves.”⁶² Partly to prove that China could develop quickly on its own, Mao became even more resolute in pushing the Great Leap Forward. After its

56 Zhou's meeting with a Soviet consular official, September 5, 1958, 109-00833-4, FMA.

57 DDZGWJ, 115-6; Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, September 19, 1958, 109-00823-01, FMA.

58 Soviet Embassy to Premier Zhou, September 27, 1958, enclosed in Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, September 29, 1958, 109-00823-02, FMA.

59 Zhou's meeting with Soviet chargé d'affaires, October 7, 1958, 109-00833-02, *ibid.*

60 Liu Xiao to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 20, 1958, in JGYIMZDWG, vol. VII, 486-87.

61 Minutes of conversation, Mao and two Brazilian journalists, September 2, 1958, *ibid.*, vol. VII, 373-74.

62 Mao's speech at the fifteenth meeting of the Supreme State Conference, September 5 and 8, 1958, *ibid.*, vol. VII, 387-89.

launch in the spring of 1958, he kept raising its production goals in hopes of achieving an unprecedented rate of growth without relying on Soviet aid.⁶³

From crisis to collapse

At the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, the growing internal difficulties embedded in the Sino-Soviet alliance evolved into open estrangement. As bilateral differences over domestic and foreign policies became increasingly deep, the mutual distrust that was profoundly rooted in personal, cultural, and racial factors would loom so large that temporary goodwill could not prevent the alliance from collapsing.

At the end of the 1950s, the CCP still hoped to sustain the alliance. Beijing toned down its harsh attitude toward Moscow and expected the latter to do the same. Liu, the ambassador to Moscow, suggested on January 13, 1959, that, in order to save the relationship, the CCP should stop “publicly criticizing” Soviet policies even if they were “wrong” and should be “more sensible” and “more modest” toward Soviet advisers in China.⁶⁴ Endorsing Liu’s suggestion, Mao instructed the rank and file to learn from the Soviet and other Communist countries’ “advanced experiences” as long as they “fit” China’s realities.⁶⁵ He also told the Soviet ambassador and ambassadors of ten other socialist states on May 6 that “all of you are our teachers, but the most important teacher is the Soviet Union.”⁶⁶

The Kremlin also made accommodating gestures toward the CCP. The PRC embassy in Moscow reported on January 24, 1959 that the draft of Khrushchev’s speech for the Twenty-First CPSU Congress contained a statement characterizing the CCP as “loyal to Marxism-Leninism.” Although the CCP “adopt[ed] different methods in constructing socialism,” the draft stressed that Moscow had no “objection” to it. Moreover, the draft speech recognized that “all the socialist states will help and exchange experiences with one another on an equal basis so as to realize Communism simultaneously.” The third draft of the speech, moreover, omitted the word “peace-loving” when characterizing the American people, which was in line with China’s position.⁶⁷

63 Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 218–23.

64 Liu Xiao to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1959, in JGYIMZDWG, vol. VIII, 5–6.

65 Mao’s instruction, February 13, 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 41–42.

66 Mao’s speech at the meeting with the delegation of eleven ambassadors, May 6, 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 248–49.

67 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, January 24, 1959, 108 00919 09, FMA.

Despite the more relaxed political relationship, CCP leaders remained extremely sensitive about Moscow's criticism of China's economic development, especially when Mao's Great Leap Forward was in grave trouble. On July 2, 1959, the PRC's embassy in Moscow alerted Beijing that some Soviet advisers who had just returned from China had spread "rumors" that the CCP was facing economic chaos. As these stories about China's disaster circulated in Moscow, the embassy stressed, Soviet officials might conclude that the CCP leadership had "committed grave errors." Profoundly concerned about this report, Mao added a note to it which read, "Some Soviet Comrades Are Criticizing Our Great Leap Forward," and directed his associates to "study this matter" further.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the Kremlin kept trying to press Beijing to adopt a "moderate" policy toward Taiwan and India. When rebuffed by the CCP, Soviet officials complained that Beijing's stubbornness would cause troubles "in the near future."⁶⁹ Pushing for a new détente with the United States, Khrushchev expected the CCP to support his initiative.⁷⁰ Invited for an urgent visit to Beijing in late September and early October 1959, Khrushchev held a seven-hour meeting with Mao and other top CCP leaders on October 2 and accused Mao of taking great risks in his belligerence toward Taiwan and India. Irritated by Khrushchev's criticism, Mao and his associates viciously refuted the Soviet leader by calling him a "time-server." The agitated Khrushchev shouted back that Mao intended to "subordinate" him.⁷¹

After Khrushchev left, Mao prepared the rank and file for a tough stance against the Kremlin. At a meeting with his top associates in December 1959, Mao vehemently accused Moscow of seeking to dominate China. He alluded to ten incidents between 1945 and 1959, the most recent attempt coming from Khrushchev. Because the politically "immature" Khrushchev had such a limited understanding of Marxism-Leninism, he was "easily deceived by imperialists." Knowing little about China, he refused to learn, trusted "false intelligence reports," and talked "too freely." Khrushchev, Mao said, was

68 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, July 2, 1959, enclosed in Mao's instruction, July 19, 1959, JGYIMZDWG, vol. VIII, 367. See also S. Skachkov to the Central Committee, CPSU, July 2, 1959, "On the Present Economic Situation in the PRC," in Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events*, 63–64.

69 Political report for 1959, Soviet Embassy in Beijing, cited in M. Y. Prozurnenshchikov, "The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 252.

70 Chen Yi's meeting with A. Gromyko, October 2, 1959, 204 00078 01, FMA.

71 Minutes of Mao-Khrushchev meeting (Russian version), October 2, 1959, in Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events*, 64–68.



29. Nikita Khrushchev (left) and Mao Zedong: a difficult toast during the 1959 meeting in Beijing.

“fearful not only of imperialism but also of Chinese-style Communism, because he is worried that East European and other [Communist] parties will trust not them, but us.” In Mao’s view, all these problems were “historically rooted.” He was certain that Russian chauvinism under Khrushchev would “one day” become much worse. In future years, Mao predicted, Khrushchev might be toppled if he refused to change his policy and attitude.⁷² At another meeting that month, Mao chastised Khrushchev for treating China as a child, preventing its rapid development, refusing to provide the best assistance, and seeking to sabotage China’s current leadership.⁷³

Soviet officials, too, were growing embittered. To prepare his central committee for a possible Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev circulated a report to the Politburo by senior member Mikhail Suslov on his recent visit to China. Elaborating on the policy differences between Moscow and Beijing, Suslov attributed the Sino-Soviet dispute primarily to Mao. The CCP chairman, he said, tended to “embellish” his successes to the extent that his head had “gotten somewhat dizzy.” Much like Stalin, Suslov reported, Mao was

72 Mao’s speech at the CCP Politburo meeting, December [undated] 1959, *JGYIMZDWG*, vol. VIII, 599–602.

73 Mao’s speech at a meeting in Hangzhou, December [undated] 1959, *ibid.*, vol. VIII, 604.

developing “a cult of personality,” portraying himself as “a great genius” and insisting that he alone made all the crucial decisions. Furthermore, Mao regarded himself as the original Marxist, maintaining that he was infallible and that his work must be viewed “as the final word on creative Marxism.”⁷⁴

It is interesting to note, though, that the CCP still wanted to keep the “internal” dispute from going public. When a U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union, Beijing openly supported Khrushchev’s protest. On May 8, 1960, Vice Premier He Long proclaimed in Budapest that any “provocative aggression” against the USSR would also mean war against China, suggesting the alliance was still operative.⁷⁵ In private, the PRC Foreign Ministry instructed its embassy in Moscow “not to provoke quarrels” with the Soviets, in particular, when dealing with an international crisis. Whatever the Kremlin said about the alleged American aggression, the embassy should express agreement with it.⁷⁶ Beijing wanted its embassies abroad to assume a “low profile,” hoping to avoid leaving an impression that Khrushchev’s hardened attitude toward Washington was a result of “our influence.” Should the issue be raised, Chinese diplomats were instructed to say that “China and the Soviet Union remain united.”⁷⁷

But efforts to sustain Sino-Soviet unity proved fleeting. At a meeting with his top associates on February 22, 1960, Mao decided that the CCP should prepare a public critique of Khrushchev’s “opportunism” and “revisionism.”⁷⁸ Under Mao’s close supervision, a group of CCP “theorists” drafted a series of articles accusing Khrushchev of betraying Lenin.⁷⁹ In response, Khrushchev orchestrated a “surprise attack” on the CCP at the Budapest gathering of fifty-one Communist and labor parties on June 24–26, which resulted in a resolution criticizing Beijing’s radical domestic and foreign policies.⁸⁰

What started as an ideological polemic soon turned into a diplomatic crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. On July 16, 1960, the Soviet embassy notified the Chinese Foreign Ministry that all Soviet experts would be immediately

74 Suslov’s report, December [undated] 1959, in *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 244 and 248; Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events*, 69–72.

75 Foreign Ministry to all embassies, May 11, 1960, 109-00917-01, FMA.

76 PRC embassy in Moscow to Foreign Ministry, May 5, 1960, 109-00917-01, *ibid.*; Foreign Ministry to PRC embassy in Moscow, May 6, 1960, *ibid.*

77 Foreign Ministry to all embassies, May 11, 1960, 109-00917-01, *ibid.*

78 Li Danhui, “A Last Effort: The Sino-Soviet Struggle and Reconciliation in the Early 1960s,” March 27, 2007, www.coldwarchina.com/zgyj/zsjm/002110.html.

79 Mao’s instruction on revisions of the draft *Red Flag* editorial, “Long Live Leninism,” April [undated] 1960, *JGYIMZDWG*, vol. IX, 139–42.

80 *DDZGWJ*, 116–17.

withdrawn from China because of “their unsatisfactory treatment.”⁸¹ Without waiting for China to reply, on July 25, Moscow instructed all Soviet personnel to depart by September 1. Meanwhile, the Kremlin held back more than 900 experts already scheduled to head for China. Within one month, altogether 1,390 Soviet experts had returned, and Moscow had terminated twelve agreements on aid and over 200 cooperative projects on science and technology.⁸²

Although furious, Chinese leaders attempted to minimize the damage. Soviet actions caused huge problems in China, as two-thirds of the 304 Soviet-aid projects were not yet completed. In its first response to Moscow on July 31, Beijing asked the Kremlin to reconsider its decision or, at least, to allow experts to stay until their contracts expired. At a meeting with Soviet ambassador to Beijing Stepan Chervonenko on August 4, Vice Premier Chen Yi asked Moscow to stop “severing the friendship between the two countries.”⁸³ Since the Sino-Soviet estrangement would only benefit their common adversaries, Chen suggested to the Soviet deputy foreign minister two weeks later that Moscow and Beijing should both try to save the alliance.⁸⁴

Thinking hard about Chen’s suggestion, the Soviet ambassador in Beijing tried to mollify his boss’s anger. In a telegram to Moscow, he warned that unilateral termination of aid agreements “would be a violation of international law.” Urging the Kremlin to permit Soviet advisers to stay until their contracts were up, he hoped “things would get patched up at the top.”⁸⁵ Khrushchev, however, refused to yield. He was now resolved to teach the Chinese a lesson. Speaking at the plenum of the Central Committee in 1960, he complained that, whenever he met with Mao, he felt as if he were “talking with Stalin and listening to Stalin,” something that he could no longer tolerate.⁸⁶

Seeing no change of policy on the Soviet part, Chinese leaders began to harden their attitudes. Accusing Moscow of “seriously violating” international law, the PRC Foreign Ministry asserted that China would now prove that it could never be intimidated by “socialist imperialist blackmail.”⁸⁷ Meeting with

81 Soviet Embassy in Beijing to Foreign Ministry, July 16, 1960, 9–16, 109-00924-01, FMA. Another source indicated that the note was dated July 18, 1960: *CWIHP Bulletin*, (Winter 1996/97), 249–50.

82 *DDZGWJ*, 117–18.

83 *Ibid.*

84 Chen Yi’s meeting with Soviet deputy foreign minister, August 20, 1960, 135–37, 109-00933 15, FMA.

85 Cited in William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 247.

86 Khrushchev’s speech is cited in Prozumenshchikov, *ibid.*, 252.

87 PRC Foreign Ministry to Soviet Foreign Ministry, August 13, September 20, and October 23, 1960, f. 0100, op. 2, p. 453 (1960), RFMA.

a high-ranking Soviet delegation in September, Deng Xiaoping admitted that the withdrawal of experts had hurt China, but retorted that the Chinese people would be mobilized “to make up for the losses and build our own nation with our own hands.”⁸⁸ At an enlarged Politburo meeting on November 17, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the termination of Soviet aid provided an opportunity for the CCP to demonstrate that “difficulties” could be overcome through “self-reliance.” Believing that a nation would have a better chance to develop “under strenuous circumstances,” Zhou wanted to galvanize the nation to work “with one will to make the country strong.”⁸⁹

Mao felt that the Sino-Soviet estrangement liberated the CCP. At a meeting of the Central Committee on January 18, 1961, he urged his associates not to fear conflict with the Soviets. The worst outcome might be a break in cultural and economic relationships. As long as China was prepared for these contingencies, he believed, “we will not be intimidated in the least” even if Khrushchev severed all relations with China.⁹⁰

Nor would Mao be placated by Moscow’s offer to provide relief when a devastating famine, resulting from the Great Leap Forward, afflicted China. Khrushchev offered to loan 1 million tons of grain and half a million tons of sugar, both desperately needed in China, but Mao no longer trusted Khrushchev, and he rejected the assistance.⁹¹ Later, when Moscow offered a five-year deferment on payments for commercial transactions in 1960 (up to the amount of 288 million rubles), the CCP turned it down. Instead, Mao somehow found the money to pay the Soviets two years ahead of the due date.⁹² Whereas the Chinese regarded the Soviets as “evil-minded,” the Kremlin viewed the Chinese as stubborn and “ungrateful.”⁹³

The Sino-Soviet rift dramatically changed the Cold War in Asia. Moscow notified Beijing in August 1961 of its acceptance of a US proposal for a treaty that would ban certain forms of nuclear testing, that would forbid any nuclear power from transferring nuclear technology to any nonnuclear country, and that would prohibit nonnuclear countries from producing or acquiring

88 DDZGWJ, 118.

89 Zhou’s speech, November 17, 1961, ZELNP, vol. I, 370.

90 Mao’s remarks, January 18, 1961, cited in Yang Kuisong, “Toward the Split: How the CCP Faced the Sino-Soviet Crisis,” unpublished paper, Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University, 10.

91 Zhou’s meeting with Chervonenko, March 8, 1961, ZELNP, vol. II, 397.

92 DDZGDWY, vol. III, 263.

93 John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963–1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 141–42.

nuclear technology. Such stipulations would endanger China's ongoing nuclear projects. Beijing reacted angrily, protesting that Soviet acceptance of the treaty would violate China's sovereignty.⁹⁴ Regarding the treaty as Moscow's attempt to collude with the United States to contain China, the CCP decided to speed up China's atomic project. In early November 1962, it set the year 1964 as the best time to explode its first bomb.⁹⁵ At the same time, wary of Indian "expansionism" and suspicious of Khrushchev's siding with Jawaharlal Nehru in the Sino-Indian border dispute, Beijing did not hesitate to attack India in October 1962. Zhou Enlai explained to the Soviet ambassador to Beijing that China could no longer stand India's provocation and was "determined to counterattack."⁹⁶ The Chinese leaders suspected that Moscow was colluding with New Delhi, thereby assisting a dangerous enemy on their border.

Why did the alliance collapse?

Both Moscow and Beijing should have benefited from a Cold War alliance. Indeed, the leaders in both capitals had tried to maintain the alliance by resolving differences through direct communications and through what they regarded as a fair exchange of resources. But unlike the key Western Cold War alliances, the Sino-Soviet one failed in the end. In explaining the Sino-Soviet estrangement, some historians have pointed to the differences in leaders' personality and psychology; others credited it to US attempts at driving a wedge between the two.⁹⁷ More recent scholarship argues that culturally bound factors such as values, beliefs, and historical memories contributed to the collapse of the compact.

The historical consciousness of Chinese leaders largely shaped their attitudes toward Moscow. Given their strong sentiment about "foreign devils" and "national humiliations," the CCP leaders could hardly relinquish their memories of Russian chauvinism, which they continued to see in Stalin's behavior regarding aid, trade, and advisers. Within this context, they treated Khrushchev's reluctance to offer the most advanced (especially atomic) technology, his proposal for further integration, and his harsh criticism of Mao's

94 DDZGWJ, 119–20.

95 ZELZ, vol. IV, 1745–47.

96 Zhou's meeting with Chervonenko, October 8, 1962, cited *ibid.*, 1657.

97 Taubman, "Khrushchev vs. Mao"; Jack L. Snyder, "The Psychology of Escalation: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958–1963," RAND Paper, P 6191, 1978.

domestic and foreign policies as new evidence of a chauvinistic and expansionist USSR.

The Russian ethnocentric view of the Chinese formed the basis of the Kremlin's China policy. Seeing the world through the prism of their own beliefs, Soviet leaders could not allow the CCP to take a different path from theirs. Locked in their own belief system, Soviet officials expected their "junior partner" to adopt the Soviet model of socialist transformation. While denouncing Mao for his misunderstanding of the Cold War's big picture, Khrushchev failed to respect the Chinese emphasis on independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance in foreign relations. Kremlin leaders often found it hard to understand why the Chinese seemed so "stubborn" on these principles, even at the risk of losing badly needed Soviet aid.

Coming from different traditions, the Chinese and the Soviets harbored different expectations of the partnership. The Chinese tended to stress personal trustworthiness in a relationship: you can only deal with a person when there is trust. Believing that policy stances reflected a person's character, Mao took all policy differences as personal affronts. Stalin and then Khrushchev, in his view, did not pay due respect to him, and were thus untrustworthy. On the other hand, the Soviets attached greater importance to structural interests in a partnership. They believed the Chinese were in need of assistance and that Beijing had little to offer in return. Regarding the alliance as asymmetric, they were frustrated about the CCP's emphasis on building personal relations and found it hard to understand why the Chinese stressed equality and reciprocity.

The personal clashes between Khrushchev and Mao were defined by cultural differences. Having acted in official capacities under Stalinism, Khrushchev showed a limited ability to tolerate challenges and believed in the utility of coercion to resolve differences. A good student of Chinese traditions, Mao overreacted to challenges because he saw them as threats to his long-term plans. From this perspective, he regarded Khrushchev as a short-sighted opportunist: when in need of Beijing's support, Khrushchev was willing to accommodate; otherwise, he never shied away from coercion. In Khrushchev's judgment, Mao became China's Stalin: the only way for Mao to secure control was to build a cult of personality, not just in China but eventually within the world Communist movement.

Mao believed Khrushchev tried to dominate him while Khrushchev thought Mao treated him as a "subordinate." The same feeling, ironically, seemed rooted in the same oriental traditions. Bound by natural ties of kindness on one side and devotion on the other, the oriental way of relationship-building requires favors in exchange for loyalty. Both Mao and Khrushchev thought of

themselves as benefactors: Mao supported Khrushchev politically, and Khrushchev aided Mao economically. Each leader expected his largesse to be reciprocated with appreciation and deference; when this did not happen, each viewed the other as returning kindness with ingratitude. The mutually patronizing attitude invariably produced mutual animosity.

The increasingly difficult relationship between Beijing and Moscow between 1954 and 1962 shows that common interests in fighting common enemies were not enough to sustain an alliance between the two Communist powers. China and the Soviet Union failed to overcome the perceptions and misperceptions derived from their culturally bound ethnocentrism.

Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962

DAVID HOLLOWAY

Nuclear weapons are so central to the history of the Cold War that it can be difficult to disentangle the two. Did nuclear weapons cause the Cold War? Did they contribute to its escalation? Did they help to keep the Cold War “cold”? We should also ask how the Cold War shaped the development of atomic energy. Was the nuclear-arms race a product of Cold War tension rather than its cause?

The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War

The nuclear age began before the Cold War. During World War II, three countries decided to build the atomic bomb: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain put its own work aside and joined the Manhattan Project as a junior partner in 1943. The Soviet effort was small before August 1945. The British and American projects were driven by the fear of a German atomic bomb, but Germany decided in 1942 not to make a serious effort to build the bomb. In an extraordinary display of scientific and industrial might, the United States made two bombs ready for use by August 1945. Germany was defeated by then, but President Harry S. Truman decided to use the bomb against Japan.

The decision to use the atomic bomb has been a matter of intense controversy. Did Truman decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order, as he claimed, to end the war with Japan without further loss of American lives? Or did he drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviet Union, without really needing them to bring the war to an end? His primary purpose was surely to force Japan to surrender, but he also believed that the bomb would help him in his dealings with Iosif V. Stalin. That latter consideration was secondary, but it confirmed his decision.¹ Whatever Truman’s motives, Stalin regarded the use

1 I here follow Barton Bernstein’s interpretation. See his “The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, 135–52.



30. Mushroom cloud over Nagasaki, 1945.

of the bomb as an anti-Soviet move, designed to deprive the Soviet Union of strategic gains in the Far East and more generally to give the United States the upper hand in defining the postwar settlement. On August 20, 1945, two weeks to the day after Hiroshima, Stalin signed a decree setting up a Special Committee on the Atomic Bomb, under the chairmanship of Lavrentii P. Beria.² The Soviet project was now a crash program.

2 The decree is in L. D. Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR: dokumenty i materialy*, vol. II, *Atomnaia bomba 1945–1954*, book 1 [The Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials, vol. II, The Atomic Bomb 1945–1954, book 1] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 11–13.

In 1946, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with several other countries, began negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations to bring atomic energy under international control. These negotiations failed. It was national governments rather than international organizations that were to determine the future of atomic energy. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal, slowly at first, but with increasing urgency as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. In September 1948, Truman endorsed a National Security Council paper (NSC 30), "Policy on Atomic Warfare," which concluded that the United States must be ready to "utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore plan accordingly."³ The atomic air offensive became the central element in US strategy for a war against the Soviet Union. The Strategic Air Command (SAC), which had been established in March 1946, was the spearhead of American military power.

In 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) set up a committee to examine how effective an atomic air offensive would be, and it reported in May 1949 that an atomic attack on seventy Soviet cities would not defeat the Soviet Union.⁴ That assumption was written into the "Offtackle" Emergency War Plan, which was approved by the JCS in December 1949 and remained operative for two years. This envisaged a war in several stages. The Soviet Union would launch offensives in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East; it would also bomb Britain, assail Allied lines of communications, and try to attack the United States by air. Strategic bombing would not stop the Soviet offensives. The Western Allies would be too weak to hold Western Europe; they would have to try to secure the United Kingdom and hold on to North Africa. The resulting situation would be like that of 1942–43. The Allies would carry out strategic bombing attacks, build up Britain as a major base, and begin to move outwards from North Africa with the aim of reentering the European continent. World War III would be decided by campaigns like those of 1944–45.⁵

The Soviet atomic project was an enormous undertaking for a country that had been devastated by the war. The first Soviet test took place on August 29, 1949, twenty months later than the target date established by the Soviet

3 "NSC 30: United States Policy on Atomic Warfare," September 10, 1948, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. I, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 628 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

4 David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security*, 7, 4 (Spring 1983), 16.

5 Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. IV, 1950–1952 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1980), 161–62.

government in 1946, but several years earlier than the Central Intelligence Agency thought probable.⁶ The Soviet Union strengthened its air defenses to deal with an American atomic air offensive and enhanced its capacity to conduct large-scale strategic operations by restructuring its ground and air forces. From the fragmentary evidence available, it appears that in 1950 the Soviet image of a future war was very much the same as the American: an atomic air offensive by the United States, which would not succeed in defeating the Soviet Union, and large-scale Soviet offensive operations to push the Western powers out of Europe and the Middle East.⁷ In the first five years after the war, neither American nor Soviet military planners saw the atomic bomb as a weapon that would by itself win a world war.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers grew steadily worse in the five years after World War II. The role of nuclear weapons in this deterioration was subtle but important. Truman did not issue explicit nuclear threats against the Soviet Union, but the nuclear factor was present even when not specifically invoked. The most overt use of the bomb in support of foreign policy took place in July 1948, when Truman dispatched B-29 bombers to Europe during the Berlin crisis. Though not modified to carry atomic bombs, these bombers were intended to signal that the United States would defend Western Europe with nuclear weapons if necessary. For the United States, the bomb provided a counterweight, in psychological and political as well as military terms, to Soviet military power in Europe.

Stalin feared that the United States would use the bomb to put pressure on the Soviet Union, and he was determined not to let that happen. He adopted a policy of what he called “tenacity and steadfastness.”⁸ This first became apparent in September 1945 at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, where the Soviet Union took a tough stand on issues relating to the postwar settlement. Instead of proving more pliable and willing to compromise, as the Americans had hoped, Stalin adopted a policy of stubbornness, for fear of seeming weak and inviting further pressure.

In spite of the growing international tension of the late 1940s, there was little expectation that a new world war would break out soon. All three Allies

6 Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR*, 435; David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 220.

7 Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 227–42.

8 I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beriia, A. I. Mikoian, December 9, 1945, in *Politburo TsK VKP(b) i sovet ministrov SSSR 1945–1953* [The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR 1945–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), 202.

demobilized, though to varying degrees. The bomb nevertheless cast a shadow over relations. It gave the Americans confidence and enhanced their willingness to make security commitments, most notably the commitment to Western Europe embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949. The bomb had a dual effect on Soviet policy. It inspired caution and restraint, but it also made the Soviet Union less willing to compromise for fear of appearing vulnerable to intimidation. The bomb made the postwar relationship even more tense and contentious than it would have been in any case.

Nuclear weapons and the Korean War

On September 24, 1949, almost four weeks after the Soviet nuclear test, the Soviet Politburo instructed the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, not to attack the South. North Korea, it said, was not prepared in military or political terms for such an attack. Four months later, on January 30, 1950, Stalin let Kim know that he was now willing to help him in this matter.⁹ Why did Stalin change his mind? When Kim visited Moscow in March and April, Stalin explained to him that the Chinese communists could now devote more attention to Korea. The Chinese Revolution was evidently more important than the Soviet bomb in Stalin's decision to support Kim. Stalin cannot have thought that the nuclear balance of forces had changed very much, because the Soviet arsenal grew very slowly; it was not until November 1 and December 28, 1949, that the Soviet Union had enough plutonium for its second and third bombs.¹⁰

The war did not turn out as Moscow and Beijing had hoped. The United States intervened under the auspices of the United Nations and, as UN forces advanced into North Korea, the Chinese, who had supported Kim's plans, had to decide whether or not to enter the war. Those opposed to entry feared that the United States would use the atomic bomb in order to avoid defeat. Those in favor argued that China's alliance with the Soviet Union, which now had the bomb, would deter the United States from using nuclear weapons.¹¹ Stalin stiffened Chinese resolve by reassuring Mao Zedong that the United States

9 A. V. Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov* [The Mysterious War: The Korean Conflict 1950–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), 46, 55.

10 Protocol of the meeting of the Special Committee, October 22, 1949, in Riabev (ed.), *Atomnyi proekt SSSR*, 392.

11 Sergei N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 164–67.

was not ready for a “big war” and that, in any event, China and the Soviet Union together were stronger than the United States and Britain.¹²

China’s entry into the war caused alarm in Washington. On November 30, 1950, Truman created the impression, in answer to a reporter’s question, that the atomic bomb might be used in Korea at General Douglas MacArthur’s discretion. This caused an outcry. Clement Attlee flew to Washington on December 4 for reassurance that Truman was not actively considering the use of the bomb and that the decision to use it would remain in the president’s hands.¹³ Truman did not seriously consider using the bomb during the Korean War. He deployed nuclear-capable B-29s to Britain and to Guam in July 1950 but without nuclear weapons. The purpose was partly, as in the Berlin crisis, to signal American resolve and partly to enhance strategic readiness for a possible war. The bombers in Guam were soon withdrawn. In April 1951, Truman authorized the deployment of B-29 bombers and nuclear weapons to Guam. This was the first time since 1945 that the United States had sent nuclear weapons abroad. The purpose of the deployment was to be ready to respond in case the Soviet Union should enter the war. The bombers and the weapons were withdrawn in July, once the armistice talks began.

The Pentagon and the State Department studied at various times the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea, but the studies only pointed up the difficulties. There were few good targets in Korea itself: using the bomb on the battlefield would produce little effect if Chinese and North Korean forces were dispersed, and it might harm UN forces if the two sides were engaged in close battle. Using the bomb against Chinese or Soviet bases in Manchuria, or against Chinese cities, would lead to an expansion of the war, which Washington wanted to avoid. Besides, United States allies in NATO were strongly opposed to the use of the bomb, and to use it once more against Asians might undermine the American position in Asia.

Truman was forthright in defending his decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki but he did not want to use this terrible weapon again. President Eisenhower was more willing to contemplate its use. He told the NSC on February 11, 1953, that the United States should consider employing tactical atomic weapons in Korea. At the same meeting, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke of inhibitions on the use of the bomb, and of “Soviet success to date in setting atomic weapons apart from all other weapons as being in a

12. Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina*, 116–17.

13. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 398–401.

special category.”¹⁴ At an NSC meeting on March 31, Eisenhower commented that he and Dulles “were in complete agreement that somehow or other the tabu which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed.”¹⁵ The Eisenhower administration dropped hints that it would resort to nuclear weapons to bring the Korean War to an end, and it deployed nuclear weapons to Guam. Eisenhower later claimed that it was the threat to use the bomb that made possible the armistice signed on July 27, 1953. Recent evidence from the Russian archives suggests that, whatever role indirect nuclear threats may have played, it was Stalin’s death on March 5 that was the key event in bringing the war to an end.¹⁶

Military planners thought of the bomb as another weapon to be used in war, but policymakers, influenced perhaps by the peace movement and public opinion, saw it as being in a class of its own. Eisenhower and Dulles regarded this as a constraint and complained about it. Putting the bomb in a special category made it more difficult to use, because its use would have to be justified by special factors. The distinction between “conventional” and “nuclear” weapons began to emerge at the end of the 1940s, reinforcing the idea that the bomb belonged in a special category. Each side was willing to put intense pressure on the other, but – as Soviet and US policy in the Korean War made clear – neither wanted what Stalin called the “big war.” Viacheslav Molotov said many years later that the Cold War involved pressure by each side on the other, but “of course you have to know the limits.”¹⁷ The bomb, because it was so clearly in a category of its own, marked one important limit: to use it would mean crossing a significant threshold on the path to general war.

The hydrogen bomb

The hydrogen bomb, which uses a fission bomb to ignite thermonuclear fuel, marked a new and extremely important stage in the nuclear-arms race. Los Alamos worked on the hydrogen bomb during and after World War II, but did not come up with a workable design. The Soviet test of August 1949 provided a new impetus, and on January 31, 1950, Truman announced that the

14 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 11, 1953,” *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. XV, 770.

15 “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” *ibid.*, 827.

16 Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina*, 272–90.

17 *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov: From the Diary of F. Chuev] (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 88–89.

United States would develop the superbomb, as the hydrogen bomb was known. The “Mike” test on November 1, 1952, produced an explosive yield of 10 megatons, demonstrating that the United States had now mastered the basic design concepts (staging and radiation implosion) that made the superbomb possible. In the spring of 1954, the United States conducted a series of thermonuclear tests in the South Pacific, and one of the devices tested was more than 1,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (15 megatons of TNT equivalent, as opposed to 13.5 kilotons). The Soviet Union did not lag far behind. In August 1953, it tested an intermediate type of hydrogen bomb, and in November 1955 it conducted a test that showed that it too knew how to build a superbomb.

Public opinion around the world was shocked by these tests and by the dangers that thermonuclear weapons presented; the tests gave a powerful impetus to antinuclear movements in the United States, Europe, and Asia. The political leaders of the three nuclear powers – Britain had tested a fission bomb in October 1952 – were also shaken. After his election as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower received a report on the US Mike shot. He was troubled by the report and in his inaugural address declared: “science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from this planet.”¹⁸ On March 9, 1954, Winston Churchill, who was once again prime minister, wrote to Eisenhower after reading an account of that same Mike shot: “You can imagine what my thoughts are about London. I am told that several million people would certainly be obliterated by four or five of the latest H Bombs.”¹⁹ On March 12, 1954, the Soviet premier, Georgii M. Malenkov, made a speech in which he said that “a new world war ... with modern weapons [would mean] the end of world civilization.”²⁰

Eisenhower was convinced that the Soviet leaders did not want war, because war would put at risk their hold on power, but the prospect of growing Soviet nuclear strength impelled him to make sure that the Soviet leaders understood just how destructive a nuclear war would be. At the Geneva summit in July 1955 – the first meeting of Soviet and Western leaders since Potsdam ten years earlier – he made a special effort to impress upon them the terrible

18 Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 3–4, 34.

19 Winston Churchill to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 9, 1954, in Peter G. Boyle (ed.), *The Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence 1953–1955* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 123.

20 “Rech’ tovarishcha G. M. Malenkova” [Comrade G. M. Malenkov’s Speech], *Izvestiia*, March 13, 1954, 2.

consequences of a nuclear war, pointing in particular to the danger of nuclear fallout. At dinner one evening he explained with great earnestness that the development of modern weapons was such that the country that used them "genuinely risked destroying itself."²¹ Because of the prevailing winds, he added, a major war would destroy the northern hemisphere.

The Geneva summit did not yield any major agreements, but Eisenhower returned to Washington believing, as he put it in a television broadcast, that "there seem[ed] to be a growing realization by all that nuclear warfare, pursued to the ultimate, could be practically race suicide."²² Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, drew very much the same conclusion: "Each country present learnt that no country attending wanted war and each understood why ... this situation had been created by the deterrent power of thermo-nuclear weapons."²³ Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that he returned from Geneva "encouraged, realizing that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them."²⁴

By the mid-1950s, the political leaders of each of the nuclear states understood that nuclear war was unacceptable in some profound, if ill-defined, way. Each of them knew that the others understood this too, and each of them knew that each knew that the others understood it. The unacceptability of nuclear war had thus become "common knowledge" among those who had the authority to launch nuclear weapons.²⁵ The situation was neatly summed up by a comment Khrushchev made to an American official in April 1956: "Nearly everyone knew that war was unacceptable and that coexistence was elementary."²⁶

Nuclear deterrence

Washington did not expect its nuclear monopoly to end so quickly. Truman called for a study of the implications of the August 1949 Soviet test. The

21 "Memorandum for the Record of the President's Dinner, President's Villa, Geneva, July 18, 1955, 8 p.m.," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. V, 376.

22 Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), 302.

23 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), 306.

24 N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, vol. I (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 427.

25 Something is "common knowledge" in a group if each member knows it, knows that the others know it, knows that each one knows that the others know it, and so on. It is important for coordinated action. See David K. Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 52-60.

26 "Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, April 25, 1956," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XX, 380. The official was Harold Stassen.

resulting paper, NSC 68 (“United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”), warned that within four or five years the Soviet Union would be able to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States and called for a rapid buildup of air, ground, and sea forces, and of nuclear forces too.²⁷ This recommendation seemed unrealistic when NSC 68 was submitted in April 1950, but it gained a new relevance when the Korean War broke out in June. The United States and Britain began major rearmament programs, and NATO committed itself to ambitious force levels.

The economic impact of these programs soon caused concern. The British Chiefs of Staff argued in the spring of 1952 that the primary deterrent against Soviet aggression should be provided not by expensive conventional forces, but by the threat of nuclear retaliation. Eisenhower took the view that the federal budget – including the defense budget, which had grown threefold between 1950 and 1953 – had reached the point where it was damaging the economy. His “New Look” national security policy, which was set out in NSC 162/2 (“Basic National Security Policy”) and adopted on October 30, 1953, aimed to reduce the defense burden. Its most striking innovation was the emphasis it placed on nuclear weapons: “in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”²⁸ The United States would rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union. Any major war with the Soviet Union would be a nuclear war.

NSC 162/2 took a more sanguine view of the Soviet threat than NSC 68 had done. It backed away from the idea of an imminent year of maximum danger. The Soviet Union, it argued, was unlikely to launch a general war against the United States in the near future, and it foresaw the time when the two countries would have so many nuclear weapons that there would be “a stalemate, with both sides reluctant to initiate general warfare.”²⁹ The main challenge was rivalry “over the long pull”; that was why economic strength was so important.³⁰ NSC 162/2 argued that local aggression by the Communist powers could be inhibited by the threat of a nuclear response, even though that threat would become less effective as Soviet nuclear forces grew.

Nuclear deterrence was now the organizing principle of US national security policy. Eisenhower rejected the idea of preventive war against the Soviet

27 Ernest R. May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston, MA: Bedford Books, 1993), 23–82.

28 “Basic National Security Policy,” *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. II, 593.

29 *Ibid.*, 581. See also Robert J. McMahon’s chapter in this volume.

30 *Ibid.*, 582.

Union, which seemed to some senior officers to be a realistic option in the early 1950s; "there are all sorts of reasons, moral and political and everything else, against this theory," he told a press conference in 1954.³¹ He expedited the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as reconnaissance satellites. He deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Europe and other theaters. The basic Cold War structure of US nuclear forces took shape during his presidency.

Eisenhower's New Look policy was widely criticized in the United States for lacking credibility against all but the most extreme threats. The United States, in the eyes of the critics, would have to respond to limited aggression by choosing between doing nothing and starting a general war. Credibility was understood to be essential for deterrence, and the problem of making credible threats came to occupy a central place in theoretical analyses of deterrence and in discussions of US national security policy. It was a particular problem for NATO as Soviet nuclear forces grew: was it credible for the United States, once it became vulnerable to Soviet nuclear strikes, to threaten to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies?

Soviet policy after Stalin's death in March 1953 ran parallel to American policy in some key respects. The Soviet Union cut back the conventional forces that it too had built up in the early 1950s. It placed increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons and on ballistic missiles as the means to deliver them; in December 1959, it created a new military service, the Strategic Rocket Forces, which now became the spearhead of Soviet military power. The post-Stalin leaders moved away from the idea of an imminent year of maximum danger, which Stalin had adopted in the early 1950s. The concept of "peaceful coexistence," which suggested that war could be postponed indefinitely, was the Soviet equivalent of Eisenhower's rivalry "over the long pull." Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), attacked Malenkov for his statement that a new world war would mean the end of world civilization, but he did declare, at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, that war was no longer fatally inevitable, because the Soviet Union now had the means to prevent it.³²

The Soviet Union was very secretive about its armed forces, and overstated rather than underplayed its military power. In the absence of firm information, exaggerated fears erupted in Washington, reinforced by bureaucratic interests. There was a "bomber gap" scare in 1955 when air force intelligence

³¹ Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 251.

³² Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 335–45.

predicted that the Soviet Union would soon have far more bombers than the United States. A second scare, the “missile gap,” was triggered by the launch of Sputnik in October 1957, which demonstrated that the Soviet Union could deliver a warhead on an intercontinental trajectory. Khrushchev added to American anxieties by bragging about Soviet superiority.

Eisenhower did not share the prevailing sense of alarm. He was skeptical of the claim that the Soviet Union was rapidly overtaking the United States. He knew that the photographs obtained by the U-2 spy plane, incomplete though their coverage was, showed no evidence of a rapidly growing Soviet ICBM force. The missile gap was laid to rest only when John F. Kennedy, who had criticized Eisenhower for complacency in the face of mortal danger, became president. By the summer of 1961, it was clear from satellite photographs that whatever gap existed was in favor of the United States.

Throughout this period the United States maintained a considerable superiority in nuclear forces. Between 1950 and 1962, the US nuclear stockpile grew from 369 weapons to over 27,000, while the Soviet stockpile grew from a handful of bombs to about 3,300. The American capacity to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union was much greater than the Soviet capacity to launch nuclear strikes against the United States. The United States had many more long-range bombers than the Soviet Union, and it also had bases close to the Soviet Union, in Europe, Asia, and North Africa, as well as forward-deployed aircraft carriers. The Soviet Union had no aircraft carriers and no bases close to the United States. For technical as well as strategic reasons, the Soviet Union focused first on the deployment of medium-range – rather than intercontinental – bombers and missiles that could strike the bases and carrier groups from which US forces could attack Soviet territory. In spite of the early Soviet lead in ICBM development, the United States moved forward more quickly with deployment. By 1962, the United States had 203 ICBMs and 144 SLBMs, compared with the Soviet Union’s 36 ICBMs and 72 SLBMs.³³

By 1960, the United States and the Soviet Union had an image of a future war that was very different from the one they had shared in 1950.³⁴ First, each side conceived of a nuclear war as starting with a full-scale strategic nuclear

33 Archive of Nuclear Data on the National Resources Defense Council website, www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp.

34 *Sovremennaiia voina* [Modern War] (Moscow: Academy of the General Staff, 1960), a study carried out under the direction of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, chief of the General Staff; and Scott D. Sagan, “SIOP 62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” *International Studies*, 12, 1 (Summer 1987), 22–51.

attack against a mix of targets. In each case, the most urgent targets would be the other side's strategic nuclear forces, but centers of military and government control, as well as industrial and transportation centers, would also be attacked. Second, each side aimed to win. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, chief of the General Staff, declared in 1960 that World War III would inevitably end in the victory of Communism. He did, however, assert his military professionalism by emphasizing that victory had to be prepared for and would not come by itself.³⁵ General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the JCS, assured Kennedy in 1961 that execution of the SIOP (the Single Integrated Operational Plan) "should permit the United States to prevail in the event of general nuclear war."³⁶

Third, each side feared a surprise attack by the other. That fear was compounded by memories of the German attack on the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Each side regarded it as essential to be able to preempt such an attack. In the 1950s, each side had a strong incentive to preempt by striking first. The United States might have been able to destroy a large part of the Soviet strategic force, thereby reducing the impact of a Soviet retaliatory strike. The Soviet Union, by the same token, could have lost a great part of its strategic force if it failed to go first; preemption, on the other hand, would allow it to blunt an American attack by destroying US forward-based systems.


Some analysts worried that the "reciprocal fear of surprise attack" might create a spiral of anxiety and suspicion that would result in one side's attacking for fear that the other was about to do so, but that did not happen.³⁷ Preemption would have been a difficult strategy to implement. It required accurate warning of an impending attack, and the danger of "going late" was counterbalanced by the danger of "going early," in the sense of starting an unnecessary and unwanted war. Moreover, neither side believed that it could escape retaliation if it launched the first strike.³⁸ Even though each side regarded retaliation as a less desirable option than preemption, both sides tried to make sure they would be able to launch a retaliatory strike. Besides, the political leaders of the nuclear states believed that nuclear war would be a catastrophe, and each knew that the others

35 *Sovremennaia voina*, 53.

36 Sagan, "SIOP 62," 51.

37 Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), ch. 9.

38 *Sovremennaia voina*, 50; Sagan, "SIOP 62," 50.



3. US-USSR/Russian nuclear stockpile, 1945–2002.

Source: www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/dafig11.asp.

knew that, and so on. That common knowledge served as a factor of restraint and reassurance at a time when the strategic balance offered incentives for preemption.

Britain and France

The United States stopped nuclear cooperation with Britain at the end of World War II, much to the annoyance of the British government. There was widespread agreement in the country that Britain should have a bomb of its own, and this was reinforced by two specific anxieties. The first was that Britain did not want to repeat the experience of 1939–41 when it had stood virtually alone against Germany; the second was the fear that the United States, which was less vulnerable to attack than Britain, might rashly precipitate war. Britain hoped that the bomb would help it both to deter the Soviet Union and to influence the United States.

Britain tested the atomic bomb in October 1952 and the hydrogen bomb in May 1957. In 1958, the United States amended the Atomic Energy Act to permit close cooperation in nuclear weapons research, design, and production with countries that had already made “substantial progress” on their own. Britain achieved what Prime Minister Harold Macmillan called “the great prize,” when agreements were signed in 1958 to establish the basis for collaboration in

the design and development of nuclear weapons.³⁹ Cooperation extended to the coordination of strike plans and the transfer of US nuclear weapons to Britain in the event of war.

French nuclear policy followed a quite different course. After the war, France focused on the peaceful uses of atomic energy; the decision to build the bomb was taken later and in stages. In 1952, the government decided to build two reactors suited to plutonium production; in December 1954, the government decided that France should build the bomb; two years later, a secret committee was set up to bring together the scientists and the military chiefs. On April 11, 1958, Prime Minister Felix Gaillard signed the order to make and test the bomb. General Charles de Gaulle reaffirmed this decision when he took power in June of the same year, and in February 1960 the first French bomb was tested in the Sahara.

Several different motives shaped the French decision, but the most important was the insistence on having a voice in decisions affecting France's survival as a state. This was true of the governments of the Fourth Republic, which were concerned that without nuclear weapons they would have no influence on NATO's strategic planning. It was even more true of General de Gaulle, who doubted the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. He proposed in September 1958 that a triumvirate consisting of the United States, Britain, and France be formed in NATO with the power to take joint decisions on questions affecting global security and to draw up joint strategic plans. This was so important to France, he said, that it would withdraw from NATO's military organization if his proposal were not adopted.⁴⁰ Eisenhower was willing to promise regular consultations, but that did not satisfy de Gaulle.

Nuclear threats and nuclear crises

Leaders on both sides tried to exploit nuclear weapons for political advantage. Eisenhower concluded from the Korean War that nuclear threats worked. That belief underpinned his New Look policy, which aimed to use nuclear threats to deter local aggression. As Dulles explained, the United States "would depend primarily on a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by

39 Alastair Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986: Volume II of the Official Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 56.

40 Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur: politique étrangère de général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 117-25.

means and at places of our own choosing.”⁴¹ Eisenhower and Dulles considered using nuclear weapons in three crises in Asia. The first was in Indochina, where France was facing a Communist insurgency in Vietnam. There was discussion in the administration in 1954 of the possibility of using nuclear weapons to relieve French forces under siege in Dienbienphu. In the event Eisenhower took no action and made no overt nuclear threat.

The second and third crises concerned the islands of Jinmen and Mazu (Quemoy and Matsu), which lie only a few miles off the coast of China and were still controlled by the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan. In 1954 and 1958, the Chinese Communists bombarded the islands with artillery. Eisenhower concluded in each case that the defense of Taiwan required that the offshore islands be held. He was willing to use nuclear weapons if they were attacked, and he made that clear in March 1955 and in August 1958. These threats were not a bluff. Eisenhower gave serious consideration to the possibility of using nuclear weapons. He was not eager to do so, and he was well aware of the normative restraints on their use, but he did believe that nuclear threats could be used for political purposes. In each case the crisis ended when the Chinese expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement. Mao's main purpose appears to have been to make a political point, to show that China was a force to be reckoned with, rather than to seize territory from Nationalist control. In 1958, he had the additional goal of using international tension to mobilize Chinese society for the Great Leap Forward, a radical and ill-considered plan to industrialize China.

Ironically, Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, was persuaded of the utility of nuclear threats by a crisis in which the effect of such threats appears to have been negligible. Khrushchev conducted his first experiment in nuclear diplomacy during the Suez crisis. On November 5, 1956, he sent notes to London and Paris threatening them with missile attacks if they did not withdraw their forces from Egypt, where they had landed with the intention of regaining control of the Suez Canal. He sent a similar note to the Israeli government, which had allied itself with Britain and France. On the following day, Britain decided to end the Suez operation, and France was obliged to follow suit; Israel withdrew its forces later. Most historians assign a minor role to Soviet threats in explaining the collapse of the Suez operation; they give much greater weight to Eisenhower's opposition and US financial pressure. Khrushchev concluded otherwise. He was apparently convinced by the Suez

⁴¹ Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 254.

crisis that nuclear threats were effective – and also that bluffs worked, since he could not have carried out the threats he made.⁴²

Khrushchev wanted to make political gains by exploiting Soviet successes in nuclear technology and in space. He knew that a nuclear war would be catastrophic, and he knew that Eisenhower knew that too. If he could press hard enough, however, Eisenhower might back down. “I think the people with the strongest nerves will be the winners,” he remarked in 1958. “That is the most important consideration in the power struggle of our time. The people with weak nerves will go to the wall.”⁴³ He believed that he could wage an effective war of nerves against the West.

On November 27, 1958, Khrushchev announced that he would conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) within six months, thereby effectively revoking the rights of the occupying powers in Berlin. This was a serious challenge for the United States and NATO. The Soviet Union had overwhelming conventional superiority around West Berlin; if the Soviet Union decided to take Berlin, NATO might have to respond with nuclear weapons. Would the United States be willing to use such weapons, knowing that the Soviet Union would, in all likelihood, respond with nuclear strikes of its own? Eisenhower used this quandary to NATO’s advantage by consistently denying that war in Europe could remain conventional. He sought thereby to deny Khrushchev any leverage from the overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority around Berlin.

In the note that precipitated the crisis, Khrushchev warned Washington: “only madmen can go to the length of unleashing another world war over the preservation of the privileges of the occupationists in West Berlin.”⁴⁴ The difficulty for Khrushchev was that it was equally true that only a madman would start a war in order to *end* those privileges. Eisenhower knew that Khrushchev understood that a nuclear war would be catastrophic for everyone; he knew that Khrushchev knew that he (Eisenhower) understood it as well. In March 1959, after Khrushchev had dropped the six-month deadline, Eisenhower stated, in a television broadcast, “global conflict under modern conditions could mean the destruction of civilization. The Soviet rulers,

42 Sergei Khrushchev, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: kniga ob otse* [Birth of a Superpower: A Book about My Father] (Moscow: Vremia, 2000), 185.

43 Mohammed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World* (London: Collins, 1978), 98. See Vojtech Mastny’s chapter in this volume.

44 “Note from the Soviet Government to the United States Regarding the Question of Berlin, 27 November 1958,” in Gillian King (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 163.

themselves, are well aware of this fact.”⁴⁵ The best way to reduce the risk of war, he went on, was to stand firm over Berlin. Eisenhower stood his ground and Khrushchev did not carry through on his threat.

Khrushchev reopened the Berlin crisis at the Vienna summit meeting in June 1961 when he handed Kennedy an *aide-mémoire* demanding that West Berlin become a free city and that peace treaties be signed with the GDR. Once again he set a six-month deadline, and again he applied pressure on the Western powers. He hoped that Kennedy would be more susceptible to pressure than Eisenhower, but he was mistaken. He did not follow through on his threat to sign a peace treaty. In August 1961, he decided to erect the Wall in order to staunch the flow of people to the West. This action, though it was followed by some tense confrontations between American and Soviet forces, provided the basis for a *modus vivendi* on Berlin.

When the Central Committee presidium (as the Politburo was then called) removed Khrushchev from power in October 1964, it drew up two indictments. The milder of these, which was read to the Central Committee, made little mention of foreign policy. The harsher indictment, which was written by D. S. Polianskii, a member of the presidium, was prepared in case Khrushchev was not willing to resign at the presidium's request. It is worth quoting from its comments on the Berlin crisis. Comrade Khrushchev, it stated, “gave an ultimatum: either Berlin will be a free city by such and such a date, or even war will not stop us. We do not know what he was counting on, for we do not have such fools as think it necessary to fight for a ‘free city of Berlin.’”⁴⁶ Comrade Khrushchev, it continued, “wanted to frighten the Americans; however, they did not take fright, and we had to retreat, to suffer a palpable blow to the authority and prestige of the country, our policy, and our armed forces.”⁴⁷ It is hard to disagree with these judgments.

Both Eisenhower and Kennedy stood firm against Khrushchev's pressure, but there was an important difference between them. Eisenhower was willing to confront Khrushchev with the prospect of general war. Kennedy wanted to have more options at his disposal: he increased US forces in Germany and explored the possibility of a limited first strike against the Soviet nuclear forces. In Berlin, Eisenhower's policy proved to be effective, but that did not stop the Kennedy administration's search for flexible options.

45 Radio and television address, March 16, 1959, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1959* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 276.

46 “Takovy, tovarishchi, fakty” [Such, Comrades, Are the Facts], *Istochnik*, 1998, 2, 112.

47 *Ibid.*, 113.

The Cuban missile crisis

In May 1962, Khrushchev decided to deploy in Cuba a group of Soviet forces consisting of 50,000 troops armed with medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, fighter aircraft, light bombers, cruise missiles, naval vessels, and submarines, as well as strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. It was planned to build a submarine base as part of the Soviet presence.⁴⁸ The defense of Cuba against a US invasion was one crucial motive for this decision, but the composition of the group of forces suggests that a more important goal was to strengthen the Soviet strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. After the setbacks over Berlin, Khrushchev believed that it was important to increase pressure on the United States.⁴⁹

Khrushchev wanted to present Kennedy with a *fait accompli*. The Soviet operation was organized in great secrecy, but on October 15 the Kennedy administration discovered that missile sites were being constructed in Cuba. The missiles were not yet operational, so the administration had several days to deliberate in private. Various responses were discussed, including air strikes against Cuba and an invasion of the island. On October 22, Kennedy announced that the United States would impose a naval quarantine on Cuba and insisted on the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles.

Khrushchev was in an extremely difficult position. His goal, he told the presidium, was not to unleash war but to deter the United States from attacking Cuba. The tragedy was, he said, that, if the Americans attacked Cuba, Soviet forces would respond, and that could lead to a "big war."⁵⁰ The United States placed its strategic forces on higher alert and assembled forces in Florida to prepare for an invasion of Cuba. The Soviet Union also increased the readiness of its forces. The crisis, which had begun with a serious miscalculation by Khrushchev about Kennedy's reaction to the placing of missiles in Cuba, was now acquiring a dangerous momentum, in which a further miscalculation by one side could elicit an unwanted reaction from the other, leading to an uncontrollable spiral ending in war. An accident or an

48 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964* (London: John Murray, 1997), 188–89.

49 A. A. Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964*, vol. I [The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU 1954–1964] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 545. For a fuller discussion of Khrushchev's motives, see Vojtech Mastny's chapter in this volume and William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya's chapter in volume II. See also the discussion in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 439–45.

50 Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964*, vol. I, 617.

unauthorized action by one side could produce the same result. The situation was in danger of slipping out of control.

Khrushchev expressed this fear vividly in a letter he wrote to Kennedy on October 26, objecting to the quarantine and proposing steps to resolve the crisis:

If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive of what this might lead to, then Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.⁵¹

Khrushchev understood how terrible a nuclear war would be and counted on Kennedy's understanding of the same point. When Fidel Castro suggested in a letter to Khrushchev, on October 26, that the Soviet Union be prepared to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States if it invaded Cuba, Khrushchev reacted strongly. Such a strike would start a thermonuclear war, he wrote, explaining how terrible such a war would be. In a later letter he tried to convince Castro that Kennedy understood that too.⁵²

The crisis was finally resolved on October 28 when Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for a commitment by Kennedy not to invade Cuba. A secret agreement was also concluded in which Kennedy promised to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey as long as Khrushchev did not make that promise public. In October 1964, the presidium's harsher indictment was direct in its condemnation of Khrushchev. His decision to put missiles in Cuba (which almost all members of the presidium had supported) "caused a very profound crisis, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war; it gave a terrible fright to the man who organized this dangerous undertaking."⁵³ The indictment went on to say that it was of course sometimes necessary to threaten the imperialists with the force of arms, in order to sober them up; but it was wrong to turn threats of war into a method for conducting foreign policy, as Khrushchev had done.

51 *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VI, 177.

52 F. Castro to N. S. Khrushchev, October 26, 1962, and N. S. Khrushchev to F. Castro, October 30, 1962, *Granma (International Edition in English)*, December 2, 1990, 1–4; N. S. Khrushchev to F. Castro, October 31, 1962, in *Vestnik ministerstva inostrannykh del*, No. 24 (82) (December 31, 1990), 78.

53 "Takovy, tovarishchi, fakty," 113.

The Cold War and the arms race

The four nuclear powers, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, devoted considerable resources to building up their nuclear stockpiles and acquiring the bombers, submarines, missiles, and guns to deliver the nuclear weapons to target. The origins of the nuclear-arms race can be traced to the political rivalry between the wartime allies, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. By the 1950s, nuclear threats were permanently embodied in the forces that each side deployed against the other. Each side feared that the other was seeking the capacity to launch a surprise attack and each stressed the importance of preempting such an attack if it appeared to be imminent. Nuclear threats were both a product of the Cold War and a factor contributing to the great tension of those years. Over time, the weapons laboratories, the defense industry, and the armed forces became increasingly influential in the formulation of policy. In his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961, Eisenhower warned of the need to guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military-industrial complex. A similar phenomenon became apparent in the Soviet Union at a somewhat later date.



31. The Soviet Union sharply expanded its nuclear arsenal in the 1960s; here Soviet citizens watch ICBMs in Red Square, Moscow, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 1969.

Nuclear weapons also helped to keep the Cold War “cold.” By the mid-1960s, a situation had been created in which each side could inflict massive death and destruction on the other. A set of conventions and understandings emerged between the two sides to help them manage their nuclear relationship. The distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons provided a threshold, which helped the two sides conduct their rivalry short of the general war neither of them wanted. The idea that general nuclear war was in some profound way unacceptable became common knowledge among the political leaders of the three nuclear powers, that is, among those who had the authority to use nuclear weapons. That common knowledge constituted a basic premise of the Cold War and shaped the nuclear politics of the following years. Political leaders were willing to make nuclear threats, but they understood the difference between threat and action. Khrushchev exploited the fear of nuclear war to wage a dangerous and unsuccessful war of nerves, but he was limited in what he could threaten by the common knowledge that nuclear war was unacceptable. He knew that the other side wanted to avoid nuclear war, but they knew that he did too, and he knew that they knew he did. This was nevertheless a very dangerous period, because there was the danger that miscalculation or unauthorized acts could lead to an uncontrollable spiral toward war.

The Cuban missile crisis was a turning point in the Cold War. It drove home the lesson that crises are dangerous and should therefore be avoided. The first steps toward arms control had been taken in the late 1950s and early 1960s in talks on surprise attack and negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, but no significant agreement had been concluded before the Cuban missile crisis. That crisis gave a new impetus to efforts to make the nuclear relationship more stable and to reduce the risk of war.⁵⁴

54 For a more detailed analysis of the missile crisis and of the continuing arms race in the 1960s and 1970s, see G. James Hershberg's and William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapters in volume II.

Culture and the Cold War in Europe

JESSICA C. E. GIENOW-HECHT

In Graham Greene's postwar screenplay, *The Third Man*, American pulp author Holly Martins is invited by an old friend, Harry Lime, to Vienna, a city once known as the high cultural bulwark of Europe now occupied by the Allied forces, to give a talk at the British Cultural Re-education Centre. Ignorant of high culture, Martins represents the American innocent and ignorant abroad who refuses to believe that his well-educated friend now worships dictators and crime. "Don't be so gloomy," Lime offers at one point. "[I]n Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, and bloodshed – they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland, they had brotherly love, 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock." In a nutshell, *The Third Man* encapsulates European cultural development in the Cold War: the bipolar conflict unfolding amidst the ruins of Europe; the intensifying propaganda war for the minds of men; the clash between high and popular culture, between tradition and modernity; the cliché that Americans have no culture; and the fact that, in the end, the winners do not take it all.

The Cold War as a cultural contest

Culture constitutes the transmission of ideas, dreams, mores, traditions, and beliefs from one generation to the next, from one continent to another, from one group of people to another in the form of schools, galleries, orchestra halls, shopping centers, department stores, and information centers. A painting, a composition, a poem, or a film constitutes part of culture when people

I am grateful to the members of Hans Jürgen Puhle's research colloquium at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main and the participants of the panel "Culture, Society, and Ideology" at the Cambridge History of the Cold War Conference at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in April 2006 for their comments on my ideas.

receive, listen to, or look at it. It is the desire to pass on information that makes an artistic or intellectual inspiration part of culture. In Europe, the Cold War shaped a new way of transferring and selling ideas, values, productions, and reproductions. State interest, geopolitical strategy, ideological preconceptions, obsessive self-definition, and the continuous challenge of an enemy image dictated its contours to an unprecedented degree. In that sense, the Cold War was a war about two different *Weltanschauungen*, two ways to organize cultural life, two possibilities of defining modernity and grappling with its most daunting cultural challenge: how to preserve cultural tradition in the face of impending massive social change.

Beyond this change, the Cold War's influence on European culture was more qualitative than quantitative: it shaped existing disputes and developments more than it inspired new trends. We see in other chapters of this volume that many economic and social developments in Europe were not created, but rather reconfigured by the bipolar conflict.¹ Likewise, many developments, public debates, and social conflicts that moved to the foreground of European society after 1945 would have occurred without any reference to the clash between capitalism and Communism. Nonetheless, the Cold War provided new tools and new avenues for this cultural debate in a new context.

The Cold War played itself out against a background of tremendous cultural change, a transformation that would have taken place even if there had never been a Cold War. The debate over modernity, the menace of popular culture, mass society, and the relationship between the state and the economy had occupied Europeans since the early 1900s.² Cultural critics had long disagreed over how to preserve traditional values in the face of impending social change. This question rose again in European minds in 1945 when educators, clergymen, state reformers, politicians, and media experts pondered their continent's future. The Cold War did not trigger this debate, but it did shape its evolution and affect its outcome.

In Europe, the Cold War derived its cultural meaning from both historical and contemporary currents. On the one hand, it drew on cultural bonds and perceptions in place since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including trans-Atlanticism and the debate on modernity. At the same time, the culture of the Cold War attempted to draw together two very polarized

1 See the chapters by David S. Painter and Charles S. Maier in this volume.

2 See David C. Engerman's chapter in this volume.

continents – North America and Europe, including the Soviet Union – geographical areas that for centuries had watched each other with suspicion.³

This development began right after World War II, underwent a serious transformation in the 1960s, and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the core of the Cold War was an international battle over how to modernize society; the organization, control, and administration of culture; and the challenge of popular culture. Between 1945 and 1989–91, cultural centers, including the Amerika Häuser in Germany, and artistic tours, such as those featuring the Bolshoi Theater, became significant arenas for the battle between ideologies. Even governments in countries that had formerly not prioritized the support of culture began to invest heavily in the promotion of music, literature, and the visual arts. Both superpowers deliberately employed psychological warfare and cultural infiltration to weaken the opponent and its client states on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In the United States, C. D. Jackson, a former special assistant to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, claimed that culture “is no longer a sissy word ... The tangible, visible and audible expression of national idealism is culture.”⁴ Only in the 1990s, when these structures and financial subsidies collapsed, did we begin to understand to what an extent the Cold War had subsidized postwar culture everywhere. In Germany, most of the Amerika Häuser were closed; in Moscow, musicians and ballet dancers struggled to finance overseas tours.

At the same time, the culture of the Cold War in Europe spawned antigovernment tendencies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In nearly every West European country, the decades after 1945 witnessed protests against American culture, which the United States could never overcome. Likewise, popular protest movements in the East demanded a more open society and more exchange opportunities with the West. And on both sides of the Iron Curtain, people used popular culture to voice their political discontent.

This is the irony of the Cold War in Europe and the gist of this chapter. The bipolar conflict had a profound qualitative effect on the development of European culture and society. It shaped existing debates and conflicts on the continent’s transformation into modernity. The ideological confrontation

3 Frank Trommler, “A New Start and Old Prejudices: The Cold War and German–American Cultural Relations, 1945–1968,” in Detlev Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968: A Handbook*, 2 vols. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), vol. I, 371.

4 Cited in Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 225.

between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a cultural cold war which scholars commonly believe the United States won thanks to the lure of popular culture. But the orientation toward a great cultural past constituted a central part of the struggle to define modernity. Early on, the Soviets mounted the most powerful argument in the battle for the minds of men and women: linking progress and modernity both to their history and to the future, the Soviets claimed that they looked back on a great cultural past. They said the Americans had not produced any high culture. Building on a massive propaganda crusade, American strategists worked hard to rebut this argument. But it was almost impossible to contest the Soviets' negative portrayal of American civilization because this vision had existed long prior to 1945 – since the American Revolution – and it would remain in place after the demise of the Warsaw Pact.

Ironically, the influx of American popular culture into Europe – condemned by Communists and conservatives, welcomed by young people, and regarded with concern by US propaganda strategists – eventually cemented both the victory and the failure of American propaganda in Europe. By providing a language of protest, popular culture successfully contributed to the defeat of Communist ideology. In country after country, people assimilated elements of US popular culture, thus often making it their own. But US popular culture did not enhance the image of the United States in Europe; instead, both conservatives and left-wing intellectuals used the same language of protest emerging within the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to voice longstanding concerns against American civilization. The legacy of the US triumph at the end of the Cold War continues to be a deep-seated anti-Americanism all over Europe.

Making Cold War cultures

In the rivalry between the Soviets and the Western allies after 1947, cultural life and cultural institutions moved from the sidelines to the center of the political confrontation. Both Soviet and American policymakers realized that to “win the minds of men” in Europe, they needed to appeal more to their cultural than to their political identity. Because much of this propaganda war concerned the division of Germany, Soviet and American policymakers dedicated more time, more activities, and more money to the cultural cold war in Germany than to any other region or continent. Consequently, we know more about the cultural cold war in Germany than in any other European country.



32. Kirov Ballet School, Leningrad (St. Petersburg), 1958: ballet performances were enormously popular abroad and counted among the most successful assets in Soviet cultural propaganda in Europe.

In the eastern zone, Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Sowjetische Militär Administration in Deutschland, SMAD) officials took culture much more seriously than their Anglo-American colleagues. While Americans regarded culture – above all, the fine arts – as elitist, Soviets viewed culture as intrinsically political and ideological; their efforts in this field preceded those of the Western allies. The Soviets presented themselves as the saviors of occidental culture (*Abendlandkultur*): their army had saved European culture from the onslaught of Adolf Hitler. This argument resonated powerfully in the smaller countries of Eastern Europe because it rested on two pillars: on the one hand, European high culture enjoyed more respect and a broader audience in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Communism did not just preserve high

culture; it made it accessible to everyone with the help of heavy state subsidies. On the other, the Soviets posed as the only true inheritors and saviors of European culture because they had defeated Nazism.

Soviet propagandists hurried to sell this vision to target audiences in Germany in order to win their sympathies. While Allied officials in the West were still busy screening artists who had applied to perform in the western zones, the Deutsche Theater in the Soviet sector had already offered some ten productions, among them Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* and Molière's *L'École des Femmes*.⁵ In May 1945, SMAD invited two hundred artists, writers, sculptors, and painters to discuss the future of German culture. Soviet officers in charge of cultural programs were intensely familiar with German history, language, and culture; often, they were descendants of the Russian Jewish bourgeoisie with a degree in literature or a related field.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt about their instructions. These officials worked hand in hand with cadres of the German Communist Party (KPD) who had spent the war in the Soviet Union, such as Walter Ulbricht. Soviet intelligence officers developed a tight system of overt and covert activities and tried to mobilize art for the defeat of capitalism and fascism in Germany. In the field of contemporary art, Soviet cultural policy sought to denounce abstraction, surrealism, and expressionism as outgrowths of corrupt capitalism and fascism. The strategy was to reach the German cultural intelligentsia with the help of incentives, threats, and coercion.⁶

The cooperation between German intellectuals and artists and Soviet officials was key to SMAD's propaganda strategy. This propaganda heaped praise on the Soviet Union and sought to diminish the image of the United States and, subsequently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In music, literature, and the visual arts, Communist propagandists argued that the West lagged behind and was, therefore, particularly aggressive. In the 1960s, the tone toward the United States changed and became more conciliatory. But the principal argument – the tension between Western imperialism and militarism on the one hand and Soviet pacifism on the other – remained in place until the 1980s.

5 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater: Cultural and Intellectual Life in Berlin, 1945–1949*, trans. Kelly Barry (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 63–64.

6 David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 319–27, 459–64; Schivelbusch, *In a Cold Crater*, 34–37; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 146.

In addition to these political charges the Soviets focused their cultural message on Russia's classical tradition, its music, paintings, history, and performing arts. Their productions of orchestral concerts and their fairy-tale ballets evoked dreamy visions of the past rather than the harsh modern reality of collective farms and oppressed peasants around the world. The export of Russian and Soviet art remained a standard duty of VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.⁷

This cultural nostalgia provided Communist cultural diplomacy with its strongest asset. When Communist propagandists devised their advertising campaigns, the preservation of "Old World culture" – above all, German *Kultur* – formed the thrust of their argument. The *Tägliche Rundschau*, the Red Army newspaper in the Soviet occupation zone, often published reports on the respect the Soviet people had for the works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Ludwig van Beethoven. The subtext was clear: the Soviets had a high cultural background. Americans did not; they were dull and aggressive. Repeating their central argument over and over again, Soviet propagandists skillfully fanned the flames of anti-Americanism that had originated in the late eighteenth century.

Public opinion polls taken by the American military government in Germany between 1945 and 1950 confirmed the success of this propaganda approach: Germans clearly feared the adoption of democratic values at the expense of their cultural heritage. Letters to the US radio station in Berlin revealed that it lost many listeners due to its supposedly "Western" (jazz) music program. Communism evidently supported high culture to nurture the sensibilities of people. Democratic systems such as the United States, in contrast, anesthetized minds with popular culture and jazz.⁸

Communist media spokespeople relentlessly stressed the status of high culture in their society, often tying this message to political propaganda. The foremost instrument of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) for cultural propaganda was the broadcasting station Deutschlandsender. From 1948 to 1971, the station targeted audiences outside the Soviet zone and, later, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in an effort to convince listeners of the Communists' cultural priorities as well as their resistance to fascism, militarism, and the imperialism of the Atlantic alliance. The Deutschlandsender reached a significant fraction of the West German audience, above all because to many West Germans its classical music program constituted a welcome

7 David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 10, 28.

8 D. G. White, *US Military Government in Germany: Radio Reorientation* (Karlsruhe: US European Command, Historical Division, 1950), 114–17.

alternative to the modern music programs offered by local Western stations in the 1950s and 1960s.⁹

But, for all their anti-Western propaganda, East European Communist countries often combined cultural criticism in theory with cultural rapprochement in reality. As a result of internal political pressure, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, and other states developed viable cultural contacts with West European countries in the 1950s. Many Communist countries experienced a series of internal conflicts and massive upheavals in the 1950s and 1960s. Domestic critics of these Communist regimes focused on their lack of openness and lamented the absence of an international dialogue. Such charges forced Communist policymakers to develop a more conciliatory foreign policy and cooperate culturally with the West.¹⁰

By the early 1950s, the Soviets had mounted a significant exchange program. Some 17,000 foreigners visited the Soviet Union in 1950. Three years later, their number had grown to 45,000.¹¹ In the mid-1950s, the Soviets joined UNESCO, where they soon embarked on a struggle for a new information order, an international press code, and a licensing system for journalists to facilitate state control of the press. In 1967, the Warsaw Pact states suggested the formation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in order to improve the intra-European cultural and political dialogue along with confidence-building in military affairs. Their efforts were crowned by success: the CSCE first met in 1973; simultaneously, the European Council developed a number of cultural programs such as student exchanges between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

As in other East European countries, the GDR established an exchange program designed to develop permanent cultural contacts with the United States in the 1960s. In the spring of 1962, shortly after the building of the Berlin Wall, the East Berlin theater review, *Theater der Zeit*, invited West German dramatic advisers to visit theaters in Berlin, Weimar, Leipzig, Dresden, Halle,

9 Klaus Arnold, *Kalter Krieg im Äther: Der Deutschlandsender und die Westpropaganda der DDR* (Münster: LIT, 2002); Peter Strunk, *Zensur und Zensoren: Medienkontrolle und Propagandapolitik unter sowjetischer Besatzungsherrschaft in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996); Adelheid von Saldern and Inge MarBolek (eds.), *Zuhören und Gehörtwerden II. Radio in der DDR der Fünfziger Jahre: Zwischen Lenkung und Ablenkung* (Tübingen: Edition Diskord 1998).

10 See the sections on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried (eds.), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, forthcoming).

11 These numbers are US estimates: Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 8.

and Magdeburg.¹² The GDR Peace Council also extended an invitation to Western intellectuals: in 1966, a small group of Americans visited the GDR, where they were welcomed by leading officials such as Walter Ulbricht and Willi Stoph, chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1972, Günter Kunert worked as a visiting writer at the University of Texas in Austin for five months.

East German officials used cultural relations to establish the GDR as a state celebrating high and working-class culture. By doing so, they hoped to gain international recognition of their state. Throughout the 1970s, GDR officials lobbied for a cultural treaty that would cement US–GDR relations, though with little success. In Washington, officials feared that the Communists would exploit any exchange program as an avenue for espionage. East Berlin officials, in turn, insisted on the right to select American exchange visitors according to their own ideological criteria.

Nonetheless, the GDR maintained a number of international cultural programs. The state participated in the activities of the New York-based International Research Exchange Board. The board organized academic exchange programs between the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The GDR also managed to sign on with exchange programs at various US universities. The export of GDR orchestras, paintings, and performing artists likewise formed part of the country's effort to establish lasting cultural ties with the United States. But the ends often conflicted with the means as well as with each other: ideologically, GDR officials fought and ridiculed the imperialist United States; politically and culturally, they hoped for rapprochement and recognition.¹³

Propaganda and cultural offensives

While Warsaw Pact propagandists hammered home a clear message all across Europe, it remains much harder to define what US propagandists were trying to do. Instead of outlining utopian goals – as propaganda typically does – US propaganda remained primarily defensive. Americans thought that they had already developed the best society in the world. Their propaganda therefore lacked vision and tended to be mostly unappealing, dismissing other societies while extolling their own.

12 Helmut Karasek, *Auf der Flucht: Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Ullstein, 2006), 264–67.

13 Heinrich Bortfeldt, 'Im Schatten der Bundesrepublik: kulturelle Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und den USA', in Detlev Junker (ed.), *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges*, vol. II, 1968–1990 (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001), 467–75.

Such a lack of vision clearly slowed the development of US propaganda programs. For the first five years after the war, Washington had very little interest in cultural matters in Europe. US officials disputed cultural policy; they were skeptical about whether the promotion of American values and culture abroad was appropriate at all; and they remained indifferent to the implementation of cultural policy in postwar Europe. For example, media guidelines from the State and the War Departments to the division charged with the reconstruction of the German press often came late or were lost. If these directives trickled down to their point of destination, US information strategists in Germany disregarded them without informing their superiors in Washington, DC.

US propagandists in Europe were often confused about what they wanted. Many US information officials in Germany, for example, remained unwilling to tear down the icon of German music from its international pedestal, partly because they themselves admired it and partly because they were intimidated by Germany and its *Kultur*. Others, in contrast, were tremendously reluctant to make any concessions to the quality of *Kultur*, believing that such an acknowledgment would echo Joseph Goebbels's propaganda tune that "Americans are money-hungry barbarians with no cultural life of their own." Such concessions, US propagandists feared, would enforce the Germans' "national feeling" that their life and culture were superior to any other way of life. As a result, American officers' definition of American "culture" – supposedly a viable alternative to fascist *Kultur* – remained fuzzy.

When US propaganda strategists in Washington finally designed their own cultural program in the early 1950s, everything they did and said was a response to Communist faultfinding, European anti-Americanism, and the Korean War. Because Soviet propagandists had already seized the initiative, their US counterparts had no choice but to follow suit. And, as we have seen, the parameters of Soviet and East German Communist propaganda embraced *Bildung* (knowledge, education) and *Kultur* and ridiculed the absence of both in the United States. The effort to defy the criticism that the United States had no high culture and no tradition remained at the heart of US cultural propaganda in Europe throughout the Cold War.

The European charge that Americans lacked culture had been a standard fare of European anti-Americanism since the Revolution of 1776. The European obsession to eliminate everything "American" from contemporary values and terminology, and the refusal to see the United States as having a separate culture rather than being a shrill deviation from Europe, originated in the decades after the American Revolution. Because European

criticism had such a long history, US officials in the 1950s found it difficult to counter it effectively.¹⁴ They designed a "Campaign of Truth" during the Korean War to refute Soviet propaganda and to show a "full and fair picture" of American society and culture. A few, such as Shepard Stone, a cultural diplomat in the early years of the High Commission in Germany, grasped that the United States had to focus on the positive in the history of transatlantic relations. A successful political partnership between Europe and the United States could flourish only if it was grounded on a cultural alliance as well.

US officials believed that, to revise Europeans' unfavorable impressions of American culture, they needed to learn more about US academic and high cultural achievements. They needed to be reminded of their longstanding cultural relations with the United States, which had tied the two continents together for over a hundred years. The United States had to cease telling foreign audiences how to be more like Americans; instead, programs should reveal how much the country and Europe resembled each other on the cultural level.

These were the goals of all the institutions, information programs, and cultural exchanges created after 1950, such as the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Fulbright program. They aspired to export American culture, including literature, music, art, and science abroad, while simultaneously stimulating academic exchange. By 1956, the United States had already sent some 14,000 people to Germany alone, while 12,000 Germans had visited the United States on such programs. Countless European and American researchers would visit scientific laboratories on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean for periods ranging from a month to a year. In the social sciences and in psychology in particular, an intense internationalization took place.¹⁵

As in the Soviet Union, the media played a decisive role in this propaganda scheme. The US radio station in Berlin and Radio Free Europe were among the most important channels for Western propaganda. After Stalin's death, Radio Liberty was created; the BBC also broadcast programs in Russian

14 Volker Depkat, *Amerikabilder in politischen Diskursen: deutsche Zeitschriften von 1789 bis 1830* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998).

15 Karl Heinz Füssl, "Between Elitism and Educational Reform: German-American Exchange Programs, 1945-1970," in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 409-16; Mitchell G. Ash, "Science and Scientific Exchange in the German-American Relationship," *ibid.*, 417-24.

designed for audiences behind the Iron Curtain. The Voice of America likewise formed the United States' major channel for criticism of the Soviet Union, airing programs in Russian, English, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian.¹⁶

Classical music, symphony concerts, and music competitions for soloists became some of the foremost arenas in the bipolar competition for cultural preponderance. For example, the Soviets often won the prizes at the renowned Queen Elizabeth competition in Brussels prior to World War II. As late as 1951, Soviet citizens occupied the first, second, fifth, and seventh place, while Americans were left with the ninth and eleventh. The US State Department subsequently initiated the formation of a review committee to select talented American contestants for future competitions. The initiative was a success: in 1952, Leon Fleisher, one of eight Americans sent to Brussels, placed first. The State Department also supported 23-year-old Van Cliburn from Texas: in April 1958, he won first prize at the International Tchaikovsky Competition in Moscow, with an interpretation of Rachmaninoff's Piano Concerto No. 3 and Tchaikovsky's Piano Concerto No. 1.¹⁷

In their effort to convince Europeans of the cultural attractiveness of the United States, US propagandists employed not only overt but also covert operations. Funneled through dummy organizations, including the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations not only spent millions of dollars on exchange programs but also created American information centers and sponsored guest professorships, books, and libraries in Western Europe.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed a sizable portion of the US cultural program. Between 1945 and 1967, the CIA fostered the translation and worldwide distribution of more than 1,000 books by American authors, such as John Steinbeck and Ernest Hemingway. In Germany, authors such as Philip Roth, Henry Miller, Vladimir Nabokov, William Faulkner, Truman Capote, and Tennessee Williams remained in vogue for decades after the occupation, thanks to the formal introduction of

16 Nick Cull, "'The Man Who Invented Truth': The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy Years," in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 30–33.

17 Joseph Horowitz, *The Ivory Trade: Music and the Business of Music at the Van Cliburn International Piano Competition* (New York: Summit Books, 1990), 21–29.

American literature after 1945. Between 1968 and 1990, American literature comprised one-third of all translated books on the German market.¹⁸

At the center of the CIA's activities was the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an organization formed in Europe as an intellectual forum for cosmopolitan intellectuals and as a response to leftist and Communist influences. The CCF aimed to support US culture among European leftists; it had offices in some thirty-five countries. The Congress organized exhibitions, award ceremonies, international conferences, and music concerts; it published magazines; and it ran a news service. Other organizations benefited from CIA funds as well, often without being aware of the original source of their funding.

These covert actions have recently stirred a heated debate among British and German historians over the issue of political control and cultural independence in Europe. For many years the United States attempted to influence and guide the political tactics of the British Left. The CIA specifically targeted the intelligentsia, youth and women's groups, students, trade unions, left-wing literary intellectuals, political parties, and especially the British Labour Party, as well as the magazine *Encounter*, in an effort to strengthen anti-Communist tendencies and promote Atlantic harmony. Some scholars have argued that these operations deprived intellectuals, artists, and even governments of their freedom of expression; if they did not "behave," the CIA would cut their funding.¹⁹

Yet the American vision of a transatlantic alliance based on a shared set of cultural values always encountered serious problems in Europe and the United States. Even when funded by the CIA, US organizations proved unwieldy instruments of state propaganda. Sponsored by the Ford Foundation and designed as forums of elitist opinions, transatlantic institutes were often preoccupied with internal conflict over staff hierarchies, objectives, and personnel policy, creating more disagreement than harmony. Other organizations gladly accepted US funds but still went their own way with no regard for the aims of the United States. And almost all transatlantic groups grappled with profound national differences in Europe. For example, the CCF never managed to establish its Scandinavian headquarters in Denmark because its

18 Willi Paul Adams, "Amerikastudien in der Bundesrepublik," in Junker (ed.), *USA und Deutschland*, vol. II, 451–65; Martin Meyer, "American Literature in Germany and Its Reception in the Political Context of the Postwar Years," in Junker (ed.), *Germany and the United States*, vol. I, 425–31.

19 Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (eds.), *The State-Private Network: The United States Government, American Citizen Groups, and the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

first chief organizer was mostly interested in extending his own covert network rather than promoting the goals of the CCF.²⁰

The Marshall Plan, to cite another example, was designed to catalyze European integration and economic activity while also sending a cultural message stressing modernization. US policymakers gambled that Europeans would reject Communism once they understood the “superiority” of the American way of life. But European public debates over the plan were inextricably intertwined with fears of “Americanization.” In France, recipients managed to take advantage of US aid, but they rejected the political message that came with it and often refused to visit and even damaged US exhibitions extolling modernity and efficiency in the United States. The story of the Marshall Plan and “the creation of the West”²¹ followed a much bumpier road than the view from Washington suggests. It was one thing to finance West European economies, but it was quite another to forge political and cultural consensus.²²

Europeans and American culture

From the beginning, Europeans encountered the influx of American culture with both admiration and resistance. The European debate on modernization, already prevalent in the 1920s and 1930s, became an integral part of the Cold War in the 1950s and beyond, coupled with an increasingly intense debate over the downside of American culture.

Even if there had been no Cold War, the debate over modernization would have taken place. But the presence of American popular culture imported by American GIs and manufacturers aggravated and personalized these changes. The cultural implication of American movies, cartoons, and paintings in Europe was not merely their ostentatious display of consumer goods or dark heroes, but recipients’ social use of these artifacts in the creation of

20 Ingeborg Philipson, “Out of Tune: The Congress for Cultural Freedom in Denmark, 1953–1960,” *ibid.*, 237–53.

21 See William I. Hitchcock’s chapter in this volume.

22 Oliver Schmidt, “Small Atlantic World: US Philanthropy and the Expanding International Exchange of Scholars after 1945,” in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 115–34; the essays by Anthony Carew and Valerie Aubourg in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); and those by Hugh Wilford, Alexander Stephan, Dag Blank, Günter Bischof, David Ellwood, Nils Arne Sorensen, and Klaus Petersen in Alexander Stephan (ed.), *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti Americanism after 1945* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006).

their own new identity. The Cold War thus politicized European historical hopes and fears.

Historians have described the controversial appeal of American popular culture among Europeans in the 1950s. In France, for example, the "American Way of Life" fascinated a generation of young men and women attracted to consumerism, better living standards, and economic growth.²³ At the same time, older speakers continuously denounced the Americanization of French culture, language, and the arts. For many French people, the United States represented a scapegoat in the discourse over the future and the modernization of French society: whatever seemed to go wrong in France, it was the United States' fault.

The European film industry served as a powerful catalyst in the debate over the continent's cultural future. Soviet propagandists denounced American movies as imperialist and capitalist trash while West European critics deplored the demise of an independent European film scene. But in some countries American movies quickly gained a significant share of the market, often more than 50 percent within a few years.

Much of this success originated in the controversial appeal of American movies to younger Europeans. The influx of American films shaped a new West European youth culture, but it also antagonized their parents and teachers. In France and Italy, workers and young people adored Hollywood movies. At the same time, Communist Parties in those countries, as well as films such as Jacques Tati's *Jour de Fête*, made it clear that their work ethos and labor tradition differed significantly from the consumerist orientation of workers in the United States. In blue-collar areas in Italy, the advent of Hollywood productions accelerated the break between traditional local culture and the new world. It estranged rural families from their urbanized children and it divided the proletariat from the mass rallies of organized labor. Watching Hollywood movies allowed workers and young people to understand these transformations.²⁴

The protests against American culture in the 1950s remained partial and local. They were typically limited to a particular cause (anti-jazz,

23 Brian McKenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005).

24 Fabrice Montebello, "Hollywood Films in a French Working Class Milieu: Longwy, 1945–1960," 213–46, T. P. Elsaesser, "German Postwar Cinema and Hollywood," 283–302, and Bruno P. F. Waroij, "Dollars and Decency: Italian Catholics and Hollywood (1945–1960)," 247–65, all in David Elwood (ed.), *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994).

anti-Western), profession (workers against the Marshall Plan), or generation (youth against parents). But beginning in the 1960s, a nascent leftist movement identified American expansive capitalism both as the driving force behind the conflict between East and West and as representative of consumerism, modernity, organization, and the conflict between society and the individual.

In Europe, this change of climate may be attributed in no small part to generational reasons. Many of the networks founded during the late 1940s and 1950s were created by émigrés, prisoners of war, and, later, exchange students who had spent several years in the United States, as well as by tens of thousands of US civil engineers who had worked in Europe. The generation coming of age in the 1960s had not had such experiences. They did not remember the Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan, or the democratic reconstruction of Italy and West Germany. Instead, they witnessed the assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King and watched the urban riots of 1968.

Disillusionment arising from those events as well as the presence of US troops and student revolts alienated a culturally significant portion of the West European population who came to despise NATO and the benefits of a free-market economy. In West Germany, the war in Southeast Asia destroyed the credibility of the US government and its image as a Camelot of the Western world. Instead, young Germans began to perceive the United States as imperialist and materialist. "My entire liberal education began in the [information center] Amerika-Haus [*sic*] where I studied the American Declaration of Independence," one young man stated; "what happens now is an open assault on these ideals."²⁵

This move toward open rejection manifested the emancipation of young Europeans: in liberating themselves from their identification with the United States, West Germans began to come to terms with their own identity. Consequently, much of the cultural development taking place in the areas of music, film, theater, literature, and the performing arts after 1968 derived its emancipatory character and legitimacy precisely from the postwar right to protest and reject. Although American popular culture permeated European life, European intellectuals, artists, and consumers advocated cultural tropes celebrating the rejection of US culture.

25 Cited in William J. Weissmann, *Kultur- und Informationsaktivitäten der USA in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland während der Amtszeiten Carter und Reagan: Eine Fallstudie über Alliierten Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), 66. See also Jeremi Suri's chapter in volume II.



33. American jazz musician Louis Armstrong at a bookstore on rue de l'Odeon in Paris's Latin Quarter, 1948. US officials wanted to export high culture, but American pop culture resonated throughout Europe.

Curiously, the European rejection and acceptance of American culture were always joined at the hip. American artists such as Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen continued to regard a tour of Europe as a mandatory part of their global trekking because they often found their European audiences even more enthusiastic than their American fans. Modern German pop, in turn, borrowed from the American model. In the 1970s and 1980s, singers such as Udo Lindenberg, Nina Hagen, or Herbert Grönemeyer, as well as groups such as BAP, Die Toten Hosen, or Einstürzende Neubauten, reflected the musical heritage of pop, rock, and new wave while their texts criticized US hegemony and reflected the tradition of German Liedermacher.²⁶ Musicians – like the public – borrowed a language framed in the United States to make statements critical of that country.

Audiences in the East likewise accepted American popular culture, but they used it to criticize their own governments. During the first decade of the Cold War, consumer culture became a way to delineate the boundaries between

²⁶ Edward Larkey, "Experimente und Emanzipation: die deutsche populäre Musik und das anglo-amerikanische Vorbild," in Junker (ed.), *USA und Deutschland*, vol. II, 517–28.

East and West, both as a way of life and as a means of expressing cultural and political protest. Throughout the 1950s, East and West Germans shared a common interest in and consumption of American popular culture, including music and dance, movies, fashions as exhibited in music halls, broadcasting programs, stores, and television. Jeans, jazz, and stars such as Elvis Presley reached adolescents in both the Federal Republic and the GDR, who enthusiastically embraced the new styles.

After the building of the Berlin Wall, legal and physical restrictions seriously hampered the influx of popular music, movies, and artifacts behind the Iron Curtain. Both East and West German authorities began to contain Americanized youth culture in their respective regions. Their efforts reflected a continuation both of the cultural cold war and of the old debate over modernity. From then on, critics in the East could no longer openly use the language of popular culture when criticizing their governments.²⁷ Instead, popular culture – notably rock and roll – became a way to silently protest against the government as well as against state-run cultural productions and artifacts.

Still, a society in which the state organized culture did not effectively ban all popular culture. Take, for example, science fiction. For both American and Soviet societies, outer space served as a screen on which to project their fears and expectations. Heroes of technological advancements, such as the astronauts Neil Armstrong and Yuri Gagarin, became symbols of human progress. Both democratic and Communist countries rallied around the celebration of the “scientific-technological revolution.” Stalinist science fiction evoked visions of stunning inventions and new sources of raw materials in order to depict a perfect society. Some authors, such as Stanislaw Lem, opted for a “third way” and developed a vision of a future in which Communism and capitalism had merged into a hybrid.²⁸ Science fiction thus became a form of social protest (the “forbidden fruit” of popular culture) and a vision of an alternative future.

Nowhere was the European debate around the challenge of modernity and the organization of culture more evident than in the field of new technologies and the visual arts. Hollywood significantly shaped the West European

27 Uta Poiger, “Cold War Politics and American Popular Culture in Germany,” in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 439–44; Edward Larkey, “Popular Music in Germany: The Genesis of a New Field of Discourse,” *ibid.*, 445–49.

28 Science fiction did not fare well everywhere behind the Iron Curtain. See Patrick Major, “Future Perfect? Communist Science Fiction in the Cold War,” in Mitter and Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs*, 71–96.

perception of American popular culture. Hollywood film studios lobbied successfully with the State Department in order to export much of their production on the West German market. But local filmmakers strove to remain independent and successful at the box office until the 1960s, focusing on crime thrillers, *Heimatfilme* (nostalgia), musical revues, and the like.²⁹ German film directors such as Volker Schlöndorff (*The Tin Drum*) attempted to found a new German cinema, which would neither oppose mainstream commercial productions nor revive the spirit of German productions prior to 1945. Still, their ideas about German postwar identity typically revolved around the relationship between Germans and Americans, and their funds often originated in the United States.³⁰

Culture in and from the Eastern bloc

Behind the Iron Curtain, film likewise developed into a powerful medium, but remained officially subordinated to propaganda rather than existing as popular culture. Depending on the time period, Soviet officials differed on the extent to which they exerted this control. Soviet cinema had not been censored much during the war, but the Cold War induced a much more interventionist state policy. As tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States escalated, Communist propagandists recognized cinema as a key weapon in the war of ideas. In 1946, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union created a Ministry of Cinematography for propaganda and agitation purposes. Stalin felt that directors should portray the Soviet people as strong, modern, and forward-looking. Soviet cinematography should also distance itself from Hollywood productions and portray Soviet citizens as moral people. Movies, such as *Admiral Nakhimov*, an epic filmed in 1943 about the famous admiral of the Russian fleet who successfully fought the Turks at the battle of Sinope in 1853, were reworked into new productions in an effort to put this message across.³¹

The Soviets controlled film far beyond their national boundaries. After the war, they supervised more than 70 percent of Germany's movie facilities, once the property of the Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft (UFA), which the Soviets turned into a state monopoly, DEFA (Deutsche Film AG).

29 Daniel J. Leab, "Side by Side: Hollywood and German Film Culture," in Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany*, vol. I, 457–63.

30 See Nicholas Cull's chapter in volume II.

31 Sarah Davies, "Soviet Cinema and the Early Cold War: Pudovkin's *Admiral Nakhimov* in Context," in Mitter and Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs*, 49–70.

Originally, well recognized even outside the Communist world, DEFA eventually lost influence due to the rise of television but also because of its growing production of propaganda movies. After the surprisingly ambivalent *Die Mörder sind unter uns* ([Murderers Among Us], 1946), a story about a German doctor striving to forget his memories with the Nazi army, DEFA produced a variety of films celebrating socialist realism at its best. Movies such as *Roman einer jungen Ehe* ([Story of a Young Couple], 1952), *Frauenschicksale* ([Women's Fate], 1952), and *Das verurteilte Dorf* ([The Condemned Village], 1952) all focused on American military forces as oppressors.

Curiously, Communist propaganda neglected one of its most fashionable cultural productions. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various Warsaw Pact states produced a multitude of children's films and television series that became tremendously popular among Western audiences due to their high artistic standard. Celebrating timeless fairy tales, magic, and the vision of a world inhabited by sorcerers, monarchs, and elves, these films avoided overt propaganda and enchanted several generations of children and their parents on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For example, *Pan Tau*, a German-Czechoslovakian series starting in 1967, featured the adventures of a man who could change his appearance into a puppet by tapping on his magical bowler hat. Still popular on European television stations today, films such as DEFA's canny 1974 production *Drei Nüsse für Aschenbrödel* [Three Nuts for Cinderella] – a covertly sociocritical adaptation of the Brothers' Grimm *Cinderella* – offer a glimpse on how successful Communist film propaganda could have been had it fully embraced its crusade of high culture. In focusing on straightforward propaganda, Communist cinematography ignored a potentially powerful instrument in its battle for cultural preponderance.

Modernity, culture, and Cold War

The Cold War embedded two different ways of organizing culture and defining modernity. While the Soviets' early engagement in cultural propaganda gave the Warsaw Pact states a tremendous edge in the battle for high culture, popular culture unexpectedly provided the vehicle for the United States' triumph in 1989–91. Fostered by technological innovations such as satellite television, US films, cartoons, and fashion appealed to people in many regions east and west of the Iron Curtain before the Wall came down. In Western Europe, the arrival of consumerism went hand in hand with the internalization of many values such as productivity, efficiency, and the eternal quest for a higher living standard, as well as the development of a

service sector, suburbs, youth culture, and the increasing preponderance of visual culture.

Still, this is not a story of winners and losers. For one thing, despite the domination of the two superpowers in the Cold War, their client states and peoples chose a process of cultural adaptation and rejection. West European consumers dismissed or reinterpreted many US products, often in an open effort to attack the United States. In Eastern Europe, the embrace of popular culture became part of the language of silent protest. Because popular culture bred the lure of capitalism and evoked opposition to the status quo, Warsaw Pact governments remained opposed to it.

Ironically, neither American nor Soviet officials intended to focus their cultural crusade on popular culture. In contrast, propagandists on both sides of the Iron Curtain concentrated their campaigns on the preservation and appeal of European high culture, and they shied away from openly employing popular culture for political ends. Communist officials everywhere derided the threat of popular culture while the USIA worked hard to rid the United States of the stigma of mass culture before realizing, toward the end of the Cold War, that popular culture helped to promote US influence abroad.

As a result of the bipolar competition for ideological and cultural preponderance, the Cold War privileged culture and cultural relations in Europe to an unprecedented degree. High culture remained front-page news despite a continuous shortage of government funds. Never before and never afterwards did governments, hegemonic powers, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals invest as much money, energy, and thought in the promotion of the arts, academic exchange, and cultural representation. Never again did Europeans enjoy so many state-subsidized performances, exhibitions, and shows as during these decades. If Communist states suffered from a vacuum in the area of popular culture, they continued to score points by celebrating and exporting their classical dancers and soloists. And they never lost the argument that high culture flourished in the East.

US propagandists, in contrast, never realized the full dimensions of the battle they fought. They failed to see that Europeans continuously discussed culture, modernization, and the future of their countries in historical opposition to the United States. Instead, Americans were convinced that the United States had to win two cultural battles in the Cold War: one against the Warsaw Pact states and the global influence of Communism, and another against deeply rooted negative images of American civilization. Hoping to change what could never be changed, US propagandists failed to see that the European image of the United States reflected everything Europeans feared

about modernization: materialism, individualism, and loss of cultural identity. The United States may have won its “first” cultural war in 1989–91. But it did not win the second one, the battle against anti-Americanism with all its negative connotations about American culture.³² Like Holly Martins in Vienna, Americans in Europe remained innocents abroad, their ideological message triumphant but their cultural image forever tainted.

³² Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Always Blame the Americans: Anti-Americanism in Europe in the Twentieth Century,” *American Historical Review*, 111, 4 (October 2006), 1067–91.

Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States

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As United States policymakers charted a more aggressive internationalism at the end of World War II, it was not immediately clear how ordinary Americans might be affected by this new course. Early Cold War blueprints mentioned a role for civilians in the emerging East–West conflict, but this amounted to fervent but still fuzzy calls for heightened public interest in current events. As US–Soviet relations grew chillier, Cold War architects such as George Kennan sermonized that morally flabby Americans would have to strengthen their civic muscles and “measure up” to earlier generations of revolutionary Americans whose courage and commitment had preserved the nation. In more muted and sterile policy parlance, other Cold Warriors grimly foretold a future of higher taxes, cuts in nondefense spending, and the restraint of civil liberties for the promise of internal security. By 1950, however, a National Security Council policy paper, NSC 68, warned more starkly that the Cold War was not merely a clash of ideologies but rather “a real war in which the survival of the free world [was] at stake.” To meet the challenge, Americans would have to summon their better selves and demonstrate their “ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity.”¹

Such were the stakes for mid-century Americans, but few of them readily understood their new civic burdens. National security planners talked more to one another than to their publics, and much of this early reflection about the Cold War’s domestic impact would be held closely within policy circles. And yet, to get the needed public engagement, presidents and a vast array of

1 “American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President,” September 24, 1946, 70; Moscow Embassy Telegram #511, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, 62–63; George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 89–90; and NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, 402–03, 435–36, 442, all in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

military and civilian administrators had to somehow translate and disseminate these plans to American citizens. From the immediate postwar years to the early 1960s, policymakers tasked the Cold War's home-front institutions – state and local governments, schools, businesses, labor unions, civic organizations, and media – with the same objective of containment they would pursue at higher levels through military and covert means. The job was formidable: how could they popularize national security goals in a civilian vernacular? How could they reorient a nation-state around national security objectives while still maintaining the legal, economic, and cultural traditions that most citizens identified as “the American way of life”? Even NSC 68 acknowledged that the American people and American institutions would have to be mobilized through a “traditional democratic process” that respected basic values and institutions and the slower tempo of consensus-building.²

For several decades now, historians of the Cold War United States have grappled with the question of how foreign-policy priorities reconfigured the home front. In essence, scholars have tried to understand what Kennan called the “point at which domestic and foreign policies meet.”³ A focus on this encounter can reveal how so-called high policy, made in secretive and rarefied environments, shaped everyday life, where the pronouncements of American Cold Warriors were subject to popular interpretation by those well outside the circles of power. Anyone who has studied this encounter, however, has faced the limitations of the historical method. It is difficult to measure precisely how American political institutions, cultural fantasies and fears, and daily practices surrendered themselves to Cold War mindsets. How did a set of strategic decisions projected outward to countries most Americans knew little about shape the political culture, domestic institutions, and values of ordinary people?

To answer this, most studies have carved out a particular slice of the home-front experience or focused on a particular flashpoint to see how Cold War ideology may have insinuated itself into and then manifested itself in the domestic realm. In recent decades, scholars have produced a rich and varied literature on the domestic Cold War, generated by new sources and questions, and a new kind of interdisciplinary adventurism that has blurred the lines between diplomatic and social-cultural histories of the era. We now see culture – language and symbol – not merely as window dressing but as a dynamic historical force on its own, capable of framing states of mind

2 NSC 68, *ibid.*, 402–03. 3 “The Long Telegram,” *ibid.*, 63.

and state policies alike. Implicit in such an approach is an assumption that the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union permeated every institution and interaction, from schools to religion to sexuality. As Chris Appy has commented, “who can name a realm of human endeavor untouched by Cold War competition?”⁴

Some historians now maintain, however, that such arguments about the Cold War’s reach are overdetermined. They seek to complicate the relationship between the foreign and the domestic, not so much to overturn the thesis that Cold War diplomacy shaped political culture but to capture more of the nuances of how this happened – and where it did not. Peter Kuznick and James Gilbert, for example, dispute the notion that there was a monolithic postwar culture driven by national security concerns. American culture after World War II, they contend, was an amalgam of longer-term social and political trends interacting with some genuinely new features of the Cold War. They reject “Cold War culture” as a shorthand term to describe all of postwar society, arguing that the “Cold War [was] not synonymous with American culture, even at the height of its impact.”⁵

This chapter forges a path somewhere between older and newer interpretations, staking out not so much an ambiguous middle ground but a position that firmly acknowledges the Cold War’s potency and reach but that also recognizes its internal paradoxes and limits. Drawing on newer approaches that fuse disciplinary styles and that define “politics” and “political culture” very broadly, this chapter explores how the foreign and the domestic engaged one another from the end of World War II to the early 1960s. Language and culture are taken seriously, but not as being self-contained or wholly determinative. The domestic Cold War was fought through language, symbols, and images, and, yet, it also had formidable institutional muscle in the new national security state. That state grew into a powerful multilayered bureaucracy that shaped political discourses and possibilities, and its elected and appointed officials used the machinery available to reward and punish. Nonstate actors, too, are part of this history, and it will be shown how some movements fused national security with liberal advocacy for older, pre-Cold War political agendas.

4 Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 3.

5 Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, “US Culture and the Cold War,” in Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), 1–13.

Looking at the early Cold War, then, as a trio of discourse, state policy, and popular politics, it becomes clear that it emerged with less coherence and momentum than those who lived through it may remember. It was fought in several arenas, with different players and tools, and with different intensities. There were periods of crisis and panic, along with slower and more subtle but still incremental transformations. Domestic Cold Warriors could mark some important successes, and scholars have detailed many of these: the reorganization of government – in both structure and tone – around national security, the enhancement of executive branch power, the narrowing of political speech, the destruction of the Left and of left-liberal coalitions, and the rise of a popular consumer culture preoccupied with “red” villains and flag-waving heroes. As Michael Sherry has aptly summed up this period: “War – as deed or state of mind or model ... moved to the center of American political culture in a more lasting way.”⁶

And, yet, there were still systems and social dynamics where the Cold War did not have an impact. In tracing the encounters between the foreign and the domestic, we must avoid imbuing the Cold War with an ideological and institutional solidity it did not have. The Cold War’s political reach, popular applications, and cultural meanings were neither consistent nor complete. The United States after World War II was simply too messy and diverse a society to fold neatly into an ideological crusade. As Michael Hogan has said, “Although the national security mentality pressed relentlessly toward cultural and ideological conformity, it never achieved that goal.”⁷

The Cold War’s “many McCarthyisms”

Many historical surveys of the domestic Cold War begin with the dramatic story of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s rise to power. In some ways, this is appropriate, for it forces us to acknowledge up front just how potent and destructive – even if not complete – the Cold War’s national security mentality could be. “McCarthyism” is the term generally used to describe those early years of the domestic Cold War but, as historians have documented, its reach went well beyond the man himself. McCarthyism drew heavily on the dualistic language (good and evil) and binary frameworks (aligned and

6 Michael Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 124.

7 Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 424.

non-aligned) deployed by foreign policymakers, but the synergy between McCarthyism and the Cold War did not mean they were one and the same. In fact, red scares marked earlier historical periods, as was the case after World War I and during the heated battles over the New Deal. Furthermore, although the Cold War certainly gave McCarthy his vigor and stature, that same Cold War nudged him out of mainstream politics. Thus, the relationship between McCarthyism and the Cold War is complex, with each giving the other some vigor and credibility, but also some ideological instability.

Scholars have long debated McCarthyism's emergence, its reconfiguration of postwar politics, and its eventual ebb. Early observers first suggested that McCarthy was the product of a kind of homegrown conservative populism, whose followers harbored class resentments and were particularly susceptible to the remonstrations of irrational fanatics. A new generation of scholars emerged in the 1970s, rejecting the psychological inflections of this earlier work, revealing that McCarthy himself was not the story. As Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis then claimed, McCarthy "was the product of America's cold-war politics, not its progenitor," and his followers could not be cast as premodern malcontents.⁸

Most historians now agree that McCarthyism "was primarily a top-down phenomenon," not a grassroots social movement. Its more elite progenitors came from the political mainstream, from both parties, from various branches of government and law enforcement, and from corporations and civic arenas. As Ellen Schrecker has shown, "there was not one, but many McCarthyisms, each with its own agenda and *modus operandi*." Its diverse sources did not prevent coordination and coherence, however. As Schrecker reveals, the campaign against Communism "was, above all, a collaborative project." Still, initially, it was the power of a smaller group, McCarthy among them, but J. Edgar Hoover in particular, who managed to convince a larger group of political elites that outing and then ousting Communists should be the state's full-time pursuit. They did so by borrowing heavily from diplomatic discourses that exaggerated dangers and simplified complexities, and then by showing how such a politics of fear could reap myriad tangible gains in political, economic, and cultural arenas. Once the logic and rhetorical frameworks of Cold War anti-Communism were in place, political leaders (the sitting and the aspiring) had a readymade set of speeches and shaming rituals

8 Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), xi.

at their disposal, and corporate and civic elites could borrow heavily from these scripts to conduct their own crusades.⁹

A few examples of McCarthyism in action in different settings can illustrate its diverse applications, its destructive power, and its limitations. The massive strike wave after World War II has been well documented by historians as part of a larger story of American workers seeking their share of capitalist abundance – the peace dividend, in effect, promised to them during the war. Labor remained an important constituency in the eyes of American foreign-policy leaders; its productive muscle and political power would be crucial for a smooth reconversion and for future economic security. The postwar strike waves, however, hinted that restive workers might have their own blueprint for the postwar world, one that prioritized domestic prosperity above national security – although the two were not mutually exclusive, as Cold Warriors liked to point out. To gain labor's firm backing, Secretary of State George Marshall warned the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1947 that it had a special obligation to oppose "enemies of democracy" who might attempt to erode workers' faith in internationalist plans, such as his own.¹⁰

The political background noise for Marshall's speech was the brewing Cold War, as President Harry S. Truman's loyalty program and his landmark Truman Doctrine were pushed forward that same year. These larger policies touched labor directly through the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, a piece of legislation that attacked labor's actual and potential power – which seemed even more formidable after the strike waves. A clause contained in Taft-Hartley required union leaders to sign an affidavit avowing they were not Communists and, although this was but a small part of the Taft-Hartley legislation, it nevertheless signaled an anti-Communist offensive against the labor movement's most visionary and progressive wing. Corporations could now use the loyalty pledge to pursue longstanding anti-union agendas; buttressed by patriotic bluster and national security justifications, management could refuse to negotiate with unions whose leaders had not signed.

Taft-Hartley also emboldened anti-Communists within the CIO, who saw an opportunity to weaken their own left flank. Indeed, the loyalty pledge resurrected bitter internecine conflicts within the movement about the role of Communists in progressive causes. After the war, labor's moderates were hoping for a new power-sharing arrangement with government and business,

9 Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), x–xvi.

10 George Marshall, as quoted in George Lipsitz, *Rainbow at Midnight: Labor and Culture in the 1940s* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 190–91.

and they could ill afford the taint of radicalism. The CIO's top leadership thus played the loyalty game, sacrificing some of its own progressive membership to broker a closer relationship with President Truman, whose veto of Taft-Hartley persuaded them that the White House was the best guarantor of labor's interests.¹¹ In the end, this whole episode of domestic anti-Communism "wiped out an entire generation of activists," argues Schrecker. Rather than pushing new initiatives forward or moving outward into new industries, "the labor movement turned inward and raided its own left wing." More than that, the Taft-Hartley fight diminished the power of ordinary workers; it diverted attention and resources from fighting for the bread-and-butter issues that mattered most to those who punched the clock and signed a union card, but who might not have otherwise thought of themselves as particularly political.¹²

Taft-Hartley's passage in Congress – over Truman's veto – suggests that anti-Communism had gained currency among elected officials who saw no political risk to themselves or their party for supporting it. As a piece of legislation, Taft-Hartley represents a moment in the domestic Cold War when politicians began to codify the ideology of anti-Communism into state policy. Its non-Communist affidavit was part of a larger phenomenon in which federal, state, and municipal governments began to use their regulatory and enforcement powers to screen, investigate, and remove, if necessary, alleged subversives. The use and abuse of this power illustrate how McCarthyism increasingly intersected with the formation of the evolving national security state.

This new Cold War security state was a massive bureaucracy or, as Daniel Yergin has put it, "a state within a state." It encompassed the federal government's powers of surveillance, investigation, lawmaking, and enforcement. Emerging in the late 1940s, it grew to include a wide swath of elected leaders, appointed officials, affiliated intellectuals, think tanks, law-enforcement officials and courts, and their cultural brokers – nongovernmental organizations such as the American Legion and the Boy Scouts, and parts of the national media, who put the security threats into terms everyone could understand. The term "national security" itself was common parlance in the Cold War, and its potency was its elasticity and ambiguity. It was a cluster of ideas about

11 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 336–39; Lipsitz, *Rainbow at Midnight*, 182–203.

12 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 379–81. See also David M. Oshinsky, "Labor's Cold War: The CIO and the Communists," in Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter*, 116–51; and Nelson Lichtenstein, *State of the Union: A Century of American Labor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 98–118.

foreign and domestic affairs that framed all global developments as potential threats to US interests. "National security" was used widely, many would say recklessly, to understand a whole range of issues, seemingly disconnected from US diplomacy. The energy and resources devoted to the creation of this state set a new cultural tone – a kind of ambient militarism in which military priorities and mindsets came to dominate popular discourse.¹³

The new national security state was what Gary Gerstle has called a "disciplinary state," a government with formidable powers to spy, prosecute, and purge.¹⁴ Nowhere was McCarthyism's state power more clear than in the actions of J. Edgar Hoover and his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose maneuvers were more covert but just as harmful as Congress's show trials. In fact, Schrecker argues that McCarthyism's "bureaucratic heart" was in the FBI, and that McCarthyism might more accurately be called "Hooverism." Her research shows that it was Hoover's FBI that "designed and ran much of the machinery" of the government's pursuit of Communists. From 1946 to 1952, the Bureau added close to 3,500 staff to investigate some 2 million federal employees. Truman's loyalty program had Hoover's imprint, with its capricious standards for what constituted credible evidence, and its refusal to allow the accused to know or confront their accusers.¹⁵ Truman himself was a liberal anti-Communist who was more than uneasy about the Bureau's overreach. He especially disliked Hoover's tactics. As Congress continued to pass legislation that further narrowed the range of acceptable speech, such as the 1950 McCarran Act, Truman cautioned against excesses. He warned it was "entirely contrary to our principles" to ban the Communist Party, and that the FBI was bordering on Gestapo-like tactics in its approach.¹⁶

But as was the case for perhaps all elected officials in this first blush of the Cold War, Truman's political calculations circumscribed his own speech and actions. Even as he tried genuinely to curb anti-Communist hysteria, he wanted to protect his own diplomatic and domestic agendas and to insulate his party from red-baiting. Thus, he made concessions, such as the federal loyalty program, that gave momentum to the very political forces he hoped to restrain. The same was true for Dwight Eisenhower, a more moderate

13 Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Press, 1990), 5, 193–220; Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12–15, 152–56.

14 Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 242.

15 Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 203–04, 210–11.

16 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 252–56; Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 232–33.

Republican, less indulgent of his fellow conservatives' red panics, but more worried about how an outright confrontation with McCarthy and the myriad anti-Communist factions in and around Congress might fracture his own party. Both presidents, then, had principled objections, but both backed away from taking strong and sustained public stands against either McCarthy's or Hoover's abuses of power. As some have argued, McCarthyism had legs because of both the "actions *and* inactions" of elected officials in the White House and Congress.¹⁷

McCarthyism's political clout went well beyond party politics and the formal powers of the national security state. As an elite-inspired phenomenon, it trickled down into state and local bureaucracies, private corporations, and civic groups. The familiarity of McCarthyite rhetorical frameworks, the "one size fits all" approach to identifying Communists, and the showy shaming rituals allowed even amateurs to play the game. Many citizens participated in a kind of grassroots anti-Communism, taking their cues from those higher up and fashioning a generic national anti-Communism into a style that fit their local situations. Much has been written about Cold War culture – the films, television shows, comic books, and advertising that reflected and projected Americans' fears of Communism. Though fascinating, these are limited indices of how citizens responded to and participated in the red scare. How did people actually "do McCarthyism," so to speak? Or as Richard Fried asks: "How did anti-Communism settle into people's lives at times HUAC [House Un-American Activities Committee] or McCarthy ... were not in the news?"¹⁸

Studies of Cold War parades and public commemorations suggest that anti-Communists' efforts to reach the grassroots yielded mixed results. In 1948, New York City's Veterans of Foreign Wars organized locally what later became a national Loyalty Day whose purpose was "to show before the world that Americans rejected communism," as Fried puts it. Hundreds of thousands of regular citizens across the nation marched from the late 1940s into the mid-1950s, mainly tugged by their unions, schools, churches, or ethnic

17 Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 64–72, 80–82; Griffith (drawing on Michael Paul Rogin's argument), in "American Politics and the Origins of 'McCarthyism,'" in Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter*, 5 (emphasis added).

18 Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), ix.



34. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy waves a document while delivering a “report” on Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, 1952. His anti-Communist attacks helped shape American political culture during the early Cold War.

associations. But this patriotic pageantry did not capture the nation; presidents paid homage but did not attend, and citizens’ interest ran hot and cold.¹⁹

Even something like the Freedom Train, a traveling exhibition of the United States’ most sacred documents, demanding no participation – just genuflection – could not compel citizens to practice Cold War anti-Communism in the way sponsors intended. Traveling to hundreds of cities, loaded with documents already sanitized by organizers to remove any hint of conflict over race or New Deal class struggles, the Freedom Train attracted massive crowds but also pointed criticism. Poet Langston Hughes and actor Paul Robeson raised the painfully obvious contradictions of taking a Freedom Train to the Jim Crow South. Often, the Train’s visit to a city or town motivated locals to organize a Rededication Week, where they would pledge to practice anew what the Freedom Train preached. But here, too, people drew different lessons and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 51–66.

interpreted the nation's documents in ways that departed from the Train's anti-Communist origins. Rededication Week in Iowa City, for instance, urged racial tolerance and celebrated women's rights, and in Cincinnati one club used the week to organize a "Stop the Bigot" rally.²⁰

Such fickle applications of Cold War dogma have made it difficult for scholars to quantify McCarthyism's impact. Schrecker offers some numbers: two deaths – Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, several hundred imprisoned, and some ten thousand to twelve thousand dismissed from their jobs. Griffith has tallied 135 congressional investigations, led mainly by the House Un-American Activities Committee, from 1945 to 1955. His analysis of public opinion polls reveals both support for and sentiment against McCarthy himself but a persistent intolerance for Communism, in general. Polling data also show, however, that anti-Communism did not always trump other concerns. In partisan politics, for example, Richard Fried catalogs the national and state elections in which red-baiting increasingly permeated election rhetoric. He detects a "full-blown electoral McCarthyism" by 1950, when establishing one's anti-Communist credentials became a central motif in victorious Senate, House, and gubernatorial campaigns. And yet, he argues, McCarthyism's electoral impact was never as great as politicians and the press believed at the time. Polls from the early 1950s show that voters' motivations for casting a ballot did not turn on the issue of Communism; their concerns were more immediate, such as the high cost of living and taxes. Certainly, candidates could handily transform these issues into anti-Soviet screeds, but politicians' rhetoric has never been a reliable index of voter rationale and intent. Thus, "while the specter of communism has haunted US politics since 1917," Fried concludes, "it never prowled full-time."²¹

The Cold War and the liberal state

If McCarthyism left an indistinct imprint on partisan politics, the same could be said about its footprint on other features of the postwar landscape: liberalism, racial politics, religious affairs, and gender relations. All of these were in flux after World War II, and, in order to examine how they intersected with McCarthyism, it is important to widen the lens. From this vantage point,

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 38–43; Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 426–34.

²¹ Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, xiii; Griffith, "American Politics," 2–4; Richard M. Fried, "Voting against the Hammer and Sickle: Communism as an Issue in American Politics," in William H. Chafe (ed.), *The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and Its Legacies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 99–127.

though, the relationship between McCarthyism and the Cold War becomes even blurrier, for although they were not the same, and they did not march in lock step, McCarthyism and the Cold War mingled with one another in complex ways – always in conversation, but sometimes talking past or even interrupting one another. Indeed, the Cold War's priorities and interests abroad could undermine some of McCarthyism's domestic political goals. An examination of the liberal state – in particular, the ideological struggles around its size and function, as well as of postwar racial, religious, and gender politics – can reveal some of the Cold War's contradictory effects on domestic politics and social relations.

McCarthyism's practitioners accused government officials and their agencies of disloyalty, creating a culture and bureaucratic structure to root out subversives. In essence, this amounted to an attack on government itself, ironically, just as Cold Warriors were trying to expand government to fulfill national security objectives. This ideological tension between a passionate antigovernment conservatism and an equally insistent Cold War statism marked the first decade of the postwar era. As policymakers rolled out expansive plans for the United States as global policeman, conservatives began to fear that those plans might give rise to a highly bureaucratized "garrison state," in which private enterprise would be subject to state regulation and citizens would have to surrender personal freedoms, all for the sake of national security. Such fears, as Hogan has written, were articulated mainly by Republican conservatives who, with some Democrats, argued that building a national security state would concentrate too much power in the military and executive branch, and that expenditures for defense might lead to higher taxes and, worse, economic controls. The ambitious Cold War foreign-policy agenda implied a turn away from small government and decentralized authority and toward new encumbrances on private enterprise and self-reliant working homeowners. Indeed, at the very moment when conservatives saw the opportunity to shrink the New Deal state, an ever larger state, this time organized not around welfare but around warfare, seemed to be taking shape.²²

The conflicts between conservatives and liberals about the fate of the state are not easily unraveled, because the Cold War reconfigured politics around international stability and national security, bipartisan values that no politician dared challenge after 1950. Earlier, however, at the end of World War II, left-liberal coalitions had put forward an ambitious social-welfare agenda that

22. Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 7–9; McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 20–23.

called for a more interventionist state, more responsive to the interests of workers and consumers than to the designs of the private sector. This idealistic, collaborative liberalism sought to democratize the postwar American economic system, but it soon met resistance as events abroad began to nudge their way into every discussion of domestic reform. As Jonathan Bell shows, in state political campaigns across the country, liberal politicians increasingly “saw their commitment to social democracy held up as a liability” by those who linked any state expansion with Soviet-style totalitarianism.²³ Of course, the Cold War did not invent antistatism; rather, it stretched its meanings and popularized it. Conservatives could now use a red-baiting antistatism to fight anything from tax increases to civil rights. In response, liberals operated from a more defensive crouch, cognizant that many Americans still endorsed statist measures, such as social security and the GI Bill, but equally aware that any call for additional social-welfare programs had to be matched with a zealous defense of individual rights and private enterprise.²⁴

After the foreign-policy crises of 1949 and 1950, conservative and liberal debate turned not on whether to endorse national security doctrine but on *how* precisely to enact it in government structures and policies. As Hogan argues, “At issue in all of these debates was the central question of state making,” specifically, the size and scope of the budgets, policies, laws, and bureaucracies created to preserve national security. President Truman’s Fair Deal liberalism and President Eisenhower’s moderate Republicanism were both pulled in different directions because of the tensions of trying to build an impressive national security state while containing its size. Conservatives, in particular, notes Bell, had “to wrestle with the thorny problem of how to fight communism without enlarging the power of the state.” Both Truman and Eisenhower argued that their policies would obviate the rise of a garrison state, but they also acknowledged that it was a difficult balancing act. As Eisenhower confessed, “the whole thing ... was a paradox.”²⁵

In the end, these conflicts about the fate of the New Deal state – how to dismantle it, shore it up, or graft a national security state onto it – resulted in a hybrid system in which no one vision prevailed. National security boosters

23 Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), xv.

24 Meg Jacobs, *Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth Century America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 221–45; for a different view of consumers and the liberal state, see Laura McEnaney, “Nightmares on Elm Street: Demobilizing in Chicago, 1945–1953,” *Journal of American History*, 92 (March 2006), 1265–91.

25 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 21; Bell, *Liberal State on Trial*, 273; D. D. Eisenhower, quoted in McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 22.

did not get everything they wanted. It is true that, by Eisenhower's departure, they *had* succeeded in building a massive state, dominated by the worldviews of military planners, scientists, and defense intellectuals, whose visions of a high-tech atomic diplomacy made budgets and bureaucracies fatter. But as Hogan has shown, although taxes, deficits, and government all swelled in the early Cold War, none of this amounted to "the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state." And both liberals and conservatives found themselves compromising some of their core values to build the security state. As Hogan succinctly puts it: "Liberal intellectuals were willing to put the containment of communism ahead of the welfare state while conservative intellectuals were prepared to give antistatism a back seat to anticommunism."²⁶

Such tradeoffs are evident as well in other arenas of the domestic Cold War. Questions about black-white race relations grew more insistent after World War II. Fighting for the "double V," victory over fascism abroad and over racism at home, returning African-American veterans and home-front workers found new opportunities in the postwar years to push forward older reforms. Just as Cold War anti-Communism could and did hamper liberal movements, it could also create openings for liberal advancement. Working through local and national organizations, African-Americans pressured elected officials to deliver the freedoms promised to non-aligned peoples abroad to deserving Americans at home. Here, they forged a new kind of national security liberalism that actually undermined the prevailing McCarthyite antipathy to social change while remaining faithful to Cold War doctrine. The story of black-white racial politics illustrates how Cold War foreign policies could generate such unintended opportunities, and how social movements capitalized on these possibilities to force the government to make good on its own freedom rhetoric.

After World War II, American claims to global leadership came under fire from the international community when media images of American-style apartheid traveled overseas like other US exports. Historian Mary Dudziak has analyzed how a case, such as *Brown v. Board of Education*, for example, played out abroad and became a decisive facet of Cold War geopolitics. Cases such as *Brown* mattered during the Cold War, Dudziak argues, because "segregation harmed US foreign relations." Secretary of State Dean Acheson

26 Hogan, *Cross of Iron*, 22, 461. Sherry makes a similar point in *Shadow of War*, 504. See also Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

noted that segregation was “a source of constant embarrassment to this Government,” and State Department reports from all over the world showed that Jim Crow was drowning out Uncle Sam, making it difficult for diplomats to fight the Cold War with credibility. American officials tried to disseminate a particular narrative of American race relations imbued with Cold War simplicities and dualisms. As Dudziak shows, it was “a story of progress, a story of the triumph of good over evil, a story of US moral superiority.”²⁷

But civil-rights activists told a different story, advancing a more compelling “counternarrative of racial oppression” that exposed the hypocrisies of Cold War rhetoric. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), whose membership had grown dramatically during the war, tested Cold Warriors’ commitments to real democracy at home, petitioning the United Nations in 1947 to lodge an international protest against Jim Crow. Using words such as “barbaric” (a term used historically by Americans to describe peoples from Africa), the NAACP’s petition said the real threats to African-Americans were coming from inside the building, so to speak – from Southern segregationists and from national leaders who endorsed a laissez-faire approach to race relations. Such claims did not go unnoticed or unpunished. In McCarthyite fashion, segregationists tried to associate racial reform with Communism and quash it. When nine school children in Little Rock, Arkansas, exposed *Brown*’s limits, state officials charged that local NAACP activists were part of a larger Communist conspiracy.²⁸

The domestic civil-rights movement, however, was both victim and perpetrator in this Cold War drama. As Eric Foner has commented, “Every political and social organization had to make its peace with the anti-Communist crusade or face destruction.” The NAACP made that peace in the same way labor did: it purged its Communist membership to display its Cold War credentials, hoping that its support for US foreign policy would win concessions on domestic policy. Thus, African-American liberals became civilian Cold Warriors themselves. Paradoxically, they adapted Cold War language to silence their progressive wing while pushing vigorously for racial progress in a conservative climate. And they found some success in this strategy. For example, they were able to pressure President Truman to desegregate the military in 1948, and they found an ally in the Justice Department when it filed an amicus brief for the *Brown* case. The Cold War thus provided race liberals

27 Mary L. Dudziak, “*Brown* as a Cold War Case,” *Journal of American History*, 91 (June 2004), 34, and Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13.

28 Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 44–45, 61–77, 124–25.

an opening, a way to attach the urgency of national security to their arguments for equity.²⁹

And, yet, this opening remained a fairly narrow one throughout the 1950s. As long as race liberals framed equality as Cold War necessity, it would be hard to advance a more far-reaching vision. Of course, there were movement activists who did see the struggle in more expansive terms. Jo Ann Gibson Robinson, one of the organizers of the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, described her group's motivations: "Justice in the end was the coveted goal that helped and inspired me and fifty thousand others," she wrote. Indeed, she hoped her own fight would have a ripple effect outside the United States, so that "oppressed people the world over" could become "more optimistic that their own fate could be improved."³⁰ But this progressive internationalist vision was increasingly unusual in this period, for rights talk was almost always yoked to containment and war. As Sherry has argued, "national security was the dominant rationale" for racial advancement in this early Cold War era, and thus the "[p]reoccupation with national security ... made the reform impulse both urgent and limited."³¹

The perils and possibilities of Cold War reform can be seen, as well, if we examine women's status in the postwar era. Here, too, we see compatibility and collision among varying post-World War II political currents: McCarthyism, Cold War containment, and a reenergized liberal feminism. Until recently, the history of postwar gender and family ideals has followed the now-familiar narrative of Elaine Tyler May's groundbreaking *Homeward Bound*. May argues that the Cold War fostered a conservative political culture in which men and women looked for security in conventional gender roles and domestic pursuits – home ownership, childrearing, and consumption. Kennan's containment doctrine, she says, offered "an overarching principle" to postwar Americans; indeed, more than just rhetoric, the doctrine "would guide them in their personal and political lives."³²

Some demographic data point to a pro-family mood in the 1950s. Earlier marriage, higher birthrates, and lower divorce rates, along with the suburban migration to single-family homes, all suggest a national pursuit of privacy,

29 Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 257; Sherry, *Shadow of War*, 145–49.

30 Jo Ann Gibson Robinson, *The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It: The Memoir of Jo Ann Gibson Robinson* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 3, 100.

31 Sherry, *Shadow of War*, 147.

32 Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 10–15.

domesticity, and security. But scholars have also suggested that at least some of these trends could have emerged without the Cold War. Early marriage and childbearing, for example, were a logical aftermath of a decade of economic depression and warfare, during which family formation was disrupted or delayed. In fact, the baby boom began before the Cold War heated up. Perhaps the Cold War merely intensified a heterosexual family consumer culture that would have materialized anyway after such dislocation.³³

Another way to measure the Cold War's effect on gender arrangements is to examine female activism from 1945 through the early 1960s. Historians have argued recently that the Cold War did not circumscribe gender roles as neatly or completely as May had suggested. Joanne Meyerowitz was one of the first to claim "the Cold War had no fixed association with the domestic ideal." While Meyerowitz acknowledges anti-Communism's toxic effects on women's postwar reform, she also argues that "the Cold War offered a new vocabulary for extending democratic ideals and demanding individual freedom."³⁴ In fact, increasing numbers of studies are showing that professional and working-class women's groups found a fairly hospitable environment in the Cold War years for their activism. Meyerowitz's own study of popular women's magazines reveals that Cold War ideology was not a uniform prescription for female domesticity; indeed, magazines such as the *Ladies' Home Journal* told women it was their civic obligation to participate in politics, especially during political crises.³⁵

Still, there were limits to the liberal adaptability of the Cold War credo. Like their partners in the civil-rights movement, female activists struggled to find ideological harmony between Cold War militarism and social liberalism. Women who fought for a role in home-front civil-defense programs offer a good example of this tension. These clubwomen, union members, and ordinary housewives used a range of arguments to nudge their way into debates about citizen obligation in a nuclearized Cold War. They were ardent Cold Warriors, but they were also maternalists who believed that the experience of motherhood made them uniquely qualified to join men's

33 Jane Sherron De Hart, "Containment at Home: Gender, Sexuality, and National Identity in Cold War America," 124–55, and Peter Filene, "'Cold War Culture' Doesn't Say It All," 156–74, both in Kuznick and Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture*.

34 Joanne Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 8; Joanne Meyerowitz, "Sex, Gender, and the Cold War Language of Reform," in Kuznick and Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture*, 107.

35 Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946–1958," in Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver*, 229–62.

conversations about nuclear preparedness. They held some feminist beliefs, too, pushing hard for female representation in government and policymaking. This strand of women's organizing was a strange hybrid of Cold War militarism, domesticity, and older female reform traditions, but it could take activists only so far. Cold War national security discourse ultimately valorized masculine toughness and made only token gestures to accommodate maternalist or feminist reform.³⁶

Making peace with the bomb

The participation of nonstate actors, such as these women's clubs, in nuclear-preparedness debates brings us to a final but important feature of the early Cold War's political and cultural landscape: nuclear fear. As Presidents Truman and Eisenhower embraced atomic weapons as the basis of US military and diplomatic power, citizens found themselves in a Cold War with ever-sharper atomic teeth. Much has been written about how Americans began to sense their own nuclear peril after their leaders dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. Some have noted a correlation between escalating nuclear-age insecurities and a rise in religiosity. Membership in mainly Christian churches spiked in this era, perhaps a sign that organized religion provided some comfort amidst global instability. Higher church attendance certainly meshed with the postwar culture's emphasis on what *McCall's* magazine termed "togetherness." The image of nuclear families huddled together in church and in the other sacred space – the suburban home – was a fitting Cold War counterpoint to the allegedly "godless" Soviets. Political leaders, too, sponsored measures to bring church and state closer together, putting God on currency and into the Pledge of Allegiance.

These were clearly symbolic gestures, but it is too cynical to argue that they held no real meaning for citizens. People of faith leaned on churches in times of crisis, as they always had, but it is simply impossible to determine precisely how religious practice and Cold War nuclear fears interacted. For some, religious conviction endorsed preexisting views about the bomb and Communism, generally. Television evangelists and prophecy writers told their millions of followers that nuclear war was part of God's design; thus, opposition against the inevitable end time was futile. The "new evangelicism" of the postwar years was a diverse movement, with moderates, such as Billy Graham, and hardliners, such as the Christian Anti-Communist

³⁶ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 88–122.

Crusade's Fred Schwarz, but all of its leaders saw the growing nuclear faceoff as a call to preach a steady sermon of anti-Communism – using their burgeoning media outlets. For other people of faith, in contrast, the bomb generated urgent and fundamental questions about human fellowship, national leadership, and the fate of the planet. Faith-based organizations were a significant presence in some of the early nuclear activism, offering both moderate and radical critiques of the arms race. Their critiques resurfaced decades later in the antinuclear protests of the Ronald Reagan era.³⁷

Looking at more secular manifestations of nuclear fear, studies of films, television, science fiction, comic books, and music suggest that from August 1945 through the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, citizens vacillated between elation, horror, fear, and hope. Paul Boyer's study of Hiroshima's immediate aftermath reveals that "there was an almost compulsive post-Hiroshima effort to trivialize the event and avoid its deeper implications."³⁸ Initially, Americans endorsed the use of the bomb; they were war-weary and open to Truman's rationale for using the weapon. But as the months and years went on, there was a growing ambivalence, despite both Truman's and Eisenhower's efforts to hail atomic energy's salutary and "peaceful" uses.

The atomic bomb was obviously the technological creation of World War II, but the Cold War gave that technology its most menacing cultural meanings and images: genetic mutation, social chaos, the mushroom cloud, and apocalypse. The duck-and-cover exercise, too, has now become a staple of our cultural memory of the era. Still, to catalog the ample metaphors and maneuvers of Cold War nuclear fear becomes redundant – even if instructive as a history lesson. It is more useful to historicize that fear by giving it a more concrete policy and social history, grounded in the ideological and political currents of the Cold War. Most Americans had what one policymaker called a "bomb consciousness," and it could certainly be heightened during periods of international crisis. Still, a cultural consciousness about the bomb did not translate into a grassroots national-preparedness movement, as planners had hoped. Policymakers asked citizens to stock supplies, learn civil-defense techniques, and build shelters; leaders endorsed a privatized nuclear preparedness, financed, built, and practiced by citizens themselves. Most Americans,

37 Paul Boyer, *Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 129–61; Scott Flipse, "Below the Belt Politics: Protestant Evangelicals, Abortion, and the Foundation of the New Religious Right, 1960–1975," in David Farber and Jeff Roche (eds.), *The Conservative Sixties* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 127–41.

38 Boyer, *Fallout*, 10.



35. Children test the escape hatch of their family's bomb shelter in Bronxville, New York, 1952. Bomb shelters were publicized, but largely rejected.

however, rejected this kind of self-help defense. Only a tiny minority built family shelters, for example.³⁹

In a sense, Cold War citizens were private pacifists but public militarists. That is, they refused to practice self-help defense inside their homes, largely rejecting nuclear readiness as daily practice. But this rejection should not be read as a no-confidence vote on the national security state. Citizens made political choices to tolerate a much higher level of preparedness outside their homes. As taxpayers and voters, they endorsed the principles of national security, anti-Communism, and an arms buildup through several presidential

³⁹ McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home*, 40–67.

administrations. Policymakers may have successfully raised people's bomb consciousness, but most of these fears found material expression in horror films, comic books, and other forms of Cold War pop culture, not in actual state-sponsored shelter programs, nor in civil-defense efforts in the urban neighborhoods and suburbs populated by nuclear-age Americans.⁴⁰

The limits of Cold War culture

This chapter has tried to make sense of the encounters between the foreign and the domestic in the early Cold War. Historians have yet to fully uncover and explain the layers and meanings of these encounters, for the disciplinary fluidity between diplomatic, social, and cultural history is still relatively new. Our histories of the Cold War are now richer as a result of that fluidity, but the question remains about whether or not we can identify a distinctive "Cold War culture" in the first decades after World War II. The phrase "Cold War culture" itself, as Peter Filene has observed, is "irresistibly convenient," for it fuses the diplomatic and domestic with a conciseness that still makes room for lots of interpretive possibility.⁴¹ It suggests the fantasy of a neat and overarching framework to explain all domestic developments through a singular conflict. But the Cold War was no monolith and, though that is not an original statement, it bears repeating in any essay on Cold War political culture. There was popular consensus that Communism was bad and national security was good but, beyond this, there was debate and dissent about the degree to which daily life should be given over to these principles.

Although our popular fascination with the Cold War has centered on its more dramatic showdowns and shadowy covert intrigue, ultimately, the more absorbing history is found in its fissures and ambiguities. The Cold War did not create the red scare, but it certainly gave it legitimacy, lethality, and longevity. Indeed, Schrecker has called McCarthyism "the most widespread and longest lasting wave of political repression in American history."⁴² And, still, the same Cold War political culture that allowed Senator McCarthy to capture center stage also gave him the hook when his act wore thin. Similar complex dynamics played out in social movements. Cold War politicians demanded loyalty from labor and African-American groups, but these movements' patriotism was always conditional – expectant of rights at home in

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 152–56.

⁴¹ Filene, "'Cold War Culture' Doesn't Say It All," 156.

⁴² Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, x.

return for support of adventures abroad. And in the so-called private realm of gender and family relations, too, containment does not hold up as a metaphor. There were simply too many ideological crosscurrents at work: one can find pairings of Cold War doctrine with a whole range of conservative and liberal gender worldviews. Richard Nixon's Cold War triumphalism at the "kitchen debate," where he held up homemakers and their gadgets as a sign of American supremacy, was the conservative variant; female activists who pushed for more rights, using the very language of postwar domesticity, was the liberal version.

In the end, it was the diversity, plurality, and the decentralized individuality of postwar American society – the very characteristics celebrated by Cold War boosters – that made Cold War political culture less sturdy and steady than its adherents had hoped. The Cold War's cultural authority was constantly tested by these more resilient and long-evolving features of American political culture. As literary scholar Donald Pease has written, "the cold war framework was inherently unstable," for it tried to construct "a coherent national identity out of diverse constituencies whose differences could only be partially and unevenly repressed." It was a culture, he says, "whose stability had to be constantly renegotiated" on the ground – in response to the ways American people really lived their daily lives.⁴³ Cold War culture was not an abstraction. We know far too much to say its force was mainly rhetorical. But where it did materialize – in the state, in the law, in the workplace, in political movements, and in neighborhoods and families – its power was never absolute.

43 Donald E. Pease, "Hiroshima, the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, and the Gulf War," in Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (eds.), *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 557–58.

Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union

DAVID PRIESTLAND

In May 1946, Iosif Stalin complained to writers about their excessive respect for Western culture: 'They [Soviet intellectuals] still feel themselves minors, not one hundred percent, they've got used to considering themselves in a situation of eternal pupils ... [a good Soviet man] adores some foreign bastard, a scholar who is three heads shorter than he. He loses his dignity.'¹ And, thirteen years later, Nikita Khrushchev revealed a similar anxiety about the dignity of the USSR on the eve of his trip to the United States. As he later reminisced: 'I'll admit that I was worried ... we had to express our point of view ... without letting ourselves be humiliated ... Stalin [had] kept trying to convince us that we ... were no good, that we wouldn't be able to stand up to the imperialists ... Stalin's words sounded in my head.'²

As both of these statements indicate, the Soviet leadership throughout the early Cold War was obsessed with the competition with the West, and was deeply anxious about its status and the need to improve its weak position. The enormous expenditures by the Soviet state on the military and military-industrial establishments, at the direct expense of consumption, also ensured that the Cold War had an enormous impact on the lives of ordinary Soviet citizens. Yet, it has not been common for historians to discuss the internal political and social developments within the USSR specifically through the prism of the Cold War, or even to emphasise the role of the Cold War in analysing Soviet domestic political and social developments during the period (though there are of course exceptions). This is in sharp contrast to historians of the United States, who are engaged in a sophisticated debate on whether it is reasonable to define the postwar era as one dominated by the Cold War.³

1 I. Stalin, quoted by Konstantin Simonov, translated in E. Van Ree, *Stalin's Political Thought* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 182.

2 William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (London: Free Press, 2003), 423–24.

3 See Laura McEnaney's chapter in this volume.

In part, this may reflect a form of parochialism within writings on the history of the USSR. One of the central questions addressed by the historiography has concerned the impact of Bolshevik Marxism on Soviet politics and society, and its relationship with non-ideological, 'pragmatic' concerns, such as economic or social pressures. This has sometimes led to a neglect of international context. Some historians, in particular those writing on the revolutionary and civil war period, have tried to redress this balance, but the 'internationalisation' of the historiography has not extended into the Cold War period to such an extent. So is the time now ripe for a reconceptualisation of post-1945 Soviet history in which the Cold War plays a central role?

This chapter will argue that the Cold War was of supreme importance to all aspects of Soviet politics, and that the literature on the period, which is still in an early stage of development following the opening of archives, certainly could pay greater attention to the interaction between domestic and international forces. However, the role of the Cold War should not be exaggerated, because the Soviet system was already well adapted to competition of a Cold War type.

The Soviet leadership had been engaged in ideological, economic, and military competition with the West and then with Germany and Japan since 1917. The regime was born during war, and many of its institutions and practices were designed during the civil war period to mobilise the population for war. Its economic system, established by Stalin in the late 1920s, was also, in essence, created for war, or at least military competition. At times, this competition was cooler and at times hotter, but throughout the interwar period the Bolsheviks believed that they were fighting an ideological battle against the capitalist West, and in much of the period they were fighting or preparing for wars against foreign enemies. The onset of the Cold War therefore merely confirmed Soviet leaders in their view that 'capitalist encirclement' was a reality and their responses were heavily conditioned by past experience. So, while the Cold War dominated the thinking of the leadership in 1945–62, it did not demand a special set of approaches to domestic politics, designed specifically for it. Indeed, very different domestic policies can be identified during the period, especially if one compares the Stalinist with the post-Stalinist period. In this respect, the experience of the Soviet Union contrasts with that of the United States. The Cold War arguably changed the politics of the United States much more substantially than the politics of the Soviet Union.

Also, changes in the politics of the Soviet Union after 1945 cannot necessarily be ascribed to the circumstances of the Cold War: the 'Terror' of 1936–38

and the Second World War were also important in determining the response of the leadership to its problems in the period. The chaos produced by the Terror showed that extreme repression combined with ideological purism could be counterproductive, and probably helps to explain why the campaigns of the postwar period were so much less radical and disruptive. But the experience of the 'Great Patriotic War' was much more significant for the politics of the postwar period. It caused enormous economic dislocation and destruction, while at the same time victory allowed the regime to feel more secure than it had in the 1930s. It also established a different relationship between state and society: those who fought were more confident and less willing to accept a rigid ideological orthodoxy than pre-war generations had been, and the Stalinist state was forced to dilute the Marxist-Leninist content of its ideology, making concessions to nationalism and religion; yet, on the other hand, there was much less open opposition to the regime than there had been before the war, at least from the peasantry. Hence, although the state did go some way to re-imposing the pre-war system, there was a degree of 'normalisation' of relations between the regime and society compared with the interwar period: the regime no longer pursued violent and divisive campaigns of 'class struggle', and, with some exceptions, there was less social and political conflict. Thus, the aftermath of the Terror and the Second World War contributed towards greater stability, while complicating the leadership's efforts to remobilise the population for the Cold War.

Yet, even if mobilisation for the Cold War did not create a fundamentally new political system or political culture, the specific characteristics of the Cold War did contribute to particular outcomes and ensure that some approaches to politics were more likely to be favoured than others. The Cold War forced the Soviet leadership to compete in two areas – the military and economic, and the ideological – the second of which many Soviet leaders saw as equally, if not more, important in the struggle with the West. In the military and economic spheres, the Cold War presented the USSR with a new set of challenges. Even though it was no longer threatened by an enemy determined to destroy it militarily, the USSR struggled to keep up with the West technologically (possibly to a greater extent than in the 1930s, when the Red Army had reached the technological level of the French and British armies).⁴ At the same time, for reasons described above, the regime was not as prepared to use

4 N. S. Simonov, *Voenno promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950 e gody* [The Military Industrial Complex of the USSR from the 1920s to the 1950s] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 323.

force to ensure stability at home as it had been before the war. The crucial distributional 'guns or butter' question which dominated high politics therefore became particularly difficult to resolve.

The Cold War placed the USSR in an equally difficult position in the ideological sphere. On the one hand, science and technology were particularly crucial in the nuclear age; but on the other the ideological conflict between the two superpowers was arguably sharper than it had been between the USSR and the Nazis, as both were struggling to present themselves as true heirs of the Enlightenment, and both were aware of the importance of winning hearts and minds, initially in Europe and then in the developing world. These peculiar conditions ensured that the perennial tension between the ideological and the technological in Soviet politics (*politika* and *tekhnika* in Bolshevik language) was particularly fraught, and this conflict also had implications for the institutional rivalry between the party (which had primary responsibility for ideology) and the state (which, among other things, managed the economy).

So, while in both the military-economic and ideological spheres, tensions – between industrial and defence investment and consumption, and between technocracy and ideology – had dominated Soviet politics since 1928, during the Cold War period they were arguably more difficult to resolve than before the war. The balance of forces changed over time, and the period 1945–62 can be divided into three: the late Stalinist period, when 1930s Stalinism was re-established after the war, but in a slightly more technocratic form; the years immediately after Stalin's death, when conflicts emerged within the leadership and Lavrentii Beria and Georgii Malenkov were condemned for an excessively technocratic and consumerist position; and the Khrushchev era, when attempts were made to establish a new equilibrium, combining a turn towards consumption with a new emphasis on ideology – one that proved to be highly unstable.

All leaders, whatever the strategies they adopted, put enormous energy into mobilising the population for the Cold War, and inevitably the conflict had a significant effect on the attitudes of the population. The war helped to forge a Soviet identity and a sense of patriotism to a much greater extent than had been the case in the 1930s, and this was reinforced during the Cold War. However, at the same time, the international situation complicated the leadership's attempts to maintain its legitimacy. In the 1930s, the West seemed to be failing economically and did not pose a significant ideological challenge. This changed after 1945, and the perception that the West was economically superior and possessed an attractive culture was reinforced by Red Army

soldiers who had been in the West. And, from the 1950s, a combination of short-wave radio, the appeal of Western youth culture and the Western propaganda effort ensured that the leadership found it even more difficult to insulate popular culture from foreign influences.⁵

Guns and butter

The tension between the demands of defence and heavy industrial production on the one side, and consumption on the other, had been a central question of Soviet economic policy, and politics more generally, since the 1920s. Even in the harshest period of Stalinist industrialisation in the early 1930s, the state was forced to balance the requirements of industrial development with the interests of the Soviet consumer. If the consumer was squeezed too much, there might be unrest; also the absence of material incentives, which depended on the availability of consumer goods, would damage labour productivity.

Even so, the Stalinist system favoured production at the expense of consumption, and Stalin regularly denounced any attempts to redress the balance as 'rightist' and 'capitalist' deviations. The Stalinist economic system was designed to reduce consumption and extract resources from agriculture, 'pumping' them into heavy (Group A) industries and defence, and the absence of material incentives ensured that the regime had to rely on high levels of coercion. This strategy reached its climax during the war, when over half of national expenditure was spent on defence and military industry; meanwhile, investment in light (Group B) industry was only 60 per cent of pre-war levels and personal consumption fell by 35–40 per cent. The regime relied on patriotism to overcome discontent but, even so, it was forced to enhance material incentives to some extent, and reduced restrictions on peasants' private plots and the markets where their produce was traded.

After the war, there was agreement within the leadership that spending on defence and military-industrial products be scaled down dramatically; the population had to be rewarded for its sacrifices. But, at the same time, Stalin insisted that investment be poured into the reconstruction of heavy industry, which would establish the Soviet Union's industrial and defence base in the longer term. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50) was a compromise document: the first priority was to build up the industrial base, and the second was to develop agriculture and consumer-goods industries, while defence came

⁵ See Jessica C. E. Gienow Hecht's chapter in this volume, and Nicholas Cull's in volume II.

only fifth in the list; Group A and B industries were to grow at more or less the same rate. Although these contrasted with pre-war plans, which gave heavy industry many more resources than consumer industries, they amounted to a severe squeeze on consumption, because living standards in 1945 were already at lower levels than before the war.⁶

A poor harvest in 1946 led to a serious famine, and standards of living deteriorated further. Estimates suggest that in 1948 real wages were 80% of their level in 1940, which were in turn between 25% and 40% lower than their level in 1928. Yet, despite this poverty, the leadership refused to cut its plans for heavy industrial investment. The international situation was in large part responsible, and in November 1947 the regime increased plans for the production of military hardware substantially.

At about the same time, however, the economy began to turn the corner, largely because better harvests improved food supply. The leadership decided that conditions allowed it to abolish rationing in December 1947, and from 1948–49 there was some economic recovery. Production began to reach pre-war levels, and living standards rose (although they remained very low) – in 1952 real wages were 25 per cent higher than in 1940. And this improvement allowed the regime to use slightly less coercion in its treatment of the Soviet working class from 1950 (even though, as will be seen, the regime was launching repressive campaigns against elite groups at the same time).⁷ Hence, although the beginning of the Korean War seems to have led to an increase in spending on the military, this did not have such a severe effect on the living standards of the population.⁸

In the years after 1945, therefore, competition with the West encouraged the leadership to retain the emphasis on heavy industry and defence of the 1930s, although it did not feel able to invest such a high proportion of the national product in industry and the military as it had in the early Stalinist period. While low living standards did not cause much open, organised discontent, they gave the population very few incentives to work, and the leadership as a whole recognised that there had to be limits to industrial and military investment.

6 Janet Chapman, *Real Wages in Soviet Russia since 1928* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 144–45; Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 42–43.

7 Filtzer, *Soviet Workers*, 247.

8 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 99.

Yet subterranean disagreements about where those limits lay are apparent. In 1952, for instance, Stalin admitted that a crisis in beef production was caused by poor incentives, and he established a commission headed by Khrushchev to investigate. Khrushchev proposed that procurement prices for meat be raised, but Stalin was willing to accept this only if it was financed by increasing the already very high taxes on agriculture as a whole; he was unwilling to sacrifice his heavy industrial programme. Tensions within the leadership were also evident on the question of labour in the prison camp system (Gulag). Beria and Malenkov, both leaders involved in the management of the economy, were aware of the inefficiencies of a system that relied on force and discipline rather than material incentives. Beria, who was in charge of the Gulag system and was expected to ensure that the camps fulfilled high plan targets, seems to have become convinced that forced labour was more inefficient than free labour, and was worried about the frequent unrest within the camps. He surreptitiously tried to introduce material incentives into the system and to release prisoners. Malenkov seems to have sympathised with his view, although neither criticised forced labour openly for fear of antagonising Stalin.

When Stalin died, an influential part of the successor leadership was convinced that the Stalinist model of heavy defence spending, a squeeze on consumption, and a reliance on force and discipline at the expense of material incentives had to change. The evidence suggests that domestic rather than international considerations were the driving force for change, but there obviously was a link between domestic and foreign policy, as the best way to increase consumption was to cut back on defence commitments and lower tensions with the West. Events outside the USSR also seemed to suggest that Stalinist rigidity in international relations and repression at home were not working. Unrest in Eastern Europe in 1953 forced the leadership to accept that reforms were needed in the satellite states; at the same time, there were genuine concerns that Stalin had pursued too risky a foreign policy, and that international tensions would escalate dangerously, leading to the use of nuclear weapons in Korea by the United States.

Initially, this consensus on the need for change extended even to more orthodox Stalinist figures such as Viacheslav Molotov. However, differences over the nature and extent of reform are evident throughout the post-Stalin period. These were largely generated by personal rivalries at the top, but, as was always the case in Soviet politics, leaders had to use ideology to advance their personal ambitions, and as a result programmatic differences did play a role. Additionally, leaders had to appeal to broader institutional interests, such as those in the military, the party apparatus, and heavy industrial ministries.

More generally, though, these conflicts were driven by the difficulty of solving the problem of how the USSR could maintain its role as a superpower while at the same time developing its economy and shoring up its legitimacy at home.

Stalin's successors argued for different solutions to this problem. Beria and Malenkov, as was to be expected given their involvement in economic management, adopted a more technocratic approach, emphasising more effective material incentives and, in the case of Malenkov, significantly greater investment in consumer industries. Malenkov also seems to have been particularly willing to make concessions on defence and foreign policy. Meanwhile, Khrushchev favoured, at least initially, an eclectic approach that combined commitment to heavy industry and defence with improvements in consumer industry, and he was less willing to dilute collectivism in the name of individualist, capitalist incentives. Molotov seems to have been more conservative on economic issues than the younger leaders, and was generally less prepared to make compromises in the Cold War.⁹

Immediately after the death of Stalin, Beria initiated a series of reforms that sought to end the reliance of the economy on forced labour, and to circumscribe the powers of the secret police in the economy – policies that are better seen as technocratic than liberal. He was also outspoken on the need to address difficulties in Eastern Europe, and particularly the German Democratic Republic (GDR), by making concessions and retreating from harsh Stalinist economic policies – although in this period there was a considerable degree of consensus, and all Soviet leaders recognised the need for change.

Policy differences were less important than personal rivalries in precipitating the coup against Beria in 1953: his colleagues clearly feared that he would start to move against them unless they launched a pre-emptive strike. Even so, Molotov, in particular, made attempts to blame Beria for excessive compromise with the West, which, it was alleged, had contributed to the East German uprising. And a similar fate befell Malenkov, who again tried to press for a radical departure from the Stalinist orthodoxy. In March 1954, he was calling for a redirection of resources away from heavy to consumer industries and arguing for an end to the confrontation with the West on the grounds that a war in the nuclear age would destroy world civilisation. But Malenkov, like Beria, found himself outmanoeuvred by his rival Khrushchev, in alliance with Molotov, and condemned for an excessively consumerist and pro-détente position. He was removed from the premiership in January 1955.

⁹ Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 261, 266–9.

Yet Khrushchev's condemnation of Malenkov for 'rightism' did not amount to a defence of the Stalinist orthodoxy. Rather, he sought his own version of reformism, which avoided Malenkov's radicalism and Molotov's more orthodox Stalinism, while squaring the circle: reforming the Soviet economy and enhancing the legitimacy of the regime at home by increasing consumption, without undermining the position of heavy industry and the USSR's international role. He did so by emphasising the role of the party and of ideology, arguing that the Soviet Union could solve its problems if the leadership remained true to its Leninist ideals and used them to inspire the population to achieve great feats. Thus, at least initially, he refused to accept that there was any need to reduce investment in heavy industry in the interests of consumption because mass mobilisation campaigns organised by the party, such as the introduction of wheat to the 'Virgin Lands' of Kazakhstan, could increase agricultural production cheaply. In foreign policy, he argued that the Soviet Union's role as a global power and promoter of socialism could be sustained at the same time as military expenditures were reduced by investing in cheaper nuclear technologies and transferring the competition with the West from the military to the ideological and economic spheres.

Predictably, Molotov criticised several of these initiatives from a more orthodox Stalinist position, condemning the Virgin Lands campaign as unrealistic, and objecting to Khrushchev's attempts to make peace with Josip Broz Tito, the Yugoslav leader. Relations between the two became increasingly tense, culminating in a final breach when Khrushchev denounced Stalin (and implicitly Molotov and others close to him) in 1956, and when Molotov participated in the attempt to remove Khrushchev in 1957.

Initially, Khrushchev's policy programme seemed to succeed in resolving the conflict between the demands of defence and consumption, and it was attractive to a significant section of the Soviet elite. Yet, it was ultimately impossible to sustain. Party mobilisation campaigns, while frequently attracting a good deal of support, often caused chaos and failed to provide a magic formula for the solution of economic problems. Moreover, Khrushchev found that his brand of aggressive ideological competition with the West was expensive and required military expansion. Therefore, once Khrushchev had emerged as *primus inter pares*, he found that serious choices on investment priorities had to be made. While he was consolidating his position within the leadership, Khrushchev supported cuts in consumer industries and increases in investment in heavy industry. However, as he became stronger in 1956 and 1957, he reversed his position and adopted a much more reformist programme, closer to that of Malenkov. He cut heavy industrial investment

and proposed that the Soviet Union compete with the United States in the production of food; he also promised that the USSR would overtake American production of meat, milk, and butter in three to four years. From 1959 to 1961, when Khrushchev's authority was at its highest, he redirected resources from heavy to consumer industries and agriculture. At the same time, he felt that he had the political strength to challenge the military establishment, and in January 1960 he announced a continuation of the substantial unilateral troop reductions begun in 1957.

Predictably, Khrushchev began to attract serious opposition from heavy industrial and military interests. His attempts at agricultural reform continued to be ineffective, and his efforts to shake up industry by increasing party control were disruptive. In foreign policy, his ambition to promote Communism outside Europe and his willingness to pursue a highly risky strategy in pursuit of these revolutionary goals conflicted with his hope that he could achieve *détente* and military cutbacks. In 1961, the 1960 defence cuts were reversed, and actual defence spending rose by 24.6 per cent.¹⁰ Heavy industry's priority was affirmed in 1961, and in May 1962 retail food prices on meat, sausage, and butter were substantially increased, while wages were reduced. The result was serious unrest throughout the industrial areas of the Soviet Union, most notably in Novocherkassk, where riots had to be put down by Red Army tanks.

The events of 1962 showed that Khrushchev had failed to resolve the problem of guns and butter. His ambitious attempts to enhance the legitimacy of the regime, while at the same time expanding the international influence of the USSR, exacerbated the problems of reconciling defence and consumption, and led to crisis.

Technology and ideology

Closely related to the conflict between supporters of consumption on the one hand, and heavy industry and defence on the other, was that between the ideologues and the 'technocrats'. Ideological supporters of heavy industry and defence tended to emphasise *politika*, taking a more hard-line stance internationally, while avoiding the use of 'capitalist' market incentives at home. Technocrats, in contrast, called for policy-making to be informed by scientific expertise and *tekhnika*, and usually argued for the 'pragmatic' use of market incentives; this required more investment in consumer industries for them to

¹⁰ Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 159.

be effective, and less in defence. There were various ways of combining *tekhnika* and *politika*. We can identify a trajectory similar to that seen in the conflict over investment priorities: a late Stalinist compromise, in which *politika*, which still had the major role but did not have the power it had had in the 1930s, gave way after Stalin's death to a sharp policy conflict. Extreme technocrats had a brief prominence, but that period was followed by a new tense and unstable relationship between *tekhnika* and *politika* under Khrushchev. Yet, the nature of the debate did change under Khrushchev because his conception of the content of the ideology differed from Stalin's. Khrushchev's Marxism-Leninism was internationalist, rather than quasi-nationalistic and xenophobic, and it emphasised popular mobilisation, in contrast to Stalin's advocacy of elite control. He also attempted to reconcile a commitment to Marxism-Leninism with an economic policy that broadly favoured consumption.

The tension between *tekhnika* and *politika* was fundamental to Bolshevism.¹¹ For technocratic Bolsheviks, the best way of building a powerful and wealthy state was to rely on educated experts to plan the economy and organise the state rationally, using a mixture of discipline and material incentives (but not going so far as to introduce a market system). For more 'revivalist' Bolsheviks, these strategies did not take account of the peculiarly socialist nature of the regime: they created hierarchies of expertise and were too 'bourgeois'; they also neglected the economic and military advantages that true socialism could bring. If party spirit were revived and the population mobilised, revivalists argued, the system could achieve heroic feats because 'moral' incentives were much more effective than material ones. Thus, Bolshevik revivalism was closely connected with economic voluntarism – the notion that willpower and enthusiasm could generate economic miracles. This division over ideology and strategy was often, although not always, associated with the institutional division between party and state. As the party's role was to inspire the masses and ensure that the regime remained socialist, it was likely that it would stress the power of ideas to mobilise the masses, while the 'state' bureaucracy, which was dominated by the ministries that ran the economy, was more likely to adopt a technocratic approach.

Stalin's political position, like that of most Bolshevik leaders, changed over time, but it is possible to identify a reasonably consistent belief in the primacy of *politika*. Yet, his interpretation of revivalism was of a particular type: he was

11 For this tension, see David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter War Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), introduction.

interested in the mobilising power of Marxism-Leninism, but his views often had a xenophobic colouring. He was always worried about the power of foreign ideological influence to corrupt the population and undermine its willingness to build and fight for socialism. In the Terror of 1936–38, for example, he combined a populist ‘class struggle’ against officials and experts with xenophobic campaigns against particular ethnic groups within the USSR, such as Germans, Poles, and Koreans.

The Terror, and especially its antibureaucratic elements, was extremely damaging to economic success and military preparedness because it virtually destroyed expert bureaucracies. From the late 1930s, Stalin was forced to move away from *politika* towards *tekhnika*, and the power of managers and economic officials was strengthened against political interference. These trends continued during the war. Political commissars in the army were subordinated to officers, and Stalin himself delegated a great deal of authority over the economy to his subordinates. More generally, political and ideological restrictions were relaxed. The leadership used more explicitly Russian nationalist messages and made fewer efforts to associate them with socialist ideology once Stalin recruited the Orthodox Church to the patriotic cause in 1943. At the same time, the status and influence of scientists increased. They were credited with a major role in winning the war, and their importance in the nuclear-arms race was fully accepted. They were given a good deal of independence from the requirements of the party and ideology. They were also encouraged to collaborate with their Western colleagues so that they could learn from and overtake the West.¹²

However, soon after the war this ideological laxity was reversed, and Stalin pursued versions of the campaigns he had waged during the 1930s. Given his long-established concerns about the dangers of foreign ideas, it is probable that Stalin would have wanted to impose greater ideological conformity after the war, whatever the relations were with the West. There is a great deal of evidence that returning soldiers were particularly assertive and critical. They believed that their sacrifices in war had earned them a less repressive political system. Many had witnessed the higher living standards in the West, an experience that was an ‘emotional and psychological shock’, as the playwright Konstantin Simonov put it.¹³

12 N. Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), ch. 4.

13 Quoted in Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 16–18.

Yet deteriorating relations with the West also contributed to Stalin's hardening line. In the spring of 1946, at a time of increasing tension, he began his ideological campaigns in earnest, using both Marxist-Leninist and Russian nationalist (and particularly anti-Semitic) themes to attack the West. In April, Stalin criticised the literary journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* for their openness to Western influences, and in August he used his chief ideologist, Andrei Zhdanov, to launch a broader condemnation of 'cringing before philistine foreign literature'.¹⁴ The next stage came the following April, shortly after Harry S. Truman's announcement of his 'doctrine'. Several months before, Stalin had criticised a new *History of Western European Philosophy* by the head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, G. F. Aleksandrov, for neglecting the achievements of Russian philosophy. Now, Stalin tried to use the case to signal a larger assault on Western values. At the same time, 'honour courts' were established in state institutions in order to stage trials of officials and academics accused of harbouring unpatriotic attitudes.

The socialist patriotic campaign also spread to the natural sciences, and scientists were accused of 'servility to the West'. The first significant attack on scientists came with the criticism of Nina Kliueva and her husband Grigorii Roskin (the 'KR affair'), medical researchers who were accused of giving details of a cancer cure to the Americans. Even so, Stalin, while using the campaigns to promote a broader attack on the West and its culture, did not want to damage scientific research. Those criticised, including Kliueva and Roskin, were allowed to continue their work. Other established scientists also retained some influence. The antigeneticist 'Marxist-Leninist' biologist Trofim Lysenko, for example, failed to secure political support in 1947, even though he tried to use the patriotic campaign against his academic enemies.

It was only in the summer of 1948, again in response to a deterioration in East-West relations, that Stalin decided to intervene in support of Lysenko. Stalin deliberately used the Lysenko affair to demonstrate the fundamental differences between East and West and the superiority of Soviet science and the Soviet system more generally. The victory of Lysenkoism in biology certainly demonstrated that the party had extended its power in the scientific realm and that science had been subordinated to ideology; yet Stalin remained unwilling to jeopardise research in areas which he believed were of particular importance, such as physics and nuclear weapons. A conference designed to denounce 'Western' ideas in physics, planned for March 1949, was cancelled at

14 Quoted in Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, 34-35.

short notice, possibly because Beria realised that this might imperil the nuclear programme.¹⁵

In many respects, then, the socialist patriotic campaigns of the late 1940s echoed the revivalist campaigns of the late 1930s: the balance between *politika* and *tehnika* was tipped in favour of the former, the party was allowed to interfere in some areas of technical expertise, and the ideological mobilisation of the population against the Western threat was the priority. While the 'ideology' promoted in the 1940s included more nationalistic elements than it had in the 1930s, this was not a conventional ethnic nationalism. 'Enemies' were still defined according to their relationship with socialism; the Jews thus took the place of the Germans, Poles, and Koreans as potential fifth columnists. Yet there were important differences between the campaigns of the 1930s and those of the 1940s. The revivalism of the postwar period was more limited and relied less on popular mobilisation than that of the 1930s. Science was never fully subordinated to ideology, possibly because the leadership had learned lessons from the 1930s, but also because science and expertise were now seen as crucial weapons in the Cold War. Stalin had never claimed that there was a special proletarian science, superior to bourgeois science, but in the 1930s he had argued that working-class 'practical people', such as the heroic Stakhanovite workers, could be as expert as qualified scientists and technicians.¹⁶ In the 1940s and 1950s, however, he expressed very different sentiments. While Stalin believed that he, as the 'coryphaeus of science', had the right to be closely involved in scientific debates, he insisted that there were objective scientific and economic laws independent of Marxism.¹⁷ For instance, in 1948, he crossed out Lysenko's statement 'any science is class-based' and wrote in the margin: 'HA-HA-HA!!! And what about mathematics? And what about Darwinism?'¹⁸ Stalin, therefore, did recognise, in theory, that science had to develop free from politics, although his willingness to launch political campaigns against scientists had a seriously detrimental effect on Soviet science.

15 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 211–12.

16 I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* [Works] (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967), I (XIV), 275–77.

17 Ethan Pollock, 'Stalin as the Coryphaeus of Science: Ideology and Knowledge in the Post-war Years', in S. Davies and J. Harris (eds.), *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 284–85.

18 Quoted in K. Rossianov, 'Editing Nature: Joseph Stalin and the "New" Soviet Biology', *Isis*, 84 (1993), 728–45.

Stalin's campaigns against scientists were also much more targeted than they had been in the 1930s, and did not involve a populist 'class struggle'. They affected the scientific elite, and were propagandistic in intent, designed to mobilise the population against the West. The scientists themselves were generally not arrested, and these campaigns did not lead to purges of technicians throughout the country. More generally, the power and status of managers and technicians in relation to workers rose in the postwar period, and strict hierarchies were maintained in factories. Most obviously, the campaigns did not lead to mass violence against 'enemies'. Officials were executed in various purges of the period, but the victims were relatively few. It may be that Stalin was planning mass violence against Jews in 1952–53, just before his death, in connection with the so-called Doctors' Plot, but, given evidence currently available, this seems unlikely.¹⁹

This balance, which gave *politika* primacy but was more favourable to *tekhnika* than before the war, is also evident in the power structure that emerged at the very top during the postwar Stalinist period. Stalin used purges and aggressive bullying to restore some of the powers he had been forced to delegate to his inner circle during the war. Nonetheless, he knew that he could not exercise personal control over the economy. In February 1947, therefore, he acquiesced in granting the 'state' Council of Ministers (Sovmin) almost complete control over the economy. Stalin did not participate in Sovmin meetings which largely involved leaders interested in economic affairs, such as Beria and Malenkov. But he wholly controlled the party Politburo, which dealt with 'political' and foreign-policy questions. This was a departure from the 1930s, when Stalin had been closely involved in economic management. In the political sphere, Stalin maintained his arbitrary, personalistic form of rule, often involving his subordinates in terrifying late-night meetings. In contrast, Sovmin developed a formal bureaucratic structure and a hierarchy of specialised committees.²⁰

This balance between *politika* and *tekhnika*, and between party and state, made sense during the early Cold War, at a time when the Soviet Union was forced to compete with the West in a struggle that was both ideological and military, but it was clearly an unstable one. For the more technocratic Beria and Malenkov, political interference damaged scientific progress and the state's ability to manage the economy. For those associated with the party

19 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk deny that Stalin was planning a mass repression: Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, 158–59. For an alternative view, see J. Brent and V. P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime: The Doctors' Plot* (London: Murray, 2003).

20 Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*, ch. 7.

and interested in ideology, such as Khrushchev, the potential of Bolshevism to mobilise the population was being neglected: the 'Marxism-Leninism' promoted by Stalin was too elitist and xenophobic. The party apparatus, moreover, resented its subordination in economic affairs. In large part its discontent at the late Stalinist compromise was driven by institutional conflicts and long-established ideological tensions. But the international environment also had an influence. At a time when the Cold War was becoming associated with decolonisation struggles, an emphasis on the universalistic element of Marxism-Leninism clearly appeared attractive. The critics of Stalin's xenophobia, therefore, had powerful arguments in favour of change. At the same time, however, the nuclearisation of the Cold War strengthened those technocrats who argued both that conventional defence spending could be cut and that the world was too dangerous for continued ideological competition.

The first significant challenge to the Stalinist compromise came from Beria and Malenkov, both technocrats and leaders in the state apparatus. Beria rapidly moved to reduce the politicisation of justice and to undermine the power of the party over the ministries.²¹ He also criticised the Russian nationalist elements of late Stalinist ideology, condemning the power of Russians in high positions in non-Russian republics and criticising the dominance of the Russian language. On Beria's fall, Malenkov took up the baton and continued the departure from the Stalinist compromise. He tried to free the intelligentsia from ideological restrictions and asked for advice from leading economists and scientists. The former called for greater economic liberalisation, and the latter demanded an end to the power of Lysenko in the biological sciences.²²

However, the tense international environment in 1954–55 strengthened those who took ideology seriously both at home and in the struggle against the West. Khrushchev, the head of the party apparatus, was in a particularly good position to take advantage of this situation. For Khrushchev, the party was to retain its international ideological role, as promoter of world Communism. Inside the USSR, he adopted a revivalist position: the party had to be strengthened in its relationship with the state apparatus so that it could imbue the population with enthusiasm for a non-Stalinist 'democratic' socialism. This would strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and inspire people to work harder. He made more serious efforts than Stalin to reconcile these strategies

21 Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 185–86.

22 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 260.

with the demands of scientific autonomy, but understandably he found it difficult to resolve tensions between his encouragement of scientific excellence and his enthusiasm for a renewal of Marxism-Leninism.

Khrushchev's partial denunciation of Stalin in October 1956 allowed him to justify these policies. He did not condemn the essence of the Stalinist system – collectivisation, industrialisation, the plan, and the centralisation of political power – but concentrated on criticising the 1936–38 Terror. He presented it as a departure from Bolshevik 'democracy' and as an attack on the party (neglecting the larger numbers of non-party members persecuted under Stalin).

In many ways Khrushchev was returning to the populist revivalism of the Bolshevik Left in the 1920s. His ideas were universalistic and atheistic, rather than quasi-nationalistic. They emphasised the importance of 'democracy' and 'struggles against bureaucracy'. Attempts were made to raise the enthusiasm of the masses by 'democratising' the party and industrial management. The party rank and file and workers were encouraged to participate in discussions of decision-making. The masses were not to challenge party rule, but were to put pressure on 'bureaucratic' officials. At the same time, Khrushchev gave the party much more power over economic managers by destroying the economic ministries and creating regional economic councils (*sovmarkhozy*), which could be more effectively influenced by the party.²³

Party influence was also closely associated with economic voluntarism, particularly in agriculture, Khrushchev's particular area of interest. Khrushchev had a typical revivalist Bolshevik view of the miraculous power of labour heroism. When 'people come to know their own strength', he declared, 'they create miracles'. He did place a high priority on science, and he was sympathetic to the view that Stalinist controls had damaged the intelligentsia.²⁴ However, in a rather more populist vein, he at times had contempt for 'pointy-headed intellectuals' who did not understand production as well as 'working people'.²⁵ At the same time, he set himself the task of competing with the West in the area of consumption, and his voluntarism often won out in his disastrous pursuit of high plan targets against the advice of experts. His support for Lysenko, who promised agricultural miracles, showed he was still a revivalist, prepared to put pressure on scientists to endorse impractical economic goals. Lysenko did not regain the degree of influence over science he had held in the late Stalinist era, and scientific debate

23 G. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 4–5, 75–77, 104–07, 127–31.

24 *Ibid.*, 387.

25 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 374–75.



36. Women welders chatting, USSR, 1962.

remained much more open than it had been. But for many in the party leadership, one of Khrushchev's main faults was his subordination of science to politics. As *Pravda* declared in its explanation for his removal on 16 October 1964, he was guilty of 'unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already worked out'.²⁶

A Cold War popular culture?

The competition with the West, therefore, clearly dominated the thinking of Soviet leaders, even if they advocated different ways of mobilising Soviet

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 620.

society. So how effective was this mobilisation, and how far did the population internalise the leadership's insistence on the primacy of the Cold War? Research on popular attitudes suggests that in crucial respects they accorded with official attitudes. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, fear of war with the West was high, and frequent incidents of panic buying were reported as rumours of war spread. Winston Churchill's Fulton speech and the outbreak of the Korean War, for example, were especially worrying to Soviet citizens. The evidence of discussions at electoral and party meetings also suggests that questions of foreign policy were of particular interest.

There is also some evidence that the experience of the war had given many people a highly critical attitude towards the West, and led many to sympathise with official Soviet patriotism. In particular, Soviet citizens expressed anger at the failure of the Allies to open a second front. They were dismayed by the high living standards in the West and poverty in the Soviet Union, despite the heavy losses sustained on the Eastern front. As Zdeněk Mlynář, the Czech Communist who spent some time in the USSR in the 1940s and early 1950s, reminisced, it was common at the time to believe that the Soviet people had made unique sacrifices in the war, and therefore deserved special respect. These sentiments accorded with the official view that the Soviet Union was a particularly moral nation, both because it had a collectivist political system and because it had freed the world of Nazism. But these views combined with a desire to avoid war at all costs, and with a reluctance to make any more sacrifices than were absolutely necessary. People complained about fraternal aid to East European countries and expressed scepticism about the rejection of the Marshall Plan.²⁷

Notwithstanding broad sympathy for official views on foreign policy, Soviet citizens did not like the rigid internal controls established during the early Cold War period. Elena Zubkova and others have argued that the experience of war created a generation that was more confident and less willing to accept control from above. People, who had experienced more mobility during the war and who had been permitted to communicate outside official channels, believed their wartime sacrifices now entitled them to

27 For popular opinion during this period, see especially Zubkova, *Russia after the War*; D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 14; Mark Edele, 'More than Just Stalinists: The Political Sentiments of Victors', in J. Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), 167–91.



37. New housing in Novosibirsk, 1958.

more dignity and autonomy than they had previously received.²⁸ This interpretation, based on a range of archival sources, is confirmed by the Harvard Project's interviews after the war, which found that while most citizens accepted the system, they did want an end to arbitrary and harsh government, and felt that they were given too few rewards for their contributions to society.²⁹ However, Soviet citizens' opinions varied enormously. Some did make more fundamental criticisms of the Soviet system as a whole, and contact with the West convinced some veterans that there was an alternative. Meanwhile, others condemned the Soviet system from the opposite point of view, in the name of an idealistic and moralistic neo-Leninism.³⁰ Yet it is clear that many Soviet citizens had internalised the regime's patriotic message and saw the world as it was presented to them by the party – as made up of 'two camps', 'ours' (*svoi*) and the 'alien' (*chuzhoi*).

Yet official attempts to extend these nationalistic attitudes to the broader sphere of popular culture, and to create a moralistic and puritanical society immune from Western influence were less successful, partly because official policy was highly inconsistent. During the war, there had been some relaxation in popular culture more generally, and front-line soldiers were exposed to big-band jazz, for example. Likewise, American films were shown during and

²⁸ Zubkova, *Russia after the War*, 16–17 and ch. 3.

²⁹ D. Bahry, 'Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika', *Slavic Review*, 52, 3 (1993), 515.

³⁰ Edele, 'More than Just Stalinists'.

after the war, as were German 'trophy' films, taken as part of reparations. With the new cultural policies of the postwar era, jazz was condemned as both Western and frivolous, and at times foreign films were criticised and banned. However, official policy was ambivalent in the late Stalinist period. Jazz tunes were sometimes rearranged as Soviet 'light music' and played in restaurants. Jazz could also be seen in trophy films, which were shown for much of the period, despite the concerns of local party and party youth (Komsomol) officials.

Western cinema and jazz were extremely influential in youth culture, and many youths imitated the dress and acting styles they saw in the trophy films. Listening to jazz and rock and roll on Western stations was also widespread. This Western culture was at the centre of *stiliachestvo* (literally 'stylishness'), a term coined by the authorities to describe a youth sub-culture devoted to stylish clothes, dancing, and music. The Komsomol was extremely worried about the *stiliagi*, but as in the case of trophy films, there was no coherent effort under Stalin to eliminate these potentially dangerous cultural phenomena. Policy changed dramatically under Khrushchev, who, as part of his attempts at ideological revival, sought to eliminate all signs of Western, bourgeois decadence from youth culture. Predictably, these campaigns met with little success.

The Komsomol certainly had something to worry about. The so-called *stiliagi* did, implicitly, challenge official norms by neglecting politics, while establishing their own collective life, separate from official organisations. Interest in Western culture did not necessarily imply political or even cultural opposition to the regime. But, even so, aspects of postwar Western culture, and in particular its emphasis on consumption, did help to undermine the collectivism and quasi-military ethos of sacrifice which was such an important element of Bolshevik culture. It would be wrong to exaggerate the novelty of the emphasis on consumption, but Khrushchev's attempts to transfer competition from the military sphere to that of the production of consumer goods, legitimised consumerism ideologically to a greater extent than before. 'Communism', as described by Karl Marx and the Bolsheviks, was a society of extraordinary plenty and so, in theory, there was no contradiction between ideology and high living standards. However, it was likely that Marxism-Leninism's emphasis on collective, as opposed to individual, interests would be threatened by the officially endorsed culture of consumption. By the 1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear that this was indeed happening.

Throughout the early Cold War period, therefore, popular opinion was particularly difficult for the regime to manage. If most people were probably

willing to accept the official line on foreign policy, there was clear evidence of dissatisfaction with the late Stalinist regime of austerity and discipline. It is not surprising, therefore, that Stalin's successors decided the balance between guns and butter had to be altered. Yet the question of *politika* and *tekhnika* was more difficult to resolve. The Communist Party's legitimacy depended on its claim that it was following a special path to modernity, one that relied on 'socialist' economic methods, such as mass mobilisation, rather than conventional technocratic ones. Some Soviet citizens were also committed to this idea, and Khrushchev's revivalist initiatives initially had some popular support. But their failure discredited them, and Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, presided over a more technocratic regime.

The struggle to keep up

The Cold War did not create a fundamentally different form of politics or a new official political culture because the Soviet system was already designed for the mobilisation of its population for war. Yet this is not to deny that the Cold War dominated the thinking of the Soviet leadership. As the weaker party in the superpower relationship, struggling to keep up economically and militarily and to gain equal status politically, it was inevitable that the Soviet elite should have been obsessed by the conflict, possibly even more so than its American counterpart. And the need to compete with an economically and ideologically powerful West arguably exacerbated the tensions within the elite that had been present before 1945 – over the balance of investment and consumption, and the relationship between ideology and technocracy. By the early 1950s, it was clear to many in the elite that Stalin's solution to these problems was not working. But neither Beria nor Malenkov could secure support for their alternatives, and by 1962 Khrushchev's solutions – filled with ambiguities and contradictions – appeared to have failed.

The influence of the Cold War on popular attitudes is less easy to ascertain. Nonetheless, it appears that, while Soviet citizens often followed the elite's view of the world as one divided into two camps, many people were less willing to accept cultural isolation and felt that they deserved rewards for their wartime sacrifices. It was not surprising that when, from the later 1960s, elites themselves started to lose faith in the ability of the Soviet system to compete with the West, they found it even harder to encourage popular sacrifices in the interests of superpower supremacy.

Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962

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In 1900, most of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East were ruled directly or indirectly by the Euro-American colonial powers. As late as the outbreak of World War II, almost a billion of the world's people lived under direct colonial rule. But in the two decades after 1945 imperial order collapsed. At times peacefully, but often after protracted warfare and violence, the imperial powers eventually ceded independence to most of South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East by the mid-1950s. Independence movements ruptured much of the rest of the imperial world over the next decade. In Africa, the year 1960 alone brought independence to seventeen former colonies. Ten more African states would gain their independence over the next several years, as would former colonies in the Caribbean and Latin America. One dramatic measure of the rapidity and scope of this shift in the constitution of world political order was the enlargement of the United Nations. At its founding in 1945, the UN included 51 member states. In 1965, the number had more than doubled to 117, with a majority of the increase made up of states in the global South that formerly had been colonies.

Making sense of these complex events and processes – which crossed time, space, and cultures and were just as much highly contingent and local as they were part of larger shifts in global power and sensibilities – has presented conceptual difficulties for historians. The very terms by which to analyze the phenomena of decolonization have been unusually vexed. For historians of Euro-American empire, decolonization marks the final chapter of high imperialism. It is often viewed through the lens of actors in the metropole and colonial administrators on the ground, emphasizing the ways they shaped both the timing and the trajectories of independence. Historians of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, more concerned with the experiences of the colonized than the colonizers, have argued that such a narrative risks reinscribing patterns of Western imperial power and denies

agency to local actors. In this view, independence was not so much given as taken, and anticolonial actors and their construction of postcolonial states and society become central elements of the story. More recently, the meanings of empire and its dissolution have been seen as overlapping and intertwined processes in which the historical experiences of metropole and colony, albeit under considerable differentials of power, mutually constituted one another.

This vantage point is suggestive for approaching the interpretive puzzle at the heart of this chapter: the relationship between decolonization in the global South and emergence of the Cold War. From the Manichean perspective of most Cold War policymakers in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as some scholars, the movements for independence in the colonized world after World War II were seen as a subset of the bipolar geopolitical order dominated by the Soviet–American rivalry. Without question, the Cold War affected decolonizing states at multiple levels. They were, particularly after 1950, a central Cold War battleground, most dramatically illustrated by the Cuban setting of the missile crisis that marked the apex of Soviet–American tensions. More generally, the high modernist models of US liberal capitalism and Soviet (and later Chinese) state socialism offered powerful and competing ideological paths for realizing the efforts of postcolonial states to remake their societies. The Soviet–American rivalry also presented revolutionary movements and newly independent states with the benefits and the dangers of superpower patronage through weapons and arms, advisers and funds for civil and military development, and direct military intervention. Furthermore, it contributed to the intensity of wars of national liberation and the rise of repressive regimes under superpower sponsorship, producing massive human rights abuses and profoundly destabilizing the decolonizing world.

At the same time, however, the global move toward decolonization was rooted in local particularities that long preceded, ran parallel with, and ultimately persisted beyond the Cold War. Colonized peoples renounced imperialism and sought to escape from it in considerably less fixed ways than a Cold War framework would suggest. The Cold War, therefore, tends to obscure the significance of transnational postcolonial visions in the global South that imagined a world apart both from the biopolar international system and from the imperial order. This chapter limns the porous boundaries of the imperial, the postcolonial, and the Cold War to explore and situate the meanings of decolonization for the structures of international order between 1919 and 1962.

Imperialism and its discontents

The high imperialism of the nineteenth century encountered almost immediate resistance from many colonized peoples. Avoidance, sabotage, and flight were among the most common ways that ordinary people responded to the harsh conditions that colonialism imposed upon them. More organized forms of elite-led rebellion, sometimes aimed at restoring the precolonial order, confronted imperial authorities directly and violently. If some local elites collaborated with colonial powers, they frequently did so to serve their own ends. But beginning in the early twentieth century a more sustained challenge began to dominate the anticolonial politics of the imperial world. The nationalist movements that emerged in this period, with their diverse range of radical thought and action, directly shaped the wave of postcolonial independence after 1945.

World War I and its aftermath were critical in shaping the sensibilities of nationalist leaders. Hundreds of thousands of colonial subjects were conscripted during wartime. They returned from the battlefields of Europe with a deepened suspicion of the civilizational promises of their colonial masters and with an expanded political and social consciousness. The dynamics of Wilsonian peacemaking in the aftermath of the war and the potentialities of the Russian Revolution further radicalized anticolonial thought and action.

Woodrow Wilson's promotion of self-determination as one of the fundamental elements of the postwar peace brought a number of anti-colonial leaders to Paris in 1919, hoping to wrest some form of autonomy from colonial rule. Anticolonial figures from the Egyptian nationalist leader Sa'd Zaghlul to Bal Gangadhar Tilak of India and Nguyen Ai Quoc (later better known as Ho Chi Minh) of Vietnam presented petitions that drew on Wilsonian language to ask for relatively moderate reforms of colonial rule leading to gradual self-government and independence. Their entreaties met with silence from Wilson and the other European imperial powers. At the same time, the peace conference declined to support Japan's efforts to insert a racial equality clause into the provisions of the peace settlement. But, by articulating self-determination as an international norm, Wilsonianism both inspired anticolonial activists and opened up a space through which they could make claims for the legitimacy of movements for independence.

When it became clear that Wilson and his European colleagues had no intention of immediately extending self-determination, some of these frustrated leaders from the colonies began looking to the Bolshevik Revolution as a more alluring path to political independence and social transformation. Anticolonial

figures such as Jawaharlal Nehru in British India, Tan Malaka in the Dutch East Indies, and Ho Chi Minh in French-controlled Vietnam all became active in projects sponsored by the Comintern, the entity created by the Soviet Union in 1919 to foster worldwide revolution. Some Chinese Communist leaders, such as the cosmopolitan Zhou Enlai, were part of these global revolutionary networks. But Iosif Stalin's commitment to revolution outside the West was uneven. He ordered dramatic changes in the Comintern approach to revolution, with sometimes disastrous effects for local Communist Parties in the colonized world. Nonetheless, the Comintern organized training schools in the Soviet Union and brought thousands of activists from the colonial world to Moscow. They saw the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state as models for organizing anticolonial action and postcolonial state-making.

Others in the colonial world were drawn to alternative paths out of colonialism beyond Wilsonian internationalism or international socialism. Their efforts point to the persistent inclination of non-Western peoples to use the shared experiences of oppression to organize transnational anti-imperialist movements. In 1919, just as the great powers were meeting to map the postwar world, the first Pan-African Congress opened in Paris, with delegates from Africa, the Caribbean, and the United States. The congress was part of a broader pan-African movement that had its origins two decades earlier in the 1900 Pan-African Conference in London. Organized to influence the deliberations over German colonies in Africa at the Paris Peace Conference, the congress issued a series of resolutions to secure rights to land, capital, labor, education, medicine, hygiene, and culture for colonized peoples in Africa and sought their protection under the nascent League of Nations.

The transnational solidarities of the pan-African movement would continue to play a powerful role in African and Caribbean affairs in the interwar period and beyond. Many of the activities of the movement in this period centered on the African diasporic community in London and Paris. Among them was the Négritude movement led by Aimé Césaire of Martinique and Léopold Senghor of Senegal, who articulated expressions of shared African identities in the Francophone world in a variety of literary, philosophical, and political registers. In the English-speaking world, a radical form of pan-Africanism under the leadership of the West Indian George Padmore in the late 1930s combined Marxism, trade unionism, anti-imperialism, and an elastic definition of "coloured" that included Asians. Along with Césaire and Senghor, political and cultural elites from Africa, among them Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta, and from the Caribbean and the United States, including

I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, C.L.R. James, and W.E.B. DuBois, were actively engaged in pan-African politics in this period. Nkrumah and Kenyatta would come to lead the anticolonial struggle and the first postcolonial states in Ghana and Kenya respectively.

Pan-Islamic and pan-Asian sensibilities also emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. In northern Africa and the Middle East, the pan-Islamic reform movement first emerged among the urban, educated Turks of the Ottoman Empire, but gradually spread to Cairo, Damascus, and other urban centers in the region. It sought to encourage Muslims to collapse their political and religious differences to unite against European imperialism by rethinking the principles and practices of Islam. Al-Azhar University in Cairo attracted students from throughout the Islamic world and became the center for the development and dissemination of pan-Islamic ideas. In Asia, during the first two decades of the century, some elites in China, Korea, and Vietnam responded to the dangers posed by European, American, and increasingly Japanese colonialism through a transregional dialogue and non-Western solidarity that looked to Egyptian reformism of the middle of the nineteenth century, the 1898 Philippine revolution against the United States, and the Turkish constitutional experiments of 1908–10 as sources of inspiration.

Against the impact of World War I and transnational currents of anticolonial thought, radical political and nationalist sentiment emerged more directly in British, French, and Dutch colonies throughout the 1920s and, with the coming of the global Depression, deepened in the 1930s. In Africa, the pan-African movement shaped anticolonial politics in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya in the 1920s, including the formation of the West African Students' Union in 1925 as a regional vehicle for reclaiming political control from the imperial powers. In the 1930s, labor strikes and organizing pushed anticolonial politics in more radical social and economic directions. In French-controlled Africa, the Islamic-inspired Rif war and Istiqlal Party in Morocco and the Néo-Destour Party in Tunisia sought independence. Egypt emerged as a semi-independent state in the wake of massive demonstrations and strikes in 1919, but continuing British influence limited political independence and stymied efforts by secular and modernist Egyptian political elites to undertake political and economic reform. The 1930s brought a religious revival that sought to restore the supremacy of Islam in Egyptian public life. The Society of Muslim Brothers, which attracted a wide following among students and industrial workers, channeled popular opposition to the continuing British presence and offered proposals for economic reform based on Islamic and socialist principles. In the British West Indies, colonial subjects began to seek racial equality

in the franchise and civil services in the 1920s. A rising black and working-class consciousness in the 1930s further radicalized their demands for independence and socioeconomic change.

In Asia, Mohandas Gandhi came to lead a mass nationalist party in British India capable of mobilizing millions for its revolutionary noncooperation or *satyagraha* campaigns, most notably his march to the sea in 1930 to protest the colonial salt tax, aimed at securing Indian independence. In the Dutch East Indies, anticolonial parties drew on supralocal religious faith, socialist internationalism, and emergent discourses of the nation in an effort to transcend the diverse local particularities of the Indonesian archipelago, undertake socioeconomic reform, and ultimately drive out the Dutch. Similarly, in Burma, activist monks in the Young Men's Buddhist Association and later students in the Dobama Asi-ayone (We Burmans Association), whose influences included Irish nationalism, Fabian socialism, and Marxism-Leninism, challenged British colonial rule.

Vietnamese anticolonialism and visions of postcolonial independence in the interwar period reveal some of the larger dynamics and fluidities that animated and constrained anticolonial thought and practice more generally before World War II. The 1920s brought a new generation of nationalists to the Vietnamese political stage, among them the future leaders of Vietnamese Communism. Many of these young radicals were students, sons and daughters of traditional elites, who were impatient at the pace of change. They were as critical of French rule as they were of the precolonial Confucian political order and of what they perceived as the inability of an older anticolonial generation to effectively respond to the predicament posed by French colonialism. The movement also drew on a new social group in urban Vietnam, one that bitterly resented French colonialism. This urban intelligentsia was made up of shopkeepers, smaller traders, clerks, primary-school teachers, journalists, and technicians whose livelihoods emerged in the context of French colonialism. But they deeply resented their economic marginality and the limits the French placed on their opportunities for education and political participation.

Self-consciously experimental and iconoclastic, Vietnamese radical thought was never fully anchored around a body of shared principles. The radicals' disparate search for individual and societal transformation rested on an almost romantic belief in revolutionary heroism. Within this intellectual milieu, Ho Chi Minh founded the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Kach Menh Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League) in 1925, which became the precursor of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The ideology of Thanh Nien emphasized the

immediate imperative of the national question rather than social revolution or class issues, borrowing as much from indigenous political discourse and the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, Gandhi, and Sun Yat-sen as it did from Marx and Lenin. Ultimately, Ho Chi Minh and many Vietnamese Communists envisioned progressive elites and peasant masses coming together through patriotic ties and the desire for social revolution to throw off French colonialism. Vietnamese radicals, like anticolonial activists elsewhere, were no closer to transforming colonial society and achieving independence at the end of the 1930s than they had been in the early decades of the century. Imperial power remained too strong, and nationalist movements were fragmented and diffuse, with only limited capabilities to mobilize urban and rural populations.

World War II and the coming of the Cold War

The experiences of World War II dramatically shifted the fortunes of many anticolonial movements in the imperial world. Even more than World War I, the war played a critical role in inspiring independence movements and in fostering radical change in the international system. The coming of war in the Pacific, especially the initial defeat of Western imperial powers by the Japanese, had a strong and immediate psychological effect on colonial peoples in Asia. Japanese occupation of much of Southeast Asia also dislodged the region's British, French, and Dutch rulers and revealed the tenuous nature of European control. As the war came to a close and the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the victorious powers, anticolonial actors sought to harness American and Soviet wartime commitments to a postcolonial future. In the power vacuum at the time of the Japanese defeat in August 1945, anticolonial forces in the global South moved to assert their independence. Aung San's efforts to create a provisional independent government in Burma, Sukarno's establishment of an Indonesian republic, and Ho Chi Minh's proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the summer and fall of 1945 were among the earliest manifestations of the impending wave of decolonization. In British India, sustained negotiations between Indian anticolonial leaders and British imperial agents began in 1945 about the terms of independence, discussions complicated by the increasing schism within Indian nationalism between Hindus and Muslims. At the same time, anticolonial actors in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan put pressure on Great Britain and France to relinquish their control in the Middle East. The most radical of these challenges to colonial order brought with them a commitment not only to independence, but also to the construction of postcolonial states that would

transform the political, social, and economic prospects of their urban and rural citizens.

Although the experiences of Latin American nations are usually separated analytically from these events, the sharp challenge to repressive regimes in the region from 1944 to 1946 and the calls for far-reaching societal restructuring paralleled these efforts to break away from the colonial order in Asia and the Middle East. In 1944, only five Latin American states – Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico – could call themselves even nominal democracies. In three short years, dictatorships throughout the region fell as popular democratizing forces were mobilized. In 1946, only El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic continued to be ruled by dictators. In the rest of the region, social democratic populist and progressive movements came to power, supported by vocal and muscular labor unions as well as Communist Parties whose ties to the Soviet Union before the 1940s had been muted during the wartime period. Like anticolonial leaders in Asia and the Middle East, Latin American actors were emboldened by World War II to attempt to effect change by drawing upon strong liberal and socialist political traditions that predated the war itself.¹

These early struggles to transform colonial and illiberal states emerged against the acceleration of transnational discourses of human rights, anti-imperialism, and racial solidarities during and after World War II. The year 1945 marked major international conferences of colonized peoples as well as deliberations at the San Francisco Conference over the place of the colonized world in the United Nations Charter. The fifth Pan-African Congress that met in Manchester, England, in October 1945 brought together Africans, including the future leaders of almost all of decolonized British Africa, as well as African-American and Afro-Caribbean delegates. The congress condemned imperial economic exploitation, but focused on political independence in the African context, calling colonial freedom “the first step toward and necessary prerequisite to complete social, economic and political emancipation.”²

Anticolonial leaders were a visible presence at the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 and sought language in the UN Charter that would directly advance the immediate prospects for colonial independence. While the charter fell short of guaranteeing self-determination for the colonial world, its guarantees of human rights, and the full elaboration of these rights in

1 For a discussion of Central America at the end of the Cold War, see John Coatsworth's chapter in volume III.

2 George Padmore (ed.), *The History of the Pan African Congress* (London: Hammersmith Bookshop, 1963), 5.

the drafting of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided a powerful new vocabulary for making anticolonial claims and imagining the new postcolonial world. The Universal Declaration and its promises of political, economic, and social rights were the product in large measure of the work of social democrats from Latin America as well as delegates from newly independent Lebanon, India, and the Philippines. Neither the charter nor the declaration included enforcement mechanisms, but they provided another source of legitimacy for efforts of colonized peoples to remake colonial societies and to gain the sympathy of world opinion.

These transnational aspirations were quickly tested in an international environment hostile to the rhetorical promises of decolonization. The transfer of political authority from the colonizers to the colonized was sometimes peaceful but often collapsed into protracted violence in the immediate postwar period. If Nehru marked the moment of Indian independence in August 1947 by claiming at "the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom,"³ the subcontinent was quickly fragmented by the partition of India and Pakistan and consumed by the religious and sectarian violence that followed in its wake. The proclamations of independence by anticolonial elites in Southeast Asia were greeted by imperial powers unwilling to give up their colonial possessions. Both the Dutch and the French sought to reclaim their empires in protracted wars beginning in 1946, with Dutch forces attacking Sukarno's Indonesian republic and the French challenging Ho Chi Minh's DRV. The British too sought to maintain their control of Malaya and Singapore as well as their territories in Africa and the Middle East.

In the fast-moving and chaotic environment that marked the first wave of decolonization in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the coming of the Cold War in the global South was an almost unimagined contingency for anticolonial and imperial actors as well as for the Soviets and Americans themselves. Preoccupied with events in Europe – the occupation of Germany, the reconstruction of Western Europe, the fate of Eastern Europe, and the Greek Civil War – Soviet and American policymakers initially saw decolonization as peripheral to their growing rivalry and antagonism. More concerned by the contours of his postwar relationship with the Western allies, Stalin offered little significant material support to the most important

3 J. Nehru, "A Tryst with Destiny," August 14–15, 1947, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, second series, vol. III (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), 135.

Communist-led movements in this early period. Despite wartime Soviet interest in establishing friendly regimes in Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan, Stalin withdrew his forces from Iran in May 1946 after significant American pressure and kept his distance from the Iranian Communist party, the Tudeh. In China, Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintain an alliance with Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD). He did not provide vigorous military or material support for the CCP in its ensuing civil war with the GMD. Given Stalin's distrust of what he saw as Ho Chi Minh's bourgeois nationalist proclivities and the lower priority he ascribed to developments in the colonial world, he provided almost no material assistance to the Vietnamese in their war against the French and only muted rhetorical support of their anti-imperial cause.⁴

The United States was also initially slow to cast events in the global South in Cold War terms. US policymakers increasingly recognized the radical nature of many movements for independence, and did not like it. But they remained wary of giving overt support to British, French, and Dutch efforts to maintain their empires in the postwar period. American policy favored anti-colonialism of a kind, but one in which racialized perceptions of backward non-Western peoples undercut support for immediate independence. A 1947 cable by Secretary of State George Marshall about Vietnam illustrates this larger American dilemma over its response to decolonization. While Marshall acknowledged that the United States had "fully recognized France's sovereign position" in Indochina, he could not understand "the continued existence of an outmoded colonial outlook" and the inability of the French to recognize the realities of a postcolonial future. Equally concerned by what he perceived as Ho Chi Minh's Communist connections, Marshall argued that it "should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by a philosophy emanating from and controlled by the Kremlin." Confounded by the perceived impossibilities of choosing between a radical political regime and an archaic colonial one, Marshall could offer no clear American policy toward the French war in Vietnam.⁵

The character of diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Ho Chi Minh's DRV illuminates the fluid possibilities of this period and the marginality of the Cold War to it. In the face of unsuccessful efforts to win support from the Soviet

4 On Stalin's relationship with the emergent global South, see Vladimir O. Pechatnov's chapter in this volume.

5 Secretary of State to Embassy in Paris, February 3, 1947, in *US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947*, vol. VI, *The Far East* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972), 67–68.

Union and the United States, the DRV hoped to capitalize on widespread professions of moral support from nationalist leaders in India and Southeast Asia. Through its diplomatic mission in Bangkok and later in Rangoon, the Vietnamese state tried to establish closer ties with Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines as well as more informal ties with radical nationalists in Malaya. Vietnamese diplomats were active in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in India and participated in the establishment of the Southeast Asia League which aimed to formalize networks of nationalist regional cooperation. Although these efforts brought few immediate material rewards, they served to foster ties of nationalism and anticolonialism in the region that facilitated the organization of clandestine networks to obtain arms and military supplies and that provided a platform to mobilize international sympathy for their war against the French.

The Cold War in the global South

The rise of Mao's China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 brought the dynamics of the Cold War more fully into the processes of decolonization and increasingly influenced superpower politics toward the global South.⁶ In Vietnam, the Soviets largely ceded the field to China, whose military and economic support for the Ho Chi Minh government after 1950 was substantial. The United States came to fully support the French war effort in Vietnam, the result of Cold War pressures in Europe and Asia and their impact on domestic politics, ultimately paying for as much as three-quarters of the cost of the war. For the Americans and Chinese, however, the financial and military support of their allies was fraught with tension, illustrating the complex ways in which the Cold War could play out in the decolonizing world. American policymakers' contempt for French colonial methods and military abilities were matched by French fears that the United States was seeking to gain control of Vietnam for its own political and economic purposes. Their Cold War partnership was far from smooth or harmonious.

Tensions and hostilities also emerged in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. The massive influx of Chinese advisers, weapons, and supplies for the war effort, as well as a Chinese political advisory group that sought to involve itself in the making of DRV domestic policy, seemed to overwhelm the Vietnamese. Disputes over military tactics and strategy quickly emerged, deepened by the personal antipathies between senior Chinese and

6 On these developments, see Niu Jun's chapter in this volume.

Vietnamese military leaders. The fragile contours of Sino-Vietnamese relations in this period were also shaped by the manner in which Chinese national and geostrategic interests could sometimes clash with and supersede fraternal ideological ties. New evidence from Chinese sources suggests that Mao's willingness to support the Vietnamese against the French was prompted not simply by his ideological commitment to anti-imperialist solidarity but also by his fears of an American-led invasion into southern China at a time when Mao felt his fledgling regime remained vulnerable.⁷

The deep suspicions that colored the relationship between the Chinese and the Vietnamese did not prevent a Vietnamese victory in 1954 in which Chinese support played a key role in defeating the forces of French colonialism. The psychological resonance of the Vietnamese triumph was a powerful one in the decolonizing and postcolonial worlds, emboldening anticolonial actors elsewhere in their struggles against imperial powers. In its wake, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China became more deeply engaged with the processes of decolonization and postcolonial state-making.

Stalin's death in 1953 prompted a fundamental reassessment of Soviet diplomacy and the place of the global South in it. In his 1956 speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev emphasized that decolonization was a "postwar development of world-historical significance." He intended to support progressive non-Marxist movements for national liberation under the larger rubric of "peaceful coexistence."⁸ Confident that Soviet anti-imperialism and models of economic growth would appeal to decolonizing elites, Khrushchev began to donate billions of rubles in military and economic aid to states such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt, which would become leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, in an effort to draw them into the Soviet orbit.

For these early recipients of Soviet aid, the economic aspects of the Cold War were frequently more important than its political dimensions. The Soviet Five-Year Plans, along with centralized planning, huge new steel plants and dams, and the mechanization of collective agriculture, offered postcolonial elites alluring strategies for economic growth and rapid industrialization. Indian prime minister Nehru, who visited the Soviet Union in the late 1920s

7 Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), chs. 1–3; and Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo China War, 1950–1954," *China Quarterly*, 133 (March 1993), 85–110.

8 Nikita Khrushchev, "Speech to a Closed Session of the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress," February 25, 1956, in *Khrushchev Speaks!*, edited by Thomas P. Whitney (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 259–65.

and was deeply impressed by Soviet industrial progress, strongly favored state planning as a model for India's economic development after independence. Accordingly, in the 1950s, Nehru deemphasized investment in agriculture and small-scale village industries and favored the development of heavy industry and the construction of major steel complexes. In drawing on Soviet models, advice, and money to launch these efforts, Nehru nonetheless rejected Soviet political ideology and pursued an independent diplomatic course. Indonesia and Egypt also received hundreds of millions of dollars in Soviet aid and welcomed aspects of Soviet economic models but remained cool to the bloc politics of the Cold War.

Developments in the global South were increasingly viewed through a Cold War lens in the United States. Like the Soviets, Americans were also actively engaged in efforts to promote development in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.⁹ Under the guise of modernization theory, US policy-makers posited a spectrum from traditional to modern societies in which the American economy, society, and culture provided a universal model for development. Max Millikan, the director of a prestigious think tank, expressed the typical sentiment of the period: "A much extended program of American participation in the economic development of the so-called underdeveloped states can and should be one of the most important elements in a program of expanding the dynamism and stability of the Free World and increasing its resistance to the appeals of Communism."¹⁰

For US policymakers in the 1950s and the 1960s, billions of dollars in economic development – whether in the form of miracle rice and agricultural assistance or import substitution and the development of a consumer economy – appeared as a necessary bulwark against Communist-led political insurgency and social engineering in much of the decolonizing world. Despite its anti-Soviet cast, modernization theory shared key attributes with Soviet models. It mirrored the Marxist-Leninist formulation of a move upwards from feudalism, albeit to liberal capitalism rather than socialism; it also reflected the Soviet insistence on enlightened elites leading an inevitable historical progression. At the same time, more than a bit of racialized paternalism informed

9 On the intensification of these efforts after 1960, see Michael E. Latham's chapter in volume II.

10 Max Millikan, "Economic Policy as an Instrument of Political and Psychological Policy," cited in Nils Gilman, "Modernization Theory, the Highest Stage of American Intellectual History," in David C. Engerman *et al.* (eds.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 48–49.

American conceptions of the divide between developing states and capitalist modernities, recalling the Social Darwinian discourse of high imperialism that pitted non-Western barbarism against Euro-American civilization.


The impact of modernization theory and US economic assistance sometimes replicated the results of Soviet development projects and aid. In Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines, economic aid did sustain deeper political relations even if the impact of American development practices was generally uneven and sometimes disastrous. But for states that sought to remain outside the Cold War divide in the late 1950s and early 1960s – such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt – interest in American economic models did not usually extend to making political and diplomatic alliances.¹¹

Along with greater US attention to economic and social development, the intensification of Cold War pressures prompted a considerably more activist policy of direct intervention in the global South. In 1953, the Eisenhower administration orchestrated the overthrow of the government of Muhammad Mossadeq in Iran. The CIA-led operation was prompted by a number of factors, including Mosaddeq's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its ramifications for Great Britain. But US officials also feared the Tudeh Party's Communist orientation, its seemingly growing strength, and its dependence on Soviet patronage. Although the Tudeh Party was far weaker and considerably more divided than the Americans understood at the time, and although the domestic political situation in Iran was far more complex than a Cold War lens would allow, the Soviet–American rivalry axiomatically shaped US perceptions and policy.

In Latin America, the postwar turn to democracy was reversed almost entirely by 1954 when dictators again came to rule most of the countries in the region. In 1947 and 1948, there was a regionwide crackdown on organized labor and local Communist Parties. Authoritarian governments repressed militant labor leaders, marginalized and disbanded some unions, introduced antistrike legislation and formally outlawed Communist Parties. In subsequent years, reformers and populist leaders who championed social democracy were contained and repressed.

The reemergence of conservative elites and their military allies in Latin America was not entirely driven by the Cold War. They had not been eviscerated by the rise of social democracy after World War II, but had

¹¹ See Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States–Philippines Relations, 1942–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).



6. Decolonization in Africa and Asia since 1945.

been forced temporarily on the defensive. As the Cold War came to dominate US diplomacy in the global South, local developments intersected with the rising concern of American policymakers over Communism in Latin America. In some cases, US support for the military coups that brought illiberal conservative regimes to power was indirect. In others, direct involvement can be carefully documented, as was the case with the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Although the relationship between the social democratic Arbenz, local Communists, and the Soviet Union was fluid, the Eisenhower administration insisted that the Arbenz government was a beachhead of Soviet Communism. The administration authorized Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for the invasion of Guatemala from Honduras and put immense pressure on the Guatemalan army, which proved decisive in the collapse of the Arbenz government. It was followed by a reign of “Cold War terror,” in which supporters of Arbenz in the countryside were arrested, tortured, and killed.¹² This precursor of the “dirty wars” in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s drew directly on the advice and support of US intelligence operatives. The CIA supported repression in Guatemala through a variety of means, including manuals with detailed instructions on how to torture insurgents.

Bandung and revolutionary nationalism

An intensifying Cold War and its impact on global struggles for decolonization prompted many anticolonial leaders to rethink the terms of their engagement with the international system. In April 1955, leaders from thirty newly post-colonial states, along with observers from national liberation movements throughout the colonial world, gathered in Bandung, Indonesia. The meeting provided an opportunity for Third World leaders to discuss transnational anticolonial ideologies of regional, race, and class solidarities and to create an international space apart from both the imperial and the Cold War orders.

The speeches at Bandung focused on shattering the bipolarity of Cold War politics. The head of the Indian delegation, Prime Minister Nehru, argued, “If I join any of these big groups, I lose my identity ... If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war.”¹³ Indonesian president Sukarno, who

12 Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), xiv.

13 J. Nehru speech, April 22, 1955, in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, vol. XXVIII (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), 124.

presided over the conference, called upon governments to follow “the highest code of morality and ethics” and warned against the urge to “indulge in power politics.” An alternative conception of global relations, Sukarno continued, rested on the commonalities that joined those gathered at Bandung: “Almost all of us have ties of common experience, the experience of colonialism ... Many of us, the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ nations, have more or less similar economic problems ... And I think we may say we hold dear the ideals of national independence and freedom.”¹⁴

What emerged at Bandung were the outlines of a nascent alternative international order made up of former colonial states and peoples that tilted neither to the Soviet nor to the American side in the Cold War. These leaders were deeply concerned with supporting ongoing independence struggles and realizing postcolonial political and economic justice. Their vision found more concrete expression in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961 by India, Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana, Yugoslavia, and Algeria; within three years the movement had more than fifty members drawn from former colonial states.

In the mid-1950s, the spirit of Bandung inspired further challenges to the imperial and bipolar Cold War international orders. In Egypt, a military coup in 1952 by young army officers, intent upon reducing continuing quasi-colonial British domination and challenging social-economic inequality, brought General Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. He launched a radical program of economic nationalism. In 1956, Nasser challenged British control of the Suez Canal, a longstanding symbol for Egyptians of the limits on their sovereignty and a potential source of revenue for Nasser’s vision of economic development.¹⁵ Egypt’s stiff military resistance to a British-French-Israeli operation not only advanced Nasser’s domestic agenda, but also turned him and his revolutionary nationalist supporters into heroes in the colonized world. Nasser exploited his perceived dramatic victory over the British at Suez and capitalized on the neutralist sensibilities of Bandung to lead a pan-Arab movement. It supported oppositional politics in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan as well as Palestinian claims against Israel. The twin struggles against imperialism and Zionism catalyzed the formation of Nasserite parties in several Arab states, and, in 1958, culminated in a short-lived union between Egypt and Syria, a union that was envisioned as the basis for a single Arab state.

14 Sukarno speech, April 18, 1955, in *Asia–Africa Speaks from Bandung* (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1955), 19–29.

15 See Douglas Little’s chapter in volume II.

Bandung, the Suez crisis, and Nasser's revolutionary nationalism further complicated and deepened the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization. Few American policymakers welcomed Bandung's emphasis on non-alignment but they viewed developments in Egypt and the Middle East with far greater alarm. The Eisenhower administration's opposition to the joint British-French-Israeli military campaign to retake the Suez Canal reflected both a sense of the passing of European empire in the region and a fear of Soviet intentions to gain regional advantage by supporting Nasser and the forces of Arab revolutionary nationalism. The perceived dangers posed by Nasser and pan-Arabism prompted Washington to intervene directly in the Lebanese civil war in 1958 and to offer substantial military and economic assistance to conservative, pro-Western leaders in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Iraq. Outside the Middle East, the Cold War prism heightened American fears of decolonizing and revolutionary challenges. In the late 1950s, these worries led to the massive influx of US support for the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam.¹⁶

While the Soviet Union and China greeted Bandung and Nasser more favorably than did the United States, their leaders disputed tactics and strategies for the decolonizing world.¹⁷ From the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao had always directed more attention to developments in the global South than had Soviet officials, and he espoused aggressive support for movements of national liberation. His envoys played a substantial role at the Bandung Conference and consciously sought to build a "united front" with newly decolonizing states against Western imperialism. Although Mao's more public break with the Soviet Union in 1959–60 was largely driven by his domestic concerns, it also reflected his ideological tensions with the Soviets over policy toward the decolonizing world. In denouncing Soviet "revisionism" and "peaceful coexistence," Mao argued that imperialism could be vanquished only through armed struggle and class conflict. Thereafter, he vigorously supported Ho Chi Minh's struggle against the Americans in South Vietnam and nurtured deeper ties with radical regimes and movements in Africa.

China's international activism pushed the Soviets toward more sustained commitments in the global South, not only in the Middle East but in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean as well. The competition between them

¹⁶ See Fredrik Logevall's chapter in volume II.

¹⁷ On the Sino Soviet split and its impact on the global South, see chapters by Shu Guang Zhang in this volume and Sergey Radchenko in volume II.



38. Leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement: from left, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Gamal Abdel Nasser of United Arab Republic, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia.

meant their potential allies were faced with pressures from both states to side with one of the two parties. But for those who successfully navigated these treacherous shoals, such as the Vietnamese Communists, the material rewards could be very rich.

Decolonization and the global South

The late 1950s and the early 1960s marked the end of the great decolonizing wave of the first two decades of the post-World War II era. The outbreak of the Algerian war for independence against France, the Mau Mau rebellion in British Kenya, and Ghana's independence in the mid-1950s ushered in the beginning of what would become a flood of postcolonial states in Africa and the Caribbean. As many as seventeen formerly colonial African states gained independence by 1960. Others would follow in the early 1960s, as would Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana. In 1959, Cuban revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro triumphed and their assertive anti-imperialism and calls for

revolutionary social and economic change became an inspiration for radical movements not only in Latin America but throughout the global South.

Cold War rivalries shaped these developments in critical ways, inspiring American efforts to overthrow Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba in 1960 and Cheddi Jagan's government in Guyana in 1964, prompting Soviet support for Castro's increasingly Marxist regime in Cuba, and motivating the Chinese to provide loans and advisers to newly independent African states. But countervailing currents, including legacies of imperialism and the inter-war anticolonial struggle along with others new to the postcolonial era, served to limit the impact of the Cold War and circumscribed the actions of the superpowers in the global South.

The pan-African movement of the first half of the twentieth century continued to exert considerable power over African decolonization. Nkrumah, the vigorous leader of independent Ghana, had been active in local and transnational anticolonial politics since the 1930s, and he advocated a strong pan-Africanism designed to assist independence movements and to foster solidarity among postcolonial African states. In 1958, in the spirit of Bandung, he helped convene an All-African People's Conference. It urged African states to close ranks against superpower Cold War politics and tried to promote mutual assistance in social and economic development. Subsequently, the overthrow and murder of Lumumba in 1961 accelerated the pan-African project. Lumumba had been a committed pan-Africanist, and the culpability of the United States in his death reinforced local and regional pressure for African unity. By establishing the Organization of African Unity in May 1963, pan-Africanists sought to institutionalize their transnational movement, but subsequent splits in the organization would diminish its regional impact.

Tensions with client states complicated superpower efforts to direct and manage the processes of decolonization and postcolonial state-making. In South Vietnam, the Eisenhower administration lavished money on the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in the late 1950s, lauding Diem as the "miracle man" of Southeast Asia. But with the rise of urban discontent against Diem's regime and a heightened Communist insurgency in the early 1960s, US policymakers increasingly worried about his refusal to take American advice and direction. In supporting the coup that led to Diem's murder in 1963, however, they ushered in a period of escalating chaos. Likewise, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro backed away from his close relationship with the Soviet Union. Along with Che Guevara, he launched a competitive global campaign for influence with radical independence movements in Latin

America and Africa.¹⁸ And, at much the same time, the Sino-Indian border war complicated Chinese efforts to lead a united front of decolonizing states. Several years later, during their cultural revolution, the shrill insistence of Chinese leaders on the primacy of Maoist models abroad frayed their ties with many of the states and movements in the global South, whom the Chinese had so assiduously courted earlier in the decade.

Finally, the wave of decolonization in Africa and the Caribbean brought with it even larger forces that none of the superpowers could fully contain and control. As Matthew Connelly has argued, the Algerian war unleashed a “diplomatic revolution” that fundamentally challenged the state-based scaffolding upon which the Cold War international order rested. In part, this was the result of the Algerian liberation movement, the Front de Libération Nationale, assuming the attributes and legitimacy previously accorded only to states. This shift in perception of the power and significance of liberation movements contributed to the increasing importance of the African National Congress in South Africa, al Fatah in the Palestinian diaspora, and similar groups in Angola and East Timor in the international politics of decolonization after 1962. The diplomatic revolution of the postcolonial moment, Connelly argues, went even deeper. The wider processes of decolonization – population growth, environmental scarcities, supranational institutions, new media forms, and the conscious agency of colonized peoples to promote radical systemic change – severely weakened the Cold War system even at the height of superpower confrontation, and ultimately gave shape to the post-Cold War world.¹⁹

After 1962, the dynamics of the Cold War would continue to play a powerful role in the global South. Soviet, American, and Chinese intervention in postcolonial state-making took an increasingly intrusive and militarized turn, first in Vietnam and later in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Central America, and Afghanistan. As the leaders of the first wave of decolonization, such as Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, Nasser, and Nkrumah, passed from the scene, a generation of more militant local actors emerged – some radical such as Antonio Neto in Angola and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, others deeply conservative such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile or Joseph Mobutu in

18 On escalating Cuban–Soviet tensions and their significance for developments in the global South in the 1960s and 1970s, see chapters by James Hershberg and Piero Gleijeses in volume II.

19 Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 3–13, 276–87.

Zaire – whose worldviews heightened levels of confrontation and repression among and between states and peoples in the postcolonial world.

“The wars fought in the Third World during the Cold War,” writes Odd Arne Westad, “were despairingly destructive.” The violence and terror of war, and the authoritarian regimes of the Right and of the Left that emerged in their wake, destabilized and sometimes devastated many local societies. Significantly, if depressingly, the end of the Cold War has done little to ameliorate conditions. As Westad notes, when the Cold War ended fewer than one in four of the world’s population lived in areas with improving standards of living; today, that number is fewer than one in six.²⁰ In Africa alone, per capita gross national product is now lower in some states than it was in the 1970s, and poverty, famine, HIV/AIDS, genocide, and predatory regimes crush people’s hopes for a minimum standard of well-being.

The present moment, like decolonization itself, remains rooted in the complex interplay of the imperial, the postcolonial, and the Cold War. This constellation of historical forces, however, offers not only burdens but also opportunities. From the interior and intimate spaces of the family to the national visions of postcolonial leaders, new and often radical calls for more just, equalitarian, and humane societies have emerged. Anticolonial and postcolonial thought, with its rich and fluid nature, reaches beyond the boundaries of the nation and imagines transnational and global spaces in which its larger emancipatory project can be advanced. The present moment, therefore, contains the possibility of realizing the vision of a world in which social equity and justice prevail as naturally as inequality, poverty, and war.

20 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 400, 406.

Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962

DAVID S. PAINTER

Control of strategic raw materials played a key role in the origins and outcome of World War II and continued to be a source of power and policy during the Cold War. Modern warfare generated an unprecedented demand for oil and other resources, and modern industrial society consumed massive amounts of energy and raw materials. The United States and the Soviet Union were continent-spanning countries rich in oil and strategic minerals, and their control of these resources helped underpin their power. Both also sought to gain access to resources outside their borders. The United States possessed the military and economic capability to look all over the world, especially to the Third World, for resources for itself and its allies. Lacking comparable power projection and economic capabilities, the Soviet Union was forced to look to its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to meet its needs.

British, French, and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia possessed tin, rubber, tungsten, and oil, and European colonies in Africa contained several strategic minerals, including copper, cobalt, manganese, chrome, uranium, and industrial diamonds. Raw materials were an important source of dollar income for most European colonial powers, and the profits British oil companies made in the Middle East were essential to Britain's balance of payments and its ability to continue to maintain military forces in the region. Latin America was also rich in strategic raw materials, including petroleum, copper, manganese, nickel, tin, tungsten, and bauxite. Revolutionary nationalism in the Third World threatened Western access to vital raw materials, disrupted plans to draw on Third World resources to rebuild the economies of Western Europe and Japan, and weakened the overall Western position in the Cold War.

Rather than attempt to survey the entire range of strategic raw materials, this chapter will focus on uranium and oil. Access to uranium, the main ingredient in the atomic bomb, was an important strategic issue during the first decade of the Cold War. Oil was central to military power and economic

life, and control of oil was a key source of power and influence throughout the Cold War.

Uranium

Although uranium is one of the most common elements in the earth's crust, large deposits of high-grade ore are relatively rare. During World War II, the United States and Britain set up an organization, the Combined Development Trust, to gain control of the world's supply of high-grade uranium. By the end of the war, it controlled an estimated 97 percent of world uranium production and 65 percent of the world supply of thorium.¹ US forces also seized the bulk of existing German supplies of uranium and bombed facilities in Germany that processed uranium for the German atomic project. US policymakers believed that Western control of uranium would delay Soviet development of atomic weapons and limit the number of atomic weapons the Soviets could produce if they successfully tested a bomb.

Control of world supplies of uranium and thorium was also a key element in the US plan for the international control of atomic energy presented to the United Nations in June 1946 by Bernard Baruch. The Baruch Plan allowed the United States to retain its atomic arsenal until an international control system was fully functioning to US satisfaction, and called for sanctions for violations and for the permanent members of the Security Council to give up their veto on matters related to atomic energy. These provisions would preserve the US atomic monopoly while preventing other nations from developing atomic weapons. Aware of the Baruch Plan's implications, the Soviets blocked its adoption by the United Nations Security Council in December 1946.

Western control of uranium forced the Soviets to intensify efforts to find and develop uranium within the Soviet Union and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Mines in Czechoslovakia had been an important source of uranium before World War II and, in March 1945, the Soviets signed a secret agreement with Czech president Edvard Beneš that provided for Soviet control of existing stocks of uranium in Czechoslovakia and future Czech production. The Soviets also found rich deposits of uranium in south-west Saxony in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.

¹ Although not itself fissionable, thorium 233 decays into uranium 233, which is. See David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Weapons, 1939–1958* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 174.

Uranium from East Germany became a key source for the Soviet atomic project, supplying around 45% of Soviet demand by 1950, compared to 33% from within the Soviet Union and 15% from Czechoslovakia.² Although East German uranium helped fuel the Soviet atomic program, the methods used to extract the ore – forced labor and terrible conditions in the mines – undermined Soviet political goals in their occupation zone. Pay and working conditions improved by the early 1950s, but work-related disease and environmental degradation continued to plague the region.

The uranium that fueled the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima came from Belgian Congo, and Congo remained the main source of uranium for the United States until the early 1950s.³ Congolese ore, from Katanga province, was rich in uranium and cheap due to the low wages paid to native miners. Concerned that Congolese supplies would soon run out, the United States signed a supply agreement in 1950 with the Union of South Africa, which possessed around 60 percent of the world's significant deposits of lower-grade uranium ore. To cement its relationship with South Africa, the United States extended economic and military assistance to the apartheid regime.

The strategic importance of access to uranium lessened in the mid-1950s due to increased production in the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, the development of improved means to utilize low-grade ore, and the shift to thermonuclear weapons, which required less uranium.

Oil

World War II highlighted the vital role of oil in modern warfare. All the main weapons systems of World War II were oil-powered – surface warships (including aircraft carriers), submarines, airplanes (including long-range bombers), tanks, and a large proportion of sea and land transport. Oil was also used in the manufacture of munitions and synthetic rubber. Access to ample supplies of oil was a significant source of Allied strength, while German and Japanese failure to secure the same was an important factor in their defeat.

Although the development of nuclear weapons and later ballistic missiles fundamentally altered the nature of warfare, oil-powered forces remained central to military power. Despite the development of nuclear-powered warships (mainly aircraft carriers and submarines), most of the world's warships

2 *Ibid.*, 177. According to World Nuclear Association statistics, East Germany accounted for an even higher share of Communist world uranium production in this period.

3 Although the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki was fueled by plutonium rather than uranium, the plutonium was derived from uranium.

still relied on oil, as did aircraft, armor, and transport. In addition, each new generation of weapons required more oil, and more raw materials in general, than its predecessors, a trend that continued throughout the Cold War.

There was a symbiotic relationship between oil and the US global strategy of maintaining access to economically and strategically vital overseas areas, including overseas sources of raw materials such as oil. Although the strategic forces – air and sea power – necessary for maintaining access to these areas were dependent on oil, they could be used for other purposes and in other parts of the world.

Oil also played a central role in the world economy. Oil's economic importance increased after World War II as the United States intensified its embrace of patterns of socioeconomic organization premised on high levels of oil use, and Western Europe and Japan began the transition from coal to oil as their main source of energy. Oil was also an important energy source in the Soviet Union.

Supply, demand, and security

The Soviet Union was a net importer of oil (mostly from Romania) through 1953 as slow recovery of crude oil production combined with the need to import high-quality petroleum products led the Soviets to turn to Eastern Europe to acquire the necessary supplies. Damage, disruption, overuse, transportation problems, equipment shortages, and competing priorities led to a sharp decline in Soviet oil production during World War II. In addition, the Soviets lacked sufficient refinery capacity, especially for high-quality products such as aviation gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene.

A joint Soviet–Romanian oil company set up in 1945 gave the Soviets control of around 30 percent of Romanian production and refinery capacity, and in 1948 the Romanian government effectively nationalized the remainder of the oil industry. Romanian oil production, 34.7 million barrels in 1945, dropped to 32 million barrels in 1950, before rising to 78.6 million barrels in 1955 and 93.7 million barrels in 1965.⁴ Almost all Romanian oil exports went either to the Soviet Union or to other Communist-controlled states in Eastern Europe.

4 DeGolyer and MacNaughton, *Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics 2005* (Dallas, TX: DeGolyer and MacNaughton, 2005). Unless otherwise noted, all oil statistics in this chapter are from this source.

The Soviets also obtained oil from their occupation zone in Austria. In 1946, the Soviets confiscated the oil fields in their zone and put them under a Soviet Mineral Oil Administration. Austrian oil production, most of which was in the Soviet zone, rose from 3.1 million barrels in 1945 to 24.9 million barrels in 1955. According to Austrian statistics, the Soviets took 60–70 percent of Austrian oil production between 1947 and 1955.⁵

Soviet oil production expanded from 154.9 million barrels in 1945 to 509.7 million barrels in 1955 and 1.78 billion barrels in 1965. In 1945, around 80 percent of Soviet oil production originated in the Caucasus, mostly in the Baku region in Azerbaijan, but production shifted in the postwar period to the Volga–Urals region, which accounted for around 60% of Soviet oil production by 1955, and over 70% by the early 1960s. As Soviet oil production increased and transportation networks improved, oil and natural gas began to claim a larger share of Soviet energy consumption, rising from 17.4% of energy consumption in 1950 to around 30–35% by 1965. Soviet per capita consumption of petroleum products rose from 1.3 barrels in 1948 to 4.3 barrels in 1958.⁶

The Soviet Union became a net exporter in 1954, with the bulk of exports going to Communist-controlled countries, most of which were dependent on the Soviets for oil. Romania, Albania, and China were exceptions, a factor in their ability to take an independent stance toward the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Although the Soviets charged their allies somewhat higher prices than they charged Western customers, they provided markets for products that were unable to compete in other countries. The Soviets also used oil to support friendly regimes in the Third World; Soviet oil helped Cuba survive the cutoff of oil from Western companies after 1960.

The United States was the world's leading oil producer until 1974, accounting for around 66% of world oil production in 1945, 44% in 1955, and 25.8% in 1965. US domestic oil production expanded from 1.71 billion barrels in 1945 to 2.48 billion barrels in 1955, and 2.84 billion barrels in 1965. Proved reserves increased from 19.9 billion barrels in 1945 to 30 billion barrels in 1955, and 31.3 billion barrels in 1965. The postwar increases in production and reserves were achieved through development of already existing fields, greatly expanding drilling efforts, and the opening of offshore oil fields in the Gulf of

5 William Bader, *Austria between East and West, 1945–1955* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966), 121.

6 Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 47, 48; Paul E. Lyndolph and Theodore Shabad, "The Oil and Gas Industries in the USSR," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 50 (December 1960), 474.

Mexico. Not only were more wells drilled, but they were, on average, deeper and more expensive than before the war. Discovery of new fields declined sharply, especially in the largest-size classes.

Following World War II, automobiles, trucks, buses, airplanes, and diesel-powered locomotives replaced steam and electric-powered modes of transportation. Neglect of public transportation and dispersed housing patterns, fostered by increasing suburbanization, encouraged increased automobile use, and the nation's truck population expanded sharply as trucks increased their share of intercity freight traffic. Oil also made inroads in the residential heating market, and industries and utilities began to turn to oil. The growth of the petrochemical industry further increased the demand for oil. US annual per capita consumption of oil rose from 13.3 barrels in 1945 to 18.7 barrels in 1955 and 21.3 barrels in 1965, and oil increased its share of total US energy consumption from 30.5% in 1945 to 44.1% in 1955, before falling to 43.6% in 1965.

Oil and the world economy

In the late 1940s, seven large oil companies controlled over 90 percent of oil reserves outside North America and the Communist countries. They accounted for almost 90 percent of world (as defined above) oil production, owned almost 75 percent of world oil-refining capacity, and provided about 90 percent of the oil traded in international markets. Known as the Seven Sisters because of their close ties and multiple joint ventures, they included five US companies – Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), Standard Oil of California (Chevron), the Texas Company (Texaco), and Gulf – as well as the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British Petroleum) as well as and the Royal Dutch/Shell group, a 60 percent Dutch and 40 percent British partnership. The Seven Sisters, in cooperation with state regulatory authorities in the United States, were able to exercise informal control over the world oil economy, matching supply with demand and maintaining prices at highly profitable levels.⁷

The main oil-producing areas outside the United States and the Soviet Union were Venezuela and the Middle East. In 1945, Venezuela was the second-leading producer in the world and the leading exporter. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Shell, and Gulf dominated the Venezuelan oil industry, and US

⁷ US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, *The International Petroleum Cartel: Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952), 21–33. Although the British government held a majority share in Anglo-Iranian, it was run as a private concern.

military power assured access to its reserves. During World War II, the US government played a key role in facilitating a settlement between the major oil companies and the Venezuelan government. The agreement resulted in a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement and confirmed the companies' existing concessions, their extension for forty years, and the opening of new areas for exploration. Between 1945 and 1960, annual Venezuelan oil production increased from 323 million barrels to over 1 billion barrels. Venezuela was the world's second-largest oil producer until 1960, a leading exporter, and supplied more than half of US oil imports for most of the 1950s.

Following the lead of the major oil companies, the United States cooperated with both democratic and undemocratic Venezuelan governments as long as they did not challenge corporate control of the oil industry and Western access to Venezuela's oil. Between 1945 and 1948, American officials accepted demands by reformist governments to share profits more equally and to raise wages for oil workers. They did so because they viewed the social democratic *Acción Democrática* (AD) party as a bulwark against Communism. As the Cold War intensified, however, US Army officials became concerned about the AD government's ability to ensure the security of oil installations against sabotage and attack, and warned that the AD's nationalism represented a threat to US interests. Scholars have found no evidence that the US government was involved in the military coup that ousted the AD in November 1948, though the United States did little to prevent it and provided increased assistance and training to the Venezuelan military afterwards.

The new government repressed the AD and the oil workers' union, worked with US officials to strengthen plans to protect oil installations, and opened new areas to the oil companies. The military dictatorship increasingly lost support during the 1950s. After it fell to a popular revolution in January 1958, the United States recognized the new government once the main parties in the revolutionary coalition had pledged to respect US investments. Later in the year, American officials supported the election of AD leader Romulo Betancourt – even though he promised to raise taxes, restrict production, establish a national oil company, and ban new concessions. They believed that the AD provided a better barrier to Communism than the other possibilities.

Mexico also possessed large oil reserves and had been a leading exporter in the years around World War I. Production and exports began to decline in the 1920s, and in 1938 Mexico nationalized its oil industry. Although development of Mexico's nearby reserves could have enhanced US security, US policy-makers feared that assistance to the Mexican state oil company, *Petróleos*

Mexicanos (Pemex), would encourage other nations to take over their oil industries. Therefore, the United States tried to convince Mexico to reverse nationalization and open its oil sector to foreign companies. These efforts were unsuccessful, but the United States maintained its policy of providing no assistance to Pemex. Mexican oil production expanded gradually after World War II, but during most of the period 1945–60 consumption outpaced production, forcing Mexico to import oil to meet domestic demand.

At the end of World War II, Canada produced only enough oil to meet 10 percent of its domestic demand and had to import most of its oil requirements. Following the discovery of a major oil field in Alberta in 1947 and subsequent important discoveries, annual Canadian oil production rose from 8.4 million barrels in 1945 to 129.4 million barrels in 1955 and 292.5 million barrels in 1965. Over 20 percent of production in 1960 was exported, mainly to the United States. By 1965, Canada was supplying almost a quarter of US oil imports.

Middle East oil and the Cold War

During World War II, US policymakers began to turn their attention to the Middle East. The Middle East contained one-third of the world's known oil reserves and offered better geological prospects for the discovery of additional reserves than any other area. A US government-sponsored oil mission that surveyed the Middle East in late 1943 concluded that "The center of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Gulf–Caribbean region to the Middle East – and is likely to continue to shift until it is firmly established in that area."⁸

Before World War II, the US government invoked the Open Door principle and provided diplomatic support to help private US oil companies gain concessions in foreign countries. Under wartime conditions, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration contemplated creating a government-owned Petroleum Reserves Corporation to take over concession rights in Saudi Arabia, where Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) and the Texas Company held the concession rights. It later proposed having the US government construct and own an oil pipeline stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean as a means of securing the US stake in Middle East oil. By the war's end, the US government had also worked out an agreement with Britain that called for guarantees for existing concessions, equality of

8 Quoted in David S. Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 52.

opportunity to compete for new concessions, and a binational petroleum commission to allocate production among the various producing countries.

SOCAL and the Texas Company refused to part with their valuable property, and the oil industry – except for SOCAL, Texas, and Gulf, which would benefit from the pipeline – opposed government involvement in that project. Oil companies whose operations were primarily domestic opposed the Anglo-American Oil Agreement because they feared it would allow cheap foreign oil to flood the US market. These concerns found support in Congress, and all three initiatives failed. Different segments of the oil industry could agree only on a return to Open Door diplomacy, according to the principles of which the government limited direct involvement in foreign oil matters but maintained an international environment in which private oil companies could operate with security and profit.

Utilizing private oil companies as vehicles of the national interest in foreign oil soon required the United States to take an active interest in the security and stability of the Middle East. During World War II, British and Soviet forces had jointly occupied Iran. At the same time, 30,000 US troops operated a supply route through Iran to the Soviet Union and American advisers assisted the Iranian government and military. Iran was important to Britain because it was a source of oil and because it was located astride the lines of communication of the British Empire. The Soviet Union's interest in Iran was scarcely less vital; Iran provided a back door to the Soviet Union and bordered on the center of Soviet oil production in the Caucasus. US leaders viewed Iran as a strategic buffer between the Soviet Union and US oil interests in the Persian Gulf. Writing to President Roosevelt in August 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned that "it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important petroleum development in Saudi Arabia."⁹

Efforts by the Iranian government to attract US oil companies to balance British and Soviet influence led to a scramble for concession rights in the fall of 1944. When the Soviets demanded exclusive oil rights in northern Iran, the Iranian government announced that it had decided to postpone its decisions on oil until after the war. Following the crisis, the British concentrated on protecting their position by increasing their interference in Iranian politics. The United States focused on getting foreign troops out of Iran, seeking to

9 US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. IV, 377–79 (hereafter *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

provide the Iranian government with greater freedom of action. Determined to maintain some influence in this important border region, Soviet officials supported separatist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, delayed withdrawing their occupation forces from northern Iran, and renewed their demand for oil rights in Iran's northern provinces. After the Iranian government promised to allow the Soviet Union to participate in oil development in northern Iran and to seek a peaceful settlement with the separatists, the Kremlin withdrew its forces in May 1946.

In a report sent to President Harry S. Truman in September 1946, White House Special Counsel Clark Clifford warned that access to Middle East oil was threatened by Soviet penetration into Iran, and argued that the United States should be ready to use force to guard its vital interests. Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported on October 12 that it was "to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East." According to the JCS, loss of access to Persian Gulf oil would force the United States and its allies to fight an "oil-starved war." Conversely, without access to the region's oil, the Soviet Union would not have sufficient oil to fight a major war.¹⁰

Circumstances differed greatly in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, but US officials interpreted events in all three as part of a Soviet plan to dominate the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal feared that, without Middle East oil, European recovery would falter and Europe would go Communist.¹¹ On March 12, 1947, Truman went before Congress and pledged that the United States would resist Communist expansion anywhere in the world. Although mention of oil was deliberately deleted from the president's address, concern over access to the region's chief resource played an important role in the shift in US foreign policy.¹²

Meanwhile, the Iranian government, with US support, had retaken control of its northern provinces and brutally crushed the separatist movements. Then, in October 1947, the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) rejected Soviet participation in oil development. The Majlis also forbade the granting of oil concessions to foreigners and prohibited foreigners from forming joint-stock

10 Arthur Krock, *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 419–82; *FRUS*, 1946, vol. VII, 529–32.

11 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 143.

12 Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 198.

companies to develop Iranian oil. It also instructed the government to do whatever was necessary to recover Iran's rights to its natural resources, especially the oil concession held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in southern Iran.

Iran's actions, coupled with US aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, consolidated the American position along the northern tier of countries and protected US interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. By excluding the Soviets from the Middle East, the United States retained the region's oil for Western recovery. Likewise, by nurturing the development of Middle East oil production, the United States reduced the pressure on western hemisphere reserves. US policymakers also recognized the importance of the profits that British oil companies made in the Middle East for easing Britain's balance-of-payments problems. In addition, US and British strategic planners wanted to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East because the region contained the most defensible locations for launching a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union in the event of a major war.

At the same time as the US government was announcing its determination to contain Soviet expansion in the Near East, the major oil companies secured their position in the region by joining forces with each other. The centerpiece of the "great oil deals" was the expansion of the ownership of the concession in Saudi Arabia to include Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum. In addition, Gulf contracted to sell its share of Kuwaiti production to Shell, and Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony signed long-term contracts to buy oil from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The result was a private system of worldwide production management that facilitated the development of Middle East oil and its integration into world markets. To help consolidate this system, the US government supported fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangements between the major oil companies and host governments. The US tax code granted US corporations credits for taxes paid overseas. This solution to host-country demands for greater revenues transferred the cost of higher payments from the oil companies to the US Treasury.

The emerging postwar petroleum order underwent its first test with the Palestine issue. Truman's decisions to support the UN plan to partition Palestine in November 1947 and to recognize the new state of Israel in May 1948 went against the advice of the State Department, the military, and the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They feared that US support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine could undermine relations with the Arab world and provide an opening for the Soviet Union to extend its power and influence at a time when the West needed Middle East oil for

European and Japanese reconstruction. Loss of access to Middle East oil, one study warned, would force the United States to choose between curtailing domestic consumption and making oil available to Europe to ensure the success of the Marshall Plan.¹³

US officials refrained from sending troops and arms to enforce the UN decision. They did not want to alienate the Arabs and provide an opening for Soviet influence. This strategy succeeded in minimizing the threat to US strategic and economic interests. While official relations with the Arab states suffered because of US support for Israel, the oil companies managed to maintain a degree of distance from government policy and thus escaped Arab displeasure.

Before World War II, Western Europe had depended on coal for over 90 percent of its energy requirements. Wartime destruction, dislocation, and overuse drastically reduced Western European and British coal production. Although oil accounted for a little less than 10 percent of Europe's total energy supply in 1947, it was the only source of fuel for aviation and road haulage and an increasingly important source of fuel for inland and ocean shipping and railway transport.

Soviet expansion into East Central Europe left the Soviet Union in control of most of Europe's indigenous oil reserves as well as important sources of coal in Poland. As a result, nearly half of Western Europe's oil in 1947 was supplied by US-owned companies and required payment in dollars. Oil was the largest single item in the dollar budget of most West European countries, and its sharp price rise largely accounted for the deterioration of Europe's dollar-denominated current accounts.

US leaders feared that the dollar shortage could lead to economic distress and Communist gains in Western Europe. To fuel economic recovery, the United States provided this critical area with the dollars it needed to purchase oil. From April 1948 to December 1951, the Marshall Plan provided more than \$1.2 billion for the purchase of crude oil and refined products, more than 10 percent of the total aid extended under the European Recovery Program. Over half (56 percent) of the oil supplied to Marshall Plan countries by US companies during this period was financed by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).¹⁴

Oil increased its share of West European energy consumption from 13.5% in 1950 to 32.3% in 1960, and of Japanese energy consumption from 6.5% in

¹³ Painter, *Oil and the American Century*, 116–26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 155–60.

1950 to 39.6% in 1960. Oil fueled the automobile industry, which played a key role in economic growth in Western Europe and Japan. Automobile registrations rose tenfold in Western Europe from 1950 to 1974 and at an even faster rate in Japan.¹⁵

Marshall Plan aid not only provided Western Europe with the energy it needed for recovery; it also helped maintain markets for US oil companies at a time when potential customers otherwise would not have had the means to acquire their oil. This aid was especially important to US companies with concessions in the Middle East since most of their oil went to markets in Western Europe.

Marshall Plan aid altered patterns of trade. Before World War II, Western Europe had relied on the western hemisphere for the bulk of its oil imports, with only 20% coming from the Middle East. By 1947, the Middle East supplied 43% of European oil imports, and by 1950 the figure was 85%. Although rising dependence on Middle East oil increased European and Japanese vulnerability to disruptions in supply, controlling access to essential oil supplies helped the United States reconcile its goal of German and Japanese economic recovery and integration into a Western alliance with that of ensuring against the recurrence of German and Japanese aggression.

Oil and Middle Eastern nationalism

The main problem facing the United States in the Middle East in the 1950s was how to maintain and defend Western interests in the region in the context of limited military capabilities and declining British power. The possibility of Soviet military action against the region, while always a danger, was not an immediate concern. Rather, the main threat to Western interests lay in instability and the growing anti-Western, particularly anti-British, orientation of Middle Eastern nationalism. US policymakers feared that these problems could provide an opening for the expansion of Soviet influence into the region.

Although the United States and Britain shared the goal of maintaining Western control of Middle East oil, they disagreed on how to deal with nationalism. US policymakers favored a strategy of coopting nationalists by meeting their demands for a greater share in the revenues generated by the oil industry as long as they did not threaten Western access and corporate

15 Steven A. Schneider, *The Oil Price Revolution* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 521, 522; Jean Pierre Bardou, Jean Jacques Chanaron, Patrick Fridenson, and James M. Laux, *The Automobile Revolution: The Impact of an Industry* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 197–200.



39. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery, Abadan, 1955. Nationalization of the British-owned company triggered a CIA coup that had long-lasting consequences.

control. The British, whose balance of payments and position as a great power were much more directly dependent on Middle East oil, distrusted nationalists and resisted their demands for a greater share of oil revenues. These divergent approaches shaped the US and British responses to the Iranian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in May 1951.

Anglo-Iranian's operations in Iran were Britain's most valuable overseas asset, and the British feared that, if nationalization succeeded, all of Britain's overseas investments would be jeopardized. Although US policymakers shared British concerns about the impact of nationalization on foreign investment, they also feared that British use of force to reverse nationalization could result in turmoil in Iran, undercut the position of the shah, boost the prospects of the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, and might even result in intervention by the

Soviets at Iranian invitation. Moreover, the crisis broke out in the midst of the Korean War, making US policymakers reluctant to risk confrontation. Therefore, the United States urged the British to reach a negotiated settlement that preserved as much of their position as possible. Although US opposition derailed British military intervention, the British organized an international boycott of Iranian oil and intervened covertly in Iranian politics in an effort to reverse nationalization.

US efforts to mediate a settlement failed, as did attempts to convince the shah to remove nationalist prime minister Muhammad Mossadeq. By 1953, the oil boycott had sharply reduced Iran's export earnings and decimated government revenues. In addition, British and US intervention in Iranian internal affairs exacerbated the polarization of Iranian politics. Finally, the end of the Korean War and the completion of the US military buildup allowed a more aggressive posture toward Iran. Fearing that Mossadeq might displace the shah and that Tudeh influence was increasing, the United States and Britain organized, financed, and directed a coup that removed Mossadeq in August 1953 and installed a government willing to reach an oil settlement on Western terms.

Following the coup, the US government enlisted the major US oil companies in an international consortium to run Iran's oil industry. Cooperation of the major companies was necessary in order to fit Iranian oil exports, which had almost ceased during the crisis, back into world markets without disruptive price wars and destabilizing cutbacks in other oil-producing countries. The antitrust exemption required for this strategy undercut efforts by the Department of Justice to challenge the major oil companies' control of the world oil industry and strengthened the hand of the major oil companies, whose cooperation was needed to ensure Western access to the region's oil.

The new government of Iran also proved willing to cooperate with US plans to set up a regional defense organization. After Egyptian opposition frustrated successive plans to set up a Middle Eastern Command and a Middle Eastern Defense Organization, the United States focused on creating a smaller organization limited to the "northern tier" of countries bordering the Soviet Union plus Iraq. In February 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed a defense agreement known as the Baghdad Pact. Britain joined the pact in April, followed by Pakistan in September and Iran in October. The United States, concerned about Arab reaction, did not join, though US military planners worked closely with pact members.

While the Baghdad Pact focused on the Soviet threat, the Iranian crisis demonstrated that threats to Western access to Middle East oil could come

from within the region. In July 1956, Egyptian nationalist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal Company. The Suez Canal was an important symbol of the Western presence in the Middle East and a major artery of international trade; two-thirds of the oil that went from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe passed through the canal. Viewing Nasser's action as an intolerable challenge to their position in the region, the British, together with the French, who resented Nasser's support for the Algerian revolution, and the Israelis, who felt threatened by Egyptian support for guerrilla attacks on their territory, developed a complex scheme to recapture control of the canal and topple Nasser through military action. The plan, which they put into action in late October, depended on US acquiescence and US cooperation in supplying them with oil if the canal were closed.¹⁶

The Egyptians closed the canal by sinking ships in it, Saudi Arabia embargoed oil shipments to Britain and France, and Syria shut down the oil pipelines from Iraq to the Mediterranean. Incensed by his allies' deception, concerned about the impact of their actions on the Western position in the Middle East, and embarrassed by the timing of the attack – just before the US presidential election and in the midst of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt – President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to provide Britain and France with oil, blocked British attempts to stave off a run on the pound, and threatened to cut off economic aid to Israel. The pressure worked. Following the withdrawal of the British and French forces, the US government and the major oil companies cooperated to supply Europe with oil until the canal was reopened and oil shipments from the Middle East to Europe were restored.

By shutting off the flow of Middle East oil to Western Europe, the Suez crisis highlighted the danger that Arab nationalism posed to US plans to use oil to rebuild Western Europe and ensure its alignment with the United States. Nasser wanted Arab states to use their control of oil to further a political agenda that included Arab unity, the economic development of resource-poor Arab countries, and the destruction of Israel.¹⁷

Without Middle East oil, Eisenhower warned in early 1957, "Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall

¹⁶ See Douglas Little's chapter in volume II.

¹⁷ Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo, NY: Economica Books, 1959), 71–74.

Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”¹⁸ Eisenhower pledged to protect Middle East states from the Soviet Union and its regional allies. To counter Nasser, who received military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, Eisenhower sought to bolster conservative Arab regimes and reinforce their pro-Western alignment through economic and military assistance. Labeled the Eisenhower Doctrine, these policies marked the official assumption by the United States of Britain’s role as the guarantor of Western interests in the Middle East.

The key routes connecting Persian Gulf oil with markets in Western Europe ran through Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The formation of the United Arab Republic in early 1958, joining Syria and Egypt, seemed to give Arab nationalism the “stranglehold” over access to Middle East oil that US and British policymakers had long feared.¹⁹

To make matters worse, the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq was overthrown in a bloody revolution in July 1958. At first, US and British leaders feared that Nasser and, behind him, the Soviet Union, had inspired the coup. They decided not to intervene militarily, however, believing that such action would be counterproductive. The coup had wiped out the royal family in Iraq, and Western intervention could easily radicalize the revolution and inflame the whole region. In addition, the coup’s leaders assured Washington and London that they would respect their oil interests. Instead, the United States and Britain sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, and to the Persian Gulf to secure their position in the region and protect access to its oil.

Rather than increasing the threat from Arab nationalism, the Iraqi revolution exacerbated divisions within the Arab nationalist movement and reduced the danger to Western interests in the region. Although Nasser was popular in Iraq, General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, who emerged as the leader of the revolution, distanced himself from Nasser, withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, and turned to the Iraqi Communist Party for support. Relations between Qasim and Nasser quickly deteriorated, and Nasser began issuing warnings that Iraq was becoming a tool of the Soviet Union and was undermining Arab unity.

From the US standpoint, either Arab nationalist or Soviet control of Iraq was a threat to US and Western interests. Communist control of Iraq, a Special

18 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), 8.

19 *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. XII, 48–54, 64–71.

National Intelligence Estimate warned in February 1959, would put Soviet influence into the heart of the Middle East, bypassing Turkey and Iran. Arab nationalist control of Iraq could also threaten Western oil interests. Viewing Nasser as the lesser of two evils, the United States decided to let Egypt take the lead in opposing Communism in Iraq. The British, in contrast, saw Nasser as a greater danger, and stressed that a revolutionary Iraq split the Arab nationalist movement and lessened its threat to Western oil access.²⁰

The Arab reaction to the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961 underlined how divisions among the Arab states lessened the threat from Arab nationalism. In June 1961, shortly after Britain turned sovereignty over to Kuwait, Qasim revived Iraq's claim to Kuwait, insisting that it was a province of Iraq. Kuwait was the fourth-largest oil producer in the world in 1961 and the largest single supplier of oil to Britain. Kuwaiti oil could be purchased in sterling and this, combined with British Petroleum's 50 percent stake in the Kuwait Petroleum Company and the £300 million in Kuwaiti government investments in Britain, made the small nation very important to Britain's international financial position. The British, with backing from the United States, took the lead in opposing Iraq's claim and sent troops to Kuwait to deter an attack. The other Arab states opposed Iraq's claims, quickly admitted Kuwait to the Arab League, and sent an Arab League Security Force composed of troops from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, and Sudan to defend Kuwait. These forces allowed the British to withdraw their troops while maintaining their economic interests in Kuwait.

In December 1961, the increasingly radical Iraqi government repossessed almost all the territory the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had acquired but not developed. Oil fields in production were not affected, but the IPC's directors, backed by the US and British governments, refused to accept the unilateral revision of their concession rights. The United States had been considering covert action to remove Qasim. The CIA may have been involved in the bloody coup in February 1963 that eliminated Qasim, brought the Baath Party to power, and led to the repression of the Communists.²¹

20 *Ibid.*, 114–34, 375–77, 381–88; Nathan J. Citino, "Middle East Cold Wars: Oil and Arab Nationalism in US–Iraqi Relations, 1958–1961," in Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds.), *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 245–69.

21 Citino, "Middle East Cold Wars," 254–59. The oil dispute continued until 1972 when Iraq nationalized the IPC.

Origins of OPEC

Changes in the world oil economy also reduced the threat from Arab nationalism. Beginning in the mid-1950s, increasing numbers of smaller, mostly US-owned, companies obtained oil concessions in Venezuela, the Middle East, and North Africa. Drawn by the lure of high profits, aided by the increasing standardization and diffusion of basic technology, reassured by the security provided by the Pax Americana, and unconcerned about reducing the generous profit margins available in international markets, the newcomers cut prices in order to sell their oil.

As Middle East oil displaced Venezuelan oil from European markets, US oil imports from the western hemisphere increased, putting pressure on prices and high-cost domestic producers. The question of oil imports presented US policymakers with a strategic dilemma. In an emergency, a rapid increase in domestic production could be achieved only if spare productive capacity existed. Too high a level of imports could undercut such capacity by driving out all but the lowest-cost producers. On the other hand, restricting imports and encouraging the increased use of a nonrenewable resource would eventually undermine the goal of maintaining spare productive capacity as a national defense reserve.

The President's Materials Policy Commission in its June 1952 report rejected national self-sufficiency in favor of interdependence, arguing that the United States had to be concerned about the needs of its allies for imported raw materials and about the needs of pro-Western less-developed countries for markets for their products. Although possible, self-sufficiency in oil and other vital raw materials would be very expensive and the controls necessary to enforce it would interfere with trade. Self-sufficiency would undercut the goal of rebuilding and integrating Western Europe and Japan under US auspices, and it would increase instability in the Third World by limiting the export earnings of oil-producing nations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The commission concluded that the United States should seek to ensure access to the lowest-cost supplies wherever located and that private investment should be the main instrument for increasing production of raw materials abroad.²²

As imports increased from 5.9% of US domestic demand in 1945 to almost 18.4% in 1958, domestic producers and the coal industry increased their

22 President's Materials Policy Commission, *Resources for Freedom*, 5 vols. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952).

demands for protection against cheap foreign oil. Attempts to implement voluntary oil import restrictions failed, and in March 1959 Eisenhower imposed mandatory import quotas, with exemptions for oil that entered overland from Canada and Mexico. The Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) constrained demand somewhat through higher prices, but also accelerated the depletion of US reserves because increases in US consumption during its operation were met mainly by domestic production.

By limiting US demand for foreign oil, MOIP put downward pressure on world oil prices. The reentry of Soviet oil into world markets in the late 1950s also affected oil prices. By 1961, Soviet oil met all of Iceland's oil needs, 80% of Finland's, around 35% of Greece's, 22% of Italy's, 21% of Austria's, and 19% of Sweden's. Japan also imported significant amounts of Soviet oil.²³ Soviet oil exports to non-Communist countries were the USSR's largest earner of foreign exchange and helped the Soviet Union obtain Western technology and other goods unavailable at home. Soviet sales also raised fears that the Kremlin could use Western dependence on oil as a political weapon.

US intelligence analysts concluded, however, that, although Soviet oil exports would "probably account for as much as seven percent of the total international movements into free world markets" by 1965, it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would be able "to upset the preponderant position of the Western oil companies or destroy the present overall pattern of the Middle East oil industry." Soviet use of oil for political purposes would "probably be limited to some degree by its desire to derive maximum economic benefits for itself from its oil exports."²⁴

Meanwhile, in September 1960, following two rounds of cuts in posted prices by the major oil companies, the oil ministers of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela met in Baghdad and formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Although OPEC eventually gained power over pricing in the 1970s, its formation subordinated the broader Arab nationalist agenda of using "Arab oil" for the benefit of all Arab states to the narrower economic goal of protecting the revenues of the major oil-producing countries by securing the best possible terms within the postwar petroleum order.²⁵

The breakup of the United Arab Republic in September 1960, coupled with the development of supertankers that could bypass the Suez Canal, further

23 Bennett H. Wall, *Growth in a Changing Environment: A History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) Exxon Corporation, 1950–1975* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1988), 342.

24 FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. IV, 671.

25 Citino, "Middle East Cold Wars," 259–61.



40. Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) and Richard M. Nixon (right) at dinner with King Saud of Saudi Arabia, 1957: with Arab nationalism burgeoning, Eisenhower embraced the Saudi monarchy as the key to ensuring oil supplies from the Middle East.

reduced the danger that Arab nationalists might cut off Western access to Middle East oil. In addition, the development of North African petroleum fields and the availability of Soviet oil made Western Europe less dependent on purchases from the Middle East. A December 1960 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that “the odds are against developments in regard to the Middle East that would be critically detrimental to US national interests in the next few years.” The Soviets were unlikely to try to seize any part of the Middle East “short of a general war,” and “even a Communist takeover in one of the producing countries would not necessarily result in a refusal to sell the country’s oil to the West.”²⁶

Resources and strategy

A focus on oil and other natural resources reveals important patterns in the Cold War and highlights the relationship between resources and strategy.

²⁶ *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. IV, 676–77.

Although US and British efforts to control world uranium supplies slowed the Soviet nuclear weapons program and raised the cost of the program to the Soviets, the Anglo-American quest for control of uranium “reflected and furthered” the transition of the Soviet Union from ally to enemy and thus contributed to the origins of the Cold War.²⁷ It also led the United States to support the continuation of white rule in southern Africa. The brutal methods the Soviets used to extract uranium, while broadly representative of their behavior in the early Cold War, nonetheless proved counterproductive in the long run.

Until Soviet oil production recovered from World War II, the Soviets looked to Eastern Europe for oil. After 1954, East European dependence on Soviet oil and natural gas strengthened Soviet influence in the region, but did not buy loyalty. Oil exports to the West became the Soviet Union’s largest generator of foreign exchange and allowed the Soviets to buy grain and Western technology, but oil revenues also propped up a system that was in serious trouble and diverted attention from the need to reform.

Control of oil played a vital role in establishing and preserving US pre-eminence in the postwar international system. Maintaining access to foreign oil, especially the vast reserves of the Persian Gulf, remained a key priority of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Oil fueled Western prosperity and enabled the United States to promote the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan while ensuring their international alignment. US efforts to maintain access to foreign oil led the United States not only to try to contain Soviet influence but also to oppose revolutionary nationalism in the Third World.

27 Jonathan E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 4, 249–53.

Bibliographical essay

The bibliographical essays in the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* aim at being selective and critical overviews of the literature available in each subfield of historical investigation. The entries are written by the authors of the chapters in the main text, with additions, deletions, and crossreferences suggested by the editors. Readers may want to look at the bibliographical entries in more than one volume to get an overview of the literature on a particular issue or region.

1. The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century

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(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). On broader perspectives, see M. Malia, *History's Locomotives: Revolutions and the Making of the Modern World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), and R. Service, *Comrades! A History of World Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). For the United States in a comparative perspective, see T. Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), and C. S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For an excellent overview of ideological confrontations in Europe, see M. Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). R. Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), is outstanding. For the Third World, see F. D. Colburn, *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); B. Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); and V. Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007).

2. Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962

Recent works on the origins of the Cold War use declassified materials from Soviet archives; the most important of these include John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) – but see also Melvyn Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?,” *American Historical Review*, 104, 2 (1999), 501–24; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Vladislav Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). While Soviet materials on later years have been harder to come by, three recent works provide important accounts: William Taubman, *Nikita Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: Norton, 2006); and Vladislav M. Zubok, *The Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). A key work illuminating American policies in the early Cold War is Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); for a stronger focus on ideology in the eyes of a key American participant, see Anders Stephanson, *Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Historians disagree over the extent to which “rollback” was a strategic objective vs. a rhetorical claim; see Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: NYU Press, 1999) vs. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

On the main lines of American liberalism, see the classic Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), leavened with the incisive essays in James Kloppenberg, *The Virtues of Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). See

also Dorothy Ross, "Liberalism," in Jack P. Greene (ed.), *Encyclopedia of American Political History*, vol. II (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1984). For discussion of a more diffuse American ideology, and its relation to foreign policy, see Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

Key explications on the origins and nature of Marxist ideology are two accounts by Polish philosophers: Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), and Andrzej Walicki, *Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the Communist Utopia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

On the emergence of the ideological conflict during World War I, see Arno J. Mayer, *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917–1918* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), and N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). On Wilson and his legacy, see also Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

For US–Soviet perceptions, see Christopher Lasch's insightful first book, *The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). More exhaustive studies are Peter G. Filene, *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1917–1947," *American Historical Review*, 94, 4 (October 1989), 937–62; and Norman Saul, *Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921–1941* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). See also the relevant chapters in David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Economic Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); and David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire": The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Richard Day offers useful commentary on Soviet views: *The "Crisis" and the "Crash": Soviet Studies of the West (1917–1939)* (London: New Left Books, 1981); his *Cold War Capitalism: The View from Moscow, 1945–1975* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995) does the same for the Cold War.

On US–Soviet relations before World War II, see, on the Soviet side, Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1994); V. A. Shishkin, *Stanovlenie vneshnei politiki poslerevoliutsionnoi Rossii (1917–1930 gody) i kapitalisticheskii mir: ot revoliutsionnogo "zapadnichestva" k "natsional'no-bolshevizmu"* [The Formation of the Foreign Policy of Post-Revolutionary Russia (1917–1930) and the Capitalist World: From Revolutionary "Westernism" to "National Bolshevism"] (St. Petersburg: Bulanin, 2002); and Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930* (London: Sage, 1979). On the American side, see Lloyd C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1917–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Mary E. Glantz, *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

Some of the most interesting conceptualizations of the early Cold War rely on multiple national perspectives and often multiple archives. See, for instance, Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions*

and *the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and William Curti Wohlforth, *Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Since the late 1990s, some historians and political scientists have sought to balance ideological and material factors in the Cold War. See, for instance, Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1999), 90–109; Jonathan Haslam, "The Cold War as History," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6 (2003), 77–98; and Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," *Review of International Studies*, 25, 4 (October 1999), 539–76. See also two broad overviews: David C. Engerman, "The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 28, 1 (January 2004), 23–54; and Odd Arne Westad, "The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms," *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (Fall 2000), 551–65.

3. The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century

For a general survey of political economy in the West throughout the era of the Cold War, consult Barry Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). For the major strand of Western postwar policies, see Peter A. Hall (ed.), *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). For influential analyses by contemporaries who sought a common logic underlying the contending economic and social systems, see Raymond Aron, *Sociologie des sociétés industrielles: esquisse d'une théorie des régimes politiques* (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire [Sorbonne lectures], 1958); Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); and John Kenneth Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (New York: New American Library, 1967). Walt Whitman Rostow's widely read *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) suggested a common developmental logic and chronology for industrializing societies, which at a late stage might then choose either aggressive collectivist goals or more rational consumer-oriented welfare.

The orientation of labor movements appeared to be a crucial political stake that rested on economic outcomes. Among the numerous studies in many languages, see Anthony Carew, *Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); Federico Romero, *The United States and the European Trade Union Movement, 1944–1951*, trans. by Harvey Fergusson, II (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Siegfried Mielke (ed.), *Organisatorischer Aufbau der Gewerkschaften 1945–1949* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1987); Peter Lange and George Ross, *Unions, Change, and Crisis: French and Italian Union Strategy and the Political Economy, 1945–1980* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); and, for a view from Asia, Andrew Gordon, *The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Post-1970 developments allowed a new perspective on the role of labor and mass production. For issues surrounding "Fordism" and its historical contingency, see Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), *Worlds of*

Possibility: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

In addition to early celebratory accounts, there is a large scholarly literature on how the Marshall Plan functioned. For the concepts behind the European Recovery Program, see Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); for mechanisms, see Imanuel Wexler, *The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983); for the impact, see Alan S. Milward, "The Marshall Plan and German Foreign Trade," in Charles S. Maier and Günter Bischof (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program* (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1991), 452–87. For the European Recovery Program in the context of Cold War rivalry, see Robert A. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and for a focus on a decisive resource, David S. Painter, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The transition from a decade of dollar shortages to one of dollar surplus and its consequences for American policy is the theme of Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

For US influence on economic organization more generally, see John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); the final chapters of Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 336–480; and Matthias Kipping and Ove Bjarnar (eds.), *The Americanisation of European Business: The Marshall Plan and the Transfer of US Management Models* (London: Routledge, 1998). For an early discussion of the politics of development assistance, see Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

For state socialist economics in general, see János Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); for its history, see W. Brus, "Postwar Reconstruction and Socio-Economic Transformation," in Michael Kaser and Lianne Radice (eds.), *The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919–1975*, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 564–643. For early discussion of the cybernetic enthusiasm in state socialism, see V. G. Afanasyev, *The Scientific Management of Society*, trans. L. Ilyitskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971; Russian original, 1967?). The Soviet role in postwar Germany was dispassionately treated in J. P. Nettl's still valuable *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945–1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), and is recently assessed by Norman Naimark in *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Andrew Port's *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) documents how state socialism managed to function on the local level during the Walter Ulbricht years, while the continuing failure to satisfy consumer demands is analyzed by Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Jonathan Zatlin, *The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), as well as in Charles S. Maier,

Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Across the world, Chinese rural catastrophes under Communism emerge from Dali L. Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

For the burden of military expenses, see Till Geiger, "Economic Growth and National Security: National Income Analysis, Western Rearmament, and Cold War Strategy, 1950–1952," *International History Review* (2004); also Till Geiger, *Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War: The Political Economy and the Economic Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945–1955* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Charles S. Maier, "Finance and Defense: Implications of Military Integration, 1950–1952," in F. H. Heller and J. R. Gillingham (eds.), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 335–51. On Soviet military spending, see David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984). Environmental impacts of the Cold War are currently under scrutiny by John McNeill, who discusses the Green Revolution in that framework (see his chapter in volume III of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*), while Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), sees both the forests and the trees in his unique study of woodlands management in the German Democratic Republic. For further suggestions, see the bibliographical essays in volumes II and III.

4. The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952

Memoirs, diaries, and printed letters vividly illustrate the thinking of US policymakers during the Truman era. See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (New York: Signet, 1955 and 1956); Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *Dear Bess: Letters from Harry to Bess Truman* (New York: Norton, 1983); Dean G. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (New York: Bantam, 1967); Joseph M. Jones, *Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955); Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951); and Jean Edward Smith (ed.), *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974).

There are very useful "official" histories of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. See, for example, Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); and James F. Schnabel, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945–1947* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996).

There are several excellent biographies of President Truman. For incisive criticism, see Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); for an evocative and heroic portrait, see David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); for a scholarly and thoughtful analysis, see Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Truman relied heavily on his advisers and there are excellent biographies of the president's most important assistants. See especially Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); Kai Bird, *The Chairman*. John J. McCloy: *The Making of the American Establishment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal* (New York: Knopf, 1992); Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); David Allan Mayers, *George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972); and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

Among the most important analyses of US policy and the origins of the Cold War are: Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet–American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3–145; and John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (rev. and expanded, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3–124.

There are important books and articles on the atomic bomb and its impact on the diplomacy and strategy of the Truman administration. See, for example, Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Vintage, 1965); Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Vintage, 1977); David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *Journal of American History*, 66 (June 1979), 62–87; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War* (New York: Knopf, 1980); Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," *Diplomatic History*, 19 (Spring 1995), 227–73; J. Samuel Walker, *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan*, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

For excellent analyses of Truman's policies in different regions and countries, see Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy towards Eastern Europe, 1943–1947* (Tromsø, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1978); Eduard Mark, "American Policy towards Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1946: An Alternative Interpretation," *Journal of American History*, 68 (September 1981), 313–36; Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in*

the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Thomas J. Christensen, *Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999); and Mark A. Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

For literature on the Korean War, see section 13 of this bibliographical essay; for literature on domestic political culture, see section 20.

5. The Soviet Union and the world, 1944–1953

There is a growing body of published primary sources on Soviet strategy and diplomacy in 1945–53 available in Russian. The most valuable collections of documents are: Grigori Kynin and Ioahim Laufer (eds.), *SSSR i germanskii vopros, 1941–1949: dokumenty iz Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi federatsii* [The USSR and the German Question, 1941–1949: Documents from the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1996–2003), 3 vols.; Galina Murashko (ed.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953* [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives, 1944–1953] (Moscow: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1997–98), 2 vols.; Grigori Sevost'ianov (ed.), *Sovetsko-amerikanskii otnosheniia, 1945–1948* [Soviet–American Relations, 1945–1948] (Moscow: Materik, 2004); and Sergei Tikhvinskii (ed.), *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia* [Soviet–Chinese Relations], 5 vols., vols. IV and V on the 1937–50 period (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi Mysli, 2000–2005). Published documents in English include: Giovanni Procacci (ed.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Fondazione Feltrinelli, 1994); *Stalin and the Cold War, 1945–1953: A Cold War International History Project Documentary Reader* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999); and Kenneth Jensen (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of 1946* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1991).

For useful diaries and memoirs, consult Georgi Dimitrov, *Dnevnik (9 mart 1933–6 fevruari 1949)* [Diaries, 9 March 1933–6 February 1949] (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo “Sv. Kliment Okhridski,” 1997); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967); Anastas Mikoian, *Tak bylo* [That Is How It Was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999); and A. Resis (ed.), *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993).

General accounts of Stalin's strategy and foreign policy of that period include John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Vladimir Pechatnov and Earl Edmondson, “The Russian Perspective,” in Ralph Levering et al. (eds.), *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives* (Lanham, MD:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 85–153; Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2006); William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). The history of the Soviet atomic project and its impact on Stalin's strategy are detailed in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1954* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). The Kremlin's internal decisionmaking in the late Stalin years is best covered in Y. Gorlizki and Oleg Khleniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

For Soviet policies in postwar Europe, see Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–1953* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943–1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child: The German Question and the Founding of the GDR* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

Soviet strategy in Asia and the Near East as well as Cold War crises there are treated in Chen Jian, *China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Jamil Hasanli, *At the Dawn of Cold War: The Soviet–American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); Odd Arne Westad, *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Nagai Yonosuke and Arira Iriye (eds.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

For useful recent biographies of principal Soviet decisionmakers, consult R. Service, *Stalin: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2004); Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Young Stalin* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); and D. Watson, *Molotov: A Biography* (London: Macmillan, 2005).

For literature on the Soviet Union and East Asia, see sections 11 and 13 of this bibliographical essay; for Eastern Europe and the Balkans, see sections 9 and 10.

6. Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955

The multivolume *Documents on British Policy Overseas* (Series I and II, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Whitehall History Publishing with Frank Cass, 1984–97)

series contains printed material and microfiches which are relevant to this period, although its coverage is topic-based rather than chronological. There is also the microform series *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print* (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1999–), which covers a number of post-1945 topics.

An overview of Britain's position in the world at the end of the war is in chapter 1 of the third volume of Alan Bullock's political biography of Ernest Bevin, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983). See also, more generally, Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: William Heinemann, 2005), and Mark Mazower's *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1998), both of which also draw out the cultural and sociological dimensions of this period. The economic challenges of the time are covered with clarity by Alec Cairncross, *The British Economy since 1945: Economic Policy and Performance, 1945–1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For general accounts of the domestic and foreign-policy developments, see Peter Hennessy, *Never Again: Britain 1945–1951* (London: Cape, 1992), and *Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), as well as Kenneth Morgan's *Britain since 1945: The People's Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The plight of the political Left as the Cold War developed is analyzed in Jonathan Schneer's *Labour's Conscience: The Labour Left, 1945–1951* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

Major biographical studies include Geoffrey Best, *Churchill: A Study in Greatness* (London: Penguin, 2002); David Dutton, *Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation* (London: Arnold, 1997); and D. R. Thorpe, *Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897–1977* (London: Pimlico, 2004). Kenneth Harris's *Attlee* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995) remains the most comprehensive study of the Labour prime minister, while Bevin is covered by Bullock, and by Geoffrey Warner, "Ernest Bevin and British Foreign Policy, 1945–1951," in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats 1939–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 103–34. Macmillan's earlier career is examined by Alistair Horne, *Macmillan, 1894–1956* (London: Macmillan, 1988). The three Conservatives also all wrote extensive memoirs or personal histories, while Attlee's relatively slender memoir, *As It Happened* (London: Heinemann, 1954), can be supplemented by Hugh Dalton's *High Tide and After: Memoirs, 1945–1960* (London: F. Muller, 1962), and *In the Midst of Events: The Foreign Office Diaries and Papers of Kenneth Younger*, edited by Geoffrey Warner (London: Routledge, 2005). The period is covered by an insider, John Colville, in *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985).

For the international context of British Cold War policy, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), and John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). On the imperial context of postwar Britain, consult Wm. Roger Louis's definitive *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), as well as Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). Coverage of Anglo-American relations in this period is authoritatively dealt with in David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century* (Harlow: Longman, 2000).

Alan S. Milward's volume in the UK Official History series, *The UK and the European Community*, vol. I, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945–1963* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), is exhaustive.

Archivally based specialized studies are essential for this period. David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Anne Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); and Melvyn Leffler and David S. Painter (eds.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 2005), between them cover most of the political and regional issues. Marshall aid and the creation of NATO respectively are given comprehensive treatment in Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). On Germany, see Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); on France, see John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), and Claire Sanderson, *L'Impossible Alliance? France, Grande-Bretagne et défense de l'Europe, 1945–1958* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003). On Empire and the Middle East, John Kent, *British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1949* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), Yazid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), and Louise Fawcett, *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), contribute well-documented arguments. With regard to nuclear issues, the classic study remains Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952* (London: Macmillan, 1974). Churchill's second administration is covered by John Young in *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–1955* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and by Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

For archivally based research on intelligence, on cultural aspects of the Cold War, and on the "secret state," see especially Richard Aldrich's path-breaking *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and the Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001); Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001); and Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2002).

7. The division of Germany, 1945–1949

Some key West German documents for this period are available in Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989–). A useful introduction to the vast research on occupied Germany is Wolfgang Benz (ed.), *Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung 1945 1949/55: ein Handbuch* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1999). On the Allied Control Council, see Gunther Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und Deutschland, 1945 1949: Alliierte Einheit, deutsche Teilung?* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). The most thorough interpretation of the negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers is Hanns Jürgen Küsters, *Der Integrationsfriede: Viermächteverhandlungen über die Friedensregelung mit*

Deutschland, 1945–1990 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2000). The global background of the division of Germany within the framework of the Cold War is treated in Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre des Cinquante Ans: les relations Est–Ouest 1943–1990* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 9–225.

A dominant characteristic of the research on the division of Germany has always been the national perspective. See the account of British policies in Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). The controversial reparation issue is superbly dealt with by Sir Alec Cairncross, *The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations, 1941–1949* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). The best monograph on Ernest Bevin is Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983). For a German view of the relevant British policies, see Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Großbritanniens und die Britische Zone 1945–1949* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1979).

There is an exhaustive literature on the American contribution to the division of Germany. Detlev Junker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1968: A Handbook*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), contains several succinct, up-to-date essays; see also Jeffrey Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Herman-Josef Rupieper (eds.), *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1993). Carolyn Wood Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), believes that Germany's partition was fundamentally an American decision. Of remarkable impartiality in this field replete with sometimes overblown controversies is John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968). Of the numerous studies of former officials, the most useful is Harold Zink, *The United States in Germany, 1944–1955* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957). For an account of American economic policies with regard to Germany, see Wilfried Mausbach, *Zwischen Morgenthau und Marshall: das wirtschaftspolitische Deutschlandkonzept der USA 1944–1947* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1996). General Clay's decisive role has been analyzed in several well-documented studies with partially controversial conclusions: Wolfgang Krieger, *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1949* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1983); and Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt, 1980). A critical assessment of George F. Kennan's changeable German policies is Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 141–77. There are two significant memoirs that still deserve critical reading: George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), 415–28, and Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (London: William Heinemann, 1950). For the Berlin blockade, see Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–1949: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), and for the influential role of John J. McCloy, see Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

The contribution of France to the partition of Germany is discussed in the context of its general foreign policy by William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For an informative account by a leading expert on Germany, see Alfred

Grosser, *Deutschlandbilanz: Geschichte Deutschlands seit 1945* (Munich: Hanser, 1970), 9–119. Policies in the French zone are covered in Volker Koop, *Besetzt: französische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland* (Berlin: be.bra-Verlag, 2005). Still useful are Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder (eds.), *Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die französische Zone 1945–1949* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983); Roy F. Willis, *The French in Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962) and John W. Young, *France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-war Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). The best collection of essays on the important influence of de Gaulle in early French policies toward German unity is Claire Andrieu, et al. (eds.), *Dictionnaire de Gaulle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2006).

Since the opening of the archives of the German Democratic Republic and the partial accessibility of Soviet archives, a relatively vast literature has appeared on Moscow's German policies. Indispensable collections of new sources are Jochen P. Laufer and Georgij P. Kynin, *Die UdSSR und die deutsche Frage 1941–1948: Dokumente aus dem Archiv für Außenpolitik der Russischen Föderation*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2004), and the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*. The best account of policies in the Soviet zone is Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). A comprehensive monograph on the Soviet Military Administration in Deutschland is Jan Foitzik, *Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945–1949* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999). In spite of the rich harvest of new sources, interpretation of Soviet policies is still controversial. There are those who think that Stalin was bent on a united, pro-Soviet Germany: see, for example, Gerhard Wettig, *Bereitschaft zur Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1949* (Munich: Olzog Verlag, 1999). For an alternative view, see Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), who believes that Stalin wanted to secure or restore "Germany's unity," and was ready to accept a neutral Germany and even a Western-style democracy. The thesis that Stalin had always secretly pursued the goal of "two Germanies" also finds a supporter: Jochen Laufer, "Stalins Friedensziele," in Jürgen Zarusky (ed.), *Stalin und die Deutschen* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2006), 131–58.

Good introductions to the role of the Germans under Allied occupation can be found in Antony Nicholls, *The Bonn Republic: West Germany 1945–1990* (London: Longman, 1997), 1–92, and Dennis L. Bark and D. R. Gress, *From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 1–227. A standard account from a contemporary German scholar is Theodor Eschenburg, *Jahre der Besatzung, 1945–1949* (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: DVA and F. A. Brockhaus, 1983). Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 1945–1949* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), is my own interpretation of the interplay of Allied and German policies that gave rise to the division of Germany.

8. The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West

Several European countries now have their own series of published diplomatic documents; for France, for instance, see *Documents diplomatiques français*, published by the Ministère des affaires étrangères, Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, or

for Italy, *Documenti diplomatici italiani*, published by the Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la Pubblicazione dei Documenti Diplomatici.

Early accounts of the origins of the Marshall Plan, such as Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955), and the official history by Harry Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955), are useful, though filled with reverence for Marshall and his team. A recent popular account of the American role in the design and implementation of the plan is Greg Behrman, *The Most Noble Adventure* (New York: Free Press, 2007). John Gimbel focuses chiefly on the Marshall Plan in the German context and opens up fruitful avenues of research in *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). Imanuel Wexler, *The Marshall Plan Revisited* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1983), gives careful attention to the Plan based on detailed statistics. The scholarly contributions of Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), and Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), frame the debate about the economic impact of the Plan by placing the European Recovery Program into the economic histories of the United States and Europe, and by exploring European sources about how the Plan was received. The essential points of contention are outlined in Milward's review of Hogan's book: "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?," *Diplomatic History*, 13, 2 (1989), 231–53. A middle position is sketched by Charles Maier in his thoughtful essays in *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). John Killick gives a clear, brief survey in *The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945–1960* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997). There is also an important collection of articles on various countries in *Le Plan Marshall et le relèvement économique de l'Europe* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1993).

Country studies abound. For Britain, see Henry Pelling, *Britain and the Marshall Plan* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), though Hogan's work covers Britain thoroughly. On France, the best treatment is Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine, et la construction européenne, 1944–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992); the diplomatic context is ably treated in Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); for economic issues, see Frances Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1997). Chiarella Esposito has made a detailed comparative study: *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948–1950* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1994). Ennio di Nolfo argues that Italy's participation in the Plan was motivated far more by domestic political considerations than by economic ones: "L'Italie et le Plan Marshall: aux origines de la participation italienne," in *Le Plan Marshall*, 59–68. For an excellent collection of essays that treats Italy in a European context, see Elena Aga Rossi (ed.), *Il Piano Marshall e l'Europa* (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1983). Werner Abelshauser downplays the effectiveness of Marshall aid in Germany; see his *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1980* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983); and his article, "Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan, Westeuropa Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 29 (1981), 545–78. Gerd Hardach, *Der Marshall-Plan: Auslandshilfe und Wiederaufbau in*

Westdeutschland, 1948–1952 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1994), and Alan Kramer, *The West German Economy, 1945–1955* (New York: Berg, 1991), are useful, though the essays in Charles Maier and Günter Bischof (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 1991), provide excellent detail and broad context, as does Karl Hardach, *The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).

For the diplomatic calculations behind Marshall aid, see Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Melvyn Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," *Diplomatic History*, 12 (Summer 1988), 277–306. For an interpretation of Soviet behavior toward the Marshall Plan, see Scott Parish, "The Marshall Plan, Soviet–American Relations, and the Division of Europe," in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianski (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 268–90, and Scott Parish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, *New Evidence of the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports*, CWHIP Working Paper No. 9 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994).

Accounts that stress Britain's role in the origins of NATO are Martin H. Folly, "Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty," *Diplomatic History*, 12, 1 (Winter 1988), 59–77; Bert Zeeman, "Britain and the Cold War: An Alternative Approach. The Treaty of Dunkirk Example," *European History Quarterly*, 16 (1986), 343–67; and John Baylis, "Britain, the Brussels Pact, and the Continental Commitment," *International Affairs*, 60, 4 (Autumn 1984), 615–29. More general is Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1988).

There is an extensive literature on Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and the origins of European integration. See Monnet's own *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976); William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds.), *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (London: Macmillan, 1991); and John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Excellent introductions to the Americanization of Europe are Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Volker Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). An excellent case study of one aspect of the transatlantic economic relationship in the Marshall Plan era is David S. Painter, "Oil and the Marshall Plan," *Business History Review*, 58, 3 (Autumn 1984), 359–83. A broad economic assessment is offered in the essays in Barry Eichengreen (ed.), *Europe's Postwar Recovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). A recent (and inconclusive) attempt to synthesize the story of Americanization is Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For a skeptical view of the concept of Americanization, see Rob Kroes, "American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End," *Diplomatic History*, 23, 3 (July 1999), 463–77.

9. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953

New documentary collections continue to shed light on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. Two vital sets of documents on the Soviets' deep involvement in the establishment of Communist regimes are G. P. Murashko *et al.* (eds.), *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh Rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953* [Eastern Europe in Documents from the Russian Archives, 1944–1953], 2 vols. (Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1997); and T. V. Volokitina *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe], 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999, 2002). An Italian-sponsored publication contains the transcripts of the first three Cominform meetings and very useful articles on aspects of Cominform history: *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994).

Country-specific collections include an updated edition of essential documents on the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, Gennadii Bordiugov *et al.* (eds.), *Sovetskaiia voennaia administratsiia v Germanii (SVAG): upravlenie propagandy (informatsii) i S. I. Tiul'panov 1945–1949* [The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG): The Propaganda (Information) Administration and S. I. Tiul'panov, 1945–1949] (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2006). For the establishment of Communist hegemony in Poland, see Gennadii Bordiugov *et al.* (eds.), *SSSR–Pol'sha: mekhanizmy podchineniia 1944–1949 gg.* [The USSR–Poland: Mechanisms of Subordination 1944–1949] (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1995). For the Soviet takeover of Romania, see T. A. Pokivailova *et al.* (eds.), *Tri vizita A. Ia. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest 1944–1946 gg.* [Three Visits by A. Ia. Vyshinskii to Bucharest 1944–1946] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998).

Two highly influential early monographs are Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1965), which sets the framework for three generations of writing about the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), a foundational political science treatment of the subject. One of the best-documented and most reliable accounts of the origins of the Cold War in Eastern Europe from the pre-1989 period is Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). See also Mastny's study of Stalin's policies abroad, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Important recent studies of Stalin's foreign policy include Donal O'Sullivan, *Stalins "Cordon Sanitaire": die sowjetische Osteuropapolitik und die Reaktionen des Westens 1939–1949* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); T. V. Volokitina *et al.*, *Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa: stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov sovetskogo tipa, 1949–1953* [Moscow and Eastern Europe: The Emergence of Political Regimes of the Soviet Type, 1949–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), an archive-based study of the Stalinization of Eastern Europe by leading Russian specialists; and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

There are also several vital new collections of articles, including A. O. Chubar'ian *et al.* (eds.), *Stalinskoe desiatiletie kholodnoi voiny: fakty i gipotezy* [The Stalin Decade of the Cold War: Facts and Hypotheses] (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), including leading Russian specialists on the Stalin period; Stefan Creuzberger and Manfred Gortemaker (eds.), *Gleichschaltung unter Stalin? Die Entwicklung der Parteien im östlichen Europa, 1944–1949* (Paderborn:

Schöningh, 2002), which comprises recent articles on Sovietization by German and East European scholars; N. I. Egorova *et al.* (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina, 1945–1963: fakty, sobytia* [The Cold War, 1953–1963: Facts, Events] (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2003), a reevaluation of the Cold War by Russian archival scholars. See also papers based on new research presented at a Moscow Academy of Sciences conference, collected in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

Interesting new interpretations are offered by John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), on the ways in which East Europeans were able to preserve their own traditions and institutional cultures during the process of Sovietization; and T. V. Volokitina *et al.*, *Narodnaia demokratiia: mif ili real'nost'* [People's Democracy: Myth or Reality] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), an argument by leading archival scholars of Eastern Europe that "people's democracy" had serious democratic content and intent in the immediate postwar period.

Studies on specific countries include Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948*, trans. and annotated by John Micgiel and Michael H. Bernhard (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), the English translation of the first archive-based Polish study of the period of Communist takeover; Ivo Banac's pioneering analysis of Yugoslav politics during the Tito–Stalin split, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), an archive-based examination of Soviet policy in Germany and the origins of the German Democratic Republic.

Robert Levy's *Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001) is an important reevaluation of the Romanian Stalinist based on extensive interviews and archives. The premier Czech historian of Communism in that country, Karel Kaplan, studies the origins and course of the 1948 coup in *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987). See also his *Report on the Murder of the General Secretary* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990), which, in addition to an account of the Slansky trial, includes a general history of the East European purges. On Hungary, see Charles Gati's excellent series of extended essays, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), and George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1987), the best available work on the East European purges by a former victim of Hungarian Stalinists.

Finally, there are several key published memoirs and diaries. The memoirs of the Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas remain one of the fundamental sources for understanding Stalin's wartime and postwar thinking, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962). Likewise, many insights can be gleaned from the splendidly edited notes of the famous Bulgarian Communist Georgii Dimitrov, Stalin's most trusted East European deputy during the war and after, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003). Essential insights into the Sovietization of East European intellectuals are found in Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1981). Lastly, Teresa Toranska, *"Them": Stalin's Polish Puppets*, trans. Agnieszka Kolakowska (New York:

Harper and Row, 1987), contains striking interviews with Polish Stalinists by an unusually aggressive journalist.

See also sections 5, 7, and 10 in this bibliographical essay.

10. The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956

The body of literature on the Balkans during the early Cold War, in particular in English, is far from impressive in spite of the explosion in the availability of documentary sources from Soviet and regional archives after 1989. By far the most comprehensive survey of the history of the region after 1945 can be found in Richard J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* (New York: Longman, 2002). Although mainly focused on the first half of the century and the Second World War, an overview by Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), is a valuable contribution.

A more elaborate review of the literature on the Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe in the early Cold War is already given in the entries in this bibliographical essay, sections 5 and 9. However, works such as *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), and the most recent book by Vesselin Dimitrov, *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy, and Communism in Bulgaria, 1941–1948* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), provide invaluable insight into Stalin's attitudes toward the Balkans. See also Artiom Ulunian, *Balkany: goriachii mir kholodnoi voyny. Gretsia i Turtsia mezhdu Zapadom i Vostokom, 1945–1960 gg.* [The Balkans: Hot Peace, Cold War. Greece and Turkey between West and East, 1945–1960] (Moscow: Rossiiskie vesti, 2001).

Among the country-specific literature, Dimitrov, as well as R.J. Crampton's *Bulgaria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), offer exceptional insight into developments in Bulgaria. For US policy, Michael M. Boll, *Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943–1947* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), is still useful.

For an overview of the history of Turkey during this period, one should consult Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed. (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), and William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000). For relations between London and Ankara, see Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era* (London: Tauris Academic, 2008), and between Moscow and Ankara, Bulent Gokay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (London: Routledge, 2006). A useful overview of domestic politics in Turkey is John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005).

From a relatively large body of literature on the Greek Civil War, two edited volumes deserve special mention, as they provide a comprehensive general overview of the conflict with its many complexities: John O. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), and John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley (eds.), *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995). On the American role in the conflict, one should consult Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949* (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1982). On the subject of the Greek Communists' goals and tactics in the Greek Civil War and Soviet policies, a very good overview can be found in Peter J. Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). Additional insights can be gleaned from more recent articles that have benefited from the opening of the Soviet archives, such as John O. Iatrides, "Revolution or Self-Defense? Communist Goals, Strategy, and Tactics in the Greek Civil War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 3 (Summer 2005), 3–33, and Thanasis D. Sfikas, "War and Peace in the Strategy of the Communist Party of Greece, 1945–1949," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3, 3 (Fall 2001), 5–30. A rare and thus valuable comparative analysis of Soviet and British attitudes in the conflict is provided in the article by Thanasis D. Sfikas, "Toward a Regional Study of the Origins of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe: British and Soviet Policies in the Balkans, 1945–1949," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 17 (1999), 209–27. For Greece after the civil war, see Euanthes Chatzevasileiou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967* (London: Routledge, 2006). The scarcity of published Greek documents on the Greek Civil War is somewhat compensated for by the inclusion of relevant documents in series from the US and British governments.

Among English-language books on Yugoslavia during this period that focus on the Tito–Stalin split and its aftermath, see the excellent analysis of Western policies and the dilemmas of policymaking in Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), and Beatrice Heuser, *Western "Containment" Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–1953* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). A still unsurpassed insight into the Yugoslav side of the conflict and an accurate reading of Stalin's mindset is provided in Vladimir Dedijer's *The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948–1953* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978), and in the documentary collections he edited in Serbo-Croatian, the three-volume *Dokumenti 1948* [Documents on 1948], (Belgrade: Rad, 1979). Interesting aspects of the Tito–Stalin split and its ramifications are discussed in Ivo Banac, *With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Several memoirs and biographies are particularly important for the understanding of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict and the process of normalization after Stalin's death, most notably Vladimir Dedijer's documentary biography of Tito, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* [New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], vol. III (Belgrade: Izdavačka radna organizacija Rad, 1984), as well as Nikita Khrushchev, *Vremia, liudi, vlast'* [Times, People, Power], vols. III and IV (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999), Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine, 1956–1958* [Moscow Years, 1956–1958] (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1977), and Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče: memoari* [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs] (Belgrade: Komunist, 1971). For the process of Soviet–Yugoslav reconciliation, see Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War, 1953–1957* (London: Routledge, 2010).

See also entries in section 9 of this bibliographical essay.

II. The birth of the People's Republic of China and the road to the Korean War

The documents pertaining to the Guomindang government's policies were published after the 1970s, such as Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian – duiRi*

kangzhan shiqi, di san bian, zhanshi waijiao II [First Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China The Anti-Japanese War Period, vol. III, War-time Foreign Relations, II] (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang dangshi weiyuanhui, 1981). Some of the Soviet documents pertaining to China for this period have been published by Shen Zhihua and others; see Shen Zhihua et al. (eds.), *Sulian lishi dang'an xuanbian* [Collection of Selected Soviet Historical Documents] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 2002); and *Chaoxian zhanzheng: Eguo dang'anguan de jiemi wenjian* [The Korean War: Declassified Documents from Russian Archives], 2 vols. (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 2003).

This chapter uses historical documents that have been published in China since the 1980s. Major archives in China, such as the Central Archive, remain inaccessible to independent research projects, and therefore it is at present difficult to give China the role in the history of the period that the country deserves.

Zhongyang dang'anguan (ed. and comp.), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee], 18 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao, 1989–92), vols. XV–XVIII covering the postwar period; *Mao Zedong wenji* [A Collection of Mao Zedong's Works], 8 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1993–97; *Mao Zedong zai qida de baogao he jianghua ji* [Collection of Mao Zedong's Reports and Speeches at the Seventh CCP Congress] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1995); and *Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [A Selection of Important Documents since the Founding of the People's Republic of China], 17 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), are of key importance to scholars. For military affairs, see *Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (ed. and comp.), *Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan* [Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai], 4 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1997). *Zhongyang dang'an guan* and the CCP Department of United Front (eds. and comps.), *Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian* [A Selection of Documents on the CCP Central Committee's United Front during the Liberation War Period] (Beijing: Dang'an, 1988), is crucial for understanding the policies of the CCP.

There is now a large literature in many languages dealing with this period. For an overview of research in China, see Yafeng Xia, "The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 10, 1 (Winter 2008), 81–115. Steven Levine, *Anvils of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), was among the first to explore the complex interrelations between the CCP's postwar development in Manchuria and Soviet and American policies. Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), provides an original explanation of the Chinese Civil War by placing it within the context of the emerging Soviet–American confrontation. Chen Jian's classic *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) transformed our understanding of the domestic causes of China's entry into the war, while his *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) offers a convenient framework for understanding many of the issues discussed in the present chapter. Shu Guang Zhang's work, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), emphasizes "strategic culture" as a tool for understanding Chinese policies. Niu Jun, *From Yan'an to the World: The Origin and Development of Chinese*

Communist Foreign Policy (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2005; Chinese original 1992), studies how the CCP handled and manipulated its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. For a contrasting view, underlining CCP enmity toward the United States, see Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). For an overview of the debate, see "Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China," *Diplomatic History*, 21, 1 (Winter 1997), with contributions from Warren Cohen, Chen Jian, Odd Arne Westad, John Garver, and Michael Sheng. Yang Kuisong, *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de enen yuanyuan* [Mao Zedong's Gratitude toward and Grievances against Moscow] (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin, 2005), meticulously presents Mao's complex relations with the Soviet Union. Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu chaoxian zhanzheng* [Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin, 2003), carefully reexamines the connections between the Sino-Soviet alliance and the outbreak of the Korean War.

For other aspects of China's foreign policy during this period, see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), and Qiang Zhai, "Tibet and Chinese-British-American Relations in the Early 1950s," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 3 (Summer 2006), 34–53. On the latter issue, see also Michael M. Sheng, "Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 3 (Summer 2006), 15–33. On Mongolia, see Xiaoyuan Liu, *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

Some important memoirs and biographies have been published since the early 1980s; see, for instance, Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu* [Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Renmin, 1981); Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefang, 1984; Engl. transl. 1988); Wu Xiuquan, *Zai waijiaobu banian de jingli* [Eight-Year Experience in the Foreign Ministry] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1983; Engl. transl. 1985); and, not least, those of Mao's Russian interpreter Shi Zhe, *Zai tishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu* [Together with Historical Giants: Memoirs of Shi Zhe] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991).

See also sections 13 and 17 of this bibliographical essay.

12. Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945–1960

There are several overviews of US–Japanese relations that also examine alliance relations during the early Cold War. Roger Buckley's *US–Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945–1990* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) is one of the earliest monographs that highlights the political, military, and economic aspects of the emerging alliance. In his magisterial book, *The Clash: US–Japanese Relations through History* (New York: Norton, 1997), Walter LaFeber devotes about half of the text to an analysis of the post-World War II period. Michael Schaller's *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) is also a well-balanced survey of the bilateral relationship focusing on the postwar period. John Hunter Boyle's *Modern Japan: The American Nexus* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993) contains useful chapters on postwar US–Japanese relations and covers questions surrounding the atomic bomb.

Biographies of individuals who played a critical part in US Japanese relations during the early Cold War abound. John Dower's classic *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 1878–1954* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) is a critical portrayal of the postwar prime minister who laid the groundwork of the US Japan Cold War alliance. Michael Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) is a clear-eyed probe into the career of the ambitious general who shaped the contours of postwar Japan. Richard Finn's *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992) highlights these key individuals and their work during the Allied occupation. *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1961) provides a rare look into the inner thoughts of a politician who faced a powerful American overlord. Howard Schonberger's *Aftermath of War: American and the Remaking of Japan 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1989) highlights American politicians and strategists who directed the course of the US occupation of Japan.

The literature on the origins of the Cold War in East Asia with a focus on Japan is also rich. Akira Iriye's *The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1974) remains a classic. A collaborative volume of American and Japanese scholars, edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), examines the coming of the Cold War in a regional framework. Michael Schaller's *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), along with William S. Borden's *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery 1947–1955* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), shaped the early scholarly debate on the links between American occupation policy and Japan's postwar economic recovery. Marc Gallicchio's *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) provides a concise summary of the US–Asian policies that shaped Cold War policies in the immediate postwar years.

The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has generated a spirited debate among historians. J. Samuel Walker's *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atom Bombs against Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997) offers the most updated and balanced analysis of the momentous decision. Ronald Takaki's concise volume, *Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), places greater emphasis on the racial aspect of the American decision. Based on a special issue of *Diplomatic History*, Michael Hogan's *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) highlights various historical questions arising from the atomic bombing.

Among the earliest accounts of the Allied occupation of Japan are Kazuo Kawaii, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), and Frederick S. Dunn, *Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). Thomas W. Burkman (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan: The International Contest* (Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial, 1982), and Robert E. Ward and Frank Joseph Shulman (eds.), *The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952: An Annotated Bibliography of Western-Language Materials* (Chicago: American Library Association, 1974), are useful references. Eiji Takemae's *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002) explains well the structure and workings of the occupation administration. Robert Wade and

Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), contains many useful chapters on American reform efforts.

For more recent studies on the occupation, see Ray Moore and Donald Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). John Dower's *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) offers a panoramic view of Japan's social and cultural landscapes during the American occupation. For a general appraisal of occupation policies, see Carol Gluck, "Entangling Illusions: Japanese and American Views of the Occupation," in Warren I. Cohen (ed.), *New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 169–236. Yukiko Koshiro's *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the US Occupation of Japan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) discusses race in the context of US-Japanese relations.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye hosted several international conferences that resulted in collections of well-balanced essays based on recently declassified government documents and memoirs of key decisionmakers. See especially Iriye and Cohen, *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), and Cohen and Iriye, *The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

The literature focusing on the 1950s has grown in the last decade. Aaron Forsberg's *America and the Japanese Miracle* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) and Sayuri Shimizu's *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 2001) both focus on the Eisenhower administration's policies for Japanese economic recovery. Burton Kaufman's *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953–1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) is rich in information regarding the Eisenhower administration's trade and aid policies during the early Cold War years. John Swenson-Wright's *United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) examines the military aspects of US-Japan relations between 1945 and 1960. *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001) by Gavan McCormack analyzes postwar Japan and social and cultural transformation.

For further guidance, see the bibliographical essay in volume III.

13. The Korean War

Numerous US documents on Korea, 1945–1953, are available in published form in the series US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969–88). For numerous translated documents from China and the former Soviet Union, plus commentaries by leading scholars, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 3 (Fall 1993), 5 (Spring 1995), 8–9 (Winter 1996/97), and 11 (Winter 1998). Evgeniy P. Bajanov and Natalia Bajanov, "The Korean Conflict, 1950–1953: The Most Mysterious War of the Twentieth Century – Based on Secret Soviet Archives," is an unpublished manuscript, widely circulated among Korean War scholars, that includes lengthy quotations of documents (in English translation) from the Soviet Presidential Archives strung together by a spare narrative. For other Russian overviews,

see Anatolii Torkunov, *Zagadochnaia voina: koreiskii konflikt 1950–1953 godov* [Mysterious War: The Korean Conflict 1950–1953] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000), and the official study made by the Soviet General Staff, *Voina v Koree: 1950–1953* [War in Korea, 1950–1953] (St. Petersburg: Poligon, 2000). For materials in Chinese, see the entries in section 11 of this bibliographical essay.

The best-known scholarly work on the origins and early stages of the war is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990). However, this magisterial study appeared before much documentation became available from the Soviet and Chinese sides. Cumings's criticism of the United States and Syngman Rhee remains defensible, but some of the analysis regarding interactions among the North Koreans, Chinese Communists, and the Soviet Union has been disproved. The argument that the war was essentially civil in nature is hotly contested, especially by William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), ch. 3. Other important works on the origins of the war include James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), on the US side; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), and Soon Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1967), on the US and South Korean sides; Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), and Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), on the Chinese side; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), on the Chinese and Soviet sides; Erik Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy toward Korea, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), and Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945–1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), on the Soviet and North Korean sides; and Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution 1945–1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), on the North Korean side.

For one-volume syntheses of the war, see Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Burton Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (New York: Knopf, 1986), Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), and David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1964), a classic. On the diplomacy of the war and its international implications, see William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). For a briefer topical study, see Stueck's *Rethinking the Korean War*.

The best studies focusing on US policy during the war include Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," *International Security*, 13 (Winter 1988/89), 61–89; Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset'? American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954," *International Security*, 13 (Winter 1988/89), 5–49; Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia,

MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999). See also Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24 (December 1980), 563–92.

For a comprehensive treatment of the Chinese side of the war, see Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995). Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), ch. 4, provides the most up-to-date treatment of China's strategy in the armistice talks. Zhang Xiaoming, *Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea* (College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), covers the Communist side of the air war, especially the Chinese perspective.

For a collection of essays on the war by leading scholars with an editor's introduction and conclusion placing them in historiographical context, see William Stueck (ed.), *The Korean War in World History* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2004). Particularly useful are Kathryn Weathersby's summary of "the state of historical knowledge" on the Soviet side, Chen Jian's chapter on China, and Michael Schaller's chapter on the impact of the war on Japan.

14. US national security policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy

Especially important on the overall national security strategy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration are Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Saki Dockrill, *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and the relevant chapters in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Reappraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) and *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), provides a succinct, and highly favorable, early assessment of Eisenhower's Cold War policies; Blanche W. Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), offers a more critical perspective. Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), makes a strong case for the centrality of psychological warfare and public diplomacy in Eisenhower's Cold War strategy. See also Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), on cultural factors shaping Eisenhower's foreign policy. David Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999), provides a penetrating analysis of the conflicting assessments of the Soviet threat in the late 1950s.

A useful examination of Eisenhower's approach to leadership and decisionmaking is Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982). On the different decisionmaking styles of the Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy administrations, consult Meena Bose, *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1998).

For valuable studies of Kennedy's overall strategy, which feature detailed explorations of different regions of the world and topical issues, see the essays in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Diane Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Other important studies include Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Timothy P. Maga, *John F. Kennedy and New Frontier Diplomacy, 1961–1963* (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1994); and the relevant chapters in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* and *We Now Know*.

For nuclear strategy and European issues during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), is indispensable. Other important studies include Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security*, 7 (1983), 3–71; Marc Trachtenberg, "'A Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance," *International Security*, 13 (1988/89), 5–49; H.W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," *American Historical Review*, 94 (1989), 963–89; Peter Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Christopher Preble, *John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap* (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); Andreas Wenger, *Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); and Jeffrey Glen Giauque, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

On Third World strategy and issues, the scholarly literature is now quite voluminous. The following works are particularly useful: Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (eds.), *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," *Political Science Quarterly*, 101 (1986), 453–73; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982); Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); David L. Anderson, *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Kathryn C. Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007); Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy Matsu Crisis," *International Security*, 12 (1988), 96–123; Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Douglas Little, "Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945–1958," *Middle East Journal*, 44 (1990),

51 75; and Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

15. Soviet foreign policy, 1953–1962

Some of the most important documents on Soviet foreign policy in this period are published in Aleksandr Fursenko (chief ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954 1964: chernovyye protokolnye zapisi zasedanii, stenogrammy, postanovlenii* [Presidium of the CC of the CPSU 1954–1964: Preparatory Session Protocol Minutes, Reports, Resolutions] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003–2008). For an overview of the literature, see Andrea Graziosi's online bibliography at www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/resources.htm.

Different views on alleged missed opportunities for East–West accommodation after Stalin's death are presented in Kenneth Osgood and Klaus Larres (eds.), *The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A New International History* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Amy Knight's biography, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), uses all the fragmentary evidence that is ever likely to surface on his foreign-policy deviation.

For evidence of changes in Soviet policy on Germany, see Elke Scherstjanoi, "Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik nach Stalins Tod 1953: neue Dokumente aus dem Archiv des Moskauer Außenministeriums," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 46 (1998), 497–549. The Soviet handling of the East German crisis is documented in Christian Ostermann, *Uprising in East Germany 1953* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

Nikolaus Katzer, "Eine Übung im Kalten Krieg": *Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz von 1954* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), gives the most detailed account of Soviet conduct at the abortive Berlin conference. Soviet initiatives on European security are examined in Marie-Pierre Rey, "L'URSS et la sécurité européenne 1953–1956," *Communisme*, 49/50 (1997), 127–30.

William Taubman's magisterial biography, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), is most thoughtful of its subject's foreign policy. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006), the first to make use of the long-hidden records of the Soviet party presidium meetings, adds many important details. James G. Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), focuses on the crucial domestic determinants of Khrushchev's foreign policy.

On the Austrian State Treaty and the origins of the Warsaw Pact, see Vojtech Mastny, "The Launching of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Grand Strategy," in Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955: internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 145–62. Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), is the best on the subject.

Using extensive revelations from the archives, Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33, 2 (1998), 163–214, is partly updated by Aleksandr Stykalin, "The

Hungarian Crisis of 1956: 'The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents,' *Cold War History*, 2, 1 (October 2001), 113–44. The growing influence of the Chinese factor on Khrushchev's foreign policy is best explained in Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Matthew Evangelista, "Why Keep Such an Army?" *Khrushchev's Troop Reductions*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 19 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), makes the best of new sources. Donald R. Falls, "Soviet Decision-Making and the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Romania," *East European Quarterly*, 27, 4 (1993), 489–502, clarifies that puzzling episode. On the wider implications of Khrushchev's security policy, Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), has withstood the test of time remarkably well.

Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1964* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), remains valuable for the understanding of Khrushchev's disarmament initiatives, as does Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), for his missile deception.

In her account of the Berlin crisis, Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), attributes a major role to Walter Ulbricht as "the tail that wagged the dog," whereas Michael Lemke, *Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963: Interessen und Handlungsspielräume der SED im Ost–West-Konflikt* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995), stresses the East Germans' limitations in influencing Soviet policy. Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), remains an essential study.

For the U-2 incident and the breakdown of the Paris summit, see Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper, 1986).

For bilateral Soviet–American relations, Georgii M. Kornienko, "Upushchennaia vozmozhnost': vstrecha N. S. Khrushcheva i Dzh. Kennedi v Vene v 1961 g." [A Missed Opportunity: The 1961 Khrushchev–Kennedy Meeting in Vienna], *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 1992, No. 2, 97–106, offers the view of a knowledgeable high-ranking insider from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Aleksandr A. Fursenko, "Kak byla postroena berlinskaiia stena" [How the Berlin Wall Was Built], *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 2001, no. 4, 73–90, benefits from privileged access to the Kremlin archives.

The first to call attention to the significance of the "Buria" exercise for Moscow's planning for a Berlin confrontation is Matthias Uhl, "Storming on to Paris: The 1961 Buria Exercise and the Planned Solution of the Berlin Crisis," in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), 46–71.

On the path from the Berlin to the Cuban crisis, Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and John C. Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996), are as illuminating on the Soviet as they are on the American side.

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble": *Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), makes the best use of the substantial though selective archival documentation the Russian authorities chose to provide to the authors. Dimitrij N. Filippovych and Wladimir I. Ivkin, "Die strategischen Raketentruppen der UdSSR und ihre Beteiligung an der Operation 'Anadyr' (1962)," in Dimitrij N. Filippovych

and Matthias Uhl (eds.), *Vor dem Abgrund: Die Streitkräfte der USA und UdSSR sowie ihrer deutschen Bündnispartner in der Kubakrise* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 39–63, presents revealing new evidence about the scope of the operation. Svetlana V. Savranskaya, “New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28, 2 (2005), 233–59, shows how close was the danger of a nuclear confrontation at sea. See also James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Studies in Intelligence*, 46, 1 (2002), 49–58.

16. East Central Europe, 1953–1956

While we are still awaiting a comparative archive-based study of East Central Europe in the mid-1950s, two classical works of Kremlinology are still useful guides to the historical debate over the de-Stalinization process: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), and Francois Fejtő, *A History of the Peoples' Democracies*, 2 vols., translated by Daniel Weissbort (New York: Praeger, 1971).

Among the several available general histories of the region in the postwar period, one of the most illuminating works is Ivan T. Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

On Soviet–East European relations in the transition period after Stalin's death, three articles by Mark Kramer are the best sources: “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal–External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making,” parts 1–3, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 3–55; 1, 2 (Spring 1999), 3–38; 1, 3 (Fall 1999), 3–66.

While several German-language books were published for the fiftieth anniversary in 2003, the best documentary coverage and concise history of the 1953 Berlin uprising, covering the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak revolts as well, is Christian F. Ostermann (ed.), *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001).

Relatively few publications are available in English on the Polish October in 1956. The most informative, archive-based studies are Leo Gluchowsky, “Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka and the ‘Polish October,’” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 5 (1995), 40–43; Pawel Machcewicz, “Social Protest and Political Crisis in 1956,” in A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), *Stalinism in Poland 1944–1956: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995* (London: Macmillan, 1999), 99–118; and Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33, 2 (1998), 163–214.

The 1956 Hungarian revolution is one of the most extensively covered Cold War topics: several hundred books have been published on that event since 1956, and many archive-based volumes and publications have appeared since 1989, mostly in Hungarian. For a full bibliography, see www.rev.hu. Among the most important English-language studies are György Litván, János M. Bak, and Lyman H. Legters (eds.), *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression, 1953–1963* (New York: Longman, 1996); Csaba Békés, *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 16 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1996), the first archive-based comprehensive study of the international context of the 1956 revolution. A combination of archive-based essays by

Hungarian and Russian military historians and the recollections of J. Malashenko, deputy commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, is in Jenő Györkei and Miklós Horváth (eds.), *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956*, trans. by Emma Roper-Evans (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2006), provides a provocative and inspiring analysis of what happened and what could have happened differently during the revolution of 1956. Victor Sebestyen, *Twelve Days. Revolution 1956: How the Hungarians Tried to Topple Their Soviet Masters* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), is a well-written, basically reliable history of 1956. An imposing 956-page volume of essays on all aspects of the revolution by leading historians in Hungary and abroad is Lee Congdon, Béla K. Király, and Károly Nagy (eds.), *1956: The Hungarian Revolution and War for Independence* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs and Highland Lakes: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2006).

The most important documentary collections on 1956 are Paul Zinner (ed.), *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February–November, 1956* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), the first and fullest publication of publicly available documents in English; “The ‘Malin notes’ on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, *CWIHP Bulletin*, 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997), 385–410, showing the view from inside the Kremlin; and Elena D. Orekhova, Viacheslav T. Sereda, and Aleksandr S. Stykalin (eds.), *Sovietskii Soiuz i vengerskii krizis 1956 goda: dokumenty* [The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis in 1956: Documents] (Moscow: Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediia, 1998), is the most comprehensive collection of Soviet documents on 1956 in Russian.

Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer (eds.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002), contains 600 pages of documents covering the period 1953–58 from ten countries’ archives and a concise history, based on the research of the 1956 Institute in Budapest.

Relevant chapters of the following recent books provide archive-based analyses of the events in individual countries of the region in the mid-1950s: Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Andrzej Paczkowski, *Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, trans. by Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); László Borhi, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004); Muriel Blaive, *Une déstalinisation manquée: Tchécoslovaquie 1956* (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2005); and Richard Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

17. The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962

Among the first generation of scholarship on the Sino-Soviet estrangement, Donald S. Zagoria’s *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962) is the most balanced in examining all aspects of the relationship. Others include

G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Raymond L. Garthoff (ed.), *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1966); and John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963–1967* (New York: Oxford University, 1968). Jack L. Snyder, in his 1978 RAND Paper “The Psychology of Escalation: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1958–1963” (P-6191), offers an interesting analytical framework. He uses a cognitive-process model of decisionmaking to explain the Soviets’ choice of a strategy for pursuing their interests, which, he concludes, caused the Sino-Soviet alliance to collapse.

With Chinese material becoming more available and some Russian archives opened to scholars since the late 1980s, there have emerged sequential reexaminations of how the Sino-Soviet alliance fell apart. Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Odd Arne Westad, “Unwrapping the Stalin–Mao Talks: Setting the Record Straight” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6–7 (Winter 1995/96); Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); and Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), show how Russian and Chinese – as well as American and British – records can be integrated into one database, thereby to explore the political, economic, and military as well as personal and cultural aspects of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s and 1960s.

To trace ideological differences between Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders in the pre-People’s Republic of China period, see John Garver, *Chinese–Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet–American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Michael M. Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

The best interpretations in English of the Sino-Soviet estrangement from a Russian perspective are G. Ganshin and T. Zazerskaya, “Pitfalls Along the Path of ‘Brotherly Friendship’: A Look at the History of Soviet–Chinese Relations,” *Far Eastern Affairs*, 6 (1994); William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 243–48; Vladislav M. Zubok, “Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!’: Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1956–1963,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (March 1998), 152–62; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); M. Y. Prozumenshchikov, “The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” *CWIHP Bulletin* (Winter 1996/97), 251–57; and David Wolff, *One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 30 (2002).

Important works from a Chinese perspective are Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Jaser Becker, *Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine* (New York: Holt and Co., 1996); Mercy Kuo, *Contending with Contradictions: China’s Policy toward Soviet Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1953–1960* (New York:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); and Shen Zhihua, Yang Kuisong, Yu Minling, Lin Yunhui, Mori Kazuko, Dai Chaowu, and Li Danhui, *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations* at php.isn.ethz.ch/publications/areastudies/sinosov.cfm. In Russian, see Boris Kulik, *Sovetsko-kitaiskii raskol: prichiny i posledstviia* [The Sino-Soviet Split: Causes and Consequences] (Moscow: Institut Dalnego Vostoka RAN, 2000), and Vladimir Fedotov, *Polveka vmeste s Kitaiem: vospominaniia, zapisi, razmysleniia* [A Half-Century with China: Memoirs, Reports, Reviews] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005); both are overviews by participants at the time. See also the memoirs of former Soviet foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, *The Kremlin's Scholar: A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev*, edited by Stephen V. Bittner, translated by Anthony Austin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). In Chinese, Liu Xiao, *Chushi Sulian banian, 1955–1962* [Eight Years of Serving as Envoy in the Soviet Union, 1955–1962] (Beijing: Zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, 1998), and Wu Lengxi, *Huiyi Mao zhuxi* [Remembering Chairman Mao] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1995), are useful memoirs. Shen Zhihua (ed.), *Zhongguo guanxi shigang, 1917–1991* [An Outline History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2007), is a good introduction to scholarship in China.

See also sections 11 and 12 of this bibliographical essay for further suggestions.

18. Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962

McGeorge Bundy's *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988) provides a sophisticated account of the key decisions. Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) remains the best survey of thinking about nuclear weapons. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1945–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), provides a thorough account of antinuclear movements throughout this period.

Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959) remains one of the most astute analyses of nuclear strategy. Thomas C. Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) explores deterrence and the politics of threats with great acuity. Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), shows just how important accidents have been in nuclear history.

Several books examine Harry S. Truman's decision to use the bomb and its implications for US–Soviet relations: Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy. Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, updated ed. (New York: Penguin, 1985), is the classic revisionist text, first published in 1966; Martin Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Knopf, 1975), explores the impact of the bomb on US relations with Britain and the Soviet Union; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), looks at the decision to use the bomb in the context of the Pacific War and US–Soviet rivalry. Barton Bernstein has published a number of important articles on this topic, and a summary of his views may be found in his "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, 135–52.

On US nuclear weapons policy, the three volumes of the official history are fundamental resources: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. I, *The New World, 1939/1946* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and F. Duncan, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. II, *Atomic Shield, 1947/1952* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1969); and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953 1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989). Herbert York provides a lucid account of the development of the hydrogen bomb in *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, 1976). An important article by David Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," *International Security*, 7, 4 (Spring 1983), 3–71, describes the incorporation of nuclear weapons into US military strategy. Greg Herken explores the impact of the bomb on US policy after World War II in *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945–1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982). Dwight Eisenhower's policies are examined in Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

On Soviet nuclear weapons policy, see the documents now being published under the editorship of L. D. Riabev with the general title *Sovetskii atomnyi proekt* [The Soviet atomic project]. Since 1998, seven volumes have appeared (from various publishers) and several more are due. The documents cover the period up to 1954. David Holloway's *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) examines the development of Soviet nuclear weapons and the Soviet response to US nuclear weapons policy. A detailed analysis of the development of Soviet nuclear forces can be found in Pavel Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, in *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), examine Nikita Khrushchev's policies on the basis of the latest archival material.

For British nuclear policies, the official histories are indispensable: Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing assisted by Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952*, vol. I, *Policy Making*, and vol. II, *Policy Execution* (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Lorna Arnold, *Britain and the H-Bomb* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). A detailed account of the development of British strategic nuclear forces is given by Humphrey Wynn, *The RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces: Their Origins, Roles, and Deployment 1946–1969: A Documentary History* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1997). John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), provides a very clear analysis of the issues involved in the development of nuclear strategy in Britain.

Dominique Mongin, *La Bombe Française 1945–1958* (Brussel: Bruylant, 1997), gives a good account of the decisions leading to the French bomb. Maurice Vaisse (ed.), *La France et l'atome: études d'histoire nucléaire* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994), contains some helpful essays on French nuclear history. His *La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958 1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), is excellent on the Gaullist years.

Marc Trachtenberg's *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945 1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), provides a good account of nuclear weapons issues in Europe, and of the Berlin crises, in this period. Hope Harrison's *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2003) examines the Berlin crises in the context of Soviet East German relations. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), discuss different ways of thinking about the crisis. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, in *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), provide a detailed analysis of Soviet policy. Sheldon M. Stern's *Averting "The Final Failure": John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) carefully analyzes the tapes of the crucial meetings in the White House.

19. Culture and the Cold War in Europe

Scholars interested in European–American cultural relations can draw on a plentiful literature. For a general assessment of US cultural diplomacy, see Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: US Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Randolph Wieck, *Ignorance Abroad: American Educational and Cultural Foreign Policy and the Office of Assistant Secretary of State* (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1992); and Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

For US cultural diplomacy in Europe, see Henry J. Kellermann, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program between the United States and Germany* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978); and Manuela Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German–American Relations, 1955–1968* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).

Cultural imperialism and transmission since 1945 are the topic of Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1994); Rob Kroes, Robert W. Rydell, and Doeko F. J. Bosscher (eds.), *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1993); and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Cultural Transfer," in Michael Hogan and Thomas Patterson (eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 257–78. In *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), Victoria de Grazia argues that American consumer society constitutes the key conquest of the twentieth century.

Reeducation and high culture in the media are at the heart of Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); and David Monod, *Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans, 1945–1953* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Klaus Arnold analyzes East German broadcasting in *Kalter Krieg im Äther: der Deutschlandsender und die Westpropaganda der DDR* (Münster: LIT, 2002).

For analyses of US cultural diplomacy since the 1970s, see Hans Tuch, "Die amerikanische Kulturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik," in *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten*

Krieges: ein Handbuch, vol. II, ed. Detlef Junker in collaboration with Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach and David B. Morris (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001), 420–29.

The role of nongovernmental organizations is the subject of Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993). Historians haggle over the question of whether governments, NGOs, and secret services departed from a strict interpretation of “freedom” in order to funnel funds clandestinely to pro-American organizations. See Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003).

For European reactions to American cultural efforts, see Robert Hewison, *In Anger: Culture in the Cold War, 1945–1960* (New York: Oxford, 1981); for reactions to the Marshall Plan, see Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Brian McKenzie, *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); David Ellwood, “The Propaganda of the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War Context,” in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 225–36.

Assessments of German youth culture in the 1950s are offered by Kasper Maase’s *BRAVO Amerika: Erkundungen zur Jugendkultur in der Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre* (Hamburg: Junius, 1992); and Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und “Zeitgeist” in der Bundesrepublik der fünfziger Jahre* (Hamburg: Christians, 1995). For an introduction to the role of Hollywood, see David Ellwood (ed.), *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994). The role of American popular culture in East and West Germany is covered by Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

The number of comparative research projects on the cultural dimension of the Cold War remains small. For a methodological discussion, see Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War,” in Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 1–22. Though critical, Frederick Charles Barghoorn’s *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976) praises the imagination and efficiency of Soviet cultural diplomacy. A regional approach is offered by David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). David Caute’s *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) is excellent. The *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4, 1 (Winter 2002), offers a special issue on *Culture, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*. On Soviet exchange programs, see Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003). For East European interpretations of the cultural struggle between East and West, see Bradley Abrams, *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

20. Cold War mobilization and domestic politics: the United States

General syntheses of the postwar era usually address the Cold War's domestic politics, but several collections give the topic full treatment and debate the particular question of whether there was a distinctive Cold War culture. Anthologies offer the best sampling of the scholarship. Lary May, *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), was one of the first collections to debate the issue. Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert (eds.), *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), take up the question with fresh perspectives from a variety of subfields. Christian G. Appy (ed.), *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945–1966* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), looks at the cultural underpinnings of Cold War diplomacy in a variety of world areas. Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), adds an important international perspective to US scholarly debates. Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), is an adequate survey of the excesses of American Cold War culture. Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), is one of the best syntheses of the postwar era, offering an original interpretive framework through which to assess all dimensions of the early Cold War experience (and beyond).

Works that examine the domestic Cold War through the career of Senator Joseph McCarthy are plentiful; many are journalistic, but academic historians have tried to place McCarthy and his crusade in a broader historical context. One of the earliest collections to probe McCarthyism as more than the man himself is Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (eds.), *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974). More recently, Richard M. Fried has written two useful chronicles of McCarthyism's political and cultural impact: *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), is a good synthesis of McCarthyism as part of twentieth-century political history; *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Paganry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), is one of the few to detail how grassroots organizations practiced anti-Communism locally. Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998), argues a "many McCarthyisms" thesis, offering fresh insights on the American Communist Party's postwar activities and exhaustive research on the government's myriad modes of political repression.

Recent studies have broadened our understanding of the ideological and political crosscurrents surrounding the creation of the national security state. On the Harry S. Truman years, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Jonathan Bell, *The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), looks at the fate of postwar liberalism through analysis of state and local elections in the Cold War's first decade. For an analysis of how American antistatism shaped both the Truman and the Dwight Eisenhower administrations' domestic policy, see Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State:*

America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

The rise of a Cold War nuclear culture has been examined by social critics, historians, cultural-studies scholars, and linguists. An excellent introduction to the topic is Paul Boyer, *Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998). Margot A. Henriksen's *Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) uses a cultural studies approach to reveal a nascent "culture of dissent" emerging in response to the pursuit of nuclear supremacy. Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), examines the political debates and social movements that gave rise to the "duck and cover" programs of the 1950s. Allan M. Winkler, *Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), offers a good survey of postwar nuclear culture, extending the narrative to Ronald Reagan's presidency.

Scholars have explored how the Cold War intersected with and was shaped by other domestic political phenomena. Mary L. Dudziak was one of the first to suggest a connection between the race problem in the United States and its Cold War foreign policy. See her path-breaking article, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review*, 41, 1 (November 1988), 61–120, and her *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). For a broader sampling of the scholarship on race and Cold War foreign relations, see Brenda Gayle Plummer (ed.), *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). See also Plummer's own study, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). The Cold War's effect on gender and family ideals has received even more scholarly scrutiny. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), was the first to suggest that "containment" might apply to postwar gender and family relations. Joanne Meyerowitz (ed.), *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945–1960* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994), offers essays that challenge or reconfigure May's thesis on domestic containment. Similarly, Susan Lynn, *Progressive Women in Conservative Times: Racial Justice, Peace, and Feminism, 1945 to the 1960s* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993), reveals a robust women's movement pushing liberal reform at the height of the Cold War. Helen Laville, *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organisations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), highlights women's engagement in Cold War politics at home and abroad, despite the emphasis on domesticity.

21. Cold War mobilisation and domestic politics: the Soviet Union

The postwar Stalinist period is still a relatively unresearched area, but a lively literature is emerging. The fullest account so far of high politics is Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pyzhikov, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: SSSR v pervye*

poslevoennye gody [The Rise of a Superpower: The USSR in the Early Postwar Years] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001). For Stalin's thinking about politics, see E. Van Ree, *Stalin's Political Thought* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).

A general overview of Stalinist economic policy is provided in Timothy Dunmore, *The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy, 1945-1953* (London: Macmillan, 1980). On defense spending, see N. S. Simonov, *Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920-1950-e gody* [The Military-Industrial Complex of the USSR from the 1920s to the 1950s] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996); on consumption, see Julie Hessler, *A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Don Filtzer analyzes the effects of harsh economic policies on the working class, in D. Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism: Labour and the Restoration of the Stalinist System after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

The importance of nationalism in postwar Soviet ideology is analyzed in D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); and A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). For the "patriotic" campaigns, see Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace*; for the "anticosmopolitanism" campaign, see G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Stalina: vlast' i antisemitizm* [Stalin's Secret Policy: Power and Anti-Semitism] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001). The effects of these campaigns on science are analyzed in Nikolai Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); D. Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); and E. Pollock, "Stalin as the Coryphaeus of Science: Ideology and Knowledge in the Post-war Years," in S. Davies and J. Harris (eds.), *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 271-88. On the relationship between *politika* and *tekhnika* between the wars, see David Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-War Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

For accounts of foreign policy under both Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). Mark Kramer has produced a detailed analysis of the relationship between foreign and domestic politics the year after Stalin's death: Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1, 1 (1999), 3-55; 1, 2 (1999), 3-38; 1, 3 (1999), 3-66. See also Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

For the politics of the Khrushchev years, see W. Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (London: Free Press, 2003); and G. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). James G. Richter analyzes the links between foreign and domestic politics in his *Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). Helpful collections of essays include P. Jones (ed.), *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era* (London: Routledge, 2006); and W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev, and A. Gleason (eds.), *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). See also D. Filtzer, *Soviet*

Workers and Destalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953–1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), for a study of industrial relations.

On the popular culture of the postwar period, see Richard Stites (ed.), *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995); S. Frederick Starr, *Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Limelight Editions, 1994); and Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For discussions of youth culture, see J. Fürst, “The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Identity in Late Stalinism,” in J. Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London: Routledge, 2006), 209–30; and J. Fürst, “The Arrival of Spring? Changes and Continuities in Soviet Youth Culture and Policy between Stalin and Khrushchev,” in Jones (ed.), *Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 135–53.

For popular attitudes toward politics and the regime, see E. Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1947* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Mark Edele, “More than Just Stalinists: The Political Sentiments of Victors,” in Fürst (ed.), *Late Stalinist Russia*, 167–91, on the views of veterans; J. Fürst, “Prisoners of the Soviet Self? Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, 3 (2002), 353–75; P. Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones (ed.), *Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, 41–63. For opposition during the Khrushchev period, see Vladimir Kozlov, *Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhnev (1953–nachalo 1980-kh gg.)* [Mass Disorder in the USSR under Khrushchev and Brezhnev (from 1953 to the Beginning of the 1980s)] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999). Discussion of popular views of foreign policy in the latter part of the period can be found in A. G. Airapetov, “Politika razriadki i obshchestvennoe mnenie (opyt mikroissledovaniia)” [The Policy of Détente and Public Opinion (the Findings of Micro-Research)], in N. I. Egorova and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds.), *Kholodnaia voina i politika razriadki: diskussionnye problemy (sbornik statei)* [The Cold War and the Policy of Détente: Discussions and Problems (Collection of Articles)] (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2003), 54–66. Interviews conducted by the Harvard Interview Project can be accessed online at hcl.harvard.edu/collections/hpss/index.html.

Useful memoirs include: F. I. Chuev, *Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Feliks Chuev*, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974); and N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, foreword by Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed. by Jerrold Schecter and V. V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990).

22. Decolonization, the global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962

The starting point for all efforts to consider the relationship between the Cold War and decolonization is now Odd Arne Westad’s magisterial *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which explores the perceptions and policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the

People's Republic of China along with a host of actors in the global South across the twentieth century. Also critical for their larger and probing analytical sweep are Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korea War*, vol. II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

On high imperialism and its discontents, David B. Abernathy's *Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) is a useful overview. For pioneering explorations of imperial order that place the colonizers and colonized in the same interpretative frame, see Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

On the global dimensions of anticolonialism after World War I, Erez Manela's *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) is essential. On pan-Africanism and other forms of transnational solidarities, see Imanuel Geis, *The Pan-African Movement: A History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1974); Rebecca E. Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Penny von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Mary Ann Glendon, *World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001). The Bandung Conference awaits the attention of an international historian, but suggestive for its immediacy is Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Company, 1956).

On the larger contours shaping American, Soviet, and Chinese Cold War intervention in the global South, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006); and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

On the role of high modernism and economic development in the Cold War and decolonization, the following are essential starting points: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); David C. Engerman *et al.* (eds.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); and Michael Adas, *Domination by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

On Southeast Asia and India, see Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and the United States: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina

Press, 2000); Mark Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: European and American Commitment to Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mary P. Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961); and Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).

On the Middle East, see Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Nigel Ashton, *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–1959* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Nathan J. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa‘ūd, and the Making of US–Saudi Relations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002); Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004); and Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

On Latin America and the Caribbean, see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough’s *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Nick Cullather, *Secret History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and Stephen G. Rabe, *US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

On Africa, see Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940–1960* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); Robert Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004).

23. Oil, resources, and the Cold War, 1945–1962

Many of the volumes of US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, various years; also available at digital.library.wisc.edu), contain documents on oil and natural resources. Ian O. Lesser, *Resources and Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1989), relates control of resources to overall strategy. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin, TX: University

of Texas Press, 1979), and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, *When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1989), are useful overviews.

Jonathan E. Helmreich, *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), details British and American efforts to control world supplies of uranium. Thomas Borstelmann, *Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), explores how uranium affected US policy toward southern Africa. David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Weapons, 1939–1958* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), is valuable on the Soviet atomic project. Ralf Engeln, *Uransklaven oder Sonnensucher? Die Sowjetische AG Wismut in der SBZ/DDR 1946–1953* (Essen: Klartext, 2001), and Norman H. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), cover uranium mining in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.

The parts of this essay that deal with oil draw on David Palmer, *Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of US Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Nathan J. Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa'ud, and the Making of US–Saudi Relations* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), is very helpful on the 1950s.

Overall studies of the oil industry include Simon Bromley, *American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State System, and the World Economy* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1991); Neil H. Jacoby, *Multinational Oil: A Study in Industrial Dynamics* (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Edith Penrose, *The Large International Firm in the Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968); George Philip, *The Political Economy of International Oil* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994); US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975); and Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

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THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE
COLD WAR

★

VOLUME II
Crises and Détente

★

Edited by
MELVYN P. LEFFLER
and
ODD ARNE WESTAD



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837200

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First published 2010

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

The Cambridge history of the Cold War / edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-521-83720-0

I. Cold War. 2. World politics – 1945–1989. 3. International relations – History –
20th century. I. Leffler, Melvyn P., 1945– II. Westad, Odd Arne. III. Title.

D842.C295 2009

909.82'5–dc22

2009005508

ISBN 978-0-521-83720-0 Hardback

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Preface to volumes I, II, and III

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War has gradually become history. In people's memories, the epoch when a global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs has taken on a role very much like that of the two twentieth-century world wars, as a thing of the past, but also as progenitor of everything that followed. As with the two world wars, we now also have the ability to see developments from the perspectives of the different participants in the struggle. Declassification, however incomplete, of a suggestive body of archival evidence from the former Communist world as well as from the West makes this possible. The time, therefore, is ripe to provide a comprehensive, systematic, analytic overview of the conflict that shaped the international system and that affected most of humankind during the second half of the twentieth century.

In this three-volume *Cambridge History*, the contributors seek to illuminate the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War. We want to elucidate how it evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two World Wars and the interwar era. We also seek to convey a greater appreciation of how the Cold War bequeathed conditions, challenges, and conflicts that shape developments in the international system today.

In order to accomplish the above goals, we take the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs. We seek to clarify what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the conflict cannot be grasped without understanding how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomatic events, and strategic thinking. Consequently, we shall deal at considerable length with the social, intellectual, and economic history of the twentieth century. We shall discuss demography and consumption, women and youth, science and technology, culture and race. The evolution of the Cold War cannot be comprehended without attention to such matters.

The *CHCW* is an international history, covering the period from a wide variety of geographical and national angles. While some chapters necessarily center on an individual state or a bilateral relationship, there are many more chapters that deal with a wider region or with global trends. Intellectually, therefore, the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach.

The authors of the individual chapters have been selected because of their academic standing in the field of Cold War studies, regardless of their institutional affiliation, academic discipline, or national origin. Although the majority of contributors are historians, there are chapters written by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. While most contributors come from the main research universities in North America and Britain – where Cold War studies first blossomed as a field – the editors have also sought to engage scholars working in different universities and research centers around the globe. We have included a mixture of younger and more established scholars in the field, thereby seeking to illuminate how scholarship has evolved as well as where it is heading.

The *CHCW* aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralist in its approach. The contributors have deliberately been drawn from various ‘schools’ of thought and have been asked to put forward their own – often distinctive – lines of argument, while indicating the existence of alternative interpretations and approaches. Being a substantial work of reference, the *CHCW* provides detailed, synthetic accounts of key periods and major thematic topics, while striving for broad and original interpretations. The volumes constitute a scholarly project, written by academics for fellow academics as well as for policymakers, foreign affairs personnel, military officers, and analysts of international relations. But we also hope the *CHCW* will serve as an introduction and reference point for advanced undergraduate students and for an educated lay public in many countries.

The present *Cambridge History* was first conceived in 2001 and has therefore been almost ten years in the making. It has been a large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries. We have met for three conferences and had a large number of hours on the phone and in conference-calls. Most chapters have been through three, if not four, different versions, and have been read and commented upon – in depth – not only by the editors, but also by other participants in the project. In the end, it was the spirit of collaboration among people of very different backgrounds and very different views that made it possible to bring this *Cambridge History* to completion in the form that it now has.

While the editors' first debt of gratitude therefore is to the contributors, a large number of others also deserve thanks. Jeffrey Byrne, our editorial assistant, did a remarkable job organizing meetings, keeping track of submissions, and finding maps and illustrative matter, all while completing his own doctoral thesis. He has been a model associate. Michael Watson, our editor at Cambridge University Press, helped keep the project on track throughout. Michael Devine, the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, worked hard to set up the conferences and provide essential funding for the project. At the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the wonderful administrative staff of the International History Department, the Cold War Studies Centre, and LSE IDEAS provided help far beyond the call of duty; Arne Westad is especially grateful to Carol Toms and Tiha Franulovic for all the assistance rendered him during a difficult period when he juggled the *CHCW* editorship with being head of department and research center director.

Both editors are grateful to those who helped fund and organize the three *CHCW* conferences, at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Besides the Truman Library director, Michael Devine, we wish to thank the director of the Johnson Library, Betty Sue Flowers, the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, Christian Ostermann, and the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton. We are also grateful to Philip Bobbitt, H. W. Brands, Diana Carlin, Francis J. Gavin, Mark Lawrence, William Leogrande, Robert Littwak, William Roger Louis, Dennis Merrill, Louis Potts, Elspeth Rostow, Mary Sarotte, Strobe Talbott, Alan Tully, Steven Weinberg, and Samuel Wells.

Being editors of such a large scholarly undertaking has been exhausting and exhilarating in turns (and roughly by equal measure). The editors want to thank each other for good comradeship throughout, and our families, students, and colleagues for their patience, assistance, and good cheer. It has been a long process, and we hope that the end product will serve its audiences well.

Melvyn P. Leffler
and
Odd Arne Westad

Note on the text

All three volumes use the simplified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Cyrillic alphabets (without diacritics, except for Serbian and Macedonian), Arabic, and Japanese (modified Hepburn), Pinyin (without diacritics) for Chinese, and McCune-Reischauer (with diacritics) for Korean. Translations within the text are those of the individual contributors to this volume unless otherwise specified in the footnotes.

Grand strategies in the Cold War

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

Wars have been around for a very long time. Grand strategies for fighting wars – if by “grand strategy” one understands the calculated use of available means in the pursuit of desired ends – have probably been around almost as long; but our record of them dates back to only the fifth century BCE when Herodotus and Thucydides set out to chronicle systematically how the great wars of their age had been fought. We do have, however, in the greatest of all poems, mythologized memories of a war fought centuries earlier, none of whose participants appear to have known how to write. But they did know about the need to connect ends with means: “Put heads together,” Homer has wise Nestor admonishing the Achaeans at a desperate moment in the long siege of Troy, “if strategy’s any use.”¹

The ancient Greeks made no sharp distinction between war and peace. Wars could last for years, even decades; they could pause, however, to allow the sowing and harvesting of crops, or for the conduct of games. The modern state system, which dates from the seventeenth century, was meant to stake out boundaries that did not exist in the era of Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides: nations were either to be at war or they were not. But the boundaries blurred again during the Cold War, a struggle that went on longer than the Trojan, Persian, and Peloponnesian wars put together. The stakes, to be sure, were higher. The geographical scope of the competition was much wider. In its fundamental aspects, however, the Cold War more closely resembled the ancient Greek wars than it did those of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.

It is hardly surprising, then, that grand strategies dominated Cold War statecraft. They could no longer be deployed when military operations began, and retired when hostilities ended. Nor could such strategies remain static,

1 Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 371. For the illiteracy of Homer’s characters, see Bernard Knox’s introduction to this edition, 7–8.

for the Cold War's particular combination of limited violence with long duration required responding not only to the actions of adversaries but also to the constraints of resources, the demands of constituencies, and the persistent recalcitrance of reality when theory is applied to it. The grand strategies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies therefore evolved in relation to one another, much as competitive species do within common ecosystems.

Here too an ancient Greek provides a guide. Thucydides' great history of the Peloponnesian War gives equal weight to the strategies of all its belligerents, to the ways in which each shaped the other, and to the manner in which none escaped the unexpected. Even more strikingly, Thucydides does this with *us* in mind: he writes for "those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it."²

Stalin's grand strategy

Before there can be a grand strategy there must be a need for one: a conflict that goes beyond the normal disputes of international relations, for which diplomacy is the remedy. Because we know that the Cold War followed World War II, it is easy to assume that the leaders of the victorious coalition knew this too and were preparing for the struggle that lay before them. This was not the case. Indeed, it is doubtful that any of those leaders, prior to 1945, anticipated a "cold war" as we have come to understand that term – with the sole exception of Iosif Stalin.

We do not often think of Stalin as a grand strategist, but perhaps we should. He rose to the top in the Kremlin hierarchy by systematically eliminating rivals who underestimated him. He transformed the Soviet Union from an agrarian state into an industrial great power. He then led that state from a devastating military defeat to an overwhelming triumph in less than four years. When World War II ended, Stalin had been in power for almost two decades: he alone among postwar leaders had had the time, the experience, and the uncontested authority to shape a long-term plan for the future.

Stalin's strategy had several objectives, the first of which was to continue the acceleration of history his predecessor Vladimir Ilich Lenin had begun. Karl Marx had identified class conflict as the mechanism that would cause

2 Robert B. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, revised edition of the Richard Crawley translation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 16.

capitalism to give way to socialism and then to Communism, at which point states would wither away. But Marx had been as vague about when this would happen as he had been precise about where it would occur: in the great industrial societies of Europe. Lenin sought to hasten the process by starting a revolution from the top down in Russia, with the expectation that it would spark revolutions from the bottom up in Germany, Britain, and other countries in which workers were supposedly waiting to overthrow their capitalist masters. They had not done so, however, by the time Lenin died in 1924.

That disappointment led Stalin toward another method of advancing the Communist cause: he would industrialize Russia, and then use it as a base from which to spread revolution elsewhere. He undertook this process during the 1930s with little regard for the human or material costs. He also knew, though, that his accomplishments would mean little unless the USSR was safe from external attack. One could hardly expect capitalists to welcome the emergence of a strong socialist state whose goal it was to end their own existence.

This led to the second of Stalin's objectives: a fusion of traditional Russian imperialism with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Lenin regarded imperialism as the highest form of capitalism, but since capitalism was doomed he thought imperialism was also. He never saw the reconstruction of empire as a way to speed the destruction of capitalism. Stalin's strategy, however, required extending the Soviet Union's boundaries as far as possible, for with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan on the rise, the international environment was hardly benign. The most plausible justification was to claim all the lands the Russian tsars had once possessed, together with spheres of influence beyond them that would allow only "friendly" neighbors.

From this perspective, Stalin's apparent inconsistencies between 1935 and 1945 – his call for the League of Nations to resist the aggressors, his support for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War, his 1939 "non-aggression" pact with Adolf Hitler, his alliance with the United States and Great Britain after Germany attacked in 1941, his determination to retain his wartime gains after the war – reflected a single underlying priority, which was to ensure the safety of the Soviet state, the base from which the international proletarian revolution would in time spread. Imperialism now had a revolutionary purpose.

The third and final objective in Stalin's grand strategy was to await the self-destruction of capitalism. Stalin firmly believed, as had Lenin, that "internal contradictions" arising from an inability to resolve economic crises would produce rivalries among capitalist states which would eventually lead them to attack one another. The two world wars had arisen, after all, from just such

causes: why should there not be a third that would bring about capitalism's demise once and for all?

Until that happened, the Soviet Union would rebuild its strength, absorbing the new possessions victory had brought it while letting the United States, Great Britain, and the other capitalist countries stumble into the next war. It was a curiously passive program for a revolutionary, but it reflected Stalin's conviction that the forces of history were on his side: the "science" of Marxism-Leninism guaranteed it. At no point did he share the capitalists' interest in a stable postwar order. Such a system could only come, he believed, with a victory for Communism everywhere. It was in this sense, then, that Stalin anticipated a "cold war," and developed a grand strategy for conducting it.

Roosevelt's response

No equally comprehensive strategy for confronting the Soviet Union emerged anywhere in the capitalist world before 1945. One reason was the absence of a single manager for the global economy, Britain having relinquished that role after World War I, and the United States not having yet assumed it. The rise of authoritarianism in Italy, Germany, and Japan further fragmented capitalism. By the mid-1930s, the remaining European democracies were too preoccupied with the Great Depression to devise common approaches in foreign affairs – beyond the vague hope that appeasing the fascists might somehow satisfy them. Stalin's diagnosis in this sense was correct: divisions among capitalists prevented their devising a plan comparable to his own.

Despite their power, the Americans during these years were particularly purposeless. Woodrow Wilson had called, in response to the Bolshevik Revolution, for a new international order based upon principles of collective security, political self-determination, and economic integration. Before he even left the White House, however, the United States had reverted to its traditional posture of avoiding entanglements beyond its hemisphere. It thereby dodged the responsibility for defending ideas it valued – democracy and capitalism – at a time when no other state had the strength to do so. Franklin D. Roosevelt had hoped to revive Wilson's cause after becoming president in 1933, but he made domestic economic recovery the greater priority, while the appeasement policies of the British and the French left him little basis upon which to seek an end to American isolationism.

All of this changed with Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1939, the outbreak of war in Europe later that year, and the fall of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to the Germans in the spring of 1940.

By this time, Roosevelt had a grand strategy: it was to do everything possible to save Britain, defeat Germany, and contain Japan. That meant *cooperating* with the Soviet Union, however, because Hitler's invasion in June 1941 had made that country an informal ally of the British and the Americans. Germany's declaration of war on the United States following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor closed the circle, creating the Grand Alliance.

It was almost as if Roosevelt had foreseen these events, for from the moment he extended diplomatic recognition to the USSR in 1933, he had sought to bring it within a shared international system. He consistently assumed the best of Stalin's intentions, even when the Kremlin dictator – with his brutal purges and his cynical pact with Hitler – made this difficult. After they became wartime allies, Roosevelt deferred generously to Stalin's postwar territorial demands. But he also expected Stalin to respect an American design for a postwar world that would combine great power collaboration with a new set of international institutions – most significantly the United Nations – based on Wilsonian principles.

Was Roosevelt naïve? It is difficult to say for sure because his death, in April 1945, prevents our knowing what he would have done once it became clear that Stalin was no Wilsonian. We do know, though, that Roosevelt left his successor, Harry S. Truman, in a strong position to confront the Soviet Union if that should become necessary. Roosevelt had kept wartime casualties to a minimum, relying on the Red Army to do most of the fighting against the Germans. He had agreed to few, if any, territorial changes that Stalin could not have brought about on his own. He had doubled the size of the American economy during a war that had devastated the economies of most other belligerents – including that of the USSR – and he had authorized the building of an atomic bomb. Roosevelt's did not seem, to Stalin, to have been a naïve grand strategy.

None of this changes, however, a fundamental asymmetry. Roosevelt allowed for the possibility that a “cold war” might not happen. Stalin regarded it as inevitable.

Kennan and containment

But no grand strategy fails to produce feedback. What if Stalin's own brutality – the harsh nature of his dictatorship and the unilateral manner in which he had imposed Soviet influence in Eastern and Central Europe – should frighten other Europeans into settling their differences? What if the United States should commit itself to reviving capitalism and democracy among them?

For someone who used fear with such success in gaining and consolidating power, Stalin was strangely oblivious to the possibility that fear might rally his adversaries.

The chief wartime priority of the United States and Britain had been to secure the Eurasian balance of power against future threats like those of 1914 and 1939–41. Stalin shared that objective to the extent that it meant defeating and totally disarming Germany and Japan. By the spring of 1946, however, the Soviet Union itself seemed, to the Americans and their West European allies, to be threatening postwar stability.

Few officials in Washington, London, or Paris expected a Soviet military attack, but there were fears that war-weary Europeans – recalling the prewar failures of capitalism and democracy – might vote their own Communist parties into power, in effect *inviting* the Soviet Union to dominate them. The crisis was one of confidence, in the absence of which any positive program might prevail. The Truman administration had made it clear that it was not going to be another Harding administration: that however frustrating the European situation might be, it would not produce yet another American withdrawal from overseas responsibilities. But that was only a promise. It was not a strategy for countering European despair.

It fell to George F. Kennan, an American Foreign Service expert on Russian history and Soviet ideology, to show how such a strategy might work. Kennan agreed with Marx, Lenin, and Stalin that industrialized states held the key to power in the modern world, but he did not accept their view that capitalism carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Stalin's own system, he pointed out, contained more serious "internal contradictions." These included its lack of legitimacy – the fact that it had never risked free multiparty elections – together with the tendency of all multinational empires to over-expand, provoke resistance, and break apart. Here Kennan cited Gibbon on Rome.³ He could as easily have invoked Thucydides on Athens.

Democracy embodied legitimacy, Kennan pointed out, and that made it stronger than most of its practitioners realized. If they could muster the self-confidence in their institutions that Stalin claimed to have in his – and if they could keep remaining centers of industrial power from falling under his control – then future Soviet leaders could hardly continue to see history as on their side. The United States and its allies would have found a path between renewed appeasement and a new world war.

3 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1967), 129–30.

That was the *theory* behind what Kennan called “containment,” but it took leadership to put it into practice. This came in June 1947 when the Truman administration offered Europeans the resources necessary to rebuild their economies and revive their societies. The Marshall Plan’s beneficiaries in turn agreed to subordinate their historic rivalries to the common *European* task of reconstruction, integration, and democratization. That meant including an old enemy – the western parts of Germany then under British, American, and French occupation – within the new Europe. The United States in 1948 embraced a similar set of priorities for occupied Japan.

Stalin had not expected any of this because Leninist theory said it could not happen: capitalists were supposed to fight, not help, one another. Caught off guard, he authorized a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, denounced Yugoslav Communists for insubordination, and blockaded the city of West Berlin. These measures backfired: they ensured public support for the Marshall Plan within the United States, they hastened the creation of a democratic capitalist West German state, and they led the other European democracies to request inclusion within a formal military alliance organized by the United States. Meanwhile Josef Broz Tito’s regime in Belgrade survived – with discreet American help – thereby showing that international Communism could fragment, just as Stalin had expected international capitalism to do.

With the success of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the rehabilitation of West Germany and Japan, and the Yugoslav defection, Stalin’s strategy of exploiting capitalist rivalries lay in ruins. His “scientific” theory had run up against an emotional reality, which was that the Soviet Union frightened the capitalists – even some other Communists – more than the capitalists did each other. All that the Americans and their allies needed to do henceforth, Kennan claimed, was to wait for a Soviet leader to detect this fact, abandon his nation’s revolutionary-imperial aspirations, and transform the USSR into a satisfied member of the international system. History, it appeared, was not on Stalin’s side after all.

The global Cold War

Kennan too, though, failed to anticipate feedback, notably the risk that selective containment – protecting only the industrial regions of Western Europe and Japan – might not sustain self-confidence within the democracies over however long it might take for Soviet behavior to change. Self-confidence is an *emotion*, which Kennan hoped to produce through *rational* argument. So had Pericles when he advised the Athenians to rely exclusively on their

naval strength and the wealth it brought them, while watching impassively from atop their walls as the Spartans ravaged their countryside.⁴ Strategy depends as much on morale as on logic, and Pericles found the Athenians unready for the path he meant to follow. Kennan's experience was similar.

Containment, Kennan acknowledged, was like walking a tightrope. It was an economical way to cross an abyss, but it was important not to look down. That meant maintaining composure when Stalin succeeded – unexpectedly early – in building his own atomic bomb. It meant not worrying about Communist victories in non-industrial regions like China, where Mao Zedong had defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and was poised to take power. Neither of these developments significantly shifted the global geopolitical balance, Kennan argued at the end of 1949: deterrence would still work, Mao might not follow Moscow's orders, and even if he did China would absorb whoever tried to run it. The United States should simply stick to reviving capitalism and planting democracy in Western Europe and Japan – lest it too succumb, as the Soviet Union had, to imperial temptations.

But the Americans were no more prepared than the Athenians had been to suffer setbacks with equanimity. The Truman administration, under congressional pressure, had to agree to build a thermonuclear bomb, a weapon so powerful that war planners had no idea how it might be used. The president also commissioned a reassessment of containment, NSC-68, which concluded that no parts of the world were now peripheral, that no means of protecting them could now be ruled out, and that the existing defense budget was woefully inadequate. Then, in June 1950, the North Koreans invaded South Korea, a country whose defense no one in Washington had regarded as a vital interest. Now everyone, including even Kennan, believed it to be.

Historians have generally argued that Stalin blundered in authorizing this attack. He had not expected the United States to intervene; when it did military spending tripled, while Truman used the crisis to justify rearming the West Germans and stationing American troops permanently in Europe. From the Soviet leader's perspective, however, Korea also brought benefits. The United States suffered major military reversals there without using the atomic bomb. Chinese involvement ended any hope in Washington that Mao might become another Tito. And the war convinced Truman and his advisers that the authors of NSC-68 were right: any part of the world threatened or even apparently threatened by international Communism – industrial or not – would have to be protected.

4 Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides*, 98, 125.

So the Americans, like the ancient Greeks, lost the self-confidence to leave anything undefended. They gained in its place the insecurity that accompanies expansion: “fear [was] our principal motive,” Thucydides has the Athenians tell the Spartans. “[I]t appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you.”⁵ From a strategy meant to retain the initiative by distinguishing vital from peripheral interests, the United States shifted to one that yielded the initiative to its enemies. Wherever *they* chose to challenge, it would have to respond.

Stalemate: ideology

Therein lay the makings of a grand strategic stalemate, like the one that perpetuated the Peloponnesian War. Its roots lay in frustrated hopes: those of Soviet leaders that capitalism would collapse; those of American leaders that it would be enough simply to ensure that capitalism survived. The Cold War shifted now to strategies for breaking this stalemate, none of which proved decisive. Their effect instead was to stabilize and therefore prolong the Cold War – to transform it into a new international system that closely resembled a very old one.

The first of these efforts focused on reforming Marxism–Leninism. Stalin saw little need to make his dictatorship popular because he assumed that capitalist economic crashes and the wars they produced would do that for him. But as his successors watched the growing prosperity and political legitimacy of postwar capitalism, they lost any illusions that its self-destruction was imminent. Instead, they began wondering how their own system was going to sustain itself and spread its influence if it could not demonstrably improve the lives of the people who lived under it.

The problem became clear as early as June 1953 when workers in East Germany – the very class, according to Marx, that should have most welcomed Communist Party rule – instead rebelled against it. The Red Army quickly crushed the uprising and the hardline East German leader Walter Ulbricht survived, but the experience convinced Nikita Khrushchev, soon to emerge as the Soviet Union’s new leader, that “socialism” had to be given “a human face.” That meant disavowing Stalin and promising something better – even if still within the framework of a command economy and one-party rule.

5 *Ibid.*, 43. Compare with Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 445.

Conceding the necessity of reform, though, made it hard to control the pace. Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin's legacy – most dramatically his February 1956 “secret” speech – had the unintended effect of encouraging attacks on Soviet authority, for how could the two be separated? By the end of that year, Khrushchev had narrowly avoided a revolution in Poland, only to face one in Hungary that he suppressed by harsher means than Stalin had ever employed in that region. Meanwhile, an open border with West Berlin was allowing millions of East Germans to emigrate. When Khrushchev and Ulbricht built a wall to prevent this in 1961, they gave up any pretense that the people they governed preferred “socialism” over democratic capitalism. The Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe would remain, but only against the wishes of those included within it.

Khrushchev's reforms provoked an equally unanticipated response from the Chinese, a people he could not shoot down or wall in. It had been one thing for Tito to challenge Stalin and stay in power: Yugoslavia was a small country, and the Soviet dictator's influence within the international Communist movement remained dominant. It was quite another thing for the volatile and inexperienced Khrushchev to condemn Stalin without consulting Mao, the leader of the most significant revolution since Lenin's who now ruled the world's most populous country – and who had patterned his leadership on the example Stalin had set. With the Sino-Soviet split, the fragmentation of international Communism became irreversible just as the revival of market capitalism and democratic politics was also becoming so.

Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, Khrushchev's successors, did no better. Having encouraged reforms in Czechoslovakia, they concluded in 1968 that these had gone too far and ended them with yet another military intervention. It was the Soviet Union's right, they claimed, to intervene whenever “socialism” seemed to be in danger. But the Brezhnev Doctrine frightened whatever Marxist sympathizers were left in Europe, while Mao saw it as aimed at China and began preparing for war with the USSR. By the end of the decade, the Communist world had two centers whose hostility toward one another was at least as great as that of each toward the capitalists they had sworn to overthrow.

However well-intentioned it may have been, then, Khrushchev's strategy of reforming Marxism–Leninism instead diminished its legitimacy and shattered its unity. It showed that any withering away of state authority – or any wavering of resolve among leaders – could cause that ideology itself to implode. This was disconcerting indeed for ruling Communist parties because it suggested that change carried within itself the seeds of *their* own destruction.

Stalemate: nuclear weapons

Why, then, did the Cold War continue? Why did the Americans and their allies fail to confront a dysfunctional adversary and claim victory? The best answer is that this crisis within an ideology coincided with a quantum leap in the lethality of weaponry. By the early 1960s, tolerating a Cold War stalemate – even if one side lacked the legitimacy the other side thrived on – seemed safer than trying to end it.

The United States tested its first thermonuclear weapon in November 1952, but the Soviet Union quickly followed with one of its own in August 1953. Hydrogen bombs were at least a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs that had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki: it quickly became clear that their mass use might render the northern hemisphere uninhabitable. For only the second time in modern military history – the first was the non-use of poison gas in World War II – competing war plans came up against a common ecological constraint.

This danger discouraged the exploitation of vulnerabilities. The United States did nothing to assist the rebellious East Germans, Poles, or Hungarians – despite the fact that it had earlier aided the rebellious Yugoslavs. It assumed that the Soviet Union would fight to retain its sphere of influence in Europe, if necessary with nuclear weapons, and that the results would be catastrophic. It insisted that it would do the same to defend its NATO allies, and especially the exposed Anglo-American-French outpost in West Berlin. As a consequence, the political asymmetry that dominated postwar Europe – the legitimacy of democratic capitalism and the illegitimacy of Marxism–Leninism – did nothing to change its political boundaries, which remained frozen through the end of the 1980s.

There lingered, however, the lurking sense that there must be some way to extract advantages from nuclear weapons without actually using them. President Dwight D. Eisenhower thought that threats to use these devices might lower the costs of containment while deterring Soviet and Chinese challenges outside of Europe, but the results were unimpressive. Meanwhile, Khrushchev seized upon a rare Soviet technological “first” – the launching of an earth satellite in October 1957 – to claim that the USSR had surged ahead of the United States in strategic rocketry and to attempt to extract concessions from this feat. That strategy failed even more thoroughly than Eisenhower’s, though, because the Soviet Union had not in fact surged ahead, a fact the Americans soon confirmed from secret reconnaissance flights and later satellite photography.

The nuclear-arms race, then, reinforced the Cold War status quo, a fact made dramatically evident in 1962 when Khrushchev undertook one more effort to change it. In a risky attempt to redress the strategic balance – and to defend Fidel Castro’s revolution – he sent medium- and intermediate-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads to Cuba. He thereby brought the world as close as it came during the Cold War to a nuclear war, but in the end the crisis changed little. Khrushchev withdrew his missiles, the Americans promised not to invade Cuba, and the Soviet–American rivalry went on as before – except in one respect. The confrontation had been sufficiently alarming that Soviet and American leaders agreed tacitly not to use nuclear weapons again to try to break the Cold War stalemate. That was one promise they kept.

Stalemate: tails wagging dogs

The United States and the Soviet Union were not alone in seeking to shape Cold War strategy, however, and here, too, there were ancient echoes. One of the striking things about the Peloponnesian War is the extent to which smaller powers maneuvered the superpowers of their day. For in so delicately balanced a situation, small shifts in allegiance could make big differences.⁶ The same was true in the Cold War.

Small powers had several sources of strength during that conflict. One came from the simultaneous dismantling – in some cases collapse – of the great European colonial empires in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. All at once dozens of new states were appearing that had not yet taken sides in the Soviet–American conflict. Few, if any, could expect by doing so to tilt the global balance in any measurable way. But fears in Washington and Moscow had gone beyond the measurable: the critical balance was now a *psychological* one in which appearances meant as much as hard facts. That empowered regimes that only recently had lacked power.

If there was a grand strategist of tilt it was Tito, whose defection from Moscow and subsequent success in winning American aid first demonstrated the possibility of playing off one superpower against the other. He, in turn, became close to Jawaharlal Nehru in India and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, who also saw the leverage such a strategy could provide and encouraged other new states to embrace it. By 1955, the three of them had organized the “Non-Aligned” Movement: a Third World, as it came to be called, where

6 Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides*, especially 24, 365.

power resided in the possibility that the countries that constituted it might cease to remain non-aligned.

The United States and – later – the Soviet Union tried persistently to shape such choices through diplomacy, economic and technological assistance, even covert and overt intervention. Their successes, however, were problematic because none of these measures could prevent future defections, whether as the result of revolutions, coups, dissatisfaction, neglect, or simply the other side's offer of a higher price. The Third World, then, was both victim and manipulator of the "first" and "second."

Alliances – formal and informal – provided another way to transform weaknesses into strengths. States generally join alliances because they lack power: they have either sought protection or been forced to accept it. But if the leading nation of an alliance has lost the ability to discriminate – if it has put its credibility on the line everywhere by declaring everything vital – then it has passed the initiative to its weaker partners, who can often use that advantage to get what they want.

Hence Ulbricht in East Germany undermined Khrushchev's attempts to reform Marxism-Leninism by repeatedly warning that, if pressed too hard, his regime might collapse. Similarly, Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek on the Nationalist-held island of Taiwan coerced a reluctant Eisenhower into giving them security guarantees, on the grounds that without these the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists would attack, with devastating results for American credibility. Rhee and Chiang were hardly democratic allies – they were not even predictable allies. But by flaunting their weakness they made themselves, like Ulbricht, necessary allies.

The risks of *not* defending allies became clear in 1963 when the administration of John F. Kennedy decided to abandon Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. It thereby left, for Lyndon B. Johnson, a leadership vacuum he was never able to fill. Fearing that the North Vietnamese, with the help of their Soviet and Chinese allies, would take over the country, Johnson embarked upon a full-scale military intervention that would cost the lives of 58,000 Americans, an unknown but far larger number of Vietnamese, and would bring the United States close to domestic paralysis.

It later became clear that neither the Soviet Union nor China had authorized Ho Chi Minh's war against South Vietnam. In yet another demonstration of strength through weakness, he had acted on his own, confident that neither Moscow nor Beijing would disavow him. He was right: these large Marxist-Leninist states let a small one tell them what to do because they feared their own loss of ideological credibility if they failed to support it. Ho's

strategy produced impressive results. The long and costly war in Vietnam dissipated American resources and shook American resolve – even though, in retrospect, the global balance of power was never really at stake there to begin with.

One additional effect of the Vietnam War was to help mobilize a new generation of educated young people who were less prepared than their elders to accept the Cold War stalemate. Their energies manifested themselves, to be sure, in anti-war protests, but also in challenges to “establishments” everywhere: to governments, corporations, and universities throughout the United States and Western Europe, to Marxist–Leninist regimes that had suppressed dissent in Eastern Europe, even to the state and party bureaucracy in China, where Mao himself launched his destructive “Cultural Revolution” – a rare instance of an establishment igniting an insurrection against itself.

By the end of the 1960s, the grand strategic flexibility available to the Cold War great powers had narrowed significantly. Leaders in the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and even China found themselves frustrated in winning support for their ideologies, frightened by the prospect of nuclear war, worried about the solidity of their alliances – and even about the cohesion of their own societies. The Cold War was now not only a stalemate: it seemed to be diminishing the influence of the states that supposedly dominated it.

Détente: a failure of stabilization

Détente was a cooperative superpower effort to reverse this trend, but also a competitive superpower attempt to regain the advantage in the Cold War. It was, thus, the first grand strategy to reflect common interests in Washington, Moscow, and the capitals of their respective allies – beyond the obvious desirability of avoiding a nuclear holocaust. But détente was never meant to end the Cold War: instead its designers sought to set rules for what they all understood would continue to be a contest. What none had anticipated was that setting rules would sharpen the conflict.

By 1969, all sides had an interest in cooling off the Cold War. The Americans were failing in Vietnam. The Soviet Union had suppressed the “Prague spring,” but only by alienating ideological allies elsewhere. Sensing the unlikelihood of reunification, West and East Germans had begun easing tensions across the walls that divided them. And in China, Mao Zedong had convinced himself that the Soviet Union was now a greater threat to his country’s safety than the United States would ever be: his diplomatic revolution was about to over-shadow – though not yet end – his cultural revolution.

These converging circumstances made it possible for the new president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, and his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, to make the most radical shift in American grand strategy since NSC-68. They had several objectives: to get the United States out of Vietnam without appearing to have been forced out; to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on arms control, economic contacts, and the management of Third World conflicts; to open relations with China as a way of applying pressure in Moscow, and to restore presidential authority at home. By the end of 1972, it all seemed to have worked: Nixon had traveled to Beijing and Moscow, signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the USSR, come close to a Vietnam ceasefire, and won reelection triumphantly. It looked as though the Americans had become grand strategic wizards.

But the wizardry rested on shaky foundations. The Nixon–Kissinger strategy required a carefully controlled “linkage” of inducements with constraints – of sticks with carrots – leaving little room for leaks to the press, complaints from critics, or congressional oversight. It implied an equal distribution of calculable benefits to the United States and the Soviet Union, but their rivalry had long been propelled by incalculable fears. It expected saintliness on the part of the superpowers – that they would resist Third World temptations – but it did nothing to prevent Third World regimes from continuing to offer them. And it conflated stability with justice: the relief that would come from lessening the danger of nuclear war, Nixon and Kissinger believed, would overcome whatever resentments would arise from locking the Cold War stalemate into place.

None of these assumptions held up. Domestic critics assailed the Nixon administration for giving away too much on strategic arms, and for not having done enough for human rights. The president’s insistence on centralizing power led to abuses of power, with the Watergate crisis forcing his resignation in August 1974. Meanwhile, Nasser’s successor in Egypt, Anwar Sadat, had tempted the United States by expelling Soviet advisers from his country: when Washington failed to seize this opportunity, he attacked Israel, forcing an American-imposed settlement from which Kissinger excluded the USSR – a bitter humiliation for Moscow. That left Kremlin leaders with little sympathy for Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, when he and Kissinger tried to save South Vietnam from a North Vietnamese invasion in the spring of 1975, or when they sought to prevent Cuban and Soviet intervention on behalf of Marxist rebels in the former Portuguese colony of Angola later that year.

American unilateralism in the Middle East was not the only reason, though, that the Soviet Union went on the offensive in the Third World. Brezhnev

worked hard for détente and wanted it to succeed; but within the Soviet Communist Party and especially the emerging regional institutes – Moscow’s equivalent of think tanks – a new generation of experts was insisting that this was the time to seize the initiative. The United States had shown itself unexpectedly irresolute in Vietnam. The USSR now had the naval and air strength to project power into distant parts of the world. The Cuban revolution had shown that Marxism–Leninism could thrive in “developing” countries, and the Cubans themselves had become adept at playing Ho Chi Minh’s game: embracing causes – Angola was an example – which Moscow could not easily disavow. Perhaps history was again moving toward revolution, this time in Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, and Latin America.

So while the plans of Nixon and Kissinger, by the mid-1970s, had fallen into disarray, so too had those of the Soviet Union. The international Communist movement had long ceased to be monolithic; now leadership in Moscow was becoming pluralistic. Détente, which began as a joint superpower effort to stabilize the Cold War, instead destabilized the priorities of both superpowers. It was not even clear anymore what each side’s grand strategy was, much less how one might measure its effectiveness. The resulting confusion left a vacuum in which the long-observed ecology of the Cold War – the environment within which all of its antagonists operated – began to manifest itself.

Soviet strategic overstretch

One reason we still read Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War is that he allows us to see the underlying structural features of that conflict. One of these was dissimilar capabilities: the fact that Athens was a naval power while Sparta relied on a land army meant that neither could easily defeat the other. Structures in this ancient war, however, were never completely stable. If one side could master the skills of the other, or if one side blundered into situations that favored the other, then the stalemate could end. This happened when the Athenian assembly approved a land war in Sicily for which its army was ill-prepared, after which the Spartans found ways to harass and then defeat it by sea. Athens never recovered from this reversal of roles – this failure to respect structures that had sustained its power, even as it exposed itself to those that had favored its enemy.

Something like this happened to the Soviet Union after détente collapsed. At first the United States seemed weakened: Jimmy Carter’s administration found it difficult to devise any consistent grand strategy with respect to the USSR, while that country’s leadership appeared, from the outside at least,

to be increasingly self-confident. In retrospect, though, Carter and his critics were debating how to *adapt* American strategy to the realities of a post-détente era. Brezhnev and his colleagues fundamentally *misjudged* those realities, with far more devastating consequences.

Soviet leaders now concluded – as if to echo the Americans a decade earlier – that the global balance of power required demonstrations of resolve wherever Moscow's reputation might be at stake. Following the fall of South Vietnam and the unexpected success of the Angolan revolution, Brezhnev found it necessary to aid new insurrections that claimed to be Marxist in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. History seemed to be vindicating Marx in places Marx had hardly heard of. If the most powerful Marxist state failed to help history along, however, it might lose credibility with more militant Marxists like the Cubans while creating opportunities for renegade Marxists like the Chinese. It hardly mattered that the Yemenis, Ethiopians, and Afghans had only the vaguest idea of Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, and even Castroism. Like the Americans in Vietnam – and like the Athenians in Sicily – the aging Brezhnev regime lost the ability to distinguish what was vital from what was not.

Soviet interventions in these countries weakened what little support was left for détente within the United States, even though Carter had hoped to revive that strategy. They left Moscow's agents at the mercy of forces they did not understand: the analytical categories of Marxism–Leninism were of little use in societies dominated by warlords, tribalism, and deeply held but violently manifested religious convictions. And when the Afghan revolution began to fail, in 1979, Brezhnev ordered military intervention on a massive scale, at great cost to the Afghan people, to the Soviet Union itself, and to its own anti-imperialist reputation. He thereby empowered an improbable coalition that included the Afghan mujahedin as well as Pakistanis, Iranians, Saudis, Chinese, and Americans – who employed the tactics of Ho Chi Minh against Ho's former superpower ally.

Meanwhile, in another misjudgment of Cold War structures, Soviet leaders had abandoned their long-time policy of isolating Marxist–Leninist countries from the global economy. With the inefficiencies of that ideology having become obvious and with popular discontent growing, they had little choice by the early 1970s but to relax either authoritarianism or autarchy. They chose the latter, gambling that by importing technology and even food from the United States and Western Europe, they could buy the time necessary for yet another attempt at reform at home and in Eastern Europe – this time one that would *not* get out of control and have to be suppressed.

As it happened, though, Moscow lost control in another way. Capitalist credits left the East Europeans – apart from the enterprising Hungarians – with few incentives to undertake reforms: they simply borrowed the money to finance their imports. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, a major oil producer, was hooked on the artificially high price of that commodity brought about by the 1973 Middle East War, and that too induced complacency. As the decade ended, the Soviet and East European economies were much more closely tied to the global economy than they had been at its beginning. That solved some problems but created others: notably a contraction of credit when the Eastern Europeans found it difficult to repay their loans, and – even more devastatingly for the USSR – a sharp decline in oil prices during the early 1980s.

All of this took place as Soviet military expenditures were soaring, owing to the collapse of *détente*, the Afghan war, and support for Third World revolutions elsewhere. By some calculations, the USSR was spending as much as 25 percent of gross domestic product on defense – the equivalent figure for the United States, on a far larger economic base, was about 5 percent. Meanwhile, living standards were worse than they had been when Kremlin leaders first decided to reverse autarchy and risk integration into what was still a capitalist world.

The most surprising way in which Brezhnev and his advisers misjudged structures, however, had to do with human rights. The Soviet Union had long sought recognition of post-World War II boundaries in Eastern Europe, and in the spirit of *détente* persuaded the United States and its NATO allies to sign a formal agreement to that effect at Helsinki in the summer of 1975. In return, and with remarkable short-sightedness, Brezhnev committed his country to the principle that sovereignty could no longer shield brutality – that the manner in which a state treated its own citizens was a legitimate matter for international concern.

He did this in the belief that Soviet and East European authorities could easily contain whatever disruptions the concession might cause: it was more important to get the boundaries recognized. But no one had any intention of challenging boundaries in the first place. Challenging authoritarian rule, however, was now a legitimate enterprise, because Brezhnev's signature on the Helsinki Final Act formally endorsed the argument that the Soviet Union's adversaries had been making throughout the Cold War: that the people, not the party and its leaders, had the right to organize, vote, and thereby determine their own future.

Dissidents who had long hoped for reform could now claim it as their right, and within months their demands were sweeping the Soviet bloc. Several

circumstances prevented Moscow from crushing these movements as it had in the past. One was the economic dependence on the capitalists that had come with the abandonment of autarchy: any replay of Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968 would cause an immediate cut-off in credits, technology, and food imports, worsening an already deteriorating situation. Another was disproportionate military spending, which left little room – especially after the invasion of Afghanistan – for taking on still greater military burdens. But a third was what Soviet leaders had themselves pledged at Helsinki: a public commitment to respect precisely the processes that were eroding their own authority.

Each of these miscalculations – these failures to respect structures that had sustained Soviet power – became, for Moscow, what the Sicilian expedition had been for Athens: an ill-considered departure from a long-held strategy, with results that overstretched resources, exposed vulnerabilities, and thus handed enemies the means to break a long stalemate.

Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War

By 1981, the Soviet Union had many enemies: in China, where the twice-purged Deng Xiaoping had succeeded Mao Zedong and shown that a single-party Marxist state could indeed reform its economy – but only by moving toward capitalism; in Czechoslovakia, where the playwright Vaclav Havel and the movement he founded, Charter 77, were pressing Soviet leaders to honor their Helsinki human rights commitments; in the Vatican, where a papal conclave surprised the world – and especially the Kremlin – by electing a Polish pope determined to challenge Moscow's influence in Eastern Europe; in Britain, where Margaret Thatcher had become prime minister by attacking planned economies; in Poland, where a persistent Gdansk shipyard worker, Lech Wałęsa, had forced the government in Warsaw to recognize Solidarity, the first independent trade union within the Soviet bloc; and in the United States, where Ronald Reagan had become president after decisively defeating Carter's bid for reelection – with an explicit promise to kill détente.

The simultaneous appearance of so many adversaries suggests several things. One is a major failure of strategy in Moscow, since an obvious standard for success in strategy is to decrease, not increase, the number of opponents one faces. Another is that the shaking up of the Cold War stalemate – the destabilizations of the 1970s and the misjudgment of structures into which these lured the USSR – destroyed the sense of inevitability that had come to surround bipolarity: they opened minds to the possibility that a superpower rivalry was not the only conceivable way to organize the world. Still another is

that détente, which had been meant to institutionalize such a system, instead wound up de-institutionalizing it.

For it now had become apparent that détente could never end the Cold War: it could at best only make the struggle safer and more predictable. That was progress, but it still meant that half the world would live under governments it had not chosen. Détente's gravediggers – Havel, John Paul II, Thatcher, Wałęsa, Reagan – were determined to change that situation. Deng was content with it but sought something else equally radical: to make the world's most populous country a prosperous country. There was no common strategy in all of this – the anti-Soviet movement was too diverse and disconnected – but there was a convergence of strategies with a common objective. That was to move beyond the Cold War.

No one was sure, though, how this might happen. Many people still feared a nuclear war, not least the dying Brezhnev and his equally feeble successors Iurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Others hoped for a negotiated settlement, but the Reagan administration at first seemed uninterested, and even if it had been interested, the old men in the Kremlin would hardly have been capable of negotiating. A few prophets predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union but found it difficult to specify how or when that might occur. A few officials in Washington and London foresaw the possibility that a Soviet leader might emerge, as Kennan decades before had foreseen, who would sense the "internal contradictions" of his own system and seek to change it. But it was not at all evident, even to Kennan, how the Soviet system of the early 1980s, which had never been more set in its ways, could ever produce such a visionary.⁷

In the end, as often happens in history, all expectations were confounded. The nuclear danger was greater than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis, but Reagan turned out to be a nuclear abolitionist – the only one ever to occupy the White House – and upon recognizing the risks quickly moved to diminish them. The ossified Soviet system did produce a negotiating partner in Mikhail Gorbachev, who succeeded Chernenko in 1985, but it also produced much more: Gorbachev turned out to be the Soviet leader Kennan had hoped for. To everyone's surprise including probably his own, Gorbachev abandoned the Soviet Union's revolutionary-imperial aspirations and set out to make his state a normal member of an international system in which the Cold War itself would cease to be "normal."

7 John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 126–27.

But Gorbachev too misjudged a structure, which was that of the Soviet Union itself. It turned out that to give up its ideology, to relinquish its sphere of influence, and to acknowledge the right of non-Russian nationalities to secede – without at the same time transforming that state into a multiparty democracy and a market economy – was to hollow it out from within: Gorbachev left it no reason to exist. He could never bring himself to acknowledge that reality, but his successor, Boris Yeltsin, saw it clearly. For just as the visionaries of the 1980s understood that détente, having perpetuated the Cold War, had to be eliminated, so this visionary of the early 1990s concluded that the same was now true of the Soviet Union itself.

A Clausewitzian conclusion

The Cold War ended differently from the Peloponnesian War, indeed from all the other great wars of which we know: with the peaceful collapse – no surrender was necessary – of one of its participants. Grand strategies on all sides contributed to this outcome because none valued violence as an end in itself. Each respected the teaching of the greatest of all students of strategy, Carl von Clausewitz, who insisted that war must always and in all of its aspects reflect policy. During the Cold War, strategy went beyond this principle to substitute for war in most of its aspects. And so modern civilization – except for Marx and his ideological descendants – did not follow the trajectory of Greek civilization, which survived the Peloponnesian War only as art, ideas, and ruins.

No single strategy, strategist, or state was responsible for this achievement. Rather, they each adapted to and evolved within their common ecosystem or, where they could not, they accepted extinction gracefully. As a consequence, the Cold War resembled the past, but did not in all respects reflect it. Thucydides would not have been surprised.

Identity and the Cold War

ROBERT JERVIS

The question for this chapter is how Soviet and American national identities shaped and were shaped by the Cold War. Defining identity is not easy, however.¹ Is it the same as self-image or self-perception? How does it relate to ideology and political culture?² Can we treat national identity as singular in the face of internal differences? What evidence can establish the content or even the existence of identities, and how do we go about determining their causes and effects?

Although in the end perhaps we have to settle for the Potter Stewart definition of knowing it when we see it, more formally national identity can be seen as the set of values, attributes, and practices that members believe characterize the country and set it off from others. Identity is the (shared) answer to central if vague questions: Who are we? What are we like? Who are we similar to and different from? Identity is at work when people say "We must act in a way that is true to what we are," as Jimmy Carter did in his 1978 state of the union address when he declared that "the very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights."³ Identities thus carry

¹ For a good review, which also includes a discussion of methods for determining the substance of identities, see Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a Variable," *Perspectives on Politics*, 6 (2006), 695–712. For identity and political conflict, see, for example, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Consuelo Cruz, *Political Culture and Institutional Development in Costa Rica and Nicaragua: World-Making in the Tropics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

² The literature on ideology and the Cold War is extensive: for good recent statements, see Mark Kramer, "Ideology and the Cold War," *Review of International Studies*, 25 (1999), 539–76; Nigel Gould Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 (1999), 90–109. Important older treatments include Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), ch. 9; Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," in Alexander Dallin (ed.), *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 37–46.

³ See www.let.rug.nl~usa/P/jc39/speeches/su78jec.htm, 8.

heavy affective weight, and this helps explain why scholarly arguments about the Cold War are often very bitter because the stakes include what the Soviet Union and the United States are like or should be like.

Soviet and American identities

As the preceding paragraph indicates, identities are like stereotypes in being over-generalizations. With this in mind, I think it is fair to say that characteristics of the American identity during the Cold War included democracy; individualism and voluntarism as contrasted to strong direction – let alone compulsion – from the government; opposition to concentrated power, especially when wielded by the government; the belief in a supreme being that supplies meaning to life; and a faith that this model or “way of life” can, should, and eventually will be adopted by others as well. To say that the United States saw its model as potentially universal is not to say that it was viewed by Americans as yet widely shared. Quite the contrary: the idea of American exceptionalism is not merely an academic construct but has deep roots in American society. The United States was founded to be different from the rest of the world (meaning Europe), and it would or at least could remain uncorrupted. As Thomas Paine explained, “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”⁴ Much of this can be traced back to the fact that the thirteen colonies were dominated by a middle-class fragment which, as Louis Hartz argued, meant that unlike Europe the United States never had a bourgeois revolution or a strong socialist movement, and this in turn helps explain why the United States feared and failed to understand revolutions and radicalism abroad.⁵

The Soviet identity also held out its system as one that would eventually spread throughout the world, but its content was very different in being built around the proletariat, the centrality of class conflict, and the transformation of individuals and societies. As Stephen Kotkin puts it: “From its inception, the Soviet Union had claimed to be an experiment in socialism, a superior alternative to capitalism, for the entire world. If socialism was not superior to capitalism, its existence could not be justified.”⁶

4 Thomas Paine, *Basic Writings of Thomas Paine* (New York: Willey, 1942), 65.

5 Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955).

6 Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19. Melvyn Leffler sees the Cold War as a struggle in these terms: *For the Soul of Mankind* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).

An additional aspect of Soviet identity, one about which Soviet leaders were ambivalent, came from interaction with the United States. This is the Soviet Union as a superpower, equal in status and rights to its rival. The ambivalence stemmed from the fact that at least some Soviets associated being a great power with behaving like a “normal” state – i.e., seeking narrow advantage and exploiting others rather than behaving in accord with socialist principles. But as Soviet power grew and a global reach became possible, the sense of the Soviet Union as being an equal of the United States became much more important. It increasingly rankled Soviet leaders that the United States consistently upheld a double standard and denied them the right to do things that the United States did routinely – for example, intervene in the Third World, establish bases all over, and play a central role in the Middle East. The Soviets then bent their efforts less to restricting American activities than to establishing the right for them to behave in the same way. Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues placed great store in the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972 because it seemed to ratify their equality (Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not take the agreement seriously and signed it just to humor the Soviets); détente broke down in part because of disagreements over whether the Soviets could emulate American behavior in the Third World. Status as well as specific privileges were involved. As Kissinger put it in a memo to prepare Nixon for a possible meeting with Aleksei Kosygin: “It has always been one of the paradoxes of Bolshevik behavior that their leaders have yearned to be treated as equals by the people they consider doomed.”⁷

Symmetries and asymmetries in Soviet and American identities

Soviet and American identities had four major similarities or parallelisms, but they heightened rather than dampened the conflict. First, each implied a form of universalism in that there was nothing unique about the country that meant its values could not spread. Some countries do have identities that are bounded in this way. Thus, while the British believe they have a distinctive and highly valued way of life that has much to offer others, they do not expect the world ever to be entirely British. But for somewhat different reasons,

7 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” (undated), US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, vol. XII, *Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 603 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

neither the United States nor the Soviet Union felt this way: both were founded not on nationality or myths of blood and common heritage, but on ideas. The United States is famously a country of immigrants, one in which it was possible to be “un-American” by believing incorrect ideas. For the Soviets, universalism was built into the ideology from the start. There was nothing particularly Russian about Marxism, and indeed the triumph of this doctrine in a backward country was regarded as a fluke. Indeed, for the Soviets, and to a lesser extent the Americans, the validity of the founding principles would be upheld only if they triumphed elsewhere.

Second and relatedly, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw themselves as the standard-bearers of progress and modernity. It was taken for granted that historical advancement is real and that while there might be setbacks, other peoples would eventually follow the same path that they did. Furthermore, within the world and within each country, there were progressive and regressive forces, and the former deserved encouragement if not active support.

Third, in a break from traditional European thinking about international politics, both the Soviet and the American ideologies implied that states’ foreign policies were deeply influenced by their domestic systems. In the framework of Kenneth Waltz, they were “second-image” thinkers.⁸ A balance of power might temporarily yield peace and security, but because of the primary role of the nature of the domestic regime, the world could be made safe for democracy (for the United States) or for Communism (for the Soviet Union) only if it became dominant if not universal throughout the world.

Finally, perhaps because the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the result of revolutions, each was prone to expect and seek transformations of politics. For the USSR, the nature of the class struggle meant that gradual change was unlikely. Politics was not about small advantages and adjustments of interests, but about the basic question of *Kto-Kogo* – who-whom, who is going to dominate and who is going to be dominated. Transformationism was not as prominent an element in the American worldview, but President George W. Bush did not have to conjure it up from nowhere. As Steven Sestanovich has argued, during the Cold War the United States often reacted to setbacks not by limiting its goals or adjusting its tactics, but by seeking major changes, and this approach had deep roots in American history.⁹

8 Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

9 Stephen Sestanovich, “American Maximalism,” *The National Interest*, no. 79 (2005), 13–23.

These similarities created a malign environment. Most fundamentally, they meant that while temporary agreements were possible, especially to minimize the danger of war, deep and long-run cooperation was not. A second-image view of international politics implies that the international conflict can end only when the other's fundamental beliefs and domestic arrangements change.¹⁰

One shared belief restrained conflict, however, and indeed may have saved the world from war. Each side believed that time was on its side, and that if war could be avoided, the long term would bring not only survival but victory. The most dangerous combination of beliefs is short-run optimism coupled with long-run pessimism, which gives great impetus to preventive wars; fortunately, most of the Cold War was characterized by long-run optimism even as predictions about the short-run oscillated.

As important as these similarities are four asymmetries between Soviet and American identities. First, Soviet identity came from the top down, and it remains unclear exactly how much of it was adopted by the population at large. This made Soviet leaders wary of permitting contact between their citizens and outsiders, and indeed their worries were well founded. Second, the American identity was much less self-conscious than the Soviet self-image. The lack of American awareness gave a certain flexibility to policy and a resilience to its sense of self. Third, Soviet identity pivoted not on what Soviet society was, but what it could be, and, relatedly, on what it should lead the world to be. American identity, although also looking to the future, was based on a view of what American society actually was (of course an idealized one). Because the Soviet identity represented beliefs about what would develop, it could lead to grave disappointments. Fourth, Soviet identity grew out of an explicit ideology, one that both predated the Soviet state and was formed in explicit opposition to capitalism, the main force it would confront during the Cold War. American identity developed more slowly, and, although it could readily be pressed into service against the Soviet Union, originated in differentiation from Europe, and especially Britain, which was seen as tyrannical.

Perhaps the most important implication of the asymmetries was that domestic reverses and the failure of the world to move in desired directions would be corrosive to the Soviet regime and identity. This also helps explain

10 This is why I think the Cold War can be described as a "deep security dilemma" in which each side was an inherent threat to the other's security: Robert Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?" *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3 (2001), 36–60.

what I think is the fact that the American identity was left relatively unscathed by the Cold War. This conflict left its mark on US domestic society, politics, and economy, but sense of self was altered relatively little. Hartz hoped that its encounter with the world in the Cold War would lead the United States to better understand itself and the range of social processes operating in the world. This turned out not to be the case, however.

The theoretical context

At first glance, the disputes over the importance of identity as a cause of Soviet or American foreign policy would seem to be a classic example of what international relations (IR) scholars call the level of analysis question and historians talk of as “*Primat der Innerpolitik*” versus “*Primat der Aussenpolitik*.” Much traditional IR and diplomatic history argues that the main determinant of states’ foreign policies is their external environments. This means not only the general context of international anarchy (i.e., the lack of sovereign power above national governments), but also the particular landscape of adversaries and allies through which the state must navigate. The fundamental contrast is to arguments asserting that internal characteristics and domestic politics are crucial, that different states will behave differently despite similarities in their external situation, and that foreign policies are guided by domestic factors and often aimed at producing domestic change in others.¹¹

How identities operate

While identity is internal, in two crucial ways it operates differently from the factors discussed in the previous paragraph. By its very nature, an identity cannot be completely internal because it forms in response to others. To hold an identity is to set a boundary, to separate Self from Others, to exclude as well as include. Furthermore, the very act of separating people into groups, even without any rational basis, leads to an in-group bias. Conversely, conflict usually leads the actor to see the adversary in a way that maximizes contrast with it. Thus, differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, great as they were, were often exaggerated in the United States, especially at

11 For more discussions of the empirical implications of theories at different levels of analysis, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), ch. 1.

the start of the Cold War when differentiation was most necessary. Although the totalitarian model of the USSR had significant validity and was readily accessible because of the previous experience with Nazi Germany, its widespread acceptance owed at least something to the contrast it provided to American individualism, freedom, and lack of state control.

The links between seeing others as different and having a hostile relationship with them are reciprocal. To paraphrase Charles Tilly, "identity makes conflict, and conflict makes identity." Although more attention has been paid to the influence of identity on conflict, the reverse is at least as strong. Thus, while feelings of racial superiority may underlie much imperialism, the perception of racial differences and their central importance often follows rather than precedes conflict and domination. For the United States in much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when leaders or countries became targets of enmity or acquisition, they developed darker skins. Similarly, conflict can magnify, or even create, a collective sense of self. Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland deepened their communal ties and identity when they were attacked for being Catholic or Protestant; Bosnians had little sense of this as a meaningful category and held a relaxed view of Islam until they were driven from their homes for being Bosnian and Muslim. Identity can then come from how others define you.

In the modern era when states must claim and believe to be fighting for more than simple material advantage, the need to differentiate will entail both real and perceived changes. Thus, with the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs and Croats tried to develop distinct languages from what had been a shared Serbo-Croatian. They claimed to be purging "their" language of words introduced by the other and to be returning to the ancient and pure version but in fact often achieved the differentiation by developing new words. In the Cold War, each side shunned anything that smacked of the other. In the mid-1950s, in addition to adding the phrase "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance, Congress replaced "E pluribus unum" as the official national motto with "in God we trust," which was also put on paper money. Arguments against increased federal spending for education received added power from the association of central control of education with Soviet indoctrination, and measures of community that smacked of compulsion rather than voluntarism had to be avoided. Along with actual changes came perceptual changes and exaggerations. The degree to which American society was in fact individualistic was exaggerated and episodes and areas that were communal or communitarian were downplayed. The role of government, including state governments, in American economic development was slighted and the quality of American democracy was exaggerated.

The conception of democracy was also at least marginally influenced by the Cold War, just as American ideas on this topic had been shaped by previous encounters with enemies. For scholars in the 1930s influenced by the Great Depression, democracy had a significant economic dimension, and substantive outcomes were included. As the Cold War developed, scholars came to define democracy solely in terms of procedures such as competitive elections and a free press. There are good intellectual reasons for this formulation and it might have been adopted in any event, but it was no accident that it provided a sharper contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union than did the older one.¹²

Tensions, *détentes*, and identities: the limits of sustainable claims

If identities can be shaped by conflict, perhaps one of the root causes of conflict is the need of one or both sides to establish and maintain an identity, which is difficult to do in a relaxed international system. This need could be conscious or unconscious and could arise either from popular pressures or elite manipulation. We should then expect the Cold War to be at its most bitter when identity is under most pressure and, conversely, cooperative policies to be pursued when identities are secure. The argument is not without some plausibility, and we could see the early Cold War years as ones in which each side, having been challenged by world war and domestic upheavals, felt a loss of self and turned to a foreign enemy for confirmation and consolidation. But it is difficult to see later periods of *détente* as arising from secure identities,¹³ and counterfactuals illustrate how the supposed connections between posited identity considerations and foreign-policy behavior can all too easily be fitted to any history that unfolded. Had the United States and the Soviet Union reached out to each other in the early period, one could attribute this behavior to the social and psychological security that came from winning the world war, and if the Cold War had coincided with extensive immigration into the United States, this line of thinking would lead us to conclude that American elites conjured up a foreign threat in order to Americanize the newcomers.

12. Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and Us: America's Rivalries and the Making of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

13. Indeed, it can be argued that it was domestic unrest that forced the leaders into *détente*: Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

If the argument that conflicts are created in order to differentiate between populations and produce unity within them is too Machiavellian, the less extreme claim that conflict induces homogeneity is worth more consideration. This claim implies that conformity will rise and fall with international tensions. There is something to this, especially on the Soviet side. At the start of the Cold War, Iosif Stalin launched a campaign to denigrate the West and ensure that Soviet citizens had no contact with it. But we should not be too quick to accept the common claims for a parallel process in the United States. Although the stereotype of the late 1940s and 1950s is indeed one of conformity, it is far from clear that this is accurate. Abstract Expressionism, often held up as an example of the way in which the United States differentiated itself from the Soviet Union and sought to win over the Europeans by showing them that it had a significant culture, was transgressive and met with fierce resistance, not least from conservatives who strenuously objected to government-sponsored exhibits of it abroad.¹⁴ While McCarthyism policed the liberal flank of acceptable views, its success was less attributable to widespread domestic sentiment than to calculations and maneuvers by the mainstream Republican leaders.¹⁵ The foundations for the later success of the civil rights movement were also laid down in the early Cold War years, and Cold War concerns were largely responsible for the limited support for racial equality that was provided by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. International tension did not consistently solidify a narrow identity or slow social change in the United States.

The early Cold War years also saw heightened homophobia, justified in part by the claim that homosexuals were security risks, which was a self-fulfilling prophesy because as long as being gay was stigmatized, homosexuals were vulnerable to blackmail. But the subsequent changing course of American attitudes toward homosexuality does not track with increases and decreases in international tensions. Here as elsewhere, the influences on American culture were numerous and the Cold War was not the most potent one.

Even more strikingly, the economic policies not only of Harry S. Truman but even of Eisenhower did not maximize the differentiation from socialism. Although the onset of the Cold War may have diminished liberal impulses, the role of the government in the economy in the 1940s and 1950s looks very

¹⁴ Taylor Littleton and Maltby Sykes, *Advancing American Art: Painting, Politics, and Cultural Confrontation at Mid Century* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1989).

¹⁵ Michael Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967).

large from today's perspective, with vigorous anti-trust measures, a degree of economic planning, the consolidation of the welfare state, and high taxes on upper-income brackets. Many of the measures undertaken to meet the perceived Soviet threat increased federal direction of the society, most obviously the increased role of Washington in education, and an interstate highways project that literally reshaped the American landscape. Two general conclusions follow. First, international competition can lead to measures that do not easily fit with identity or can undermine it. Second, the fact that the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, has a relatively strong society and a relatively weak state means that many of the forces acting on it came internally, and, while not unaffected by the course of the Cold War, had much autonomy from it.

Identity and the standard view of the Cold War

Arguments for the importance of identity come through most clearly by contrast with what is the standard account, at least in IR, which is that the United States and the Soviet Union were "enemies by position," to use the felicitous phrase by Raymond Aron.¹⁶ They emerged from World War II as the only superpowers; no other state could menace them and each by its capabilities menaced the other. The normal frictions of international politics, the desire by each country to ensure its own security, and – perhaps – expansionism by one or both sides then made the latent Cold War manifest.

This story is not all wrong, but it is incomplete. First, although both the United States and the Soviet Union were potential superpowers by dint of their size, they were able to play this role only when they mobilized significant domestic resources and placed themselves at the head of their respective blocs, something that only followed their clashes. Second and relatedly, bipolarity may tell us that each superpower will view the other warily, but structure and even specific instances of friction do not automatically produce the degree of hostility and fear that characterized the Cold War. Would hostility have grown as it did if the two superpowers had had compatible identities? Third, while it is true that each side thought that the other was menacing its interests, only to some extent can we explain how each conceived of its interests by reference to uniform and unchanging factors of

¹⁶ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 138, see also p. 544. I am indebted to Marc Trachtenberg for noting that this phrase does not fully reflect Aron's views of the conflict, which is less deterministic than this.



1. Stalin claimed that the creation of NATO led to an enemy encirclement of the Soviet Union. Some Western cartoonists saw it differently; here is Leslie Illingworth's illustration from 1949.

international politics. Identity and interest can shape each other or even merge. Each side's interest in many questions was defined in part by its identity, and the interactions of the contending interests in turn affected each side's sense of self. While the competition for Western Europe can perhaps be understood in terms of the need for countries to contend for the potential centers of power, the conflict over the Third World is not explicable in this framework, and it is to this topic that we will now turn.

Conflict in the Third World

At first glance, it might seem that Soviet–American competition in the Third World can be readily explained by traditional IR theories.¹⁷ These tell us, after

17 For the best survey, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).

all, that major states struggle for power and advantage, that each will try to match what the other does, and that clients will be sought. Just as the European powers divided Africa and much of Asia during the period of imperialism, so the United States and the Soviet Union sought to spread their influence around the globe. But in fact the competitive logic of international politics does *not* lead to this conclusion. The most prominent IR theory, Waltz's neorealism, argues that because the superpowers were so much stronger than everyone else and able to balance against the adversary by mobilizing their internal resources, they did not need to pay much attention to the Third World.¹⁸

The power of identities and the related fact that each side understood the Cold War as a clash of social systems explains much here. With Europe and China having chosen one way of life or the other, the Third World represented the uncommitted states and peoples. What was at stake was nothing less than each side's view of the rightness of its cause, the universalism of its values, and the answer to the question of whose side history was on. Kissinger's reaction to Salvador Allende's election in Chile was particularly telling: "I don't see why we have to let a country go Marxist just because its people are irresponsible."¹⁹ The idea that an educated and sophisticated country would choose a different path was deeply upsetting for reasons that go beyond standard interstate power competition.

The Soviets felt that supporting revolutionary forces was not only good international politics because it weakened the adversary, but also a revolutionary duty. The whole purpose of the Bolshevik Revolution was to lead others to the same path. One of the great surprises in Soviet archives was that the elites spoke the same way in private as they did in public. Politburo stationery bore the heading "Proletariats of the world unite!" and while this did not mean that Soviet security was to be risked to help foreign comrades, this mission was a central part of Soviet identity. Class conflict was the driver of politics, and without its revolutionary mission the Soviet Union would have no convincing self-justification.

The sense of being on the right side of historical forces and the duty to help them along come out nicely in the Kennedy–Khrushchev discussions – a mild word for the exchange – at Vienna. To the president's plea that events in the

18 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); for a critique, see Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 118–22.

19 Quoted in Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 290.

Third World had to be managed so that they were not unduly upsetting to either side,

Mr. Khrushchev said that the West and the U.S. as its leader must recognize one fact: Communism exists and has won its right to develop ... The Soviet Union is for change. It believes that it is now in the political arena and it is challenging the capitalist system just as that system had challenged feudalism in the past. Mr. Khrushchev ... wondered whether the United States wanted to build a dam preventing the development of human mind and conscience. To do such a thing is not in man's power. The Spanish Inquisition burned people who disagreed with it but ideas did not burn and eventually came out as victors. Thus if we start struggling against ideas, conflicts and clashes between the two countries will be inevitable. Once an idea is born it cannot be chained or burned. History should be the judge in the argument between ideas ... Did the President want to say that Communism should exist only in those countries that are already Communist and that if Communist ideas should develop the U.S. would be in conflict with the USSR? Such an understanding of the situation is incorrect, and if there really is such an understanding, conflicts will be inevitable. Ideas do not belong to any one nation and they cannot be retracted.²⁰

Although Nikita Khrushchev may have enjoyed tweaking his younger and less experienced counterpart, there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, just as there is no reason to doubt that he shared the sentiment that Mikoyan expressed to him that meeting Castro made him feel young again.²¹

Since the Third World started out as non-Communist, if not always friendly to the United States, the main American objective was to keep it that way. Although it always hoped for the spread of democracy and American values, the primacy of blocking the Soviet Union meant that it was relatively open-eyed in its support of tyrannies when this proved necessary, as it often did. As President John F. Kennedy explained in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafael Truillo in the Dominican Republic: "There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Truillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the

20 Memorandum of conversation, June 3, 1961, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, *Soviet Union*, 174-76; for an interesting discussion of this conversation, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 243-48.

21 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), 39.



2. Communism and capitalism compete for attention on walls in Calcutta.

third.”²² The Soviets were also willing to be pragmatic and often supported friendly Third World countries that repressed the local Communist parties, such as in Egypt. But on these occasions they had to tell themselves that these regimes, as bourgeois nationalists, were historically progressive and would eventually lead to socialism. This helps explain their continuing faith in the Third World despite the almost unbroken record of disappointment.

Of course, neither side reacted to the Third World as it actually was, but to what they perceived, and each saw events and possibilities through the lenses of their own experiences, hopes, and fears. For both sides, modernization was crucial, but in quite different ways. The United States believed that revolutions and Communism grew out of poverty and despair. If countries could be launched on the path of economic development, and if the difficult years of destabilizing transition could be weathered, then they would begin to resemble the West. Walt Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth* was the clearest statement, but it was only one of a whole shelf of related volumes. The Soviet Union also placed great faith in modernization, which it was undergoing itself. The model of how it was leading its Asian populations to modernity was

22 Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 769.

particularly important to it. This produced optimism, the sense that many Third World regimes were or soon would be ripe for revolution, and led to the perception that many Third World leaders had the skill and will to lead their countries to socialism at home and alignment with the USSR. If the United States suffered from exaggerated fears, the Soviet Union held exaggerated hopes. Both saw the Third World through the lenses of their understanding of their own history.

Khrushchev, the thaw, and the Third World

Both Soviet identity and its response to the Third World changed more than the American, and this was not a coincidence. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was built on a less rigid view of the role of class and class conflict, just as the earlier perception of great threat from the capitalists made it seem dangerous to permit domestic relaxation. As Ted Hopf explains, acknowledging difference at home made the acceptance of differences abroad less threatening. When the distinction between workers and members of the bourgeoisie was taken to be either-or, with no mixtures or complex combinations possible, compromise was difficult at home and abroad; by making class only one of many possible identities for another state, the Soviet Union multiplied its possible relationships in the world.²³ The wider scope for what it meant to be a good Soviet citizen or to be on the path to socialism made it much easier for Khrushchev to see the bourgeois nationalist regimes as potential allies, as countries that were moving in the right direction rather than being irretrievably non-Communist. Indeed, local Communist parties could be sacrificed because the local regime was acceptable and a more progressive outcome would come in due course. Of course, there was more than a dose of hypocrisy and traditional international political calculation in this, but we may wonder whether it would have been possible without a change in the sense of what the USSR was.

The relations among the thaw, modifications of Soviet identity, and external relations bring us back to interactions. Identities are shaped by existing and desired relations abroad as well as shaping them. The realization that the Third World was the best ground on which to compete with the West and that this would be possible only if the USSR courted regimes that were constituted differently was conducive to constructing a less rigid Soviet

²³ Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 41, 92.

identity. What the Soviet *New Times* said in its retrospective survey of 1955 also characterized the changes in domestic attitudes: "The desire to find what unites countries, not disunites them, became a universally accepted slogan."²⁴ Similarly, the pressing need for relaxing tensions with the West in order to decrease the danger of war and gain access to Western economic resources and technology not only provided a strong impetus to peaceful coexistence, but also made it more likely that Soviet leaders would adjust their self-image to be consistent with the new policy. People want to think of themselves as principled and consistent, and so their beliefs about many things, including themselves, will be modified to justify their behavior.

Détente, identity, and the end of the Cold War

The relations between identity and foreign policy are brought out well by the 1969–1975 détente and the end of the Cold War, and to compare them brings us back to the asymmetry between the Soviet and American identities. What is most important for my analysis is the decline of détente, but this cannot be examined without some discussion of its origins and course. As usual, we know more about the American side, for which Vietnam was central. Nixon inherited a bloody and unpopular war and, like Lyndon B. Johnson before him, could neither win it nor afford a defeat. For Johnson and Nixon, what was at stake was the credibility of American commitments around the world, and the importance of credibility was greatly enhanced by a nuclear strategy that stressed the role of resolve and signals in producing deterrence in an era when nuclear war meant total destruction. This also meant that it was not so much defeat that was unacceptable as it was defeat of a type that would produce these unfortunate effects. Thus, if the Communists won not by pushing out American troops, but only after a decent interval following their removal, the harm to the United States would be less and the domino effects could be greatly attenuated. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union could be pressured into helping end the war, it might not take the American actions as indications of weakness.²⁵

Such a "soft landing" was also needed for reasons more closely related to identity, as an open defeat in Vietnam could undermine the self-confidence of the American public, and perhaps of US leaders. From the start of the Cold

²⁴ Quoted in Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, p. 94.

²⁵ For further discussions of US policy, see the chapters by Frank Costigliola, Robert D. Schulzinger, and Marc Trachtenberg.

War, the US elite worried that the public lacked the steady nerves that the struggle required and was prone to vacillate between defeatism and excess fear on the one hand and unwise bellicosity on the other. Defeats were particularly dangerous because they could lead to an over-reaction in either direction, and if the United States was to keep on track, the war had to be ended in a way that minimized its adverse consequences.

The Nixon administration also sought to limit Soviet advances in the Third World through the policy of linkage – i.e., making arms-control agreements, treaties formalizing the European settlement, and access to American economic resources contingent on Soviet restraint in the Third World. This assumed that the United States could afford to withhold these benefits if the Soviet Union did not cooperate. And that, of course, was the problem. Although in earlier periods the United States had resisted negotiating from a perceived position of weakness, Nixon and Kissinger had no choice. American opinion had turned against the war in Vietnam and it simply had to be ended. Furthermore, the war had undercut the domestic support for vigorous defense programs and measures to counter Soviet penetration of the Third World.

Soviet motives for détente both overlapped and differed, and also in part related to identity. For them, Vietnam was both a danger and an opportunity. The danger was that the war could spread, Chinese influence could grow, and chances for economic relations with the West would decline. (In fact, Soviet-American relations entered such a deep freeze that President Johnson and Soviet ambassador Dobrynin were reduced to discussing whether the Broadway musical *Hello Dolly* would be permitted to travel to the USSR.) The benefits of the war were equally obvious: the United States was wasting its efforts, dividing its alliances, and alienating much of the Third World. Furthermore, for the Soviets, Vietnam had intrinsic value as a revolutionary movement, and they had the duty to support it as this was the *raison d'être* for the Soviet existence. Even had it not been for competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC), it would have been very difficult for the Soviets to cooperate with the United States in a way that kept South Vietnam non-Communist.

For them, as for the Americans, the Third World was also important, but in a quite different way. As Brezhnev explained in 1976: détente did “not abolish or alter the laws of class struggle.”²⁶ The Soviets hoped that by stabilizing the

26 Quoted in John Soares, Jr., “Strategy, Ideology, and Human Rights: Jimmy Carter Confronts the Left in Central America, 1979–1981,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8 (2006), 59.

central issues of arms and Europe, détente would allow them to proceed with competition in the Third World from a position of equality. Being treated as an equal was both a necessary part of a robust policy in the Third World and a valued end in itself. The Revolution had truly arrived: Moscow was recognized as a power equal to Washington; the capitalists finally realized that Communism was permanent; this would now set the stage for its eventual triumph. For the Soviets, détente offered a great opportunity to confirm what they were.²⁷

The decline of détente

At bottom, détente failed because the two sides had incompatible expectations.²⁸ The United States saw the easing of tensions as a way to maintain the status quo in the face of American weakness; the Soviets saw it as a way to attain equal status and gains in the Third World. Although a variety of calculations, miscalculations, and accidents were at work, even under the best circumstances détente could not have brought the Cold War to an end because the United States and the Soviet Union, being founded on such different principles, were inherently a threat to each other as long as they were what they were. For the Soviets, there were then real limits beyond which détente could progress if it meant restraining itself in the Third World; the policies that were dictated by the Soviet conception of its interests and duties meant that it would be hard to maintain good relations for long in the face of US resistance.

It remains unclear whether Nixon and Kissinger pursued détente in truly cooperative terms and thought that it might be semi-permanent. This is the view expounded by Kissinger in the first two volumes of his memoirs and vigorously attacked by Raymond Garthoff, who argues that the administration never ceased pursuing unilateral advantage.²⁹ In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Kissinger dropped his earlier stance and endorsed Garthoff's, using the third volume of his memoirs to argue that he saw détente as a way of gaining breathing space until the public would support a harder line, and claiming that the United States made no concessions in the hope of establishing long-run cooperation. For our purposes, what is crucial is

27 For Soviet policy, see William Taubman and Svetlana Savranskaya's chapter in this volume and Vladislav M. Zubok's chapter in volume III.

28 For assessments of détente, see Jussi Hanhimäki's, chapter in this volume and Olav Njølstad's chapter in volume III.

29 Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

that Kissinger's second view implies that the USSR remained a revolutionary power, driven by its ideology and identity. Whether or not the latter view was correct, to the extent that American policymakers believed it, détente in fact could not have been permanent.

From the start, détente was opposed by neoconservatives who argued not only that the United States was getting the worse part of the bargain, but that the very notion of détente was flawed because it abandoned America's deepest ideals of supporting the forces of freedom throughout the world. Although some of the critics were opportunistic in seeking their own domestic political advantage, their stance was effective because it represented a strong reaffirmation of American identity and the parallel claim that the Soviets were driven by theirs. A détente that accepted a Communist Soviet Union was a betrayal of American values and would at most buy a temporary respite since it could not tame the expansionist Soviet policy that stemmed from its identity. Furthermore, such a policy would sacrifice domestic support because even if Kissinger, Nixon, and Gerald Ford were realists, the bulk of the American population remained truer to traditional American values.

Jimmy Carter's presidency embodied and magnified the contradictions in Kissinger's views. On the one hand, Carter and some of his advisers thought the United States had exaggerated the Soviet threat and believed that there was a great deal of common interest that could be realized through diplomacy – the United States and Soviet Union were, after all, normal states. On the other hand, he and others in his administration believed that the Soviet Union would press the United States wherever possible throughout the world, yet was vulnerable because its domestic system, which drove its foreign policy, was increasingly recognized as a failure. While this view was skeptical about détente, it recognized that a crucial lever could be American insistence that the Soviet Union grant human rights to its citizens. It appears that Carter's stance here was simultaneously instrumental and principled.

But even had Carter ignored human rights, détente probably would have failed. The Soviets saw a number of opportunities to support movements and states in Africa that they believed to be progressive, if not revolutionary. The United States was being forced to grudgingly acknowledge Soviet equality, and even if the Soviet moves harmed relations with the United States, this was a price worth paying. Some of the gains came in traditional power-political terms, but at least as important was the Soviet feeling that they could not be true Soviets if they abandoned the progressive cause. This played a role in the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan that gave the *coup de grâce* to détente. The

potential loss was not only of a client on their borders, but that a potentially socialist state would revert to the forces of reaction.

Identity and the end of the Cold War

The Cold War ended when Soviet identity shifted, and Reagan refused to reciprocate Soviet concessions until he believed that this was occurring.³⁰ This provides a fundamental contrast with the earlier détente. The change in Soviet policy and identity, furthermore, grew out of comparisons and interactions with the West.

Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues realized that the Soviet system was failing. But this failure was relative not absolute. The economy was not collapsing, indeed it was growing a bit. There was no starvation or privation, and despite the concern of Soviet military leaders, the large and secure nuclear arsenal was adequate to deter an American attack. The inadequacies of the Soviet performance appeared only when compared to the capitalist world. This had always been true, but in the past Soviet leaders could tell themselves that they were catching up. The contrast between East and West Germany was particularly striking since many of the other excuses of the weak socialist performance were implausible here. Furthermore, increased travel and contacts with the West meant that more members of the Soviet elite understood the situation, which undermined the leaders' confidence in their system and the beliefs that had produced it. Competition in the Third World by military activities, foreign aid, or serving as a model of development was obviously being crippled. Since the Third World represented the future, impending failure there cast doubt on Soviet prospects. Even more centrally, the knowledge that socialism had failed to out-compete capitalism struck at the core of Soviet beliefs about themselves and the world.

To reform the Soviet economy, Gorbachev needed better relations with the West in order to reduce military spending and gain access to Western investment and technology. Thus, he began a series of initiatives and concessions, mostly dealing with arms control. These were accompanied by a basic shift in outlook toward world politics, summarized in the phrase "new thinking." Whether these ideas were largely rationalizations for policies forced on him by pressing circumstances or whether they were autonomous and more freely adopted is heatedly debated but is of less importance here than the fact that the

30 For a similar argument, see John Mueller, "What Was the Cold War About? Evidence from Its Ending," *Political Science Quarterly*, 119 (2004-05), 609-32.

new thinking implicitly if not explicitly contradicted key elements of Soviet identity. Not only was lowering international tensions given priority over supporting progressive movements, but the sources of tension were located in the traditional dynamics of international conflict, especially misperceptions and spirals of unnecessary hostility and fears. In arguing that Soviet isolation and Western belligerence were largely brought on by ill-advised Soviet actions, Gorbachev adopted what IR scholars call a security dilemma analysis. Although not new to Western observers, this line of thought was not only innovative in the Soviet context but constituted a denial of the crucial idea that politics pivots around class conflict. Thus, at the XXVIIth Party Congress in 1986, for the first time there was no mention of the “world revolutionary process,” and by December 1988 Gorbachev abandoned talk of defending the “Socialist Commonwealth,” of supporting progressive revolutions, and of the dangers from “American imperialism.”³¹

Once Gorbachev and his colleagues concluded that they needed a solid rapprochement with the West, it was hard for them to maintain that the difference between the Soviet and American social systems had to be central to their relationship. So it is no accident that Yegor Ligachev, who opposed Gorbachev’s policies, claimed that “We proceed from the class nature of international relations. [Any other approach] only confuses the Soviet people and our friends abroad.”³² Once class conflict was dropped, little remained of the unique Soviet identity and mission in the world. Even if the Soviets thought that their system was more humane and progressive than capitalism, there was no reason to believe that Soviet security required keeping the West on the defensive, and little need to resist concessions on arms control or maintain Soviet clients in the Third World. As Marx and Engels had said, the revolutionizing power of capitalism was so great that under its influence “All that is solid melts into air.”³³

Gorbachev famously said that he was going to do something terrible to the United States – he was going to deprive it of an enemy. In fact, what is striking is how little the United States actually changed after the Cold War. While

31 Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 30; minutes of the Politburo, December 27–28, 1988, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 12/13 (Fall–Winter 2001), 24–29.

32 Quoted in Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 225.

33 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), 7. Of course, Marx and Engels were referring to the displacement of pre capitalist systems by the rise of the bourgeoisie, but the point seems to have more general validity.

Soviet identity was formed in opposition to a capitalist world, American identity did not need Communism, and the United States came out of the Cold War with little more knowledge of itself or others than it had at the start. Whether the American identity would have withstood prolonged reversals abroad or falling behind the USSR in economic and technological competition is an interesting question. Certainly, American self-confidence was shaken at a number of points, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But having deeper roots in its own society and history, the American identity had a resilience that the Soviet one did not. Although American society changed markedly during the Cold War, it is far from clear that it would have been much different had those years been peaceful or characterized by conflict with a different adversary. Furthermore, to the extent that American identity did change during the Cold War, there was a broadening of sense of self, a greater tolerance for diversity, and, at least until the late 1970s, the acceptance of a greater role for government in many spheres of life, just the opposite of what we would expect if the Cold War had led to an exaggeration of those features that separated the United States from the USSR.

It is not hindsight that leads to the conclusion that the asymmetries outlined earlier were crucial. Maintaining Soviet identity depended on the future unfolding according to plan: a cooperative worker's society was to be put in place, the Soviet Union was to modernize, class conflict would dominate until the workers prevailed, and the superiority of Communism would be demonstrated by overtaking the West and by the triumph of revolutions abroad. Until these hopes were dashed only limited *détentes* were possible, and these would be undermined by the refusal of either side to give up the competition. Conversely, when the hopes faded and politics was not seen as dominated by class conflict, there was no reason for the Soviet Union to either menace or fear the US, and once American leaders concluded that the Soviet domestic system was changing, issues that had bedeviled the relationship for so long were easily resolved. The Cold War ended only when one side's identity did; it could not have ended peacefully otherwise.

Economic aspects of the Cold War, 1962–1975

RICHARD N. COOPER

US objectives during the Cold War were to prevent Soviet attacks on the United States and its allies and to prevent the spread of Communism as a political and economic system to other countries, whether by force or by threat, subversion, persuasion, or bribery. The principal instrument to prevent attack was an extensive build-up of defensive and retaliatory military forces, combined with political and military alliances that extended US protection to other countries in exchange for their engagement and support. The principal instruments for preventing the spread of Communism by nonmilitary means involved building an international economic system conducive to economic prosperity; engaging in persuasion, providing incentives, and occasionally imposing economic sanctions; and, not least, promoting a robust US economy that could serve as a stimulant to others and as a beacon for the benefits of a free, enterprise-based, market-oriented economy.

This chapter will examine the second set of instruments, usually neglected by historians of the Cold War in favor of a focus on the actual or threatened military actions and the diplomacy associated with them. Following some introductory remarks, the chapter will discuss developments in the world economy and will highlight the comparative economic performance between Communist countries and what was called the “free world.” I will then analyze the actions taken by the United States, including public expenditures on national security and international affairs that were motivated, at least in part, by their international implications. Subsequent sections will consider US economic policies toward the Communist countries, toward US allies (mainly Western Europe and Japan), and toward the international economic system as a whole. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of actions toward other non-Communist countries, often loosely albeit unhelpfully called the Third World, where the competition was most visible. The main focus will be on the United States, which typically took the initiative, but other countries played important, somewhat critical, supporting roles.

Economic policy, broadly interpreted, was an essential complement to the policy of deterrence. In the end, the Soviet Union was not defeated in military combat, but rather it collapsed because of internal economic weaknesses that were increasingly evident to the Soviet people and, more gradually, to their leaders. These emergent internal weaknesses marked a sharp contrast to the robust performance of economies in the orbit of the United States and its allies – first in Western Europe and in Japan, followed soon by southern Europe and the four Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), with Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and others starting down the same successful path. It was increasingly evident that Communism did not work well economically – it did not deliver significantly higher standards of living to ordinary people – as became evident especially with the growing contrast between Eastern and Western Europe, between North and South Korea, and between the People's Republic of China (China hereafter) and Taiwan and Hong Kong. After some initial successes, the Communist countries became mired in inflexible systems of resource allocation and low levels of innovation in a world increasingly dominated by rapid technological advances. Not that all countries in the non-Communist world did well. But many did, yet after an initial spurt of capital-intensive industrialization, economic performance deteriorated significantly in all Communist countries. Gradually those countries in the non-Communist world that experimented with central planning and control drew away from it – including eventually even China and Vietnam, which remained under political control by Communist parties.

It is necessary to recall the high promise which Communism and central planning of the economy held out to many. Kim Philby, the Russian spy who was high in the British diplomatic corps, could still write from his Moscow exile as late as 1968 that he had no doubt that the verdict of history would be victory for Communism.¹ The battle of ideas was not decisive; but the cumulative experience was increasingly difficult to ignore. In the end, this cumulative comparative experience was at least as important in preventing the spread of Communism as was deterrence. And, of course, economic prosperity in the West made it easier to carry the financial burdens of defense, deterrence, and containment.

All this would become evident with the passage of time. In the 1960s, however, Communism was still seen as an aggressive, vigorous ideology, with continuing support from the Soviet Union but drawing also on indigenous

¹ Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 90.

revolutionary groups and idealistic new leaders around the world. Nearly every year brought forth some perceived new Communist threat. Fidel Castro's Cuba became increasingly Communist from 1960. The Soviet Union sent funds and advisers to the leftist prime minister Patrice Lumumba of Congo immediately following the abrupt abandonment of its colony by Belgium, threatening the break-up of that newly independent country, and leading President John F. Kennedy to take countervailing measures. The Soviet Union under Nikita S. Khrushchev tried once again to isolate Berlin in 1961, and a wall was built to prevent increasing migration of East Germans into more appealing West Berlin, thence into Western Europe. The Soviet Union tried, with Cuban encouragement, to place missiles in Cuba in 1962, leading to the Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, China, still (erroneously) considered by many Americans to be a surrogate of the USSR, fought Indian troops in areas claimed by India. In 1964, indigenous Communist groups were disciplined enough to emerge successfully from anarchy in the Dominican Republic, prompting President Lyndon B. Johnson to send in US marines to reestablish order and an interim government. In 1965, Communists in Indonesia staged a coup, possibly with the support of President Sukarno, threatening to take the world's fourth most populous country into the Communist "orbit"; it was brutally suppressed by Indonesia's army. In 1967, Syria, with Soviet encouragement and support, promoted terrorist raids in Israel, leading ultimately to the Six Days War in June. In 1968, Soviet troops marched into Czechoslovakia, suppressing the "Prague Spring" and ushering in the Brezhnev Doctrine. In 1971, a left-wing president, Salvador Allende, was contentiously elected in Chile. Even as late as 1975, Communists made a serious run at taking over Portugal after the collapse of the dictatorship there; immediately thereafter they tried to do the same in Angola, newly liberated from Portugal.

And, of course, the conflict in Vietnam ran right through the entire period. So while the Communists had few successes between 1960 (Cuba) and 1975 (Vietnam), they were vigorously pursuing opportunities around the world, always with encouragement and often with material support from the Soviet Union. President Richard M. Nixon could say to his senior officials in 1971 "the impressive thing about the Communist leaders is their total absolute conviction that they're going to win, and their determination to do everything to win."²

2 H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam, 1994), entry for September 13, 1971.

These continuing episodes provide a backdrop for the efforts by leaders in the United States, Western Europe, Canada, and Japan to attempt to assure economic prosperity, both through national policy and through international cooperation. The main components of the strategy were already laid down in the late 1940s, with Marshall Plan aid to Europe, trade liberalization through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and President Harry S. Truman's "Point Four," calling for aid to developing countries. Private US investment abroad typically followed, although it was not a reliable instrument of policy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, created in 1946, were also important features of the international economic architecture. The United States, with the sometimes reluctant cooperation of others, tried also to penalize countries within or too close to the Soviet orbit.

World economic performance

The 1960s was a decade of high global economic growth, perhaps the highest decadal growth in history. US growth was interrupted by recessions – declines in total production – in 1960–61, 1970–71, and 1975. The rest of the world continued to grow during the first two US downturns, but global output declined following the nearly fourfold increase in world oil prices in 1974, resuming in 1976. Inflation increased in the major economies in the late 1960s but remained modest compared with the acceleration of inflation associated with the two sharp oil price increases of 1974 and 1979–80.

Continental Western Europe and Japan, in particular, experienced extraordinary growth in the 1960s and early 1970s. This performance was no doubt influenced, in the case of Europe, by the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 and the trade liberalization that ensued within Europe, as well as by the global trade liberalization brought about by successive GATT rounds of negotiation. In particular, imports of merchandise into the United States, the world's largest national economy, grew by 170 percent during the 1960s, from \$15 billion in 1960 to \$40 billion in 1970. Both the fact and the prospect of selling into the large US market stimulated growth-enhancing investment in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.

The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies were also growing rapidly during this period. There are serious measurement problems for any growing economy whose structure of production is changing rapidly, and those problems become acute for an economy, such as the Soviet Union, where resource allocation occurs on the basis of quantitative targets rather than through market-determined prices. Moreover, official Soviet growth figures are

known to have an upward bias, due partly to some double counting, partly to the exclusion of the (slower growing) service sector. For all these reasons, considerable disagreement surrounds estimates of Soviet growth rates during this period. Thus, official Soviet figures, which undoubtedly influenced the perceptions and the self-confidence of Soviet leaders, show growth of 10.1 percent a year during the 1950s, declining to a still high 7.0 percent during the 1960s and to 5.3 percent during the 1970s. America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in contrast, basing its analysis on work by Abram Bergson and other American scholars, estimated Soviet growth rates at 6.0, 5.1, and 3.7 percent, respectively, during these three periods.³ On either measure, the USSR in the early 1960s was on a roll, reflected in the frequent exuberant boasts of the Soviet premier, Khrushchev. Growth gradually declined on both measures, and the USSR had increasing difficulty in maintaining its economic growth, and particularly its growth of oil production, the major source of hard currency export earnings as well as a critical input into the Soviet economy and military machine. Inability to innovate, or even to absorb foreign innovations, loss of discipline among Soviet workers, and failure to maintain installed equipment and to scrap obsolete equipment have all been given as explanations for the gradual but steady decline in economic growth.

Foreign trade did not fit comfortably into national central planning. In 1949, the Soviet Union formed the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) with its Eastern European satellites, and over time developed a concept of the "socialist division of labor." But it was never received enthusiastically by many of Comecon's members, there was no effective mechanism for multilateral trade or for balancing trade over time, and trade was not thoroughly integrated into the five-year planning process. As a consequence, trade within Comecon was limited (compared, for example, to that within Western Europe), although the Soviet Union was the major source of oil for East European countries and Cuba. Trade with non-Communist countries, sometimes occurring within the framework of barter agreements (for example, with India), sometimes carried on in "hard" currency (mainly US dollars), was even more limited – partly because of the unfavorable treatment of Soviet exports, to be discussed further below, partly because of the cumbersome and awkward institutional arrangements for trade within the Soviet Union.

Trade with non-Communist countries gradually increased during the 1960s and especially after Germany's *Ostpolitik* and the promulgation of détente in

3 Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure*, 6th ed. (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1998), 225.

Table 1. *Annual percentage-wise growth in gross domestic product*

	USSR	Eastern Europe	USA	Western Europe	Japan
1950–60	5.2	5.1	3.5	4.9	8.8
1960–70	4.8	4.3	4.2	4.8	10.5
1970–80	2.4	3.8	3.2	3.0	4.5
1980–90	1.5	–0.2	3.2	2.2	4.0

Source: calculated from Maddison, *The World Economy*, 275, 298, 329.

the 1970s. Exports by industrialized countries to the Comecon countries, partly on the basis of credits, grew from \$2.8 billion in 1960 to \$8.7 billion in 1970 to \$34 billion in 1975 to \$58 billion in 1980, before a cutback in the early 1980s following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁴ The share of market-oriented countries in total Comecon imports grew from 27 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 1970 to 46 percent in 1975. World trade grew modestly more rapidly than total Comecon trade, but trade within Comecon grew more slowly. The main earner of hard currency for the Soviet Union was exports of oil, whose price rose gradually in the early 1970s and sharply in 1974, thus improving its export earnings and its terms of trade. Prices of oil exports to other Comecon countries were raised only gradually, thus implying a subsidy to those countries, but oil exports over allotment were priced at world prices and payable in dollars, a practice that did not please the Soviet Union's fraternal allies.

Table 1 provides estimates of annual average growth rates in gross domestic product (GDP), by decade, for the USSR, Eastern Europe, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Several points are noteworthy. First, the USSR grew faster than the United States to 1970, raising Soviet GDP on one estimate from 35 percent of the US level in 1950 to 44 percent in 1975, before declining to 34 percent in 1990.⁵ Second, economic growth declined over time in all countries, but especially sharply in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, less markedly in the United States. Third, these

4 *International Trade 1975–76*, Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Table F.

5 Calculated from Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: Organization for Economic Development, 2001), 274–75.

measures are for total output, not consumption or standards of living. In the Soviet Union, 15 to 17 percent of GDP was devoted to equipping and supporting the military, and an even larger and growing portion was devoted to investment, which by all accounts was used very inefficiently. Thus, the high growth in output was not always reflected in equally high growth in consumption. After the Hungarian revolt of 1956, in which workers conspicuously participated, Khrushchev worried that the standard of life of ordinary Soviet citizens was not improving sufficiently. He therefore tried to cut down on military spending and redirected resources into consumer goods, particularly food production. Without formally reversing this emphasis on agriculture, Leonid Brezhnev increased military spending in the mid-1960s. However, Soviet standards of living increased respectably during the 1960s.

Fourth, a division of GDP by population yields output per capita, which showed Soviet “productivity” growing from 30 percent of the US level in 1950 to 38 percent in 1975, and declining to 30 percent by 1990. These figures are based on purchasing power parity calculations for the Soviet Union, which have always been problematic and contentious because of the absence of meaningful prices for Soviet-produced goods and services; it is now believed that they overstate the quality of Soviet goods and services, hence of Soviet GDP and output per capita.

Finally, post-1991 work by Russian economists has judgmentally lowered growth rates during the Soviet period even below those estimated by the CIA, from which the growth rates reported in Table 1 have been adapted.⁶ But Soviet leaders in the 1960s and early 1970s may not have been aware of this weaker performance, since production in sectors in which they were especially interested, such as steel, cement, and oil, were continuing to grow rapidly, and indeed by 1975 had overtaken that of the United States.

In any case, during the period covered by this chapter the Soviet economy was performing reasonably well, although market-oriented economies in Europe and Japan were growing even more rapidly, and in the case of Europe from a significantly higher base. Soviet leaders had reason to be confident in their economy – serious weaknesses showed up later – but also to be concerned about the long-term prospects of Communism as a method for organizing production compared with market capitalism.

6 Gregory and Stuart, *Russian Economic Performance*, 227.

Economic and other policies within the United States

President Kennedy was convinced that US policy toward the USSR, and toward the world, must be based on a robust US economy. On the basis of its lackluster performance in the late 1950s, he campaigned in 1960 that he would “get the economy moving again.” To that end, he proposed significant trade liberalization. To stimulate growth and domestic demand, he proposed an investment tax credit, and eventually a significant reduction in income taxes, which was finally legislated in 1964. As expected, economic growth improved, and indeed became too robust after the sharp buildup in military expenditures associated with Vietnam, such that President Johnson (belatedly) proposed a tax increase in 1967, enacted in 1968. As the economy grew, so did government revenues.

A government’s spending priorities can be found in its budget. Defense expenditures in the United States declined from a Korean War high of \$49 billion (13 percent of GDP) in 1953 to \$38 billion in 1955, and then rose gradually to \$45 billion (8.8 percent of GDP) in 1960 and to \$49 billion in 1965 (7.1 percent of a significantly larger GDP). The Vietnam War built them up to \$77 billion in 1968 (8.8 percent of GDP), whereupon they rose to \$86 billion (representing a sharp decline in real terms, because of inflation), 5.0 percent of GDP in 1976, and fell below 5 percent in the years 1977–79.

During this period, the United States also expanded its expenditures on “international affairs,” mainly foreign assistance, but also including the Peace Corps and the US Information Agency (USIA). In addition, Federal government expenditures on higher education increased under the National Defense Education Act, as did the space program, both launched in 1958. Kennedy promised in 1961, following the manned earth orbit by Russian Yuri Gagarin, to land a man on the moon “before the decade is out” – an achievement accomplished in July 1969. Kennedy wanted to reestablish the United States as being on the frontiers of technology in the eyes of Americans and of those around the world – not least in the Soviet Union. The expenditures of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) rose from nothing in 1958 to a peak of \$5.1 billion in 1965 before receding to below \$3 billion in 1974–75.⁷ These government expenditures did not impose severe strains on the US economy except during the years of the rapid military buildup in Vietnam in the late 1960s.

⁷ US Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1991* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office 1991), 597.

Trade and financial policy toward Communist countries

The use of economic sanctions was an ongoing feature of US foreign economic policy. In the context of the Cold War, specific sanctions were used against North Korea, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam. But they were also used against the thoroughly anti-Communist Trujillo regime of the Dominican Republic, against neutral India, and against Portugal, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States often resorted to sanctions when a foreign government's behavior displeased it. Other countries also used economic sanctions, although not so frequently as the United States, where members of Congress individually and collectively complained about foreign behavior and wanted to employ economic sanctions against the offending foreign government.

Specific sanctions were threatened, introduced, or tightened against Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), North Vietnam, Chile, and Kampuchea (Cambodia); they were relaxed against Laos. But it needs to be emphasized that the United States threatened or imposed economic sanctions twenty-six times during the period 1960–75, not counting US participation in United Nations' (UN) sanctions against South Africa (1962), Portugal (1963), and Rhodesia (1965).⁸

Before addressing specific episodes, we need to describe US trade policy toward Communist countries in the absence of specific sanctions. This consisted of three components: treatment of imports from Communist countries; controls on exports to Communist countries; and granting of official credits to foreign countries, for example, by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for the purchase of US agricultural products or by the Export–Import Bank for the purchase of US equipment.

The basic tariff legislation of the United States was (and in 2008 remained) the infamous Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. These high tariffs had been greatly reduced through a series of reciprocal trade negotiations, bilateral in the 1930s, multilateral (under the auspices of GATT) thereafter. Tariff reductions to any country were typically extended to other countries under so-called most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, both by US policy and as required by GATT for all signatories to GATT. The United States did not, however, extend MFN treatment to Communist countries (except Yugoslavia

8 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliot, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990).

and, after 1960, Poland). Thus, while the Soviet Union, for example, could export to the United States, its goods had to pay the typically high 1930 tariffs, except for those goods on the duty-free list, mostly raw materials. A combination of central planning in the USSR, with tight control over foreign trade, and high import duties into the United States assured little trade between the United States and the USSR and other Communist countries.

The United States also limited sales to the Soviet Union and its allies of military goods and of “strategic” goods that might have direct or indirect military application. This process started in 1948 and was formalized in the Export Control Act of 1949, which, with amendments, governed US exports thereafter. The United States also enlisted the cooperation of West European countries, and of Japan, in limiting such sales to the USSR and East European communist countries, and to Communist China and North Korea – covering both strategic goods originating locally and reshipment of such goods from the United States. An initially secret Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was established to agree on lists of goods considered “strategic” and to discuss enforcement of the export controls.

Like other countries, the United States had mechanisms for extending official credits or credit guarantees to foreign purchasers of US exports, through CCC, Exim Bank, the Defense Department (for credit on sales of military equipment), and the Agency for International Development (AID) or its predecessors (for foreign economic assistance to poor countries). In general, Communist countries were denied access to these credits, although occasional exceptions were made for CCC credits.

In addition to the “penalties” imposed on Communist countries affiliated with the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia was exempt after Josip Broz Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948), specific sanctions – effectively, a total embargo – had been applied to trade with North Korea after its invasion of South Korea in 1950, and to China after its entry into that war. Chinese and North Korean assets in the United States were also frozen, and all financial transactions between American residents and those countries required a license. These embargoes continued through the 1960s; that against China was relaxed following President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972; that against North Korea continued into the twenty-first century.

Trade with Cuba was partially embargoed, with increasing severity, starting in 1960, following nationalization of American-owned property, with inadequate promised compensation; the embargo persists (as of 2009), nearly five decades later. In 1961, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), with the approval of the Soviet Union, put an economic squeeze on West Berlin,

which was viewed increasingly as a disruptive island of growing prosperity surrounded by the GDR and an unwanted source of attraction to East Germans, many of whom worked in the western sector. The United States and its allies protested vigorously and sent additional troops; economic sanctions against the GDR were seriously, and openly, considered. In the end, the GDR backed off and instead built the infamous Berlin Wall between the east and west sectors of the city, closing West Berlin to East Germans, and the sanctions were not applied.

In 1963–65, the United States first threatened and then cut foreign aid and agricultural credits to the United Arab Republic (Egypt), following its intervention in Yemen, its alienation of Saudi Arabia, and its support for rebels in Congo. In May 1964, after Hanoi augmented its support for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the United States imposed an embargo on all economic transactions between the United States and North Vietnam and froze North Vietnamese assets in the United States – an embargo that was terminated only in 1994. In 1975, President Gerald Ford imposed a total trade embargo on and froze the US assets of Kampuchea (Cambodia), after the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Communists) seized power, sought to be self-sufficient, and forced many Cambodians into the countryside (and ultimately to their deaths).

The United States attempted to reward actions it considered positive as well as penalize countries that moved in the wrong direction. Thus, in 1960, the United States extended MFN treatment to goods from Communist Poland, as it had earlier done for Yugoslavia, as that country showed greater autonomy with respect to the USSR. Aid, turned off and on since 1956 as the Communist Pathet Lao moved in and out of coalition governments and attempted to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR and China, was finally resumed to Laos in 1962, following the Geneva accords; it was suspended again in 1975 after a takeover by the Pathet Lao. Although rigidly authoritarian, Romania increasingly distanced itself from the USSR, and gained MFN treatment from the United States in 1975.

This is not the occasion to evaluate the effectiveness of the sanctions, or the rewards. Suffice it to say that one detailed analysis found a mixed picture. Many of the sanctions were judged to have had negligible effect on their stated objectives, such as the long-lasting embargo on Cuba, which arguably contributed to keeping Castro in power for more than four decades. But others, such as the cut-off of critical agricultural credits to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, may have encouraged that country to pull back from its foreign interventions.⁹

By the mid-1960s, the time seemed ripe to improve relations with the USSR – what later was called *détente*. Kennedy and Johnson started the process, banning atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1963 and concluding the important non-proliferation agreement in 1968 to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Johnson had hoped also to start negotiations on limiting nuclear arms, anti-ballistic missiles, and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), but an upcoming summit in Leningrad was cancelled following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The process eventually led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) finally agreed at a Brezhnev–Nixon summit in May 1972.

Détente also involved increased East–West trade. As part of his bridge-building effort, Johnson tried to alter the discriminatory US trade policy in 1966, but failed to persuade the Congress.¹⁰ Germany's foreign minister (later chancellor) Willy Brandt inaugurated *Ostpolitik*, with tacit US approval. In July 1972, after Nixon's trip to China, the United States agreed to sell \$750 million of grain to the Soviet Union over the following three years (which was implicit acknowledgment that the Soviet economy could not by itself provide meat to its people on the scale desired). In October 1972, the two countries initialed a trade agreement that would extend MFN treatment to Soviet goods sold in the United States (which would have reduced US tariffs by on average about 64 percent, from 24 percent to 8.6 percent), while the USSR agreed to a significant partial payment (of \$722 million) on its 1945 Lend Lease debts to the United States.

Some Americans were concerned about the inability of minorities, especially Jews, to emigrate from the USSR. The Soviets responded quietly by allowing more emigration, rising from 400 in 1968 to 35,000 in 1973. Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–Washington) and Congressman Charles Vanik (D–Ohio) added an amendment to the trade bill that was then passing through Congress to the effect that MFN could not be extended to non-market (i.e., Communist) countries that restricted emigration. Soviet officials suggested privately that emigration might reach 45,000, but bristled at any open US intervention in what they considered their internal affairs. In the end, Nixon resigned over Watergate, the newly installed president, Gerald Ford, signed the Trade Act of 1974, including the Jackson–Vanik amendment (and a parallel

10 Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 472–73.

piece of legislation that restricted – but did not prohibit – Export–Import Bank loans to the Soviet Union). The USSR backed out of the 1972 trade agreement, and Soviet goods never received MFN treatment.

The Jackson–Vanik amendment is an example of the ability of a determined Congress to thwart an American president’s foreign policy. More generally, presidents must constantly seek at least the acquiescence of Congress for the actions they wish to pursue, and must work diligently for legislative support when additional funds are required.

The Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt of October 1973 led to an Arab oil embargo on the United States and a nearly four-fold increase in oil prices in 1974. This relieved the hard currency shortage of the oil-exporting Soviet Union and diminished its eagerness to receive MFN treatment from the United States.

Trade and financial policies toward allies

The economic dimension of Cold War policy was not confined to penalizing Communist countries or rewarding those who resisted the embrace of the Soviet Union. There was a more affirmative agenda. As often, its roots go back to the late 1940s. But the young President Kennedy became an articulate spokesman of the need for vigorous US leadership of an economically vital Western world. He sounded the theme in his inaugural address in January 1961. His first year in office was plagued by the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba and by the crises over Berlin and the Congo.

A major element of the world economic system was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, adopted by twenty-three countries in 1947, which promulgated rules to guide states in their trading relationships and provided a forum for reducing tariffs and other restrictions on imports from their high levels of the late 1940s. By 1961, this liberalizing process seemed to have run out of steam. Moreover, six European countries had in 1958 created the EEC, which when completed (in 1970) would become a trading entity larger than the United States, with a single negotiating authority. The United States desired the reluctant United Kingdom to join the EEC. With all this in mind, in January 1962, Kennedy proposed a bold new round of trade negotiations. In contrast to earlier multilateral negotiations, he wanted to cut tariffs (with selected exceptions) across the board by to 50–100 percent on products for which the United States and the EEC together accounted for more than 80 percent of world exports. This was a respectable list if the UK joined the EEC, but not otherwise. It provided for elimination of duties on

tropical products. And, domestically, it called for the first time for adjustment assistance for firms and workers who were hurt by the trade liberalization.

Kennedy cited five important changes in the world as reasons for proposing legislation, one of which was the “communist aid and trade offensive.” The Soviet bloc had trebled its trade with forty-one non-Communist developing countries, and Soviet trade missions had been active around the world. Kennedy’s trade proposal was to be his top legislative priority in 1962. It created the basis for the subsequent Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. The president identified the basis for the subsequent Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. The president identified seven benefits expected to flow from the legislation and subsequent trade liberalization. The first three concerned benefits to the US economy, including enhancing its capacity to bear burdens of defense, as well as that of its allies. The remaining four reasons – promoting the strength and unity of the West, proving the superiority of free choice, aiding developing nations, and maintaining US leadership of the free world – were suffused with references to competition with the “Sino-Soviet world” and the importance of a liberal trading regime for winning that competition.

The results of the Kennedy Round, concluded in 1967, were less than hoped for, but nonetheless impressive. Britain did not join the EEC until 1973, delayed by a veto by President Charles de Gaulle of France. As a result, the provision for elimination of tariffs on manufacturing goods went unused. But tariffs were reduced by an average of about 35 percent on \$40 billion of world trade in the base year, 1964. Above all, it was a successful cooperative venture, overcoming parochial domestic interests, and bringing the “free world” closer together economically.

President Johnson faced the domestic challenge of ensuring civil rights to American blacks and the domestic objective of introducing publicly financed medical care for the aged and the poor – furtherance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, as he saw it. Apart from relations with the Soviet Union and the escalating conflict in Vietnam, Johnson faced the challenge – as did other Europeans – of dealing with de Gaulle’s aspirations and ambitions for establishing France’s independence of the United States and its primacy in Europe. De Gaulle aggressively questioned the international role of the dollar in early 1965 and withdrew French forces from NATO’s integrated command (but did not withdraw from NATO) in March 1966. De Gaulle had earlier vetoed Britain’s application for EEC membership and had stymied the EEC by prohibiting his ministers from attending the decisionmaking Council of Ministers. De Gaulle desired France to have a relationship with the Soviet

Union independent of, and different from, that of the United States and other European countries. The Soviets responded politely but warily. Their main concern was with Germany, and they flirted with various ideas for weaning Germany away from the Western alliance. Johnson worked hard (and successfully) to keep Germany firmly with the West, even while making overtures to the Soviet Union on non-proliferation (which would effectively deny Germany nuclear weapons) and on strategic arms control.

Johnson unsuccessfully sought new tariff-negotiating authority in May 1968. President Richard Nixon, breaking with the protectionist tradition in the Republican Party and reflecting his view of America's proper role in the world, renewed the request in November 1969. New authority was finally granted by Congress in December 1974 (after Nixon had resigned), which provided the basis for US participation in the next major trade-liberalizing round of multilateral negotiations, the Tokyo Round, begun in 1973 and concluded in 1979.

The other main strand of post-1960 foreign economic policy with respect to Europe was mainly defensive. In 1944, forty-four nations had agreed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to postwar rules governing financial transactions among countries, and to the creation of two new implementing institutions, the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later known as the World Bank). The rules *inter alia* required restriction-free access to currency for current account transactions (for example, trade and travel), nearly fixed exchange rates among currencies, and currency convertibility into gold for monetary authorities (but not for ordinary citizens), a commitment adopted only by the United States. As the Bretton Woods system came under increasing strain after the late 1950s, one strand of US policy was to avoid a collapse of this system. Various currencies, including the US dollar, came under pressure from time to time, and adjustments had to be made to deal with imbalances in international payments. The main thrust of US policy during the 1960s was to pursue actions that forestalled a serious financial crisis while still preserving high-priority US objectives, which included maintaining the Atlantic alliance, keeping British and US troops in Germany, extending an open trading system, and pursuing the non-proliferation treaty and other initiatives. The cooperation of other countries was required, and the United States did not want to jeopardize that cooperation. Thus, a series of temporizing measures were taken to head off periodic US payments crises. As President Johnson once said to a startled William McChesney Martin, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, "I will not deflate the American economy, screw up foreign policy by gutting aid

or pulling troops out, or go protectionist just so we can continue to pay out gold to the French at \$35 an ounce.”¹¹

One mechanism for supporting countries in financial trouble, especially if the trouble was due to currency speculation on a change in the official exchange rate, was to provide short-term credit to the country's monetary authorities enabling them to ride out the speculation until it reversed. Thus, a mechanism was put in place to provide such credits, partly by the US Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund, partly through “swap” lines extended by the Federal Reserve System to other central banks. Through these mechanisms the United States provided short-term credits to Canada (1962, 1968), Italy (1963–64, 1975), Britain (many times), and France (1968, 1969). If the short-term credits could not be repaid quickly from reversals of speculative capital flows, they could be repaid by drawing on the IMF, another cooperative arrangement, for longer-term credit.

Britain's budget and balance of payments were so heavily burdened that Prime Minister Harold Wilson considered not only pulling British troops east of Suez into Britain, which was ultimately done, but also cutting significantly the British Army on the Rhine. If he had done so, he would have increased pressure in the United States to reduce its own forces in Germany and elsewhere in NATO, actions that were already being advocated in the US Senate, especially by Senator Mike Mansfield (D–Montana), during a period of intense fighting in South Vietnam. In addition to short-term financial support to Britain, the United States, itself facing financial pressure, launched in 1967 a tripartite burden-sharing discussion with Britain and Germany. The three governments worked out financial arrangements that increased German purchases in Britain and, secondarily, in the United States. These accords deflected pressure in both countries to reduce troop levels in Germany.

The leading Western countries, joined by all members of the IMF, also agreed on a major reform of the international monetary system. They created a new, international money (for monetary authorities), the Special Drawing Right (SDR). The financial journalists dubbed it “paper gold” because it was to replace gradually the international monetary role of gold and ease the demand for dollars by central banks. The SDR was seen at the time as a major step forward toward international monetary cooperation, although it subsequently failed to live up to expectations.

¹¹ As paraphrased by Francis M. Bator, “Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy: The Case of Western Europe and the Soviet Union,” in Aaron Lobel (ed.), *Presidential Judgment: Foreign Policy Making in the White House* (Hollis, NH: Hollis Publishing, 2001), 175.

Britain's balance-of-payments problems were eased following a 14 percent devaluation of the pound in November 1967. US balance-of-payments problems came to a head in August 1971, when President Nixon ceased convertibility of the US dollar into gold (for foreign monetary authorities). At the same time, he imposed a wage/price freeze in the United States to stop the momentum of inflationary pressures that had built up in the preceding four years, and levied a 10 percent surcharge on all dutiable imports into the United States – the last mainly to force other countries to negotiate seriously on a realignment of exchange rates. These tense negotiations were concluded in December 1971 with the Smithsonian agreement. It realigned exchange rates of the leading currencies against the dollar and provided for an increase in the official dollar price of gold. However, pressures continued in foreign exchange markets, and in March 1973 major currencies were allowed to float against the US dollar (Canada and Britain had earlier switched to floating exchange rates). Continental Europeans struggled to maintain a higher degree of exchange rate stability among their currencies, leading to the European monetary system in 1979 and eventually to a common European currency in 1999.

Thus, in the early 1970s, two key features of the Bretton Woods system were abandoned: gold convertibility of the dollar and fixed exchange rates among major currencies (many other countries around the world maintained fixed exchange rates with respect to the dollar, the French franc, the British pound, or some other currency). This traumatic period of financial turmoil prompted serious discussions of reform of the international monetary system, which in some respects has not matured even in the early twenty-first century, but those issues lie outside a discussion of the Cold War, except insofar as they affected Western cohesion and prosperity. Despite occasional monetary turmoil, the Western economies generally performed well, as noted above.

Economic policies toward developing countries

The United States pursued an active policy toward the Third World, or “developing countries,” as they were designated in UN jargon – as did Canada and West European countries, joined by Japan as it became richer. Soviet interventions in developing countries, especially in the Middle East and Africa, mainly in the form of grants of military equipment and training and resident technical advisers, more rarely as financial assistance, were a source of frustration and irritation to successive American administrations

during the 1960s and 1970s. The US government tried to counter these measures, both by preemption and by direct response.

The program that captured most imagination in the United States and indeed in many developing nations was the Peace Corps. President Kennedy created it in 1961 to mobilize the energy, enthusiasm, and idealism of young adults, as he thought the Communist countries (especially Cuba) were able to do. This program sent volunteers (only expenses were covered by the government) to developing countries to work in towns and villages on anything that could be helpful, mainly teaching and public health. Starting from nothing, the program grew to over 10,000 volunteers by 1964, in forty-six countries.¹² It reached a peak expenditure of \$110 million in 1968, before declining as Nixon showed less interest in it. The volunteers went abroad neither as diplomats nor intelligence agents, but to do good in ways envisioned largely by each individual. The experience exposed young Americans to different and much less privileged parts of the world; the program also exposed people in developing countries to idealistic Americans, unencumbered by the exigent requirements of US government policy. By all accounts, the Peace Corps was highly successful. In recipient countries, the demand for volunteers often greatly exceeded the supply. Many of the Americans who volunteered felt their careers were decisively shaped by their Peace Corps experience.

Kennedy also altered the guidelines of the United States Information Agency (USIA). Previously, it had disseminated information about the United States around the world and had focused on doctrinaire material about the merits of capitalism. Now, it provided more realistic and pluralistic accounts of life in the country. Its budget, moreover, was nearly doubled over the decade, 1960–70.

Kennedy also built on earlier legislation and created a “Food for Peace” program. American agricultural products were exported to developing countries not only in humanitarian emergencies (for example, due to drought), but more generally to alleviate malnutrition and to contribute to development projects through the budget of the recipient country. This program grew sharply from \$350 million in 1960 to over \$1.6 billion in 1965 before stabilizing between \$1–2 billion annually. It had the advantage of appealing greatly to US farmers, who under US agricultural support programs were producing surpluses of several products that periodically became fiscally burdensome.

12 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 607.

It had the disadvantage, as was later discovered, of diverting the attention of recipient governments away from improving their indigenous agricultural production and productivity, and sometimes depressing the incomes of their farmers. But it was typically appreciated by recipient governments, and it created a source of US leverage insofar as the threat of cutting food aid could occasionally be used to alter undesired behavior, as noted above in the case of Egypt and perhaps most dramatically in the case of India.

The United States had had foreign assistance programs since the late 1940s, most notably the Marshall Plan to help Europe recover from World War II (Eastern European countries were invited to join, but at Soviet insistence declined to participate – one of the earliest signs of the sharp division of Europe that was to persist for four decades). After the Marshall Plan, US bilateral aid (as opposed to loans for development projects from the World Bank) was largely in the form of technical assistance until the Development Loan Fund was created by the Eisenhower administration in 1958. Kennedy felt that the US aid program lacked overall strategic vision and that it was guided too much by short-term, Cold War considerations. Earlier programs were combined in 1961 into the Agency for International Development, with the charge of focusing on economic development and taking a longer-term view of each recipient country's prospects and how they could best be assisted. Kennedy tried but failed to get congressional support for multiyear appropriations, and his Department of Defense objected to incorporating military assistance in AID's mandate. Moreover, economic assistance levels actually declined for several years due to congressional skepticism combined with outright opposition. Nonetheless, US economic assistance was somewhat reoriented toward development objectives. The largest recipients of US economic assistance during the period 1966–72 were, in order of amount received, India, South Vietnam, Pakistan, South Korea, Israel, Brazil, Turkey, and Colombia, ranging from \$3.7 billion for India to \$600 million for Colombia.

A component of economic assistance that received special attention was the Alliance for Progress. Latin America, it was felt, had been neglected by US policymakers, and such attention as they did focus on the region went mainly to protecting American business interests. After the unhappy developments in Cuba, Kennedy felt the need for a more affirmative, preemptive program for Latin America, and the Alliance for Progress was his response. This component of the aid budget grew sharply during the 1960s – possibly with some effect. Soviet adventurism there was notably lower than in some other parts of the world, although it was not altogether absent. Cuba, however, sometimes encouraged and assisted revolutionary groups and local Communist parties.

Finally, just as the Soviet Union supported many governments by providing arms and other military equipment, so did the United States. Indeed, the United States in total exported nearly twice the value of military equipment – some as sales to allies, some provided as foreign assistance to developing countries. The assistance sometimes included money for training. Military grants generally exceeded \$1.5 billion a year in the early 1960s, then rose steadily to a peak of \$4.5 billion in 1972. The steep increase reflected the US attempt to shift military responsibility to the government of South Vietnam for defending the South against Communist North Vietnam and its Viet Cong allies. Thereafter, it receded to under \$3 billion (less in dollars of 1960, due to the inflation that occurred between 1967 and 1975). The main recipients of military assistance in the early 1970s, apart from Vietnam, were Turkey and Greece in NATO, Israel, South Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Jordan, in that order, but many other countries received smaller amounts on a regular basis.¹³

One further channel of economic assistance needs to be mentioned: discriminatory trading arrangements. The newly established EEC, with its common external tariff, provided preferential access to the European market (through lower tariffs, or higher quotas on selected agricultural products) for former European colonies in the so-called ACP (for Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) regions, but excluding larger former colonies such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Thus, goods from selected small countries got preferential access to the European market. In the mid-1960s, the developing countries, through the newly created UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), called upon all rich countries to extend tariff preferences to all poor countries. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), as it was called, was first embraced by Australia, Europe, and Canada, and only later by a more reluctant Japan and United States. President Johnson accepted GSP for the United States only in 1967. Since it required legislation, it was not legally adopted until the Trade Act of 1974, and could not be implemented until 1976. Neither the European nor the US scheme, which differed in important details, was nearly as generous as liberal trade advocates had in mind; but these schemes arguably encouraged some private investment in developing countries to take advantage of the tariff preferences.

The Soviet Union also purchased products from its client states, most notably sugar from Cuba, which could not be sold to the United States because of its embargo, or to Europe because of its agricultural protection. But Soviet trade

¹³ *Statistical Abstract 1978*, Table 1508.

was undertaken by a monopoly trading ministry, so sales were subject to government-to-government negotiation and had to fit into the requirements of the five-year economic plan or else was regarded as outright aid.

The real “battleground” of the Cold War after the early 1960s was thus competition for influence in developing countries through trade, financial and technical aid, and military assistance in the form of equipment and training. Both the USSR and the United States also had programs for bringing students to their respective universities. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin, lamented, in his memoirs, published many years later, that “détente was to a certain extent buried in the fields of Soviet–American rivalry in the Third World.”¹⁴

Recession and recovery

From the perspective of Soviet leaders, the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s was doing very well in its economic competition with the United States. Its aggregate production had risen slowly but steadily relative to US production, and output of products of special interest, such as steel, had come to exceed US production. The major hard-currency exports of the Soviet Union, crude oil and gold, had enjoyed substantial increases in price on the world market. At the same time, the “capitalist” world economy was in turmoil, experiencing in 1975 its worst recession since the 1930s. The Bretton Woods system of financial cooperation was in disarray, and the onset of “stagflation” created serious dilemmas of policy in most market-oriented economies. In short, Communists still confidently expected the ultimate victory of Communism against the ailing capitalist system.

This self-satisfaction neglected the fundamental recuperative capacities of market capitalism. Incentives for adaptation, innovation, and private initiative remained strong. To take only one example, the integrated circuit, introduced in the early 1970s, was to revolutionize computation, communication, and much else, including military applications.¹⁵ While the Communist system could dictate heavy investment in traditional products, it did so inefficiently and inflexibly, without extensive innovation. It could not adapt well to changes in technology and to changes in the composition of demand. By the mid-1980s, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev would declare, “We cannot go on like this,” and inaugurated his ultimately unsuccessful economic reform of the Soviet system of Communism.

14 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 473.

15 See David Reynolds's chapter in volume III.

The Cuban missile crisis

JAMES G. HERSHBERG

In October 1962, the Cold War endured its most perilous passage – and humanity survived its closest brush with the ultimate man-made catastrophe: a thermonuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union that could have incinerated scores of cities and killed half a billion people, rendered much of the northern hemisphere uninhabitable, lacerated industrial civilization, and stamped a lethal exclamation point on a century already twice bloodied by outbursts of global carnage that would now pale in comparison.

On its surface, the Cuban missile crisis involved a single discrete set of circumstances: It stemmed from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's secret dispatch of nuclear missiles to Fidel Castro's revolutionary Cuba and US president John F. Kennedy's determination to reverse that deployment – and climaxed during the famous “13 Days” “eyeball-to-eyeball” “on the brink” (the crisis birthed so many clichés that one can string them together to evoke it) extending from Washington's detection of the missiles in mid-October to Khrushchev's coerced consent to remove them on October 28.

Yet, any serious analysis requires assessing how multiple narratives converged to bring the Cold War to its tensest apex. Most broadly, the crisis starkly dramatized the chasm between ends and means that Hiroshima portended for international affairs. Cuba itself represented a vital interest for neither the United States nor the Soviet Union; both proclaimed their ideological contest should be decided through gradual historical processes, not war; and both Khrushchev and Kennedy sought their political goals short of a hazardous military collision.

Nevertheless, in the supercharged atmosphere of the missile crisis, with forces on high alert, any direct clash, whether intentional or accidental, was fraught with the danger of uncontrollable escalation. As Khrushchev wrote Kennedy, “if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know

that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.”¹

Had full-scale war erupted, it would have dwarfed all others since humans bashed each other with stone clubs over raw meat and choice cave locations: though the nuclear balance overwhelmingly favored Washington – possessing, in 1962, about 27,300 nuclear warheads, including more than 7,000 strategic thermonuclear weapons, to Moscow’s roughly 3,300 nuclear warheads, about 500 of them strategic² – the two countries had more than enough firepower to justify Kennedy’s acknowledgment that “even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth” and Khrushchev’s warning that a lack of wisdom could lead to “a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.”³

Kennedy and Khrushchev managed to avoid yanking their fellow lemmings over the precipice – though how close they came remains disputed – and as the fear and patriotic fervor faded, the ludicrous dissonance between the crisis’s nearly apocalyptic outcome and ephemeral causes began to inspire ridicule, symptomatic of a slackening of reverence for Cold War orthodoxies. Stanley Kubrick’s *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (1964) fused subversive humor and technical verisimilitude to depict accidental nuclear war and hilariously mock Cold War paranoia. “So long, Mom, I’m off to drop the bomb,” sang Tom Lehrer a year later in a bit of “pre-nostalgia” (since ditties commemorating World War III had to be composed beforehand). Promising mom he’d “look for her when the war is over – an hour and a half from now,” the soldier marching off to Armageddon jauntily juxtaposes the impending conflict’s devastation and gripping entertainment value:

While we’re attacking frontally
Watch Brinkally and Huntally⁴
Describing contrapuntally
The cities we have lost.
No need for you to miss a minute
Of the agonizing holocaust ...

1 Nikita S. Khrushchev (NSK) to John F. Kennedy (JFK), October 26, 1962, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol. XII, *Cuban missile crisis and Aftermath* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 236 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

2 Natural Resources Defense Council website, www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp.

3 JFK address, October 22, 1962; NSK to JFK, October 26, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 240.

4 NBC TV nightly news co anchors David Brinkley and Chet Huntley.

In Cold War history, the crisis culminated a decade-and-a-half of superpower jousting and groping toward tacit “rules of the game.” To block Communist expansion, John Foster Dulles had espoused “brinkmanship” – the doctrine to display unflinchingly, when challenged, the nerve to risk nuclear war – and Khrushchev embraced this recipe for his own ratcheting up of tensions to discover whether the West would cave. In no place was his strategy more apparent than Berlin, where, in late 1958, he launched a drive to expel US and allied military forces from the western sector of the divided capital and, eventually, ease its absorption into East Germany. Though Dwight D. Eisenhower and Kennedy (JFK) vowed they would stay put, Khrushchev repeatedly turned up the heat. At a June 1961 summit in Vienna, he brusquely told JFK that he had until the end of the year to relent or else Moscow would sever West Berlin’s access routes to West Germany, and rebuffed his cautions against “miscalculation” (yet he would let the ultimatum lapse). Khrushchev once likened the isolated city to the “testicles of the West” – it hollered whenever he squeezed – but to colleagues in January 1962, he used a more genteel metaphor to describe his tactic of keeping East–West relations on a knife-edge to extract maximum concessions: filling a wineglass just past the brim, so the liquid formed a “meniscus” yet never quite overflowed.⁵

So harrowing were the years leading up to the Cuban crisis that they were compared to the atmosphere pervading J. R. R. Tolkien’s *Lord of the Rings*, laden with evil and imminent doom.⁶ Sooner or later, the superpowers would have to break their habit of meeting at the brink – because a crisis exploded into all-out war, or grew so terrifying as to sober them up.

Countdown to crisis: Khrushchev’s decision

Why did Khrushchev send nuclear missiles to Cuba? The question has gnawed at officials and analysts since they were first discovered. “Well, it’s a goddamn mystery to me,” JFK confessed, as to why the “awfully cautious” Soviets would take this most provocative step since the Berlin blockade.⁷ “It’s all gray to me, this whole Russian thing,” he mused, “... ahh ... someday.”⁸

5 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006), 414.

6 Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 138n.

7 Meeting transcript, 6:30 p.m., October 16, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.), *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 107.

8 Sheldon M. Stern, *Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 432.

At the time, secrecy shrouded Kremlin decisionmaking, but since the Cold War's fading, inside information has illuminated Operation ANADYR, Khrushchev's initiative (and it's now clear it was *his* rather than the military's or Castro's). On May 21, 1962, he formally proposed secretly deploying medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) to Cuba; the Presidium provisionally approved his concept three days later and, once a delegation to Havana secured Castro's wary approval, ratified it on June 10. The "joint defense" plan envisioned shipping 24 R-12 (SS-4) MRBMs with a 1,100-mile range and 16 R-14 (SS-5) IRBMs with a range roughly double that – plus half that amount of missiles in reserve – equipped with 200 kt-1 MT warheads. Khrushchev also sent tactical nuclear weapons. After JFK publicly warned in early September against introducing "offensive weapons" to Cuba, the Soviet leader upped the ante by augmenting (and sending nuclear-armed submarines to escort) this battlefield atomic arsenal, which ranged from eighty short-range FKR-1 nuclear cruise missiles to nine warheads for Frog/Luna battlefield missiles to six warheads for short-range (about 600 miles) IL-28 bombers. The total buildup, apparent to US reconnaissance by late summer, also included tanks, surface-to-air missiles (SA-2s), MiG-21 jet fighters, and roughly 50,000 soldiers and technicians.

Khrushchev's venture defies mono-causal explanation; like Harry S. Truman's dropping of the atom bomb on Japan (which combined short-term military and postwar political aims), it had overlapping objectives. Seeking a panacea to alleviate manifold ailments, Khrushchev prescribed "a cure-all, a cure-all that cured nothing."⁹

Most US officials presumed Khrushchev's decision stemmed from a desire to redress Soviet nuclear inferiority, which Washington (after fretting over a purported "missile gap") had trumpeted the previous fall to deflate his truculence on Berlin. By establishing Cuba as an unsinkable strategic missile base, Americans guessed, Khrushchev sought to double Soviet capacity to hit targets in the continental United States more cheaply and easily than with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) stationed at home. The nuclear balance did, indeed, vex Khrushchev – especially in view of his lagging ICBM program – and enhance the deployment's attractions. Yet, attributing it to this motive alone shortchanges other considerations.

For instance, Americans generally derided as a patent propaganda ploy Khrushchev's claim that he acted to defend Havana from aggression. But information emerging from US and then Russian sources has gradually led

9 William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton., 2003), 532.

historians to take his assertions more seriously. Besides its open campaign to isolate Havana diplomatically, politically, and economically following the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the Kennedy administration sponsored secret actions – covert harassment (“Operation Mongoose”), assassination plots, military muscle-flexing – that might have fanned fears of attack both in Havana and in Moscow, even as Washington grossly underestimated Khrushchev’s personal commitment to Castro’s revolution. Safeguarding Cuba – strategic missiles to “restrain the United States from precipitous military action,”¹⁰ tactical weapons to fight if deterrence failed – was a key Khrushchev aim.

Other Cold War hot spots may also have swayed the Kremlin boss. He hatched the idea of sending missiles to Cuba while visiting Bulgaria in May 1962, as he paced a Black Sea beach and brooded over nuclear-tipped Jupiter MRBMs pointing at his homeland from over the horizon in Turkey. Forcing the Americans to swallow comparable rockets on their doorstep would merely dispense “a little of their own medicine.”¹¹ (Khrushchev’s bid to swap the missiles in Cuba for the Turkish Jupiters, however, was improvised rather than premeditated.)

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali speculate that Laos, of all places, may have been the “ultimate trigger for the decision to put missiles in Cuba.” On the eve of his Cuban venture, Khrushchev raged at JFK’s rushing troops to northern Thailand (to counter a Communist offensive) and grumbled that he was pursuing a Dulles-like “position-of-strength policy.”¹²

Looming over everything, however, was Berlin, where Khrushchev had been stymied. Kennedy suspected that leverage there was the Cuban deployment’s real aim, and during the missile crisis set up a special high-level group to deal with a possible counter-blockade around West Berlin. Though it didn’t happen, a successful Cuban gambit might have emboldened the Soviet leader to resume squeezing.

Though it remains uncertain whether Khrushchev devised any specific plan, timetable, or “grand strategy” to exploit a *fait accompli* in Cuba (as Fursenko and Naftali contend), he counted on it to enhance his overall position on the Cold War chessboard for subsequent moves in Berlin or elsewhere. More important than the missiles’ military impact, the Kremlin

10 Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), 494.

11 *Ibid.*, 492–94.

12 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 433, 513.

leader hoped they would alter the political and psychological “correlation of forces” in his favor. “This will be an offensive policy,” he vowed to associates.¹³

Khrushchev’s ploy also promised to boost his leadership of international Communism. Acting decisively to protect revolutionary Cuba would counter Chinese claims that the Soviet “revisionists” had gone soft. Khrushchev also wanted to avoid losing ground to Beijing in Havana itself. While dependent on Soviet economic aid since the rupture with Washington, Cuban leaders such as Che Guevara ideologically skewed closer to Beijing’s avid support for armed uprisings throughout Latin America. With Soviet–Cuban ties strained in early 1962 as Castro purged pro-Moscow Communists, Khrushchev believed that sending missiles might reinforce the alliance and fence out China.

Khrushchev also had economic incentives. Like Mikhail Gorbachev, he genuinely wished to reduce Soviet military spending drastically in order to improve his people’s lot. Yet, unlike his reformist successor, Khrushchev also indulged in threatening behavior that undercut East–West progress. The first half of 1962 impaled him on the horns of this contradiction: secret plans to expand commitments abroad coincided with discontent at home at the poorly performing economy. As Khrushchev puzzled over how to save Cuba, the prohibitive cost of fending off its giant neighbor magnified the allure of a nuclear deterrent – much as his enemy had laid a tripwire in West Germany rather than match Soviet conventional forces. Khrushchev thereby emulated not only Dulles’s “brinkmanship,” but also Eisenhower’s “New Look” of seeking “more bang for the buck” through increased reliance on nuclear weapons.

Finally, personality mattered, not just abstract historical forces. Khrushchev steamrolled the Presidium, but odds are remote that his associates, if in power, would have chanced nuclear war for Cuba’s sake. Though hardly irrational, the deployment did not simply flow from a detached reckoning of Soviet interests. Khrushchev’s idiosyncratic sensibilities and temperament – and misjudgment of his youthful adversary – produced a step the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) judged “incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.”¹⁴

13 Presidium notes, May 21, 1962, University of Virginia Miller Center of Public Affairs website, <http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/kremlin>. On Khrushchev’s foreign policy aims, see also Taubman and Savranskaya’s chapter in this volume.

14 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85 3 62, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” September 19, 1962, Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: History Staff, CIA, October 1992), 93.

The crisis arrives: Kennedy's response

The news Kennedy received on the morning of Tuesday, October 16, 1962, came as a shock. Throughout the late summer and early autumn, his administration had watched with mounting unease the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and, as the mid-term congressional elections in November neared, sustained barbed Republican criticism for allowing it to proceed. Secretly, JFK stepped up military contingency planning and covert operations against Havana. Yet publicly he resisted calls for immediate military action and hewed to the line that the Soviet aid appeared purely "defensive," even while warning Khrushchev that if his military aid crossed the line into "offensive" weaponry, such as ground-to-ground missiles, "the gravest issues would arise."¹⁵

Khrushchev, while intimating in private correspondence that he planned to reopen Berlin later in the fall, sent reassurances through his Washington embassy – both new ambassador Anatolii F. Dobrynin and military intelligence officer Georgii Bolshakov, who maintained a back channel to the White House via the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) – that he would not embarrass Kennedy before the vote and certainly not send offensive or nuclear weapons to Cuba. Though CIA director John McCone, dissenting from his own analysts, argued from his French honeymoon that the SA-2s were probably meant to hide the installation of surface-to-surface missiles, JFK preferred to believe Khrushchev. As late as Sunday, October 14, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy reiterated on national television that there was neither "present evidence" nor a "present likelihood" of an offensive threat.

Even as he spoke, a U-2 spy plane snapped damning photographs of MRBM sites under construction southwest of Havana. On Monday evening, word seeped through top administration ranks, and the next morning, Bundy broke the bad news to JFK in his bedroom as he breakfasted and read the papers. At 11:50 a.m., the first meeting convened of what would become known as the Excomm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council). The ad hoc group varied – Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, Adlai Stevenson, and others came and went – but regulars included Bundy; Secretary of State Dean Rusk, his deputy, George Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, and Soviet expert Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr.; Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, and chair of the Joint

¹⁵ JFK press release, *New York Times*, September 5, 1962; also JFK press conference, *New York Times*, September 14, 1962.

Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor; Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson; CIA director McCone; Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon; speechwriter Theodore C. Sorensen; and most importantly, the president's brother. As later caricatured, Excomm "hawks" favored military action, while "doves" preferred political and diplomatic pressure. In fact, debate frequently shifted, as participants oscillated between camps or advanced arguments that combined approaches.

From the outset, all agreed the United States could not passively accept the missiles. Debate revolved around the *means* of removing them – if possible without sparking World War III. The option of doing nothing received scant consideration, though JFK mused that a month earlier, "I should have said that we don't care ... What difference does it make? They've got enough to blow us up now anyway."¹⁶ Kennedy leaned strongly toward a no-warning attack, and his brother belligerently exhorted the CIA to intensify Mongoose operations and brainstormed a provocation to justify an invasion "through Guantánamo Bay or ... you know, sink the *Maine* again or something."¹⁷

By Tuesday evening, McNamara had limned the parameters of the secret debate. Fearing escalation after a first strike and less concerned than the uniformed military over the missiles' strategic impact (primarily a "domestic political problem"), he shunned either preemptive military action or a purely political-diplomatic path and instead proposed, as a moderate alternative, a blockade on offensive weapons shipments to Cuba.¹⁸

Over the next few days, Kennedy felt rising pressure to act: U-2 flights spotted more MRBMs plus IRBM bases; the clock ticked toward the missiles going operational; and worries of a leak grew. Amidst the intense deliberations came one of the Cold War's most duplicitous encounters: On October 18, Kennedy and Andrei Gromyko conversed politely for more than two hours in the Oval Office. Neither put his cards on the table. JFK hid the fact that he had caught the Kremlin red-handed and, resisting temptation to display the incriminating U-2 photos in his desk drawer, reaffirmed warnings against introducing offensive weaponry to Cuba. The unsuspecting foreign minister repeated Moscow's false assurances and, despite noticing Rusk's "crab red" face, blithely cabled home that the situation seemed "completely

¹⁶ Excomm meeting transcript, 6:30 p.m., October 16, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 100–01.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 86–87, 89, 112–13.

satisfactory.”¹⁹ (Khrushchev, disdaining Castro’s argument that a no-invasion vow couldn’t be trusted, later noted that Gromyko had told JFK “that we have no atomic missiles in Cuba. And he was lying. And how! And that was the right thing to do; he had orders from the Party. So, the imperialists cannot trust us either.”²⁰)

By Thursday, the Excomm had swerved behind the blockade. Most important, JFK had edged away from his initial impulse toward an airstrike (although hearing General Curtis LeMay, the cigar-chomping air force chief, growl that a blockade would be “almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich” bluntly reminded him of the domestic political hazards of appearing weak).²¹

Maintaining the charade of normality, the president left for a scheduled campaign swing. To convince hardliners they were getting a fair hearing, he secretly instructed Bundy to keep the airstrike option alive. But after cutting short his trip on Saturday (on the pretext of a cold) to return to Washington, and hearing closing arguments from the bitterly split Excomm, he reaffirmed his preference for a limited blockade.

Attention turned to divulging the news before it leaked. By Monday afternoon, when the White House announced that the president would address the nation at 7 p.m. on a “matter of highest national urgency,” a crisis atmosphere gripped Washington. After sending special envoys to brief key allies (Harold Macmillan, Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer) and telephoning predecessors (Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower), Kennedy informed congressional leaders and heard some of them rip the blockade as a futile half-measure. Irrked, he then walked to the Oval Office to tell the world of its predicament.


Why did Kennedy ultimately choose the blockade? First – McNamara disclosed decades later – JFK felt deterred by the prospect of a single Soviet nuclear warhead detonating on an American city,²² and his military advisers could not guarantee a surprise airstrike would wipe out all the missiles. Second, Kennedy derived thin comfort from the hawks’ forecasts that the Soviets would swallow a first strike on Cuba without retaliating elsewhere. He expected a

19 Andrei Gromyko cables, October 19, 20, 1962, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (hereafter, *CWHP Bulletin*), 5 (Spring 1995), 66–67 and 8–9 (Winter 1996/97), 278–82.

20 Memorandum of conversation between NSK and A. Novotný, Moscow, October 30, 1962, briefing book, National Security Archive conference, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Political Perspective after 40 Years,” Havana, October 11–13, 2002.

21 JCS meeting transcript, 9:45 a.m., October 19, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, p. 178.

22 Robert McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” *Foreign Affairs*, 62, 1 (Fall 1983), 59–80.



3. During the Cuban missile crisis, US newspapers carried maps showing that Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba could reach any point in the continental United States except the Pacific northwest.

strike on Cuba to provoke Khrushchev to seize West Berlin, “which leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons – which is a hell of an alternative ...”²³ Third, Kennedy worried that military action to erase a threat Europeans had learned to endure, risking Berlin or general war, would undermine the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Fourth, a limited blockade could be intensified.

Finally, Kennedy recoiled at a surprise attack liable to kill thousands of Cubans and Soviets. “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor,” his brother jotted wryly.²⁴ Though hawks bitterly rejected the analogy, RFK passionately argued that a sudden strike would be “very, very difficult indeed for the President ... with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions.”²⁵

23 JCS meeting transcript, 9:45 a.m., October 19, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 176.

24 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 803.

25 Excomm meeting transcript, 11 a.m., October 19, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. 11, 119.

Crucible of the Cold War: how close did they come?

"Good evening, my fellow citizens," a somber Kennedy began. On Monday evening, October 22, 1962, the president opened the public phase of the crisis by revealing that "unmistakable evidence" had confirmed the presence in Cuba of Soviet missile bases whose purpose could only be "to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere." Calling on Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations" and "move the world back from the abyss of destruction," JFK declared that this "secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup" constituted a "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe."

To persuade the Kremlin to reverse course, he announced a "strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment" bound for Cuba, effective from Wednesday morning. Invoking Munich – the 1930s' "clear lesson" that "aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war" – Kennedy vowed neither to "prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war" nor to "shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced." Abandoning flexible response for massive retaliation, he warned Washington would "regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."²⁶

In Moscow, Khrushchev had already called an unusual late-night Presidium meeting. When the text of JFK's speech arrived, he was relieved the president had not announced an actual assault on Cuba yet feared one was still likely and "may end in a big war." At first, Khrushchev did not shy away from nuclear conflict *in Cuba*: while withholding permission to fire strategic missiles, he was inclined to authorize use of tactical nuclear weapons if needed. Pleas from associates (particularly Anastas Mikoyan) convinced him to moderate his course and issue a diluted directive to "take immediate steps to raise combat readiness and to repulse the enemy together with the

26 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy: containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1962* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963), 806–09.

Cuban army and with all the power of the Soviet forces, *except*” nuclear warheads.²⁷

The next day, both sides dug in. US, Soviet, and Cuban military establishments went on high alert. Rusk quipped mordantly to an aide that they had won a “considerable victory” since they were still alive – Khrushchev had not retorted with a preemptive strike.²⁸ As the United Nations (UN) Security Council opened emergency debate, Kennedy secured unanimous endorsement of the blockade by the Organization of American States (OAS), and NATO allies also quickly closed ranks.

In a private letter, Khrushchev curtly demanded Kennedy renounce the quarantine, a “gross violation” of international law threatening “catastrophic consequences.”²⁹ Less belligerently, the Soviet leader deflected suggestions to erect a retaliatory blockade around Berlin. Ready to settle for a “halfway successful” outcome, he ordered two IRBM-transporting ships to stop shy of the quarantine line while instructing one vessel to run for Cuba before it went into effect. He leaned toward Mikoyan’s cautious advice to order nuclear-armed Foxtrot submarines to avoid the area around Cuba over his defense minister’s brash confidence that the noisy vessels could evade US detection – but that instruction seems never to have reached the commanders of the submarines.³⁰

Rebutting Khrushchev, Kennedy warily stressed that both leaders should “show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.”³¹ To convey his rage more vividly, he sent his brother to see Dobrynin on Tuesday evening, opening a vital back channel (replacing Bolshakov). RFK vented the president’s ire at being “deceived intentionally,” and the two argued hotly. Leaving, the attorney general asked what orders Soviet captains approaching the blockade held. Standing instructions “not to obey unlawful demands to stop or be searched on the open seas,” Dobrynin presumed. Robert Kennedy waved good-bye and said: “I don’t know how all this will end, for we intend to stop your ships.”³²

27 R. Malinovskii to P. S. Pliev, October 22, 1962 (emphasis added), in General Anatoly I. Gribkov and General William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: edition q, 1994), 62.

28 Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Bantam, 1966), 110.

29 NSK to JFK, October 23, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 170–71.

30 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 476–80 (“halfway,” 477).

31 JFK to NSK, October 23, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 174–75.

32 A. Dobrynin cable, October 24, 1962, *CWHP Bulletin*, 5 (Spring 1995), 71–73; Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969), 63.

Wednesday was the day JFK – and much of the globe – dreaded. Once the quarantine started at 10 a.m., no one knew whether Soviet ships would respect or flout it. The president commented glumly that the situation looked “really mean,” but seconded his brother’s comment that if he hadn’t acted firmly “you would have been impeached.”³³ Waiting for news of the first intercept, hearing McNamara explain that US ships would use depth charges to force Soviet subs to surface, John Kennedy felt unbearable suspense. “This was the moment we had prepared for,” recalled RFK,

which we hoped would never come. The danger and concern that we all felt hung like a cloud over us all ... These few minutes were the time of greatest worry by the President. His hand went up to his face & covered his mouth and he closed his fist. His eyes were tense, almost gray, and we just stared at each other across the table. Was the world on the brink of a holocaust and had we done something wrong?³⁴

Then reports arrived that Soviet ships had stopped “dead in the water” or reversed course. Rusk whispered to Bundy, “We’re eyeball-to-eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”³⁵

The Excomm exhaled, but the crisis continued. Kennedy remained bent on evicting the missile bases already in Cuba, work on which was accelerating. Khrushchev still exuded belligerence. Besides telling an American businessman that JFK better not hit Cuba or they would all “meet in Hell,”³⁶ he sent Kennedy a note blasting the blockade as “outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism,” an “act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.”³⁷

On Thursday, the international spotlight shone on the UN Security Council. Dramatically, Stevenson insisted his Soviet counterpart answer the “simple question” of whether Moscow was placing MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. “Yes or no?” the US ambassador demanded. “Don’t wait for the translation, yes or no?”

Removing his earphone, to nervous laughter, Valerian Zorin demurred. “I am not in an American courtroom, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions.”

33 Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 67.

34 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 514; Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 69–70.

35 Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” *Saturday Evening Post*, December 8, 1962, 16–20.

36 William E. Knox *Oral History*, JFKL, in Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963* (New York: Little, Brown, 2003), 563–64.

37 NSK to JFK, October 24, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, 185–87.

"You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now," Stevenson shot back, "and you can answer yes or no."

"You will have your answer in due course."

Indicating he could wait "until hell freezes over," the American then achieved a public relations coup by unveiling enlarged U-2 images of the missile bases.

Combining pressure and restraint, Kennedy had McNamara keep tight reins on navy commanders implementing the blockade and scotched any boarding of Eastern bloc ships; but he added, "we must act soon because work on the missiles sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now."³⁸

Behind Moscow's outward defiance, Khrushchev decided to cut his losses. Masking his retreat with gibes at JFK's cowardice, the Soviet leader scaled back visions of a Cold War masterstroke. Confirming a decision that ships ferrying nuclear hardware to Cuba should not defy the blockade, he confided a "fall-back position." If Washington "pledges not to touch Cuba," he would dismantle the missile sites under UN inspection. Such an outcome, leaving the tactical nuclear weapons undiscovered, would be "not bad." More candidly, he admitted his venture had "succeeded with some things and not with others." You had to play this game "without losing your head" – war was "not advantageous."³⁹

Unaware of his adversary's modified stand, Kennedy seemed gloomy, even fatalistic. Convinced the quarantine would merely hasten an eventual confrontation ("which may or may not be desirable"), he suspected the only realistic ways to expel the missiles were negotiations or "to go over and just take them out."⁴⁰

But during the evening of Friday October 26, a long private telegraph from Khrushchev – one of the Cold War's most remarkable communications – clattered in. Reaching out in personal, emotional terms, Khrushchev viscerally evoked the horrors of war and also implied a deal. If JFK ended the blockade and foreswore attacking Cuba, "this would immediately change everything."

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion

³⁸ Excomm minutes, October 25, 1962, *ibid.*, 209.

³⁹ Presidium notes, October 25, 1962, Miller Center website.

⁴⁰ Excomm meeting transcript, 10 a.m., October 26, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 464, 468.

of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

... Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.⁴¹

Khrushchev's proposal also arrived more explicitly through an unorthodox channel: a journalist related that a Soviet embassy contact (KGB *rezident* Aleksandr Feklisov, under diplomatic cover) had urgently inquired whether Washington might agree not to invade Cuba if Moscow dismantled the missile bases under UN scrutiny – terms mirroring Kremlin thinking so closely that it almost certainly was an authorized feeler.

In Havana, meanwhile, Castro geared for apocalyptic battle. Judging an attack “almost imminent within the next 24 to 72 hours,” he composed a letter on Friday night advising Khrushchev that if “the imperialists invade Cuba with the goal of occupying it, the danger that the aggressive policy poses for humanity is so great that following that event the Soviet Union must never allow the circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear strike against it ... that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be, for there is no other.”⁴²

For Kennedy, October 27 (“Black Saturday”) started out bad and steadily deteriorated. First, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that Soviet diplomats in New York were preparing to burn their papers. Then, Radio Moscow broadcast a tougher, more impersonal Khrushchev message demanding that in exchange for removing Soviet missiles from Cuba, Kennedy withdraw “analogous means” from Turkey.⁴³ Inspired by a

41 NSK to JFK, October 26, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 235–41.

42 F. Castro to NSK, October 26, 1962, in James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 509–10.

43 NSK to JFK, October 27, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 257–60.

Thursday column by journalist Walter Lippmann, Khrushchev hoped this new demand might yet enable him to “win” the duel.⁴⁴

Confused by the discordant messages, some on the Excomm blanched at rewarding nuclear blackmail. JFK, however, saw that stand as untenably rigid. Long wishing to replace the obsolete, vulnerable Jupiters with nuclear-armed Polaris submarines, he observed that the United States would be hard-pressed to justify war over “useless missiles in Turkey” and “to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade.”⁴⁵ Washington couldn’t openly pressure Ankara, but the Turks themselves might request the Jupiters’ departure given the “great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.”⁴⁶

As the Excomm squirmed on Saturday afternoon – “Let’s not kid ourselves,” said JFK, Khrushchev made a “very good proposal”⁴⁷ – U-2 incidents jangled already frayed nerves. A weather-sampling mission strayed over Siberia, rousing Soviet interceptors to scramble. US fighters escorted the petrified pilot to safety, but Khrushchev later admonished Kennedy that at such an anxious moment “an intruding American plane could easily be taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step.”⁴⁸ Over Cuba, an SA-2 missile downed a U-2, killing its pilot. The news stoked fear on the Excomm – uncertain whether Moscow had authorized the act (it hadn’t) – that the Soviets had deliberately “fired the first shot” in the crisis. “Well, this is much of an escalation by them, isn’t it?” the president remarked.⁴⁹

But Kennedy cautiously deferred authorizing a reprisal against the SAM site and prodded aides to refocus on Moscow’s “inconsistent and conflicting proposals.” Most Excomm members adamantly opposed a public swap and several advisers, including RFK, Bundy, and Thompson, urged JFK to eschew the Turkish offer and instead “accept” the deal implicit in Khrushchev’s private letter – an idea that would go down in crisis lore as

44 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 488.

45 Excomm meeting transcript, 10 a.m., October 27, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 498.

46 Excomm minutes, 10 a.m., October 27, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 252–56 (quotation 255–56).

47 Excomm meeting transcript, 10 a.m., October 27, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 512.

48 NSK to JFK, October 28, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 282.

49 Excomm meeting transcript, 4 p.m., October 27, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 571.

the “Trollope Ploy,” after the Victorian novelist’s description of a damsel’s interpreting an innocuous gesture as a marriage proposal.

Kennedy grew dismayed as conversation turned toward the likelihood of imminent combat, especially if firing at surveillance flights persisted. When General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged a “big strike” no later than Monday, followed by an invasion, RFK drolly remarked, “Well, that was a surprise.”⁵⁰ McNamara hawkishly advised removing or defusing Jupiters in Turkey and Italy to dissuade Moscow from reprisals – and *then* invading Cuba ... nonplussing CIA director McCone and Lyndon Johnson, who wondered, then, why not trade and avoid the casualties?

The president – freshly sensitized to history’s judgment from reading Barbara Tuchman’s *The Guns of August* – feared the consequences of rash military action or political intransigence more than anyone:

We all know how quickly everybody’s courage goes when the blood starts to flow, and that’s what’s going to happen to NATO. When we start these things and they grab Berlin, everybody’s going to say: “Well, that was a pretty good proposition” ... I think we’re better off to get those missiles out of Turkey and out of Cuba because I think the way of getting them out of Turkey and out of Cuba is going to be very, very difficult and very bloody, in one place or another ... Of course, what we would like to do is have the Turks come and offer this ... We can’t very well invade Cuba, with all the toil and blood it’s going to be, when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey. If that’s part of the record, then I don’t see how we’ll have a very good war.⁵¹

In his reply to Khrushchev, JFK converted the private letter’s hazy terms into a firm proposition: should Moscow “agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision” and prevent their reintroduction, Washington would lift the quarantine and “give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.” “[S]uch a settlement on easing world tensions,” he noted, “would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding ‘other armaments,’ as proposed in your second letter which you made public.”⁵²

But Kennedy anticipated only further stalling from Khrushchev, and on Saturday night he desperately searched for an escape hatch from the crisis. As ships, warplanes, and troops massed around Cuba, and pressure for an attack built – a conference ended with the wisecrack, “Suppose we make Bobby

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 563 ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 548–49, 578, 602.

⁵² JFK to NSK, October 27, 1962, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, 268–69.

mayor of Havana?"⁵³ – he took a series of secret initiatives to create alternatives to using force.

First, he had his brother assure Dobrynin that if Khrushchev removed his missiles, the Jupiters would be gone from Turkey within four to five months. But in a *de facto* ultimatum, RFK stressed that Khrushchev must answer *tomorrow*: his brother faced intense pressure to respond violently should flights over Cuba be fired on again, and a grave danger existed that "a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop," killing millions of American and Soviet citizens. "Time is of the essence and we shouldn't miss the chance."⁵⁴

Second, JFK authorized Rusk to telephone an associate of UN secretary-general U Thant with the terms of an appeal Thant might issue (if prompted) calling on Washington and Moscow to remove their respective missiles in Turkey and Cuba. Finally, Kennedy's ambassador in Rio was instructed to give the Brazilian government a message it could present (in its own name) to Castro, prodding him to evict the missiles in exchange for a rapprochement with the United States.

None of these efforts struck Kennedy as promising, so it was with surprise bordering on disbelief that he learned the next morning that Khrushchev had agreed, in exchange for the no-invasion vow, "to dismantle the arms which you describe as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union," and even to permit the UN to verify the process.⁵⁵

Why had Khrushchev folded so quickly? After all, JFK (via RFK) had only requested a commitment to withdraw the missiles sometime on Sunday, so he had more hours to haggle. Yet, the Kremlin leader rushed to accept Kennedy's proposal in the belief that he needed to "act very quickly" since Washington might soon attack, and before the belligerent Castro dragged the USSR into mortal conflict. Appalled by the Cuban's implicit advocacy of a preemptive nuclear strike, he scorned: "Only a person who has no idea what nuclear war means, or has been so blinded, for instance, like Castro, by revolutionary passion, can talk like that."⁵⁶ The headstrong Castro might have seen an invasion of his country as the start of World War III, but Khrushchev did not, and on Saturday he had "categorically" re-ordered his commanders in

53 Excomm meeting transcript, 9 p.m., October 27, 1962, in May and Zelikow (eds.), *Kennedy Tapes*, 628.

54 Dobrynin cable, October 27, 1962, *CWHP Bulletin*, 5 (Spring 1995), 79–80.

55 NSK to JFK, October 28, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, 279–83.

56 NSK to Novotný, October 30, 1962.

Cuba not to fire any nuclear charges without Moscow's express consent.⁵⁷ (Contrary to long-held belief, JFK's secret Turkish concession did *not* influence Khrushchev's move.⁵⁸)

Khrushchev's surrender ended the crisis's most acute phase, but it took several weeks for US and Soviet negotiators to sort out the debris. To surmount Castro's balking at inspections, the Americans monitored the missiles' departure by flying low over the ships carrying them away as sailors pulled back the covering tarpaulins, a procedure that humiliated Soviet naval commanders. After Khrushchev grudgingly accepted Washington's demand to remove the IL-28 bombers, JFK lifted the quarantine on November 20. Khrushchev assured Kennedy that all Soviet nuclear weapons were gone from Cuba – but the tactical nuclear weapons weren't shipped out until early December. (Had US intelligence uncovered this fresh deception, the crisis might have restarted amid irresistible pressure for an invasion.) Though Kennedy never formalized the no-invasion vow due to Cuba's blocking of on-site inspection, on January 7, 1963 Washington and Moscow jointly requested the issue's removal from the Security Council agenda.

How dangerous was the crisis? How close did it come to nuclear catastrophe? Those at the top concurred that it came very close indeed. "This time we were really on the verge of war," Khrushchev told a visitor.⁵⁹ Kennedy independently agreed, estimating the odds of the Soviets going to war at "somewhere between one and three and even."⁶⁰

Though scholars still hotly debate the level of nuclear danger, evidence suggests a mixed retrospective judgment. Probably the peril of *intentional* escalation was less acute than once formerly believed. As the crisis climaxed, Khrushchev and Kennedy veered toward compromise rather than belligerence. The Soviet leader, as noted above, secretly resolved by October 25 to settle for terms Washington could accept, and JFK's frantic search for an escape hatch two days later suggests that, rather than approve an airstrike or invasion early the next week, he would have tightened the blockade, or even publicly bartered missiles. Both leaders increasingly recognized their shared, transcendent interest in avoiding the ultimate catastrophe.

Yet, the risk of *inadvertent* escalation appears to have been even greater. Contingent events might have been disastrously misinterpreted or caused an

57 Malinovskii to Pliev, October 27, 1962, in Gribkov and Smith, *Operation ANADYR*, 63.

58 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War*, 490.

59 NSK to Novotný, October 30, 1962.

60 Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 795.



4. US spy planes photographed Soviet missile equipment as it arrived in Cuba and as it was sent back. Here missile launchers are waiting to be sent back to the USSR from the port of Mariel, west of Havana.

accidental clash, and revelations about Soviet nuclear weapons in and around Cuba *other than* the strategic missiles – including the tactical nuclear weapons (which local commanders under attack might have used regardless of Moscow's edicts), and nuclear-armed submarines maneuvering around the blockade – suggest even a limited or accidental collision risked ballooning to general war, since *any* nuclear use against US forces would have provoked instant nuclear retaliation. At least one frazzled Soviet submarine commander on the blockade line, stalked and harassed by American ships and planes and out of touch with Moscow, is reported to have concluded that war had begun and considered firing his nuclear torpedo.

In sum, the crisis still earns its status as the most dangerous moment in history.

Consequences and controversies

The crisis had important consequences for the subsequent course of the Cold War and nuclear-arms race, and for the fates of its principal figures. Kennedy's success in compelling Khrushchev to pull out the missiles struck most Americans as a glorious victory. He won kudos for toughness in domestic politics (the Jupiter deal remained safely buried) and gained confidence and stature for the duration of his shortened presidency, at home and abroad.

Khrushchev had a tougher time coping with the fallout. Castro was enraged at the Soviet leader both for his concessions to JFK and for his failure to consult before making them. To mollify him, Khrushchev sent Mikoyan to Havana for weeks of tense secret negotiations, a hidden November Crisis that buffeted Soviet–Cuban ties. The Kremlin's decisions to extract additional hardware (the IL-28s, the tactical nuclear weapons) only intensified Castro's fury, while Khrushchev grew increasingly exasperated at the Cuban leader's intransigence. Though the alliance survived, the crisis's humiliating outcome gravely impaired Khrushchev's standing within the Kremlin. Together with other missteps, it solidified a sense that his erratic foreign policy had to end and ultimately hastened his ouster in October 1964. By contrast, Castro remained atop the Cuban government for decades. Despite chagrin at the way the crisis had ended, he owed his regime's long-term survival partly to JFK's no-invasion vow. Khrushchev's claims to have "saved" Cuba, hollow at the time, in retrospect have some validity.

In the Cold War and nuclear arms race, the crisis heralded an era of relative stability in superpower relations. In June 1963, JFK made a singularly conciliatory speech toward the USSR, hailing its World War II role and emphasizing the two nations' common humanity and interest in avoiding nuclear ruin. Shortly thereafter, Washington and Moscow established an emergency hot line – a step directly attributable to exasperation over the cumbersome methods used during the crisis – and agreed to a limited nuclear test ban, a major arms control advance that pointed the way towards a 1968 nuclear non-proliferation pact and also exacerbated the Sino-Soviet split as Beijing (nearing its own first atomic blast) decried superpower collusion.

Perhaps even more significant was what *didn't* happen after the crisis. Convinced now that "Imperialism, as can be seen, is no paper tiger [but] can give you a nice bite in the backside,"⁶¹ Khrushchev lost his appetite for a new Berlin showdown. Within a decade, Moscow and Washington ratified the

61 NSK to Novotný, October 30, 1962.

status quo of a split Berlin and Germany. After Cuba, neither side wanted to risk a repetition along the heavily armed divide in Europe – as the Americans showed by wary responses to upheavals in Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970, 1980–81), and all of East-Central Europe (1989).

The waning of superpower tensions fostered speculation that Kennedy and Khrushchev, had they lasted in power longer, might have ended the Cold War altogether. That seems unlikely. Neither yielded fundamentally incompatible views of ideology or the legitimacy of the postwar international order. Though military friction in Europe subsided, the superpowers repeatedly clashed indirectly in the Third World – and success in Cuba may have facilitated disaster in Vietnam. In 1965, when Johnson decided to bomb the north and send hundreds of thousands of US troops to the south, his entire national security team consisted of missile crisis veterans; McNamara later acknowledged that his experience with the quarantine directly influenced his thinking on the bombing.⁶² To the extent that Cuba inculcated confidence (or hubris) that calibrated force could compel a Communist adversary to capitulate, this may have been a fateful misreading: if Khrushchev had “blinked,” Castro never did – and nor did Ho Chi Minh, demonstrating anew the ferocity of revolutionary nationalism and leaving Washington painfully quagmired.

In arms control, too, the consequences varied. Furious at being forced to back down – and submit to mortifying close-range inspection – Moscow resolved to catch up in the nuclear competition as rapidly as possible and never again be vulnerable to American pressure. US leaders rationalized the rapid expansion of the Soviet ICBM force as a stabilizing component of what McNamara dubbed mutual assured destruction (MAD), and Nixon and Brezhnev enshrined it in 1972 as a state of nuclear parity. Some scholars argue the crisis reinforced a process of superpower “nuclear learning” – increasing judiciousness and responsibility, cementing a stable “long peace” – but this runs up against evidence that in late 1983 nuclear tensions led to another comparably perilous trip to the brink.

More than any other single Cold War event, the Cuban missile crisis stimulated a voluminous historiography and contentious public debate, not only over what actually happened but its implications for national security policy controversies, international relations theories, bureaucratic politics models, and a host of other fields and sub-fields. Since the rise of Gorbachev’s *glasnost*

62 McNamara interview, May 21, 1987, in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989, 1990), 193–94.

and the fall of Soviet Communism, the partial yet substantial release of Russian, Cuban, CIA, and other formerly inaccessible primary source materials has spawned a new generation of accounts and arguments and allowed scholars to reconstruct and assess the crisis more deeply and broadly than previously possible.

While it is impossible to do justice in a few words to the richness of this new evidence and scholarship, one may advance two tentative hypotheses. First, both Khrushchev and Kennedy come off looking worse in terms of their actions *before* the crisis – more irresponsible and reckless, less heedful of the risks and potential unintended and disproportionate consequences of their actions (for example, Khrushchev's deployments of tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed submarines; Kennedy's obsessive anti-Castro campaign) – yet, once *in* the crisis, their shared achievement in escaping it appears even more impressive. It required not only bridging the gulf between them, but mastering their own bellicose initial impulses, and those of some in their own camps. And second, even with the Cold War a receding memory, the persistence of acute fears over nuclear proliferation and confrontation into the twenty-first century suggests that the missile crisis will retain its relevance, as well as its fascination, for the foreseeable future.

Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate, 1963–1975

WILLIAM BURR AND DAVID ALAN ROSENBERG

During the years after the Cuban missile crisis, both superpowers treaded more warily to avoid direct confrontations, but traditional Cold War concerns kept them expanding their nuclear arsenals and preparing for the possibility of World War III. Motivated by fear and suspicion, but also by diplomatic and political purposes, both Moscow and Washington invested huge sums in thousands of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. During the 1960s, the United States deployed over a thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), hundreds of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and took the arms race in a new qualitative direction by developing accurate multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets, determined never to be outmatched again in a crisis, began to field a formidable ICBM force. Before Moscow reached strategic parity with Washington, and ended US nuclear supremacy, however, a stalemate had emerged, where neither side could launch a preemptive strike to gain a military advantage without incurring horrific losses. While the leaders of the superpowers recognized that nuclear weapons were militarily unusable, except in the most extreme circumstances, they nevertheless wanted them for deterrence and for diplomatic leverage.

In Europe, the cockpit of Cold War rivalries, apprehensions about military force imbalances and fears of nuclear blackmail and first strikes gave nuclear weapons a central role in alliance policies and politics. To validate security guarantees and to deter political and military threats, both the Soviet Union and the United States stockpiled thousands of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil. In light of the terrible danger of a nuclear conflagration in Central Europe, both superpowers searched for “flexible response” options to raise the threshold for nuclear weapons use in a confrontation.

The emergence of strategic parity at the close of the 1960s provided the context for superpower détente. US and Soviet leaders wanted to moderate

Cold War rivalries and avoid confrontations, but those goals uneasily co-existed with commitments to preserving and developing strategic advantages. Despite efforts at strategic arms control, innovations such as MIRVs and cruise missiles provided new fields for the nuclear competition and renewed apprehension about the vulnerability of strategic forces. With Moscow and Washington relying on electronic systems to enhance warning of strategic attack, both governments headed toward risky launch-on-warning capabilities, which raised the chances of nuclear catastrophe. While the United States and the Soviet Union continued to avoid nuclear weapons use, the practice of nuclear deterrence and nuclear blackmail remained risk-laden enterprises.

The dilemmas of nuclear stalemate

On the morning of September 12, 1963, President John F. Kennedy directly confronted the reality of nuclear stalemate in the Cold War nuclear-arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. General Leon Johnson, director of the National Security Council's Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), briefed the president and senior advisers on the NESC's 1963 report detailing the estimated future results of general war nuclear exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union between 1964 and 1968 based on war game analyses conducted under various conditions of preemption and retaliation. The US war objective in all cases was to "limit damage to the U.S. and destroy the ability of the USSR and China to wage war." Yet, the report concluded that whichever side initiated an attack, "neither the U.S. nor the USSR can emerge from a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and high casualties." In the event of Soviet preemption in 1964, the NESC estimated US fatalities at 93 million, a number that rose to 134 million in 1968. If the United States preempted in 1964, NESC estimated that 63 million Americans would die; in 1968, more than 108 million would die. "There is no way," General Johnson told Kennedy, "no matter what we do, to avoid unacceptable damage in the U.S. if nuclear war breaks out."¹

1 Summary record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council, September 12, 1963, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), vol. VIII, 499–507; Net Evaluation Subcommittee, "Oral Report," August 27, 1963, copy at the National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC (hereafter, NSA).

Having contemplated preemptive options during the Berlin crisis, Kennedy now recognized that the strategic advantage the United States had long enjoyed – the ability to destroy much of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal in a preemptive strike – was gone. When asked how the United States might reestablish nuclear superiority, General Johnson thought it was impossible. The positive side, he noted, was that the Soviets were equally aware of “the unsatisfactory estimated results of an all-out nuclear war.” If both countries recognized that a nuclear war would be a disaster, then “nuclear war is impossible if rational men control governments.” That might be true, Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed, but he saw a danger that “one side or the other would be tempted to act in a way which would push the other side beyond its tolerance level.” In addition, pressures could reach the point that one side or the other acted in a suicidal way, just “to get it over with.” “We can’t assume nuclear war won’t happen,” Rusk said. There was no certainty in “[t]his God Damn poker game.”²

This briefing marked an unheralded milestone in the history of the arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, which now had such dangerous potential that challenges to each other’s vital geopolitical interests, as in Europe or East Asia, could have unimaginably destructive results. A condition of nuclear stalemate between the two nuclear superpowers had long been forecast as coming. It had its origins in the pressures to expand the US nuclear arsenal, which derived from several major objectives: treaty guarantees for West European security and the need to stay ahead of the Soviets for military and diplomatic reasons after Moscow tested its first nuclear weapon. Confronted by a nuclear-capable USSR, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) identified destruction of the Soviet ability to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies as the highest priority for targeting. This essentially preemptive nuclear strategy, along with the need to ensure that a sufficient number of US forces would survive a Soviet surprise attack, became one of the key forces driving the expansion of the US strategic nuclear arsenal. A complex calculus of attack and counterattack, which blurred the distinction between war-fighting and deterrent capability, fueled the arms race of the 1950s. Although US officials now understood that nuclear

2 For Kennedy and preemption, see Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 97. See also Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 183.

stalemate had emerged, the same dynamic continued to propel nuclear war planning and military budgets.³

Lyndon B. Johnson, who succeeded to the presidency in November, had not been present at the September 1963 briefing, and it is not clear whether he had been back-briefed. Nevertheless, early in his presidency, Johnson received a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that included alarming details of the costs and consequences of nuclear exchanges with the Soviet Union that were consistent with the NESC briefing. Remarks made by Johnson during the 1964 campaign about the unique destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the horrific casualty levels of nuclear war strongly suggest that he drew the same lesson that Kennedy had: US nuclear superiority was fading and nuclear weapons could be used only for deterrence, not for preemption or war-fighting.⁴

That both superpowers were entering a period of stalemate showed the basic irrelevance of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1959 guidance that nuclear planning should ensure that the United States should "prevail and survive" after a war. The NESC exercise did, however, confirm the value of strategic theorist Bernard Brodie's observation that in the nuclear age the chief goal of military establishments was not to "win wars ... but to avert them." After 1963, US policymakers, and later Soviet leaders, widely shared this perception, but that could not solve key problems: what force structures and plans would suffice for deterrence? Would military planners abandon preemptive options? Moreover, would deterrence itself make the superpowers secure?⁵

US nuclear posture and force levels

US presidents wanted to avoid nuclear war but nevertheless agreed that a robust nuclear posture, that is, a large nuclear arsenal backed by elaborate war plans, was the deeply implicit threat that Washington needed in order to play a central role in shaping world affairs. Since the late 1940s, US policymakers,

3 David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960," in Steven Miller (ed.), *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 113–82.

4 Draft memorandum for the President, "Recommended FY 1965–1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces," December 6, 1963, NSA; Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 206–07.

5 David A. Rosenberg, "Nuclear War Planning," in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (eds.), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 173; Bernard Brodie (ed.), *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1946), 76.

worried about shifts in the balance of power that could threaten US security and economic interests, believed that a capability to wield the worst possible threat would preserve US influence, discourage Moscow from using military power to coerce US allies, and otherwise deter an attack.

By stationing troops in Western Europe and offering security guarantees through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States established a tripwire that raised the stakes if an East–West confrontation turned violent. Even after conditions of nuclear stalemate emerged, key officials such as Secretary of Defense McNamara believed that US strategic forces were necessary not only to deter nuclear attacks against the United States, but also to discourage lesser military challenges to US interests, for example, probes against West Berlin or nuclear “blackmail” of NATO allies. This emphasis on deterrence and diplomatic advantage was inconsistent with the preemptive logic of US, as well as Soviet, nuclear war-planning, and threatened to weaken deterrence, but it was a risk that defense officials accepted.⁶

The eight years of the Eisenhower administration bequeathed the weapons technology programs and choices of the 1960s. Those weapons – subsonic manned bombers, land- and sea-based ballistic missiles with intercontinental reach – were key elements of US forces for the next three decades. Networks of military services, government scientists, and contractors made new weapons possible, but development and deployment depended on the support of top-level Pentagon officials as well as members of Congress. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations shaped the strategic landscape by eliminating cumbersome liquid-fueled Atlas ICBMs and setting force levels for new solid-fueled missiles, Polaris SLBMs and rapid-firing Minuteman ICBMs. Although the Air Force sought thousands of Minutemen, President Johnson eventually approved 1,000, a politically negotiated number representing McNamara’s thinking on what the services would accept. Long-range weapons deployed later in the 1960s and the 1970s would largely be improved versions of existing delivery systems, such as B-52s, Poseidon and Trident SLBMs, and Minuteman II and III ICBMs.⁷

6 Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 331; Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill”; William Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 76, 130–32.

7 Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Programs of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. V, *The McNamara Ascendancy 1961–1965* (Washington, DC: Historical Office,

Since the late Eisenhower years, Pentagon officials had supported the emerging mixture of forces with what became known as the “strategic triad” concept; each element of the mix of bombers, SLBMs, and hardened ICBMs would hypothetically provide a separate retaliatory capability in the event that the others were destroyed or otherwise failed. Defense officials routinely assumed that hardened Minutemen and relatively invulnerable SLBMs would have the greatest survivability compared to bombers on the ground. While the Strategic Air Command (SAC) kept nuclear-armed B-52s on airborne alert during 1960–68, this was a risky enterprise. Nuclear accidents over Spain (1966) and Greenland (1968) led the Pentagon to cancel the program, although SAC continued putting some 40 percent of its bombers on ground alert.⁸

In 1962, McNamara and his advisers began using concepts of “assured destruction” and “damage limiting” to justify levels of strategic forces that would preserve a US edge. If the Soviets launched a first strike on the United States, SLBMs, surviving ICBMs, and alert bombers would provide a retaliatory force capable of the “assured destruction” of the Soviet Union: one-third of the population, 150 cities, the command-and-control system, and 50 percent of its industrial capability. McNamara saw the existence of such a capability as a basic deterrent. While rejecting the air force’s demands for more Minutemen to permit a full first strike, McNamara supported enough forces for a “damage limiting” mission that could destroy Soviet nuclear threat targets in either retaliatory or preemptive strikes.⁹

A US decision in the mid-1960s to produce MIRVs for ballistic missile forces significantly changed the dynamics of the nuclear rivalry. Produced to penetrate Soviet missile defenses, but also to hit strategic nuclear targets more accurately, MIRVs greatly increased the capability of US missile forces, without changing their numbers. The air force and the navy respectively developed and deployed MIRVs, first on Minuteman III (1970) and then on Poseidon SLBMs (1972). While important military organizations and interests supported MIRVs and the inertial guidance systems that made them possible, few worried about the arms-control implications. With the US

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 57–67, 478–79, 490; Graham Spinardi, *From Polaris to Trident: The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

- 8 Peter J. Roman, *Eisenhower and the Missile Gap* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Stephen Schwartz (ed.), *Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998), 189; Scott Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- 9 Deborah Shapley, *Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 193–201; Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy*, 322.



5. Minuteman III in silo. Introduced in 1970, the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had three nuclear warheads and a range of more than 6,000 miles. It remained the mainstay of the US strategic nuclear arsenal for more than forty years.

MIRV decisions, the strategic rivalry moved from quantities of bombs and missiles to such qualitative and quantitative issues as the yield, accuracy, and numbers of warheads that could be mounted on each launcher.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975); Donald MacKenzie, *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990).

Despite the innovations in strategic technologies, US war-planning, largely determined by the air force, did not stray from patterns set during the 1950s. War planners divided targets into nuclear, other military, and urban-industrial categories, with time-urgent nuclear targets – missile silos, bomber bases, command and control – driving increases in the US nuclear stockpile. Nuclear planners ignored the devastating fire effects of nuclear weapons, which may have kept estimates of weapons requirements unrealistically high. The US nuclear weapons stockpile deployed at bases throughout the United States and overseas stood at 29,000 in 1963 and peaked in 1966–67 at nearly 32,000. The decline in the following years, however, was irregular owing to the introduction of MIRVs, which, during 1969 to 1975, brought the total number of US ICBM and SLBM warheads from over 2,500 to over 7,000.¹¹

US war plans posited huge nuclear strikes, but more options became available during the 1960s. When Secretary of Defense McNamara received his first briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), he was appalled by its “rigidity” and “overkill” because it posited a single massive nuclear strike involving thousands of weapons with high damage expectancy. While McNamara wanted more flexibility and more choices for the president, including a counter-force attack for limiting damage (“no cities”), the JCS made only marginal changes. They broke up the SIOP into five options, all of which involved massive strikes with high damage requirements, which could be launched either in retaliation or preemptively. Even if the NESC had shown that preemption was not feasible, war planners wanted the possibility of striking quickly if intelligence detected Soviet attack preparations. Other emerging options included attacks against Soviet nuclear capability, other military forces, and urban-industrial targets, as well as options to defer strikes on Warsaw Pact countries and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and even national capitals, like Moscow. Force levels and their composition changed, but the SIOP remained essentially the same until the mid-1970s.¹²

While senior US officials treated nuclear weapons as central to Western defense, since the late 1950s they had recognized that as nuclear stalemate emerged, threats to use them, except in response to a surprise attack, could

11 Schwartz (ed.), *Atomic Audit*, 85; Lynn Eden, *Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear Weapons Devastation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Natural Resources Defense Council, “Archive of Nuclear Data From NRDC’s Nuclear Program,” www.nrdc.org.

12 Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill,” 177; William Burr, (ed.), “New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 236, November 22, 2007, www.nsarchive.org.

lack credibility. They (and the Europeans) questioned whether the United States would risk destruction by launching a nuclear strike if conflict broke out in Europe. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon privately acknowledged that the “nuclear umbrella was no longer there.” Although Nixon could not say this publicly, for fear that it would increase Soviet leverage, he and US defense officials continued to search for ways to buttress the credibility of nuclear threats. This concern shaped US nuclear strategy and planning throughout the period.¹³

Following patterns set during World War II, US nuclear planning occurred under conditions of deep secrecy; for example, the terms “Single Integrated Operational Plan” and “SIOP” were secret for years. As justifiable as some of the secrecy was, it was inconsistent with US political traditions of open government and raised enduring questions about accountability.¹⁴

Soviet nuclear posture and force levels

During the NESC briefing, General Johnson expressed his firm belief that the Soviets must have made the same calculations as the Americans and must have been equally convinced of the futility of nuclear war, but this conviction was based on “mirror imaging” rather than concrete intelligence. After the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leaders wanted to avoid crises and risks of nuclear war, but they supported nuclear force buildups to minimize risks of exposure to political coercion and to be in a more advantageous position should super-power conflict break out. Indeed, to deter and thwart feared US aggression, military planners embraced a preemptive strategy which shaped Soviet war plans until the early 1970s.¹⁵

¹³ Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 38–39; Robert J. McMahon, “Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History*, 15 (1991), 469–70; “Notes on NSC Meeting 14 February 1969,” box H-20, folder: NSC Meeting, Biafra Strategic Policy Issues, 2/14/69 (1 of 2), National Security Council (NSC) Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Library, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter, NA) (materials will be moving to Yorba Linda, California), and memorandum of conversation, “NSC Meeting: NATO and MBFR,” November 19, 1970, box 109, folder: NSC Minutes Originals 1970 (1 of 3), NSC Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Library, NA.

¹⁴ Schwartz (ed.), *Atomic Audit*, 433–84.

¹⁵ Christoph Bluth, *Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before SALT* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 78, 157; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 193, 203.

In a major open-source publication in 1962, senior Soviet officers headed by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii showed how their apprehensions shaped preemptive thinking. Should conflict break out, it would be a “nuclear rocket war.” Of “decisive importance” to the outcome of war would be the immediate destruction of the adversary’s nuclear weapons complex, chief military installations, and military-industrial resources. Sensitive to the danger of first strikes because of the German attack in June 1941, Sokolovskii and his colleagues feared that Washington was preparing for a “sudden nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.” Recognizing the devastating potential of a single nuclear strike, they underscored the need to repel a surprise attack with the “timely infliction of a shattering attack upon [the adversary].” While the massive destruction of nuclear war would be catastrophic, allegedly the Soviet Union would prevail to the extent that its counterattack destroyed the “aggressor.”¹⁶

Secrecy, even more pervasive than on the US side, makes it impossible to know how Soviet war planners targeted their nuclear capabilities in the Plan of Operation of the Strategic Nuclear Forces. But they were determined to frustrate the enemy’s “aggressive designs” and, just like SIOP planners, most likely gave priority to strikes on their adversary’s nuclear forces. Nevertheless, they also recognized that the limited accuracy of their forces and the dangers of a US retaliatory strike made preemption a perilous choice. In fact, the civilian leadership never supported it.¹⁷

The “aggressive definition of deterrence” assumed by Soviet strategy required, first of all, continued rapid expansion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the production and deployment of nuclear delivery systems. This stockpile had increased rapidly during the late 1950s, but not quickly enough to overcome the US lead; between 1956 and 1961, the Soviet stockpile of warheads increased from about 400 to 2,450 (compared to 3,620 and 23,200 respectively for the United States). Moscow especially lagged in the production of intercontinental delivery systems. In 1960, the newly organized Soviet

16 V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917–1991* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 214–17; Matthias Uhl, “Storming on to Paris: The 1961 Buria Exercise and the Planned Solution of the Berlin Crisis,” in Vojtech Mastny, Sven S. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), 46–52.

17 Steven Zaloga, *The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 79–80 and 137. For targeting, see Bruce Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 61.

Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) had hundreds of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of striking NATO Europe but, despite three years of testing and Nikita S. Khrushchev's missile rattling, the Soviets probably had only four ICBMs capable of reaching the United States. The Kremlin's strategic bomber force remained small compared to Washington's because missiles were its chief priority.¹⁸

US plans to build and deploy hundreds of Minutemen ICBMs, along with lessons drawn from the Cuban missile crisis, motivated Khrushchev and the high command to develop a missile force rivaling that of the United States. Determined never again to be caught in a strategically vulnerable position, Soviet leaders decided to deploy large numbers of ICBMs, including the huge SS-9s, designed to match the US Titan, and the relatively cheap SS-11, designed to be produced in large numbers so that Moscow could reach parity quickly and end US nuclear preponderance. The Soviets aimed some SS-11s east to counter Beijing's developing nuclear capabilities. While the Soviets were building formidable numbers of missiles, unlike US ICBMs, theirs had short service lives, making it necessary to build new generations on a regular basis. Moreover, Moscow's SLBM program was underfunded and Soviet submarines were vulnerable to detection.

Alliances and nuclear weapons

As a central front in the Cold War, Europe became a focal point for superpower nuclear rivalries. Both Washington and Moscow deployed thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe and their allies played integral roles in operating systems to deliver them. Both superpowers kept tight control over the weapons themselves, but Moscow's nuclear policies toward European allies were top-down, while US policy involved the construction of a shaky NATO consensus on nuclear planning. Both superpowers came to support "flexible response" strategies to avoid use of nuclear weapons, although by the early 1970s the Soviets eventually supported "no first use," which Washington consistently rejected.

US nuclear weapons policies in NATO Europe reflected military, security, and political priorities. Unease about the size of Soviet conventional forces served as an enduring justification for fielding US nuclear weapons in Europe,

18 This and the following paragraph draw on Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star*, 217; Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 61–66, 75–76, 80; Pavel Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 121–26, 145–47, and 196–205.

even though tactical nuclear deployments was one area where the United States retained an edge over the Soviets. Although US nuclear deployments were often controversial in Western Europe, US leaders assumed that their presence was necessary to reinforce security guarantees and maintain the confidence of allies. According to McNamara, a strong US military posture was important not only for maintaining NATO cohesion, but also to check “Soviet political pressure and blackmail” and avert changes in West German policy – either a militaristic revival or the negotiation of special security arrangements with Moscow – that could disrupt the Western security system.¹⁹

The Pentagon fielded growing numbers of theater and tactical nuclear weapons during the 1960s to support security guarantees and reinforce deterrence. In 1960, the United States had deployed only a few hundred weapons in NATO Europe; by 1967, it had stockpiled over 7,000. They were designed for a variety of missions, including anti-submarine, air defense, battlefield use, and strikes on Soviet bases and command posts. In part, the deployments flowed from the decisions of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to continue Eisenhower’s NATO nuclear stockpile program by negotiating nuclear-sharing agreements with European allies. To prevent unauthorized use of the weapons, Kennedy’s advisers tightened up control of the weapons by installing Permissive Action Locks (PALs) on weapons deployed in Europe.²⁰

The danger of nuclear weapons use in a Central European confrontation shaped Washington’s search for non-nuclear options that raised the threshold for nuclear weapons use. NATO’s General Strike Plan (later known as the Nuclear Options Plan) included a wide array of “package” nuclear options for clashes with Warsaw Pact forces as well as for strikes against fixed targets. Nevertheless, during the 1960s and 1970s, senior Pentagon officials found it difficult to visualize plausible scenarios for using tactical weapons that did not involve risks of escalation and nuclear conflagration. Those dangers made the Kennedy and Johnson administrations want to strengthen the credibility of nuclear threats with a NATO capability for “flexible,” nonnuclear, responses

19 Matthew Evangelista, *Innovation and the Arms Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); R. McNamara to President Johnson, “NATO Strategy and Force Structure,” September 21, 1966, copy at NSC. Francis J. Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” *International History Review*, 23 (December 2001), 858.

20 Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 193–200, 304–09; Ivo Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 108–11.

to less than all-out Soviet conventional attacks. While US defense officials rejected a “no-first-use” nuclear policy, they hoped that “flexible response” would make it possible to avoid early, or even any, use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. This was a difficult objective, complicated by balance-of-payments pressures, French withdrawal from NATO forces, and opposition from European partners, who refused to expand conventional forces.²¹


A growing belief that the threat of general war had receded and US-European agreement that NATO needed conventional capabilities to deal with limited nonnuclear attacks created conditions for the formal revision of NATO strategy along “flexible response” lines. In October 1967, NATO approved MC-14/7, which emphasized the need for both conventional and nuclear options so that NATO could react “appropriately” to any level of attack. Thus, MC-14/7 straddled US support for nonnuclear approaches and British and German beliefs that deterrence required a commitment to early nuclear use. It did not, however, resolve a question that would be an enduring dilemma for military planners: just how long could alliance forces hold against Soviet attack before resorting to nuclear weapons.

The growing stockpile of US nuclear weapons in Europe raised another basic problem: how to give NATO allies a voice in nuclear use and war planning, especially so that some, such as West Germany, did not become motivated to acquire their own nuclear forces. While NATO guidelines gave “special weight” to the views of governments, and Washington made loose consultative arrangements with Bonn and London on nuclear weapons use, the United States retained final control over the weapons. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), created in the mid-1960s, was a significant US-led effort to ensure alliance participation in the complexities of nuclear use. The NPG focused on such problems as consultation and preliminary guidelines for firing tactical nuclear weapons. That it would take the NPG nearly two decades to agree on a full statement of political guidelines on nuclear use suggests the depths of controversy over this sensitive problem.²²

The Soviets saw their large conventional forces in Eastern Europe as a necessary counter to US strategic forces as well as valuable for local political

21 The following paragraphs draw on Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, *The McNamara Ascendancy*, 313; Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 188–89, 289; John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Forces Posture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); and Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967* (New York: Oxford University, 1996).

22 Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Daalder, *Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 80–84, 90–93.



Graph 1. US-USSR/Russian ICBM Launchers, 1959–2002



Graph 2. US-USSR/Russian Strategic Bombers, 1945–2002

control. US deployments of theater nuclear forces in NATO Europe stimulated the Soviets to field tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, but their stockpile was half the size of NATO's, and most of the weapons were high-yield and not suited for battlefield use. Using storage sites in several Warsaw Pact countries, Moscow kept tight control of its weapons. Local Warsaw Pact forces received training from the Soviets in using them for their role in the war plan, but they would not gain possession of them until war broke out. In spite of these plans and deployments, by the 1970s, Warsaw

Pact leaders understood that even though they had advantages in numbers of troops and heavy armor, NATO had a “qualitative edge” in nuclear weapons and aircraft.²³

While little is known about Soviet nuclear plans, archival releases from the former Eastern bloc show how concern about escalation also led them to raise the nuclear threshold. A Warsaw Pact Command Post exercise held during the 1961 Berlin crisis showed the Soviet bloc striking NATO Europe with a massive nuclear attack of over 1,000 weapons in response to warning of impending US and allied airstrikes. General nuclear war was expected to quickly ensue. Similar assumptions informed Pact war plans in 1964. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets began to change their doctrine because they recognized the nuclear stalemate and saw the emergence of US flexible response strategies. The high command no longer assumed that war in Europe would be automatically nuclear and Soviet/Pact planning anticipated fighting a conventional war first, with nuclear weapons introduced only if the Western powers used them first or threatened to do so. That the NATO powers would use nuclear weapons first remained a Warsaw Pact planning assumption.²⁴

Intelligence, war plans, and warning

To improve their strategic position and to secure early warning of hostile moves, Moscow and Washington tried to perfect intelligence capabilities. On the US side, reconnaissance satellites transformed nuclear planning by settling the missile gap controversy in 1961 and then discovering in 1966 that the Soviets were heading towards parity. More accurate knowledge of Soviet force levels would help defense planners forecast nuclear weapons requirements and configure US strategic forces, while satellite technology made it possible to target Soviet installations with high levels of precision.²⁵

23 Evangelista, *Innovation*, 215; Daalder, *Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, 119; Uhl, “Storming on to Paris,” 59–62; Christoph Bluth, “The Warsaw Pact and Military Security in Central Europe During the Cold War,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 17 (2004), 299–311.

24 See Uhl, “Storming on to Paris,” Petr Luňák, “War Plans from Stalin to Brezhnev: The Czechoslovak Pivot,” and Frede P. Jensen, “The Warsaw Pact’s Special Target,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, and Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War*, 52–56, 81–84, and 105–08; Raymond Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990), 52–69.

25 Eden, *Whole World on Fire*, 99–107, 225–26; Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites* (Washington, DC:

Acquiring “real-time” warning of a strategic missile attack became a high-priority goal of the intelligence services. Unless detected in time, a surprise attack would not give SAC bombers enough warning to take off or US political authorities time to respond. By the late 1960s, Defense Support System satellites provided at best a twenty-seven minutes warning. That could give time for bombers to launch and the president to authorize a retaliatory strike, but US military experts still worried about the vulnerability of the US command-and-control system to disruption by a paralyzing attack. While US presidents, beginning with Eisenhower, had approved “predelegation” arrangements (depicted in *Dr. Strangelove* as “Plan R”) authorizing top commanders to launch strikes in the event that an attack had incapacitated the president, the Pentagon kept searching for methods to improve command-and-control and communications. Such innovations as ARPANET, the forerunner of the Internet, emerged in that context.²⁶

The problem of inadequate warning time provided the context for the launch-on-warning capability. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, White House advisers recognized that warning systems could make it possible to launch quick-reaction Minutemen almost automatically, although the possibility of a false alarm made that option perilous. With the Defense Support System, launch-on-warning became technically feasible; some analysts argue that the “U.S. strategic posture gravitated to [that] option” by the early 1970s. Later in the decade, the closely related launch-under-attack option became part of the SIOP in order to facilitate a quick Minuteman strike of a foe’s targets. That both the US and the Soviet deterrence postures rested on such a potentially catastrophic basis was one of the most worrisome secrets of the Cold War.²⁷

The Nixon administration, like its Democratic predecessors, recognized that under conditions of stalemate first strikes and preemption were not workable. Nevertheless, seeking more freedom of action, Nixon and Henry Kissinger wanted to find ways to make nuclear weapons useful for political coercion. Based on his interpretation of Eisenhower’s conduct during the 1950s crises, Nixon’s “madman theory” – the “principle of a threat of excessive force” to coerce Moscow or a Soviet ally – informed a number of his actions.

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 26, 184, 204–06, 209; Lawrence Freedman, “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates,” *Intelligence and National Security* (1997), 124–26.

26 Leonard Wainstein, C. D. Cremeans, J. K. Moriarty, and J. Ponturo, *The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945–1972*, Study S 467, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 1975, Top Secret (declassified 1992); Jeffrey Richelson, *America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999); Schwartz (ed.), *Atomic Audit*, 218.

27 *Ibid.*, 216–17; Blair, *Logic of Accidental Nuclear War*, 186–87.

Thus, in October 1969, Nixon ordered a secret alert of US nuclear and conventional forces to “jar” the Soviets into cooperating with his Vietnam War diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger continued to employ the “madman” strategy, e.g., raising alert levels of Mediterranean forces during the Jordan crisis (1970) and going to a DEFCON 3 alert during the October War (1973), but Kissinger eventually recognized that nuclear threats in diplomatic risk-taking had become too dangerous to use.²⁸

Ironically, “madman” tactics, with their risks of unintended consequences, went hand in hand with US efforts to reform the SIOP to give more options to the president and minimize risks of escalation to all-out nuclear war. Feeling “horror” over the SIOP’s massive destructiveness and believing that more limited nuclear options would make deterrence and nuclear threats more credible, a persistent Kissinger induced the Pentagon to undertake major studies of strategic targeting policy during 1972 and 1973. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger also favored changing the SIOP. By 1974, in response to Nixon’s instructions, defense planners began creating a range of attack options for a variety of possible confrontations with the Soviet Union (as well as China), with preemption remaining an option. Change was slow and some questioned whether escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons had been used, even on a “limited” basis. Moreover, the war plan produced under the new guidance, SIOP-5, had few limited options. It shifted some emphasis from military targets by stressing the importance of destroying “military forces” and “critical industries” that would be needed for Soviet postwar recovery. While secretaries of defense had publicly declared that “we do not ... target civilian population *per se*,” nuclear planners were, in effect, treating urban workers as high-priority targets.²⁹

The Soviets also began to recognize that preemption was unfeasible, although later than US leaders. Even if Minutemen ICBMs were vulnerable to attack, secure US missile-launching submarines put the Soviets at risk, and the constant training and retraining for successive generations of ICBMs

28 “Notes on NSC Meeting February 14, 1969” and Minutes, MBFR Verification Panel meeting, July 30, 1970, box 109, NSC Institutional Files, Nixon Presidential Library. For the October 1969 alert, see William Burr and Jeffrey Kimball, “Nixon’s Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969,” *Cold War History*, 3 (January 2003), 113–56; Brzezinski to Carter, “Weekly National Security Report #8,” 9 April 1977, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia.

29 Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy,’ and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7 (2005): 34–78.

caused “turmoil” in Soviet rocket forces. Those problems greatly complicated the possibility of a successful preemptive strike. Instead of preemption, the Soviet military headed toward reliance on a launch-on-warning concept, which new warning systems supposedly made conceivable. During the late 1960s and the 1970s, the Dnestr-M radar system provided a ten-minute warning, but it may have been unreliable, and a satellite warning system was not available until the 1980s. The warning gap continued to make launch-on-warning problematic, especially when US submarines could launch missiles with little warning to Soviet command and control.³⁰

Much about Soviet strategic intelligence and targeting remains secret. The Soviet spy satellite, the Zenit, was deployed in August 1962, with a more precise system deployed a year later. Soviet military intelligence sought such precision to help create the accurate maps needed for targeting. Later in the 1960s, the Soviets deployed Sfera geodetic satellites that collected information on gravitational and magnetic fields needed to make trans-polar ICBM flights more accurate. Although the satellites were designed to enhance targeting and facilitate an attack, they eased the problem of verifying arms-control agreements. “National means of verification” ensured that each side could monitor the other’s force deployments.

Nuclear taboos and arms control

Despite Dean Rusk’s fears of suicidal conduct, during the period between the missile crisis and the Helsinki summit, the superpowers avoided direct confrontations where nuclear use was a possibility. During the tense October War, Leonid Brezhnev acted with more restraint than Kissinger by eschewing nuclear readiness measures. During the Vietnam War, when some US officials and scientists studied the possibility of nuclear use, no one saw any military advantage in such action. Some analysts have argued that in the United States a deep-rooted predisposition emerged, a “nuclear taboo” against the military use of nuclear weapons, except in retaliatory circumstances, based on such concerns as adverse international reaction and the disproportionate effects of the weapons. McNamara’s private understandings with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that the United States would not use

30 This and the next paragraph draw on Zaloga, *The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword*, 123, 127, 163–166, 177; Podvig, *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 420–32; Peter Gorin, “Zenit: The Soviet Response to CORONA,” Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), *Eye in the Sky*, 157–72.

nuclear weapons first reflected that inclination. That the Soviet leadership had similar concerns is suggested by the Politburo's early 1970s decision that military plans should reflect a "no-first-use" doctrine. Although the civilian leaders of the superpowers believed that nuclear weapons were valuable politically and diplomatically, they found them virtually unusable militarily, except for the most unlikely circumstance (response to a first strike). This may have been one of the biggest secrets of the Cold War.³¹

Widespread public anxiety about nuclear testing led Kennedy and Khrushchev to reach agreement on the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1963). Stopping atmospheric testing by the superpowers, the treaty left them free to test nuclear weapons underground, thus facilitating the development of new weapons, such as MIRVs. While the superpowers negotiated an agreement to ban nuclear weapons from space (1966) and sponsored the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), arms-control achievements were scarce during the 1960s. Nuclear taboos did not discourage either side from fielding new weapons systems or from searching for nuclear options.³²

ABMs and SALT

The fear of surprise attack created significant pressure for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, which were highly controversial. Both sides spent huge sums for research and development, but even the ABM system that was developed to defend Moscow could stop only a few missiles. Realizing that "absolute protection" was impossible, top political leaders, such as Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin favored negotiations to limit ABMs, but the Defense Ministry and military-industrial complex wanted to work on a national missile defense system. McNamara opposed missile defense, not only because of technological uncertainties, but also because both sides could defeat it by building more missiles and MIRVs. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly favored an ABM deployment, and President Johnson would not oppose it unless the Soviets agreed to discuss mutual limitations. The Soviets, however, were not yet interested in talks on freezing strategic force levels. Therefore, in a September 1967 speech, McNamara reluctantly announced that Washington

31 Tannenwald, *Nuclear Taboo*, 1–25, 190–240; Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*, 80–89; Kaplan, Landa, and Drea *The McNamara Ascendancy*, 322.

32 Kendrick Oliver, *Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1961–63* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 414–41. For non proliferation, see Francis M. Gavin's chapter in this volume.

would deploy Sentinel, a “thin” ABM system, mainly aimed at an alleged Chinese missile threat in the 1970s.³³

Progress in arms control partly depended on Moscow’s attaining strategic parity with Washington. By 1968–69, Soviet ICBM forces were close to matching those of the United States in size, the Soviet leadership was more worried about a ruinous ABM competition, and interested in limiting US forward-based systems (aircraft and SLBMs) in Europe and the Mediterranean. What gave compelling stimulus to Brezhnev’s support for Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations and détente policies was his personal commitment, formed by his World War II experience, to avoiding war and to promoting peaceful relations between the superpowers. That, however, did not rule out pursuing an ICBM buildup to maintain Soviet strength.³⁴

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia derailed initial plans for SALT talks, and internal problems on both sides led to delays until November 1969. Nixon supported SALT in part because he wanted a reputation as a peacemaker to offset public apprehension about Vietnam. Worried about the erosion of US power signaled by parity and determined to preserve a central US position in world affairs, he and Kissinger also pursued arms control and détente as a subtle form of anti-Soviet containment. At first, they wanted to delay negotiations by trying to “link” SALT to progress on Vietnam War and Middle East settlements. That failed, but Nixon gave the go-ahead to a limited, but highly controversial, ABM deployment plan to strengthen his leverage in the SALT talks.³⁵

A central issue in the negotiations was the status of MIRVs, where the United States enjoyed a temporary advantage. For State Department and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) officials, banning multiple warheads could prevent a spiraling arms race, but the Joint Chiefs saw strategic advantages in deploying the MIRVed Minuteman III, and neither Nixon nor Kissinger wanted to oppose them. To protect Pentagon interests, the White House instructed negotiators to make an offer that Moscow would have to refuse, because it would have left the US Air Force with a stockpile of already-tested MIRVs, while the Soviets would have to freeze

33 Victor Gobarev, “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 14 (June 2001), 29–48; Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 412–20; Shapley, *Promise and Power*, 389–95.

34 Zaloga, *Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword*, 141–43; Gobarev, “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System,” 40–43; Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 201–05.

35 Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 28–68, 78, 146–50; also see Robert Schulzinger’s chapter in this volume.

their development work. Whether an effective MIRV ban could have been negotiated or not, Kissinger suggested an opportunity had been missed when he later observed that he should have “thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970.”³⁶

The complex SALT negotiations produced agreements, signed at the Moscow summit (May 1972), which confirmed each side’s strategic advantages. An “Interim Agreement” had less consequence; it froze US and Soviet ICBMs at 1054 and 1618 respectively, but the Soviet lead in missiles was offset by the US advantage in MIRVs. Reflecting Kissinger’s oversight in excluding SLBMs from his original back-channel freeze proposal, the final agreement froze US SLBM levels at 656 and 44 submarines, while allowing the Soviets to build up to 950 SLBMs and 62 submarines, as long as they retired over 200 old ICBMs. The “Interim Agreement” left untouched strategic bomber forces, preserving SAC’s three to one advantage, as well as US forward-based systems (FBS) in NATO Europe. The most significant achievement, however, was the ABM Treaty, which sharply checked an arms race in this area by barring national missile defense systems altogether.³⁷

With the SALT I Interim Agreement permitting modernization and replacement of old ICBMs, the Soviets moved ahead on the third generation of ICBMs that they had begun planning in 1969. In this way, the Soviets hoped to match US qualitative improvements but also compensate for FBS, British, French, and Chinese nuclear forces. After major controversy between design bureaus, defense industry leaders, and technologically conservative military officers over the degree of innovation, Brezhnev and the Politburo approved the development of three new MIRV-capable ICBMs: the SS-17, the SS-18, which would replace the SS-9, and the SS-19, slated to replace the SS-11. With these decisions, the defense industry sector, which was becoming a decisive player in setting force levels, secured more work, but the Strategic Rocket Forces became “saddled with three entirely different missile systems ... with entirely different infrastructure, training requirements and maintenance demands.”³⁸

By the mid-1970s, the Soviets had begun to offset the US advantage in MIRVs. The SS-17 and SS-18 were especially formidable, with hardened silos, significant accuracy, and improved fuel storage and command-and-control

36 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 153–61; Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 51, 83.

37 The following paragraphs draw on Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 8–9, 130–32; Zaloga, *Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword*, 135–53; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 180–97; Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 220–24; Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 243.

38 Zaloga, *Kremlin’s Nuclear Shield*, 135–41.

systems. US intelligence was well aware of these developments, having detected testing activity in 1972 and 1973. While the deployments would eventually fuel alarmist rhetoric in the United States about a “window of vulnerability,” they did not threaten parity or give the Soviets a first-strike capability. Brezhnev saw them as legitimate moves wholly compatible with détente.

The protracted SALT II negotiations reflected a more complex political context for arms control, especially in Washington. Kissinger’s secretive negotiating style antagonized the Pentagon and his position further weakened when Nixon purged ACDA in early 1973 in response to pressure from SALT critic Senator Henry Jackson (D-Washington). Removing moderate arms controllers from the internal debate strengthened hardliners like Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and limited Kissinger’s maneuverability. Kissinger himself complicated SALT II by pressing for the development of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles to increase US negotiating leverage. While Brezhnev remained strongly committed to the SALT process, his top commanders were highly suspicious of the negotiations.³⁹

After two years of difficult negotiations, at the November 1974 Vladivostok summit, Brezhnev and Gerald Ford, Nixon’s successor, reached an understanding that sought to limit the drive for strategic advantage. Based on the principle of equal aggregates, the agreement allowed each side up to 2,400 launch vehicles, bombers, and missiles, with a 1,320 sub-limit of MIRVed missiles. Both sides could improve strategic systems qualitatively. For senior US officials, the understanding reduced concern that the Soviets could get a numerical edge that would improve their political and diplomatic position. The agreement included no compensation to the Soviets for US forward-based systems; the Soviet high command thought this concession was unjustifiable, but Brezhnev forced them to accept it.⁴⁰

Negotiations to fill in the details of the Vladivostok agreement bogged down during 1975 and 1976. Washington sought broad freedom of action to deploy cruise missiles, but the Soviets wanted limits on US deployments. Even more controversial was whether to count the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic system. Despite the disagreements, by late 1975, Kissinger and Soviet

39 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 369–71, 467–73, 493–505; Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 221, 245.

40 Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 14; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 369–71, 467–73, 494–505; Minutes, National Security Council, January 29, 1975, Gerald Ford Presidential Library website, www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/nscmin/750129.pdf.

negotiators were heading toward an understanding, but the Ford administration, facing re-election in 1976 and political challenges to détente and controversies over Angola and CIA estimates of Soviet forces, was losing its freedom of action. Kissinger's position was now weaker, and opposition from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon made completing a worthwhile agreement impossible in 1976.⁴¹

The SALT II stalemate dovetailed with other emerging US–Soviet controversies generated by routine pressures to improve weapons systems. Soviet decisions to replace obsolete MRBMs with up-to-date MIRVed SS-20 mobile missiles, and thereby preserve a full range of nuclear systems to meet all military needs, triggered questions in the West about the impact of the SS-20 on the nuclear balance. Senior Defense Department and West German officials, already supporting modernization of NATO nuclear forces, and misconceiving the SS-20 as a force for blackmailing NATO, wanted to find ways to counter the new missile. Moreover, in late 1976, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pushed for accelerated development of the highly accurate MX ICBM, as well as a more accurate Minuteman MIRV, which could destabilize US–Soviet strategic relations because of their counterforce and preemptive potential. All of these developments foreshadowed some of the US–Soviet tensions that emerged later in the decade.⁴²

The nuclear Cold War

The US–Soviet nuclear competition of the 1960s and early 1970s saw the end of US nuclear superiority and the emergence of the strategic parity that would characterize the remainder of the Cold War. Driven by fear, credibility concerns, and organizational interests, both sides made massive investments in weapons systems whose use would have horrible consequences. Preemption came to be understood by both sides as highly dangerous and highly difficult technically. Indeed, US defense officials, and possibly their Soviet counterparts, were not sure how tactical nuclear weapons could be used without inviting catastrophe. As the nuclear danger increased and as

41 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 502, 517, 596–601; Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, 13–14, 390–94; Zaloga, *Kremlin's Nuclear Sword*, 175.

42 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 872, 958–74; Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 114–21; John Edwards, *Superweapon: The Making of MX* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 95–121.

taboos against the use of nuclear weapons strengthened, US and Soviet leaders sought to avoid high-stakes nuclear “poker games.” They moved toward military strategies that postponed nuclear weapons use (flexible response), but also engaged in strategic arms control.

Even while détente and SALT were unfolding during the early 1970s, Cold War concerns continued to shape strategic policy. Both sides prepared for the worst by developing high-tech warning systems and heading toward launch-on-warning capabilities. Also making deterrence hazardous and uncertain, both sides developed new weapons systems, cruise missiles on the one hand, and MIRVed missiles on the other, that raised apprehensions about vulnerabilities to attack. By the mid-1970s, the prospects for an end to the Cold War were hard to imagine as arms control faltered and arms builders on both sides continued to develop and deploy new strategic weapons. US and Soviet leaders knew that it was insane to use nuclear weapons, but they wanted to keep them because of their fears and pursuit of national advantage.

US foreign policy from Kennedy to Johnson

FRANK COSTIGLIOLA

Like their predecessor Dwight D. Eisenhower, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson adhered to the major tenets of post-World War II US foreign policy. They saw the Cold War as a long-term struggle played out in military, ideological, political, economic, scientific, and cultural arenas. All three leaders sought to contain the Soviet Union while advancing US influence around the globe. They agreed that radical revolution threatened US interests, and that such upheavals were instigated by the Soviets, “Red China,” or Fidel Castro’s Cuba. All three presidents believed that Western-style modernization – and particularly American values and institutions – offered the best model for developing nations. They also concurred on the strategy of tightening links with European allies in order to win the Cold War, head off potential problems with Germany, and compensate for the relative decline in US economic predominance. Kennedy (JFK) and Johnson (LBJ) differed from Eisenhower, however, in embracing an exuberant activism that “Ike” distrusted. In their respective presidencies, Kennedy and Johnson saw greater opportunities and threats than Eisenhower perceived in his time.¹ While Kennedy and Johnson differed in background, style, and the relative emphasis each placed on domestic or foreign initiatives, they shared similar ideological assumptions and policy goals. Both had competitive personalities.

Kennedy and Johnson regarded the Cold War as the defining paradigm for international relations in their time. They interpreted almost all events and trends in terms of this struggle. On the one hand, this view was nearly inevitable. These men faced the unrelenting reality of East–West propaganda barrages, nuclear and conventional arms rivalries, a space race, troops glaring across the tense borders dividing Germany and Korea, tension over Berlin, civil wars in Vietnam and Laos, revolution in Cuba, and competition for new African states and non-aligned nations in Asia and Latin America. Kennedy and

¹ See Robert J. McMahon’s chapter in volume I.

Johnson worried that Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, egged on by a militantly anti-American “Red China,” might indeed try to “bury” the United States, if not militarily, at least economically. Indeed, the Cold War intensified in 1961–62 as the Berlin and Cuban missile crises brought the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war.

On the other hand, the Cold War, like other paradigms, entailed some distortion of perceptions. Long-term changes that probably would have occurred in the absence of the East–West struggle were interpreted by Kennedy and Johnson as Cold War phenomena. With historical hindsight, decolonization appears as the nearly inevitable redress of power by Africans and Asians temporarily overwhelmed by Europeans in the nineteenth century. From the perspective of Kennedy and Johnson, however, the breakup of colonial empires upset the established order they had known since youth. They regarded the new nations as malleable objects of Cold War competition that might be won for the West or lost to the East. Another secular trend largely independent of the Cold War was China’s recovery of great power status after its century of neocolonialism and civil war. JFK and LBJ, however, interpreted this development as a Cold War disaster. In a telling Cold War discourse, a senior adviser recalled that Kennedy “always regarded the Chicom nuclear explosion as likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.”²

Kennedy, Johnson, and most of their advisers overestimated both the threats and promises facing them. The excitement greeting the dawn of the 1960s was overblown. Caution ended up prevailing in the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis. New nations in Africa and turbulent ones in Latin America resisted both Communist-exported revolution and US-inspired modernization. Structural problems, such as the US balance-of-payments deficit and the disparity between the US and European wings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), persisted despite efforts to fix them. Although the worst dangers of the Cold War did not materialize, neither did the promise of détente for Kennedy in 1963 or for Johnson in 1966–68. Historical memory, ideology, and personality encouraged Kennedy and Johnson to overrate the potential of the new decade.

Most of them born in the 1910s, the men in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reflected their generation’s memories of the 1930s–40s, when aggressive nations marched into one country after another. Imprinted with what they regarded as the lesson of Munich, this generation concluded that

2 James Fetzer, “Clinging to Containment: China Policy,” in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 182.

“totalitarian” states, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, were expansionist and ideological. As a consequence, the democracies had to remain armed, vigilant, and opposed to “appeasement.” Kennedy and Johnson feared “Red China” as particularly dangerous because it seemed to be in a highly ideological, “Stalinist” phase. Notions about historical development had another consequence. Kennedy and Johnson shared the prevailing belief that the decade of the 1960s portended extraordinary change. Pundits tried to decide on a unifying “national purpose.” A blue ribbon panel that featured a number of Kennedy’s and Johnson’s appointees, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, published *Prospect for America* (1958), which predicted a decade of challenge. Presidential adviser Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. recalled that at Kennedy’s inauguration, “we thought ... the world was plastic and the future unlimited.”³

Such assumptions stemmed in part from rarely questioned ideological beliefs. Kennedy and Johnson assumed that their nation had the power and the obligation to lead others toward adopting American-style institutions and values, particularly elections, gradual reform, and free markets. This doctrine, flattering to American sensibilities, incorporated elements of John Winthrop’s 1630 dream of a model “city upon a hill”; mid-nineteenth-century faith in manifest destiny; and twentieth-century confidence in US superiority in production, technology, and societal institutions. Woodrow Wilson synthesized these notions into an ideology of mission to the rest of the world. Wilson believed that the United States – close to God and superior in its economic, political, and cultural institutions – not only offered a model, but also had the obligation to help other nations become like itself. Wilson and his successors believed that adopting US-style institutions would enable other nations to become more prosperous, modern, stable, and friendly. In turn, the more other nations modeled themselves on the United States, the greater would become US security and the opportunity for Americans to do business and feel comfortable overseas. Radical change, such as in the Russian Revolution of Wilson’s time and the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions during the Kennedy–Johnson era, appeared as the arch enemy to these ideas and to American opportunity.

Kennedy

This ideology informed Kennedy’s inaugural address. The new president argued that American freedom packed such transforming power that the

3 Thomas G. Paterson, “Introduction: Kennedy and Global Crisis,” in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory*, 15.



6. President Kennedy's oratory moved a nation, here delivering his inauguration speech, January 20, 1961.

1776 revolution remained the touchstone for all peoples. He asserted that "the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe."⁴ In January 1962, he declared that "people everywhere ... look to us," especially to "the splendor of our ideals." Affirming manifest destiny, he said: "our Nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success."⁵ The phrase "commissioned by history" indicated, with the difficult-to-contest logic of the passive voice, that history itself had ordained the US mission. According to this logic, the United States could either stand idly by as freedom failed, or "cause" it to succeed around the world.

Kennedy's personality also inclined him to tackle challenges. In JFK's boyhood, ambition, contact sports, risk-taking, performance, and, above all, winning were mandated by his father, Joseph P. Kennedy. After his eldest brother died on a bombing mission, JFK inherited the mandate to fulfill the family's presidential destiny. In 1946, JFK's appeal as a war hero helped him win election to Congress. In 1952, he ascended to the Senate. As his brother

4 Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 242–48.

5 Fred L. Israel (ed.), *The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790–1966* (New York: Chelsea House, 1966), 3132.

Robert F. Kennedy recalled, JFK spent half his days on earth in pain. He suffered back spasms, Addison's disease, and gastrointestinal problems. Kennedy responded by trying to demonstrate manliness and courage. His philandering was extraordinary for the sheer number of women he slept with and the risks he took in choosing such partners as the Mafia moll Judith Campbell Exner. After Kennedy proved his calm toughness to Khrushchev and to the world in the Cuban missile crisis, he seems to have settled into a more relaxed, confident appraisal of risk and dangers.

Before October 1962, however, Kennedy exaggerated crisis. In his inaugural address, he dramatically declared: "In the long history of the world only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger."⁶ By characterizing January 1961 as an historic "hour of maximum danger," the new president was invoking memories of his generation's formative experience. In 1941-42, the Germans and Japanese threatened to link up and isolate the rest of the world. But that was not the danger the United States faced in 1961, regardless of how enthusiastically the Soviets and Chinese might support "wars of liberation." Ten days after he took office, Kennedy warned that in the next four years, "we shall have to test anew whether a nation organized and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome is by no means certain."⁷ This was astounding hyperbole. As Kennedy noted, he was speaking on Franklin D. Roosevelt's birthday. Kennedy might have considered that even after the devastation of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt had voiced nothing but confidence in the nation's institutions.

Kennedy probably expected that a sense of emergency would spur Congress, the bureaucracy, and the allies to accept his proposals. He secured a 15 percent increase in military spending. The Kennedyites' confidence that they could achieve the extraordinary was reflected in how they labeled their programs: the "New Frontier" at home, the "Grand Design" for Europe, the "Alliance for Progress" for Latin America, and the "New Africa" policy. Equally ambitious was the "Peace Corps," which would mobilize American youth to win hearts and minds in the Third World. If revolutionary guerrillas threatened, Kennedy would counter with the "Green Berets," special forces trained in guerrilla tactics. To deter aggression while heading off a nuclear holocaust, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed the concept of careful escalation of force through "flexible response." Despite their differences, these programs were alike in promising so much that they were bound

6 Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 242-48.

7 Israel (ed.), *State of the Union Messages*, 3122.

to disappoint. Neither other nations nor structural problems proved as malleable as Kennedy and his advisers hoped.

As Kennedy took office, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) predicted that though the Soviets and the Chinese would promote revolution, they would not risk “recklessness.” Another NIE opined that “stresses and strains” would “weaken the Communist world posture and diminish the effectiveness of world Communism outside the bloc.”⁸ After the aborted May 1960 summit froze relations with Eisenhower, Khrushchev anticipated the new president. “What can we do to help the new administration?” the deputy Soviet foreign minister asked Kennedy’s advisers.⁹ Khrushchev sought help with his problem: the hemorrhaging of people and talent from East Germany through Berlin. The open city also offered Western espionage and propaganda entry into the Soviet bloc. Khrushchev “had nightmares about it,” his son recalled. “The German problem gave him no peace; instead it kept slipping out of his hands.”¹⁰ The Kremlin leader also acted on his Marxist–Leninist ideology, out of sincere belief and to stave off competition from Mao Zedong. On January 6, 1961, Khrushchev lauded “wars of liberation.” The US ambassador in Moscow pointed out that the speech also reaffirmed peaceful coexistence and declared that wars of liberation must not become wars between states.¹¹ Kennedy, however, feared that Khrushchev’s tactics could slice away pieces of the Third World. He determined not to lose but rather to win the Cold War.

Although Kennedy and his advisers worried about the Third World, they also understood that wealth and political influence remained concentrated in the northern half of the globe. Indeed, advisers regarded links with Europe as key to winning the Third World and the Cold War. Rusk laid out this thinking.

Western Europe if it were really unified, and the North American Community, if we really developed the relationships that all of us have been discussing ... would be a nexus of special relationships reaching right around the world, with our relations with Latin America, and with the countries in the Pacific, the British with the Commonwealth, and the French with the French-speaking countries. Germany [too] is establishing some interesting relationships with selected countries.

As Rusk saw it, the United States would be the hub, with direct and indirect spokes of influence radiating to most of the world. Such organization would

8 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), December 1, 1960, and January 17, 1961, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), vol. V, 2, 17–18.

9 William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 486.

10 *Ibid.*, 482. 11 *Ibid.*, 487–88.

isolate the Communists and, he predicted, “would be reflected in growing caution on the part of the Soviet Union.” The Communists would be reduced, as State Department adviser Walt Whitman Rostow put it, to a “relatively minor power in the world.”¹²

Western Europe figured at the center of Kennedy’s concerns. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy worried that the US balance-of-payments deficit, foreign distrust of the dollar, and the resulting gold outflow could weaken the nation’s vitality. “What matters,” Kennedy declared to an adviser, “is the strength of the currency. It is this, and not its nuclear weapons, which makes France a factor. Britain has nuclear weapons, but the pound is weak, so every one pushes it around.”¹³ The European Common Market and Japan were presenting tough competition. US exports could no longer pay for the nation’s imports, capital investments, tourist expenditures, foreign aid, and military expenditure overseas. Kennedy told the National Security Council, “we have been very generous to Europe,” but now “it is time to look out for ourselves.” Cognizant of the crippling impact on Britain of its chronic payments crises, Kennedy warned that “if we cannot keep up our export surplus, we shall not have the dollar exchange with which to meet our military commitments. We must either do a good job of selling abroad or pull back.”¹⁴ Part of JFK’s solution was the Trade Expansion Act, which facilitated tariff decreases to expand markets for US exporters. (This proved another exercise in overconfidence. The reduced tariffs boosted US imports more than exports.) Kennedy also advocated Britain’s admission into the Common Market (the European Economic Community) to keep it looking outward and receptive to US interests. Given French President Charles de Gaulle’s opposition to allowing the “Anglo-Saxons” into the Common Market, the Kennedy administration deputized West Germany to check de Gaulle. In January 1963, however, de Gaulle shocked Washington and London by vetoing British entry to the Common Market and by signing a friendship treaty with Germany’s octogenarian leader, Konrad Adenauer.

An astonished Kennedy wondered “what kind of a deal [could] de Gaulle make with the Russians which would be acceptable to the Germans?”¹⁵ The phrasing of this question highlighted key assumptions. Almost every international development was interpreted by the administration in terms of the Cold War. An underlying fear was that a diplomatic revolution could overturn the

12 Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory*, 29.

13 Andrew Schlesinger and Stephen Schlesinger (eds.), *Journals, 1952–2000: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.* (New York: Penguin, 2007), 186.

14 Costigliola, “Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” 30. 15 *Ibid.*, 50.

NATO alliance that anchored the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the rest of Western Europe to the United States. The Achilles heel of the alliance was the reality that the Soviet Union, which controlled East Germany, held the key to German reunification.

Throughout the forty-five-year history of the Cold War, Germany remained the principal prize of the conflict. Neither the Americans nor the Soviets could permit the other to control all of Germany. Both superpowers and their allies felt more comfortable with a divided Germany, though no one wanted to antagonize the Germans by admitting this attitude. Washington exercised much of its influence in Europe through the FRG and through the integrated military command of NATO, to which the Germans made the largest European contribution. Though it remained impolite to say so, the 300,000 US troops in the FRG had a mission of double containment: blocking a Soviet invasion and keeping the West Germans facing west. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had helped create the FRG, reminded McNamara: "Germany is the most important country in the world to us. It is subject to be influenced by us ... as the Soviet Union, France, and Britain are not."¹⁶ Under Secretary of State George Ball recalled that Americans counted on West Germany's burgeoning payments surplus "as a bank ... for our grandiose Third World programs."¹⁷

The importance of both Germanys raised the stakes of the Berlin crisis. In 1961, Khrushchev renewed his 1958 threat to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The treaty would turn over to the GDR regulation of access to the democratic-capitalist enclave of West Berlin. Aside from the danger that the GDR might isolate West Berlin, the treaty could douse hopes for eventual reunification. Americans worried that such disappointment could unleash unrest. Desperate East Germans might revolt, call on their western brethren for aid, and drag Washington into a nuclear confrontation with Moscow. Bitter West Germans might strike a deal with de Gaulle or the Soviets, or seek an independent nuclear capability as an avenue toward reunification. Rostow warned that "the Soviet strategy will certainly be to try to demonstrate to West German nationalists that the West could not give them unity and that they should break out and make a private deal with Moscow. It's not too hard to imagine [Minister of Defense Franz Josef] Strauss playing that game, despite his tough talk."¹⁸ Rostow's warning of a West

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁷ George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 184–85.

¹⁸ Frank Costigliola, "The Failed Design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe," *Diplomatic History*, 8 (1984), 232–33.

German “break out” and shift in alliances demonstrated the tendency to overestimate dangers while underestimating the tenacity of the status quo.

The projected multilateral force (MLF) illustrated the mirror tendency of Americans to overestimate their ability to craft institutions. The MLF idea grew out of concern that as the FRG developed its economic and political clout, it would overthrow the restrictions that kept it a nonnuclear power. De Gaulle’s development of an independent nuclear force seemed to set a dangerous example. Joined by other nations, the Soviet Union adamantly opposed a West German nuclear force. After all, many Germans wanted to reunify their nation. Moreover, the FRG, pending a peace treaty, refused to accept as final Germany’s postwar losses of territory. Americans hoped that the MLF could square the circle. Conceived in the Eisenhower years, the MLF was planned as a fleet of surface ships, manned by a mix of NATO nationalities (including Germans) and armed with nuclear missiles. The missiles could not be launched without Washington’s approval. The MLF would give the Germans a finger near, though not on, the nuclear button. Kennedy appreciated the MLF as a device to “increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO.”¹⁹ Although quickly dubbed the Multilateral Farce, the scheme was embraced by Kennedy, who swallowed his skepticism. The fact that the unwieldy proposal survived into the Johnson years testified to the persistence of US efforts, as a top aide put it, to “contain and provide a creative outlet for a West Germany which might be tempted to seek reunification with East Germany through bilateral arrangements with Moscow.”²⁰

Kennedy believed that the United States could not hope to win in far-off Berlin and Vietnam unless it secured what he saw as the nation’s backyard, Latin America. JFK probably paid more attention to Latin America than did any other president of the Cold War era. He toured southern neighbors, met with leaders, and devoured economic and political reports. Despite his familiarity with the region, however, Kennedy overrated the threats and possibilities.

He called Latin America “the most dangerous area in the world.”²¹ In retrospect, this designation appears odd because the Soviets had only a minimal presence in Latin America, aside from Cuba. Again, apart from Cuba, there was little possibility of a US or Soviet provocation or miscalculation escalating into a major war, as could happen along the nuclear-armed

19 Costigliola, “Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” 51. 20 *Ibid.*, 39.

21 Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 7.

border between the two Germanys. Kennedy feared that Castro's charismatic appeal could spread revolution to the dispossessed of the region. Eliminating the Cuban revolutionary grew into an obsession. McNamara remembered that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter."²² Castro survived this April 1961 US-sponsored invasion and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Operation Mongoose designed to assassinate him and sabotage the Cuban economy. Trying to eliminate Castro helped set in motion a chain of events leading to the worst confrontation of the Cold War. Concern about another US invasion induced the Cuban dictator to welcome the installation of Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles as a deterrent. That led to the US-Soviet missile crisis of October 1962.²³ Although Castro's revolution sparked a nuclear confrontation, the Cuban model ended up being difficult to export. A year after Kennedy's death, Castro concluded that Latin America presented poor prospects for revolution. The Soviets remained unwilling to commit resources to the region. Latin American Communists resented the Cubans' know-it-all attitude. In November 1964, Castro shifted his revolutionary efforts to Africa.²⁴

Kennedy exaggerated the promise as well as the danger in Latin America. He probably agreed with Schlesinger, who described "the atmosphere" of the region as "set for miracles."²⁵ In a speech broadcast throughout the hemisphere on March 13, 1961, Kennedy announced a signature initiative, the Alliance for Progress. He called for sweeping changes to promote economic growth, redistribution of wealth, education, and democracy. His administration pledged \$20 billion in public and private US capital, to which Latin Americans were to add \$80 billion. The Kennedyites expected that this investment would double real growth rates and foster more equitable, democratic, and stable societies. The hope was that the Alliance could immunize Latin America against Castro-type revolutions. Although such revolutions failed to materialize, it was not because the Alliance reinvigorated economies. Despite the growth in US aid, private capital inflows and internal investment remained disappointing. US modernization theories proved ill adapted to Latin American realities. Elites and middle-class groups clung to their privileges. Economic growth stagnated, and wealth remained concentrated. Despite their

22 Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War against Castro," in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory*, 123.

23 See James G. Hershberg's chapter in this volume.

24 See Piero Gleijeses's chapter in this volume.

25 Thomas G. Paterson, "Kennedy's Quest for Victory and Global Crisis," in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory*, 15.

soaring rhetoric about democracy, the Kennedyites chose anti-Communist stability rather than risk radical change. US Army Special Forces trained policemen and soldiers in techniques for suppressing popular discontent. Washington accepted military coups in Peru and elsewhere and destabilized democratic, leftist governments in Argentina, Brazil, British Guiana, and Guatemala. The Kennedy administration may have launched more covert operations in Latin America than any other Cold War president. Before his death, Kennedy realized that the Alliance for Progress was sputtering. He remained uncertain how to respond.

Kennedy also perceived serious challenges in Africa and South Asia. The rush to independence by scores of African nations – seventeen in 1960 alone – excited imaginations. Kennedy saw supposedly malleable societies that could drift toward capitalist or Communist models of development. Africa appeared a battleground. “We cannot simply sit by and watch on the sidelines,” JFK declared. “There are no sidelines.”²⁶ Although Kennedy realized that these nations preferred non-alignment, he remained anxious that neutrality not slide toward hostility. Moreover, his competitive nature impelled him to jockey for advantage. Discussing with Rusk which countries were willing to accept Peace Corps volunteers, Kennedy said, “If we can successfully crack Ghana and Guinea, Mali may turn to the West. If so, these would be the first Communist-oriented countries to turn from Moscow to us.”²⁷ Also concerned with populous, non-aligned nations such as India, Kennedy told his advisers, “We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc.” If “we lose them, the balance of power could swing against us.”²⁸ The Kennedyites believed their support of India in its 1962 border skirmish with China provided the opportunity to win an ally. But aid to India alienated rival Pakistan. And India was not about to abandon its neutrality in the Cold War. African nations also proved resistant to blandishments. Neither Western nor Eastern models of development met the needs of extractive economies suffering a dearth of infrastructure and trained personnel. Moreover, most Africans remained loath to trade colonialism for some new tutelage. Kennedy also met frustration with the problems of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, chaos in the Congo, and apartheid in South Africa. Although the United States voted against Portugal in the United Nations, most African nations still

26 Thomas J. Noer, “New Frontiers and Old Priorities in Africa,” in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy’s Quest for Victory*, 256.

27 Paterson, “Kennedy’s Quest for Victory and Global Crisis,” 15.

28 Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 177.

regarded Washington as Lisbon's ally. While the CIA helped assassinate Congo premier Patrice Lumumba, whom Americans and Belgians feared as unstable and radical, peace did not return to that resource-rich nation. And South Africa resisted Kennedy's efforts to moderate apartheid.²⁹

Vietnam became the most grievous instance of Kennedy's tendency to overvalue both dangers and opportunities. JFK developed a special relationship with South Vietnam. Although Senator Kennedy in the early 1950s criticized French colonialism in Vietnam, he welcomed Washington's client government in Saigon as an independent, vital partner.³⁰ In 1956, Kennedy declared South Vietnam "the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike."³¹ Subscribing to Eisenhower's "domino theory," JFK argued that keeping this "finger in the dike" was crucial to preventing Communists from flooding into all of Southeast Asia, which would deprive Japan of markets and raw materials. Senator Kennedy traveled in the American Roman Catholic circles that lauded President Ngo Dinh Diem as the Christian savior of his country.

As president, Kennedy deepened commitments to South Vietnam. Meanwhile, Diem's unpopular government persecuted non-Communist opponents and botched the suppression of the pro-Communist National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas. After Kennedy suffered embarrassment with the Bay of Pigs invasion, a rough-and-tumble summit with Khrushchev in June 1961, and the erection of the Berlin Wall that August, he believed he simply had to "win" on some Cold War battlefield. He took seriously the reports of Vice President Johnson, who journeyed to Vietnam in May 1961, and Rostow and General Maxwell Taylor, who visited in October. Johnson exaggerated the stakes in Vietnam. He praised Diem as the "Winston Churchill of Asia" and framed the issue as a "fundamental decision" between trying "to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia" or "throw[ing] in the towel."³² Rostow and Taylor advised sending more US military advisers. By the end of his presidency, JFK had raised their number from 600 to 16,000. Some became casualties.

The Kennedyites chose escalation because they overrated the ability of foreign military forces to achieve political aims in a culturally different society such as Vietnam. They underplayed the determination of the Vietnamese,

²⁹ See Michael E. Latham's chapter in this volume.

³⁰ See Fredrik Logevall's chapter in this volume.

³¹ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006* (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008), 242.

³² *Ibid.*, 226.

who had a two-thousand-year history of expelling invaders. Wilsonian ideology proved naïve in its underestimation of the resolve of non-Americans to achieve their own goals in their own way. Having raised military spending from his first months in office, Kennedy had at his disposal overwhelming forces: the troops and ships of the US Pacific Command, the Green Berets, and innovative weaponry such as helicopters. After the Soviets backed down when confronted with US superiority during the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy drew the conclusion that escalation of force could impel the Communists in Vietnam likewise to back down. He regarded the conflict as an opportunity to demonstrate that “wars of liberation” could be defeated. The deepening war proved the most tragic element in Kennedy’s legacy to Johnson.

But that legacy also included steps toward détente. The accolades that Kennedy won after his perceived victory in October 1962 seem to have eased his burning need to best the Soviets at every opportunity. The brush with nuclear war tempered him. Khrushchev’s many letters awakened Kennedy to the Soviets’ legitimate concerns about nuclear war, possible German revenge, and improving the lives of the Russian people. In December 1962, JFK mused to Schlesinger that “Khrushchev makes much the same set of charges against the West that the West makes against him.” The president added that this “mirror effect reinforces his own detachment and his refusal to regard the world contest as a holy war.”³³ Kennedy and Khrushchev opened a direct “hot line” to ensure communication should another crisis strike. They also renewed efforts to reach a nuclear test ban treaty. On June 10, 1963, at American University, Kennedy called for a relaxation of tensions and “genuine peace” with the Soviet Union. Implicitly recognizing that Khrushchev had reason to dread a remilitarized Germany, Kennedy recalled that “no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the course of the Second World War.”³⁴ In August 1963, US, Soviet, and British negotiators signed the treaty to ban all but underground nuclear tests. Underground tests, which required greater technical sophistication, would add another hurdle for nations bent on developing nuclear weapons. While a step toward détente, the treaty was also aimed at the nuclear aspirations, real or feared, of China and West Germany. When Kennedy was struck down, his advisers were still divided on détente. Rostow warned that a relaxation of tensions with Moscow would legitimize Communism and induce people in the West to let down their guard. Rusk,

33 Schlesinger and Schlesinger (eds.), *Journals*, 181.

34 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 183.

however, believed that détente with the Soviets “was bound to work in favor of the West.”³⁵

From Kennedy to Johnson

This split on détente highlights Kennedy’s mixed legacy to Johnson. Kennedy’s crises gave Johnson breathing space. As leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev were both highly competitive while entertaining exaggerated hopes and fears. This volatile mix had brought the world close to nuclear war. Faced with apocalypse, Washington and Moscow had accepted common-sense mitigation of the underlying problems. The Berlin Wall ended the hemorrhage of East Germans while allowing West Berliners their freedom and ties with the outside world. The Cuban crisis subsided with the missiles withdrawn and the Americans promising not to invade the island unless provoked. This easing of the issues that had preoccupied Americans and the Soviets in 1958–62 enabled the Johnson administration to pursue détente, especially in 1966–68. Happily, there was no serious Soviet–American confrontation during LBJ’s term. Unhappily, the retreat from Armageddon enabled Johnson to focus his foreign policy on a disastrous project, the Vietnam War. Kennedy had deepened the US commitment to South Vietnam. Despite his rhetoric and activism, Kennedy did not solve but rather passed on to Johnson structural problems he had inherited from Eisenhower. The balance-of-payments deficit and gold drain continued. With Germany’s division dramatized by the Berlin Wall, the FRG remained frustrated. The problem of containing West German nuclear aspirations persisted. France defied US leadership, and Britain continued its quest for a post-imperial economic and political role. The Alliance for Progress did little to ease Latin American stagnation, inequality, and frustration. Non-aligned nations in Africa and Asia remained volatile and resistant to blandishments from East and West.

In terms of personality, Kennedy and Johnson presented a mix of similarities and contrasts. Although Johnson’s family did not approach Kennedy’s family in wealth or eminence, both produced intensely competitive sons bent on redressing grievances over status. While Kennedy vaulted the barriers imposed on nouveau-riche Irish-Americans, Johnson outgrew the limitations of his central Texas upbringing. During the late 1930s, when JFK was being escorted around Europe by William C. Bullitt, George F. Kennan, and other diplomats, LBJ gained entry into Roosevelt’s circle of congressmen. Roosevelt admired this intelligent, hard-working acolyte and recruited him to run

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 191.

for senator after only four years in Congress. Johnson's roots among hard-scrabble farmers and his close association with Roosevelt imprinted him with a fierce commitment to domestic reform that Kennedy never matched. Differences in background also conditioned their approaches to personal diplomacy. Comfortable with a wide range of people, Kennedy could turn on the charismatic charm. In his short presidency he met with many foreign chiefs, including twenty-eight African leaders invited to the White House. In contrast, Johnson kept foreign trips and visitors to a minimum. The problem with foreigners, LBJ explained, "is that they're not like the folks you were reared with."³⁶

Johnson shared Kennedy's tendency to personalize foreign-policy contests. Tragically, however, Johnson never gained the confident perspective and release that Kennedy won from his perceived victory in the Cuban missile crisis. Instead, Johnson waded deeper into the morass of Vietnam. Haunting him were fears that if one showed cowardice, enemies would breach the most private refuge. "What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me?" Johnson asked in 1964. Then he answered himself: "Of course, if you start running from the Communists, they may chase you right into your own kitchen."³⁷ He had learned early in life that if you ran from a bully, "he is going to wind up chasing you right out of your own house."³⁸ Explaining to Martin Luther King, Jr., his February 1965 decision to bomb North Vietnam, Johnson alluded to unspecified demons invading not just his home but also his inner self. He said he preferred not to escalate the war. "But they kept coming. They just kept coming and I couldn't stand it any longer."³⁹ George Reedy, a close associate, recalled of Johnson, "whatever may be said about him, he was a tormented man. I don't know what tormented him."⁴⁰ The president was certainly cognizant of the supposed strategic rationale for fighting in Vietnam. Nevertheless, he couched the consequences of pulling out in personal terms: "They'd impeach a president that would run."⁴¹ He feared that the American people will "forgive you for anything except being weak."⁴²

Johnson coupled his personal and political determination to stave off foreign-policy threats with faith in the righteousness of America's mission to remake the world. As he put it: "Woodrow Wilson once said: 'I hope we shall

36 LaFeber, *America, Russia*, 265. 37 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 213.

38 James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," in Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory*, 182.

39 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 220.

40 Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 646.

41 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 224. 42 *Ibid.*, 211.



7. The war in Vietnam became President Johnson's worst nightmare; here the president is reacting to news about the war from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in December 1964.

never forget that we created this nation, not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind."⁴³ In early 1965, Johnson invoked Wilsonian ideology to justify his plans for two simultaneous initiatives, an expanded war overseas and a Great Society reform program at home. He believed that domestic and foreign affairs remained inseparable: "The state of the Union depends, in large measure, upon the state of the world."⁴⁴ When protesters later criticized the war, Johnson countered that the United States risked "decay and even disaster" if it looked "only through a narrow glass." Johnson believed that America could fulfill the promise of economic opportunity and civil rights at home only if it was expanding those promises abroad. He warned that a United States "living in a hostile or despairing world would be neither safe nor free to build a civilization to liberate the spirit of man."⁴⁵

The outline for détente with Moscow that Johnson inherited was only partly fleshed out during his presidency. Two weeks after taking office, Johnson both began and ended a meeting by reiterating a first principle: "A nuclear war will be the death of all of our hopes and it is our task to see that it does not happen."⁴⁶ Johnson and his advisers did not, however, believe that nuclear war

43 LaFeber, *America, Russia*, 247.

44 Israel (ed.), *Messages of the Presidents*, 3162. 45 *Ibid.*, 3176.

46 Warren I. Cohen, "Introduction," in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.

threatened. This confidence enabled them to put other priorities ahead of improved relations with Moscow. Johnson wanted to ensure his victory in the November 1964 election as someone “tough” on Communism. He also sought to defeat the NLF and North Vietnam. Although cognizant of the Soviets’ worries about a remilitarized West Germany, he preferred to co-opt rather than frustrate that vibrant nation. Johnson remained suspicious of the Soviets and even more so of the Chinese. Khrushchev and his successors, more eager for a breakthrough, reached out to the new president. The Kremlin chiefs sent detailed letters after Johnson became president and again after his election victory. Johnson responded less effusively. He did not meet with the Soviet ambassador until four months after he became president and he delayed two months before replying to the Kremlin’s post-election proposals. Sidetracking the Soviets’ suggestion for solidifying the division of Germany, which would infuriate the FRG, Johnson knitted what Rusk called “the little threads that bind.”⁴⁷ These were noncontroversial, bilateral agreements that fostered trust, such as an accord on rescuing astronauts.

Johnson and his advisers dealt with Cold War adversaries along three tracks. They sought to isolate “Red China,” minimize disputes with Moscow, and quash Hanoi’s will to fight. The contradictions in this policy became apparent in February 1965, when Johnson chose to bomb North Vietnam even though Premier Aleksei Kosygin (who had helped overthrow Khrushchev in October 1964) was just then visiting Hanoi. LBJ explained that he “wanted to impress Kosygin and a number of others in the world.”⁴⁸ While Johnson may have “impressed” Kosygin with US military power, he failed to win Soviet aid in pressing North Vietnam and the NLF to give up their fight. Though unwilling to pay a high price for détente with the Soviets, Johnson hoped to move in that direction. In his January 1967 state of the union message, he declared: “Our objective is not to continue the cold war but to end it.” Eschewing the verbal barrage that extended back to the Truman Doctrine speech, LBJ pledged to avoid “both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war.”⁴⁹ He called for “bridge-building” to Poland, Romania, and other Soviet satellites eager to trade and establish cultural ties with the West.

The shifting nuclear balance propelled Johnson toward détente. Kennedy had deployed preponderant military power to persuade the Soviets to back

47 *Ibid.*, 4. 48 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 219.

49 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28338.

down in the missile crisis. Yet this superiority proved fleeting. Afterward, a Moscow official warned an American, "you'll never be able to do that to us again."⁵⁰ In the ensuing decade, the Soviets, despite a slowing economy, secured nuclear parity and built a blue-water navy. Johnson sought agreement with Moscow to head off a race in anti-ballistic missiles, which could destabilize the deterrence of "mutual assured destruction." After his June 1967 summit with Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, Johnson boasted of their agreements. The accords regulated consular affairs and commercial air travel and banned weapons in outer space. Always competitive, Johnson contrasted this comity with Kennedy's calamities: "We have made some progress since Vienna, the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis."⁵¹ In August 1968, however, Soviet tanks crushed prospects for an anti-ballistic missile accord when they rolled into Czechoslovakia to put down the reformist "Prague Spring."⁵² After a few months, Johnson resumed negotiations in hope of achieving a missile agreement before he had to relinquish the presidency. In this instance, too, Johnson overestimated his opportunity.

Johnson could move toward détente in part because the German issue was stabilizing. "I know my Germans," Johnson liked to say, having grown up with a German grandmother near German settlements in the Texas hill country. He determined to keep the Germans in Europe "by my side where I can count on them and where I can watch them." He acknowledged that his "overwhelming interest was to make sure that the Germans did not get us into World War III."⁵³ Since the late 1940s, Americans and their European allies had kept the West Germans contained and busy by integrating them into supranational economic and military structures, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and NATO. Americans valued the MLF scheme, despite its farcical aspects, because it promised to apply the supranational formula to the hypersensitive issue of a possible German nuclear bomb. In an elaborate dance from 1963–66, the Americans and the allies tiptoed around the fact that the MLF remained, despite the camouflage, a ruse. The scheme was not substantive enough to give West Germany a real voice in the decision to use nuclear weapons. Yet it contained enough substance to scare the Russians. The French, who had their own bomb,

50 LaFeber, *America, Russia*, 268.

51 *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson 1968–69* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970), vol. I, 27.

52 See Anthony Kemp Welch's chapter in this volume.

53 Frank Costigliola, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and the 'End of the Cold War,'" in Cohen and Tucker (eds.), *Johnson Confronts the World*, 173–74.

vehemently opposed the plan since it threatened their superior status. Finally, Johnson's advisers and their FRG counterparts opted for a "non-hardware" solution. McNamara's Defense Department agreed to admit German and other NATO defense officials into the technical process of nuclear war-planning.

Meanwhile, the mood in the FRG was changing. The Berlin Wall underscored that reunification was unlikely to be achieved through ritual pledges made by Americans and others to placate their German allies. Foreign Minister and later Chancellor Willy Brandt began reaching out to the East Germans, Soviets, Poles, and others with a policy that became known as *Ostpolitik*. As part of these policies, the FRG accepted the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiated by the Americans and Soviets.

The Vietnam War and its impact on US global standing

Two days after becoming president, Johnson, who had disapproved of the overthrow of Diem, nonetheless affirmed determination "to win the war."⁵⁴ Although Johnson positioned himself in the 1964 election as a moderate against the Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater, he also encouraged planning for escalation afterward. Johnson refused to become the first president to lose a war. He dreaded abandoning the South Vietnamese to what he saw as ruthless Communism. In the summer of 1964, the US Navy assisted South Vietnamese raids on North Vietnam. During the night of August 2, North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Tonkin Gulf fired at the U.S.S. *Maddox*. Two nights later, jittery crews reported another attack. The next morning there was no evidence of a second assault. No matter. Johnson was looking for an opportunity to hit both the North Vietnamese and Goldwater, who was accusing the administration of timidity. Johnson ordered an airstrike on North Vietnam. He sent to Congress a resolution, prepared months before, authorizing broad military actions. Passed by the Senate with only two dissenting votes, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution became Johnson's legal basis for escalating the war. In February 1965, LBJ responded to an attack on a US airbase with "Rolling Thunder," a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

In July 1965, Johnson multiplied the number of US troops in South Vietnam. As he later told Senator Eugene McCarthy, "I know we oughtn't be there, but

54 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 210.

I can't get out. I just can't be the architect of surrender."⁵⁵ To avoid surrender, Johnson kept increasing US troops in Vietnam until they reached a half-million in early 1968. Despite White House predictions that victory was near, the North Vietnamese and NLF in February 1968 launched the devastating Tet offensive. Enemy troops surged through most South Vietnamese cities, nearly breaking into the US embassy in Saigon. As US public opinion turned against the war, LBJ convened a bipartisan group of Cold War veterans. The "Wise Men" warned that the war was tearing apart society at home and failing in Vietnam. Johnson called for a limited bombing halt to jumpstart negotiations. He also launched what would become Richard Nixon's policy of replacing US troops with South Vietnamese forces. On March 31, 1968, Johnson announced he would not run for re-election.

Johnson's hope for an historic legacy of beneficial reforms at home and abroad was only one of the dreams soured by the Vietnam War. The conflict undermined US prestige and reduced the funds available for foreign aid. In Latin America, the Alliance for Progress shifted priorities from development and equality to foreign investment. Kennedy's lip service to democracy was replaced by a blatant support for supposedly stable, military-run governments. In Africa, US tacit acceptance or support of Portuguese colonialism, the all-white government in Southern Rhodesia, and a Congolese dictatorship supported by white mercenaries alienated most leaders. Johnson lacked Kennedy's personal interest in Africa and Latin America. Moreover, he grew so preoccupied with Vietnam that he neglected other issues. Protests aggravated Johnson's defensiveness. During an interview with *New York Times* columnist Cyrus R. Sulzberger, Johnson kept thumbing through a folder of papers while asserting, "I'm spending most of my time on Europe these days." The president insisted his administration had a global agenda, "despite Vietnam, despite what 'intellectuals' and the *New York Times* and those people in Georgetown say." But when he tried to talk with reporters about these other matters, "all they did was to keep whining Veetnam, Veetnam, Veetnam," protested the president, himself imitating a whining baby. Sulzberger recorded that after this performance, Johnson "suddenly ... opened the folder of papers he had been browsing over – and started to read a cable sent him by [Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge in Saigon."⁵⁶

The Vietnam War had other consequences. In much of the world, repugnance for the war fostered broader skepticism and eroded US power – as

55 Lyndon B. Johnson telephone conversation with Eugene McCarthy, February 1, 1966, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Recordings Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.

56 Costigliola, "Johnson, Germany," 176.

illustrated by the worsening gold drain. In Western Europe, increasing numbers of people grew horrified as television brought home images of heavily armed Americans and napalm-dropping jets terrorizing Vietnamese villagers. De Gaulle cited the war as further reason for European independence from both superpowers. In 1966, he pulled France out of the integrated NATO military command. This veteran of the pre-Cold War era looked toward a post-Cold War reunification of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."⁵⁷ Spending on the war prompted a March 1968 panic in the international gold market. The dumping of dollars for gold forced the Johnson administration to close the gold window of the US Treasury to all holders of dollars except other governments, which could be pressured to hold onto their greenbacks. Meanwhile, Japan boomed with orders to supply both the United States and North Vietnam. One of the many ironies of the war entailed China. Although the containment of China was cited as justifying the war, China itself retreated into self-imposed isolation with its cultural revolution.

Kennedy, Johnson, and US foreign policy

Despite their contrasts in background, style, and personality, Kennedy and Johnson differed little in many aspects of foreign policy. Kennedy paid more attention to Latin America and to Africa, which, however, yielded only limited gains. Johnson never acquired Kennedy's ease in dealing with foreign leaders and problems. Nor did LBJ acquire JFK's comfort in his own skin. Although attracted to *détente*, both Kennedy and Johnson found difficulty in escaping the premises of Cold War policies codified in the Eisenhower and Truman eras. The confines of Wilsonian ideology narrowed what JFK and LBJ regarded as acceptable change around the world. They remained committed to the belief that the United States was an exceptional nation whose values and institutions offered the best model for others. The Vietnam War helped frustrate Johnson's striving toward *détente*. If Kennedy had lived, he probably would have encountered Johnson's difficulty of fighting in Vietnam to contain Communism while trying simultaneously to engage the Soviet Union.

Neither the prospects nor the problems Kennedy and Johnson perceived evolved as they had expected. The Alliance for Progress did not yield the economic growth or political stability that Americans had hoped would inoculate Latin America against more Castros. In spite of these setbacks, Castro failed to export his revolution. The NLF and North Vietnam refused to

57 See Frédéric Bozo's chapter in this volume.

surrender despite the terrible pounding meted out in years of war. Nevertheless, the eventual US defeat in Vietnam did not pull down a long chain of dominos, as Kennedy and Johnson had feared. Notwithstanding Germans' frustration at continued division, de Gaulle's arguments for an independent Europe, and Bonn's overtures to the East in the late 1960s, the FRG remained allied to the United States. As the labels "New Frontier" and "Great Society" suggest, the domestic and foreign policies of Kennedy and Johnson – like the decade of the 1960s – stand out in history for grand promises unfulfilled.

Soviet foreign policy, 1962–1975

SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA AND WILLIAM TAUBMAN

The span of Soviet foreign policy that is the subject of this chapter covers two distinct periods, 1962 to 1964, and 1964 to 1975. The first period consists of Nikita Khrushchev's last three years in power; the second covers the first eleven of Leonid Brezhnev's. Because of the centralized nature of the Soviet system, with so much power concentrated in the Communist Party Politburo, and especially in the hands of the top party boss, Khrushchev and Brezhnev had immense influence over Soviet policy. But the two men were very different leaders with contrasting approaches to governing: by 1962 the impulsive, explosive Khrushchev hardly listened to his Kremlin colleagues. Brezhnev, on the other hand, had to struggle to consolidate his power for the first few years, and even after that, he preferred to preside over the Politburo instead of dominating it. Moreover, the Brezhnev regime came to power determined to alter, although not entirely reverse, the foreign-policy pattern Khrushchev had followed. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two sub-periods are notable for significant differences of both substance and style. Yet, there is an overall trend that characterizes the whole period – movement from the Cold War's most dangerous episode, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, to the high point of détente in 1975.

This trend reflects various Soviet domestic and international circumstances, which helped to convince both Khrushchev and Brezhnev that the USSR needed more than a short-term respite from the kind of Cold War over which Stalin had presided. Escalating numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides, along with the dangers they posed of a catastrophic war, placed a premium on limiting tensions, while Moscow's achievement of strategic parity with the United States, obtained under Brezhnev, gave him the confidence to negotiate arms-control agreements from a "position of strength" that Khrushchev lacked. The vulnerability of Soviet allies in Eastern Europe, dramatically visible in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and again in the Prague Spring of 1968, heightened Soviet interest in European détente. In contrast to

Khrushchev, who responded to Chinese charges of being soft on capitalism by getting tough with the United States, Brezhnev moved toward a new relationship of détente with Washington.

The détente achieved by Brezhnev and company stabilized Cold War competition in Europe while braking the arms race and expanding East–West ties. But it contained the seeds of its own eventual disintegration. The growing power and prestige of the USSR, sharply contrasting with America’s retreat from Vietnam, offered new opportunities to expand Soviet power and influence in the Third World. Marxist–Leninist ideology helped to ensure that Moscow would try to exploit those new opportunities, thus seeming to confirm to many in the West that Moscow was engaged in another round of global expansionism. As a result, even as détente reached its peak, it began to unravel.

Khrushchev’s last years in power

When the XXIInd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party convened on October 17, 1961, Khrushchev seemed at the height of his powers. He delivered two long reports, taking a total of ten hours, on the general state of the Union, and on the new party program. That program, prepared under his close supervision, promised that within twenty years “Communism in our country will be just about built,” and that after “steadily winning victory after victory” in economic competition with the United States, the USSR would “rise to such a great height that, by comparison, the main capitalist countries will fall far below and way behind.” Before the Congress closed, Brezhnev hailed Khrushchev’s “indefatigable energy and revolutionary passion,” while Nikolai Podgornyi, who was to join Brezhnev in a successful anti-Khrushchev conspiracy a mere year and a half later, extolled Khrushchev’s “indissoluble bond with the people, humanity, simplicity, his ability to learn constantly from the masses and to teach the masses ...”¹

Although the Congress seemed Khrushchev’s hour of glory, problems were growing at home and abroad. The 1961 harvest proved disappointing, although not as bad as the year before when Khrushchev warned, “If we don’t take measures, we could slide back to where we were in 1953.”² Particularly devastating was the sharp contrast between the resulting food shortages and the new party program’s promise of abundance. Relations with

1 *Pravda*, October 20, 1961, 2; October 21, 1961, 2.

2 See William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 480, 516.

China, already tense, further deteriorated when Zhou Enlai walked out of the XXIInd Party Congress. As for Soviet relations with the West, Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum, first proclaimed in November 1958 and then renewed in the summer of 1961, had borne little if any fruit.

In the winter of 1961–62, it appeared as if Khrushchev were still intent on forcing the German issue. He sounded desperate in a November 9, 1961 secret letter to President John F. Kennedy: "You have to understand, I have no ground to retreat further, there is precipice behind me." When Kennedy's December 2 reply took no notice of Khrushchev's plight, the latter accused the United States of "megalomania," and swore, "We must conclude a German peace treaty and we will conclude it even if you do not agree."³

These and other Khrushchev signals on Berlin form the basis for one interpretation of why Khrushchev decided in the spring of 1962 to send missiles capable of striking the United States to Cuba. When a U-2 overflying Cuba on October 14 discovered those missiles, Kennedy himself guessed the rockets were somehow linked to Berlin, a hypothesis later developed by scholars who believe, among other things, that Khrushchev sent them there in preparation for talks he hoped to hold with Kennedy in Washington in November.⁴ If such speculation seems strained, that is partly because of the vast geopolitical distance between Berlin and Cuba, but also because another explanation focused on Cuba itself seems more likely.

After Fidel Castro declared himself a Communist, Khrushchev viewed Cuba as "a beacon, a hopeful lighthouse for all the unfortunate, exploited peoples of Latin America."⁵ Khrushchev feared an American invasion designed to finish the job US-supported Cuban émigrés had botched at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Former Soviet policymakers and Russian historians have insisted that the missiles sent to Cuba were supposed to prevent that. If so, Khrushchev clearly meant to deter the Americans, not actually to fire the missiles, an approach that reflected his longstanding attachment to diplomatic bluster backed by nuclear bluff.

3 *Ibid.*, 538–39.

4 Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow (eds.), *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1997), 175–76. See also Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 537–41. For a brief summary of various Berlin related motives that have been attributed to Khrushchev, see Dan Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History* (New York: Oxford, 2007), 22. For emphasis on Berlin related motivations, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999), 99–109.

5 Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva" [Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev], *Voprosy istorii*, 7 (1993), 93.



8. The Cuban leader Fidel Castro was a particularly welcome guest for the Soviets; here with Leonid Brezhnev (left) and Nikita Khrushchev at Khrushchev's *dacha* in April 1963.

"Khrushchev possessed a rich imagination," his former foreign-policy assistant Oleg Troianovskii later observed, "and when some idea took hold of him, he was inclined to see in its implementation an easy solution to a particular problem, a sort of 'cure-all'" for many problems.⁶ Other international challenges to which Khrushchev imagined Cuban missiles could serve as a response were the apparent strategic superiority the United States had attained by 1962, and the doubts the Chinese were spreading that Khrushchev was strong enough to stand up to the Americans. But the results of Khrushchev's Cuban gamble were disastrous.⁷

Khrushchev depicted his retreat as a triumph, with *Pravda* claiming that the Soviet government's "calm and wisdom" saved the world from a "nuclear catastrophe."⁸ But as his Kremlin colleague Petr Demichev later recalled,

6 Oleg Troyanovsky, "Nikita Khrushchev and the Making of Foreign Policy," paper prepared for delivery at Khrushchev Centennial Conference, Brown University, December 1994, 39

7 For more details on the crisis, see James G. Hershberg's chapter in this volume.

8 *Pravda*, December 13, 1962, 2.

Khrushchev "made a show of having been brave, but we could tell by his behavior, especially by his irritability, that he felt it had been a defeat."⁹ Castro's angry sense of betrayal when Moscow withdrew the missiles helps to explain Khrushchev's dismay. So did the initial failure of Khrushchev's attempt, which began even before the crisis ended, to parlay a Cuban settlement into broad new negotiations with the United States. His letters to Kennedy on October 27, 28, and 30 proposed talks on a nuclear test-ban treaty, liquidating military bases, and even "general and complete disarmament."¹⁰ Impressed by Kennedy's handling of the crisis, Khrushchev was ready at last for the sort of relationship of mutual restraint that Kennedy had offered at the June 1961 Vienna summit but that he, Khrushchev, had spurned. Unfortunately for Khrushchev, Kennedy was no longer in a hurry. Only during the following summer was a treaty banning nuclear weapons testing in the air, underwater, and in outer space negotiated by the United States, USSR, and the United Kingdom concluded. Khrushchev assumed he had six more years (if the president were reelected) to build a real partnership. But several months later, Kennedy was assassinated, and before his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, could get serious about seeking a summit, Khrushchev was ousted from power on October 14, 1964.

Other setbacks contributed to that outcome. Sino-Soviet peace talks, begun in Moscow on July 5, 1963, dissolved in mutual recriminations several weeks later, with the polemics soon culminating in clashes over the Sino-Soviet border and in violent personal attacks on both Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. When the USSR's 1963 grain harvest proved disappointing (only 107.5 million tons compared with 134.7 in 1958, and with the Virgin Lands producing their smallest crop in years, although the sown area was now 10 million hectares larger than in 1955), Khrushchev had no choice but to buy grain from the very capitalists he had once promised to "bury."

The conspiracy to remove Khrushchev was set in motion as early as March of 1964, when Brezhnev and Podgornyi began approaching other Presidium members. Over the summer and early autumn, the plotters secretly secured the support of Central Committee members so as to avoid the fate of Khrushchev's "anti-party group" rivals, who outvoted him in the Party Presidium in 1957, only to be trounced when Khrushchev succeeded in transferring the issue to the larger Central Committee for final resolution. The head of the KGB joined the plot, and the Soviet military, disenchanted with

⁹ William Taubman's interview with Petr N. Demichev, Moscow, August 1993.

¹⁰ See Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 583.

what they regarded as Khrushchev's precipitous arms cuts, his emphasis on nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons, and his reckless risk-taking in Berlin and Cuba, stood aside.

On October 13, 1964, Khrushchev returned to Moscow from a vacation on the Black Sea to face a withering indictment, which his accusers later summarized publicly as "subjectivism and drift in Communist construction, hare-brained scheming, half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions divorced from reality, bragging and bluster, attraction to rule by fiat, [and] unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already worked out."¹¹ Most of the charges concerned his sins in domestic policy, but in a report prepared for delivery at the October 14 Central Committee plenum that ratified his ouster, Politburo member Dmitrii Polianskii said the following: During the Suez crisis, "We were a hair away from a big war," yet "we didn't have a mutual assistance agreement with Egypt, and hadn't even been asked to help them." As for Berlin, "only a fool would have thought it necessary to fight a war to make Berlin a 'free city.'" And the main effect of sending missiles to Cuba "was to produce a global crisis, bring the world to the edge of war, and terrify the very organizer of this dangerous undertaking."¹²

The next day the Central Committee named Brezhnev to replace Khrushchev as Soviet party leader. Khrushchev comforted himself by saying to Anastas Mikoyan, his only remaining friend in the party leadership, "I've done the main thing. Could anyone have dreamed of telling Stalin that he didn't suit us anymore and suggesting he retire? Not even a wet spot would have remained where we had been standing. Now everything is different. The fear is gone, and we can talk as equals. That's my contribution."¹³

Khrushchev was correct. In his time in power, he had succeeded in curbing the worst of Stalinism. At home, he had ended arbitrary terror, revived agriculture, allowed a cultural thaw, and fostered renewed social optimism. Abroad, he had ended Soviet isolation, eased the Cold War, and opened new contacts with the Third World. But by 1964, he had alienated all sectors of Soviet society; even the working class itself, in whose name the party had ruled since 1917, was in near revolt – witness riots in Novochoerkassk in June 1962, provoked by food price rises, increased work-norms, and terrible working conditions, which were crushed by police and army troops at the cost of twenty-six dead and nearly a hundred injured. In foreign affairs as well, despite

¹¹ *Pravda*, October 17, 1964.

¹² "Takovy tovarishchi, fakty" [Such, Comrades, Are the Facts], *Istochnik*, No. 2 (1988), 112–13.

¹³ Cited in Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev on Khrushchev*, trans. and ed. William Taubman (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990), 154.

Khrushchev's efforts to ease East–West tensions, the Soviet leader had provoked the Berlin and Cuban crises, and escalated the arms race he had set out to slow down.

Brezhnev's rise

Leonid Brezhnev came to power as a member of the “collective leadership.” His major colleagues/rivals were Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, Politburo member Mikhail Suslov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Podgornyi, and former KGB chairman and Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin, whose nickname in the Kremlin was “Iron Shurik.” Early in his tenure, some well-placed observers regarded Brezhnev as a transitional figure. But as Anatolii Cherniaev, who worked for Brezhnev before he became Mikhail Gorbachev's chief foreign policy assistant points out, once Brezhnev took full command of Soviet foreign policy, he became the driving force for détente. According to Cherniaev, Brezhnev “believed in the possibility of ‘peacemaking with imperialism.’ ... He differed from his colleagues in that, as General Secretary, he was less dependent on ideological stereotypes ... and it was permissible for him, unlike the others, to ignore sacred cows, when necessary.”¹⁴

The role of ideology in shaping Brezhnev-era foreign policy should not be underestimated. The cause of “world revolution” had long helped to legitimize Soviet rule in the USSR itself. But equally important were national interests, including a stake in “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist states, because to lead the world to socialism, the Soviet Union itself had to survive as a great power. This dual nature of Soviet foreign policy persisted into the 1970s. Moreover, ideology provided a framework for interpreting and advancing national interests themselves. It portrayed the West as inevitably hostile to the Soviet camp, but also prescribed ways of coping with the class enemy – by playing off one capitalist country against another (especially the West Europeans against Americans), and by collecting allies in the Third World.

In domestic politics, too, ideology loomed large. To be sure, discontent was emerging, reflecting the frustration of many that Khrushchev's de-stalinization campaign had not been completed. Intellectuals were attracted to the idea that the rival social systems might yet converge, and many young people, exposed to Western influence through music and literature, had lost faith in

14 A.S. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 292.

Marxism–Leninism.¹⁵ The second half of the 1960s gave rise to the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. In 1968, a dissident journal, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, appeared in Moscow with the cover page titled “Human Rights Year in the Soviet Union,” and quoting Article 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. In May 1968, Andrei Sakharov, the famous Soviet nuclear physicist and father of the Soviet thermonuclear bomb, wrote “Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,” in which he promoted the idea of East–West convergence based on “democratization, demilitarization, and social and technological progress.”

But the Soviet political system was still guided by a class of ideological “clergy,” apparatchiks who staffed ideological departments and positions at every level of the Communist Party and Soviet state, and ideology was still entrenched in the minds of the Kremlin leadership, as many memoirs of the late Soviet period, even of the most enlightened functionaries, like Anatolii Cherniaev, attest. Aleksandr Iakovlev himself, who was to become Mikhail Gorbachev’s prime ally in transforming the Soviet Union, did not question the “socialist choice” that Russia made (or, rather, one should say, had had made for it by the Bolsheviks) in 1917.¹⁶ The new dissidents, who were mostly from the intelligentsia, hardly made up a mass movement. But the potential for mass unrest, on the model of the 1962 Novocherkassk riots, alarmed the Kremlin, prompting the post-Khrushchev leadership to try to energize the economy, and especially agriculture.

Brezhnev’s highest foreign-policy priority was to prevent war. He had experienced enough of it in World War II (beginning on the Southern Front in July 1941, and ending in May 1945 in Prague with the rank of major general) to resolve never to allow another one. Above all else, Brezhnev was concerned about peace and stability in Europe. For him and other Soviet leaders, the blood of Soviet soldiers sanctified the postwar European borders that they were determined to preserve. It also cemented the new socialist alliance, making it impossible for the Soviet leadership until Gorbachev to “lose” any of its East European allies.

Brezhnev wanted to be seen as a peacemaker. In addition, as former Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatolii Dobrynin notes in his memoirs, by the late 1960s, “the party establishment gradually began to realize the need to satisfy the population’s basic requirements more fully and to narrow the gap

15 Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 100–07.

16 Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Sumerki* [Twilight] (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 32, 587.

with the West in technology and the economy itself.”¹⁷ Brezhnev was especially interested in expanding trade ties with the West but also believed that the resources spent on the arms race could be reoriented toward production of consumer goods if stability and a relaxation of tensions were achieved. However, the fear of a sudden attack brought on by “inferiority” in armaments and the Soviet military-industrial complex’s sense of having to “catch up” with the West made serious pursuit of détente impossible without first achieving full strategic nuclear parity.

The result was a rapid military buildup. In comparison to the Khrushchev period, Soviet defense spending rose 40 percent between 1965 and 1970, and the US–Soviet ratio of strategic nuclear missiles fell from a seventeen to one US advantage during the Cuban missile crisis to rough parity in 1972. By 1967, the USSR was deploying about 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) a year in an attempt eventually to pull ahead of the United States in this category. The United States developed multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology and, therefore, had more warheads, but the Soviets possessed more deliverable nuclear firepower atop its bigger land-based heavy missiles.

In the early 1970s, the USSR finally achieved the goal that had eluded Khrushchev. Achieving strategic parity, in the view of Soviet leaders, established the Soviet Union as a true superpower, able to expand its power and influence globally, while actively pursuing détente with the West. Moreover, building up the Soviet military for the purpose of making the country invulnerable to any adversary was hard to argue against in the leadership, and it was acceptable to and understandable by ordinary people. Brezhnev’s promotion in 1956 to candidate member of the Politburo in charge of the defense industry had strengthened his already existing ties with the Soviet military-industrial complex. Having been alienated by Khrushchev, the military was quick to give its support to Brezhnev.

Before he could pursue his domestic and foreign priorities, Brezhnev had to prevail in the Kremlin competition for power, and it took him several years to do so. He did not challenge his rivals openly but gradually undermined their political base and removed them from power while refraining almost entirely from persecuting them. With the exception of Kosygin, all his opponents were more conservative than he. According to Georgii Arbatov, at the time a Central Committee consultant, a “struggle for the soul of Leonid Brezhnev

17 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 217–18.

took place in the Central Committee in 1965–1967 as the conservatives tried to co-opt him.”¹⁸

Brezhnev came to power without any experience in international relations, a fact he readily confessed to his colleagues, especially in the early years. He quickly learned to rely on policy experts among his colleagues, like Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. At the start of the Brezhnev period, Prime Minister Kosygin represented the Soviet Union in meetings with foreign leaders. His June 1967 summit meeting with President Johnson in Glassboro, New Jersey, seemed to establish him (at least in Western eyes) as Brezhnev’s equal, if not superior. The main issue at Glassboro was Vietnam, but the meeting did not bring the Soviet cooperation that the United States was hoping for. Kosygin’s hopes for increased East–West trade proved to be stillborn when the next planned summit between the two leaders and the start of arms-control negotiations were both canceled because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

As Brezhnev gradually prevailed in the Kremlin, he elevated himself over Kosygin. His consolidation of power culminated in April 1973 at a Central Committee plenum that endorsed East–West détente and reconfirmed the highly publicized Peace Program that had been adopted at the XXIVth Party Congress in April 1971. The plenum also removed from office the last members of the Shelepin group – Gennadii Voronov and Petr Shelest – and promoted Brezhnev’s allies, Gromyko, Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, and KGB chairman Iurii Andropov, to full Politburo membership. After this, Brezhnev’s dominance in domestic and foreign policy was never challenged again.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

If the post-Khrushchev leadership’s goals included maintaining domination over Eastern Europe, as well as firm control at home, the Prague Spring of 1968 challenged both. Brezhnev felt he had to intervene to prevent the “domino effect” in the Warsaw Pact and to nip in the bud the liberalizing influence of Czechoslovak reforms on Soviet society. Soviet intervention was also a show of strength to the West – a reaffirmation of the postwar spheres of influence in Europe. However, the decision to intervene was made only after

¹⁸ Georgy Arbatov, *The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 127.

sharp disagreements within the Soviet Politburo and agonizing indecision by Brezhnev himself.¹⁹

As Czechoslovakia moved toward reform, Moscow initially played the role of a concerned but supportive outsider. When Brezhnev visited Prague in December 1967, his intention was to save Antonín Novotný, the conservative first secretary, who was under heavy criticism within the Czechoslovak leadership, but in the end the Soviet leader agreed to have Novotný removed from power, and Alexander Dubček was elected first secretary.

On January 18, 1968, the Soviet ambassador to Prague, Stepan Chervonenko, characterized Dubček as an “unquestionably honest and dedicated person, a very loyal friend of the Soviet Union.”²⁰ By March 15, however, after the gradual removal of censorship in Czechoslovakia, which coincided with student protests in Poland, KGB chairman Andropov compared the events in Prague to the upheaval in Hungary in 1956, which he experienced as the Soviet ambassador: “The situation is really very serious. The methods and forms, which are being used now in Czechoslovakia, are very reminiscent of the Hungarian ones. In this seeming chaos, ... there exists a certain order. This is how it began in Hungary.”²¹

The threat to stability of the socialist bloc was an especially sensitive issue for Brezhnev because he was embarking on arms-control negotiations with the United States and envisioned a European security system linking the two blocs. Throughout the winter and spring of 1968, East European Communist leaders repeatedly expressed their concerns about Dubček’s ability to maintain control. They and their Soviet counterparts were particularly alarmed by his gradual recognition of non-Communist parties in Czechoslovakia, and by the “Program of Action of the Czechoslovak People’s Army,” which called for a reassessment of the country’s military policy and its membership in the Warsaw Pact.

Practically every Soviet Politburo session in the spring and summer of 1968 registered alarm about Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev, who maintained close contact with Dubček, and Kosygin were cautious, preferring to rely on Dubček to limit the reforms. However, Andropov, Gromyko, and Shelest were inclined toward more radical measures, hoping to find replacements for

19 On Soviet internal debate and institutional interests, see Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD, and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).

20 Rudolf Pikhov, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoria vlasti, 1945–1991* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power, 1945–1991] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 2000), 273.

21 *Ibid.*, 275.

the current reformist leaders among Central Committee members who were closer to Moscow, such as Vasil Biľak.²² On March 21, 1968, Andropov went so far as to propose to his Politburo colleagues that “we should undertake measures along the military line, at least we should prepare them.” Documents justifying a military intervention were prepared by July, and in early August, during a meeting of leaders of Communist parties in Bratislava, Biľak’s group asked for military assistance.

Meanwhile, not only Soviet dissidents, but the Soviet liberal intelligentsia were looking at Prague with awe and hope to see whether socialism could be reformed peacefully, some even learning Czech in order to be able to read *Rude Pravo*. Petr Shelest expressed concern about possible disturbances in Ukraine because of its proximity to Czechoslovakia.²³

After a last conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on August 13, which persuaded the Soviet leader that Dubček was not in control of the situation, the Politburo decided to use military force. Warsaw Pact leaders met in Moscow on August 18 and agreed to send troops to Prague. Forces of five countries invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21, encountering no armed resistance from the Czechs. Up to the very end, Brezhnev was reluctant to use force and modified his position many times, but as a consensus-oriented leader, he eventually sided with his Politburo colleagues (in particular Andropov, Shelest, and Podgornyi). According to Arbatov, Brezhnev was convinced he would have been forced to resign as general secretary if he had “lost Czechoslovakia.”²⁴

The formal basis for the invasion, which subsequently became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, was the claim that in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, every Communist party was responsible not only to its own people, but also to “other socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement.” In fact, the intervention was a fiasco in the sense that the Soviets were unable to find any reliable allies in the Czech leadership, and at first had to keep Dubček at least nominally in power. In addition to shattering the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Czechoslovak population, the invasion alienated many in the Soviet public and among the party elite itself. Intellectual circles in Moscow reacted with shock, considering the invasion a crime and seeing it as the end of their hopes for reform. Arbatov reports that the invasion “played an important role in the growth of the conservative tendencies that eventually led to the period of stagnation.”²⁵

22 Valenta, *Soviet Intervention*, 20–22. 23 *Ibid.*, xvii, 15, 21.

24 Arbatov, *The System*, 141. 25 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The invasion had wider implications for Soviet foreign policy. The lack of a strong Western response to the invasion “proved to Moscow that Western governments were not prepared to commit themselves militarily on the territory of the Warsaw Treaty powers.”²⁶ This was a huge relief for Brezhnev. It meant that existing European borders were, in effect, final, and that it was now time to render that *de facto* situation *de jure* in an international agreement.

Détente in Europe

The first steps toward détente in Europe were taken before the Prague Spring. In March 1966, Brezhnev blasted the United States in his report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress, but also called for “achieving European security” on the basis of the territorial status quo.²⁷ That same year, President Charles de Gaulle of France, responding to repeated Soviet appeals for broader cooperation, visited Moscow. While de Gaulle was seeking an independent role for France in bridging the East–West confrontation, Brezhnev and Gromyko saw France as the key to a new relationship with Europe.

French–Soviet détente survived the test of Czechoslovakia. It was invigorated by President Georges Pompidou’s visit to Moscow in October 1970 and Brezhnev’s visit to France in the spring of 1971. France and the Soviet Union signed a declaration on relations between the two countries, which became a tentative model for European security principles. France then became the first country officially to endorse the Soviet proposal for a European security conference.

As for West Germany, it was slowly moving away from its earlier policy of no contact with the Eastern bloc, while not abandoning its ultimate goal of unification. When Willy Brandt was elected chancellor of West Germany in October 1969, he launched a program of *Ostpolitik* aimed at relaxing tensions in Europe by recognizing East Germany, along with post-World War II territorial changes in Europe. Brandt chose to deal directly with the Soviet Union first (rather than with its East European allies) as a way of allaying Moscow’s concerns about West German–East German rapprochement.

²⁶ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 184.

²⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 123.

As a result of very fast-moving and productive negotiations, the USSR and West Germany signed a non-aggression pact (the Moscow Treaty) in 1970. Next, Brandt signed similar treaties regulating the borders of the two Germanys with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The process was completed in 1971 by a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed by the USSR, the United States, Britain and France. The Soviets, for their part, pressured the Stalinist East German leader Walter Ulbricht to step down and be replaced by a more open-minded Erich Honecker. After this leadership transition, the two Germanys extended recognition to each other and signed a bilateral treaty in December 1972. In this way, Brezhnev and company achieved through careful, steady negotiation what Khrushchev had failed to achieve through ultimatums, bluster, and bluff.

Sino-Soviet relations

After Khrushchev was removed, the new collective leadership reconsidered the USSR relationship with China. China seemed poised to usher in the beginning of multipolarity on the international stage – by emerging as a challenger both to the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese detonated their first nuclear device in the fall of 1964 and successfully tested a ballistic missile in 1966. In the same year, responding in part to this development, the USSR began deploying the first elements of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow.

At the heart of the Sino-Soviet split, which began under Khrushchev but grew deeper in the late 1960s, was the struggle for ideological leadership of the Communist bloc, with the Third World being the main target of that competition. The Chinese leadership came to believe that the Soviet Union was abandoning the purity of the Marxist–Leninist teaching and the idea of world revolution for the benefits of cooperating with the imperialists. Yet, several members of the post-Khrushchev leadership sought to mend the relationship. While Brezhnev was not overly enthusiastic about reaching out to Mao, Kosygin saw improvement of relations with the Chinese as one of his personal priorities.²⁸

²⁸ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 462.

Kosygin anticipated that a rapprochement with China would be easier because of the growing American involvement in Indochina, which underlined the need for the two Communist states to defend their common ally. During a February 1965 trip to Hanoi, with a stop along the way in China, Kosygin failed to persuade the Vietnamese Communists to abstain from open hostilities against the South once the United States got involved, and failed to reach any agreement with the Chinese. It did not help that while Kosygin was in North Vietnam, the United States bombed Hanoi and Haiphong. The Chinese criticized the Soviets for their “revisionism” and declined to attend the XXIIIrd Party Congress in March of 1966. Later the same year, China officially launched its Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and relations with the Soviet Union dramatically worsened.²⁹

Mao made no secret of his extensive territorial claims to Soviet Siberia. Alarmed by these demands, as well as by the radical character of the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union began a massive buildup of forces along the Chinese border. This buildup, which continued through the end of the 1960s, suggested to the Chinese that Soviet forces might be used in a preemptive attack. In 1969, major border clashes erupted between the Soviet and the Chinese forces on Damansky Island. Responding to the Chinese attack, Soviet troops made a short but deep intrusion into Chinese territory. Moscow’s last illusions about the possibility of improving relations with China were dispelled by the Damansky hostilities.

During the same year, the administration of Richard M. Nixon began trying to open channels to Beijing through Pakistan and Romania. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to China, where he explicitly discussed the Soviet threat with the Chinese and even provided them with some sensitive intelligence information on Soviet military activities. President Nixon himself visited China in February 1972.

The Soviets repeatedly urged the United States not to exploit the Sino-Soviet split, but the very possibility that Washington might do so prompted Moscow to try to improve relations with both the Americans and the Chinese. On October 20, 1969, the same day that Dobrynin informed Nixon of the Soviet agreement to open Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks, the USSR and China resumed talks on their disputed border. By the early 1970s, with Sino-Soviet relations seeming beyond repair for the time being, Moscow moved to prevent a possible US–Chinese rapprochement by proposing just such a détente between itself and Washington.

29 See also Sergey Radchenko’s chapter in this volume.

Superpower détente

Although the drive toward détente was mutual, the United States and the USSR entertained quite differing views of it. Neither of the two countries was willing to forgo competition in pursuit of its interests internationally. For each of them, détente meant a limited accommodation that would allow those interests to be pursued at a lower level of tension.

For Soviet leaders, détente would confirm not only military, but political, parity with the United States. That meant that, like US policymakers, Soviet officials wanted to exert their influence and support their allies globally while relying on the other side to accept such actions as a military and political reality. The Soviet concept of “peaceful coexistence,” understood as a form of “class struggle,” would allow Moscow to promote proletarian internationalism and support national liberation movements in the Third World. The two main pro-détente arguments in Moscow – that the Soviet Union needed the West to improve its own economic situation, and that its growing military might could produce geopolitical gains at the West’s expense – were not seen as contradictory in the Kremlin.³⁰

On the US side, President Nixon and his national security adviser and later secretary of state Henry Kissinger wanted to prevent US–Soviet competition from escalating into confrontation, while at the same time gaining Soviet assistance in resolving international conflicts in Vietnam and the Middle East. Nixon, Kissinger, and Brezhnev resembled each other in their aspiration to be great statesmen and peacemakers, in their generally Realpolitik worldview, and in their preference for secrecy and personal diplomacy in conducting policy. That is why the idea of regular summitry was so attractive to both sides. The presence of a very talented Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, who also shared those views, contributed significantly to the rapid development of US–Soviet détente.

Just one month after Nixon’s inauguration, in February 1969, a secret personal “back channel” between Kissinger and Dobrynin began to function, with arms control being the first subject under consideration. With the Soviet Union on the verge of pulling ahead of the United States in ICBM launchers, and the United States actively engaged in developing the MIRV technology, both sides recognized that without agreed limits, the nuclear-arms race threatened international stability and imposed significant economic costs on both countries.

³⁰ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 40–73.

Signed on May 26, 1972, during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, SALT I did not actually reduce any armaments; rather, it froze the number of nuclear weapons at the levels existing on both sides, while failing to address the most destabilizing issue, MIRV technology. That technology allowed the side that employed it to increase the actual throw weight of its warheads many times without adding any new launchers, thus rendering the nuclear balance less predictable and therefore less stable. When the treaty was signed, MIRV technology gave an advantage to Washington because the Soviet Union was falling far behind the United States in this area. However, potentially, it was the Soviet side that could gain most from this technology because of its bigger ICBMs.

Along with SALT I, the US and Soviet leaders signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting strategic defenses, which in the future came to be perceived as critical to nuclear deterrence by both sides. Yet, even though arms control soon became the centerpiece at the summits, the May 1972 meeting did not produce other key results the two sides hoped for: "for the U.S., a definitive pledge of Soviet help in settling the Vietnam war, for the USSR some kind of understanding concerning China."³¹

SALT II negotiations began soon after the signing of SALT I. However, the negotiations were more difficult than expected because of increasing tensions in overall US-Soviet relations, growing doubts about détente in US domestic politics, plus the sheer difficulty of limiting forces that had very different components and structures. After President Nixon resigned in 1974, Gerald Ford moved quickly on SALT II, picking up where Nixon and Brezhnev left it. In late November 1974, Ford and Brezhnev met in the Soviet Far East, near the city of Vladivostok, and negotiated the basic framework of the treaty.

Brezhnev made a significant concession in Vladivostok against the advice of his own defense minister, Andrei Grechko. He agreed to an overall ceiling of 2,400 strategic launchers (including ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers), of which 1,320 could be equipped with MIRV technology, while not counting either American nuclear systems "forward-based" in Europe or the nuclear weapons of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, to the dismay of Soviet leaders, President Jimmy Carter soon abandoned the Vladivostok framework.

31 Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 75.



9. President Ford and Leonid Brezhnev at the conclusion of the SALT II talks in Vladivostok in November 1974. Brezhnev made détente the key point in his relations with the United States.

Proletarian internationalism and competition in the Third World

Détente began to unravel in the Third World. Khrushchev had reached out to national liberation movements in an ostentatious but tentative fashion. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union had almost no specialists on Africa: a subsection on Africa was just being created in the International Department of the Central Committee in 1961. Under Brezhnev, Soviet support for real or potential Third World allies shifted in emphasis from economic to military aid. The Kremlin sold arms, sent military advisers, and sought bases in some Third World Countries. Moscow's most important Third World allies were Cuba, India (after the signing of the Soviet–Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971), and Vietnam. In the Middle East, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt were particularly significant. While there was no Soviet master plan for the Third World, the Soviet Union, trying to emulate the United States, was becoming a global power, with a growing naval presence in

all parts of the world. However, there was a strong perception of a Soviet master plan within the Carter administration, championed by national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had significant influence on the new president's thinking, especially through his weekly national security reports.³²

Even as Soviet aid to Third World countries grew, some in the Soviet leadership, especially Kosygin, tried to limit it. He hoped to make relations with Third World countries more "mutually beneficial," by basing them on the "distribution of labor." Kosygin was especially interested in expanding Soviet influence in South Asia. During the September 1965 hostilities between India and Pakistan, Kosygin successfully mediated the conflict and persuaded the two countries to sign the Tashkent Declaration in January 1966. In the late 1960s, especially after the Soviet-Indian Treaty was signed, Moscow's Indian connection helped to balance the US-Chinese rapprochement. The alliance between the USSR and India was cemented during the Indo-Pakistani war of December 1971, which India fought successfully with Soviet armaments. The Chinese were deterred from intervening on Pakistan's side by the Soviet-Indian alliance.

Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the post-Khrushchev leadership initially tried to deemphasize the former leader's support for Arab states as the main source of Soviet influence in the region. Kosygin's successful mediation of the conflict between India and Pakistan kindled Soviet aspirations to replace the United States as the main Middle East peace mediator. However, Egypt, the most important Soviet ally in the area, resisted this idea.

In the spring of 1967, the Soviets found themselves being manipulated by Syria and Egypt. Soviet arms sales to these two countries encouraged their belligerence toward Israel, while Soviet pressure on them to be more conciliatory had no effect. Shortly before the outbreak of the June 1967 war, the Soviets allowed Egypt to mobilize troops to deter a possible Israeli attack against Syria, about which Podgornyi informed the Egyptian government in May 1967. Strong rhetorical support for the Arabs then undermined Soviet ability to serve as a mediator.

Once hostilities broke out, and the devastating defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan became apparent, Moscow felt it had no choice but to threaten intervention if Israel did not stop its advance. At the same time, however, the Kremlin turned to the United States for joint mediation. The shift from seeking to be the sole peacemaker in the Middle East to understanding the

32 Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 269–84. See also Nancy Mitchell's chapter in volume III.

need for US–Soviet cooperation was a turning point in Soviet Middle East policy. In July 1967, the Soviet Union and the United States successfully collaborated on UN resolution 242, which envisioned an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. In 1970, Brezhnev even proposed a gradual restoration of relations with Israel, but Suslov and Gromyko opposed it. They insisted that Soviet policy toward the Middle East stay the same until a full peace settlement in the region was reached. According to Dobrynin, Brezhnev gave in and continued the pro-Arab policy.³³

Notwithstanding the lessons learned during the 1967 war, and the newly found joint mission with the United States in the region, the Soviet Politburo, acting in response to the urgent requests of its Arab allies, decided to resupply their armies. Thousands of Soviet military personnel were sent to Syria and Egypt, and the Soviet Union acquired naval rights in Arab countries. Although Egypt and Syria were resupplied with up to \$5 billion worth of military equipment, Egypt wanted even more, and so during the war of attrition in 1969–70, Soviet fighter pilots were dispatched there. A treaty with Egypt was signed in May 1971, and a similar treaty with Iraq in April 1972. Driven by fear that the United States would marginalize Soviet efforts to be a leading mediator in the region, Moscow was seeking to consolidate its own sphere of influence in the Middle East,

Soviet interests suffered a major setback when, just six weeks after the Moscow Brezhnev–Nixon summit, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat expelled over 20,000 Soviet military advisers, technicians, and military aircraft from Egypt. Sadat had pursued secret contacts with Kissinger for a long time before that decision was made, apparently exploring a more promising alliance. His turnaround made it even more important for the Soviet Union to reach an understanding with the United States on their joint role in the Middle East, an effort that jibed with Brezhnev's personal dream of joining with Nixon to exert pressure on Soviet and American allies in a crisis situation. During his second American summit with Nixon in San Clemente, California, in June 1973, Brezhnev had a famous middle-of-the-night three-hour session with the president. Among other things, Brezhnev proposed that it was time for the two leaders to reach an agreement on the Middle East among themselves and then to “bring to bear [their] influence” on their respective allies to reach the settlement that would bring a lasting peace to the region. Brezhnev was

³³ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 162.

passionate and unrelenting, urging Nixon to step in personally before it became too late.³⁴

Nonetheless, US–Soviet collaboration failed its first test in the region just a couple of months after the summit. After the Egyptian and Syrian attack against Israel on October 6, 1973, Moscow and Washington accused each other of using delaying tactics in order to assist their allies in gaining more territory. When the ceasefire collapsed, and the Arabs seemed to have gained momentum, the United States put its forces on a very high level of alert, precipitating a crisis that threatened a direct US–Soviet clash. The ceasefire was eventually reestablished and hostilities ended, but this episode undermined Washington’s reliability as a partner in Moscow’s eyes, thus compromising the overall health of US–Soviet détente.

Conference on security and cooperation in Europe: the Final Act

Arguably the most important diplomatic process of the period between 1964 and 1975, at least symbolically, was the ambitious attempt to bring the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Europeans together within one new integrative security framework. This process, which unfolded in Europe in the early 1970s, resulted in what came to be known as the Helsinki Accords of 1975.

The idea of a European security conference, which would legitimize the postwar borders in Europe and reconfirm the Soviet Union’s status as a great European power, was one of the top priorities of the post-Khrushchev leadership, and one which especially suited Brezhnev in his role as a peacemaker.

A secondary Soviet goal was to expand trade relations and achieve some degree of integration into the European economy. Initial Soviet proposals did not include humanitarian issues, which later were commonly referred to as Basket III of the Helsinki Accords. Basket III, which included human rights provisions and other nonmilitary aspects of security such as domestic security of citizens, freedom of information, freedom of movement, and availability of cultural and educational contacts between citizens of different countries, provoked sharp differences of opinion among Soviet leaders. Brezhnev and Gromyko cautiously favored including Basket III in the negotiations, Suslov

³⁴ Memorandum of conversation, President Richard Nixon’s Meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, June 23, 1973, San Clemente, California. document no. 00766, Kissinger Memcons Collection, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

was against, and Andropov took a cautious position. He understood the need to confirm borders and expand economic contacts, but sensed the potential dangers of the human rights provisions. According to Melvyn Leffler, the Soviet leaders were faced with the “tradeoff: recognition of human rights in return for recognition of the territorial status quo.”³⁵

The attention that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations received at the highest level is evident in the fact that April 1973 and April 1975 Central Committee plenums – the only ones from 1973 to 1980 that dealt specifically with foreign-policy matters – discussed the CSCE negotiations, and that several Politburo sessions addressed CSCE-related issues, with at least one meeting, on January 7, 1974, largely devoted to it.

The Final Act of the CSCE was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, and printed in full in *Pravda*. Brezhnev’s goals seemed to be achieved: postwar European borders were confirmed in an international agreement; the Soviet Union was recognized as a member of the European great power concert; and relations with the United States were firmly set within the framework of arms-control agreements. Upon signing the Final Act, Brezhnev probably felt he was at the peak of his political career. Yet, even as Soviet leaders were celebrating the Helsinki Accords, the fruits of the perceived victory were beginning to turn sour.

Soviet human rights activists quickly began using the Helsinki Final Act as a way to make their case abroad. The first Helsinki Watch Group was established in Moscow on May 12, 1976, by the prominent dissident, physicist Iurii Orlov. The Soviet government cited other provisions of the act to accuse foreign governments of interference in Soviet domestic affairs. The dissidents retorted that the Helsinki Accords legitimized human rights movements in the USSR and other socialist countries.³⁶

Western support for the new wave of human rights movements combined with other irritants, which by the mid-1970s had accumulated in US–Soviet bilateral relations and in the Third World, to start pulling détente apart just as it seemed to reach its apogee.³⁷ Instead of becoming the year that consolidated détente, 1975 became the watershed between détente and what seemed like a second round of the Cold War.

35 Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 249

36 Paul Goldberg, *The Final Act: The Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1988).

37 See Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in this volume and Olav Njølstad’s chapter in volume III.

The end of détente

The period of 1962–75 was when the Central European theater of the Cold War stabilized. The European status quo was affirmed, first, in a series of treaties with two German states, and, finally, by the Helsinki Accords. At the same time, arms-control agreements were signed, which, while not reducing armaments, put significant brakes on the arms race. The fear of nuclear war subsided. East–West ties of all sorts – economic, political, social, and cultural – expanded.

The Soviet leadership seemed to have learned the lessons of the almost disastrous Cuban missile crisis. Brezhnev's ascendance meant moderation in foreign policy, and the achievement of détente. But détente did not remove competition in the Third World. If anything, Moscow's growing international prestige, as well as its growing arms sales to developing countries, made the Soviet Union a more attractive ally for Third World leaders at a time when the United States was suffering a major defeat in Vietnam. As more opportunities presented themselves in the Third World, the Soviet Union gradually got sucked into conflicts. When African and Asian leaders employed Marxist revolutionary rhetoric and called themselves countries of a "socialist orientation," the Soviet Union, as the leader of the socialist camp, felt it had to respond.³⁸

The fall of the last colonial empire – the Portuguese – at the very peak of détente triggered just such a Soviet response in Angola. The USSR and the United States came to support two opposing sides in the civil war there, and China also meddled in the strife to thwart Soviet influence in Africa. When the Cubans pushed the Soviets to widen their military involvement in the civil war, and the first battles were won by the faction favored by the Kremlin, Brezhnev took that to confirm that class struggle could proceed in the Third World while superpower relations improved.³⁹ In reality, however, the Soviet role in Angola strengthened the perception in the United States that the Soviet Union was using détente to lull the West into a false sense of security while driving for global dominance.

A truly cooperative relationship between East and West required a deeper consensus on basic values and principles that would not be within reach for

38 See Vladislav Zubok's chapter in volume III.

39 For the most recent detailed account of US and Soviet involvement in Angola, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 222–36; see also Piero Gleijeses's chapter in this volume.

another ten years. Such a consensus, as détente had shown, could not come about while the two main ideologies – capitalist democracy and Communism – continued to clash. Only after 1985 would Mikhail Gorbachev transform the Soviet approach to international relations, reining in the ideological clergy and the military-industrial complex, and resisting temptations to expand Soviet power in the Third World. Until then, the conflict would not only continue but worsen. As Robert Gilpin pointed out in his analysis of US–Soviet relations, “in the absence of shared values and interests, the mechanism of peaceful change [had] little chance of success.”⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 209.

France, “Gaullism,” and the Cold War

FRÉDÉRIC BOZO

The importance of France's role in the Cold War is often overlooked when compared with that of both the two superpowers and the other major West European countries. Germany self-evidently occupied a central position in the East–West conflict from its inception and was a decisive actor at its end, and Britain's role during the Cold War was much enhanced thanks to the “special” relationship with the United States. By contrast, the French contribution often comes across as less important. This may be partly explained by a comparatively modest French input in the historiography, especially in the English-speaking literature. Yet the perception of France as a lesser player in the Cold War is misleading.

To be sure, the country was in a somewhat peripheral position at the very beginning of the East–West conflict. Wartime leader Charles de Gaulle and – following his withdrawal from politics in January 1946 – his immediate successors were indeed reluctant to accept the emerging logic of the Cold War and its consequences. By the late 1940s, however, the intensification of the Cold War had led to the country's active alignment within the West, thus making France a key protagonist in the East–West conflict. Yet France's position in the Cold War soon provoked a number of frustrations that the country's painful decolonization process and chronic internal instability only aggravated, and these tensions together played no small part in the demise of the Fourth Republic and General de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Seeking to reestablish France's “rank,” de Gaulle was determined to challenge the international status quo which corseted the country on the world scene. By the mid-1960s, France's concept and practice of East–West relations had become premised on the objective of overcoming “Yalta,” thus leading France to assume an influential role in the long-term transformation of the East–West conflict. After his departure in 1969, de Gaulle's successors as presidents of the Fifth Republic by and large continued to shape France's international policies according to this grand design. Although events subsequently confirmed the durability of the bipolar order and the

persistence of the European status quo contrary to Gaullist expectations, de Gaulle's legacy remained the yardstick of French diplomacy during the second half of the Cold War and until its end.

If France's posture in the Cold War were to be summarized in one word, "Gaullism" should be considered an appropriate one. The term indeed captures the overwhelming influence of Charles de Gaulle and his legacy on France and its international role throughout the period, as well as the specificity of the French input in the conflict. France's role reflected not only its intrinsic geopolitical importance in the Cold War but, perhaps more significantly, a distinctive approach to East-West relations that resulted from a complex and, at times, paradoxical combination of accommodation and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Because dissatisfaction by and large prevailed, "Gaullism" became a synonym for the Cold War revisionism which – although culminating under de Gaulle's presidency in the 1960s – characterized France's policy during most of the period. And because it rested on a forceful and coherent concept of transcending the bloc system, "Gaullism" may be seen historically as having represented one of the most significant alternative conceptions of the evolution of the Cold War beyond the established order of the East-West conflict.

France's hesitant entry into the Cold War

France's entry into the East-West conflict in the immediate aftermath of World War II was characterized by more hesitation and second thoughts than was the case for the other major Western powers. For de Gaulle and, after his withdrawal, for his successors as heads of the "tripartite" governments (a coalition of Christian Democrats, socialists, and Communists that remained in power until spring 1947), there were, by and large, three main reasons to observe the emergence of the Cold War with concern. First, international status: for a country still under the trauma of its defeat of 1940 and whose "rank" as a great power had been only halfheartedly recognized by the Big Three in 1945, there was an obvious interest in the preservation of the wartime "club" to which it had been admitted belatedly; the French, therefore, had strong misgivings as cracks began to develop in the victorious alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union soon after the end of the war.¹ In addition, the emerging East-West divide carried the risk of

¹ Although France was not invited to Yalta in February 1945 (nor to Potsdam in July 1945), it was formally granted the status of permanent member of the UN Security Council and that of occupying power in Germany during the Crimea conference. "Yalta" subsequently became the motto of Gaullist denunciations of the Cold War system.

cutting France's ties with its traditional Central and East European allies, which had contributed to its standing after World War I, as exemplified by France's links with the "Petite Entente" in the 1920s and 1930s.

The second reason was linked to national security. Because the potential resurgence of Germany as a long-term threat remained a major French concern after the war, in spite of the total defeat of the Nazi Reich, preserving a strong connection with Moscow was key in terms of military reassurance, hence the alliance treaty that de Gaulle had signed with Iosif Stalin in Moscow in December 1944. The connection with Moscow was also important in order to gain Soviet support for what was then France's German policy, one of opposing the restoration of a central state across the Rhine and of amputating the territory of Germany while incorporating its western segments in a West European "grouping" of sorts, (such a grouping, in de Gaulle's eyes, would also help France check the growing influence and power of Russia in Eastern Europe).

Finally, there was the issue of internal stability. With a significant participation in government, the French Communist Party (PCF) was then a decisive element in France's diplomatic posture. Because it made alignment with the United States and confrontation with the USSR potentially troublesome in domestic terms, the Communist factor was a strong incentive for the maintenance of France's proclaimed role as a "bridge" between the West and the East as set forth by de Gaulle, a policy staunchly defended by his early successors, especially the foreign minister, Georges Bidault, until 1947.

Perceptions of the Soviet Union and of East-West relations evolved rapidly, however. French decisionmakers were in fact quite lucid with regard to the Soviet challenge as early as 1945. While primarily the result of his impatience with the parliamentary system of the nascent Fourth Republic, de Gaulle's withdrawal in January 1946 also reflected his frustration with France's impotence against the backdrop of a quickly deteriorating East-West context. Yet these changing perceptions did not immediately lead to the adoption of new policies, if only because the domestic situation, still marked by the politics of "tripartism," made it difficult to change the course of French diplomacy. The turning point was reached in spring 1947. France, owing to converging factors, was now forced to acknowledge Cold War realities and the necessity for alignment in the East-West conflict. By then de Gaulle, now in the opposition, had adopted a hardline stance in these matters; in April, he launched the *Rassemblement du peuple français* (RPF), a right-wing party built on a staunchly anti-Soviet posture. And in May, the Communist ministers were dismissed from government by the socialist premier, Paul Ramadier. Although primarily a matter of domestic politics (in fact, most observers expected the

Communists to quickly come back in government), the move no doubt reflected the internalization of the East–West divide. By then, the Cold War had clearly settled into French politics.

Yet the shift in France's East–West posture was primarily the result of the international context. It was the consequence, first and foremost, of increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior, which ran counter to France's interests, especially in Eastern and Central Europe where the strengthening of Moscow's grip cut France off from traditional allies. Moscow's policies with respect to Germany were also a growing concern. The Four Powers' foreign ministers conference in Moscow in March–April 1947 had shown that Stalin was not ready to support French territorial claims, in particular over the Saarland. Soviet aims vis-à-vis Germany were, in fact, increasingly seen as threatening to the West and to France. Not only was Moscow determined to incorporate the eastern part of the country in its sphere, but Stalin's objective of securing Soviet influence over Germany as a whole by playing the "German card" was now seen as a major challenge by the French. In short, the perception of a Soviet threat was now looming larger in Paris than the fear of a restoration of an increasingly hypothetical German danger, a decisive and durable shift that the events of the following years – from the Prague coup to the Berlin blockade and the Korean War – would but confirm.

France's gravitation to the West in 1947, therefore, was a result of the centrality of the German question in French perceptions: because the scheme of a Germany lastingly kept down jointly by France and the Soviet Union was now precluded and because the United States and the United Kingdom were increasingly pressuring them to that effect, the French, starting in 1948, recognized that solving the German problem implied just the reverse – rebuilding West Germany on Western terms and establishing a separate West German democratic state closely integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This was a watershed in French diplomacy. In the wake of the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, it opened the way to the Schuman declaration of May 9, 1950, which laid a solid groundwork for Franco-German reconciliation and European integration. These twin objectives would, from then on, constitute France's most consistent project, exerting a major influence on French policies throughout the Cold War (in turn, Franco-German reconciliation and European integration would profoundly change French perceptions of the German question over time, a development which also influenced France's policies significantly, as would be seen at the end of the Cold War).

Evidently, none of the foregoing would have occurred without another, equally decisive, factor: the US engagement in Europe, which, starting in 1947, became massive. For France, as for other West European nations, the announcement of the Marshall Plan carried the promise of economic recovery and political stability; it was no surprise that Paris and London took the lead in organizing the West European response to the offer in the summer of 1947. Yet the prospect of a political alliance between America and Europe, which was discussed throughout 1948 and became a reality with the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, was even more decisive. The Atlantic alliance indeed offered the country both a guarantee against the danger of Soviet belligerence *and* an insurance against the possibility of German resurgence. The alliance's transformation into an integrated organization starting in 1950 and the stabilization of the US military presence in Europe confirmed this. The agonizing German rearmament question, from 1950 onwards, certainly revealed how delicate the balance between those two concerns was in those years as seen from Paris. However, the unfolding of the crisis over the European Defense Community (EDC) in the fall of 1954 and the FRG's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) in 1955 definitively established the "double containment" (of the USSR, thanks to the Western alliance, and of West Germany within that same alliance) that would ensure France's security and status in the decades to come. By the mid-1950s, the country had settled into the structure of the Cold War for good.

The Fourth Republic's Cold War

Accommodation, however, did not mean satisfaction. Beginning in the early 1950s, the policies of the Fourth Republic were characterized by a growing sense of frustration. This reflected, first of all, a widening gap between the country's ambitions and its limited economic, political, and military means. As a result, France faced growing dilemmas when confronted with major international choices or crises. Yet Paris's frustration was also, to a significant extent, fostered by the rules of the Cold War, which France never wholeheartedly accepted. Nonetheless, the fundamentals of the country's posture in the East-West conflict and, most of all, its Atlantic and European orientations were at no point called into question after 1947. Although some of the factors that explained France's reluctance to enter the conflict in the early years were now less salient, they still continued to operate. On the domestic scene, the

influence of neutralist tendencies remained important in political and intellectual circles, especially in the early 1950s, and, in strategic terms, the fear of a confrontation with Moscow, in particular over the German rearmament question, continued to loom large.

The foregoing helps explain French thinking about East–West relations during the 1950s, which in some ways foreshadowed de Gaulle's policies in the next decade. Most important was the notion – at least in the early years of the decade – that the Cold War was a transitory state of affairs and that alternative schemes were conceivable; the belief that a more independent Europe could alleviate the East–West divide in the long run, for example, played a significant role in the thinking of Jean Monnet. Also important was the thought that France had to temper what were now and then seen as exceedingly confrontational US policies (again, the German rearmament debate revolved largely around this issue as viewed from Paris). And last, but not least, was the belief that it was important to preserve contacts with the Soviet Union for the sake of European security. Pierre Mendès France was thinking this way when he broached the theme of disarmament and détente at the United Nations in November 1954 and when his successor, Edgar Faure, pushed for the convening of the meeting of the Big Four in Geneva in July 1955. Although the international policies of the Fourth Republic can hardly be viewed as “revisionist” in the sense of de Gaulle's in the 1960s, they did reflect the country's growing sense of unease with the constraints and dilemmas imposed by the East–West situation.

Yet it was within the US-dominated Western alliance that the strictures of the Cold War were felt most bitterly by the French during the Fourth Republic. To be sure, the country had a fundamental choice in the late 1940s and the early 1950s: along with the UK, France had been the most important European supporter of the Atlantic political alliance and its military organization. Yet if “Atlanticism” prevailed under the Fourth Republic, the consequences of that choice were felt with increasing dismay. The country quickly found itself in the position of a junior partner of the “Anglo-Saxons” within the Western bloc, especially with regard to nuclear weapons, of which it was deprived. As a result, France's NATO policy, starting in the early 1950s, amounted to an uphill battle for recognition as the alliance's third big power, along with the United States and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Atlantic system inevitably led to the blurring of the European project which, by then, had become a central element of France's foreign policy and the principal justification of its claim to international leadership.

The 1956 Suez crisis, however, even more decisively affected France's disgruntlement with US domination of the Atlantic alliance. Its humiliating outcome, which Washington had forced upon London and Paris, dramatically illustrated France's and Europe's diminished margin of maneuver vis-à-vis the United States. This feeling of humiliation was aggravated by the fact that the crisis had taken place, as seen from Paris, against the backdrop of de facto Soviet-American collusion, illuminating a new phase of the Cold War, characterized by the emergence of bipolarity at the global level. But whereas the Suez crisis had led Britain to seek a reaffirmation of its "special relationship" with the United States, France, in the last years of the Fourth Republic, chose a different course and relaunched its search for strategic autonomy. Suez was the real starting point of a process that would culminate under de Gaulle in 1966.

By the end of the 1950s, the principal source of French frustration was the agonizing decolonization process that the country was experiencing in the aftermath of World War II and that was now circumscribing its ability to act freely in international affairs. France's colonial wars were without doubt only partially the consequence of the East-West conflict. The perception nevertheless prevailed that the former were exacerbated by the latter; this was in fact the case in Indochina, which had become a theater of the Cold War after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, but not in Algeria, where the motivations of the "rebels" had little to do with international Communism. Moreover, the French felt that, although the country was fighting these wars in the interest of the "West," their task was made more difficult, if not jeopardized, by their allies, especially the United States. In Indochina, Paris had quickly come to resent Washington's growing influence in the conflict, which was seen as being at odds with French objectives. This led to French-American friction culminating in the Dien Bien Phu crisis in the spring of 1954. In Algeria, the perception arose – especially after Suez – that not only did the United States call into question the legitimacy of France's fight, but that Washington acted against France's interests by encouraging Algerian nationalists. This pattern eventually led to the final crisis of the Fourth Republic in the spring of 1958. Washington and London imposed their good offices in the French-Tunisian crisis that had developed alongside the war in Algeria, thus paving the way for the return of General de Gaulle. By then, France's international impotence had become glaring, and it reflected the country's dissatisfaction with its place in a world increasingly dominated by the realities of the Cold War.

The return of de Gaulle

In spite of his increasing aloofness from active politics, de Gaulle had proved an implacable critic of the regime throughout the decade. Because he had consistently presented himself as offering an alternative to a weak Fourth Republic and an answer to the nation's growing frustrations, his return to power in June 1958 was a turning point. While the Fourth Republic had proved unable to transcend these frustrations, de Gaulle was determined to do so. From then on, France's policies were shaped by his desire to restore the country's international status and by his revisionist objectives with regard to the Cold War system.

De Gaulle's foremost ambition was to reestablish France's "rank." This implied, first of all, the restoration of internal stability and international credibility – hence the tailor-made, presidential constitution of the Fifth Republic, which gave him and his successors a robust instrument to assert French influence in international politics. His next priority was to solve the Algerian problem, which severely reduced France's margin of maneuver. Although this was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1958, de Gaulle quickly understood that no solution short of Algeria's independence would allow the country to regain a diplomatic "free hand." This result was achieved in July 1962, putting an end to a painful decolonization and enabling France to adopt a higher profile on the world scene. Finally, while de Gaulle fully recognized France's status as a medium power, he also understood that the country's ability to regain international influence would be a function of the fundamentals of power, whether economic or military. In this respect, France's economic growth and dynamism in the 1960s were exceptionally strong, enabling de Gaulle to move ahead and develop France's nuclear deterrent, which became a reality when the "force de frappe" went operational in 1964. It was on this solid ground that de Gaulle would soon base his policy of challenging the Cold War status quo.

De Gaulle's ambition to restore France's rank was indeed inseparable from his determination to transform the international system as a whole. By the time of his return to power, his dissatisfaction with the established order was no secret: although he had essentially been a cold warrior during his opposition years, he had developed a long-term vision of the end of the Cold War, a vision that stemmed from a combination of historical analysis and political anticipation. First, Communism in the East was not eternal. Sooner or later, the Soviet Union would cease to be and Russia would reappear as a "normal" power – though not necessarily a benign one. In fact, de Gaulle believed that,

under the mask of ideology, Stalin and his successors in many ways behaved internationally as the followers of the tsars. As for East European countries, de Gaulle thought they would eventually free themselves from Soviet tutelage and regain their national personalities. Second, America's role as a European power would also prove transitory. Once the Soviet threat receded, the United States would inevitably withdraw and return to its traditional aloofness from the Old World, thus allowing Western Europe to regain its autonomy. Hence, for de Gaulle, the prevailing East–West order was doomed, at least in the long run. Down the road, the loosening of the superpowers' grip would lead to the obsolescence of the bloc system, allowing for the reemergence of European nations "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Needless to say, France, in this vision, would play a prominent role, in particular as the leader of an assertive, political Western European "grouping" that de Gaulle had envisioned since World War II. After he came to power in 1958, de Gaulle labored diligently to move beyond "Yalta" and to realize this vision of a transformed international system.²

In spite of early attempts at engaging the Soviet Union (Khrushchev made a colorful but rather unproductive visit to France in 1960), de Gaulle's international policies in the first years focused primarily on the Western bloc, a priority which reflected his growing dissatisfaction with the existing Atlantic order and his conviction of the need for a profound overhaul of the alliance in accordance with his long-term vision. His views were outlined in the memorandum of September 1958 that he sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, in which he famously advocated a tripartite "directorate" of the United States, Britain, and France in the alliance. When Eisenhower rejected the idea and when the incoming Kennedy administration reiterated US disapproval, de Gaulle tried to use the lever of Franco-German cooperation and European unification: hence the Fouchet Plan of 1961–62, a blueprint to build the European Economic Community (EEC) into an intergovernmental "union of states" endowed with a large degree of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. The idea, however, was defeated in the spring of 1962 as a result of overt hostility on the part of Europeanists and Atlanticists and tacit opposition in Washington. These initiatives nonetheless illustrated de Gaulle's long-term aspirations to strengthen France's position as an interlocutor in relations with

2 See Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's* (New York: Viking, 1974), 304 (Hoffmann's analysis of the Gaullist vision remains the most thorough and cogent to this day).

the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc and as the leader of a cohesive Western Europe in the pursuit of East–West détente. In fact, the Fouchet Plan was clearly premised on ideas similar to those of the US diplomat George Kennan who believed that a more assertive, less US-dominated Western Europe would be in a better position to engage the Soviet Union and thereby overcome the East–West divide. Still, until at least 1962, de Gaulle's international revisionism had more to do with intra-West relations than with East–West transformation. Although both dimensions were linked from the outset, the priority was the redistribution of power within the Atlantic alliance rather than actively challenging "Yalta."

In any event, the East–West confrontation – which reached a peak during the second Berlin crisis in 1958–61 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 – precluded an assertive policy of reaching out to the East. De Gaulle's attitude toward Moscow in the first few years of his term was unyielding: hence his refusal to negotiate over Berlin as long as the Soviets maintained a threatening posture and, most of all, his unconditional support of President John F. Kennedy's



10. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer shaking hands during their meeting in Bad Kreuznach, West Germany, in December 1958. De Gaulle made Franco-German friendship and cooperation a key foreign-policy aim.

stance during the missile crisis. De Gaulle's behavior was, first and foremost, an expression of his conviction that Western cohesion was indispensable in order to prevent Moscow from carrying out its threats, and that yielding to blackmail would only encourage further aggression. As a result, the French rebuffed negotiations with the East well into 1963. Of course, there were ulterior motives as well: de Gaulle's show of solidarity with Konrad Adenauer over Berlin was meant to emphasize the importance of the Franco-German rapprochement (the two statesmen had developed a close relationship as early as September 1958 when they met at de Gaulle's home in eastern France). Likewise, his attitude during the Cuban crisis demonstrated France's commitment to the Western alliance in spite of an already diminishing French participation in NATO and increasing disagreements over nuclear strategy. De Gaulle, in other words, was strengthening his Western credentials with a view to his future East-West moves. Be that as it may, de Gaulle, in those years, was still perceived on the world scene as a consummate cold warrior.

The emergence of de Gaulle's "politique à l'Est"

France's rapid shift in the next few years was all the more spectacular in view of the foregoing. Although his Western objectives remained unchanged, by 1964 the search for a new model in East-West relations had become the keystone of the Gaullist international strategy. His goal now was to overcome the Cold War status quo. This change may be explained by three factors. First, the state of East-West relations after the Cuban missile showdown: if the crisis had confirmed the risk of nuclear confrontation, it also heralded, in de Gaulle's view, a new phase of Soviet-American rapprochement that could strengthen the superpowers' shared control over Europe. In this respect, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, French diplomacy was highly wary of the strategic dialogue between Moscow and Washington and, in particular, of the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of August 1963, which was seen as portending a Soviet-American condominium. De Gaulle's shift toward an active East-West policy, in other words, was a response to the challenge of a bipolar international system. If Europe was to be spared a "new Yalta," France had to take the lead in the quest for détente in Europe and, indeed, for a *European* détente.

Developments in the east of Europe constituted a second important factor influencing de Gaulle. The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 marked the end of a period of "adventurism" and appeared to set the stage for more predictable



11. De Gaulle wanted to defuse East–West tensions and nurture ties with Eastern Europe; here he is seen visiting the Polish city of Gdańsk in 1967.

and reasonable Soviet behavior in the international arena. This was all the more likely, in de Gaulle's view, because the Sino-Soviet rift was growing and would, in all probability, encourage Soviet moderation toward the West. Moreover, Moscow's satellites in Eastern Europe were beginning to show more autonomy, as illustrated by the more independent course of Nicolae Ceaușescu's Romania. In brief, by the mid-1960s, de Gaulle realized that there was a serious chance to inject fluidity into the Eastern European status quo, and he was intent on seizing the opportunity.

Last but not least, the shifting dynamics in the Western alliance also played a role in de Gaulle's evolving policies. In May 1963, the German Bundestag voted for an Atlanticist preamble to the treaty that de Gaulle and Adenauer had signed at the Elysée palace in January 1963. This, combined with Washington's pressure on European allies to set up a US-led multilateral nuclear force (MLF), was a clear illustration that Washington, while engaging in strategic rapprochement with Moscow, was also determined to block de Gaulle's design for a more "European" Europe and to insist on US primacy in the Western alliance, especially after Adenauer left office in West Germany. De Gaulle wanted to counter this trend and thought he could do so, thanks to the development of his relations with the East. For de Gaulle, an active policy of *détente*, in other

words, was also an antidote to US hegemony: hence his determination, from 1963 onwards, to step up France's *politique à l'Est*.

In de Gaulle's view, change in East–West relations required, first of all, the intensification of concrete exchanges, especially in the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural domains. Starting in early 1964, French diplomacy began to increase contacts with Moscow with a view to enhancing bilateral cooperation. This pattern was highlighted by de Gaulle's spectacular visit to the USSR in June 1966. Because of the warm welcome staged by the Soviets, the trip arguably marked the apogee of the Gaullist *politique à l'Est*. While seeking not to antagonize Moscow in Eastern Europe, the French president also tried to increase contacts with satellite countries, especially those with historic ties to France like Poland and Romania, where de Gaulle also made high-profile visits in September 1967 and May 1968. Although in the mid-1960s Gaullist France was not alone in advocating the intensification of concrete East–West ties – Bonn had begun to cultivate economic contacts in Eastern Europe as early as 1963 and US president Lyndon B. Johnson had famously declared the need for building bridges with the East in 1964 – France remained in the lead. Washington, in fact, kept a back seat until Johnson's landmark New York speech in September 1966, and Bonn remained hostage to the Hallstein Doctrine until the new government of the Grand Coalition came into office in December of that year. For a while, French diplomacy was thus in a position to set the East–West agenda in Europe, and it clearly played a role in the evolution of its Western allies' more active East–West policies. Bonn's nascent *Ostpolitik* and Washington's careful search for détente with Moscow were a response to de Gaulle's activism.

Yet beyond the intensification of France's *politique à l'Est*, de Gaulle's East–West challenge was of a broader, fundamentally political nature. Starting in 1964, he began to spell out a road map – no longer an abstract vision – of how to *effectively* overcome the Cold War. He did so most famously in his press conference of February 4, 1965, held exactly twenty years after the Yalta conference, which of course was no accident.³ De Gaulle's reasoning was as follows: two decades of East–West confrontation in Europe had led to a dead end exemplified by the division of Germany and it could not be overcome short of all-out war. Therefore, the stalemate could be ended only by calling into question the very logic of blocs. This required the USSR's transformation into a cooperative power and the gradual emancipation of its East European

³ Text of the press conference, in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. IV (Paris: Plon, 1970), 325–42.

satellites, as well as the emergence of Western Europe as an autonomous political entity with redefined ties to the United States. This dialectical process would progressively establish new patterns of continental cooperation that could eventually lead to a pan-European settlement with, at its core, a reunified Germany – an outcome which de Gaulle had described as early as 1959 as “the natural destiny of the German people.”⁴ While this would be a long-term process – it would take “a generation,” he prophesied – and would require preconditions such as Germany’s definitive recognition of its borders and renunciation of nuclear weapons, de Gaulle nonetheless placed the settlement of the German question at the top of the international agenda at a time when the confirmation of the European status quo seemed to freeze it durably. De Gaulle’s concept of *détente*, in sum, was not just about the relaxation of tensions between the two halves of the divided continent: it was about the progressive healing of East–West relations and constituted a radical departure from the Cold War system, an ambition which his motto “*détente, entente, and cooperation*” was meant to underscore.

“*Détente, entente, and cooperation*”

For the first time in two decades, a prominent European leader thus offered a credible alternative to the order of “Yalta.” The challenge was acutely felt on both sides. At a time when Soviet diplomacy had exchanged its past activism for a conservative policy aiming at the consecration of its domination of Eastern Europe and of the division of Germany, de Gaulle’s essentially revisionist approach was unsettling. Although Moscow was evidently satisfied by de Gaulle’s assault on US hegemony and his policy toward NATO, the Soviet leadership did not welcome his desire for a more autonomous Eastern Europe. Moreover, while Soviet officials shared his views on Germany’s borders and its nonnuclear status, they were clearly disappointed by de Gaulle’s refusal to ratify Germany’s partition and to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR). And while they hoped to use relations with Gaullist France to promote their vision of European security, they deplored his reluctance to endorse their project of a pan-European conference, now a key objective for Moscow. Despite common interests, the limits of Franco-Soviet convergence were quite clear. Yet France’s Western partners were perhaps even more disturbed by Gaullist revisionism. Washington was

4 Press conference of March 25, 1959, in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. III (Paris: Plon, 1970), 84–85.

dismayed by what amounted to a refutation of the very premises of the strategy of containment and by what it perceived as a blueprint for a European settlement excluding the United States. In Bonn, many leaders were distrustful of a policy which essentially reversed the traditional doctrine with regard to the German question by making reunification the long-term outcome of détente, and not the other way round. And some were – wrongly – suspicious of a “deal,” if not an old-style *alliance de revers* between Paris and Moscow in order to maintain the division of Germany.

De Gaulle’s ambitious East–West policy was all the more upsetting for France’s allies because it was coupled with his equally disturbing NATO policy. On the one hand, developments in the East and the emerging détente were used as a justification for France’s disengagement from NATO. The military bloc that had been created at the height of the Cold War, the French argued, had become a liability for improved East–West relations. Hence there was a need to transform NATO into a less bellicose, less US-dominated body that would be more attuned to the new East–West context. France’s withdrawal from the integrated organization, announced in March 1966, therefore, was not only the result of the general’s quest for “independence,” which he had pursued since 1958, but also designed to promote his vision of a new European order.

Accordingly, de Gaulle was more and more tempted to use France’s estrangement from NATO as an asset in reaching out to the East. France’s withdrawal from military integration, French decisionmakers believed, would stimulate in the long run similar centrifugal tendencies in the East and, therefore, contribute to the dismantling of blocs on both side of the Iron Curtain. In the short run, however, French officials recognized that their country’s growing distance from NATO and the United States intrigued Moscow, making France an even more valuable interlocutor in the eyes of the Soviets. It was thus no accident that de Gaulle’s visit to the USSR took place barely three months after he had announced his decision regarding NATO, creating an unsettling conjunction as seen from Washington and other Western capitals where his policies were now perceived as verging on neutralism – wrongly, since France’s withdrawal never implied a rupture of military solidarity with the rest of the alliance.

By then, de Gaulle’s East–West design had also become inseparable from what may be described as his “global” revisionism, which – although nominally directed at both superpowers – was increasingly identified with his assault on US “hegemony” worldwide. His recognition of the People’s Republic of China in January 1964, much to Washington’s dismay, was a

clear sign of his determination to challenge US policies. De Gaulle wanted to use his growing reputation as a maverick to reach out to the Third World. He wanted to position his country as an advocate of North–South cooperation as well as a champion of self-determination. He made this clear in a speech he gave in Phnom Penh in September 1966, in which he resoundingly condemned the US war in Vietnam and vibrantly called for the emancipation of subject peoples.⁵ De Gaulle's challenge to the United States – especially his assault on the Vietnam War, which he saw as likely to lead to an escalation of tension in the East–West conflict – vested him with additional capital in his dealings with the East and enhanced his global reputation as an imaginative and independent statesman. By 1968, de Gaulle's foreign policy had turned into an all-out crusade against US preponderance and against the established global order.

The watershed of Gaullist diplomacy

The year 1968, however, was to be a watershed for Gaullist France as well as a turning point in East–West relations. The students' revolt and the social unrest which paralyzed the country in May signaled a serious internal crisis. Although the situation was rapidly brought under control, the regime was deeply weakened, as de Gaulle's resignation would illustrate in less than a year's time. Moreover, the events provoked a financial crisis and weakened the French franc, thereby eroding the power base of Gaullist diplomacy. In brief, the limits of "grandeur" were now clearly visible. Perhaps even more importantly, international developments did not conform to de Gaulle's vision. As Władysław Gomułka had warned in no uncertain terms a year earlier during de Gaulle's visit to Poland, the time was not ripe for Soviet satellites to free themselves from Moscow's control.⁶ The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia at the end of the summer came as a dramatic confirmation. Although the crushing of the Prague Spring was only a temporary blow to the amelioration of East–West relations, and détente was back on track in a matter of months, the détente that began to emerge was very different from the one envisioned by de Gaulle. As evidenced by the multiplication of calls on both sides, it was a détente in which the superpowers and their respective alliances played a major role, that is, the very kind of détente "between blocs"

5 Text of the speech in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. IV (Paris: Plon, 1970), 325ff.

6 See Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle*, vol. III, *Le souverain* (Paris: Seuil, 1986), 541.

that de Gaulle had persistently rejected because it sustained the East–West status quo. This was what the Harmel Report of December 1967 called for. Named after Belgian foreign minister, Pierre Harmel, who had taken the initiative, the report was adopted by the NATO allies in spite of French reservations. Focused on the “future tasks” of the alliance, the report made the case for an increased role for the Atlantic alliance in East–West relations, in effect making the argument – much to the dismay of Gaullists – that the conduct of *détente* should become a NATO policy.

The adoption of the Harmel Report illustrated the limits of de Gaulle’s revisionist design on the Western alliance. Far from triggering the “disintegration” of the Western bloc, France’s withdrawal from the allied integrated bodies actually led to a reaffirmation of US leadership and a consolidation of the Atlantic alliance. This was made clear by the adoption, in 1967, of the new strategy of flexible response that Paris had obstructed for years, thus ending a divisive intra-alliance debate. By the time of his resignation in April 1969, de Gaulle’s all-out revisionism, in short, had failed to shatter the status quo, both in East–West relations and within both blocs.

The balance sheet of de Gaulle’s policies must be nuanced in terms of both their impact on the Cold War system and their effects on France’s international standing. In spite of the failure – at least for the time being – of his revisionist design, de Gaulle had succeeded in shaping a vision of East–West relations that represented a valid alternative to the bipolar model. To be sure, the prevailing model was compatible with a measure of East–West change, as illustrated by the intensification of *détente* in Europe in the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia crisis. In fact, the crisis arguably made *détente* easier to accept both in the East and in the West, as Soviet worries that the satellites would leave the Warsaw Pact and declare their neutrality were allayed and US fears of a dilution of the Atlantic alliance were also put to rest. Yet the American version of *détente* seemed more likely to preserve the division of the continent and of Germany for the foreseeable future than to create a dynamic which would bring about structural change. The Gaullist model thus remained an enduring alternative in the debate about the future of the European system in the decades to come.

As for France’s international standing, it was, from then on, premised on the self-proclaimed validity of the Gaullist vision in the long term. France’s international reputation stemmed from its support of an international system freed of the logic of blocs. This vision underscored France’s unique approach to East–West as well as to North–South relations and illuminated its commitment to national self-determination as well as to European autonomy. In this way, the

Gaullist ambition to overcome the Cold War status quo justified the country's independent profile and its assertive foreign policy. This was perhaps de Gaulle's most significant achievement: by restoring France's sense of a distinctive international role and status, he reconciled the French to their international environment. There was a paradox here: by making the overcoming of Cold War realities the *raison d'être* of France's international policies, de Gaulle somehow turned his country into a satisfied power – and this at a time when events seemed to be freezing those very realities.

The Gaullist legacy

This paradox remained at the core of France's international policies in the last two decades of the Cold War period, most notably during the 1970s. French foreign policy gave increasing signs of satisfaction with the established order during the presidencies of Georges Pompidou (1969–74) and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974–81). Indeed, in some important ways, the status quo could be seen as increasingly favorable to France's security and "rank." On the West–West level, relations with the United States were now exempt from the drama of the Gaullist period. The Cold War stalemate guaranteed the maintenance of the US commitment to the defense of Europe. At the same time, the country's claim to independence and non-alignment justified France's distinctive position within the Atlantic alliance. (The French position in the Euromissile debate at the end of the decade was an illustration: Paris could support the deployment of US missiles in Europe in response to Soviet SS-20s without having to accept these missiles on French territory.)

On the East–West level, Franco-Soviet ties, against the backdrop of the evolution of détente, were now a permanent factor in France's international posture. Pompidou and Giscard were willing to institutionalize the bilateral relationship beyond what de Gaulle had been prepared to accept and to maintain, to the extent possible, close contact with Soviet leaders. This orientation was much to the liking of Soviet officials: relations with post-Gaullist France were clearly an important asset for Moscow throughout the 1970s. While Pompidou was careful to avoid creating the impression of a Franco-Soviet "special relationship," Giscard proved ready to go quite far in that direction in spite of the deterioration of East–West relations at the end of the decade. His controversial meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Warsaw in the spring of 1980 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was an illustration of his strong desire to maintain an ongoing relationship with the Kremlin.

Last but not least, although the FRG had become a pivotal power as a result of its growing economic weight and political role in East–West relations, the confirmation of the European status quo now seemed to offer a long-lasting solution to the German question. The French, therefore, seemed willing to accept the stable balance of power. Accordingly, Pompidou maintained a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (which he welcomed as a German variant of détente, although it aimed to achieve long-term German national unity), and Giscard went even further, tacitly accepting the reality of Germany's division. In short, France, in the 1970s, could denounce the consolidation of the established order while enjoying its advantages.

Still, continuity with the Gaullist revisionist design prevailed over the temptation of accommodation. The objective of overcoming the system of "Yalta" remained a key element in France's rhetoric and policies in the 1970s and 1980s. True, de Gaulle's far-reaching vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals was now replaced by a more modest approach. Yet the French concept of East–West relations remained fundamentally revisionist: hence the increasingly supportive French attitude vis-à-vis the project of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which the Pompidou administration officially championed in the fall of 1969. Of course, the French realized that the Soviets' foremost objective in the CSCE was to consecrate the European political and legal status quo and the division of Europe. French diplomacy – like that of other Western allies – was therefore adamant that borders should not be recognized as inviolable as a result of the Helsinki negotiation (a key Soviet aim) and that their peaceful change should be allowed. Moreover, Paris remained watchful that the pan-European process not hinder prospects for an autonomous West European entity, which remained France's long-term priority for severing the grip of "Yalta." French officials were also active in promoting the newly established European political cooperation, or EPC, as an instrument for coordinating West European diplomacy into the CSCE framework. Yet in the context of the 1970s, the CSCE was seen in Paris as the best instrument to undercut the blocs, especially in the East, where it was hoped the CSCE would contribute to the loosening of the Soviet grip. The French therefore insisted that the Helsinki process should bring together individual nations rather than organized blocs, and that issues of culture as well as freedom of opinion be included in Basket III of the conference. Moreover, French diplomats helped devise the three-basket formula of the CSCE, a schema that aimed at keeping pressure on Soviet diplomacy throughout the negotiation by making the conclusion of the deliberations conditional on

substantive progress in human rights and economic and cultural exchange as well as security. In 1975, Giscard was the first Western leader to accept the Soviet proposal to hold the final meeting at the heads of states level, thus opening the way to the Helsinki summit which, as seen from Paris, marked the apogee of détente in Europe.

France's continued rejection of the bipolar logic in East-West relations during the 1970s was classically illustrated by Paris's refusal to participate in the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and by its defiance of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), which the French regarded as a Soviet-American attempt to establish a condominium over the divided continent. French diplomacy, meanwhile, also pursued its long-term revisionist course within the Western alliance. Although Pompidou had tried to revive the idea of European strategic autonomy, it had remained a distant goal since the 1960s. Yet at the end of the 1970s, Giscard, together with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, resumed efforts toward this goal, as illustrated by their willingness to step up Franco-German political-military cooperation in the framework of the Elysée Treaty. With the erosion of détente after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a more assertive Western Europe was again seen as a possible mediator between an aggressive Soviet Union and an overly reactive United States. In the long term, the French and the Germans might thereby help to ease the bipolar confrontation. French public opinion continued to support this aspect of Gaullism. While de Gaulle's policies a decade earlier had been at times hotly debated, by the end of the 1970s a much-famed "national consensus" by and large prevailed among the political class and in the wider public on the importance of an independent foreign and security policy, an autonomous Europe, and an end to blocs dividing the continent.

As seen from Paris, the events of the late 1980s were in line with the foregoing. A few years after his election in 1981, François Mitterrand found himself presiding over Europe's exit from the East-West conflict. A socialist and a longtime opponent of de Gaulle, Mitterrand had come to espouse de Gaulle's vision, declaring in 1981: "all that contributes to the exit from Yalta is good."⁷ Although Mitterrand had adopted a strongly pro-Western stance in the "new" Cold War after 1979 – his January 1983 speech in the Bundestag in support of the deployment of US missiles was a defining moment – the French president proved eager to engage Mikhail Gorbachev after he came to power

7 François Mitterrand's New Year's Eve statement on French TV, December 31, 1981, *Politique étrangère de la France. Textes et documents* (Nov.–Dec. 1981), 85.

in March 1985 and to take the lead in a “new” détente. At the same time, he and Chancellor Kohl nurtured Franco-German cooperation and European integration (the main objective, starting in 1988, was economic and monetary union). By 1989, against the background of rapid changes in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, France’s international policy sought to overcome Yalta progressively and establish a new European order in line with France’s long-term Gaullist vision. Democratization in the East and integration in the West, Mitterrand believed, would gradually allow Europeans to overcome the East–West divide and end the dominance of the superpowers.

This progressive scenario for the end of the Cold War was clearly outpaced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dramatic developments that followed. Yet the French by no means attempted to slow down, let alone impede, these events, as often argued. In spite of brief misunderstandings in the fall and winter of 1989–90, Mitterrand and Kohl quickly determined to use *German* unification as an opportunity to make a decisive step in *European* unification. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European Union were therefore the real endpoint of France’s policies at the conclusion of the Cold War and was the logical outcome of four decades of Franco-German reconciliation and European construction. These had been the two central objectives of French policy throughout the period; they constituted the groundwork for the kind of “European” Europe that had been at the center of the Gaullist vision since “Yalta.”

European integration and the Cold War

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European integration and the Cold War were separate but intertwined. Chronologically, the two share the same formative decades – although the basic idea of uniting the separate states of Europe into a single political and economic entity long predates the East–West conflict. Both European unity and the course of the Cold War became, moreover, central preoccupations of Western leaders on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the 1947–89 period. Yet more often than not, European integration and the Cold War have been studied in near total isolation from one another, the subject of separate journals, academic conferences and books, and the primary interest of two distinct groups of specialist scholars who have rarely exchanged ideas. This chapter will hence begin with a brief explanation of why this separation has occurred, before going on to argue that the interaction between the evolution of the Cold War and the gradual development of today's European Union (EU) was so intimate as to make it vital for historians to break down the barriers between the two fields.

One of the reasons why the two historiographies have diverged is that the most consistently successful forms of European integration have been primarily concerned with economic matters rather than military or political cooperation. Of the two economic and military plans launched within months of each other in 1950, the Schuman Plan – intended to pool the coal and steel industries of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries – succeeded in bringing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) into being in 1952. The Pleven Plan, designed to create a European Defence Community (EDC), encountered far rougher waters, was fiercely criticised from the outset and, ultimately, voted down by the French parliament in August 1954. Furthermore, since 1958 the dominant manifestation of European integration has been the European Economic Community (EEC). And while it is true that the middle initial of the EEC gradually fell out of use, partly to indicate that the interests of the Community were not confined to economics, the economic co-operation

among the member states of the EC/EU remained much more extensive than either foreign-policy co-ordination or efforts to establish a joint European approach to security. There is thus a ring of plausibility in the claim advanced by one prominent historian of the integration process that: 'The true origins of the European Community are economic and social.'¹

The divided historiography is also partly explained by the nature of the deliberations within the Community institutions, first in Luxembourg and then in Brussels. For the policy agenda of the early European institutions had remarkably little to do with the Cold War. The central concerns of the High Authority of the ECSC were naturally enough the state of Western Europe's coal and steel industries. Those of the early EEC Commission focused on trade and tariffs, the establishment of a complex agricultural subsidy system, and the relations between the EEC and its West European neighbours. East–West relations and the struggle between the 'free world' and its Communist rival were seldom mentioned directly. Those who worked in Community Brussels operated in ways that could seem almost hermetically sealed from the Cold War, despite sharing a city with the NATO headquarters from 1966 onwards. Even European foreign ministers attending meetings of the EEC Council of Ministers appeared inclined to ignore Cold War considerations in favour of an almost total concentration on the predominantly economic agenda of the early Community.

It would be misguided, however, to believe that this day-to-day separation extended to all aspects of the Cold War and European integration. For the two phenomena were in fact deeply entangled with one another in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and went on interacting, albeit less intensely, throughout the years from 1958 to 1990. Furthermore, as this chapter will show, the whole international system into which European integration was born was profoundly influenced by the overarching East–West conflict. It was therefore inevitable that the Cold War had a substantial effect on the ways in which the countries of Western Europe co-operated with one another. There is also evidence suggesting that Western Europe's efforts to unite played a role in the evolution of the Cold War and especially in the way that the East–West struggle came to an end.

An American priority

The first significant evidence showing that the Cold War influenced European integration relates to the role played by the United States in supporting

¹ Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (London: Routledge, 1992), xi.

European unity. This support was by no means guaranteed. Why, after all, should Washington have looked favourably upon a political and economic process which was quite explicitly intended by some of its proponents to create a rival to American power? There was also a danger that efforts to establish stronger regional ties within Europe might cut across the US-led drive to encourage global co-operation. Yet American backing not only materialised but proved vitally important in getting the process of integration off the ground. This reflected the belief by policy-makers in Washington that neither the economic prosperity nor the political stability that Western Europe required in order to withstand the challenge of Communism could be realised were the continent allowed to fall once more into the type of internecine rivalries which had characterised the interwar years. Franco-German acrimony in particular could not be allowed to fester. The United States thus threw itself with much energy into the promotion of European unity from 1947 onwards.²

It is admittedly the case that the first major American initiative designed to bring the countries of Western Europe closer together – the Marshall Plan – fell far short of its ambitious objectives as far as European unity was concerned.³ Western European governments proved very enthusiastic recipients of US financial largesse. The American aim of transferring to Europe some of the secrets of its economic growth was also partially successful. But US attempts to use Marshall aid as a mechanism to oblige the states of Western Europe to co-operate more closely with one another accomplished little. Washington was not, therefore, presented with one single, jointly designed list of Europe's financial requirements as it had hoped; instead, Europe's desiderata took the form of a patchwork of separate national wish-lists.⁴ Nor were the institutions of the Marshall Plan to become the embryo of a united European government. The British and French were able to obstruct such plans and ensure that bodies such as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) remained weak and purely intergovernmental, unable to impose joint European policies upon unwilling national governments.⁵ Western Europe hence proved impossible to push into any form of unity not of its own making.

This initial frustration did not deter the United States, however. For as Washington would quickly discover, it was able to accomplish much more by

2 See William Hitchcock's chapter in volume I.

3 See Michael J. Hogan, 'Paths to Plenty: Marshall Planners and the Debate over European Integration, 1947–1948', *Pacific Historical Review*, 53, 3 (1984), 337–66.

4 Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (London: Methuen, 1984), 80.

5 Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe*, 169–211.

acting as external sponsor of Western Europe's own, French-led, efforts to move towards greater political and economic unity. No explanation of why the Schuman Plan succeeded, and indeed of why the EDC progressed as far as it did, would be complete without recognition of the substantial backing provided by the United States.

American policy-makers were closely involved with the Schuman Plan from the very outset. Dean G. Acheson, the secretary of state, was the second foreign statesmen to be informed about the scheme, preceded only by the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, without whose approval the plan would have been stillborn. Acheson indeed heard of the French initiative before it had even been approved by the full French cabinet. The enthusiasm of the US response was, moreover, of great importance as Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, and Jean Monnet, the man responsible for devising the plan, sought to rebut both domestic misgivings and criticism from the British in particular. US representatives were also deeply involved in the negotiations which led to the signature of the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Monnet extracted maximum advantage from his extensive network of US supporters. John McCloy, for instance, the US high commissioner in Germany, played a crucial role in pressurising Bonn to give ground over the vexed question of industrial concentration in the coal and steel industries, which threatened to disrupt the whole negotiation. And US lobbying in favour of European integration was even more obvious, if rather less successful, in the lengthy struggle to secure agreement to the planned EDC. John Foster Dulles's celebrated threat to conduct 'an agonising reappraisal' of the American commitment to European security were the EDC not established was just the most famous incident in an energetic and wide-ranging campaign.⁶

Such unsubtle intervention in an ostensibly European decision actually proved counterproductive, as the Americans were to realise once the EDC had been rejected. The United States continued, however, to be involved, albeit rather less obviously, in the diplomacy which was to lead to the 1957 Treaties of Rome and the establishment of the EEC. The United States was, it is true, initially more interested in the proposed European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) than in the EEC. This US enthusiasm, it has been recently argued, reflected a strong belief that Euratom might constitute an effective mechanism for preventing dangerous nuclear proliferation.⁷ The

6 Cited in Michael Charlton, *The Price of Victory* (London: BBC, 1983), 186.

7 Gunnar Skogmar, *The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration* (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

Americans hence took somewhat longer than might have been expected to realise that of the two projects under consideration, the economic community had the greater potential. By 1958, however, Washington was sufficiently aware of the EEC's importance to play an active role in ensuring that the proposed European customs union did not receive too rough a passage when discussed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A pattern of American support for the EEC was thus established which would remain unchanged until the very late 1960s, at least. Both the European institutions, and all of those in favour of greater European unity, would derive substantial benefits from having so powerful an external sponsor.

Rehabilitating Germany

A second vital link between European integration and the Cold War becomes apparent once the motives behind West Germany's participation in the integration process are examined. The Federal Republic favoured European unity primarily for political reasons. Economically, West Germany could have prospered under the status quo. The ECSC after all was partially intended to prevent Germany's steel industry from becoming too dominant, while German participation in the EEC was opposed by Ludwig Erhard, the main architect of the German postwar economic miracle. Under the leadership of Adenauer, however, Bonn pressed ahead with both schemes largely as a result of the belief that integration would further the political rehabilitation of the country and stabilise its international position.

At the heart of Adenauer's strategy lay the notion of *Westbindung* – of using institutional links such as the ECSC or EEC to tie the Federal Republic securely to the Western bloc. This would help ensure that neither the chancellor's successors, nor his international allies, would be able to undo Bonn's Western alignment and pursue the goal of a reunified but neutral Germany, floating between East and West. Instead, the Federal Republic would be firmly bound into a process of intensive economic and political co-operation with its Western partners and would be able to accept reunification only when such a process could occur on its terms and without compromising the country's Western ties. Integration would also, from Adenauer's point of view, enable the Federal Republic to rebuild its economic and political strength without alarming his fellow Western European statesmen unduly. Rehabilitating Germany was very much the policy priority for the first postwar chancellor, but he was acutely aware of the need to do this without reawakening the fears of the French in particular. Renewed Franco-German hostility would, after all, be disastrous in a

Cold War context since it would weaken the solidarity of the whole Western bloc. Accepting French ideas for European integration, by contrast, would create a framework within which West Germany's gradual re-emergence would benefit, rather than harm, its still anxious neighbours.

European unity could also offer an insurance policy should US support for Germany's exposed Cold War position falter. This belief almost certainly lay behind Adenauer's attempts during his last years in power to establish a strong link with the French leader, Charles de Gaulle – a process which would culminate in the signature of the Elysée Treaty between France and Germany in January 1963. Close ties to France strongly appealed to the German leader at a time when US Cold War policy seemed to have become much less dependable than it had been in the era of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dulles. A European political structure, grounded on a strong Franco-German pairing, could act as a vital second guarantor of Germany's security.

Participation in the integration process could be further used by German leaders to demonstrate their ongoing Western alignment even when a degree of engagement with the Eastern bloc became possible. Willy Brandt, German chancellor from 1969 to 1974, would thus repeatedly stress that his efforts to forge a radical new *Ostpolitik* – or Eastern policy – were conceivable solely because of the success of Bonn's earlier *Westpolitik*. Only a Federal Republic safely anchored within the Western bloc could launch a far-reaching overhaul of its relations with the Eastern bloc. Brandt's activism in a European Community context, moreover, should almost certainly be seen partly as an attempt to reassure his Western partners that his government's new strategy towards the East did not imply any weakening of older allegiances. The multiple treaties which the German leader would sign normalising the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany were thus flanked by energetic – if largely unsuccessful – efforts to push forward Western Europe's quest for monetary integration and greater foreign-policy co-ordination. This tactic foreshadowed Helmut Kohl's attempt to use an energetic commitment to European unity to reassure those alarmed by the haste with which he seized the opportunity to reunify Germany. As Kohl put it, 'German unity can only be achieved if the unification of the old continent proceeds. Policy on Germany and on Europe are but two sides of one coin.'⁸ The Federal Republic's ongoing commitment to European

8 Cited in Helga Haftendorn, 'German Unification and European Integration are but two sides of one coin: the FRG, Europe, and the Diplomacy of German Unification', in Frédéric Bozo, Marie Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Leopoldo Nuti (eds.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War: A reassessment* (London: Routledge, 2008), 136.

integration was thus an essential element in minimising the international alarm provoked by Germany's Eastern policies and by its eventual reunification in 1990.

Restoring French power

French policies confirm the interplay between the East–West conflict and integration, especially during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the French case, the clearest link is to be found in Paris's enforced volte-face towards Germany between 1947 and 1950. The French had not wanted a powerful and sovereign German state to reappear after the Second World War. Their capacity to resist the Anglo-American drive to reconstitute a viable West German state was decisively reduced by the Cold War context, however. The breakdown of East–West relations both made it much more difficult for the French to join forces with Moscow in arguments over Germany and emphasised French dependence on American financial help. The fact that the French military campaign to cling onto its colonies in Indochina was being bankrolled by Washington – for Cold War reasons – only weakened the French position further. By the late 1940s, the French thus had no option but to accept the birth of the Federal Republic. And it was in order to accommodate this defeat that France would resort to European integration and launch the Schuman Plan. At a very basic level, France's turn to Europe – a policy innovation that was to remain fundamental to French foreign policy for decades to come – was thus Cold War-inspired, despite the seemingly economic nature of the first European institutions created. The subsequent EDC project only confirms this argument.

The Cold War context, and the way in which the possession of nuclear weapons became one of the key symbols of status in the East–West confrontation, also helps explain initial French enthusiasm for the Euratom project. This mattered greatly for the overall advance of European integration because without the lure of the proposed European atomic energy community, it is highly unlikely that France would have participated in the discussions which were eventually to culminate in the 1957 Treaties of Rome and the launch of the EEC. Euratom would, of course, have been primarily concerned with the civilian uses of nuclear power. The French were well aware, however, that advances in their understanding of peaceful nuclear power generation would also have positive effects on their parallel effort to develop atomic weaponry. European money and expertise – not to mention the substantial American assistance that Euratom at one stage looked likely to enjoy – could therefore

be of benefit in France's quest to become a nuclear power. The French decision to resume discussions about far-reaching co-operation with their European partners so soon after the humiliating parliamentary rejection of the EDC had much to do with their ambition to regain a position of influence within a Cold War world.

The interconnections between the Cold War and French European policy continued after 1958 and the return to power of Charles de Gaulle. The general's dislike of 'integration' spanned both NATO and the EEC. He deeply mistrusted the role of the United States and of American allies, like Monnet, in the genesis of European integration. He also regularly attributed to American interference any incident in which his partners objected to French European priorities. Those German politicians who opposed his desires were for instance dismissed as 'the Americans' men'.⁹ And he seems to have regarded the closeness of ties between the European Commission and the US government as further evidence of its unsuitability to hold any real power. The structures of European integration hence needed to be transformed, in de Gaulle's eyes, just as much as those of Atlantic military co-operation. The result was the double crisis of 1965 to 1966 when the French president engaged in a seven-month boycott of the EEC, followed almost at once by his unilateral decision to withdraw his country from NATO's integrated military command.

Paradoxically, though, the results of his systematic campaign against Western orthodoxies highlight important differences between Atlantic co-operation and European integration. In the former, France was able to assume a semi-detached position, protected by the Atlantic alliance but limited in its engagement with NATO activities. Its half-membership neither seriously undermined the strength of NATO nor had any real adverse effect on French security. Within the EEC, by contrast, the much greater centrality of the French meant that the boycott soon led to a situation in which both Gaullist France and its partners were confronted with a choice between accepting serious and possibly fatal damage to the Community system or finding a compromise that would allow their co-operation to resume. Each chose to give ground, thus protecting the multiple national interests which all of the member states had tied up in the integration process. France's need of the EEC *and* the EEC's need of France stood in stark contrast to France's relatively marginal position within the Atlantic alliance.

Intriguingly, this last reality demonstrates how European integration could affect the Cold War rather than vice versa. For some of France's more

9 Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris: Fayard, 1997), vol. II, p. 264.

conventionally Atlanticist European partners appear to have concluded that they needed to be relatively accommodating towards French requests within an EEC context so as to avoid a situation in which Gaullist France drifted too far away from its Western moorings.¹⁰ The very real economic rewards France gained from the EEC could, in other words, be used to deter de Gaulle from taking any irrevocable step in his intermittent flirtation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc.¹¹ The notion of *Westbindung*, originally conceived as the use of European integration to tie West Germany solidly to the West, could hence be seen as applying to Gaullist France in the 1960s as much as to the Federal Republic.

British ambivalence

A fourth interconnection between European integration and the Cold War emerges from British European policy, both during the years up until 1960, when the United Kingdom chose to remain aloof from its neighbours' European policies, and during the subsequent decade when it struggled to gain belated admittance to the EEC. In the earlier period, Cold War considerations seem to have played a significant role in ensuring that Britain's own dislike of supranational integration did not spill over into hostility towards the participation of others in such a process. Thus UK suspicions of the Schuman Plan were partially held in check by the realisation that any move which helped France to accept Germany's rehabilitation and which eased the highly strained relations between Paris and Bonn was of immense value for Western unity at a time of high Cold War tension. Both the British ambassador to Paris and the Chiefs of Staff counselled UK benevolence towards the scheme for precisely these reasons.¹² Similarly, Anthony Eden's 1952 claim that 'on balance I had rather see France and Germany in a confused but close embrace, than at arm's length' is best understood in a Cold War context where Western solidarity mattered greatly and Franco-German hostility could be disastrous for Western defence.¹³ The origins of Britain's stance of so-called 'benevolent detachment' towards the efforts of its neighbours to unite – its readiness to

10 Memorandum of conversation between US and EEC officials, January 11, 1966, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), vol. VIII, 804–09.

11 See Frédéric Bozo's chapter in this volume.

12 Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds.), *Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Vol. I, The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration 1950–1952* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1986), 30 and 73–75.

13 *Ibid.*, 846–47.

stand aside but to let its European neighbours proceed in their chosen direction without obstructing their path – are thus closely connected to the Cold War-centred priorities of British foreign policy during the early 1950s.

It would be in their initial reaction to the EEC that the British would most clearly demonstrate the way in which their European policy could be swayed by Cold War considerations. In 1955, unlike five years earlier, London no longer felt strong enough to watch benignly from the margins as six of their continental neighbours went ahead with economic integration. Equally, the British remained certain that they could not participate in the customs union being debated by the Six. They thus briefly but disastrously experimented with a policy of actively opposing the planned EEC and of urging the Six to pursue their ideas of economic co-operation in a wider European forum such as the largely ineffective OEEC. One of the key factors which brought to an end this abortive British attempt to strangle the EEC at birth proved to be American pressure, however. It was thus only when Washington made quite clear that it strongly supported the Six in their endeavour, that the UK realised that to press ahead with its European priority of halting the formation of a European customs union might well be to endanger its Cold War priority of preserving the closeness of its ties to the United States. British pressure on the Six was immediately discontinued and London began a search for a more constructive form of engagement with the emerging EEC. Within six years this quest led to the first UK application to join the EEC.

Cold War considerations played a significant role in both Harold Macmillan's and Harold Wilson's applications to the EEC. Multiple factors lay behind the Conservative government's decision to approach the Community in 1961. These ranged from Britain's growing awareness that the British Commonwealth was unlikely to remain the tightly knit and loyally supportive group of countries that had been initially foreseen to the increased salience of exports to and imports from continental Europe in the UK's trade figures. But central to the calculations of the prime minister in particular was the belief that Britain needed to become involved in the discussions then under way amongst the Six about extending their successful economic co-operation into the field of foreign-policy co-ordination – the so-called Fouchet Plan negotiations. Were Britain to remain excluded from an EC which acquired a more overtly political dimension, the UK would either see itself marginalised in an Atlantic relationship ever more dominated by discussions between the United States and a more united Europe or, still worse, find itself powerless to prevent de Gaulle from pushing the Six away from the Americans and British and into a new and dangerous Third Force



12. De Gaulle and British prime minister Harold Wilson meeting in London in 1965. De Gaulle never gave up his opposition to British membership in the EEC.

position between the two superpowers.¹⁴ For evident Cold War reasons, neither of these eventualities could be easily accepted by London. It was therefore vital for Britain to end its isolation from the Six, if necessary by accepting full Community membership. A clear strand of Cold War logic thus ran through the soul-searching which preceded the UK's 1961 bid.

Labour's decision to submit a new membership request in 1967 also had a Cold War dimension. Again, it would be unnecessarily reductionist to

¹⁴ See, e.g., Minutes and papers, Cabinet office records 134/1853; Economic Steering (Europe) Committee, June 1960, UK National Archives (UKNA), Kew, Richmond, Surrey.

suggest that Cold War factors were the sole or even the most important cause of Wilson's rethink on British EEC membership. Disillusionment with the Commonwealth and the near total collapse of Labour's economic policy options following the sterling crisis of July 1966 were probably even more central. But there is strong evidence to suggest at least one factor that pushed the Wilson government to reconsider its European options was the diplomatic fall-out from de Gaulle's March 1966 withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command. For in both Washington and London, it was realised that the UK would only be able to play a central role in countering the Gaullist challenge and ensuring that no other countries were tempted to follow de Gaulle's independent path if London could underline its European credentials by moving closer to the EEC.¹⁵ Britain's Cold War role as the United States' loyal lieutenant, alert to any serious threat to NATO solidarity, required a UK presence within the key European structure, the EEC, rather than a semi-detached position on the margins of European co-operation. Atlantic calculations were thus once more a factor as Britain reapplied to join the Community.

A further linkage between the Cold War and early development of European integration arose from the way in which the East–West conflict limited the number of countries that could participate in the formation of the ECSC and EEC. One of the direct effects of the division of the European continent brought about by the Cold War was to make it impossible for any of the members of the Soviet bloc to consider or be considered for inclusion in the institutions of European co-operation. European unity after 1947 was thus pursued without the participation of Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, despite the manifest European credentials of each of these countries. Also progressively excluded from the integration process were those countries which chose to stand aside from the East–West conflict, like Sweden, as well as those, such as Austria or Finland, which had neutral status thrust upon them. The Cold War thus substantially reduced the number of countries which could participate in the initial stages of European integration. This was almost certainly a necessary precondition of European integration's success. For while it may be possible for the twenty-first century EU to cope with a membership of twenty-seven states, it is inconceivable that so large an entity would have been able to get off the ground five decades earlier. The way in

15 James Ellison, 'Stabilising the West and Looking to the East: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and Détente, 1965–67', in N. Piers Ludlow, ed., *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik and Westpolitik, 1965–73* (London: Routledge, 2007), 105–27.

which the Cold War division of Europe thus narrowed the list of countries involved in the opening acts of the ECSC and EEC drama was a vital element in its initial success.

Of similar utility to the early integration process was the way in which the artificial and Cold War-induced division of Germany ensured a de facto equivalence in population and geographical size between France and Germany. This proved extremely valuable in allowing the structures of European co-operation to be set up on the basis of equality of representation and voting weight amongst all four 'large' member states: France, Germany, Italy and (from 1973 onwards) Britain. The sensitivity of the post-1990 readjustment of voting and representation rules to acknowledge Germany's renewed status as the EU's largest state only confirms how useful in minimising tension within the nascent Community structures the earlier limitation of its size had been.

A protective Atlantic cocoon

The final and most important connection between the development of the Cold War and the evolution of European integration that this chapter will discuss was the way in which the East-West conflict shaped the very international system into which the first European bodies were born.¹⁶ European integration may well, as argued above, have been an important factor in bringing political and economic stability to Western Europe in the decade or so after the end of the Second World War. But it was also the beneficiary of the wider Western economic and political system which developed during the same period. This system was centred on US foreign-policy leadership. Each participating country enjoyed a close bilateral relationship with the United States and tended to treat Washington rather than another European capital as the first port of call whenever foreign-policy concerns arose. The fact that virtually every European country maintained its largest embassy in the US capital rather than elsewhere in Europe and appointed its most seasoned diplomats to Washington underlined the closeness of these transatlantic relationships. This web of bilateral linkages was reinforced by a network of Atlantic institutions, some of which, such as Bretton Woods bodies, predated the Cold War but had developed into purely Western structures, and others,

¹⁶ The argument that follows is an adaptation of one first advanced by Peter Ludlow. See *Beyond 1992: Europe and its Western Partners* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1989), 5-18.

like NATO, which were clear Cold War creations. These too highlighted US dominance – the United States was very clearly *primus inter pares* in each of these collective bodies – and provided an Atlantic forum within which each European country could express its concerns, grievances or desires. Bodies such as NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the GATT also provided a range of obvious public goods for Western Europe, guaranteeing security, monetary stability and a degree of commercial liberalisation.

This environment proved a highly congenial one for the nascent European institutions. The combination of clear US foreign-policy leadership and the very obvious ideological and military threat from the USSR helped maintain a high degree of foreign-policy uniformity among the Western European powers during the early Cold War years. Compared to previous eras, there were few bilateral foreign-policy disputes or disagreements amongst the French, Germans or Italians during the formative years of the integration process, and even when they did occur – as in the case of the ongoing Franco-German argument over the fate of the Saar, for instance – strong American pressure helped prevent the issue from spiralling out of control. The dominant role of the United States also helped minimise the scope for intra-European squabbles about leadership. Within the Atlantic institutions, all were able to accept that the United States should have the lion's share of power, and this clear hierarchy at the very top made the issue of who else held positions of responsibility somewhat less contentious and divisive than it would otherwise have been.

Most fundamentally of all, the institutions of Atlantic co-operation removed the need for the early European structures to handle some of the most problematic aspects of international co-operation. Once the issue of German rearmament had been solved, there was thus no need for the Europeans to discuss defence or security matters amongst themselves, since this could be left to NATO. Nor, after 1958 and the introduction of full monetary convertibility across Western Europe, was it necessary for the early EEC to concern itself with the preservation of monetary stability. This was an IMF task, and one which seemed initially to be carried out very effectively: for most of the 1960s, the six countries that made up the EEC experienced almost total exchange-rate stability with each other. The potentially vexed topic of monetary co-operation could be left almost exclusively to the Atlantic-level institutions. As a result, the European Community could benefit from a generalised climate of macroeconomic stability and focus most of its initial energies on the eminently attainable tasks of creating a customs union and a common agricultural policy. Both of these targets had been reached by 1968.

Quite how valuable this protective Atlantic cocoon was to the early stages of European integration became apparent once the overarching system began to show signs of strain from the mid-1960s onwards. The first sign of change was the way in which détente, growing Western European confidence, and the United States' ever-greater involvement in Southeast Asia started to erode European willingness to accept US foreign-policy leadership and to encourage individual European countries to experiment with their own, more autonomous, approaches to East–West relations. De Gaulle's wide-ranging rebellion against the US role in Europe was the most obvious and extreme manifestation of this development, but was not entirely unique. Other Western European leaders also harboured misgivings about the direction of US policy, particularly in Vietnam, and aspired to a degree of influence on East–West relations. A great deal of that Western uniformity on the key foreign-policy issues of the day that had existed during the 1950s and early 1960s disappeared as a result. And disagreements among Western Europeans about the best approach to the Eastern bloc or the degree to which Europe should seek autonomy from the United States easily spilled over into disagreements within the EEC.¹⁷ Some of the disharmony in Brussels in the late 1960s reflected declining US hegemony and greater foreign-policy divergence amongst the countries of Western Europe.

The difficulties of European unity outside the protective Atlantic framework became even more apparent at the very end of the decade and into the early 1970s as European confidence in American leadership declined still further and as the Atlantic institutions that had ensured monetary stability fell apart. Together these developments helped encourage the EEC to broaden its policy agenda and to begin to concern itself with both foreign-policy co-ordination and with monetary co-operation. But while from a long-term perspective both of these steps can be seen to have been crucial to the EC/EU's subsequent development, they were not easy ones to take. On the contrary, Western Europe's initial experiences of both EEC monetary co-ordination and foreign-policy co-operation were deeply dispiriting and did much to contribute to that mood of gloom and disillusionment which characterised the Community for much of the 1970s. Co-operation in Brussels had in other words been much easier when difficult issues such as global currency fluctuations or questions about the best stance for Western Europe to adopt towards the crises in the Middle East could be dealt with elsewhere. The

17 N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006), esp. 110–14. For more on these matters, see the chapters by Bozo and Jussi M. Hanhimäki in this volume.

uncomfortable realities of operating without the protective Atlantic cocoon – realities which would become even more evident after 1990 – did, however, serve to underline the extent to which the Cold War system was a highly supportive environment for Europe's nascent institutional structures.

Shaping the Cold War

If European integration was significantly affected by the Cold War, it also had an impact upon the evolution of the East–West conflict itself. There are at least three instances where the growth of co-operation amongst the states of Western Europe had a discernable effect on the character of either East–West or West–West relations within the Cold War. The first of these was the impact of the EEC's early success on Western Europe's economic prosperity and political self-confidence; the second was the way in which West Germany used the Community framework to begin the slow process of regaining the will to act autonomously in the foreign-policy field; and the third was the importance of Western Europe's all-too-visible success in eroding the cohesion and, eventually, the stability of the Eastern bloc. Each of these deserves to be examined a little more closely.


Many factors contributed to the changing relationship between Western Europe and the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Changing patterns of trade and investment, the steady advance of decolonisation, and the shifting nuclear balance were all of some importance, as was the tendency of both superpowers to play out their rivalry in theatres ever further removed from Western Europe. But the dramatic success of the EEC, especially during the 1958–64 period, was undoubtedly a major ingredient in the growing confidence of many Western European politicians during the 1960s. No longer did the six member states of the Community feel bound to look, both individually and collectively, to the other side of the Atlantic in order to learn how a modern and advanced economy should be run. Instead, their own, largely home-grown recipe for growth and development seemed to be functioning extremely well. Indeed, there were even signs that the United States might be ready to copy aspects of Western Europe's policy recipe success rather than vice versa: John F. Kennedy, for instance, was quite open about the way in which his vision of a new drive for trade liberalisation at a global level borrowed ingredients from the EEC's success. And this new, slightly smug, gratification of Western European politicians at Western Europe's economic and political progress all too easily inclined them to look askance at US policy more generally and to steer a somewhat more

autonomous international course. The debates about NATO reform, nuclear non-proliferation, the multilateral force (MLF), the merits of collective bloc-to-bloc as opposed to bilateral détente, and the best response to Eastern bloc calls for a European security conference were all influenced by this diminished European subservience vis-à-vis the United States.

Germany's steady emergence as a foreign-policy actor ready to speak its own lines internationally, which occurred during much the same period, also owed a great deal to the European integration process. For it was in Brussels and in response to the exigencies of EEC politics that the Federal Republic made its postwar diplomatic debut as a player of note. In the early years of both the Cold War and the integration process, Bonn's international profile had been kept deliberately low. On East-West questions as well as on the key European controversies, the West Germans had seldom sought the limelight and had preferred whenever possible to join their voices with a larger chorus rather than to behave in a fashion which brought to the fore their national interests, aspirations or fears. Germany's role in defusing the EEC crisis of 1963 had, however, been the first significant break in this pattern.¹⁸ With France in temporary disgrace and the Community all but paralysed after the row that had broken out following de Gaulle's veto of Britain's first membership application, the German foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder, took the lead in calming the situation and creating an environment in which the EEC could resume its onward movement. In the process, Bonn acquired a taste for Community leadership. It took a while for this new German confidence to extend to diplomacy beyond the confines of the EEC. But it does seem likely that the foreign-policy activism demonstrated by Brandt, first as foreign minister and then as chancellor, was built in part upon the foundations laid by Schröder and others within an EEC context.

European integration also contributed to that image of Western European success, stability and prosperity that did so much to destabilise Communist rule in Eastern Europe as the Cold War came to an end. Few East German dissidents, Polish trade-unionists or Czech demonstrators are likely to have known much about the European integration process as they began the chain of actions which was to lead to the collapse of the Eastern bloc. They would, however, have been conscious of the way in which the quality of life within the other half of their continent vastly outstripped their own. They were probably also aware of the disparity between Western Europe's renewed international confidence in the latter half of the 1980s, built on the back of

¹⁸ Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s*, 17–24.



I. The expansion of European integration

progress in Brussels, and the ever-greater gloom and pessimism that characterised debate about the future of the Soviet bloc. And the fear of Germany, which had been so heavily used by the Soviets in earlier eras to justify their military presence in Eastern Europe, seemed steadily more anachronistic in the face of a Federal Republic which, thanks in part to the success of its own European policies, had become the great advocate of multilateralism and international co-operation rather than national expansion.

All of these factors seem likely to have played some part in both the surge of popular protest and the total loss of nerve on the part of the ruling regimes that was to so dramatically alter the political face of Europe in 1989–90. Certainly, it was notable how quickly the successor regimes that emerged from the revolutions that had brought the Cold War to its end both adopted the rhetoric of a ‘return to Europe’ and began the practical steps that would lead in the first part of the twenty-first century to their adherence to the EU. The expansion of the EU in May 2004 to include eight former members of the Communist bloc should in many ways be seen as the moment when the Cold War division of Europe was definitively consigned to the history books.

European integration and the Cold War have thus never been entirely immune from interaction. They were certainly both autonomous processes. Neither caused the other, and the end of one has not brought about the collapse of the other. Each was also open to multiple other influences and dynamics, whether internal or external. But it appears clear that their paths intersected at multiple points throughout the four decades of their simultaneous evolution. No detailed analysis of either can therefore afford to disregard both those instances when the East–West struggle had an impact upon the development of European integration and those where the transformation through integration of the western half of the European continent deeply influenced both its rapport with the Western superpower and its standing as a rival and magnet to the countries of the Soviet bloc. European integration was profoundly shaped by the early Cold War and continued to be affected by the East–West struggle over the next forty years; its success, moreover, played a role in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end and has guided the destinies of both halves of the once divided continent in the years since 1989.

Détente in Europe, 1962–1975

JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI

The main purpose of this chapter is to argue that European détente was, first and foremost, a *European* project. While there is no denying the significance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the shaping of Europe's fortunes in the 1960s and 1970s, détente actually began (and continued far longer) in Europe. In some ways this should be no surprise to any student of the Cold War: after all, the Cold War had commenced to a large extent in the Old World and would, in the late 1980s, wither away there as well. So, why should the "middle cold war" have been any different? In fact, one can push the argument slightly further: while the division of Germany lay at the heart of the Cold War division of Europe and the unification of that country marked the end of that era, then something profound took place in the status of Germany as a result of the *Ostpolitik* practiced, in particular, by West German chancellor Willy Brandt (1969–74). It was ultimately his policy of multiple "openings" – most significantly to the USSR, Poland, and East Germany – that ushered in an era of détente in Europe.

More precisely, the basic argument in this chapter is that the relaxation of East–West tensions in Europe was a result of a European challenge to the excesses of bipolarity. Some of these challenges came in the form of nationalistic needs – be it Charles de Gaulle's effort to lift France's international status or, most significantly, Willy Brandt's pursuit of *Ostpolitik*. There was, as Henry Kissinger observed, no obvious unity among Europeans beyond their general resentment of being treated as pawns by the United States and the Soviet Union in a game of global geopolitics.¹ Yet, as such agreements as the Harmel Report of 1967 and the Davignon Report of 1970 would indicate, most Europeans

1 This is a reference to the Year of Europe controversy that followed Kissinger's April 1973 speech in which he declared that the United States had "global responsibilities," while the Europeans were limited to having "regional interests." See Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 275–77.

agreed with each other on the general need for improved East–West relations and better interallied cooperation. The most evident culmination of the new era in European politics during the period discussed in this volume was the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. It was there that Europe’s postwar era finally came to an end.

The shadow of superpowerdom

The early 1960s saw some of the worst crises of the Cold War. In 1961, the issue of divided Berlin and the persistent brain drain of young East Germans to the West ultimately resulted in the erection of the Cold War’s most grotesque symbol, the Berlin Wall. A year later, another drama unfolded in the Caribbean after American planes photographed evidence of Soviet nuclear installations in Cuba. For a few weeks, the world – or at least those Americans tuned in to the coverage of the crisis – held their breath as a nuclear exchange appeared imminent. Both crises were, fortunately, solved (or at least diffused) through diplomatic channels. Yet, if the term “bipolarity” carried a true meaning, it was there and then, in the crisis-ridden early 1960s, when the Soviets and the Americans confronted each other “eyeball to eyeball,” as Secretary of State Dean Rusk put it during the Cuban missile crisis, that bipolarity had the potential of escalating into a true global confrontation.

In Europe, the twin crises of 1961–62 were cruel reminders of the central role that the Soviet Union and the United States continued to play in determining the course of international relations. It may have been the Germans (East and West) that were most immediately touched by the tension over Berlin; it was surely the Europeans (East and West) that would suffer most should war break out. But it was Soviet and American tanks that faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie in the fall of 1961. A year later, no ally – not even Britain despite the ruminations of London’s erstwhile ambassador David Ormsby-Gore – was truly consulted in the course of the Cuban missile crisis. Nikita Khrushchev, for his part, had naturally seen little point in asking the members of the Warsaw Pact for their views on the matter. Europeans appeared as powerless bystanders in crises that had the potential of destroying not only their way of life, as nuclear theorists reminded people in the age of mutual assured destruction (MAD), but all kinds of life.²

Consequently, the Cold War appeared primarily, if not exclusively, as a game which could be decided only by the two principal protagonists.

2 See James Hershberg’s chapter and Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in this volume.

Europeans were held hostage to the irreversible division of their continent, confirmed by the presence of Soviet and American troops in the center of Europe, and by the guardianship of officials in Washington and Moscow over massive and ever-growing nuclear arsenals. Worse, Europe seemed increasingly like a sideshow in the context of international relations in the 1960s. There were many other more urgent, more controversial, and, ultimately, more important issues. The Vietnam War, numerous postcolonial conflicts in Africa, and the never-ending scuffles in the Middle East commanded far more attention from American and Soviet policymakers than the diplomacy of a continent divided yet stable. To the chagrin of Europeans, policymakers in Washington and Moscow were also assigning more and more importance to the emerging triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Compounding their plight, Europeans – East and West – were economically dependent on the two superpowers. Although the place of the United States in the international economic structure was undergoing a major transformation in the 1960s and 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system,³ the United States retained a sizable positive trading balance vis-à-vis Western Europe. Similarly, the record of foreign direct investment (FDI) shows a continued European dependency on the United States.⁴ In the Soviet bloc, economic dependency was based on the continued dominance of the USSR over its Warsaw Pact client states who were compelled to follow the rules of the Soviet-led Comecon. Prevailing practices prevented any meaningful contacts between East European economies and Western Europe.⁵ Europe, then, was most definitely in the shadow of the superpowers.

What is then missing from the above description is the simple fact, increasingly documented by historians in recent years, that the Cold War international system was not a simple hierarchical construction. As John Gaddis puts it: "the 'superpowers,' during the Cold War, were not all that 'super.'"⁶ There was much more fluidity and bargaining within the blocs than is usually portrayed. Multipolarity existed under the cloak of bipolarity, and the weak influenced the policies of the strong. To a large extent it had been the East

3 For more detailed discussions of the international economy, see Wilfried Loth's and Richard Cooper's chapters in this volume.

4 These figures are from Alfred Eckes and Thomas Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 261–67.

5 This is another under researched area of Cold War history. The best place to start is Anthony Kemp Welch's chapter in this volume.

6 John Gaddis, "A Naïve Approach to Studying the Cold War," in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 30.

Germans who “drove the Soviets up the wall,” as one historian has summed up the outcome of the Berlin crisis.⁷ Likewise, American restraint during the Cuban missile crisis – the Kennedy administration’s decision not to use airstrikes to destroy nuclear installations – was in part a result of sensitivity to the concerns of NATO allies about the consequences that might follow (for example, Soviet retaliation against Western forces in Berlin). And, perhaps most important of all, the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s was as clear an indication as any that the idea of a monolithic Communist bloc was but an imaginary construction.⁸

In the end, the crises of the early 1960s offered a great many challenges and opportunities to which Europeans responded in a variety of ways. In both East and West, though, it was evident that the caricature-like division of Europe and the world did not always conform to the interests and aspirations of individual nations and their leaders. Most importantly for the present discussion, East–West détente in Europe was in large part a response to the alternative policies advanced by a number of countries in the aftermath of the “Crisis Years.” Indeed, any analysis of European détente needs to employ Tony Smith’s concept of “pericentrism,” the idea “that junior actors may have interests, passions, and types of leaders wanting to take advantage of what they perceive to be an international contest to give shape to domestic, or regional, or even global organizations of power that they conceive of in their own nationalist or ideological terms.” In the 1960s and 1970s, there were several such “junior actors” in Europe, pursuing either their own national interests or the economic and political integration of the continent (or, more often, a mixture of both).⁹

Centrifugal pressures in the West: de Gaulle and early *Ostpolitik*

President Charles de Gaulle, at times described as “a neutralist for nationalistic reasons,” hardly requires an introduction.¹⁰ De Gaulle ruled France for over a

7 Hope M. Harrison, *Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

8 On the Sino-Soviet split, see Sergey Radchenko’s chapter in this volume.

9 Tony Smith, “A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (Fall 2000), 591. On European integration, see Piers Ludlow’s chapter in this volume.

10 A term used by the former French foreign minister, Christian Pineau. Memorandum of conversation, April 9, 1963, box 3907, Central Foreign Policy File, 1963, RG 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (NA). See also Erin Mahan, *Kennedy, De Gaulle and Western Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

decade after 1958, during which time he attempted to raise his country into a new position of prominence in Europe. The flip side of this was, of course, that de Gaulle wished to limit the American and (if less obviously so) Soviet roles on the continent. He withdrew France from NATO's integrated military structure, pursued the development of an independent French nuclear capability, strengthened the Franco-German special relationship (for example, the 1963 Franco-German Treaty), and embarked on independent initiatives with regard to Eastern Europe (Romania, in particular) and the Soviet Union.¹¹ De Gaulle even stirred trouble in America's backyard: while visiting the city of Montreal in 1967, he declared that the Francophone bastion should move towards independence ("Vive le Québec Libre"), thus helping to stir the pot of nationalism. And there were many other tense moments over Vietnam, over foreign investment, over de Gaulle's decision to recognize the PRC without consulting the United States. President Lyndon B. Johnson undoubtedly agreed with his confidant, Senator Richard Russell, when he said that "we've really got no control over their (France's) foreign policy."¹²

De Gaulle was ultimately unsuccessful because his policies were often either contradictory or overtly ambitious. He could neither make Western Europe independent of the United States nor claim for France an unambiguous leadership position among European countries. Even with the *force de frappe*, even when he took France out of NATO's unified military command in 1966, even when he attempted to practice independent détente with the USSR, de Gaulle was unable to claim that he had removed the American 'yoke' from Europe. Nevertheless, of all the centrifugal tendencies in the history of NATO during the Cold War, it was the prominent role embraced by France under de Gaulle to lead a more independent Europe that caused the severest headaches in Washington. His *potential* impact on American-European relations might have been very far-reaching. As Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler put it, de Gaulle: "gave expression to a certain sentiment not only in France but in Free Europe as a whole in varying degree: a confused sense that it is possible, indeed natural and necessary, for Europe to have interests within the framework of an alliance with the United States which do not in all cases spring from a conception of the world identical with that held by the United States."¹³

¹¹ For a fuller account of French policies, see Frédéric Bozo's chapter in this volume.

¹² Cited in Thomas Schwartz, *In the Shadow of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 31.

¹³ Tyler's commentary in reaction to Charles Bohlen's memo, "Reflections on Current French Foreign Policy," March 11, 1964, box 169, France, vol. I, Country Files, National Security Files (NSF), Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (LBJL).

American diplomats did not “panic” as a result of France’s withdrawal from NATO in March 1966, and they were equally calm when de Gaulle visited Moscow a few months later. They were confident that de Gaulle’s talk of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” was likely to remain just that, talk. As a May 1966 intelligence memorandum confidently maintained: “[It is] unlikely that Moscow overestimates De Gaulle’s value. [It] recognizes that America is the real power, and would prefer to deal directly with Washington.”¹⁴ Indeed, had de Gaulle been the only one in Western Europe challenging the logic of bipolarity, his impact, direct or indirect, on East–West relations in Europe would likely have been limited.

Alas, he was not alone. In the 1960s, West German policymakers were expressing increased doubts about American leadership. To be sure, the leaders in Bonn had none of the global pretensions that were so evident in de Gaulle’s politics and, in particular, the Frenchman’s grand rhetoric. West German politicians, whether Christian Democrats or Social Democrats, were ultimately concerned over a nationalist goal, reunification. De Gaulle may have removed France from NATO’s integrated military structure and embarked on an independent course with regard to Moscow in order to enhance France’s significance as a player in international relations, but Ludwig Erhard, Kurt Kiesinger, Willy Brandt, and other West German leaders gradually established independent ties to the East largely because the policies of Konrad Adenauer had failed to substantially advance the unification of Germany.¹⁵

The first steps towards *Ostpolitik*, the so-called “policy of movement,” was in large part a reaction to the Wall, the apparent lack of Western commitment to German unification, and the failure of the Hallstein Doctrine to advance the cause of unification. From the West German point of view, it must have seemed as though the rest of the world, their American allies included, were in fact quite happy to see Germany divided.¹⁶ Some observers predicted in 1963 – in the aftermath of de Gaulle’s first veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and his signing of the Franco-German friendship treaty – that a strengthening of the Bonn–Paris axis might

14 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-7-66, “Trends in Soviet General Policies,” April 28, 1966, box 3: 11-66, USSR, NIEs, NSF, LBJL; CIA Intelligence Memo No. 1354/66, May 20, 1966, box 172: France memos, vol. IX, Country Files, National Security Council (NSC) Files, LBJL.

15 For a discussion of Adenauer’s foreign policies see, among others: Ronald Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: The CDU/CSU and the West, 1949–1966* (London: Berghahn Books, 2004).

16 CIA Memo 14 64 (Office of National Estimates), “Bonn Looks Eastward,” November 10, 1964, box 185, Germany memos, vol. IX, Country Files, NSF, LBJL.

result in the rupture of NATO and the unification–neutralization of Germany.¹⁷ From the US perspective, the worst-case scenario was that:

external events could cause neutralist feeling in West Germany to grow. In time, and especially if the sense of direct Soviet threat to Western Europe continues to diminish, the West Germans' conviction that NATO is essential for their security could weaken. Conceivably even the necessity for the continued presence of American forces might be put in question.¹⁸

During the following year there were, of course, a number of such “external events”: de Gaulle announced France’s withdrawal from NATO and made his visit to Moscow, America’s involvement in Vietnam deepened, and the Soviets – facing an increasingly threatening situation in Asia (that is, the Sino-Soviet split) – appeared more amenable to developing better relations with the West. There was, then, adequate reason for the growing concern about “losing” West Germany, through unification, neutralization, or the maneuverings of de Gaulle.

While France and West Germany represented the most profound political challenges to American dominance, historians have also illustrated the increasingly limited control that Washington exercised over Western trade policy. For example, by the late 1950s, Britain had taken a leading role in the transatlantic bargaining process over export controls vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. Thus, the utility of the so-called Coordinating Committee (COCOM) – the Western grouping established at the onset of the Cold War to control the export of “strategic” items to the USSR and its satellites – was being increasingly challenged. By the 1960s, the Americans faced a virtually unanimous – and increasingly more prosperous – West European front calling not only for improved political relations with the Soviet bloc, but also seeking to challenge American leadership on matters of East–West trade.¹⁹ Ironically, there was similar tension within the Soviet bloc.

17 Thomas Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in Diane B. Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Policy in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 131.

18 NIE 23-65, “Prospects for West German Foreign Policy,” box 5: “23 West Germany,” NIEs, NSF, LBJL.

19 See Ian Jackson, *Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East West Trade, 1948–1963* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Michael Mastanduno, *Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East–West Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

Unity and division in the East

To a lesser degree than in Western Europe, the Soviet bloc experienced its own centrifugal tendencies in the 1960s.²⁰ This was the case despite the fact that even contemplating a possible exit from the Soviet-led military alliance could have bloody consequences; the Hungarians had experienced this in 1956. But the repression ultimately underlined the fragility of the alliance; it illuminated the fact that the American “empire” in Western Europe was built upon a multi-lateral invitation by the founding members of NATO, whereas the Soviet empire was based upon a unilateral imposition of Moscow’s hegemony.²¹

The 1960s saw, though, an effort on the part of East European leaders to find room for independence. As early as 1960, Enver Hoxha, the Stalinist dictator of Albania, openly criticized the USSR. Although Albania remained nominally a member of the Warsaw Pact until 1968, its “defection” was symbolic of the – admittedly minor – cracks in the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. The average Albanian did not benefit very much. Chinese aid was limited and Hoxha used the increased isolation of his country to strengthen his personal hold on power. In 1966, the Albanian dictator even launched his own cultural revolution, emulating Mao’s model. Little changed: Albania remained Europe’s poorest country and did little to trouble the Soviets. Nor did Hoxha have any interest in détente; if anything he called for a more confrontational approach to the West.²²

Potentially more disconcerting than Albania’s “defection” to the Chinese camp was Romania’s independent course. Romanian leaders George Gheorghiu-Dej and, after 1965, Nicolae Ceaușescu were ruthless authoritarians, who combined repression at home with an independent foreign policy. The latter, at least partly geared toward increasing their domestic popularity, resulted in Romania’s consistent resistance to any kind of economic integration in the Soviet bloc. In 1967, Ceaușescu took riskier action by recognizing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and thus breaking Soviet bloc unity on this issue (the USSR

²⁰ See Kemp-Welch’s chapter in this volume.

²¹ The ‘empire by invitation’ thesis is usually associated with Geir Lundestad, but it has many adherents. Lundestad, “‘Empire’ by Invitation? United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 23, 3 (1986), 263–77. On the Warsaw Pact see Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005).

²² Very little has been written about Albania during the Cold War. For a general account, see, for example, R.J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* (London: Longman, 2002).

though, had recognized the FRG earlier). While refusing to participate in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and inviting President Richard M. Nixon for a state visit the following year, Romania nonetheless remained a member of the alliance. It was no wonder that Ceaușescu was often described as the Eastern version of de Gaulle; someone willing to issue a challenge to the dominant superpower in the name of national pride, but unwilling to risk a complete breakdown in relations.²³

A desire to break away from the political straitjacket of Soviet domination was further strengthened by the need to increase the limited economic links that East European countries enjoyed with the West. By the 1960s, it was clear to most Warsaw Pact leaders that Comecon – the economic organization of socialist states that had been founded in 1949 as a Soviet response to the Marshall Plan – had failed to become an engine of prosperity in the Eastern bloc. Comparisons with the EEC were negative. The EEC quickly became an integrated trading bloc with impressive economic growth; countries like Britain lined up to join it by the early 1960s.²⁴ In contrast, the Comecon shifted from being a vehicle of Soviet economic exploitation of Eastern Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s to being an organization through which the USSR essentially subsidized its satellites in the late 1950s and 1960s. While trade and energy subsidies played a role in keeping the Soviet empire together, they also illustrated the vast difference between West and East European economic integration. While the former lacked a central actor and was multilateral in nature, the latter was driven and controlled from Moscow.

The important point, though, is that by the 1960s Soviet policy was clearly failing. Instead of creating uniformity across the Soviet “empire,” Moscow had produced a competition among Comecon countries over the size of each nation’s subsidy. Moreover, once dependent on Soviet subsidies, East European leaders (who personally relied upon Moscow’s support) were reluctant to let them go. As Randall Stone puts it: “the satellites became a growing drain on the Soviet economy [that] undermined the viability of the system.”²⁵ This burden, however, made economic détente – increased East–West trade and Western investment in Eastern Europe – more acceptable, even desirable, to the USSR. Pushing in the same direction was the constant

23 On Romania, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

24 See the chapters by Ludlow, Richard Cooper and Wilfried Loth in this volume.

25 Randall W. Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet Bloc Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 238.

demand for high-technology goods from the West; the need for sophisticated machine tools and electrical equipment was a significant driving force behind trade liberalization across the Soviet bloc.

In sum, there was dissent in the East, as there was in the West. Throughout the 1960s, yearnings for national independence were increasing throughout the Soviet bloc. The Iron Curtain stood firm, yet minor cracks were already appearing as renegade leaders – de Gaulle and Ceaușescu in the forefront – made forays across the East–West divide. In addition, the Soviet bloc was caught in a set of economic circumstances that demanded the reduction of Eastern Europe’s dependency on the high level of Soviet subsidies. With the bloc’s economic integration proceeding less than smoothly, an opening to the West – that would yield economic benefits in the form of increased trade and investment – was viewed more positively by the late 1960s, exactly at the time that Brandt was beginning to pursue his *Ostpolitik*.

Bridges, reforms, and crackdown

The apparent loosening of Soviet bloc unity did not go unnoticed in the West. Already in 1961, Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Griffith had called for a policy of “peaceful engagement” with Eastern Europe designed to result “in the creation of a neutral belt of states.” In June 1963, John F. Kennedy asked Americans to “reexamine our own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war.”²⁶ A year later, Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out that “[t]he Communist world is no longer a single flock of sheep following blindly one leader,” and that, in particular, “[t]he smaller countries of Eastern Europe have increasingly asserted their own policies.” President Lyndon Johnson harped on the same theme and called for extending bridges of “trade, travel and humanitarian assistance” to Eastern Europe.²⁷ In 1966, however, the momentum toward peaceful engagement and bridge building in the United States collapsed. When Congress defeated the East–West Trade Bill, the Johnson

26 “Toward a Strategy of Peace,” Commencement Address by President Kennedy at American University, Washington, DC, June 10, 1963, quoted in Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 117; Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, “Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe,” *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (July 1961). See also Jussi M. Hanhimäki “The First Line of Defense or a Springboard for Disintegration: European Neutrals in American Foreign and Security Policy, 1945–1961,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 7, 2 (July 1996), 378–403.

27 Quoted in Joseph F. Harrington, “Romanian–American Relations During the Kennedy Administration,” *East European Quarterly*, 18, 2 (June 1984), 225.

administration's most ambitious effort to use US economic power as a tool to build bridges to the Soviet bloc ended.²⁸

While the Americans balked, West Europeans rapidly expanded their links to the East. In 1964, Britain signed a fifteen-year credit agreement with the USSR. In 1965, France negotiated a series of trade and technological exchanges; the following year, as de Gaulle visited Moscow, the French dropped many import quotas from Eastern Europe. The Italians, having signed similar agreements, invited Soviet president Nikolai Podgornyi to Rome in early 1967. Indeed, among the large European countries, the Germans were the one exception.

The Harmel Report, adopted by NATO in late 1967, was the logical culmination of the growing Western interest in détente. While maintaining the emphasis on continued military preparedness, the Harmel Report's major "new" offering was to stress the significance of negotiations with the Warsaw Pact as a means of enhancing European security. This codification of a loosely coordinated dual-track policy – maintaining military strength and pursuing détente – can therefore be seen both as a road map to a different kind of East–West relationship in Europe and as a way of meeting the challenges to NATO's unity in the 1960s. In a sense, the Harmel Report illustrated the flexible nature of NATO as well as the US leadership role in the alliance. It also served as an opportunity to link French and West German initiatives to a unified approach that the alliance embraced. As Andreas Wenger puts it, the Harmel exercise represented, quite simply, the "multilateralization of détente." Furthermore, in June 1968, at a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Reykjavik, the alliance reaffirmed its commitment to détente and declared itself in favor of Mutual Force Reductions talks with the Warsaw Pact.²⁹

Significantly, it appeared that the Eastern bloc was readying itself for détente as well. In addition to unilateral Soviet contacts with a number of West European countries, there were other moves toward détente with the West. In the summer of 1966, the Warsaw Pact issued the so-called Bucharest Declaration, reaffirming its interest in an all-European security conference that

28 Joseph Harrington and Bruce Courtney, "Romanian–American Relations during the Johnson Administration," *East European Quarterly*, 22, 2 (June 1988), 225. US exports to Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR and Yugoslavia) grew from about \$ 87.5 million in 1961 to \$135 million in 1967. Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 251.

29 See Frédéric Bozo, "Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report," *Contemporary European History*, 7, 3 (1998), pp. 343–60 and Andreas Wenger, "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–68," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6, 1 (Winter 2004), 22–74.

had first been broached in 1954. In 1967, a month after Romania's recognition of the FRG, another Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting repeated this call. Although these appeals undoubtedly encouraged NATO to move toward the adoption of the Harmel Report, the intended exclusion of the United States and Canada from these Pan-European security talks dampened the enthusiasm of the West. But such sticking points appeared minor when compared to the tensions of the early 1960s. Détente, it seemed, was about to break out.

Not even the August 1968 Warsaw Pact crackdown on Czechoslovakia – discussed in more detail elsewhere in this volume – could change the momentum toward European détente that had been built over the preceding years. Of course, the ruthless intervention that destroyed the internal Czech efforts to build socialism with a human face – the so-called Prague Spring – was a brutal reminder of the limits of internal reform within the Soviet zone. The public justification – the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine – made it clear that any threat to the socialist system was not to be tolerated. As Anatolii Dobrynin, at the time the Soviet ambassador to Washington, recorded in his memoir, the Prague invasion was “a true reflection of the sentiments of those who ran the Soviet Union” at the time, i.e.: “[a] determination never to permit a socialist country to slip back into the orbit of the West.”³⁰

Initially it seemed that the crackdown on Czechoslovakia also marked a death blow to détente in its European and Soviet–American varieties. The possibility that a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) – preliminarily outlined at a Soviet–US summit meeting a year earlier – could have been negotiated during the Johnson administration was blocked. West Europeans involved in “bridge building” were naturally taken aback by the invasion as well as Soviet accusations that their détente policy was tantamount to “interference” in the internal affairs of socialist countries. As Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger's envoy to the United States, Kurt Birrenbach (Christian Democratic Party [CDU] member of *Bundestag*) told Secretary of State Rusk in September 1968: “*Ostpolitik* is completely blocked.”³¹

Ostpolitik in the spotlight

Birrenbach could hardly have been more wrong. *Ostpolitik* was battered by the events in Prague, but as events during the next few years illustrated, its

30 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Random House, 1995), 183; for more on the Prague Spring and Eastern Europe, see Kemp Welch's chapter in this volume.

31 Memorandum of conversation, Rusk, Birrenbach *et al.*, September 9, 1968, Germany memos, vol. XVI, Country Files, NSF, LBJL.

progress suffered hardly at all. Following the Bundestag elections in the fall of 1969, the Social Democrats formed a new government with Willy Brandt as the chancellor. Subsequently, there was plenty of *Annäherung* (rapprochement), although to most Germans' taste, perhaps not enough *Wandel* (change).³² With Washington's knowledge – if not always approval – Brandt and his confidant Egon Bahr initiated contacts with the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. They then proceeded to negotiate groundbreaking agreements. The German–Soviet Treaty of August 1970, the September 1971 Four Power agreement on Berlin, and the December 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germanies were dramatic examples of the unfolding of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

While Brandt proceeded from breakthrough to breakthrough, his American counterparts had mixed feelings. Although Nixon and Kissinger were bent on pursuing bilateral détente with the Soviet Union, they were not keen on seeing themselves overshadowed by an independent German policy. More substantively, the Nixon administration wanted to make sure that there were no cracks in a unified Western position that the USSR might exploit. Already during his February 1969 trip through Europe, Nixon warned (the then foreign minister) Brandt that the Soviets' interest in *Ostpolitik* was part of “a major Soviet objective to weaken the [NATO] alliance and especially the FRG.”³³

Brandt had much the same concern. He had no intention of breaking away from NATO, but sought to find ways of aligning *Ostpolitik* with NATO policy, most specifically with the 1967 Harmel Report. Brandt well understood the need to coordinate his actions with the United States. In discussions in October 1969, Bahr outlined to Kissinger his vision of *Ostpolitik*, detailing the planned West German overtures toward the USSR, Poland, and East Germany. Writing to Nixon, Kissinger warned that the planned German initiatives “could become troublesome if they engender euphoria, affect Germany's contribution to NATO and give ammunition to our own détente-minded people here at home. The Germans may also become so engaged in their Eastern policy that their commitment to West European unity may decline. The Soviets, and with some apparent prodding by Moscow, [East German leader Walter] Ulbricht, seem willing enough to receive Bonn's overtures.”³⁴

32 An allusion to the crucial idea underlying *Ostpolitik*, *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement).

33 Memoranda of conversation, Nixon, Rogers, Kissinger, Brandt, Kiesinger, February 26, 1969, box 484 Conference Files, 1966–72, CF 340–CF342, RG 59, NA.

34 Kissinger to Nixon (drafted by Sonnenfeldt), October 14, 1969, box 917, VIP Visits, NSC and Kissinger to Nixon, October 20, 1969, box 682: Germany vol III, Country Files, NSC, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NA (soon to be moved to Yorba Linda, California). Bahr's memorandum of conversation in *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik*



13. West German chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling at the monument to those killed by German troops in the uprising in Warsaw during World War II. Brandt's December 1970 tribute did much to allay Polish anxieties about an ongoing German threat.

Indeed, the Soviets, East Germans, and other Warsaw Pact countries were eager to see Brandt succeed, thus contributing to the success of *Ostpolitik* in 1970–72. But their motives differed. To Brandt, *Ostpolitik* was a means to a larger end; a step on the way toward the ultimate unification of Germany. To East Germans, *Ostpolitik* represented an opportunity for greater legitimacy, for true “statehood.”³⁵ For the Soviets and a number of East Europeans, the treaties of 1970–72 meant the consolidation of the division of Germany and the recognition of postwar borders, while increasing access to high-technology items that were still available only in the West. In short, the aims of the leaders were almost diametrically opposite: if Brandt wanted to transform the existing situation, most of his counterparts in the East were hoping to freeze it.

Deutschland 1969, vol. II, 1114–18. Kissinger's and Bahr's versions are also in their memoirs. See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 410–12; Egon Bahr, *Zu Meiner Zeit* (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996), 271–73.

35 The best account about East German thinking is Mary E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

But how much change did *Ostpolitik* bring about? After all, Germany remained deeply divided, something that most of Germany's neighbors probably welcomed. In fact, in 1973 both the FRG and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) joined the United Nations, a conspicuous sign that they were, in fact, two separate and independent countries. From this perspective, one might easily argue that the main outcome of *Ostpolitik* was to give added legitimacy to the GDR at the expense of the reunification hopes of the FRG. Certainly, the policy-makers of 1973 did not think that they had set in motion an irreversible process that would result in the reunification of Germany less than two decades later.

Since officials could not foresee the future, the debates regarding the long-term significance of détente are frustrating: they go around in circles. How does one interpret the changes that took place? Were they radical or conservative, transformative or stabilizing? Did détente accelerate or prolong the collapse of the Cold War order in Europe (whether the collapse was inevitable is quite another matter)? It is impossible to answer any of these questions with certainty. We know that the Cold War ended after détente, so it is, of course, tempting to maintain that the simple sequence of events proves a causal link. But we cannot 'prove' that such a link necessarily exists. In terms of *Ostpolitik* and German reunification, such links are (as they were at the time) intimately tied to domestic politicking, which, in turn, is not the best possible stimulus for objective historical assessment.

Nevertheless, one can surely assert that by opening doors and building bridges, *Ostpolitik* made the eventual *peaceful* unification of Germany easier (even if not inevitable). But its impact – as well as its origins – went far beyond the narrow boundaries of German–German relations. By improving relations with a number of East European governments as well as the Soviet Union, Brandt and his *Ostpolitik* set in motion the process of increased exchanges and contacts across the Iron Curtain that paved the way to the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a key event in the era of détente.

CSCE and the rise of human security

The signing of the Helsinki Accords on August 1, 1975, represented a seminal moment in Europe's Cold War. With thirty-five nations represented, including the United States and Canada, most of them by their respective heads of state, it was the biggest (and first) European multilateral gathering since World War II. While it did not result in the signing of formal treaties, the CSCE was perhaps the most high-profile expression of the fact that the Cold

War had moved to an entirely new stage. While observers disagreed (and historians continue to do so) about whether the Helsinki Accords were a move toward undermining the Cold War order or an effort to stabilize it, the sheer magnitude of the undertaking spelled the birth of a new kind of Europe, one no longer exclusively dominated by East–West rivalries.

The CSCE had a long history. The original proposal for a Pan-European security conference had been made by the Soviet foreign minister, Viacheslav Molotov, in 1954. Because the United States (and Canada) were not invited, the proposal was turned down by NATO countries (as they rejected Warsaw Pact appeals in the 1960s). In the aftermath of the crackdown on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and virtually coinciding with the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the Warsaw Pact issued, on March 17, 1969, the Budapest appeal, which, for the first time, did not include specific preconditions (that is, it did not exclude any countries from the list of participants). Two months later, the Finnish president Urho Kekkonen, at the USSR's urging, acted as a neutral go-between, offering Helsinki as the site for such a conference. Most significantly, the latter invitation was directed to all European countries as well as the United States and Canada.³⁶ Finally, in November 1972, the initial Multilateral Preparatory Talks began at the Dipoli conference centre, outside of Helsinki. After several years of arduous negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki, involving representatives of thirty-five countries, the CSCE finally concluded with a high-level three-day summit in Helsinki (Stage III) that opened on July 30, 1975.

Both the process and the outcome were remarkable in highlighting the birth of a new kind of East–West relationship in Europe. The four 'Baskets' (or parts) of the Helsinki Accords dealt with virtually every aspect of Pan-European security. While Basket I, for example, dealt with such "traditional" security issues as the inviolability of borders, Baskets II and III dealt with economic issues and, perhaps most controversially, human rights. Basket IV – rarely mentioned – was perhaps the most important of all: it called for follow-up conferences, thereby ensuring that the accords would become a "living" document. In other words, the signing ceremony at Helsinki's Finlandia Hall on August 1, 1975, was as much the beginning of a process as it was an end of the multilateral negotiation that had stretched far beyond the time limits anticipated in 1972.

Nor should one underestimate the significance of the process itself. It was quite a feat to bring together the diplomatic representatives of countries as

36 For useful overviews of these developments, see Wilfried Loth, *Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), and John van Oudenaren, *European Détente* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992).

different as Britain and Romania, or Belgium and Yugoslavia. Equally importantly, by involving both Germanies in the process, the CSCE negotiations offered the first significant opportunity for addressing the division of the country. Of course, the Helsinki Accords did not solve the question of Germany's division; in fact, many in Western Germany were concerned lest the process, by adding further legitimacy to the East German regime, actually served to solidify the division. The CSCE did, though, fit nicely with Brandt's *Ostpolitik* by offering yet another means for strengthening the Federal Republic's ties to the East (both the GDR and other Soviet bloc nations).

Remarkable – and perhaps somewhat overrated – though the CSCE's final document was, it was also inherently contradictory, producing diametrically opposite interpretations. The Helsinki Accords were widely criticized in the United States for allegedly recognizing Soviet control over Eastern Europe. In the Soviet bloc, the provisions on human rights were basically ignored. Nevertheless, the CSCE was of major long-term significance: it signaled the emergence of human security as an important and recognized aspect of international relations. The agreements would later serve as a manifesto by numerous dissident and human rights groups inside the Soviet Union and its satellites. The fact that the CSCE did recognize the possibility that borders might be changed through "peaceful means" also satisfied the minimum demands of those Germans who still held up unification as a realistic goal.³⁷

Not everyone, however, was excited (or concerned) about the CSCE. Iurii Andropov, the head of the Soviet KGB and later secretary-general of the Soviet Communist Party, dismissed the notion that Basket III would ever have an appreciable impact inside the USSR. "We are the masters in this house," he reportedly told the Politburo members who doubted the wisdom of signing a protocol that recognized freedom of speech. Others, like Kissinger, did not even bother reading the Helsinki Accords. The American secretary of state, whose lack of enthusiasm for the CSCE was notable throughout the process, at one time even quipped that the Helsinki Final Act might just as well be written "in Swahili."³⁸

Such missives notwithstanding – and Kissinger himself would later provide a rather positive assessment of the CSCE – the CSCE did mark a certain rebirth of Europe. For the first time since the end of World War II,

37 For a thorough analysis, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

38 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, "'They Can Write it in Swahili': Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 1, 1, (Spring 2003), 37–58.

the CSCE provided a forum in which all-European negotiations could take place. In Helsinki and Geneva, under the umbrella of the CSCE, East–West contacts were fostered in a way that could hardly have been foreseen a decade earlier. West Europeans, in particular, found the CSCE to be a vehicle for putting the recommendations of the 1970 Davignon Report into practice, in effect launching what today is called a European Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO members and neutrals tended to dominate much of the negotiating process because the Americans showed but minimal interest and the Soviets (and selected East European governments) tried to keep the agenda – and the results – as limited as possible.³⁹

At the same time, the Iron Curtain was punctured economically. Already, by the late 1960s, the unity of the Atlantic alliance regarding its trade embargo against the Soviet bloc in strategic goods had evaporated. Europeans had gradually drifted away from the rigid American approach to the embargo.⁴⁰ Consequently, aggregate East–West trade (exports plus imports) rose nearly sixfold in nominal terms from 1970 through 1979. The increase, however, was imbalanced in at least two ways. First, only a few key countries (such as West Germany and Romania) saw a substantial increment in their trade with countries outside their own bloc. Second, while Western Europe produced a host of goods in demand in the East, there was little that Soviet bloc countries could offer in return. Unlike the USSR, they had no massive energy sources (gas or oil). Thus, Eastern Europe's purchases from the EEC countries were financed heavily with loans provided by banks in Western Europe. In the 1980s, the credits would effectively bankrupt a number of Soviet bloc countries and deepen the crisis of Communism.⁴¹

Perhaps most importantly, West Europeans were able to include questions of individual freedom and political rights in the CSCE agenda, an important – if initially perhaps mainly cosmetic – victory. As T. A. K. Elliott, the British ambassador to Finland who was deeply involved in the negotiations, put it in

39 This is evident both from the documentation now available as well as from the memoirs of most participants. See the sources cited above, especially Thomas, *Helsinki Effect*; for the Davignon Report and European foreign policy cooperation, see Michael E. Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

40 See Mastanduno, *Economic Containment*.

41 See Harriet Friedmann, "Warsaw Pact Socialism: Détente and the Disintegration of the Soviet Bloc," in Allen Hunter (ed.), *Re Thinking the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 213–31.

1974: "One thing the Conference has already achieved: to get it accepted for the first time by Communist states that relations between peoples – and therefore the attitudes of Governments towards their citizens – should be the subject of multilateral discussion." This principle, he added, was important because it might "eventually be able to get the Soviet Union to lower, even a little, the barriers to human contacts and the flow of information and ideas between East and West."⁴²

Herein lay the key to the long-term significance of the CSCE and of European détente. Unlike superpower détente, it did not focus on nuclear weapons or traditional security issues. What the CSCE, one of the key products of European détente, brought clearly to the international arena was a focus on human security, on the rights of people rather than the prerogatives of states.

Complexities of European détente

Détente in Europe was a complex and constantly evolving process. It sprang from the national aspirations of several countries; it represented a rebellion of sorts against the formation of tight blocs that had emerged in previous decades. De Gaulle's efforts to lift France's status and Ceaușescu's attempts to take Romania down a more independent road were two examples of such nationalism. But so was the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt, at least if one regards the chancellor's policies as an effort to advance the cause of German reunification. Still, men like Brandt touched chords and inspired people beyond their national boundaries. Among a large number of Europeans, whether they were members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact or neutrals, there was a strong desire to overcome the rigidities of the blocs and to puncture holes in the Iron Curtain. Because of his unique background, Brandt in many ways was the perfect symbol of the new European era: a social democrat and victim of Nazi persecutors, he had served as the mayor of Berlin in the early 1960s when the Soviets and East Germans had erected the wall. Because he had earned his anti-totalitarian and anti-Communist credentials, Brandt was the right person to talk peace to the Soviets.

42 T. A. K. Elliott to J. Callaghan, July 29, 1974, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series III, vol. II, *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975*, ed. G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (London: Whitehall History Publishing, 1997), 317–26.

Recognizing the aspirations of its allies to reach out to their brethren in East Germany and Eastern Europe, US officials were impelled to pursue a policy of building bridges to the eastern part of the continent. When they put their weight behind the Harmel Report in 1967, American officials were saying that they accepted détente as an appropriate policy to be undertaken multilaterally to relax tensions in Europe while they focused on other parts of the world that they now deemed increasingly important. The détente in Europe that was launched in the late 1960s, however, was very different from its Soviet–American counterpart. It was nurtured and driven by European leaders like Brandt and was embodied in European institutions like the CSCE, setting it apart from its superpower variant.

The practical results of European détente, however, are difficult to measure. Unlike Soviet–American détente, which had its specific mileposts like SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the relaxation of East–West relations in Europe was a relatively open-ended process. Because it was not propelled by a single country, it did not have a single coherent goal. Although economic intercourse grew between East and West, it did not transform continent-wide patterns. Although Brandt signed numerous agreements with his counterparts in the East, they were, in the end, less important for what they stated or recognized than for the contacts and processes that were begun. Likewise, the CSCE was not a formal treaty and could be interpreted in numerous contradictory ways; yet the Helsinki Accords for all their ambiguities – perhaps because of their ambiguities – were of great consequence.

Perhaps because it did not have such identifiable and formal “end products,” European détente did not suffer a rapid decline and collapse. Unlike Soviet–American détente which was widely proclaimed dead by 1979 (if not earlier), the European process lingered on into the 1980s. The CSCE, for example, was institutionalized in the framework of the follow-up conferences (Belgrade, 1977–78; Madrid, 1980–83; Ottawa, 1985). These had been outlined in Basket IV of the Helsinki Final Act. Indeed, unlike the ABM Treaty of 1972, the CSCE still exists in the form of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This, in turn, reflected one of the most important developments in the all-European process that had gradually emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s. Getting to the point of signing the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, had required a collective change in the mindsets of leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although the division of Europe remained intact for another decade and a half, détente and the Helsinki process had begun to nurture an all-European challenge to the division of the continent.

When Willy Brandt accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1971, he said: "Europe has its future ahead of itself. In the West it will grow beyond the European Economic Community and develop into a union which will be able to assume part of the responsibility for world affairs, independently of the United States but firmly linked with it. At the same time there are opportunities for developing cooperation and safeguarding peace through the whole of Europe, perhaps of establishing a kind of European Partnership for Peace."⁴³ Later events would show that Brandt's vision was far more prophetic than that of most of his counterparts in the West or the East.

43 Willy Brandt, "Peace Policy in Our Time," Nobel lecture, December 11, 1971, in Irwin Abrams (ed.), *Nobel Lectures: Peace, 1971–1980* (Singapore: World Scientific, 1997), 24–25.

Eastern Europe: Stalinism to solidarity

ANTHONY KEMP-WELCH

Suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956¹ gave Eastern Europe a harsh reminder of the ground rules operating within the Soviet bloc.² First, no member could leave the Warsaw Pact. Second, the states of Eastern Europe had to maintain a Communist monopoly at all times. These two principles were designed to prevent radical change within Eastern Europe. They secured Moscow's geostrategic interests in the region by setting boundaries that could not be crossed. That did not prevent leaders from taking local initiatives should they so wish, but their willingness to do so differed markedly between countries.

The Polish leader Władysław Gomułka had been brought back to power in October 1956. One of his first external acts was to renegotiate Poland's relations with the Soviet Union. Though the relationship remained subservient, a degree of formal sovereignty was restored. At home, he preserved the main domestic changes made during 'October': the return of agriculture to private hands and improved relations between Church and state. However, realising that the invasion of Hungary was a fate that Poland had missed perhaps by only a few days, he rejected any further reforms. Even modest proposals to reintroduce market elements into central planning were dismissed as attempts to 'undermine socialism'. Poland entered a decade of stagnation.

By contrast, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht became somewhat more flexible. Having gained the reputation of a dogmatist during the 1950s, he began to emerge as more open-minded. Building the Berlin Wall in 1961 helped to stabilise the domestic labour market. The new economic programme unveiled in 1963 introduced new criteria for efficiency. It used financial indicators, profits, sales and costs, rather than the Stalinist quantitative targets. Although under increasing attack from 1965, and quietly

1 See Csaba Békés' chapter in volume I.

2 East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

terminated at the end of the 1960s, its focus on consumerism and material improvements continued. Economic benefits for the population included modest wage rises and increased leisure, with the introduction of the five-day week, though these achievements were overshadowed by West Germany's 'economic miracle'.

Similarly, the Hungarian leader János Kádár began to relax the regime that brought him to power in 1956. While anxious to avoid workers' councils (a key feature of the Hungarian uprising), he tried to extend industrial democracy through extending trades union rights, including a right to veto management decisions. Greater openings to the West were permitted, particularly for credits and technology, leading 'New Left' activists to criticise the increasing 'commercialisation' of the Hungarian way of life.

The main barrier to change, both in Hungary and across the bloc, was party officials. Fearful of losing their power and privileges, apparatchiks fought fiercely to retain their role in managing the planned economy. Whenever radical reform was proposed, they would appeal to Moscow to support the status quo. The effectiveness of such lobbying depended on the prevailing climate in Soviet politics.

The early 1960s seemed a propitious time for change. Nikita Khrushchev's second round of de-Stalinisation, launched in 1961, addressed systemic questions that his 'secret speech' attacking Iosif Stalin in 1956 had evaded. A much fuller account of Stalinist crimes started to appear. Khrushchev agreed to publish Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's first stories of Gulag life. As Soviet literature began to include Stalin's collectivisation campaign and consequent mass famine (1932–34), the false optimism of socialist realism went into terminal decline. Stalinist orthodoxies were discarded, and there was a recovery of intellectual vitality unknown in Soviet life since the 1920s.

Khrushchev's new party programme boldly declared that the Soviet Union was on the road to full Communism, which would see material abundance, equality and self-government. Completion dates were even provided: public transport and education were to be free by 1980. But meeting such ambitious targets required radical restructuring, starting with the economy.

Soviet economists began to question the ability of central planning to cope with the complexity and speed of change required by modernity. A seminal article by Professor Y. G. Liberman suggested that Soviet enterprises should be geared to profits earned, not merely to output targets. He suggested that state enterprises be opened to market forces; prices and other performance indicators should no longer be set by the centre. His publication in the party

daily³ led East European reformers to believe that radical changes in economic management were becoming possible.

However, a fundamental question for both the friends and the foes of change was how far economic devolution could go without similar changes in the political sphere. Following Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, grand reforms were shelved. Instead of his dramatic, if sometimes erratic, shifts of policy, the new leadership sought stability. Their first test in Eastern Europe was Czechoslovakia. The impulse for reform from above, which eventually grew into the Prague Spring, came from economic failure.

Reform from above

In 1963, Czechoslovakia became the first country in postwar Eastern Europe to record negative growth. The Five-Year Plan was abandoned. Faced with the collapse of its economic policies, an outspoken Czech economist, Professor Ota Šik, proposed far-reaching reforms.

Šik stated that the all-powerful Planning Commission should no longer set targets for the whole economy but concentrate on long-term trends and perspectives. This would free up the microeconomy in which individual enterprises could take genuine initiatives. Šik proposed the centre should listen and respond to popular opinion. There should be consumers' rights and 'the right and real possibility of various groups of the working people and different social groups to formulate and defend their economic interests in shaping economic policy'. The workforce should also have real power. Employees should be able to replace factory directors.⁴

Though such reforms gained formal acceptance in 1965, middle-ranking officials started to dilute them. They could not envisage a 'socialist market economy' in which their own commanding voice was muted and might one day disappear. Faced with their delaying tactics, Šik stated publicly in the summer of 1966 that economic reform could not take place without political reform.

Similar conclusions had been drawn by a commission on the political system, whose chief author was Zdeněk Mlynář, a fellow student at Moscow State University in the early 1950s with Mikhail Gorbachev. His report called the political system dictatorial and monopolistic. It was based on the 'false thesis that the Party is the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat'.

3 'Plan, profit and bonuses', *Pravda*, 9 September 1962.

4 H. G. Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 114.

This was tantamount to admitting that Lenin's concept of the party as a 'proletarian dictatorship' meant in practice the party's dictatorship over the proletariat.

Mlynář urged the party to engage in genuine discussion at all levels. The Central Committee should hold authentic debates rather than simply ratify decisions taken in advance. But it should not decide everything. 'The Party does not want to, and will not, take the place of social organizations.'⁵ On the contrary, it should introduce a more democratic system allowing 'different social interests and needs to play a real part in the creation and execution of policy'.

How such a transformation could come about was unclear. Mlynář admitted it was a social and political experiment. He later noted: 'this was a development towards political pluralism under conditions in which the economic, social, political and institutional supports of classic bourgeois political pluralism had been destroyed'.⁶ He hoped that the party could gradually build up new supports from below. Meanwhile, the Soviet reaction to the burgeoning Prague Spring was crucial.

Leonid Brezhnev came to accept that Antonín Novotný, Czechoslovak Party leader since 1953, had lost touch with the popular mood. He was replaced by the Slovak Party leader Alexander Dubček. On the twentieth anniversary of the 'Prague coup' that had installed Communism in Czechoslovakia, Dubček called for 'a true invigoration and unification of all constructive and progressive forces in our Republic'. He called on the Communist Party to make 'a new start to socialism'. Nobody should be shielded from scrutiny: all problems should be looked 'boldly in the face'.⁷

The Soviet Politburo soon became doubtful about Dubček's capacity to control events. The Soviet ambassador in Prague reported in mid-January 1968 that while Dubček was 'unquestionably an honourable and faithful man and a staunch friend of the Soviet Union', his leadership was weak. Faced with divisions in the party, Dubček was 'vacillating'.⁸ The Kremlin resolved to keep a close watch on developments. Alarm bells rang when Dubček started to replace orthodox party officials in key ministries, including the Interior and in

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Z. Mlynář, 'Notions of Political Pluralism in the Policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968', Working Paper No. 3 (Vienna, 1979), 3–4.

⁷ J. Navrátil (ed.), *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (Budapest: Central University Press, 1998), 53–54.

⁸ M. Kramer, 'The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine', in C. Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), 1968: *The World Transformed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 122–23.

the armed forces. Their replacements were all reformists and less amenable to Soviet pressure. Worse still for the Soviets, Moscow was not being consulted over their appointments.

As Czechoslovak censorship was lifted and a wide range of opinions began to appear in journals and the press, fears of 'democratic infection' started to be expressed by East European leaders. Ulbricht complained that Czech writers admired the West and frequently became 'a tool for Bonn's global strategy against the socialist countries'. Their uncensored writings were being beamed back to East German audiences by West German television. Like Moscow, Ulbricht lacked confidence in Dubček's ability to restore control. Gomulka warned Dubček, 'If your situation gets worse, our hostile elements will rear their head again. We already have trouble with writers and students'.⁹

The trouble in Poland began with a classical drama staged at Warsaw's National Theatre about the country's struggle for freedom under the Russian partition. Audience reactions to the anti-Russian passages steadily grew and alarmed the authorities who banned the play. After the last performance, three hundred spectators marched to the playwright's statue nearby, festooning it with flowers and banners. This first street manifestation for more than a decade shook the party leadership.

Fliers appeared stating 'Poland awaits her own Dubček'.¹⁰ A mass meeting was held at Warsaw University in defence of democratic freedoms and university autonomy. Speakers pointed out that freedom of speech, press and assembly were guaranteed by the Polish Constitution (Article 71). But as students started to leave, heavily armed police charged them, chasing many across the campus, some down to the river, beating and clubbing indiscriminately all they could reach. There were dozens of arrests.

Academics supporting the student protest were dismissed and the faculties of Economics, Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology were disbanded. Hundreds of students were expelled and the purge was extended to other university cities. A parallel purge took place in the high offices of state when hundreds of senior officials were summarily sacked for alleged 'pro-Zionist' views, Jewish origin, or both. As a result of the pogrom, Poland lost about 13,000 citizens through emigration.

Whilst Gomulka used repression, Dubček pressed on with reform. An 'Action Programme', published on 10 April 1968, outlined a new role for the

9 A. Garlicki and A. Paczkowski (eds.), *Zaciskanie petli: Tajne dokumenty dotyczące Czechosłowacji 1968r.* [The Tightening of the Noose: Secret Documents Concerning Czechoslovakia in 1968] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1995).

10 Jerzy Eisler, *Marzec 1968* (Warsaw: PWN, 1991), 346.

Communist Party. Rather than holding a monopoly of power, it would compete for influence. The competition was to be strictly circumscribed: the party would not share power and its 'leading role' would be retained. But although alternative parties were still forbidden, the Communist Party began to acknowledge the legitimacy of non-party institutions. Organisations under its formal tutelage, such as the Socialist and People's Parties and trade unions, began to show some signs of autonomy. New associations were set up outside party auspices. Most prominent were the Club of Non-Committed Party Members (KAN) and Club K-231 (an organisation of former political prisoners). In short, the Prague Spring was becoming pluralistic.

Under pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak leaders tried to rein in these developments. Even the reformist Mlynář agreed that the police should investigate the new formation K-231, on the grounds that at least some of those arrested in the Stalinist period had deserved their sentences. Dubček made clear that all new organisations should come under the rubric of the National Front, a party-controlled body. He also assured Moscow that the Action Programme based foreign policy on the firm alliance and further co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Prague tried to placate its allies in the Warsaw Pact with repeated assurances that the country's international alignment would not change. In return for loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, Czechoslovak reformers hoped that Moscow would accept domestic initiatives. Above all, they wanted a significant expansion of personal freedoms and civil liberties, including equal status for Czechs and Slovaks within a federal state. Their economic priority was to shift from over-concentration on heavy industry to consumer production. They sought to boost living standards through the liberalisation of foreign trade.

Instead of being reassured, Soviet leaders began to plan military intervention. They announced manoeuvres on Czechoslovakia's borders. In the Kremlin's view, 'reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries abroad' were blocking normalisation in Czechoslovakia. If not stopped at once, they would move on to destabilise the other socialist states. Moscow insisted that Dubček rein in public debate by restoring censorship. He could hardly do so without jettisoning a major vehicle of the Prague Spring. Instead, he simply appealed to the press and journals to rally round the party's Action Programme.

To this appeal, a prominent writer responded bluntly that after twenty years of unchallenged rule, party leaders had lost the public's confidence. The only remedy for political stagnation was grass-roots renewal. Officials who acted brutally, embezzled, or were simply incompetent should be removed by popular pressures. Ordinary citizens should use peaceful means such as

non-violent strikes and picketing to achieve political and economic change. However, in a clear reference to threats from the country's allies, the writer's manifesto declared, 'We can show our Government that we will stand by it, with weapons if need be.'¹¹

Soviet leaders watched with alarm as the Czechoslovak Party moved away from orthodox Leninism towards social democracy. They feared this process would be completed by an Extraordinary Party Congress, summoned for early September. Other Warsaw Pact leaders had concerns about 'contagion'. They knew the spread of political freedoms in Czechoslovakia would ignite similar aspirations among their own population. At their behest, an emergency summit was held in Warsaw. Unlike earlier summits, Dubček declined to attend.

The Romanian leader Nicolae Ceauşescu was also absent. From the late-1950s, Romania had pioneered a more independent foreign policy. All Soviet troops stationed in the country left by agreement, and Romania skilfully used space opened up by the Sino-Soviet dispute to differentiate itself from Moscow. Ceauşescu took the line that since there was no longer a single 'model' of socialist development, the Warsaw Pact had no right of intervention to end 'deviations'. When Czechoslovakia was invaded, Ceauşescu later condemned the action.

But all those attending the summit had lost patience with Prague. Even the Hungarian leader Kádár was no longer supportive. His New Economic Mechanism had launched a fresh era of liberal economic reform at home. But he saw the Czechoslovak Party as endangered by 'revisionist forces' tending in a social-democratic direction. Though reluctant to call the Prague Spring 'counter-revolutionary', he thought the next stage would be a 'restoration of the (pre-war) bourgeois order'.¹²

The Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, had fewer inhibitions. 'We cannot agree with the view offered by Comrade Kádár or with his conclusions,' said Zhivkov. He thought 'counter-revolutionary centres controlled by the American and West German imperialists' were seeking to tear Czechoslovakia from the Soviet bloc. Only armed force by the Warsaw Pact could retrieve the situation. In their 'Warsaw Letter', the summit leaders informed Prague that attempts to remove Czechoslovakia from the 'socialist commonwealth' would meet a sharp rebuff.

Preparations for an invasion had been honed by extensive Soviet manoeuvres on Czechoslovak soil since early summer. To differentiate it from 1956, when Soviet forces acted alone, some 80,000 soldiers from Poland, Bulgaria,

11 Ludvík Vaculík, 'Two Thousand Words that Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and Everybody', in Navrátil (ed.), *The Prague Spring 1968*.

12 Warsaw Pact Meeting (14–15 July 1968), in Navrátil (ed.), *The Prague Spring*, 217.



14. A Soviet tank in Prague, August 1968. Moscow intervened to curb the independence of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Hungary and East Germany were added to the force. However, the great bulk came from the USSR and the whole operation was under Soviet command.

Leonid Brezhnev called the August 1968 invasion 'an extraordinary step, dictated by necessity'. He explained the unprovoked attack through a convoluted ideological timescale. The historical struggle between socialism and imperialism, foreseen by Marx and Lenin, had reached a 'new stage'. Having been held at bay by the threat of nuclear retaliation by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western imperialism was still playing its old game. Western leaders were using 'anti-socialist' elements in senior positions in Prague to subvert the Communist Party. They intended its gradual conversion to a Western orientation, through economic ties, and its eventual secession from the Warsaw Pact. The Kremlin claimed that the Prague Spring would be followed by a change of regime in Poland, assimilation of East into Western Germany and further departures from the Warsaw Pact. Faced with these audacious aspirations, the socialist commonwealth acted in self-defence. Czechoslovakian state sovereignty had to take second place to the 'sacred duty' of acting on behalf of 'socialist solidarity'.¹³

¹³ 'Sovereignty and the International Responsibility of Socialist Countries', *Pravda*, 26 September 1968.

Brezhnev's argument was circular. The Warsaw Pact would invade (itself) wherever socialism was in danger: but the meaning of danger, and of socialism, was defined in Moscow. In 1956, the Hungarians had abandoned the monopoly of their Communist Party and left the Warsaw Pact. The Czechs and Slovaks had done neither, yet the outcome was just the same. Brezhnev's Doctrine seemed a *carte blanche* for interventionism.

The invasion did not cause a superpower crisis. NATO members accepted Moscow's reassurances that the invasion posed no threat to them. There was not even a general alert. US forces in Europe were pulled back some 200 kilometres. Yet for home consumption, the Soviet Union argued that the invasion was to forestall Western 'revanchism'. The Kremlin also informed incredulous Czechs that West German divisions were massing on their borders.

But the invasion was a major crisis for East-West relations in Europe. For the first time, the Soviet Union, in collusion with other powers, acted as a deliberate aggressor without even the pretence of international legality behind it. Czechoslovakia had remained loyal to the Warsaw Pact. A joint Soviet-Czechoslovak document, signed in Bratislava on 4 August 1968, reaffirmed the country's sovereignty and the inviolability of its borders. Since this had been torn up by the invasion three weeks later, Western leaders wondered whether the Soviet government could be trusted in international relations again.

The invasion also marked a watershed within Eastern Europe. It exposed the hopelessness of attempts since Stalin to revive the Communist Party, planned economy and Marxism from above. It invalidated the assumption of 'revisionist' Communists that divisions between the party apparatus and wider society could be overcome by party-led reforms. Eastern Europe seemed to be at an impasse with the Yalta division of the continent unchallengeable. However, a surprising new development began to upset the apparently immutable status quo. In movements variously entitled civil society, a parallel *polis*, and political opposition, citizens started to influence politics from below. Their actions were not easy to suppress.

Unlike Western writers, who had largely discarded the notion of 'totalitarianism', East European activists began to challenge their 'neo-totalitarian regimes'. They started to criticise Communist state mechanisms for extinguishing civil society and smothering public life by censorship and political monopoly. They argued that politics had been replaced by an empty pantomime of ritualised claims. But the public realm could nonetheless be recovered through independent movements from below.

The first signs of such resistance came in response to the crushing of the Prague Spring.

Change from below

Czechoslovak leaders had instructed their forces and militia to offer no armed response to the Warsaw Pact invasion. But they also refused to give way to the political puppets Moscow wanted to install in their place. Thus, Moscow's military operation went smoothly, but the political objective was not easily attained. A campaign of non-violent civilian resistance to the invasion was sustained until the following spring.

In the autumn of 1968, the Czechoslovak reform movement assumed a mass character. Thousands of people took part in street demonstrations in Prague and other cities. They were dispersed violently by the police, assisted by the Czechoslovak army. Hundreds of students and young workers were arrested. Following such repression, protestors moved indoors. Students held a nationwide sit-in strike on International Students' Day (17 November) to demand renewal of reforms and respect for civil rights.

Student protesters were supported by local trade union representatives who called a fifteen-minute sympathy strike on their behalf in hundreds of workplaces. The students' national union agreed with the metalworkers' union to call a general strike should the popular chairman of the National Assembly, Josef Smrkovský, be deposed on Soviet orders. At a freely elected Union Congress in the spring of 1969, delegates resolved that the Communist Party's 'leading role' should be respected, but only on the condition that reforms continued. It took relentless pressure from the new party leader, Gustáv Husák, who replaced Dubček in April 1969, to bring the autonomous student and worker unions back under party control.

While Czechoslovakia was being 'normalised', Polish Communism encountered its most severe challenge since 1956. A new political force appeared: the working class. For the first time in history, a Communist leadership was removed by protests from below.

In December 1970, Gomułka's Politburo announced 40 per cent increases on the price of basic foodstuffs. After a decade of stagnation in real wages, most families could not afford to pay. The timing was also critical: the measures were announced a fortnight before the Christmas holiday. Spontaneous workers' protests took place across the country. Those on the Baltic Coast were brutally suppressed when the police and the army fired live rounds into peaceful crowds. In Gdynia, the port of Gdańsk, thousands of commuters

answered a televised appeal for a 'return to normal work' but were fired on outside the locked shipyards. The official death toll of forty-four people was an underestimate. Soviet leaders had not approved this use of force and expressed disquiet that protests had not been ended by peaceful means. Their confidence in Gomułka was exhausted and he went into enforced retirement, as did Józef Cyrankiewicz, prime minister since 1956. However, the price increases were not rescinded.

When protests resumed in the early New Year, the political authorities adopted a more reasonable approach. The new leadership under Edward Gierek travelled to the Szczecin and Gdańsk Shipyards for discussions with workers' representatives. Workers poured out their grievances to the visiting dignitaries. In response, Gierek mentioned his own working-class origins and called on workers to help him in overcoming Poland's economic crisis. The strikers responded positively, identifying with Gierek as one of their own, and returned to work. But the country as a whole was not pacified. Major protests by textile workers in Łódź eventually forced the new government to withdraw the December price increases. Workers' protests not only forced a change of leadership but also compelled the new government to reverse a major economic decision.

During two months of protest, Polish workers started to articulate political demands. They condemned the passivity of the state-run trades unions. Unions had lost their original purpose of defending workers against 'both big and little bosses who disregard our vital interests'. They had become bureaucratic, merely implementing production norms, doing paperwork and, at most, organising recreation. Rank-and-file members asked how their union dues were being spent. They questioned whether 'those gentlemen in high posts may have forgotten whose money they live on'.¹⁴

Strikers believed that unions should become independent of party and state control. Their officials should be elected; they should not be time-servers. Workers should also have the right to strike and to form inter-factory strike committees so that the authorities could not crush enterprises on strike by picking them off one by one. In Gdańsk, the workforce produced a popular tribune: Lech Wałęsa.

In addition to astonishing oratorical talents, entirely untutored, Wałęsa injected into Polish politics a set of attitudes that had not been articulated before. His generation, reaching adulthood in the 1960s, was ready for dialogue and compromise but was 'unreceptive to officially-launched doctrines and

¹⁴ Radio Gdańsk, 13 January 1971.

mistrustful of their empty declarations and senseless slogans'.¹⁵ Wałęsa became the emblematic figure of working-class discontent.

Aware of the threat that independent workers posed to its own authority, the party fought back with every means at its disposal. The purpose was to resurrect the barrier of fear which coastal workers had managed to overcome. In a sustained and brutal process of recriminations, strike leaders of 1970–71 were weeded out, demoted or sacked. In several cases, they were murdered by 'persons unknown'. Others were forced to emigrate.

The fate of Polish workers underlined the atomisation of social groups. In 1968, students had been largely unable to take their protests to the working class. In the winter of 1970–71, workers had received scant support from other groups. But co-operation between classes now began.

The opposition leader, Jacek Kuroń, advocated 'self-organisation' by society. His notion was that autonomous groups and social movements could arise to constitute an opposition. Expressing themselves freely, citizens with a sense of common purpose might reclaim the public space monopolised by the party and promote democratic values.¹⁶

Student leader Adam Michnik, a veteran of 1968, thought the future of Eastern Europe would depend upon a convergence of working-class self-organisation with that of other independent groups. It was not possible to predict how and when more permanent workers' representation might be achieved, but it was already clear that Polish workers had grown more politically aware.¹⁷ Michnik realised that there were limits that Eastern European reformers could not cross. But there was also a wider context. Rejecting the 'spheres of influence' established at the end of the Second World War, Michnik and other advocates of civil society wanted Eastern Europe to 'return to Europe' as a whole. This view found resonance with some leaders in the West.

Détente and Eastern Europe

The West German foreign minister, Willy Brandt, argued that détente in Europe should continue despite the 1968 invasion. An increase of

15 A. Drzycimski, 'Growing', in *The Book of Lech Wałęsa*, intro. Neal Ascherson (trans. from Polish) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 69.

16 Jacek Kuroń, 'Polityka i opozycja w Polsce', [Politics and the Opposition in Poland] *Kultura* (Paris), (11 November 1974).

17 Adam Michnik, 'A New Evolutionism', in Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and other Essays* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 135–48 (essay written October 1976).

communication between the blocs could lead to gradual change in the East. But he acknowledged that if the West had legitimate strategic interests on the continent, so too did the other side. West German openings to the East began in Moscow.

A Bonn–Moscow treaty (August 1970) declared the inviolability of existing European borders, including those between East and West Germany. According to Western critics of *détente*, this was a brilliant diplomatic success for the Soviet Union, legitimising its East European empire. But defenders of *détente* saw the results as more positive. Recognition of the postwar status quo in Europe could be the precondition for overcoming it. The first beneficiary was Poland.

A Bonn–Warsaw treaty (December 1970) recognised Poland's Western frontier and declared existing borders inviolable 'for now and for the future'. The countries had 'no territorial claims on each other and will not raise such claims in the future'. The treaty granted Poland access to the largest and most dynamic economy in Europe. West Germany agreed to promote and help finance Poland's economic growth.

Moscow was also interested in greater East–West collaboration. Brezhnev declared a new openness in economic relations with the capitalist West. In June 1973, he told business leaders in Washington that the Soviet Union sought a new era of international relations based on stability. An initial package of agreements with the United States included a grain deal to compensate for disappointing Soviet harvests and other failures of collective agriculture.

Détente offered rich pickings to the West. Even if it were a trick by the Communists, as hawks insisted, Brezhnev's offer provided opportunities. Some in the West believed that mutual self-interest through bilateral trade, credits, and even shared technology would eventually lead to a convergence of the two systems. It also gave Western governments new leverage in the East. They began to condition their willingness to share technology and extend credits on improved treatment of East European citizens. Officials in Washington, for example, argued that most-favoured-nation status should be extended to those Communist governments which had gone furthest to liberalise their rule.

Perhaps the most lasting legacy of *détente* was the least expected: the long-anticipated Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Once the Soviet Union dropped its objections to the United States and Canada attending, its implicit agenda of excluding and eventually dissolving NATO disappeared. At Helsinki (August 1975), thirty-five governments adopted a new set

of principles on security in Europe. Echoing the United Nations Charter, they declared that states would not intervene in sovereign 'affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction' of another signatory. A special section of the agreement, popularly known as Basket III, guaranteed 'respect for humans rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief'. A further paragraph committed all participating states to 'promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development'.¹⁸

The Helsinki Accords provided the incipient opposition in Eastern Europe with a new defence for human rights. They enabled dissidents to challenge their governments: 'We are merely asking you to keep your international agreements,' they could now say. Although persecuted by the authorities, Helsinki monitoring groups were founded in Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi, Erevan and Wilno. Similar groups were formed in Eastern Europe. The most notable was in Czechoslovakia.

In Prague, the proponents of 'Charter 77' gave a comprehensive account of violations of both the Helsinki Accords and the UN Charter. They stated that freedom of expression in Czechoslovakia was violated by the centralised control of media and cultural institutions. Tens of thousands of citizens had been excluded from their professions during the 'normalisation' that followed the 1968 invasion. Similarly, numerous young people had been denied entry to universities because their parents' opinions did not accord with official views. A novel feature of 'Charter 77' was its informality. To avoid official charges of illegality, it remained a 'virtual' organisation, without rules for membership, subscriptions or administration. It was open to all those 'united by the will to strive, individually and collectively, for the respect of civic and human rights in our own country and throughout the world'. In deliberate contrast to the Communist Party, the Chartists sought 'informal, non-bureaucratic, dynamic and open communities'.¹⁹

'Charter 77' championed inclusion. Seeking to build consensus rather than emphasise difference, contacts were made with Western Europeans, in particular peace activists interested in fostering détente. Czech dissidents also sought linkages with like-minded people elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Emboldened

18 *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975) 1-5.

19 H. G. Skilling, *Samizdat and an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1989).

by Helsinki's statements on the free movement of peoples and ideas, oppositionists started to communicate across frontiers. Border meetings took place between East Europeans. Despite much police harassment and frequent arrests, Poles and Czechs managed to edit a joint publication.

Their volume included Václav Havel's seminal essay, *The Power of the Powerless* (1978). Circulated widely at home, it soon came out in Hungary and Poland, and was translated in the West. Havel distinguished between two types of powerlessness. The first type, to which Havel himself belonged, was best described as 'a category of sub-citizen outside the power system'. These outsiders were known in the West as 'dissidents'. But his second category was much larger: conformists at every level who hid behind comforting phraseology and reiterated the soothing official ideology that claimed all citizens were living in the best possible world.

When a greengrocer placed the sign 'Workers of the World Unite!' amongst the onions and carrots in his window, he ignored its semantic content. The slogan was simply delivered to his shop, along with the vegetables. Not to display it would invite the charge of disloyalty. So he engaged in passive acceptance. He comforted himself with the thought that there would be nothing wrong with workers of the world uniting. Yet one day he might reconsider and remove the sign from the window. He could go further and refuse to vote in single-party elections. He might begin to express his real views at public meetings. By thus refusing to live the public lie, he would recover his personal identity and dignity.

Another Chartist, Václav Benda, advocated the construction of an alternative public sphere. He noted that a parallel – or black market – economy had always existed alongside the state-regulated one. Likewise, alternative social institutions could be set up. Independent forms of higher education were already taking place in underground ('flying') universities in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Actions by independent citizens could create a 'parallel polis' alongside the Communist one. This was beginning to happen in Poland.

Rise of Solidarity

Polish opposition reached a new stage in 1976. After a quiescent five years, in which living standards rose steadily, the authorities felt confident enough to raise basic meat prices by 50 per cent and other staples by 30 per cent. Despite careful preparations, the measures were emphatically rejected by Polish workers. After spontaneous nationwide protests, the prime minister appeared on television to state that the increases had merely been 'consultative'. Their

withdrawal was an unprecedented admission by a Communist leader that workers now had the ability to veto a major policy.

As before, strike leaders and their supporters were dismissed or demoted. This time, however, a group of Warsaw intellectuals formed a Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR). They offered medical, financial and legal help to those being persecuted and to their families. In an 'Appeal to Society', KOR declared that 'solidarity and mutual aid' were the only means for social self-defence against the arbitrary actions of the authorities.

KOR leaders set up an independent information network that escaped censorship. They published a thick factual bi-monthly *Information Bulletin*, modelled on the Russian dissident *Chronicle of Current Events*, to record and publicise all cases of government persecution and violence. These initiatives were extraordinarily successful. By the autumn of 1977, their original demands had been met. All those dismissed for the 1976 protests were released and reinstated, though sometimes to lesser positions. Rather than disband, as the authorities no doubt hoped, KOR then widened its agenda to cover all forms of persecution. It was renamed the Committee for Social Self-Defence (KSS).

The major innovation of KOR and its successor was that they acted openly. Its leaders signed their own names on public statements and listed their professions, addresses and home telephone numbers. While this information opened the authors to police repression, it also gave them greater credibility. In calling for civic courage, they showed the way themselves. They demonstrated to a wider public that Communist claims to subservience and obedience could be resisted. It became possible to say 'no' to demands from the state. This theme was also being stated openly by the Polish Catholic Church.

After the election of a Polish pope, the first non-Italian for 455 years, the Church began to play a more active role in Polish political life. John Paul II devoted his first encyclical *Redemptor Hominis* to the dignity of man and the protection of human rights, 'which can be trampled on so easily and annihilated'. This heralded a Vatican *Ostpolitik*.

The pope's first pilgrimage to his homeland (June 1979) became a massive festival in which the nation experienced itself as a community. Twelve million Poles saw the pope in person and heard his cycle of thirty-two speeches and sermons. He called for an authentic dialogue between Church and state, while recognising their 'diametrically opposed concepts of the world'. Though tactful towards the Soviet Union, the papal message was clear: 'It is necessary to work for peace and understanding amongst peoples and nations of the whole world. It is necessary to seek reconciliation. It is necessary to open the borders.'



15. Strike at Gdańsk shipyard, 1980. Poland exemplified burgeoning East European resistance to Soviet domination. The Church played a key role in nurturing dissent.

Although thousands of Czechoslovak Catholics had been prevented from crossing the frontier to hear him, the pope addressed them: 'Remember, Father, all your Czech children.' Broadening his message, he spoke to all the peoples of Eastern Europe – to Bulgarians, whose Prince Boris was baptised a century before any Poles, to Moravians and Ruthenians and others. He alluded to the 'forgotten and neglected nations'. 'There can be no just Europe,' he said, 'without the independence of Poland marked on its map'. The divided continent needed to be reunited. The 'balance of forces' might be changed without using force itself.

The pope told his congregations that the future of Poland would depend upon how many people were 'mature enough to become non-conformists'. Two million watched his departure from the Kraków meadows. The authorities had left stewarding of these vast gatherings to the Church itself. There had been a temporary suspension of the Communist state.

Emboldened by the visit, Polish oppositionists promulgated a Charter of Workers' Rights. This document, with signatories from twenty-six towns and cities, including the founders of a Free Trade Union on the Baltic Coast, remonstrated against inequality and social injustice. The Charter called for institutions to defend working people. The official trades unions were failing in their mission. Moreover, workers were deprived of a basic instrument they

needed for self-defence, the right to strike. Working people had to have the capacity to defend themselves, above all to form independent trades unions.²⁰ These unions emerged much sooner than anyone expected. The greatest of all Polish strikes in August 1980 led to the birth of Solidarity.²¹

Diversity and nonconformism

By the late 1970s, Eastern Europe presented a differentiated picture. The most repressive country in the region was Romania. A rare miners' strike was sparked in the Jiu Valley by legislation ending disability payments for miners and raising the retirement age to fifty-five. Some 35,000 strikers attended a mass meeting on 1 August 1977. Their demands included a reduction of working hours, improved medical facilities and a return to the retirement age of fifty. They called on the party leader to come to the mines for direct talks.

Faced with this unprecedented stoppage, Ceauşescu arrived to face a hostile crowd. He purported to make concessions, including the promise that there would be no punishment of those who had organised the strike. Once the miners had returned to work, however, the army and secret police moved in. Several hundred activists were transferred to other mines and the longer working day was reinstated. There was no response from other social groups. In contrast to Poland, the lack of social solidarity in Romania was stark.

Although Romania remained neo-Stalinist at home, civil resistance became more common, and better co-ordinated, elsewhere in the bloc. A growing role was played by Protestant churches in East Germany. Though a Church–State Agreement (1978) appeared to give the political authorities greater scope to curtail its independence, the reverse occurred. Under church protection, a public sphere began to develop outside the official realm. Starting with discussion groups on economic and environmental issues, this gradually grew into an unofficial peace movement, including other groups defending human rights. Elsewhere, new forms of counter-culture proliferated, such as unofficial art shows, street theatre and popular musical concerts. Such 'happenings' often arose from connections with the West.

When dissidents sent 'Open Letters' to prominent intellectuals and political leaders in the West, they often received a positive and public response. This helped to remove the sense of international isolation behind which Communist governments sought to confine their citizens. At the intergovernmental level,

²⁰ *Robotnik* [The Worker], 35 (18 July 1979).

²¹ See Jacques Lévesque's chapter in volume III.

Eastern Europe's 'return to Europe' was legitimised by the biannual monitoring of the Helsinki Accords, starting at Belgrade in the summer of 1977.

Even at the height of the Cold War, East Europeans retained their sense of universal values. They did not respond to their imposed political isolation with passivity. Repression made resistance most difficult in Romania and Bulgaria, but even in those countries there was growing understanding of the need for independence. The founding father of 'Charter 77', Jan Patočka, advised East Europeans in his valedictory statement to behave with civic dignity and courage, to live without fear and to speak the truth. As he put it: 'Let us be frank about this: in the past no conformity has ever led to any improvement in the situation.'²²

²² Deathbed Statement (Prague, 8 March 1977).

The Cold War and the transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960–1975

ENNIO DI NOLFO

If one takes a long-term view of the Mediterranean region between 1960 and 1975, it is characterized by its transition from one defined by the European colonial system and menaced by Soviet encroachment to one that became, fifteen years later, a vital conduit of communication and a channel for shipping Middle Eastern oil into a wider world dominated by the United States. The convergence of Mediterranean history with the global dynamics of the Cold War inspires the consideration of the *longue durée*. From the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire had exerted continuous pressure from the Black Sea toward the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union inherited this geostrategic imperative. The messy decolonization of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and the Balkans in the early part of the twentieth century, and subsequently that of European empires in Northern Africa after World War II, added further complexity to the region. As a result, newly independent Mediterranean states faced the problem of developing foreign and commercial policies compatible with their own interests while recognizing the influence of often distant naval powers that dominated their coasts. During the period considered here, the global rivalry of the two superpowers – with the United States always being the strongest, with unprecedented capabilities to project its power – gradually imposed itself on complicated regional dynamics with roots going back to the ancient world.

To a certain extent, the Soviet–American confrontation in the Mediterranean began during World War II. Iosif Stalin bitterly resented the exclusion of the Soviets from the Italian armistice negotiations in August 1943, and their de facto exclusion from the Allied Control Commission for Italy (October 1943 to January 1944).¹ In April 1945, pro-Soviet Titoist partisans

1 B. Arcidiacono, *Le “précédent italien” et les origines de la guerre froide. Les Alliés et l’occupation de l’Italie 1943–1944* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1984).

occupied Trieste, but Stalin was greatly displeased when American pressure forced them to vacate the city, which the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy placed under international (i.e., Western) control. Moreover, Moscow tried unsuccessfully to obtain from the United Nations (UN) a trusteeship in either Tripolitania or Cyrenaica (both in present-day Libya). During these negotiations, the Soviet foreign minister, Viacheslav Molotov, complained that “You [the Western powers] do not want to give us even a corner of the Mediterranean.” This was neither polemical retort nor improvisation, for the Soviet leadership had long coveted the strategic potential of former Italian Mediterranean colonies.²

Some of the Cold War’s early points of tension were thus located in the Mediterranean basin. Soviet designs were checked by the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, which extended US protection to Greece and Turkey and, in general, warned the Soviets off further attempts at influencing Mediterranean affairs. Subsequently, for several years, the Mediterranean seemed set to return to its imperial past, with France and Britain seeking to reimpose their grip on Africa’s northern littoral.³

Yet, throughout the 1950s, it was evident that the Mediterranean remained a priority of Soviet diplomacy. In March 1959, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration countered Soviet plans for the region by deploying medium-range Thor and Jupiter missiles aimed at the USSR in Italy and Turkey.⁴ In the Kremlin, meanwhile, Nikita Khrushchev had, since 1955, been conceiving a new political offensive against Western domination of the Mediterranean. He wanted to play a direct role in Mediterranean affairs, prepared to increase the Soviet naval presence in the region, and tried to establish close ties with North African and Middle Eastern countries.

2 V. O. Pechtanov, “*The Allies are Pressing on You to Break Your Will ...*”. *Foreign Policy Correspondence between Stalin and Molotov and Other Politburo Members. September 1945–December 1946*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Paper No. 26, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999).

3 For a general appraisal of these problems, see E. Calandri, *Il Mediterraneo e la difesa dell’Occidente 1947–1956. Eredità imperiali e logiche di guerra fredda*, 2nd ed. (Florence: Manent, 1997); A. Brogi, *A Question Of Self Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). M. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

4 D. N. Schwartz, *Nato’s Nuclear Dilemma* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1983), 73–74.



2. The Mediterranean Basin

The 1960s: competition intensifies

In the early 1960s, two developments shaped events in the Mediterranean: the Cuban missile crisis and the erosion of the Europeans' position in North Africa. The Cuban crisis was settled by a secret agreement between Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy that obliged the United States to dismantle its missile bases in Turkey and Italy. Although Washington was planning to replace these missiles with Polaris submarines in the near future, the withdrawal of the missiles was a setback for the Atlantic alliance.⁵ At the same time, after meeting the Israeli foreign minister, Golda Meir, Kennedy began preparing to deploy advanced surface-to-air Hawk missiles to Israel, thereby putting an end to a policy of equidistance between the two sides of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The missiles were deployed in 1965, giving Israel a decisive defensive advantage over its Arab neighbors.⁶

Kennedy's decision to link the Jupiter missiles in Turkey to Soviet missiles in Cuba had significant ramifications. Thomas Finletter, the US ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) noted that

Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbols of the alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against a Russian attack on Turkey ... [The] fact that Jupiters are obsolescent and vulnerable does not affect present Turkish thinking. My impression is that the symbolic importance represents a fixed Government view ... Unless we can avoid such patterns, this could foreshadow a dangerous and divisive situation for NATO alliance because other members may wonder if they too might not be asked give up some military capability at the time of the next Soviet manufactured crisis.⁷

Likewise, Robert W. Komer, a key aide to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security adviser, observed that, "from a strictly military point of view these missiles are near irrelevant," but the act of removing them "prematurely" might create negative repercussions. "Our Cuba performance to date," he said, "has greatly bucked up our allies, and increased their confidence we will act if vital US interests are threatened. But they are not

5 Memorandum of conversation, January 16, 1963, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), vol. XIII, *Western Europe and Canada*, 864 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

6 A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: John Murray, 1997).

7 Thomas Finletter to Dean Rusk, October 25, 1962, and Charles Bohlen to Rusk, November 11, 1962; National Security Files (NSF), box 226, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter, *JFKL*).

fully convinced that we will regard other situations than Cuba as involving the same degree for action." It was the old problem, linked to the formulation of Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact, i.e., the problem of American credibility. "However wrong this sensitivity may be," Komer added, "this point is painfully clear. Doubt as to U.S. intentions is at the core of our NATO problems, and we have not swept it away by our recent actions ... The Soviet target is our [whole network of] overseas bases structure, and the degradation of confidence in our will to act."⁸

After Kennedy's death in November 1963, a confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus shook the region. Britain had granted the island independence in 1960, and it was divided into two administrative districts, with Archbishop Makarios III elected president of the new state. However, disputes between Greek majority and Turkish minority inhabitants caused a series of international crises. After Britain's withdrawal from its other bases east of Suez, Cyprus had assumed a new importance to the Atlantic alliance. Both Greece and Turkey separately asked for Washington's help in support of their national kin on the island, while the United States sensed hidden danger in Makarios's neutralist approach. In 1964, fighting broke out between the two communities, prompting Ankara to threaten to invade the island in order to defend the Turkish minority. Makarios rejected an Anglo-American proposal to send a NATO peacekeeping force, but accepted one under UN authority instead. The tensions inherent in the situation strained Turkish-American relations. On the Greek side, where the annexation of Cyprus (*enosis*) was eagerly expected, suspicions of American plans for a division of the island increasingly shaped domestic politics.

Other dramatic changes had taken place in the western part of the Mediterranean during the same period. The policies of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, had a great impact on the region. Although he put an end to the war between the Algerian National Liberation Front and France in March 1962, this conflict bequeathed a series of problems. The sudden influx of almost one million white refugees was manageable by dint of France's continued economic expansion. But with the independence of Algeria on July 5, the northwestern coast of the Mediterranean was now fully decolonized, as Spain had left Morocco in March 1956 (except for the harbors of Ceuta and Melilla). There was a vacuum of power in the region.

⁸ R. W. Komer, memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, November 12, 1962, NSF, box 226, JFKL.

Freed from the Algerian nightmare, de Gaulle prepared a global strategy, premised not only upon French resources, but also upon an evolving European Community. His plans had significant consequences for the Western position in the Mediterranean. On April 27, 1964, the French military representative in NATO's Maritime Standing Group, Admiral Max Douguet, announced that French naval officers would "no longer serve in NATO naval headquarters or in units under non-French naval command." According to the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, the French decision struck "at the heart of NATO defense system." Rusk and other US officials, such as Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, feared that French action might invite Soviet military incursions into the Mediterranean.⁹ These fears mounted when de Gaulle, in March 1966, said that he intended to withdraw French forces from the Atlantic integrated army. Although this did not mean that France was abandoning the Atlantic alliance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suspected that de Gaulle was seeking to exploit the growing crisis between Israel and the Arab countries to project French influence among Muslim countries bordering the Mediterranean.¹⁰

The American reaction to de Gaulle's decision reflected Washington's alarm at the political and military changes in the Mediterranean region. The Soviets were exploiting anti-Western and anticolonial feelings and nurturing new political, economic, and military relationships. To Syria and Egypt, Moscow had supplied economic and financial aid with the hope of securing future naval facilities. Algeria quickly became another target of Soviet ambitions. Libya, too, although leaning towards neutralism, was open to Soviet influence, especially after Muammar al-Qaddafi's coup in 1969.

These developments, in combination with the growth of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, engendered pessimism in Washington. While the United States was entangled in Southeast Asia and the West Europeans were pre-occupied with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) the Soviets were becoming serious political and military players in the Mediterranean region. Washington worried that none of its regional allies could be counted on in the event of military conflict. Turkey was bitterly

⁹ "NATO Ministerial Meeting." December 1964, and "Comments by Secretary McNamara on Issues and Questions Raised by the Progress Report of the Defence Planning Committee," December 16, 1964, NSF, box 34, International Meetings and Travel File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBJL).

¹⁰ W. W. Rostow to L. B. Johnson, Washington, June 16, 1967, and enclosure CIA Intelligence Information Cable, box 17, vol. 31, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Memos to the Presidents, NSF, LBJL. See also M. Vaisse, *La Grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 615–47.

disappointed by the outcome of the Cuban and Cypriot crises; Syria and Egypt were at best neutral or more likely pro-Soviet; and the pro-Western countries, Tunisia and Morocco, were motivated principally by the exigencies of regional rivalries. At the same time, Franco's Spain was entering an uncertain phase of transition, and France seemed to be a diffident ally. Italy was probably the country closest to the United States in this period, but politics in Rome were increasingly shaped by the influence of leftist parties. Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia was neutral, Greece was disappointed by America's response to the Cyprus situation, and newly independent Malta was ruled by a pro-Qaddafi government. In the entire Mediterranean basin, Israel alone stood out for its dependence on American assistance and its willingness to cooperate with Washington's policies. By the mid- to late 1960s, therefore, the United States had reason to be worried. Despite the efforts of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the retreat of French and British power left the door ajar to the advance of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean.

Crises in the Middle East and Southern Europe

When considering the impact of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war on the Mediterranean system, the main problem to address is whether the conflict was instigated by the Israeli government in order to weaken the Arabs, or whether it was a response to a carefully crafted Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian plan to strike at both Israeli and US power in the region. There is some evidence that the Soviets were prepared to accept or even abet the destruction of Israel in order to cement their newly acquired influence with Arab states.¹¹ At the end of February 1967, about forty Soviet naval vessels had been moved from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and, on June 4, they received orders for full battle alert. The US ambassador in Moscow believed that the Kremlin's objective was "to transform the Arab/Israeli struggle into a showdown between Communists and anti-Communists for control of the Middle East, and the Soviets [were] succeeding. If Nasser wins this one, monarchies and western oil interests will go."¹²

Nevertheless, the government in Tel Aviv was not wholly innocent. Although not preparing their forces for an offensive before the crisis became acute, the Israelis had been receiving American increased missile assistance

11 See I. Ginor, "The Cold War's Longest Cover up: How and Why the USSR Instigated the 1967 War," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 7, 3 (September 2003), 34–59.

12 Lewellyn Thompson, American Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary of State, May 28, 1967, confidential, Department of State incoming telegram 029479. "Middle East Crisis," vol. II, box 105, Country File, NSF, LBJL.

since the first Hawk battery was set up around Dimona in 1965; research for developing a nuclear weapon had been underway since the mid-1950s.¹³ The Israeli high command was aware of Egyptian troop movements and decided to act without informing the United States. The Israelis even attacked the US naval intelligence vessel, the *Liberty*, either by mistake or to hinder US intelligence gathering in the conflict.¹⁴

The devastating Israeli aerial blitz and its swift and comprehensive military victory in the Six Day War was a humiliating defeat for the Egyptians and their Soviets backers. During the war, the United States maintained a very restrained public position in order to avoid recriminations from its oil-rich Muslim allies, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet it was increasingly evident that, with Moscow supplying Egypt's military buildup, Israel was abandoning its neutral attitude and becoming a forward base for US interests in the Mediterranean.¹⁵

In hindsight, therefore, the Six Day War was a decisive occasion for an American reappraisal of the importance of NATO's southern flank. In the midst of the conflict, the State Department urged Washington's permanent representative to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, to remind European allies of their common interest in the long-term stability in the Middle East region. Cleveland was instructed to emphasize how vital the Middle East region was in view of NATO's need for overflight privileges, sea communications, and oil resources. This did not mean that NATO should intervene directly in the Arab–Israeli conflict, but it was necessary to create a consultative mechanism inside NATO to facilitate the discreet coordination of Middle East policies even when member governments desired to avoid public controversy.¹⁶

The totality of Israel's military victory changed the fundamentals of regional politics. Gamal Abdel Nasser's resounding defeat forced him into greater dependence on the Soviet Union. For its part, Moscow assessed the Arab–Israeli crisis in terms of a wider global strategy, and saw it as "a confrontation between progressive Arab regimes and the vanguard of world imperialism, Israel."¹⁷ Before 1967, the Soviets viewed regional dynamics from

13 A. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 268, 470.

14 The question of the attack against the *Liberty* has not yet been fully clarified. See J. Ennes, Jr. *Assault on the Liberty: The Story of the Attack on an Intelligence Ship* (New York: Random House, 1979); A. Jay Cristol, *The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), 126–35.

15 S. L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict: Making American Middle East Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 94–314.

16 Dean Rusk to Harlan Cleveland, June 8, 1967, *FRUS*, 1974–1968, vol. XIII, 612–15.

17 I. Ginor, "Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes," *Cold War History*, 3 (2002), 127–56.

a geopolitical calculus, but after the war, they injected an ideological fervor into their Mediterranean policy. They strengthened their naval fleet and provided more aid to African and Arab countries, thereby suggesting that Leonid Brezhnev and his comrades wanted the Soviet Union to become an even more powerful force in the Mediterranean. From 1967 on, the Soviets embraced anticolonialism with renewed fervor claiming they were fighting for the liberation of all peoples oppressed by imperialism and neo-imperialism. Since Nasser was a leader of the anticolonial movement in the Third World, the Kremlin overlooked the fact that he outlawed the Egyptian Communist Party. The Soviets willingly collaborated with dubious allies of world Communism such as Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria in opposing Israel.

There was, however, a flaw in this plan, the importance of which was soon to appear. During the 1967 war, the Soviet government severed its diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and failed to grasp the significance of Israel now occupying Sinai and the Golan Heights. These facts could be changed only by another war or by diplomacy. The first option was not likely to prove successful, and the second could not occur so long as the Kremlin eschewed direct negotiations with the Israelis. Although severing relations with Israel proved to be a serious miscalculation and although Egypt's defeat reflected poorly on the merits of Soviet military assistance, it seemed for a while that Moscow had profited from the Six Day War by solidifying its position in the Arab world.

Profound changes took place in Israel and Egypt, the two most important states of the Middle East. The extension of the territory that Israel controlled encouraged the idea of creating a greater Israeli state. This vision did not take into account a newly aroused Palestinian nationalism, embodied in the growing importance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Yasser Arafat. Meanwhile, the defeat had a deep psychological and political impact on Nasser, who suddenly resigned from power, only to be compelled by public demonstrations to reverse his decision. Yet his physical health deteriorated, and in September 1970 he died of a heart attack. Anwar Sadat, his friend and successor, inherited a difficult domestic situation and a rapidly changing international environment. He quickly realized the benefits and the liabilities of Soviet protection.¹⁸

Elsewhere in North Africa, Tunisia and Morocco were kept in the Western orbit by two pro-Western leaders, Habib Bourguiba and King Hassan II, but

18 D. Hopwood, *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1981* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 180 ff.

Libya and Algeria became more radical in the late 1960s and possessed significant energy resources. In 1967, Algeria's Houari Boumedienne became the main sponsor of Palestinian nationalism, as well as a supporter of other revolutionary movements around the world. On September 1, 1969, Captain Qaddafi deposed King Idris of Libya and established a rigid "Islamic socialist" dictatorship. Both Algeria and Libya pursued socialist economic policies and nationalized their oil and gas reserves at the expense of Western companies. Qaddafi also seized control of the US Wheeler Air Force base and he and Boumedienne ostentatiously engaged in a non-aligned policy that inclined toward the Soviets, while continuing – much to American irritation – to work with France.¹⁹

In the Balkans, schisms within the Communist world persisted, but the West was unable to capitalize on them. Although Tito and Khrushchev improved Soviet–Yugoslav relations, they increasingly alienated Enver Hoxa's regime in Albania. After a bitter attack by Khrushchev, Hoxa decided to denounce Soviet "revisionism." In December 1961, Moscow broke diplomatic relations, and Albania became an isolated Chinese ally in Europe.²⁰

Bickering inside the Communist world was little consolation to the United States as each of Washington's southern European allies was plagued by internal unrest. Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal gave the United States cause for concern. All of these countries, moreover, were exposed politically and economically to the turmoil in the Middle East. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean power, the polarization of the Middle East by the 1967 war, and the radicalisation of economic policy in much of the Arab world combined to magnify the vulnerability of US strategic and economic interests in the Mediterranean region.

In Turkey, militarily the most powerful US ally in the eastern Mediterranean, politics remained unstable after a military coup in 1960. The civilian governments that followed were a series of unstable government coalitions alternating between the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel on the right and the Republican People's Party of İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit on the left. The economy was left to founder. After another coup in 1971, the military continued to have a distinct say in the country's politics. The lack of political stability and the poor economy created increasing tension between the extremes in Turkish politics, with open clashes between leftists and nationalists,

19 M. Cricco, *Il Petrolio dei Senussi: Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna in Libia dall'indipendenza a Gheddafi (1949–1973)* (Florence: Polistampa, 2002), 164–223.

20 B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, 2 vols. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. II, *The Twentieth Century*, 392–93.

while in the east the Kurdish population began campaigning for greater national rights.

Greece continued to be a weak link in the NATO alliance throughout this period. Anti-Communism had been a salient feature of Greek foreign policy since the Civil War of the 1940s,²¹ but the fragility of the Greek state became clear after the electoral success of the leftist Progressive Centre Union Party (EK), led by Andreas Papandreou, in 1964. Escalating tension between the left and right wings of Greek politics culminated in the military coup of April 1967. The new strong man, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, was as anti-Communist as can be and had longstanding contacts with the CIA, but his regime's regressive approach to civil liberties soon became an embarrassment both for the Americans and for their main European partners. Worse, Papadopoulos did nothing to ease tensions with Turkey, which had been exacerbated by his civilian predecessor, thereby presenting the Soviets with golden opportunities for propaganda victories and for playing on the ongoing feud on the southern flank of NATO.

The Iberian peninsula's right-wing dictatorships had been an even greater source of embarrassment for the West since the end of World War II. In Spain, the Fascist-inspired dictatorship of General Francisco Franco had – in spite of newfound economic growth from the mid-1960s on – never attained general legitimacy at home or abroad. While having a military agreement with the United States, Franco was never able to elbow his way into the new Europe that was coming into being two decades after the war ended. For Washington, though, a main concern was what would happen after Franco, born in 1892, faded from the scene. Some policymakers feared that Spain would fall apart in ethnic and political strife when the general's chosen successor, the young and untested Bourbon prince Juan Carlos, took over. Although Basque separatists assassinated the prime minister in December 1973, the government did not crumble and the transition continued, although how it would end remained unpredictable in the early 1970s.

Political change in Portugal was even more ominous for American interests. The end was approaching for the long-running dictatorship of Antonio Salazar, a staunch conservative inspired by Fascist ideologies and a rigid defender of the Portuguese Empire, who spent up to 40 percent of the limited national revenue on the preservation of colonial possessions in Africa. In 1968, Salazar suffered a stroke and was succeeded by the conservative Marcelo Caetano, who seemed even more clueless than his predecessor about how to

21 See Svetozar Rajak's chapter in volume 1.

end the colonial wars and get the economy in Western Europe's poorest country on its feet. His limited reforms satisfied very few Portuguese, even within the army, where many officers were disgusted with having to fight unwinnable wars in Africa while the country deteriorated at home. By the early 1970s, some of these officers began contacting the illegal left-wing opposition to Caetano's regime.

The major European powers did not buttress US efforts to counter the worsening trends in the Mediterranean. Dependent on oil and gas reserves in the hands of Arab states, Western European governments sought to cooperate with their former colonies in ways that would preserve their interests as much as possible. The Yaoundé Agreement of 1964 between the EEC and eighteen African states was designed to create an area of special economic cooperation and therefore caused some concern in the United States where it was seen as creating a preferential economic zone from which the United States was excluded. Washington feared that members of the EEC might form a closed market, protected by a high tariff wall, that might at least in some ways include their former colonies.

France and Italy took care not to alienate the Arab states on whose oil their economies depended and who constituted an important export market. It was also a natural instinct for the Mediterranean nations, Spain included, to preserve their relationship with the southern shore, which was increasingly the source of substantial immigration. Under de Gaulle, Paris reversed France's pro-Israel tilt of the 1950s and assumed a diplomatic posture more friendly to the Arabs. Likewise, Italy began to assume a more ambiguous position. This shift was due in part to the influence of the Socialist Party, whose role in the Italian government had grown since it broke with the Communists in 1956. In October 1970, the British ambassador in Rome sent London the following synopsis of Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean:

Peace in the Middle East is a major Italian interest, though those responsible for Italian foreign policy recognise that there is little which they can do by themselves to bring this nearer. But they do not think that peace is round the corner. They will be careful meanwhile not to become too identified with the Americans in order to avoid damaging their position with the Arabs. For this reason, and because of domestic political pressure from the Left, the Italians will continue to fight shy of any increase in Nato's Mediterranean role ... Despite this restrictive definition, there is no question at present of the Italian Government wishing Nato to abandon its principal bases at Naples. The Nato embrace may sometimes be an embarrassment ... but no Italian

Government, foreseeable up to the 1973 elections, at least, is likely to wish to escape from it.²²

In sum, from Washington's perspective, prospects for the Mediterranean had taken a real turn for the worse during the late 1960s. The Arab-Israeli crisis, culminating in the 1967 war, had given the Soviets an entrée as super-power patron to counter US support for Israel. At the same time, Moscow's moralistic and ideological approach to the region appealed to regimes in Cairo, Tripoli, Algiers, and even Belgrade. This rhetorical campaign capitalized on the differing economic agendas of the Western powers and highlighted their awkward reliance on the dictatorships of southern Europe.

Oil, power politics, and democratization (1973–1975)

Notwithstanding the difficulties the United States faced in Vietnam, Washington embarked on a strategic counteroffensive. "Neither Europe nor we can afford these days to be provincial in our thinking," wrote John McCloy to Walt Rostow, President Lyndon Johnson's national security adviser, on August 11, 1967.²³ Provincial they were not, because in these months they set forth a policy to roll back Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and to transform the sea into an "American Lake." Faced with European unwillingness to adopt military measures, the State Department recommended "modest, non-provocative political-military responses." It also decided to resume military aid to Greece despite the internal political situation of the country.²⁴

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968, and the election of Richard M. Nixon as US president in November created additional opportunities for the American counteroffensive. The invasion of Czechoslovakia shocked European public opinion. Although NATO governments had embraced a common policy of détente at their ministerial meeting in 1968, Nixon primarily viewed détente as a strategy "for enabling America to regain the diplomatic initiative while the war in Vietnam was still in progress."²⁵ Moreover, the American president was prepared to move ahead

22 The British ambassador in Italy, Sir Patrick Hancock, to the Foreign Office, October 19, 1970, PRO, FCO, 33/1094.

23 J. J. McCloy to W. W. Rostow, August 11, 1967, LBJL, NS, AF, NATO, General, box 36, vol. 5, No. 8.

24 Paper prepared in the Department of State, "The Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting of Nato" [no date], *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XIII, 712–16; Memorandum for the Record, "Summary of NSC Meeting on Nato," June 19, 1968, *ibid.*, 716–18.

25 H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 713.

unilaterally.²⁶ For him, the Atlantic alliance was more a formal structure than a real cooperative body in the search for solutions to the problems of the Mediterranean region. When he embarked on his offensive in the Mediterranean, three concerns shaped his policy: the need to have access to reasonably priced oil, the threat of Communism in the moderate Arab countries, and the state of relations with Israel.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia became convinced that they could not defeat Israel militarily and were inclined toward compromise.²⁷ Yet this compromise could only occur in a wholly different psychological environment than the one that prevailed after the 1967 war. A deal with Israel could be reached only if the Arabs could negotiate from a more advantageous position. Sadat was convinced that oil could be a powerful tool for gaining Western support; he also believed that dependency on Soviet economic and military aid constrained his options. In the early 1970s, he reduced his military ties with the Soviet Union while discussing with the Saudis the use of the oil weapon to force the West into a more flexible attitude.

When the Yom Kippur War erupted in October 1973, Egyptian successes in the first phase of the conflict caused Washington to fret over the extent of Soviet support, precipitating a partial mobilization of US forces in order to send a message to the Kremlin. Yet the Egyptian president's aim was not actually to win the war, which he knew to be unrealistic given the danger of sparking a wider international conflict. Rather, his objective was to achieve enough on the battlefield to erase the Egyptian (and Arab) inferiority complex vis-à-vis Israel, thus setting up a new psychological balance in the negotiations that were likely to follow.²⁸ The Soviets, in fact, were prepared to resupply his army immediately, but Sadat did not want it. Although Israeli forces managed to reverse their fortunes and gain the upper hand militarily in the war's second phase, the situation was transformed. The Egyptians shattered the aura of Israeli invincibility, thereby making it possible to put the diplomatic option on the table.

The Paris conference of December 1973 was the first occasion when Americans, Soviets, Egyptians, Jordanians, and Israeli representatives met to settle the problems of the region peacefully. At that time, Europe faced severe oil shortages, with price hikes instituted by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) threatening economic growth. EEC members

²⁶ For more on Nixon's policies, see Robert D. Schulzinger's chapter in this volume.

²⁷ See Douglas Little's chapter in this volume.

²⁸ W. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 428–34.

were unable to agree on a common approach to the oil-producing countries, and Franco-American tensions were exacerbated by the harsh clash between Henry Kissinger and the French foreign minister, Michel Jobert. In this situation – with their role in Middle East affairs seemingly acknowledged – Soviet leaders believed they were on the verge of a substantial international victory. In reality, however, the fragility of their diplomatic position was revealed: the absence of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv meant that only the Americans could deal with the Egyptians and the Israelis at the same time. Kissinger's diplomacy, which brokered the Egyptian–Israeli negotiations, demonstrated the restoration of American primacy – and Soviet haplessness – in Mediterranean affairs.

On January 18, 1974, Egyptians and Israelis signed a ceasefire agreement that provided for the withdrawal of the Israelis to 30 kilometres east of the Suez Canal. Kissinger's strategy was well defined, as he explained to a panel of US experts before the negotiations began:

We can reduce Soviet influence in the area and can get the oil embargo raised if we can deliver a moderate program and we are going to do it. If not, the Arabs will be driven back to the Soviets, the oil will be lost, we will have the whole world against us. We must prove to the Arabs that they are better off dealing with us on a moderate program than dealing with the Russians.²⁹

His strategy succeeded: in 1974, Sadat reestablished official relations with the United States, and two years later he renounced the treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. It was a stunning changing of sides by Moscow's most important ally in the region.

Sadat's realignment coincided with a wider deterioration of the Soviet position in the Mediterranean. Cairo's dumping of the Kremlin did much to discredit the Soviets in the eyes of other Arab states. The USSR continued to supply Syria, Algeria, and Libya with substantial quantities of military *matériel*, but the illusion was shattered that, in times of crisis, Moscow could match the Americans diplomatically and strategically. Henceforth, Moscow would pay more for less credibility in the Arab capitals.

On the northern shore of the Mediterranean, the Western long-term strategic position proved to be more successful than that of the Soviets. Political developments in Europe's dictatorships – Greece, Spain, and Portugal – validated the liberal project of the Atlantic alliance and the attraction of European integration, while the implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the invasion of

29 H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA.: Little, Brown, 1982), 205–27, 532ff.



16. The 1974 coup in Cyprus and the Turkish intervention that followed split the island in two. Here a Greek-Cypriot woman is looking for a relative lost in the fighting.

Czechoslovakia in 1968 ended the Soviet allure in Europe. Greece's right-wing government had been an element of weakness in the Western system and became even more of a burden after Colonel Dimitrios Ioannides took power in another coup in 1973. The strongly nationalist Ioannides helped organize a coup against the government of Cyprus in 1974, aiming at the unification of that island with Greece.

But the Cyprus coup backfired after Turkey sent in its military in July 1974 to force a division of the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Despairing of the incompetence of the Greek junta and fearful of the return of the Cypriot government under Archbishop Makarios III, whom they considered lukewarm toward the West, the US government acquiesced in the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the area in spite of the massive displacement of Cypriots from both parts of the island that followed. The Greek junta was ousted from power soon after the Cyprus debacle. The old liberal leader, Constantine Karamanlis, then formed a new government which slowly restored democracy to Greece, reestablishing confidence with the Western allies and joining the EEC in 1981.³⁰

The runaway inflation and the economic downturn caused by the 1973 oil crisis proved the end of the Portuguese dictatorship. On the morning of April

30 C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (London: Granada, 1985).



17. Mário Soares, the leader of the Portuguese Socialist Party, campaigning in Lisbon in 1975. Soares's party was supported by most of the West European Left.

25, 1974, a group of officers calling themselves the Movement of the Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas – MFA) took power in Lisbon in a bloodless coup. The Carnation Revolution, which they initiated, aimed at a full-scale withdrawal from Africa and a gradual move toward full democracy guided by the MFA. In reality, the officers soon lost control of the situation in the colonies, with a civil war breaking out in the most important of them, Angola.³¹ The collapse of the empire also meant a large influx of refugees into an already impoverished home country.

By late 1974, it seemed as if Portugal was heading toward political chaos, with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) as the best-organized political force. In early 1975, right-wing officers launched a failed coup, which seemed to put the MFA radicals and the the hardline Communists in the political driver's seat. But through hard campaigning and substantial help from a motley group of international helpers – including the US government and various West European socialists and social-democrats – the Socialist Party under Mário Soares became the biggest party after the April 1975 elections. In November 1975, moderate army officers disbanded the MFA organization.

31 See Piero Gleijeses's chapter in this volume.

The leader of the centre-right within the military, Colonel António Ramalho Eanes, was elected president in June 1976. Eanes invited Soares to become premier in the first democratically elected Portuguese government for more than fifty years.

This progression of events had a significant impact upon the Cold War in the Mediterranean. From a strategic point of view, Portuguese air bases and ports were vital for NATO's forces on the continent. Even more important was control of Madeira because it protected the North Atlantic routes to Gibraltar, while the Azores provided refuelling facilities for rapid deployment of US troops to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. As a result, when the MFA had begun cooperating with the Moscow-oriented Portuguese Communists, there had been deep-seated alarm in NATO circles. Soares's government did much to calm these fears. He kept Portugal within NATO, while moving quickly toward membership in the EEC, which the country achieved in 1986.

In Spain, when Franco died on November 20, 1975, the country had already entered a period of economic growth, and this eased the political transition and strengthened the Western position in the Mediterranean. At first, it was very unclear which direction the young king, Juan Carlos, would move in. He appointed an old Franco supporter, Carlos Arias Navarro, as his prime minister, and himself swore allegiance to Franco's principles and the political movement the general had founded, the *Movimiento Nacional* (National Movement). The political opposition – including the well-organized and Euro-Communist oriented Spanish Communist Party – prepared for a long struggle ahead.

Soon, however, it became clear that Juan Carlos was ready to move beyond the confines of his mentor's policies. In the summer of 1976, during a visit to Washington, the king made clear his commitment to rapid democratization and appealed for American support. On his return home, he replaced Navarro with the younger Adolfo Suárez as prime minister. Together, the king and Suárez began to dismantle Franco's system methodically and move toward free elections, releasing political prisoners and legalizing the political opposition as they went along. The enormous outpouring of popular support for the young king made the transformation possible; it was Juan Carlos who became the guarantor of a democratic Spain in alliance with the United States and Western Europe.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Italian Communist Party had been beset with internal debates. A long period of disillusionment ended only when Enrico Berlinguer became general secretary in 1972 and began to

construct the Euro-Communist initiative.³² In 1973, for the first time, Berlinguer spoke in favor of the Atlantic alliance. Although terrorists from both the left wing and right wing had the country under siege and the liberal center seemed to be collapsing, something new was happening in Italian politics. In 1978, the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro, the head of the Christian Democrats, marked the moment of greatest peril. But the government succeeded in crushing terrorism without impairing democracy, and a new consensus emerged regarding Italy's appropriate place in the Western bloc.³³

France also became more amenable to Washington's wishes than it had been during the presidency of de Gaulle. After the general resigned in 1969 and died the following year, his successor, Georges Pompidou, did not share the anti-American spirit of his predecessor. Although a fervent Gaullist, Pompidou realized that his predecessor's ambitious foreign policy, including the pursuit of leadership in Europe and Africa, aroused substantial public opposition and had been costly. Pompidou sought to cooperate with *les Anglo-Saxons* in Europe. He reconsidered Britain's application for membership in the EEC and collaborated with Washington and London in the Mediterranean.³⁴ After Algeria nationalized its oil and gas reserves in 1971, France was as vulnerable to OPEC's diplomacy and as dependent as the rest of Western Europe on America's arbitration of Middle Eastern affairs.

The Americanization of the Mediterranean

During the period dealt with in this chapter, roughly 1960–1975, there was no direct confrontation in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Moscow and Washington began to cooperate on broader disarmament issues and they negotiated a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as well as a series of other agreements.³⁵ Yet, it was also a period of rivalry in the Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union ultimately suffered substantial political setbacks after making serious advances up to the late 1960s. In the aftermath of the 1967

32 See Silvio Pons's chapter in volume III.

33 C. Sterling, *The Terror Network: Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981).

34 See N. Piers Ludlow's chapter in this volume. G. H. Soutou, *La Guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflit Est Ouest, 1943–1990*, (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 470–77.

35 See Robert D. Schulzinger's chapter and Marc Trachtenberg's chapter in this volume.

Arab–Israeli war, the Kremlin had a chance to solidify its relations with the oil-producing Arab states. At the same time, Moscow could capitalize diplomatically on America's association with Israel and the US collaboration with European fascist, authoritarian, and neocolonial regimes. Soviet leaders hoped to align themselves with the exploited "South" against a rapacious "North." But the Soviets miscalculated and their ambitions collapsed. They mistakenly severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and weakened their diplomatic leverage. They overestimated the ideological affinity between themselves and Arab nationalists and did not have the economic power and geopolitical leverage to exert significant influence. In effect, the United States was able to combine its "hard" and its "soft" power to regain its position of supremacy in the Middle East. The Western European states, meanwhile, were unable to adopt a unified Mediterranean policy due to their conflicting agendas and imperial legacies. Their response to the Arab–Israeli crisis was confused and reflected their vulnerability to the Arab oil weapon. The United States alone was strong enough to exert its will in the region diplomatically, economically, and politically.

Henry Kissinger's declaring 1973 to be the "year of Europe" has often been met with criticism. But although transatlantic relations were at a low ebb and although US actions often antagonized its NATO partners, the accession of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark to the EEC opened the way for the subsequent inclusion of southern Europe's former dictatorships. No longer did the West have a vulnerable southern flank. Seeing the region as one integrated whole helps us understand the significance of the transformations that took place: the Soviet Union lost its position in the Middle East, and Spain, Portugal, and Greece transformed themselves politically, strengthened democratic institutions, and became a bulwark against Soviet designs. The Cold War entered a new phase. With the Mediterranean solidly in the US orbit, Africa became the new battlefield.

The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975

MICHAEL E. LATHAM

In 1958, only one year after his country gained independence from Britain, the Ghanaian prime minister, Kwame Nkrumah, delivered a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In addition to a resolute anti-imperialism, he emphasized that two related imperatives would play a crucial role in shaping the orientation of Africa toward the wider world. First, the tremendous “industrial and military power concentrated behind the two great powers in the Cold War” demanded that the new states of Africa pursue a policy of non-alignment. In Africa, Nkrumah insisted, “the opportunities of health and education and a wider vision which other nations take for granted are barely within reach of our people.” To preserve their impoverished continent from devastating violence, African nations would have to remain apart from the Cold War’s military alliances, rivalries, and strife. Second, Africa would have to seek dramatically accelerated development. Colonial overlords had failed to deliver promised advances, but “now comes our response. We cannot tell our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do, they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more. And they will abandon us, too, if we do not in reasonable measure respond to their hopes. We have modernize.”¹

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the goals of non-alignment and rapid development shaped the ambitions of a wide range of postcolonial leaders. From the Asian–African Conference at Bandung (1955) through the Non-Aligned Conferences at Belgrade (1961) and Cairo (1964), figures like Indonesia’s Ahmed Sukarno, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Algeria’s Ahmed Ben Bella, and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser articulated a shared vision of anti-imperialism, disarmament, accelerated development, expanded trade, and economic cooperation among those emerging from colonial domination. Above all, they

1 Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 355–56.

rejected the ideological rigidity of the Cold War and insisted on the right to define freely their own paths to progress in a world of different social systems. As the official declaration from the Belgrade conference put it, “aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their will.”²

That hope, however, would go unrealized. For the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Cold War was a *fundamentally* ideological conflict, a struggle over the direction of global history and the definition of modernity itself. At the very same moment that the first generation of postcolonial leaders articulated their ambitions for non-aligned, self-determined development, each of the Cold War’s main adversaries approached the phenomenon of decolonization through hegemonic, universalistic models of social change. In that context, Third World elites made a variety of difficult choices. Some, attracted to the Soviet Union’s impressive record of industrialization and eager to centralize their authority in strong state and party structures, sought ties to Moscow. Others gravitated toward the vastly superior economic resources and development funds offered by the United States and international financial bodies. A final group of states, wary of the military alliances that were often linked to development aid, drew selectively from the different camps, played the superpowers off against each other, and tried to maintain an independent course. In the ideologies through which American, Soviet, and Chinese policymakers interpreted the world, decolonization expanded the scope of the Cold War and created new fields in which the struggle over the acceleration and destination of global change would be fought. In the upheavals of Third World revolution, each of the major powers came to perceive crucial test cases in which liberal capitalism and diverse forms of state socialism would engage in a contest of universal and lasting significance. As a result, places like Cuba, Vietnam, Indonesia, Congo, and Angola all became points of intense Cold War conflict.

Cold War interventions in the Third World would also become more lethal over time. In the early 1960s, the major Cold War adversaries approached the postcolonial world with striking ambitions. Despite the obvious differences in their objectives, US, Soviet, and Chinese policymakers all believed that

2 “Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non Aligned Countries,” in Henry M. Christman (ed.), *Neither East Nor West: The Basic Documents of Non Alignment* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1973), 57.

decolonization provided them with a moment of profound opportunity, a window in which they might draw on their own historical experience to identify the crucial levers of social change and transform the future of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. By the mid-1960s, however, their expectations became increasingly frustrated. The Third World, they learned, was not nearly as malleable as they had anticipated. American policymakers found themselves unable to promote a modernizing turn to liberal, democratic capitalism in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Soviet leaders faced growing tensions with Cuba and watched in dismay as governments they supported in Southeast Asia and Africa were overthrown. Chinese policymakers, finally, witnessed diplomatic reversals in Africa and the erosion of their relationship with North Vietnam.

The result, by the late 1960s, was a reorientation in Soviet, American, and Chinese policies that only amplified the ideological polarization of the Third World. As the first postcolonial governments were replaced by repressive military dictatorships or radical Marxist regimes, the space for nationalist elites to pursue viable, non-aligned development diminished. By the middle of the decade, US policymakers increasingly shifted from approaches stressing modernization and accelerated development to a greater reliance on direct coercion and military force. The Soviet Union also turned from a pluralistic embrace of anticolonial movements toward a more rigid insistence on Marxist-Leninist party-building. China, meanwhile, emerged from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution willing to support nearly any cause in the campaign against its Soviet rival. By the late 1960s, superpower-supported violence escalated dramatically. The struggle to determine the course of the Third World helped destroy the foundations for *détente*, but the greatest damage was done by its contribution to a tragic pattern of expanded militarization, civil war, and human suffering across some of the poorest regions of the globe.

Ideology and the acceleration of history

As many historians have argued, the policies that the major powers directed toward the Third World were shaped by a complex range of factors. Evaluations of strategic demands, material and economic objectives, domestic political forces, bureaucratic politics, and the variables of personality all played significant roles. Yet the fact that countries such as Vietnam and Angola, on the distant periphery, far from national borders and vital markets, became points of intense superpower conflict also suggests the value of taking ideology

seriously. The Cold War, as one scholar explains, was driven by “fundamentally incompatible conceptions of the organization of political, economic, and social life ... Indeed, power came in large measure to be defined in ideological terms, gains or losses during the Cold War being measured by the global advance or retreat of regime types to an extent that would confound an orthodox realist.”³ Ideology alone certainly did not wholly determine super-power policies. But as David Engerman argues, recognizing its significance can provide us with a better understanding of the way policymakers defined and pursued a broad range of national interests.⁴

The American, Soviet, and Chinese conceptions of security at home were also intimately tied to the expansion and preservation of their social systems abroad. As European empires collapsed, US policymakers feared that Communists would prey on conditions of poverty and instability to subvert fragile new states. They also worried that a failure to counter such designs with a compelling response of their own would do immense damage to American credibility, emboldening radical aggressors, disheartening allies, and jeopardizing the domestic political consensus needed to support what John F. Kennedy famously called a “long twilight struggle.” By the early 1960s, Soviet and Chinese strategists had also concluded that the Third World was an arena of crucial significance. While Soviet capabilities did not enable the same reach, Nikita Khrushchev determined that the rapid decolonization of the world had created a moment in which the “transition to socialism” might be promoted abroad in ways that would help secure the historical foundations of the Soviet state. Mao Zedong, profoundly impressed by the global anti-imperial struggle, also concluded that “only when China’s superior moral position in the world had been recognized by other peoples would the consolidation of his continuous revolution’s momentum at home be assured.”⁵ These ideologies certainly did not preclude Cold War powers from pursuing more pragmatic policies, nor did they remain fixed in stone. At different points in time each government supported regimes or movements that had little interest in their own social ideals. As this chapter will explain, these ideologies also changed over time. At the high tide of decolonization, however, they played crucial roles as conceptual frameworks through which policymakers made sense of a rapidly changing world and sought to act upon it.

3 Nigel Gould Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 27 (2003): 195.

4 See David C. Engerman’s chapter in volume I.

5 Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15.

Central to the thinking of policymakers in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing as well was a common tendency to interpret decolonization as evidence of history's global direction. While each power defined that direction in sharply different terms, they all concluded that history was ultimately on their side, and that its course might be profoundly accelerated. In the United States, the ideology of modernization was especially significant in this regard. From the late 1940s through the mid-1960s, American social scientists drew on older, Enlightenment assumptions to frame theories defining a fundamental transition from "traditional" worlds shaped by the contours of family, ascribed status, religion, and fatalism to "modern" orders characterized by individualism, achieved status, rationalism, and scientific confidence in the promise of progress. Sociologists such as Talcott Parsons and Daniel Lerner, political scientists like Gabriel Almond and Lucian Pye, and economists like Max Millikan and Walt Rostow all concluded that the world was moving along a single, universal trajectory in which the impact of Western ideals and technology was creating a "revolution of rising expectations." By positioning the liberal, democratic, capitalist United States at the endpoint of their historical scale, they also gave this framework a decidedly encouraging cast. The United States, theorists maintained, had experienced the world's first "modern" revolution, and others might now follow in its wake.

That conclusion went down well in an American culture that had long defined its own history in prophetic, regenerative terms. It also fit well in the Cold War context. Social scientists, working on projects often funded by the state itself, were quick to point out the strategic significance of their work. While necessary and beneficial, they explained, the transition toward modernity could also be disruptive and chaotic. Societies caught in the anxiety and uncertainty generated by the erosion of traditional worldviews often sought new forms of belonging, substitutions for their fallen faiths, and shortcuts to modernity, and that fact kept the field open for the dangers of Communist subversion. The Communists, as Rostow argued, were "scavengers of the transitional process," a malevolent force that preyed on societies at their most vulnerable moment. But the United States did not have to stand idly on history's sidelines. Using the tools of foreign aid, development planning, and technical assistance, the United States could dramatically accelerate the passage of traditional societies through a crucial "take-off" toward the modern endpoint. By accelerating the great transition, it could slam shut the narrow window of opportunity that Communist aggressors sought to exploit and produce a safer, liberal, more democratic world of thriving capitalist societies.

The Kennedy administration took those ideas to heart and prominent social scientists took on significant roles in US policymaking. But their theories were probably most compelling because they crystallized a set of core assumptions about the transformative power of American ideals that was already widely shared among Cold War liberals. As Kennedy himself argued before the US Congress, “We live at a very special moment in history. The whole southern half of the world – Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia – are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence and modernizing their old ways of life.” The world’s “new nations,” moreover, needed American help because they were “under Communist pressure ... But the fundamental task of our foreign aid program in the 1960s is not negatively to fight Communism: Its fundamental task is to help make a historical demonstration that in the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth – in the southern half of the globe as in the north – economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand.”⁶

The acceleration of modernity also became a fundamental policy goal. As part of an American-sponsored “Decade of Development,” the Kennedy administration launched an Alliance for Progress with Latin America, a ten-year program designed to raise economic growth rates, promote education, improve health care, provide housing, and engineer comprehensive development planning through democratic institutions. The Peace Corps sent thousands of young Americans to promote modernization through “community development” programs in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The administration also promoted modernization as a counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam, linking military objectives to an ambitious vision of social engineering. In Iran, finally, US policymakers hoped that the Shah’s “White Revolution” would promote economic growth and diversification as well as form a liberalizing alliance between the monarch and a newly educated, progressive-minded peasantry. American policymakers deeply feared Communist movements in the Third World. But by accelerating the course of modernization they hoped to contain Communism and possibly drive the world into a historical stage in which it would no longer have any appeal.

To an even greater extent than their American counterparts, Soviet strategic thinkers envisaged a world of opportunity in the early 1960s. Following Iosif Stalin’s death, the Soviet leadership embarked on a prolonged ideological reassessment. Several related factors shaped that process. First, Soviet strategists came to believe that the advent of tremendously destructive nuclear

6 Hanhimäki and Westad (eds.), *The Cold War*, 361.

weapons made the inevitability of total war between Communist and capitalist states less certain. That conclusion, in turn, placed a new premium on the development of activist policies designed to accelerate the longer-term spread of socialism in conditions of “peaceful coexistence.” Where Stalinists had defined a world rigidly divided between a “socialist” camp constituted by the Soviet Union and the Marxist–Leninist states loyal to it and a “capitalist” camp made up of all others, Khrushchev believed that Third World leaders, even determinedly nationalist ones, were not mere “stooges of imperialism” or pawns of their former colonial masters. As Mark Bradley argues, for Khrushchev, decolonization marked a decisive, global turning point.⁷ The new, postcolonial states of the world, he concluded, could potentially become elements of a “vast zone of peace,” a broad coalition of progressive forces standing in opposition to the powers of imperialism. As Khrushchev declared in 1956, “the new period in world history, predicted by Lenin, when the peoples of the East would play an active part in deciding the destinies of the entire world and become a new and mighty factor in international relations has arrived.”⁸

From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, Soviet leaders worked to put these new concepts in practice. As they debated the possibility that the historical path to socialism might take on a variety of different forms, strategists such as Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, joined Khrushchev in considering the implications of the new thinking for Soviet Third World policy. Soviet analysts often disagreed with each other, but like their American counterparts, they came to define the decolonizing world as fundamentally “transitional” and concluded that time was ultimately on their side. Postcolonial and especially non-aligned states, one scholar explains, “were not conceived to be static in equilibrium between capitalism and socialism. Instead, struggling ‘progressive forces’ within these historically transitional states were expected to encourage them over time to cooperate ever more closely with the socialist camp.”⁹ Soviet leaders believed that their country’s record of steadfast opposition to colonialism and impressive economic growth would appeal to Third World elites seeking an alternative to global capitalism and collaboration with imperial powers. They also expected that as working-class and proletarian forces

7 See Mark Philip Bradley’s chapter in volume I.

8 Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 17–18.

9 Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non Alignment in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 9–10.

gained strength, bourgeois nationalists might form alliances with them and help convert anti-imperialist revolutions into anticapitalist ones. The result would be a trend toward socialism that did not necessarily require armed struggle, a firm allegiance to Marxist principles, or the instrumental, vanguard role of Communist parties.

Following that optimistic vision, the Soviet Union moved quickly to develop close ties with a wide range of postcolonial states. Nehru's India, Sukarno's Indonesia, Nasser's Egypt, Ben Bella's Algeria, and Nkrumah's Ghana all received significant amounts of Soviet military and economic aid. While many Third World recipients of Soviet assistance embraced radical economic policies, the vast majority of them were not Marxist states. Many of them also declared their firm commitment to policies of non-alignment and even suppressed local Communist parties. The Soviets hoped, however, that anti-imperial, nationalist movements would ultimately turn in socialist directions. As Piero Gleijeses explains, Fidel Castro's Cuba became the greatest and most famous source of Soviet enthusiasm in the early 1960s.¹⁰ Although Castro had taken power without Moscow's support, Khrushchev and his colleagues quickly came to perceive the Cuban revolution as both a reflection of the Soviet past and a vision of the future.

The Soviet commitment to "national liberation movements" also led to an intervention in the former Belgian colony of Congo. In the summer of 1960, only weeks after Congo gained independence, the mineral-rich province of Katanga seceded with help from Brussels. Newly elected prime minister and former labor leader Patrice Lumumba then requested that the United Nations (UN) intervene to end the rebellion and expel Belgian military forces from the country. Worried that Lumumba might follow in Castro's footsteps and fearful that he would export his country's uranium to the Soviets, Washington helped ensure that the UN peacekeeping mission would not support his goals. In frustration, Lumumba then accepted a Soviet aid offer, and Khrushchev moved quickly to intervene. The Soviets delivered hundreds of trucks, some two dozen aircraft, and several helicopters to enable Congolese troops to mount an offensive against Katanga. In September, as Lumumba began to make progress, the United States made plans to assassinate him and supported a coup by Colonel Joseph Mobutu of the Congolese army. Lumumba's subsequent capture and murder by his Congolese and Katangese adversaries was a severe blow for Moscow's policy. By delivering arms to Congo and criticizing the UN for supporting the colonizers, however,

¹⁰ See Piero Gleijeses's chapter in this volume.

Khrushchev challenged the West and appealed to the Third World with a clear, anti-imperial stance.

Chinese policymakers also perceived decolonization as a force for tremendous revolutionary change. Yet in contrast to Washington and Moscow, Beijing did not suddenly come to that conclusion in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. For Mao Zedong, China's own long historical experience in the revolutionary struggle against Western imperialism made his nation a "natural ally" of the world's "oppressed peoples." From the time the People's Republic was founded, Mao defined the promotion of national liberation as a core element of China's revolutionary mission. In the late 1940s, Mao placed China within the vast "intermediate zone" of oppressed, non-Western countries standing between the threat of US imperialism and the Soviet socialism he admired. Promoting national liberation in the decolonizing world, Mao believed, would help ensure the survival of China's own revolution and defend socialism as a whole. In this regard, Mao and his prime minister, Zhou Enlai, sought close relations with decolonizing countries even before that objective became a major Soviet priority. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, for example, Zhou eagerly pursued a common "united front" against imperialism among post-colonial states that often had little interest in the formal ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.

Starting in the late 1950s, as Sergey Radchenko notes, the growing Sino-Soviet schism also affected Chinese Third World policy.¹¹ When the Soviets declined to back China in a Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959, and Khrushchev appeared to value his relationship with the non-aligned Nehru over solidarity with Mao, underlying ideological tensions burst into the open. Mao attacked Khrushchev's "revisionism" and insisted that war with the forces of imperialism remained inevitable. "Peaceful coexistence," he argued, was merely a temporary condition, and the "transition to socialism" could only proceed through armed struggle and class conflict. More fundamentally, Mao also viewed the question of Third World revolution through a domestic lens. Worried about the potential for bureaucratic stagnation and a loss of momentum, he sought to accelerate China's own drive from socialism to genuine Communism and feared that Soviet backsliding might infect and corrupt his own government's revolutionary commitments. Just as he promoted the disastrous Great Leap Forward at home, he sought to mobilize his country behind a more radical policy abroad.

¹¹ See Sergey Radchenko's chapter in this volume.

Chinese Third World activism in the early and mid-1960s, therefore, reflected a desire to counter American imperialism and demonstrate Beijing's claim to global revolutionary leadership, a project pursued most aggressively in Vietnam and Africa. While Mao had supported Vietnam's revolution since 1950, as the Sino-Soviet split deepened China dramatically increased its commitment. China's experience, Mao believed, was an essential model for the Vietnamese, and support for that revolution became a "litmus test for 'true communism.'"¹² Worried that higher levels of Soviet aid would draw the North Vietnamese closer to the Kremlin, Mao increased China's own weapons deliveries and deployed a total of over 320,000 engineering, anti-aircraft, transportation, and logistic troops starting in 1965. In the event of an American invasion of North Vietnam, Mao also promised that China would send its own combat units to defend the revolution. In the early 1960s, Zhou Enlai also made three separate trips to Africa, visiting Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia in one journey that lasted from December of 1963 through February of 1964. Anticolonial guerrilla commanders were invited to train in China, the PRC sent doctors to Africa despite their shortage at home, and huge shipments of Chinese rice and maize arrived in Guinea and the Sudan even as famine afflicted China itself. In Southeast Asia and Africa, China aimed to promote revolutions that would embody its own experience. As Politburo member Lin Biao confidently declared in 1965, the revolutionary encirclement of the cities by triumphant rural forces during China's civil war was about to be replicated on a global scale. As the "people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" continued "growing vigorously," it would steadily surround and overwhelm North America and Europe, putting both the Americans and the Soviets on the defensive.¹³

By the mid-1960s, American, Soviet, and Chinese policymakers perceived decolonization and national liberation as forces of immense significance. Where Americans envisioned modernization as a means to confront the Communist inroads they so feared, Soviet strategists optimistically defined the Third World as a rich field for socialist transformation. Chinese policymakers, finally, insisted on the wider validity of their own anticolonial revolution in opposition to the United States as well as their Soviet rivals.

¹² Chen, *Mao's China*, 211.

¹³ George T. Yu, "China and the Third World," *Asian Survey*, 17 (1977), 1038.

Failures and reassessments

Ambitions to direct and channel postcolonial aspirations, however, were soon disappointed. As they learned, often painfully, that the Third World was not nearly as malleable as they had assumed, both American and Soviet policymakers struggled to reorient their approaches. Chinese policy, consumed by domestic turmoil, also underwent a major shift. The result, by the end of the 1960s, was a sharp escalation in armed conflict and violence.

Much of the frustration experienced by the great powers stemmed from the fact that Third World elites were never simply passive recipients of modernizing or revolutionary models. While they certainly were attracted to the promises of accelerated development and state-building, postcolonial leaders often played the superpowers off against each other and adapted their ideologies for their own purposes. Where Soviet, American, and Chinese policymakers tended to see their models as complete, indivisible packages, Third World leaders displayed a remarkable proclivity for selecting and blending diverse elements while combining them with their own historically and culturally defined priorities.

American policymakers found that phenomenon particularly troublesome. Modernization, in their view, was a single, integrated process in which step-by-step advances in capitalist structures, psychological transformations, and political democracy would each reinforce the other. But leaders like Nehru, willing to “skip stages” and experiment in the pursuit of rapid change, eagerly combined ideas drawn from both Soviet and American experience. In an attempt to contain China and demonstrate its commitment to postcolonial Asia, the Kennedy administration provided substantial support for India’s economic development. The problem, however, was that Americans and Indians had fundamentally different understandings of what “development” itself meant. Nehru was deeply impressed by the Soviet record of rapid industrialization, embraced Soviet-style centralized planning, and strongly emphasized the production of steel, machinery, and capital goods. Indian planners also rejected the advice of American economists that instead of a crash drive toward industrialization, long-term development required greater attention to agriculture and balanced growth. Along with Nehru’s sharp criticism of US intervention in Vietnam, his leftward economic turn alienated many American supporters. US aid helped alleviate an Indian economic crisis, but the relationship between the two countries remained tense. Through Nehru’s death in 1964, the ideology of modernization prevented much of the US government from

recognizing that Nehru's interest in Soviet economics did not extend to Soviet politics.¹⁴

The internal contradictions and failures of modernization, experienced across different regions, also contributed to a reassessment of US Third World policy during the Johnson administration. Modernization, in the Kennedy period, was frequently considered as an alternative to the direct deployment of American military force, a way to promote structural solutions and win the Cold War in the Third World by speeding up the course of history itself. Lyndon Johnson and his advisers did not completely abandon that perspective, but they did determine that the risk of Communist gains and the potential damage to American credibility required far more immediate and coercive action. As scholars such as Nils Gilman have argued, the ideology of modernization was always ambivalent at best regarding the question of democracy, and by the mid-1960s it increasingly became "the intellectual equivalent of hitting the gas pedal on a skidding car: an attempt to accelerate out of a problem. As moderate solutions to development failed again and again, hard-core solutions found more and more advocates."¹⁵

In Latin America, Johnson responded to the failures of the Alliance for Progress by reorienting the program away from its original reformist ambitions. By the mid-1960s, few Latin American nations had reached targeted economic growth rates or made expected increases in popular living standards. A handful, such as Rómulo Betancourt's Venezuela, did reduce unemployment, promote modest agrarian reform, and increase the share of the national budget devoted to education and health care. But many Latin American liberals found that their ability to fund further reforms was seriously constrained by the declining terms of trade between exports of primary goods and the imports of manufactured products. The program's economic contradictions were compounded by political ones. Kennedy had warned that "those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable," but the idea of promoting "revolution" of any kind threatened conservative, anti-Communist oligarchs. In Guatemala, for example, Alliance-sponsored community leadership training, literacy programs, and financial cooperatives empowered Indians and poor peasants to challenge the dominance of merchants and landowners. At the same time, however, elites red-baited their adversaries and used the steady flow of US

14 David C. Engerman, "The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 23–35.

15 Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 12, 50–51.



18. The body of Che Guevara. He was executed after being captured in Bolivia in 1967. Guevara was regarded as the most dangerous opponent of US influence in Latin America.

counterinsurgency aid to make war against them. Johnson did little to correct these failings, and as US-sponsored repression gutted the developmental gains that modernizers had sought, anti-Communist anxieties killed the “peaceful revolution” in its infancy.¹⁶

The promotion of authoritarian regimes may not have been Johnson’s first choice, but as modernization ran aground in Latin America he concluded that such a policy would certainly be preferable to the uncertainties of long-term, democratic development. Thomas Mann, Johnson’s new assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, outlined the administration’s approach in 1964 by declaring that the United States would no longer make democratic reforms a condition for the delivery of US military and economic aid under the Alliance. In the struggle to prevent a “second Cuba,” order and anti-Communist stability would have to precede

16 Stephen M. Streeter, “Nation Building in the Land of Eternal Counterinsurgency: Guatemala and the Contradictions of the Alliance for Progress,” *Third World Quarterly* 27, (2006), 57–68.

progress. Accordingly, the administration moved quickly to recognize military coups against left-leaning governments in Brazil, Bolivia, and several other states. More dramatically, in April 1965 the Johnson administration invaded the Dominican Republic with 33,000 troops to prevent the possible return to power of Juan Bosch, a progressive who had been democratically elected in late 1962 and overthrown by a conservative junta ten months later. Although evidence of Communist activity among the pro-Bosch forces was very thin, Johnson concluded that the risk of subversion was simply intolerable.

In Vietnam, Johnson also determined that America could not wait for modernization to produce its expected miracles. While deeply concerned about Communist gains, in 1961 Kennedy planners still believed that it might be possible to derail the Vietnamese revolution through a blend of development and counterinsurgency programs. As the United States increased the flow of arms and advisers, it also stepped up civil service training programs and urged Ngo Dinh Diem toward liberal reforms. The heart of the effort, however, unfolded in the countryside where the United States directed a massive plan to relocate the Vietnamese peasantry in “strategic hamlets” that would separate them from the insurgents and allow for government-sponsored development programs to win their loyalty and support. That ambitious mix of military tactics and social engineering failed miserably. South Vietnamese government and military leaders frequently abused the peasantry they were supposed to protect and assist, but the more fundamental causes were grounded in an ideology that ignored the realities of Vietnamese history and culture. Although US officials continued to define Diem as the root of the problem and hoped for greater success after his removal in late 1963, the National Liberation Front continued to gain ground and American pessimism steadily grew.

Johnson’s response was a forceful one. As Fredrik Logevall explains, Johnson feared that a withdrawal from Vietnam would do irreparable damage to America’s global credibility as well as his own domestic political power and personal authority.¹⁷ Development-centered counterinsurgency programs continued in South Vietnam, and in April of 1965 Johnson dramatically offered to build a Tennessee Valley Authority on the Mekong Delta. Yet, the president concluded that long-term, structural efforts at “nation building” were simply not enough. In early 1965, he ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam, and by 1967 more than a half million US combat troops were in the field. Modernizing ambitions did not vanish, but visions for structural

17 See Fredrik Logevall’s chapter in this volume.

change were largely eclipsed by a massive war of attrition designed simply to kill revolutionaries faster than they could be replaced.

In Indonesia, the United States also turned toward a more aggressive policy. By 1964, Sukarno's political confrontation with British-supported Malaysia, his mismanagement of the Indonesian economy, and his declared promise to shift Indonesian politics to the left all alarmed Washington officials. Where US policymakers had previously tolerated Sukarno's neutralism and seen his government as a viable alternative to the Indonesian Communist Party, they now began to work covertly for his removal. In 1965, when General Suharto and other Indonesian army leaders put down a revolt by junior officers and crippled Sukarno's power, the Johnson administration was elated. The United States also threw its firm support behind the army's relentless, sweeping campaign to expose and execute Indonesia's Communists and suspected sympathizers. A resolute American stance in Vietnam, US officials concluded, had emboldened Indonesia's military and might help promote a crucial turn throughout the rest of Southeast Asia as well.

In Vietnam, Latin America, Iran, and Indonesia, US policymakers also discarded even the tentative steps they had previously made to promote liberal reforms. By strongly supporting a string of dictators in Saigon, backing the Shah of Iran's political repression, supporting an anti-Communist, military-driven bloodbath in Indonesia, and embracing right-wing coups across Latin America, the United States steadily turned toward "bureaucratic authoritarian" solutions. Modernization promised stability through long-term progress, but by the mid-1960s US policymakers concluded that the immediate preservation of anti-Communist order required a much more direct approach.

The Soviets also engaged in a revision of their Third World policy during the mid-1960s. Like their American counterparts, Soviet strategists were dismayed by the willingness of postcolonial elites to chart independent courses. Mao Zedong's growing hostility, in particular, raised wider questions about the wisdom of committing precious Soviet resources to build alliances with regimes that might refuse to follow the Soviet political line, or, worse, become potential adversaries. Soviet aid to self-proclaimed, non-aligned socialists like Sukarno and Nkrumah also raised doubts. Neither Indonesia nor Ghana had embarked on a disciplined "transition" to "scientific" Marxist socialism, and both governments had proven unstable enough to fall victim to military coups in the mid-1960s, a result that destroyed years of Soviet political and capital investment.

Frustrated relations with Cuba also played a significant role in triggering a Soviet reevaluation. Castro's fury, when Khrushchev removed Soviet missiles from Cuban soil without consulting him, and his decision to

block the international inspections intended to resolve the missile crisis alarmed Kremlin leaders. Protests by Che Guevara over the terms of Soviet aid, Cuba's refusal to follow the USSR in signing the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Cuban criticism of Soviet trade with its Latin American enemies, and state trials of members of the old, pre-revolutionary Cuban Communist Party all strained relations between Havana and Moscow. Where Soviet policymakers had once envisioned the Cuban revolution as a wondrous sign of socialist advance and solidarity, by 1966 they found themselves listening to a doggedly independent Castro attack the USSR for its failure to recognize the need for armed struggle in the cause of global revolution.

The Soviet investment in Egypt did not live up to Khrushchev's expectations either. Starting in the 1950s, the USSR took significant steps to cultivate an alliance by providing funding for the Aswan High Dam and supporting Egypt during the Suez crisis. Nasser, however, held firmly to his policy of non-alignment and cracked down aggressively on Egyptian Communists, imprisoning many of them. After Cairo and Damascus created the United Arab Republic in 1958, Nasser spread his anti-Communist campaign into Syria and condemned Soviet support for Communist elements in Iraq as well. While Khrushchev hoped that Egypt would take a more radical turn to the left, Nasser angrily accused the Soviets of hindering the cause of Arab unity and interfering in internal Arab affairs. Although relations improved in the mid-1960s, serious tensions persisted over the terms of Soviet support for the Arab conflict with Israel. Egypt, moreover, never embarked on the kind of thoroughgoing revolutionary transformation that Khrushchev hoped for.

As Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman explain, the growing doubt with which Soviet leaders viewed Khrushchev's revolutionary adventurism contributed to his downfall.¹⁸ Doubt also produced a political reconsideration. The "transition to socialism," many strategists concluded, was far more complex than Khrushchev had assumed. Feudalistic forces were more tenacious, peasants less politically mobilized, and the goals of rapid industrialization and land reform far more difficult to achieve than anticipated. Yet the USSR did not retreat from engagement with the Third World under Leonid Brezhnev, nor did Soviet policymakers cease to believe that history was on their side. Indeed, analysts, like Karen Brutents, argued that the USSR should pursue an activist approach. The key, however, would be for the USSR to direct its longer-term, comprehensive support more carefully to movements grounded in explicitly Marxist–Leninist ideology and to place a stronger

18 See Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman's chapter in this volume.

emphasis on the role of “vanguard parties” in providing the political structure essential to drive revolutions forward and defend them against imperialist resistance.

As its aspirations for global revolutionary change were chastened, the Soviet Union also shifted its emphasis toward military aid and arms sales, a tool that it often used for shorter-term, instrumental purposes. During the Khrushchev era, the amount of funding for economic development that was offered to a broad range of anticolonial movements and postcolonial states had slightly exceeded levels of military assistance. By the late 1960s, however, the value of military aid surpassed that of development funding, a trend that strongly increased over the next decade. Under Khrushchev limited military capabilities prevented the USSR from playing a larger role in far-flung regions, but under Brezhnev the Soviets used new assets in air transport, shipping, communications, and naval vessels to intervene at much greater levels. Following the American escalation in Vietnam in 1965, the Soviet Union dramatically amplified its military assistance to its Communist ally there, providing the North Vietnamese with surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, field artillery, and radar as well as technicians and pilots. Thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers and officers also trained in Soviet military schools. But Soviet arms sales, military aid, and advisers also poured into non-Marxist states and fueled wars fought by Egypt, Syria, India, and Iraq. In these cases, the USSR shelved its longer-term, historical vision in favor of the more practical goals of gaining leverage in diplomatic negotiations, obtaining access to naval and air bases, raising hard currency, and frustrating US efforts to build regional alliances. As ideological ambitions cooled, the Soviet Union, like the United States, placed an increasing premium on the utility of force.

From the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, Chinese policymakers endured a series of setbacks of their own in the Third World. The 1965 overthrow of Algeria’s Ben Bella eliminated a regime that China had helped come to power and had seen as a model for further armed struggle in Africa. The coup against Sukarno and the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 and 1966 also destroyed a government China hoped would become part of a strong anti-Western alliance in Asia. Several moderate African governments broke relations with the PRC in protest over China’s support for insurgencies on that continent, and China’s confrontation with India alienated other members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Chinese officials also watched in frustration as their relationship with North Vietnam deteriorated. After Mao dismissed a Soviet proposal for a collaborative approach to assisting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Soviet arms shipments steadily increased,

Hanoi stopped criticizing Soviet “revisionism.” When Le Duan traveled to Moscow in 1966 and referred to the Soviet Union as a “second motherland,” Chinese officials were deeply angered. The DRV’s 1968 decision to enter into peace negotiations with the United States, over strenuous Chinese objections, also amplified fears of Soviet influence.

As China plunged into the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969, Beijing’s Third World policy fell into disarray. While aid to North Vietnam continued, all Chinese ambassadors, with the single exception of the one in Cairo, were recalled to engage in studies of Maoist doctrine, effectively paralyzing the country’s diplomatic organization. When China finally emerged from the chaos, Mao and Zhou replaced their earlier, more flexible promotion of a broad anti-American, anti-imperial united front with an overriding and rigid insistence on the dangers of Soviet aggression. Alarmed by the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and worried that violent border clashes with the Soviets in 1969 might lead to general war, Chinese officials also began to emphasize the need for the PRC and the entire Third World to struggle against the “dual hegemony” of the world’s two superpowers. By 1973, after the famous meeting between Mao and Richard Nixon in Beijing, Chinese officials also downplayed armed struggle, deemphasized the cause of national liberation in favor of interstate relations, and subordinated their previous revolutionary goals to the overriding campaign against Soviet “social imperialism.”

From Vietnam to Angola, and the demise of détente

The combined American and Soviet turn away from ambitious, open-ended visions of decolonization to a more immediate emphasis on coercion, force, and control in the mid-to-late 1960s intersected with the passing away of the first generation of postcolonial leaders. As non-aligned nationalists were replaced in coups by military juntas or revolutionary regimes, the Third World became increasingly polarized. Resolute, dictatorial anti-Communists like Suharto in Indonesia, Mobutu in Zaire, and the Shah of Iran received substantial US support and, under the Nixon administration, came to be seen as regional bulwarks against the dangers of Marxist insurgency. At the same time, however, revolutionary ideologies, often introduced through the writings of dissident intellectuals in the West, made new headway among activists and students across Southeast Asia and Africa and helped turn liberation movements in more clearly Marxist directions.

Vietnam in particular became a source of inspiration for revolutionaries and guerrilla movements. While few Third World radicals devoted close, serious

study to Vietnam's experience, Hanoi's determined stand in the face of American technological might became an appealing symbol of determined resistance and the power of popular revolutionary war. Despite Johnson's massive deployment of US combat troops and Nixon's sharp intensification of the bombing campaign and invasion of Cambodia, the revolutionaries had struggled on. As Che Guevara proclaimed, the Vietnamese offered a lesson to the world: "Since the imperialists are using the threat of war to blackmail humanity, the correct response is not to fear war. Attack hard and without let-up at every point of confrontation – that must be the general tactic of the people."¹⁹ Where radicals came to see Soviet policies as too conservative and fainthearted, the 1968 Tet Offensive stirred revolutionary imaginations across Southeast Asia and Africa.

Impressed by Hanoi's resilience and the effect of the war on American politics, Soviet leaders also drew important conclusions of their own in Vietnam. With Soviet help, a disciplined Marxist–Leninist party like that in the DRV was capable of raising the political costs of war to the point that the United States would ultimately decide to pull back its forces. If the United States proved unwilling or unable to stop a revolution in Vietnam, where it had made an immense commitment, then the chances of successful revolutions in other areas looked to be on the rise.

As several scholars have argued, the beginnings of superpower détente also made increased Cold War conflict in the Third World more, not less, likely. America's growing frustration in Vietnam contributed to the rise of détente, and Nixon and Henry Kissinger hoped that a diplomatic engagement with the Soviets might persuade them to hold their North Vietnamese allies in check. They hoped, through a strategy of "linkage," to offer the Soviets "recognition of their strategic parity" and "a promise of access to Western capital and technology." In return, "they asked Moscow to recognize the mutuality of superpower interest in stability, especially in maintaining order in the Third World."²⁰ Yet as Raymond Garthoff explains, détente was "not a clearly defined concept held in common." While Soviet policymakers did expect that détente might help prevent war between the superpowers, they also "insisted loudly that peaceful coexistence among states did not mean an end to 'the class struggle' or the 'national liberation movement' in colonial or neo-colonial situations." Where Nixon and Kissinger anticipated that détente

19 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 190.

20 Warren I. Cohen, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183.

would result in a Soviet acceptance of the status quo in the Third World, Brezhnev believed that the Soviet Union retained a free hand to challenge the United States' global engagement there. Convinced that the Communist victory in Vietnam demonstrated that the "correlation of forces" in the world was shifting to the benefit of the USSR, Brezhnev thought it would be a mistake not to press the advantage.²¹

The conflicting expectations came to a head most dramatically in Angola. When the Portuguese dictatorship collapsed in April 1974 and that country erupted into civil war among three competing independence movements, the United States and South Africa both intervened in an attempt to prevent the Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from coming to power. An MPLA victory, South Africa feared, might promote radical attacks on apartheid in Namibia and South Africa itself. Worried about the damage to American credibility done by defeat in Vietnam, Kissinger hoped that an easy win in Angola might repair the domestic Cold War consensus and restore US prestige abroad. By the following summer, US weapons deliveries, CIA advisers, and South African military trainers were deployed there. When it appeared that the MPLA was still edging toward victory, South African troops invaded the country in October 1975 with US approval.

Although they were concerned by the factional splits within the MPLA, the USSR provided the movement with essential military equipment. The decisive contribution, however, came from Cuba. Since the early 1960s, Castro's commitment to anti-imperialism, vision of Third World solidarity, and opposition to white supremacy had led Cuba to support revolutionary movements in Algeria, Zaire, and Guinea-Bissau. Acting on its own initiative, Cuba responded to the South African invasion in November 1975 by deploying 36,000 troops, repelling the assault, and winning the war for the MPLA. As Piero Gleijeses points out, the Soviet Union did not direct Cuban policy.²² Yet once it became clear that victory was in sight, Moscow was quick to proclaim the triumph in Angola as evidence of Soviet leadership in the cause of Third World liberation.

The wider international ramifications of the Angolan war were significant. Among the immediate losers was the People's Republic of China. By the early 1970s, the PRC had become so committed to opposing Soviet influence that

21 Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 27, 45.

22 See Gleijeses's chapter in this volume.

it sacrificed previous commitments to anticapitalist liberation as well as regional diplomatic objectives. As the Soviets and their Cuban allies backed the MPLA, China threw its weight toward the rival National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a nativist, populist movement, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), a nationalist organization without a clearly defined ideological stance. When South Africa invaded Angola, the PRC then found itself in the untenable position of fighting on the same side as the United States and, more crucially, Pretoria's white supremacist regime. Although China stopped training FNLA soldiers within days of the South African attack, the result was a diplomatic disaster: "Its erstwhile clients, the FNLA and UNITA, had been defeated, its relations with the victorious MPLA had been destroyed, and its image as a disinterested and principled friend of African causes had been badly damaged."²³ Gerald Ford's administration also watched in frustration as the US Congress voted in January 1976 to cut off all funding for further US covert action in Angola. The failed attempt to bolster American credibility had only succeeded in further solidifying the anti-interventionist political climate at home. The American cooperation with apartheid South Africa also did grave damage to US relations with other African states, most of which moved quickly to recognize the MPLA government.

The MPLA victory in Angola, however, also had ironic results. Although the USSR gained little in a strategic sense, the Angolan war helped harden a growing perception among US policymakers that the Soviets were exploiting the process of détente and violating its terms. When the USSR went on to promote the Ethiopian revolution, especially after its declaration of Marxist-Leninist principles in 1976, the concept of détente came under fierce political attack in the United States, a process that helped push Jimmy Carter's administration toward a harder line and contributed to the rise of a powerful, right-wing, moralistic, anti-Soviet consensus under Ronald Reagan. Gains in Angola and Ethiopia, therefore, helped jeopardize the arms-limitation agreements that, ultimately, were of far greater value to Moscow. Perhaps even more seriously, those victories encouraged the Soviet conviction that by supporting Marxist parties and moving quickly with new military capabilities they could continue to reshape the course of the Third World, an expectation that would lead to disaster in Afghanistan. The Soviets, in that sense, were about to learn the hard lessons that intervention in Vietnam had taught the United States. Overwhelming military and technological superiority would prove a poor

23 Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93," *China Quarterly* (1995), 411.

vehicle with which to support a regime lacking real political legitimacy. The forces of culture, religion, and history at work in the Third World, moreover, were not subject to easy manipulation or rapid transformation. The result, moreover, would contribute to the overextension and final crisis of the Soviet state.

The greatest damage done by the Cold War in the Third World, however, was surely suffered by those who lived there. American and Soviet policymakers,



19. The image of Che Guevara, already dead for four years, decorating a Chilean slum in 1971. Guevara and the Cuban revolution continued to provide inspiration for many Third World radicals in the 1970s.

viewing the postcolonial world as inherently malleable, promoted competing ideologies of accelerated development. Believing that their national security depended on the spread of their visions of modernization or socialist transformation, they also deployed tremendous force to propagate them. Many Third World elites, eager for rapid economic and social progress, also embraced those approaches and employed repression in the name of transformation. The sources of violence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were often grounded in anticolonial movements and domestic conflicts along lines of class and ethnicity that pre-dated the Cold War itself. But the intervention of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China made them far more devastating. In this respect, the worry that Nkrumah expressed before his New York audience in 1958 appears prophetic. As the Cold War arrived in Africa and the rest of the Third World, the goals of peaceful, independently charted material advance receded into the distance.

The Indochina wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975

FREDRIK LOGEVALL

The struggle for Indochina after 1945 occupies a central place in the international history of the twentieth century. Fought over a period of three decades, at the cost of millions of lives and vast physical destruction in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the conflict captured in microcosm all of the grand political forces that drove the century's global history: colonialism, nationalism, communism, and democratic-capitalism. It was both an East–West and a North–South struggle, that is to say, intimately bound up with the two most important developments in international relations after World War II, the Cold War and the breakup of the colonial empires.

It took time, however, for Indochina to become a major cockpit of tensions in the international system. In the early years, the conflict was largely a Franco-Vietnamese affair, resulting from Paris leaders' attempt to rebuild the colonial state and international order from before World War II, and Vietnamese nationalists' determination to redefine that state in a new post-colonial order. France had lost colonial control when, after the fall of France in 1940, Japan swept southward and gradually gained effective control of the whole of Southeast Asia. The Tokyo authorities initially found it convenient to leave the day-to-day control of Indochinese affairs in French hands, but in March 1945 the Japanese brushed aside the French in favor of ruling Indochina themselves. By then the tide of the Pacific War had turned against them, however, and in the weeks and months that followed, the French government and various Vietnamese nationalist groups – the most powerful of which was the Communist-led Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh – jockeyed for power. They continued to do so after Japan's surrender until, in late 1946, large-scale war broke out.

East–West tensions were by then becoming serious in Europe and the Near East, and one might have expected the same to be true in Vietnam, because Ho Chi Minh and his chief lieutenants were dedicated Marxists. In fact, though, Paris leaders cared little that the Vietminh was Communist-led;

what mattered was that Ho refused to accede to French colonial control. The British government backed the French less out of concern for Ho Chi Minh's political philosophy than out of fears for what a Vietnamese nationalist victory could do to their own colonial holdings. As for Soviet leader Iosif Stalin, he showed scant interest in Southeast Asia; it was for him always a backwater. He did not extend diplomatic recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) that Ho proclaimed in September 1945, and instead continued to regard France as the legitimate ruler of Indochina. His attention on European issues, and distrustful of Ho Chi Minh (for being too independent and nationalist-oriented), Stalin early on offered the Vietminh neither material nor diplomatic support and, indeed, endorsed the French Communist Party's backing of the first war budget and emergency measures related to the prosecution of the struggle.

Stalin's pawns?

If Ho Chi Minh's Communist orientation mattered significantly in any major world capital in this early period, it was in Washington. Soviet-American relations had deteriorated sharply in 1946 and early 1947, as Moscow and Washington clashed over a range of issues: over European reconstruction, over the division of Germany, over Iran, and over the civil war in Greece. By spring 1947, Soviet hostility was a staple of both American policy documents and much journalistic reporting. Equally important in historical terms was the fact that, by then, there was no mistaking the growing salience of apocalyptic anti-Communism in American political discourse. French leaders, always keen to find favor in Washington, shifted their public diplomacy on Indochina in response to this emerging US-Soviet confrontation and this changing American mood. In Vietnam, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, the French high commissioner, early in the year moved what was then still a localized and strictly Franco-Vietnamese conflict to the highest international level, that of East versus West. He insisted before all comers that Ho and the Vietminh were mere pawns in Stalin's struggle for world supremacy, and that Indochina was where the West must make a stand.¹

That basic message, articulated also by other French officials – including some who didn't believe in it, who thought anti-Communism would be a useless weapon against a nationalist uprising – found a receptive audience in

1 Philippe Devillers, *Le Viet Nam contemporain* (Paris: Comité d'études des problèmes du Pacifique, 1950), 2; Thierry d'Argenlieu, *Chroniques d'Indochine* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1985).

Washington. Despite the fact that the State Department found no evidence of mass popular support for Communism within Vietnam, and further that it was not ideology but a desire for independence and a hatred of the French that drove the unrest, the principals in US decisionmaking proceeded on the basis of worst-case assumptions. Losing Indochina to Communism, senior planners worried, could upset the strategic balance in Southeast Asia, particularly if, as these officials anticipated, other countries in the area were to succumb as well. It would also harm the economic recovery of Japan and other key allies, who were dependent on maintaining commercial ties with the primary producing areas of Southeast Asia.

American strategists also feared the effects in France itself of a French defeat in Indochina. Might a loss cause Western-oriented moderates to lose their grip on power in Paris and enhance the prestige of the Soviet-supported French Communist Party (FCP), maybe even bring that party to power? The thought made US officials shudder, and made them reluctant to quibble with Paris over its pursuit of a military solution. True, these men acknowledged, Stalin showed only modest interest in fomenting revolution in France and, indeed, kept the FCP at arm's length, but this was only because he sought to avoid an international crisis while the future of Germany remained an open question; once that issue was resolved, he would surely turn his focus to France.

Yet senior officials were loath to simply throw US support behind the French war effort. It was too much a colonial affair. Harry Truman's team ruled out direct assistance to the military campaign and told Paris planners that any attempt to retake Vietnam by force of arms would be wrongheaded. At the same time, the administration knew full well that a sizable chunk of the unrestricted US economic assistance to France (\$1.9 billion between July 1945 and July 1948) was being used to pay war costs. In this way, though American leaders declared themselves to be neutral in the conflict, theirs was a neutrality that tilted toward the European ally. French messages were always answered, while those from Ho Chi Minh – who had modeled his declaration of independence on the American version of 1776, and several times in 1945–46 pleaded for US help – were ignored.

And so, the Vietminh fought alone, largely isolated in non-Asian world opinion. The French had a massive superiority in weapons and could take and hold any area they really wanted. But they were fighting far from home and could never deploy sufficient numbers of troops to secure effective control. The war quickly reached a stalemate. The French dominated the cities and towns but were unable to extend their control to the villages and countryside, where most Vietnamese lived and where the Vietminh had broad popular

support. It soon became clear that the French would have difficulty achieving victory by conventional military means. Far-reaching political concessions to a Vietnamese government – involving the transfer of genuine executive and legislative authority – would be essential to achieving early pacification, yet successive French governments were unwilling to grant such concessions.

In June 1948, the French did go partway, facilitating the creation of the first central government for Vietnam in opposition to Ho Chi Minh's DRV. Rightly seen by most Vietnamese as largely a French creation, it marshaled little national support. In March 1949, the French struck another deal, this time with Bao Dai, the former Vietnam emperor who had abdicated in 1945. Under this deal, Vietnam was brought into the French Union without reference to the wishes of Ho Chi Minh. Real power, however, remained in French hands. The same was true in Laos and Cambodia, whose monarchs agreed in 1948 to bring their respective countries into the French Union. Together, the three formed the Associated States of Indochina (*les États Associés de l'Indochine*).

An internationalized war

If French leaders hoped these various agreements with Indochinese monarchs would have a galvanizing effect on the anti-Vietminh effort, they were soon disappointed. In Vietnam, Bao Dai's government won little public backing, while in Cambodia and Laos the DRV countered France's Associated States by facilitating the creation of two of its own: the "governments of resistance" led by the Khmer Issarak (Son Ngoc Minh) and the Lao Issara (Prince Souphanouvong). More ominously still, in 1949, Mao Zedong's Communists won control of China, which meant that the DRV would now have a friendly government across Vietnam's northern frontier. In early 1950, both Beijing and Moscow extended diplomatic recognition to Ho's government; soon thereafter, Mao moved to support the Vietminh with arms, advisers, and training. No longer would the Vietminh be dependent on weapons it could manufacture in the jungle or capture on the battlefield; no longer would they have to rely solely on their own limited resources and facilities for the training of their men. On the flip side they would now have to put up with increased Chinese influence over military planning and strategy. Beijing sought through its support for the Vietminh to promote the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an international power in Asia and to enhance the security of its southern border.

The internationalization of the conflict also served French strategy in Indochina, for in early 1950 Paris, too, landed a major outside patron – the



3. Indochina

United States. Washington officials chose this time to move beyond their French-leaning neutrality in favor of open support of the anti-Vietminh effort. Since 1948, US analysts had watched with concern as insurgencies erupted in Burma and Malaya and as Mao's armies gained ground in China. In early 1950, the Truman administration made the first step toward direct American involvement in Indochina – it opted to prop up an embattled colonial regime in order to prevent a Communist victory and also to retain French support in the European theatre of the Cold War. In February, the administration granted diplomatic recognition to the French-sponsored Bao Dai government. In early March, it pledged to furnish France with military and economic assistance for the war effort. The outbreak of the Korean War in late June, together with concern about the intentions of the Chinese Communists, solidified Washington's commitment.

A watershed moment it was. Henceforth, the First Indochina War was simultaneously a colonial conflict and a Cold War confrontation. The arrival of Chinese Communist aid and advisers across the frontier was one reason for this transformation; the other was the decision by Washington, spurred by fears of further Communist expansion in Asia and beyond, to throw its support behind the French war effort. A National Security Council (NSC) report penned in mid-1949 speculated on the meaning of Mao's victory: "If Southeast Asia is also swept by communism, we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia ... the colonial-nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive Communist movements, and it is now clear that Southeast Asia is the target for a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin."²

There was in fact no such coordinated offensive. Stalin's interest in Southeast Asia remained minimal, and his feelings about the Chinese developments were decidedly mixed. Still, it was not altogether fanciful for Washington analysts – and many non-Communist leaders in Southeast Asia – to think that Communism was on the march in the region. In addition to Mao in China and Ho in Vietnam, there were Communist-led rebellions in Indonesia, in newly independent Burma, in Malaya, and in the Philippines. All four rebellions would fail in due course, but in late 1949 their mere existence fueled Western fears. Did the historical momentum now lie with the

2 A portion of this report is in *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. I, 82.

Communists? Even if it didn't in objective terms, might the perception gain hold that it did, sending messages that could have a pernicious impact on American national security interests? It seemed all too possible.

Domestic political pressures also inclined the Truman White House to link Indochina developments to broader developments. What historians would call the Second Red Scare was now underway, and Truman experienced ferocious partisan assaults for supposedly "abandoning" Chiang Kai-shek and "losing" China. He and his aides felt pressure to show their firmness elsewhere in the region, and providing aid to the French was one way to do so. It is of considerable significance in this regard, as historian Robert McMahon has noted, that the initial American dollar commitment to the French effort in Vietnam came from funds designated by the president's congressional critics for containment of Communism "within the general area of China."³

American strategists were not the only ones to see the Indochina conflict through a Cold War lens. DRV officials did too. Senior Vietminh theoretician Truong Chinh, for example, welcomed the coming of the Cold War to Vietnam and declared that the war against France was now not just a national liberation conflict but an integral part of the international Communist struggle against the United States in Asia. Vietnamese Communist sources make clear that leaders were keen to push the revolution not merely in Vietnam but beyond, and that their views on this score jibed with those of leaders in Beijing.

Important though the Chinese and American assistance was to the fighting capabilities of the two sides, it did not change the overall strategic situation: the Vietminh continued to hold the advantage, notwithstanding the fact that US aid to the French war effort was massively larger than that of Beijing to the DRV. The French in 1951 achieved some tactical successes under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, beating back daring offensives by General Vo Nguyen Giap, but these results did not seriously impair Vietminh capabilities. By early 1953, with the fighting now entering its seventh year, and with no end in sight, French popular disenchantment with the war grew markedly. From across the political spectrum came proposals for early withdrawal from Indochina. The proposals were rejected. The French government, feeling pressure from Washington to remain steadfast in the struggle, insisted that its policy of holding on in Indochina was working and that the war-weary Vietnamese were bound sooner or later to accept any arrangement that promised a stable regime and

3 Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 40.

security. The Vietnamese would rally to Bao Dai, Paris officials vowed, if the Communists could only be held back by military action a little longer.

Privately, these same Paris leaders were much more circumspect about the prospects. Many wanted to end the war by negotiation, a notion that found no favor in Washington (this despite the fact that the Americans were themselves pursuing the diplomatic option in Korea). And so the fighting raged on, while the United States kept raising the level of its material aid until American taxpayers were carrying, by the spring of 1954, about three-quarters of the financial cost of the French effort. Bombers, cargo planes, trucks, tanks, naval craft, automatic weapons, small arms and ammunition, radios, hospital and engineering equipment plus financial aid flowed heavily. Between 1950 and 1954, US investment in the war in Indochina reached a total of approximately \$3 billion.

Dominoes, anyone?

By 1953, if not before, American planners were in fact far more committed to the French war effort than the French were. The apocalyptic scenario depicted in the 1949 NSC report quoted above remained operative, even though its dire warning of a “coordinated offensive” in Southeast Asia directed by the Kremlin had not come true. The NSC report had been an early version of the so-called domino theory, and it was followed by other, similar articulations in the years thereafter, all arguing the same point: If Vietnam was allowed to “fall,” other countries would inevitably and perhaps swiftly follow suit.

It was, of course, Dwight Eisenhower who famously used the metaphor of falling dominoes at a press conference on April 7, 1954, as French forces faced the prospect of a major military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin. Even before that date, his administration had pushed the theory harder than did its predecessor. In August 1953, for example, Eisenhower declared: “If Indochina goes, several things happen right away. The Malayan peninsula, the last little bit of the end hanging on down there, would be scarcely defensible ... all India would be outflanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, be no defense.”⁴ Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke in similar terms, with the latter telling Congress that defeat in Indochina could trigger a “chain reaction throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia.”⁵

4 Quoted in *Pentagon Papers*, vol. I, 591–92.

5 Allan B. Cole (ed.), *Conflict in Indo China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945–55* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 171.

It is curious that the passage of time since 1949 had only made US officials more attached to this kind of theorizing. Never mind that in no previous case had the fall of a country to Communism triggered the rapid fall of a whole string of other countries. Even in a weaker form, envisioning only a short row of dominoes, in this case only those countries nearby in Southeast Asia, the theory seemingly bore little relation to reality. China, the world's most populous country, had gone Communist in 1949, but that event had not caused dominoes to fall.

Just how much Eisenhower believed in a mechanistic domino theory is a matter of debate. But it's clear he endorsed the general proposition that Communism was expanding, and that this was dangerous and should be prevented. Hence, the close consideration he and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, gave to intervening militarily in Vietnam in the spring of 1954 – in April they asked Congress for authority to use, if necessary, US troops to save France's position. The lawmakers refused to go along unless the British also joined, and Winston Churchill's government declined, on the ground that the intervention might precipitate a disastrous war with China if not with the Soviet Union too. British officials were dubious in any case that limited military intervention had any real hope of salvaging the French position and, accordingly, pinned their hopes on a negotiated settlement. Eisenhower refused to go in alone, and no US military intervention occurred that spring.

Important though Cold War strategic concerns were in shaping Eisenhower's policy on Indochina in 1953–54, he – like all six US presidents between 1946 and 1975 – also acted partly out of domestic political concerns. Savvy politician that he was, Eisenhower understood that he could face criticism at home from two different directions if he downplayed Indochina's importance. On the one side, the American public and their representatives in Congress would be reluctant to allocate funds on a matter not deemed critically important to US national security concerns. On the other, McCarthyism remained a force to be reckoned with in American politics, and the president had no desire to see the "Who lost China?" question posed again, this time with respect to Vietnam. Eisenhower knew he was already suspect among some in the Republican old guard for agreeing to an armistice in Korea the previous summer – an action, they grumbled, that constituted snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Interregnum

On May 7, 1954, Giap's forces overran the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The following day, an international conference already in session in Geneva

began to discuss a basis for a ceasefire in the war. Although the conflict was approaching its climax and Vietminh leaders vowed to continue fighting until they won a definitive victory, there was reason to hope that a negotiated settlement might be possible. France was plainly losing the will to continue a war that many of its leaders doubted could be won. Many NATO powers wanted Paris to cut its losses in Southeast Asia to concentrate its attention instead on pressing matters close to home, such as the proposed European Defense Community. Neutralist Asian states likewise wanted an end to the fighting, which they saw as retarding the development of newly independent countries in South and Southeast Asia. Most important, both China and the Soviet Union saw, for different reasons, much to gain from a political settlement. Moscow leaders worried that a prolongation of the fighting would only increase Chinese and American influence in the region, while officials in Beijing saw in the Geneva Conference a chance to demonstrate simultaneously their great power credentials and avoid indefinitely matching in Indochina the stepped-up pace of US military aid, with the attendant risk of a general war.

The Vietminh and the Americans were less enthusiastic participants. Hanoi leaders were reluctant to agree to a compromise settlement when military victory seemed within reach but were persuaded by Moscow and Beijing to accept a settlement that left them in control of only a part of the country. Take one half of the loaf now, the Communist powers in effect told them, and count on getting the other in the not-too-distant future. The senior American representative at Geneva, Secretary of State Dulles, meanwhile had grave misgivings about the negotiations, and he encouraged the French to continue the struggle in Indochina in the interest of the "free world." The French refused, and after ten weeks a peace settlement was signed. Vietnam was partitioned at the seventeenth parallel pending nationwide elections in 1956. The Vietminh took control north of the parallel, while the southern portion came under the control of the Catholic nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem, who had the backing of the United States.

And with that, the struggle for Indochina entered a kind of interregnum; a war had ended but what replaced it was not quite peace. In the North, the DRV leadership set about consolidating its control, while Diem sought to do the same in the South. The Eisenhower administration, meanwhile, tried to salvage what it could from what senior officials considered a major Cold War setback for the United States. Accordingly, in September, it took the lead role in the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a largely toothless anti-Communist alliance intended to signal resolve to Beijing and Moscow. The other members were France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand,



20. French prisoners of war and their Vietnamese captors, July 1954. Losing the battle of Dien Bien Phu made France withdraw from Indochina.

Pakistan, and, as the only Southeast Asian representatives, Thailand and the Philippines. In South Vietnam, the administration moved swiftly to supplant French influence with American dollars, advisers, and *matériel*. All too aware that Ho Chi Minh would likely win a nationwide election, the administration supported Diem's refusal in 1955 to hold even the consultations with the DRV that had been envisioned in the Geneva Accords.

Diem's truculence caused consternation in the other major world capitals, but none of these governments were willing to push the matter. The new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev did not want a fracas over elections in Vietnam to interfere with his policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. Chinese officials also stayed largely silent, content to issue tepid protests. Britain, with the Soviet Union the sponsor of the Geneva Conference, initially worked to ensure the implementation of the accords, but backed off when Washington made its position clear. Prime Minister Anthony Eden griped that his government was being "treated like Australia" by the Americans, but he was not willing to risk a serious falling out with his powerful ally on account of Indochina.⁶ The July 1956 deadline for national elections in Vietnam came and went with no balloting taking place.

6 Anthony Eden, quoted in Arthur Combs, "The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to US Policy in Vietnam, 1954–1956," *Diplomatic History*, 19 (Winter 1995), 51.

The Saigon leader and his American patrons had what they wanted, and for a time it looked like the young Republic of (South) Vietnam would become a stable and prosperous entity. The other world powers seemed content to keep the country divided indefinitely, with the Soviets in 1957 even floating the idea of admitting both Vietnams into the United Nations. (The Western powers, fearful of the implications for Germany, said no thanks.) As American aid dollars, technical know-how, and products poured into the South in the second half of the 1950s, some US officials spoke hopefully about a “Diem miracle,” about South Vietnam being a “showcase” for America’s foreign aid program.

Appearances deceived. US aid, necessary though it was, inevitably fostered a dependent relationship, which undercut the Saigon government’s legitimacy with the southern populace. Though a man of principle and personal courage, Diem had a limited concept of political leadership and was inflexible and despotic. His policies – which favored the Catholic minority and showed little sensitivity to the needs of the Vietnamese people – alienated many. He demonstrated limited interest in enacting meaningful political reform. From time to time, American officials pushed him in that direction, but usually they got nowhere. Contrary to many historical accounts, it was Diem, not the United States, who was the dominant voice in South Vietnamese politics. Washington never had as much influence over Vietnamese affairs after 1955 as the French had before.

Slowly, beginning in 1957, a guerrilla insurgency arose in the South to challenge Diem’s rule. The fighters included former Vietminh who had remained in the South after partition, but also included new recruits, non-Communists alienated by Diem’s repressive actions. The insurgency was not imposed by Hanoi; on the contrary, the DRV leadership went through a wrenching series of deliberations about whether to support it, with some Politburo members arguing for the need to focus exclusively on building a socialist state in the North. Precisely when Hanoi leaders gave their approval for armed struggle in the South remains a matter of debate (many accounts point to the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee in early 1959), but give it they did, although through the end of 1960 Hanoi still emphasized the political over the military struggle. Only in January 1961 did the Politburo assert that “the revolution in the South is moving along the path toward a general insurrection with new characteristics, and the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution is now almost nonexistent.”⁷ Henceforth, military struggle should thus be placed on equal footing with political struggle.

7 *Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Nuoc 1954–1975* [The Anti American National Salvation Resistance 1954–1975] (Hanoi: Army Printing House, 1988), 81.

The Second Indochina War

By the start of 1961, then, the Second Indochina War was underway. A new American president, John F. Kennedy (JFK) took office at just this time, and Indochina was from the start an important foreign-policy issue for his administration. Initially, however, it was not Vietnam but Laos that loomed largest. Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva conferees in 1954, and Washington had thereafter sent aid and advisory personnel to try to secure stable, pro-Western rule in the small, landlocked country. The Vietnamese countered by building up the Pathet Lao in the east. By the time of Kennedy's inauguration, the US-sponsored government of Phoumi Nosavan faced imminent defeat at the hands of Pathet Lao guerrillas, heavily backed by the DRV. Outgoing president Eisenhower and several senior US officials urged JFK to intervene militarily, but he demurred, in part due to opposition from the British and French governments. Instead, Kennedy opted to back a Soviet-sponsored initiative to convene a new Geneva conference on Laos for the purpose of negotiating a settlement among the competing factions. In July 1962, a deal was signed. It did not bring lasting peace, but it did remove Laos from the list of Cold War hot spots.

For Kennedy, diplomacy seemed the only viable option on Laos. But he feared that by choosing this course he had opened himself up to charges of being "soft on communism" from his domestic opponents, many of whom were also attacking him for the failed effort to overthrow Fidel Castro in 1961. He determined to stand firm in Vietnam. The administration consequently stepped up aid dollars to the Diem regime, increased the air-dropping of raiding teams into North Vietnam, and launched crop destruction by herbicides to starve the Vietcong (as the insurgents in the South became known) and expose their hiding places. Kennedy also strengthened the US military presence in South Vietnam, to the point that by 1963 more than 16,000 military advisers were in the country, some authorized to take part in combat alongside the US-equipped Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

Meanwhile, opposition to Diem's repressive regime increased. Peasants objected to programs that removed them from their villages for their own safety, and Buddhist monks, protesting the Roman Catholic Diem's religious persecution, poured gasoline over their robes and ignited themselves in the streets of Saigon. Intellectuals complained that Diem countenanced corruption in his government and concentrated power in the hands of family and friends, and blasted his policy of jailing critics to silence them. Eventually US officials, with Kennedy's approval, encouraged dissident ARVN generals to

remove Diem and his influential brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. On November 1, 1963, the generals struck, ousting Diem and then murdering him and Nhu. Less than three weeks later Kennedy himself was assassinated in Dallas.

The timing and suddenness of Kennedy's death ensured that Vietnam would be a particularly controversial aspect of his legacy. Just what would have happened in Southeast Asia had Kennedy returned from Texas alive can never be known, of course, but that has not stopped historians (including this one) from speculating. Consensus is usually elusive in such counterfactual exercises, and even more so in this case given the contradictory nature of Kennedy's Vietnam policy. He expanded US involvement and approved a coup against Diem, but despite the periodic urgings of top advisers he refused to commit US ground forces to the struggle. Over time he became increasingly skeptical about South Vietnam's prospects and hinted that he would end the American commitment after winning reelection in 1964. Some authors have gone further and argued that he had commenced an American withdrawal from Vietnam even at the time of his death, but the evidence for this claim is thin. More likely, JFK arrived in Dallas still uncertain about how to solve his Vietnam problem, postponing – as veteran politicians often do – the truly difficult choices until later.

Lyndon Johnson (LBJ), too, sought to put off the tough decisions for as long as possible. In the early months, he viewed all Vietnam options through the lens of the 1964 election. "Stay the course" seemed to be the wisest strategy in that regard, far less risky than either precipitous withdrawal or major escalation. Yet Johnson also wanted victory, or at least to avoid defeat, which in practice amounted to the same thing. As a result, throughout 1964, the administration secretly planned for an expansion of the war to North Vietnam and never seriously considered negotiating a settlement. In early August, the president launched the first direct US military attacks on North Vietnam, after two American destroyers reported coming under attack in the Gulf of Tonkin. He did so despite conflicting evidence as to what had occurred in the Gulf and why. Johnson also pushed through Congress the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave him the authority to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." In so doing, Congress essentially surrendered its war-making powers to the executive branch. The resolution, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later noted, served "to open the floodgates."⁸

8 Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crown, 1995), 141.

Johnson, delighted with the broad authority the resolution gave him, also appreciated what the Gulf of Tonkin affair did for his political standing – his public approval ratings went up dramatically, and his show of force effectively removed Vietnam as a campaign issue for the Republican Party's presidential nominee Barry Goldwater. On the ground in South Vietnam, however, the outlook remained grim in the final weeks of 1964, as the Vietcong continued to make gains. US officials responded by fine-tuning the secret plans for an escalation of American involvement.

In Hanoi, as well, plans were laid in 1964 for stepped-up military action. Already in December 1963, in the aftermath of the Diem coup, DRV leaders had decided to escalate the fighting in the South, in the hopes that further deterioration would either cause the Americans to give up the ghost and go home or leave them insufficient time to embark on a major escalation of their own.

Having made this decision, Hanoi officials were slow to carry it out, in part because their allies in Beijing and Moscow urged caution. Neither Communist giant was keen to see an Americanized war in Vietnam, one that could confront them with difficult choices and potentially bring them into direct contact with the US Seventh Fleet. Their own bilateral relationship deeply fractious, they also each sought to keep the other from gaining too much influence in Hanoi. Both advised the DRV to go slowly, and to avoid provoking Washington. The North Vietnamese professed to agree, even as they used the final weeks of 1964 to step up the infiltration of men and *matériel* into the South. Premier Pham Van Dong said during a meeting with Mao Zedong in October 1964: "If the United States dares to start a [larger] war, we will fight it, and we will win it. But it would be better if it did not come to that."⁹

Americanization

But come to that it did. In early December, after Johnson's massive election victory, he and his aides agreed on a two-phase escalation of the fighting. The first involved "armed reconnaissance strikes" against infiltration routes in Laos – part of the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail that carried men and *matériel* into the South – as well as retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam in the event of a major Vietcong attack. The second phase anticipated "graduated military pressure" against the North, in the form of aerial bombing and,

9 O. A. Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg (eds.), *77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Vietnam*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 22 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998), 83–84.

almost certainly, the dispatch of US ground troops to the South. Phase one would begin as soon as possible; phase two would come later, after thirty days or more.

In February 1965, following Vietcong attacks on American installations in South Vietnam that killed thirty-two Americans, Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing program planned the previous fall that continued, more or less uninterrupted, until October 1968. Then, on March 8, the first US combat battalions came ashore near Danang. The North Vietnamese met the challenge. They hid in shelters and rebuilt roads and bridges with a tenaciousness that frustrated and awed American officials. They also increased infiltration into the South.

That July, Johnson convened a series of high-level discussions about US war policy. Though these deliberations had about them the character of a charade – Johnson wanted history to record that he agonized over a choice he had in fact already made (and many historians have obliged him) – they did confirm that the American commitment would be more or less open-ended. On July 28, the president publicly announced a significant troop increase, disclosing that others would follow. By the end of 1965, more than 180,000 US ground troops were in South Vietnam. In 1966, the figure climbed to 385,000. In 1967 alone, US war planes flew 108,000 sorties and dropped 226,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam. In 1968, US troop strength reached 536,100. The Soviet Union and China responded by increasing their material assistance to the DRV, though their combined amount never came close to matching American totals.

The 1965 Americanization came despite deep misgivings on the part of influential and informed voices at home and abroad. In the key months of decision (November 1964 through February 1965), Democratic leaders in the Senate, major newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, and prominent columnists like Walter Lippmann warned against deepening involvement (though, in the case of the lawmakers, they did so quietly, behind closed doors). Inside the administration, the opponents included Under Secretary of State George W. Ball and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. The latter assured Johnson that the Republican right's dismal showing in the November elections gave the administration ample maneuverability on Vietnam. Abroad, all of America's main allies cautioned against escalation and urged a political settlement, on the grounds that no military solution favorable to the United States was possible. Remarkably, even many of the proponents of the escalation shared this pessimism. They knew that the odds of success were not great, that the Saigon government was weak and getting weaker, lacking even the semblance of popular support.

Why, then, did Johnson and his advisers choose war? Think domino theory again, only in a new form. The worry now was less tangible, more amorphous than in the early 1950s, as US officials began to expound what Jonathan Schell has called the “psychological domino theory.”¹⁰ To be sure, from the start, the domino theory had contained an important psychological component; now, however, that component became supreme. *Credibility* was the new watchword, as policymakers declared it essential to stand firm in Vietnam in order to demonstrate America’s determination to defend its vital interests not only in the region but around the world. Should the United States waver in Vietnam, friends both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would doubt Washington’s commitment to their defense, and might succumb to enemy pressure even without a massive invasion by foreign Communist forces – what political scientists call a “bandwagon” effect. Adversaries, meanwhile, would be emboldened to challenge US interests worldwide.

Vietnam, in this way of thinking, was a “test case” of Washington’s willingness and ability to exert its power on the international stage. Even the incontrovertible evidence of a deep Sino-Soviet split, which affected the strategic balance in the Cold War in the mid-1960s in serious ways, evidently did not lessen the importance of the credibility imperative. Beijing appeared to be the more hostile and aggressive of the two Communist powers, the more deeply committed to global revolution, but the Soviets, too, supported Hanoi; any slackening in the American commitment to South Vietnam’s defense could cause an increase in Soviet adventurism. Conversely, if Washington stood firm and worked to ensure the survival of a non-Communist Saigon government, it could send a powerful message to Moscow and Beijing that indirect aggression could not succeed.

Many of the aforementioned opponents of the 1965 escalation rejected this line of argument. They rebuffed the notion that US credibility was on the line in Vietnam and that a setback there would inevitably cause similar losses elsewhere. Some said US credibility would *suffer* if Johnson made Vietnam a large-scale war, as audiences around the world questioned Washington’s judgment and its sense of priorities. On occasion, top officials allowed that the critics might be right, but they pressed the credibility argument anyway. One reason was that for many of them, it was not merely *America’s* credibility that was perceived to be at stake; it was also the administration’s *domestic political* credibility and officials’ own *personal* credibility. Johnson

¹⁰ Jonathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York: Knopf, 1976), 9.

worried that failure in Vietnam would harm his domestic agenda; even more, he feared the personal humiliation he imagined would inevitably accompany a defeat – and for him, a negotiated withdrawal constituted defeat. Senior advisers, meanwhile, many of whom had for years publicly trumpeted Vietnam's importance, knew that to start singing a different tune now would expose themselves to potential ridicule and endanger their careers.

What, then, of the stated objective of helping a South Vietnamese ally repulse external aggression? That too figured into the equation, but not as much as it would have had the Saigon government – racked with infighting among senior and mid-level officials and possessing little broad-based support – done more to assist in its own defense. Talented and courageous anti-Communists dedicated to the war effort certainly existed in the South, including in the halls of power, but never in sufficient numbers, even after the ascension to power in 1965 of a more stable regime under Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Thieu. The Ky–Thieu government, a rueful Robert McNamara would remark two years later, in June 1967, “is still largely corrupt, incompetent, and unresponsive to the needs and wishes of the people.”¹¹

To the Paris Accords

The American forces fought well, and their entry into the conflict in 1965, together with the aerial bombardment of enemy areas, helped stave off a South Vietnamese defeat. In that sense, Americanization achieved its most immediate and basic objective. But if the stepped-up fighting in 1965–66 demonstrated to Hanoi leaders that the war would not swiftly be won, it also showed the same thing to their counterparts in Washington. Chinese and Soviet military and economic aid now flowed into North Vietnam in increased amounts, and Beijing also sent – beginning in June 1965 – support units to assist the war effort. Until March 1968 they would come, ultimately totaling some 320,000 troops – including anti-aircraft artillery units, defense engineering units, railway units, and road-building units.

As the North Vietnamese matched each American escalation with one of their own, the war became a stalemate. The US commander, General William Westmoreland, proved mistaken in his belief that a strategy of attrition

¹¹ Robert McNamara, quoted in Larry Berman, *Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam* (New York: Norton, 1989), 51.

represented the key to victory – the enemy had a seemingly endless supply of recruits to throw into battle. Worse, the American reliance on massive military and other technology – including carpet bombing, napalm, and crop defoliants that destroyed entire forests – alienated many South Vietnamese and brought new recruits to the Vietcong. A major Communist offensive coinciding with the Tet lunar New Year in early 1968, though inconclusive in its military effects, inflamed American domestic opinion and indirectly caused an embattled LBJ to rule out (publicly at least) a run for reelection.

This was the situation that confronted Richard Nixon when he assumed the presidency in January 1969. “I’m not going to end up like LBJ,” Nixon vowed before the inauguration, recalling that the war had destroyed Johnson’s political career. “I’m going to stop that war. Fast.” He didn’t, and the main reason is he wanted to win it first. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, understood that the conflict was generating deep divisions at home and hurting the nation’s image abroad, and that they had to begin withdrawing American troops. The difficulties of the war signified to them that American power was limited and, in relative terms, in decline. Yet the two men feared, just like the Johnson team before them, that a precipitous disengagement would harm American credibility on the world stage. Nor were they any less committed than their predecessors to preserving an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam, if not indefinitely then at least long enough to get Nixon reelected. To accomplish these aims, Nixon set upon a policy that at once contracted and expanded the war.

A centerpiece of Nixon’s policy was “Vietnamization” – the building up of South Vietnamese forces to replace US forces. Nixon hoped such a policy would quiet domestic opposition and also advance the peace talks underway in Paris since May 1968. Accordingly, the president began to withdraw American troops from Vietnam, decreasing their number from 543,000 in the spring of 1969 to 156,800 by the end of 1971, and to 60,000 by the fall of 1972. Vietnamization did help limit domestic dissent – as did replacing the existing draft with a lottery system, by which only those nineteen-year-olds with low lottery numbers would be drafted – but it did nothing to end the stalemate in the Paris negotiations. Even as he embarked on this troop withdrawal, therefore, Nixon intensified the bombing of North Vietnam and enemy supply depots in neighboring Cambodia, hoping to pound Hanoi into concessions. When the North Vietnamese refused to buckle, Nixon turned up the heat: in April 1970, South Vietnamese and US forces invaded Cambodia in search of arms depots and North Vietnamese army sanctuaries.

The president announced publicly that he would not allow “the world’s most powerful nation” to act “like a pitiful, helpless giant.” Maybe not, but the invasion triggered nationwide protests in cities and on college campuses, and caused an angry US Senate to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964. After two months, US troops withdrew from Cambodia, having accomplished little. Another invasion the following year, this one into Laos and involving no regular US ground troops, likewise yielded no appreciable results.

The fighting continued through 1972, but there was also a diplomatic breakthrough. When Hanoi launched a major offensive across the border into South Vietnam in March, Nixon responded with a massive aerial onslaught against the DRV. In December 1972, after an apparent peace agreement collapsed when the South Vietnamese refused to moderate their position, the United States again launched a furious air assault on the North – the so-called “Christmas bombing.” Months earlier, Kissinger and his North Vietnamese counterpart in the negotiations, Le Duc Tho, had resolved many of the outstanding issues. Most notably, Kissinger agreed that North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South after the settlement, and Tho abandoned Hanoi’s insistence that the Saigon government of Nguyen Van Thieu be removed. Nixon had instructed Kissinger to make concessions because the president was eager to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, to win back the allegiance of the United States’ allies, and to restore stability at home. On January 27, 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho signed a ceasefire agreement in Paris. Nixon then compelled a reluctant Thieu to accept it by threatening to cut off US aid while promising to defend the South if the North violated the agreement. In the accord, the United States promised to withdraw all of its troops within sixty days. North Vietnamese troops would be allowed to stay in South Vietnam, and a coalition government that included the Vietcong eventually would be formed in the South.

The United States pulled its troops out of Vietnam, leaving behind some military advisers. Soon, both North and South violated the ceasefire, and large-scale fighting resumed. The feeble Saigon government, whose military by the start of 1975 possessed a huge numerical advantage in tanks, artillery pieces, and combat-ready troops, could not hold out. Just before its surrender, hundreds of Americans and Vietnamese who had worked for them were hastily evacuated from Saigon. On April 29, 1975, the South Vietnamese government collapsed, and Vietnam was reunified under a Communist government in Hanoi.

The end came even sooner in Cambodia. The Nixon-ordered invasion of 1970 had set in motion a bloody five-year civil war between a US-sponsored



21. Vietnamese try to get on-board a US helicopter sent to evacuate CIA personnel from a building in Saigon, April 29, 1975. The manner of the US exit from Vietnam was humiliating to many Americans and disastrous to the Vietnamese who had collaborated with the United States.

government under Lon Nol and the Communist-led Khmer Rouge. Massive American bombing of Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese positions in Cambodia propped up the Lon Nol government for a time but devastated Cambodian society in the process. The physical destruction was enormous, and many hundreds of thousands of refugees flooded Phnom Penh and a few other urban centers. Upon returning from a visit to the war-torn country in early 1975, Republican congressman Paul N. McCloskey said: In Cambodia, the United States had done “greater evil than we have done to any country in the world, and wholly without reason, except for our benefit to fight against the Vietnamese.”¹² On April 1, 1975 Lon Nol relinquished power and fled the country for Hawaii; on the tenth, US president Gerald Ford ordered the evacuation of all remaining American personnel; and on the seventeenth, the Khmer Rouge triumphantly entered the capital.

Indochina’s third domino fell with much less violence and destruction. In early 1973, soon after the signing of the Paris Accords, Laotian prime

12. Quoted in Arnold R. Isaacs, *Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 273.

minister Souvanna Phouma reached a ceasefire deal with the Pathet Lao that gave the Communists a dominant position in Vientiane's coalition government. The departure of the United States further strengthened the position of the Pathet Lao, and following the Communist takeovers in Vietnam and Cambodia in April 1975, the non-Communist leaders fled for Thailand. That December the Pathet Lao announced the creation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Truong Chinh's dream of a revolutionary Indochina seemed to have come true.

Indochina and the Cold War

Outside Indochina, however, the dominoes did not fall, and it remains to assess the conception of Indochina as a Cold War battleground – a conception that took shape first in Washington, as we have seen, early in the Franco-Vietminh struggle, and was crucially important to all that occurred in Indochina for the next quarter-century. Ho Chi Minh was a pawn of the Kremlin, so went the argument, and his struggle was one part of a global, Soviet-directed offensive; as such, he had to be stopped. This view of the stakes always had its critics, inside and outside the American government, and it was never a widely held view in official Paris. In retrospect, moreover, it looks decidedly dubious. Stalin had minimal interest in Indochina and, indeed, saw the conflict there as a nuisance. Neither he nor his Kremlin successors had major ambitions in that part of the world, and they sought at all times to avoid a major East–West military showdown over Vietnam. DRV leadership, meanwhile, though dependent on Soviet and Chinese aid after US assistance began flowing to the French, always had considerable (though never complete) success keeping its powerful patrons at arm's length.

There's a deeper problem here. It is not at all clear that had Paris and Washington opted against war, other powers would have concluded that the credibility of US and French commitments elsewhere in the world would be grievously damaged. Harry Truman, it is well to recall, had not vowed to keep China from going Communist in 1949, and that defeat caused no meaningful pro-Moscow realignment in the international system. Nor had the "loss" of Cuba a decade later caused dominoes to fall in Latin America. By the same token, Nikita Khrushchev's humiliation in Cuba in 1962 did not mean that the United States was free to run rampant in Eastern Europe. Nor had French prestige suffered when Charles de Gaulle withdrew from an untenable position in Algeria; if anything, it rose. The list goes on. As George Ball put it

in June 1965 in arguing (too late, as it turned out) against Americanization: “[N]o great captain has ever been blamed for a successful tactical withdrawal.”¹³

By their repeated public vows of determination regarding Indochina, French and American leaders backed themselves into a corner and reduced their maneuverability. And not merely in geopolitical terms: for successive American administrations, as for many of the governments of the French Fourth Republic, Indochina’s importance derived in large measure from the effects failure there could have at home, on elections, on political alignments and agendas, on individual careers. What James C. Thomson, Jr., said of the Vietnam-era US presidents could be said also of French leaders in 1946–54: they feared they were the last domino in line. From 1947 onwards, officials in Paris and Washington always publicly defined the struggle in Cold War terms, in terms of stopping the spread of Moscow-directed Communist expansion. It was a foreign-policy rationale, and it was indeed one reason for the long and bloody and ultimately unsuccessful effort aimed at defeating the forces of Ho Chi Minh. But only one. Other factors also shaped policy, notably careerist and domestic political calculations.

For Ho Chi Minh, too, the Cold War was an early and constant preoccupation, presenting a range of problems, challenges, and opportunities. Like Sukarno in Indonesia, Ho moved quickly after Japan’s capitulation to seek American assistance, framing his request in terms of Washington’s historic anticolonialism and support for self-determination. Like Sukarno, Ho was disappointed when US leaders chose instead to back their European Cold War allies. But whereas Sukarno subsequently proved his anti-Communist bona fides by suppressing internal Communist bids for primacy in the larger Indonesian independence movement, thereby ultimately earning the Truman administration’s backing for independence from the Dutch (granted in 1949), Ho, the veteran Comintern agent and Indochina Communist Party founder, turned instead to Moscow and Beijing. Their assistance was vital but came at a price: the DRV, as a member of the Communist bloc after 1950, would be unable to use the international system to full effect against France and, indeed, had now to contend with a hostile United States. To a degree not fully evident at the time, the superpower actions in Indochina in 1950 had the effect of intensifying the struggle and prolonging it, and of reducing (but not eliminating) the freedom of action of both France and the DRV.

13 George Ball, “Cutting Our Losses in Vietnam,” June 28, 1965, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995), vol. III, 222.

Through it all, year after bloody year, DRV leaders persevered, mobilizing every available resource for the struggle, first against France, then the United States and its Saigon ally. Victory would come in the end, on a spring day in 1975, almost three decades after Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence. Ho himself would not live to see it. It would be left to colleagues to preside over the celebrations, and to tally up the enormous costs of thirty years of war.

The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David Accords

DOUGLAS LITTLE

The Cold War saw deepening Soviet–American rivalry in the Middle East from the mid-1950s to the late 1970s on three levels – a geopolitical struggle to recruit allies and secure access to strategic resources (especially oil); diplomatic maneuvers to prevent the Arab–Israeli conflict from escalating into a super-power confrontation; and ideological competition for the future of the Muslim world, where secular nationalists and Islamic radicals shook the foundations of colonial empires and absolute monarchies throughout the region. On three occasions – the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1967 Six Day War, and the October 1973 War – hostilities between Israel and its Arab enemies disrupted world oil supplies, forced Washington and Moscow to contemplate military intervention, and briefly sparked fears of nuclear Armageddon. Once the shooting stopped in late 1973, American policymakers undertook “shuttle diplomacy” between Middle Eastern capitals, prompting the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to lift their oil embargo on the United States, reducing the Kremlin’s influence among Arab nationalists, and inducing Israel to be more flexible on territorial issues, all of which paved the way for the Camp David summit in September 1978. Diplomatic progress on the Arab–Israeli front, however, was undermined by the Islamic upheavals that rocked Iran and its Muslim neighbors during the late 1970s.

The early Cold War in the Middle East

Because the United States was preoccupied during the early years of the Cold War with crises in Europe and Asia, the Harry S. Truman administration expected Britain to promote and protect Western interests in the Middle East. US expectations notwithstanding, the financial and political consequences of World War II forced UK policymakers to reassess their imperial policies, not only in Asia and Africa but also in the Middle East. In Palestine, where Britain

had held a League of Nations mandate for a quarter-century, civil war loomed between Jews and Arabs, each of whom was determined to establish an independent state. Unwilling to bear the costs of empire in the Holy Land, Whitehall turned the problem over to the United Nations (UN), whose plan to partition Palestine paved the way for the creation of Israel in May 1948. Despite Arab objections, the United States recognized the new Jewish state immediately, at least in part, as Truman's counsel Clark Clifford put it, "to steal a march on [the] U.S.S.R.," which had been supporting Zionism as a way to undermine British influence in the region.¹ Meanwhile, Britain's economic interests came under fire a thousand miles to the east in Iran, where in 1951 nationalists led by Mohammad Mossadeq seized control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which provided more than half of the petroleum consumed in the British Isles. Mistakenly interpreting the nationalization of AIOC as a sign that Iran was about to align itself with the Soviet Union, British and American intelligence secretly organized a coup d'état and deposed Mossadeq in August 1953. Having helped Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the pro-Western shah of Iran, regain undisputed power in Tehran, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration persuaded Whitehall reluctantly to relinquish AIOC's monopoly over Iranian oil in favor of a new international consortium dominated by US petroleum giants.

Nowhere in the Middle East did the British Empire have more at stake, however, than in Egypt, where the Suez Canal had served as an imperial lifeline facilitating the flow of oil, trade, and troops for seventy-five years. Because Britain exercised what amounted to a protectorate over the nominally independent Egyptian monarchy, the canal was operated by an Anglo-French company and was protected by 30,000 British Tommies stationed at the Suez base, which during the early years of the Cold War also served as home to a Royal Air Force squadron whose atomic bombs were targeted at the Soviet Union. In July 1952, a group of young officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser seized power in Cairo and vowed to reduce British influence. A secular revolutionary and self-proclaimed pan-Arab nationalist, Nasser pressed Britain in 1954 to withdraw from its Suez base and sought military assistance from the United States a year later following an Israeli attack on Egyptian troops in Gaza. After Washington declined to provide arms, Nasser swapped Egyptian cotton for Eastern bloc weapons provided by Czechoslovakia in September

¹ Clark Clifford, quoted in George Elsey's memorandum of conversation, May 12, 1948, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), vol. V, 976 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

1955. His larger goal was not to become a Soviet satellite but rather to place Egypt at the center of three circles – Africa, the Arab world, and the emerging Non-Aligned Movement. With Kremlin support for Israel now ancient history, the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was happy to oblige by providing guns and rubles to Nasser, whom he intended to groom as a poster boy among Third World nationalists during the mid-1950s. Indeed, Nasser's support for non-aligned radicals like Indonesia's Sukarno and his opposition to Western regional defense organizations like the recently established British-backed Baghdad Pact fit well with Soviet plans to pit the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia against the European colonial powers and their American allies.

Determined to prevent Russian encroachments in the Middle East, President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and their British counterparts employed economic aid to draw Egypt back toward the West. The United States, Britain, and the World Bank offered Nasser \$200 million to build a high dam on the Upper Nile at Aswan, a monumental public works project that would rival the pyramids in its scope and, by controlling seasonal flooding, increase cotton production and generate vast amounts of hydro-electric power. There were implicit strings attached, however. Nasser must tone down his anti-Israeli rhetoric, he must take part in secret peace negotiations with Israel's prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, and he must distance himself from the Kremlin. Nasser's actions during the spring of 1956 gave neither the White House nor Whitehall much cause for optimism. In quick succession, the Egyptian leader refused face-to-face talks with Ben-Gurion, encouraged Jordan's King Hussein to expel British military advisers from Amman, and recognized the People's Republic of China. US and UK officials soon concluded that what Nasser liked to call "neutralism" was really a smoke screen for Soviet subversion in the Middle East.

By the summer of 1956, the Aswan Dam project was dead on arrival both in Washington and London. On Capitol Hill, pressure was building to pull the plug, not only among Republican anti-Communists linked to the China Lobby, but also among southern Democrats, who worried that Egypt's expanded cotton crop would flood the American market, and friends of Israel in both parties, who regarded Nasser as "Hitler on the Nile." On the other side of the Atlantic, Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd questioned Nasser's bona fides and promoted pro-Western moderates like Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said to curtail the spread of Pan-Arabism throughout the region. On July 19, Eisenhower decided that "we should withdraw the U.S. offer." After alerting Whitehall, John Foster Dulles informed the

Egyptian ambassador that “no single project was as unpopular today as the Aswan Dam.” Even if American officials regarded Egypt as creditworthy (and Dulles emphasized that they did not), the United States was no longer willing to provide financial support.²

Nasser was not surprised by America’s decision, but he did resent the abrupt and condescending manner in which it was communicated. To prepare for just such an eventuality, he had quietly secured a \$400 million commitment from the Kremlin in early June. Bolstered by Soviet military and economic aid, on July 26 Nasser announced that Egypt was expropriating the Anglo-French company that operated the Suez Canal and would use the tolls to finance the Aswan Dam. British officials were apoplectic. During a late-night cabinet meeting, Anthony Eden and his colleagues vowed never to accept Egyptian control of the waterway and “agreed that our essential interests in this area must, if necessary, be safeguarded by military action.”³ Eisenhower also regarded Nasser’s actions as outrageous, but he worried that armed intervention would backfire and instructed Dulles to seek a diplomatic solution. While the diplomats talked, the Egyptians made certain not to disrupt the oil tankers passing through the canal, reinforcing the American view that any resort to military force would be misguided and premature. Should Britain and France send in troops, Eisenhower cautioned Eden on September 2, “the peoples of the Near East and of North Africa and, to some extent, of all of Asia and all of Africa, would be consolidated against the West to a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation and, perhaps, not even in a century particularly having in mind the capacity of the Russians to make mischief.”⁴ Counseling patience, US policymakers believed that the crisis could be resolved by diplomacy and covert action. “The Americans’ main contention,” Eden remarked privately on September 23, “is that we can bring Nasser down by degrees rather on the Mossadegh lines.”⁵

Unknown to Eisenhower and Dulles, however, Britain and France were conspiring to regain control of the Suez Canal by force with help from Israel. Anthony Eden was desperate to show the world that Britain was still a great

2 Memorandum of conversation between John Foster, Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 19, 1956, and Dulles memorandum of conversation, July 19, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XV, 862, 867-73.

3 Anthony Eden, quoted in Cabinet Minutes, July 27, 1956, CM(56)54, CAB 128/30, Public Record Office (PRO), National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey.

4 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Anthony Eden, September 2, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, 355-58.

5 Anthony Eden to Harold MacMillan, September 23, 1956, vol. 740, Selwyn Lloyd Papers, FO800, PRO.

power, Prime Minister Guy Mollet was eager to curtail Egyptian support for nationalist guerrillas seeking to drive France out of Algeria, and David Ben-Gurion was determined to force Nasser to open the Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. On October 23, British, French, and Israeli officials met secretly at Sèvres just outside Paris to approve an elaborate tripartite scheme. Israel would invade Egypt and march to the Suez Canal, Britain and France would demand that both sides pull back ten miles from the waterway, and when Nasser balked at withdrawing Egyptian forces from their own territory, British troops with logistical support from the French would intervene. Six days later, the Israelis staged a lightning attack, Eden and Mollet issued their ultimatums, and Nasser scuttled several Egyptian freighters to block the Suez Canal. When Nasser's Syrian allies blew up a British-owned pipeline that carried Iraqi petroleum to the Mediterranean, the oil crisis that Britain and France had hoped to avoid suddenly materialized.

The American response was clear and consistent from the very outset. Washington sought an immediate ceasefire under UN auspices, warned London and Paris not to send in troops, and worked to prevent Moscow from intervening. Outraged by the timing of the crisis, which came just one week before the US presidential election, Eisenhower insisted that whatever happened on November 6, he would condemn the Israelis as aggressors if they did not cease and desist. He was also "extremely angry with both the British and French," who "should be left to work out their own oil problems – to boil in their own oil, so to speak," should they seek emergency access to American petroleum reserves.⁶ Meanwhile, Soviet leaders were eager to divert attention from their own impending military intervention to depose a reformist regime in Hungary. To this end, Khrushchev embraced Nasser, issued thinly veiled nuclear threats against Britain and France, and offered to send in Russian "peacekeepers" to guarantee regional stability. "It is nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe," Dulles told the National Security Council as the Suez crisis came to a climax, "we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from their course."⁷

6 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in Andrew Goodpaster's memorandum of conversation, October 30, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. XVI, 873-74.

7 John Foster Dulles, quoted in minutes of the 302nd NSC meeting, November 1, 1956, *ibid.*, 902-16.

As painful as the choice was, when Whitehall pressed on and tried to retake the canal with gunboats, bombers, and paratroops, the White House employed financial leverage to force the British to stop shooting and start withdrawing from Egypt. Having halted Britain's armed intervention and removed the specter of Soviet troops in the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration managed to reclaim the moral high ground against the Soviets, who were ruthlessly shooting their way back into Budapest at a cost of 4,000 Hungarian dead. The biggest challenge the United States faced, however, was Israel, which refused to pull its troops out of the Sinai and Gaza until Eisenhower threatened to impose economic sanctions in February 1957. Even then, Ben-Gurion would not budge until the UN agreed to station blue-helmeted observers along the Egyptian frontier and the United States guaranteed Israel's right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran.

Seriously at odds with its friends in London and Tel Aviv and deeply mistrustful of the nationalist regime in Cairo, Washington worried that Moscow might move into the vacuum in early 1957. "The leaders of the Soviet Union, like the Czars before them," Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs, "had their eyes on the Middle East," where in the wake of the Suez crisis they intended "to seize the oil, to cut the Canal and pipelines ..., and thus seriously to weaken Western civilization."⁸ One option for containing the Soviets was formal US membership in the Baghdad Pact, but American policymakers worried that this step would merely drive Nasser more rapidly into the Kremlin's orbit. The preferred option at the White House was what would come to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, based on a joint resolution approved by Congress in March 1957, providing up to \$200 million in US economic aid and authorizing the use of American troops to assist any Middle Eastern nation threatened by "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."⁹

Ironically, Moscow's policies in the Arab world were somewhat less aggressive than Washington imagined. To be sure, Khrushchev proved quite willing to replenish Egypt's depleted arsenal, but he rejected a Syrian request for Soviet MIGs, and pilots to fly them, in March 1957 because this "might involve negative consequences for both the Arab states and the Soviet Union."¹⁰ The

8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace 1956-61* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 177-78.

9 Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 132-33.

10 Moscow Foreign Ministry to embassy, Damascus, March 27, 1957, quoted in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006), 143.

Kremlin's more cautious approach stemmed not only from a growing awareness that Eisenhower was deadly serious about using military force to protect American interests in the Middle East, but also from a growing suspicion that Nasser's Pan-Arabism might ultimately prove incompatible with Communism.

Nevertheless, many in Washington suspected that the radical regimes in Damascus and Cairo were likely to become Soviet satellites and worked behind the scenes to build up pro-Western moderates like Saudi Arabia's King Saud and Jordan's King Hussein as Muslim counterweights to Nasser. Once Syria agreed in February 1958 to join Egypt as part of the newly created United Arab Republic (UAR), however, pro-Nasser Muslims next door in Lebanon challenged the authority of President Camille Chamoun, a Christian strongman with close ties to the Eisenhower administration. When left-wing Iraqi officers overthrew Nuri Said and the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad on July 14, 1958, Chamoun panicked and warned Washington that his own regime was now threatened by international Communism. The next day, Eisenhower sent 14,000 US Marines to Beirut, where they remained for five months without suffering a single casualty.

Although Soviet leaders had not orchestrated events in Baghdad, they welcomed the revolution and worried that American intervention in Lebanon might be merely the prelude to an assault on Iraq. "The destruction of Iraq," Khrushchev told his colleagues on July 18, "would be a reversal for the national self-determination movement in the Arab world" and a blow to the Kremlin's prestige.¹¹ The Eisenhower administration never seriously considered invading Iraq, but Dulles did confirm that sending US troops to Lebanon was linked to American credibility, not only in the Middle East but throughout the Third World. "Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would feel – if we do not act – that our inaction is because we are afraid of the Soviet Union," Dulles explained to congressional leaders. "Elsewhere, the impact of not going in – from Morocco to Indo-China – would be very harmful to us."¹² Privately, however, senior US policymakers confirmed that the real sources of Lebanese political instability were Chamoun's own autocratic policies, the smoldering antagonism between Christians and Muslims, and the magnetic appeal of Nasserism. "Nasser has won the enthusiastic and even idolatrous support of the largely illiterate populations in the region," Eisenhower acknowledged on July 18, by relying on "the slogan of nationalism, which is one force stronger than communism."¹³ And as Under

¹¹ N. Khrushchev, quoted in *ibid.*, 182.

¹² Andrew Goodpaster, memorandum of conversation, July 14, 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–1960, vol. XI, 219.

¹³ Eisenhower to Macmillan, telegram, July 18, 1958, *ibid.*, 330.

Secretary of State Christian Herter pointed out, this meant that “we have to find some way to accommodate ourselves to Pan-Arabism.”¹⁴

For the next two years, the Eisenhower administration sought an accommodation with Nasser, the most vocal advocate of Pan-Arabism. To this end, the United States kept its distance from Israel while making surplus American wheat available to Egypt on favorable terms under the auspices of Public Law 480 (PL 480), the “Food for Peace Program.” In September 1960, Eisenhower and Nasser met for the first and only time following a tumultuous session of the UN General Assembly, memorable chiefly for Khrushchev’s shoe-thumping opposition to Western intervention in the former Belgian Congo. Although there was no meeting of the minds about the Arab–Israeli conflict or the Congolese civil war, Eisenhower promised to “respect the UAR position as a neutral” so long as it did not “com[e] under Soviet domination” and Nasser headed home hoping for better relations with Washington.¹⁵

To the Six Day War

How best to reverse recent Soviet gains in the Congo and other Third World trouble spots like Cuba was a hot-button issue in John F. Kennedy’s victorious presidential campaign in 1960. Although the Massachusetts Democrat was preoccupied with crises in the Caribbean, Africa, and Southeast Asia, he was determined to expand Eisenhower’s rapprochement with Nasser, who proved quite willing to put the question of Israel “in the ice box” after the Kennedy administration offered Egypt a three-year \$500 million aid package. As grateful as he was for US economic assistance, however, Nasser was not about to abandon Pan-Arabism, especially after Syria seceded from the UAR and Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the heir apparent to King Saud, challenged Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world. During the summer of 1962, Nasser hired West German scientists to develop short-range missiles, asked the Soviet Union for medium-range bombers, and stepped up his long-distance exhortations for revolutionary change in Riyadh.

In late September, pro-Nasser officers seized power in Yemen, a remote land in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula whose ruling family had close ties to the House of Saud. Fearful that Saudi Arabia might be next,

¹⁴ Christian Herter testimony, July 16, 1958, US Congress, Senate, *Executive Sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, 10, 535.

¹⁵ Andrew Goodpastor, memorandum of conversation, September 28, 1960, “United Arab Republic File,” International Series, AWF, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (DDEL).

Crown Prince Faisal began running guns to royalist guerrillas inside Yemen and ignited a proxy war with Nasser, who sent 60,000 troops and several squadrons of Soviet-made aircraft to support the new Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Preoccupied with resolving a nuclear crisis halfway around the world in Cuba, the White House publicly recognized the YAR while privately urging Faisal to stop the flow of Saudi arms and Nasser to start withdrawing his troops. After Egyptian bombers struck royalist base camps inside Saudi Arabia in early 1963, however, Kennedy agreed to provide Faisal with a squadron of US air force jets as a deterrent. Before the year was out, American and Egyptian pilots were playing a high-altitude game of cat and mouse along the Saudi–Yemeni border and Congress was on the verge of banning PL-480 wheat shipments to Egypt.

Relations between Cairo and Washington deteriorated rapidly once Lyndon B. Johnson moved into the White House. Irritated by what he regarded as American economic blackmail, Nasser tilted toward the Soviet Union in 1964, welcoming Khrushchev to Cairo in May to celebrate the completion of the Aswan Dam, endorsing the Kremlin's call for "wars of national liberation" from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, and heralding the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jerusalem. After an Egyptian mob sacked the offices of the US Information Agency in Cairo in December, Johnson froze American grain deliveries. Nasser responded by inviting the Vietcong to open an embassy in Egypt in the spring of 1965 and requesting more military hardware from Moscow. To make matters worse, Hafez al-Assad and the Ba'ath party, a pro-Nasser organization that preached state socialism and Arab unity, seized power in Damascus in February 1966 and quickly concluded an arms deal with the Kremlin that would bring Syria hundreds of tanks and a squadron of MIG-21 jet fighters.

While the Soviets were moving closer to Nasser and the Arab radicals, the Americans were moving closer to the Israelis. Because 1966 would see off-year elections whose outcome might erode congressional support for the war in Vietnam, Johnson was especially sensitive to the security concerns of Israel, whose friends on Capitol Hill could be very helpful on broader diplomatic and defense issues. Geopolitics, however, was at least as important as domestic politics in the emerging "special relationship" between America and Israel. With nearly half a million GI's fighting in Southeast Asia and with the Soviet Union calling for wars of national liberation in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, a well-armed Israel could be a real strategic asset for the United States. Moreover, the White House hoped that by providing the Israelis with conventional military hardware, they would be less likely to develop nuclear

weapons. With all this in mind, Johnson approved the sale of 210 tanks to Israel in April 1965 and 48 A-4 Skyhawk jet fighters a year later. When PLO guerrillas attacked Israeli villages from base camps in Jordan, Israel struck back, destroying the town of Samua in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank in November 1966. And when Syrian artillery began to shell northern Israel in solidarity with the PLO early in the new year, Tel Aviv prepared to strike back again, this time with Washington's blessing. "The Syrians are sons of bitches," a top Pentagon official told Foreign Minister Golda Meir in March 1967. "Why the hell didn't you beat them over the head when it would have been the most natural thing to do?"¹⁶

Two months later, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol hinted that Israel's ultimate objective might indeed be regime change in Syria. The Kremlin vowed to defend its new friends in Damascus and warned Nasser that the Israelis had actually mobilized fifteen brigades for an attack on the Golan Heights. Israel strongly denied that it was preparing to invade Syria, and most observers and historians have confirmed that Moscow exaggerated the threat, perhaps purposely, in an effort to stir up trouble for Washington in the Middle East.¹⁷ Based on what was at best misinformation and at worst disinformation, Nasser mobilized the Egyptian army in mid-May, demanded that the United Nations withdraw the observers it had stationed in Gaza and the Sinai ever since the Suez crisis, and closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping, something that Levi Eshkol and his colleagues regarded as an act of war. For three weeks, the Johnson administration pressed Israel not to attack and urged the Kremlin to help persuade Egypt to reopen the straits.

Time ran out at dawn on June 5, when dozens of jets marked with the Star of David knocked out Nasser's air force on the tarmac while hundreds of Israeli tanks smashed through Egyptian front lines in the Sinai, seized Gaza, and raced west through sand dunes and scrub brush toward the Suez Canal. Convinced by back-channel signals from the United States that Israel would not strike first, Nasser angrily appealed to the Soviet Union and to other Arab states for help. While the Kremlin condemned Israel as an aggressor and called for a ceasefire, Jordan's King Hussein sent his army into action against the Jewish state, an ill-advised act of inter-Arab solidarity that would backfire when Israeli forces counterattacked, seizing East Jerusalem and occupying the rest of the West Bank. Meanwhile, pro-Nasser demonstrations in Libya and

¹⁶ Townsend Hoopes quoted in Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford, 2002), 45.

¹⁷ Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six Day War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 1 (Winter 2006), 6-8.

Kuwait forced these two staunchly pro-Western regimes briefly to halt oil exports to the United States and sparked calls in other Arab capitals for a much broader embargo. When Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan sent Israeli troops into the Golan Heights on June 9 in a bid for regime change in Syria, which had heeded the Kremlin's advice and remained on the sidelines during the previous four days, the war threatened to escalate into a superpower confrontation. "The Soviets [had] hinted," Secretary of State Dean Rusk recalled grimly in his memoirs, "that if the Israelis attacked Syria, they would intervene with their own forces."¹⁸

Eager to avert a more serious crisis, the Johnson administration pressed Israel to accept a UN-sanctioned ceasefire on June 10. With Israeli forces just forty miles from Damascus, Aleksei Kosygin, Khrushchev's successor as Soviet premier, used the "hot line" to warn the White House that Soviet intervention was imminent. Lyndon Johnson decided to call the Kremlin's bluff and sent the US Sixth Fleet into the war zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the eleventh hour, Israel accepted the ceasefire, Kosygin backtracked, and as one White House aide put it, "everyone relaxed a bit as it became clear that the fighting was petering out."¹⁹ When the shooting finally stopped the next day, the Israelis controlled Gaza, the Sinai, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights while Nasser was thoroughly humiliated. Johnson was quite pleased that the Egyptian leader had been "cut down to size," but he was also frustrated by Israel's impetuosity and reminded Prime Minister Eshkol that "it wasn't Dayan that kept Kosygin out."²⁰

Two weeks later, Kosygin and Johnson met in Glassboro, New Jersey, to discuss how best to avoid another crisis in the Middle East. On June 19, Johnson had unveiled a five-point peace plan whose chief ingredients were Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and an Arab commitment to a formal peace treaty. Kosygin, however, saw things a bit differently. The Soviets were preparing to rearm Egypt and Syria, he told Johnson on June 23, and unless Israel withdrew from all the occupied territories, the Arabs "would be sure to resume the fight sooner or later. If they had weapons, they would use them. If they did not have them, they would fight with their bare hands." Johnson bristled at this threat. "Let us understand one another," he retorted.

¹⁸ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 386.

¹⁹ Harold Saunders, memorandum for the record, October 22, 1968, "Hot Line Meeting June 10, 1967," vol. 7, box 19, Middle East Crisis, National Security Files (NSF), National Security Council (NSC) History Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

²⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in the minutes of the NSC Special Committee Meeting, June 12, 1967, *ibid.*



4. Territories occupied by Israel after 1967

"I hope there will be no war. If there is a war, I hope it will not be a big war. If they fight, I hope they fight with fists and not with guns. I hope you and we will keep out of this matter because, if we do get into it, it will be a 'most serious' matter."²¹

²¹ Lyndon B. Johnson, quoted in Editorial Note 320, *FRUS 1964-1968*, vol. XIX, 556-57.

Avoiding another fistfight in the Middle East would not be easy. By July 1967, nearly half a million Palestinians had fled the Israeli-controlled West Bank for crowded refugee camps inside Jordan. Meanwhile, Israeli troops dug in for a long stay from the Golan Heights to the Suez Canal, prompting Nasser to issue his infamous “Three Nos” in late August at an Arab summit held in Khartoum, Sudan – “no recognition of, no negotiations with, and no peace for Israel.” Nevertheless, US officials worked behind the scenes to secure support for UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the Israelis to withdraw from the occupied territories, for the Arabs to respect the sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, and for both sides to sit down together at the negotiating table. Despite containing some ambiguous language that both the Arabs and the Israelis would later twist to suit their own purposes, Resolution 242 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on November 22, 1967, and UN Secretary-general U Thant sent Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat, to the Middle East in December to discuss its implementation. Weeks of haggling ensued, however, and conditions on the ground worsened throughout 1968, with PLO guerrillas led by Yasser Arafat attacking Israeli outposts in the West Bank. By the time Johnson left the Oval Office, Israel and the PLO were engaged in a nasty low-intensity war that under the wrong circumstances might force Washington and Moscow to become involved.

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict was not as high as the Vietnam War on Richard M. Nixon’s foreign-policy agenda in early 1969, he and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, embraced a policy of détente toward the Soviet Union that they hoped would pay dividends in the Middle East. When the June 1967 war erupted, candidate Nixon had remarked that “the key to peace in the Middle East is now in Moscow.”²² One week after moving into the White House, President Nixon called on the Soviets to support “new initiatives and new leadership ... to cool off the situation in the Mideast,” which he likened to “a powder keg, very explosive.”²³ The US president initiated back-channel conversations with Russian leaders during 1969, but the much-heralded new approach to the Middle East never materialized, and, as the year drew to a close, American policy retained

22 Richard Nixon to Dean Rusk, June 5, 1967, quoted in William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993) 65–66.

23 Richard Nixon press conference, January 27, 1969, *Department of State Bulletin*, 60 (17 February 1969), 142–43.

the same old characteristics – more arms for Israel and much huffing and puffing about Arab intransigence.

From the October 1973 War to the Camp David Accords

In early 1970, long-simmering skirmishes between Egypt and Israel erupted into a nasty “war of attrition.” Egyptian artillery pounded Israeli positions along the Suez Canal while Israeli warplanes, including supersonic F-4 Phantom jets recently acquired from the United States, carried out “deep penetration” retaliatory raids against Egyptian targets in the Nile Valley. As in 1967, Nasser appealed for Soviet military assistance, and once again, he got it – more MIGs, and pilots to fly them, batteries of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for use against Israel’s F-4’s, and 10,000 Red Army troops to defend the airfields and SAM sites. Soviet motives were complex. On the one hand, Leonid Brezhnev, who had emerged as first among equals at the Kremlin, was frustrated by Egypt’s poor performance during the Six Day War, which he attributed to “total carelessness, [and] a lack of understanding of what an army is under modern conditions.” Yet Soviet leaders also believed that, with enough help from Moscow, Nasser could rebound from the debacle, regain the upper hand over Israel, and destabilize pro-Western regimes in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.²⁴

Worried that the war of attrition would escalate into another Soviet–American confrontation, Kissinger brokered a ceasefire in August 1970, but a few weeks later civil war erupted in Jordan, where the PLO attempted to overthrow King Hussein. When royal troops gained the upper hand against the Palestinian guerrillas, the Soviet-backed regime in Damascus sent its tanks toward the Jordanian border. Deeply disturbed by what they regarded as Russian aggression by proxy, on September 21, Nixon and Kissinger secretly agreed that the Israelis should launch airstrikes against the Syrian armored columns if necessary to save Hussein’s throne. At the last minute, however, Brezhnev persuaded the Syrians to reverse course, King Hussein managed to expel the PLO from his realm without any help from Israel’s air force, and the “Black September Crisis” ended with a whimper rather than a bang.

Black September grew blacker still for many Arabs when Gamal Abdel Nasser died suddenly of a massive heart attack and was succeeded by Anwar

²⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 198–99.

Sadat, who proved far less flamboyant and far less committed to Pan-Arabism than his predecessor. Well aware that he would need America's help to secure Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai, in January 1971 Sadat began secretly to communicate with Henry Kissinger through a back-channel link. Convinced that the Kremlin had been the driving force behind both the war of attrition and Syria's recent meddling in Jordan, the Nixon administration now regarded the Soviets as the major obstacle to peace and stability in the Middle East and worked systematically to reduce their influence. The first step came in May 1972 at the Moscow summit meeting, where Nixon warned that another flare-up in the Arab-Israeli conflict could seriously disrupt détente. He won Brezhnev's agreement for a joint communiqué supporting the military status quo. The second step came two months later in Cairo, where Sadat accused the Kremlin of sacrificing its Arab friends at the altar of détente and demanded that Brezhnev withdraw the 10,000 Soviet "advisers" stationed in Egypt.²⁵ By the end of Nixon's first term, Washington appeared to have disrupted Moscow's longstanding alliance with Cairo. "Our policy [was] to reduce and where possible eliminate Soviet influence in the Middle East ... under the cover of détente," Henry Kissinger told an interviewer two decades later, "and we did it."²⁶

If Sadat expected the United States to respond to the expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt by ratcheting up diplomatic pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai, however, he was sorely disappointed. Preoccupied with the end game in Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger paid little attention to the Middle East during the first half of 1973, ignoring Sadat's military threats and accepting at face value Israeli assurances that their fortifications along the Suez Canal were impervious to any Egyptian assault. With America either unwilling or unable to deliver on the diplomatic front and with Russia relegated to the sidelines, Egypt and Syria launched a two-front war on October 6. While the Israelis were honoring Yom Kippur, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal shielded by Soviet-supplied MIGs and SAMs. Two hundred miles to the northeast, Hafez al-Assad's tanks overran Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, prompting fresh calls from PLO leaders in Damascus for the liberation of all of "occupied Palestine."

Stunned by the setbacks on both fronts, Golda Meir, who had succeeded Levi Eshkol as prime minister, urgently pressed Washington to replace the

25 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 155–56.

26 Henry Kissinger interview, June 19, 1991, quoted in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 174.

Israeli tanks and planes destroyed on the battlefield. Confident that Israel possessed the wherewithal to handle the Arabs without additional US help, the Nixon administration's initial response was to wait and see. "The best result," Henry Kissinger remarked privately, "would be if Israel comes out a little ahead but got bloodied in the process, and if the U.S. stayed clean."²⁷ On October 9, however, the Kremlin began to airlift war *matériel* to the Egyptians, hoping thereby to tilt the military balance further in Sadat's favor. During the next twenty-four hours, rumors circulated in Washington that the Israelis might resort to nuclear weapons if their conventional arsenal was depleted. "From where we sat," Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recalled long afterward, "there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them."²⁸ With pressure mounting on Capitol Hill to assist the Israelis, on October 13, Nixon ordered the Pentagon airlift ammunition, artillery, and tanks directly to Tel Aviv. Reassured and emboldened by the American airlift, the Israelis quickly regained the upper hand on the Sinai front, where a brilliant but brutal commander named Ariel Sharon drove the Egyptian Third Army back toward the Suez Canal and prepared to encircle it.

Sharon's bid for a knockout punch might well have succeeded had not the Arabs chosen this moment "to play the oil card." Thirteen years earlier, Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in establishing OPEC, a cartel whose principal objective was a more equitable distribution of revenue between the multinational oil companies and the producing states. Just before the October 1973 war erupted, Saudi officials informed oil executives in Vienna that OPEC would insist on greater control over prices and production. A few days later, in a surprising act of solidarity with Sadat and Assad, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab members of OPEC imposed an embargo on all oil exports to the United States until Israel agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew from Egyptian and Syrian territory. Sharply rising gasoline prices and dwindling supplies quickly produced an "energy crisis" that gave the Nixon administration an added incentive to halt the fighting in the Middle East as soon as possible.

The Kremlin, of course, also had a strong interest in an early ceasefire, since the longer the war lasted, the more likely it became that Sadat would request Soviet military intervention to prevent a resounding Egyptian defeat. Although Moscow's credibility as a guarantor in the Arab world was at stake, sending

²⁷ Kissinger, quoted in *ibid.*, 189.

²⁸ James Schlesinger quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), 230.

in the Red Army was simply out of the question. "It should be clear to everybody," Brezhnev told the Politburo in mid-October, "that this would mean a world war."²⁹ Determined to avoid a confrontation with the United States, the Soviet leader invited Nixon to send Kissinger to Moscow to work out a ceasefire that the two superpowers would impose on their respective clients. After two days of talks, Kissinger and Brezhnev agreed on the text of what would become UN Security Council Resolution 338, which called for an immediate ceasefire followed by Arab-Israeli peace talks. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 unanimously on October 23, and Sadat agreed to implement the ceasefire at once; Israel, however, fought on, hoping to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. Convinced that they had been double-crossed by Kissinger, the Kremlin sent an ominous message to the White House insisting that Moscow and Washington must work together "to compel the observance of the ceasefire without delay." Brezhnev delivered a blunt warning: "I will say it straight," he wrote Nixon on the evening of October 24, "that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally."³⁰

Brezhnev's message had an electric effect in Washington, where US policy-makers were reeling from the "Saturday Night Massacre" that had seen several high-ranking Justice Department officials resign to protest Nixon's defiance of a controversial Supreme Court ruling in the Watergate scandal. Without bothering to awaken the president, Kissinger and White House chief of staff Alexander Haig convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council in the wee hours of October 25, during which they agreed to place America's nuclear arsenal on a DEFCON III alert, the highest stage of readiness short of all-out war, and drafted a letter from Nixon informing Brezhnev that the United States was deadly serious. Meanwhile, Kissinger warned the Israelis that unless they stopped shooting and implemented the ceasefire at once, the White House might be forced to halt the American resupply effort. Later that morning, the guns finally fell silent.

Soviet officials were shocked by this saber rattling, but despite calls from some Politburo members to up the ante, cooler heads prevailed. "What about not responding at all to the American nuclear alert?" Brezhnev suggested. "Nixon is too nervous – let's cool him down." To this end, the Kremlin

29 Leonid Brezhnev quoted in Lebow and Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War*, 182.

30 Leonid Brezhnev to Richard Nixon, October 24, 1973, quoted in Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), 583.

instructed Soviet ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin to assure Nixon and Kissinger that Moscow had never contemplated military intervention, but also to point out that nuclear threats were antithetical to the spirit of détente.³¹ Nevertheless, many US officials blamed the Soviets for triggering the most dangerous super-power confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis. "All you had to do was read [Brezhnev's] ultimatum," Alexander Haig insisted many years later, "to know that we had World War III in the making."³² Kissinger, however, viewed things somewhat differently in the immediate aftermath. Just two days after the DEFCON III alert, he took a telephone call from Ambassador Dobrynin, who confirmed that "anger in Moscow is still very high" and complained that "you are trying to make this look like it was a Cuban or Hanoi crisis," when it was not. "Too much is at stake for us to be angry with each other," Kissinger replied. Emphasizing that the American reaction "can only be explained in terms of emotional stress over a domestic situation," he reckoned that "if you had no intention of acting unilaterally our letter was a mistake."³³

Despite the diplomatic fallout from the nuclear alert, however, Kissinger was more convinced than ever that the overarching American goal of eliminating Soviet influence in the Middle East was *not* a mistake. Throughout the fall of 1973 and into the new year, he solidified his back-channel contacts with Anwar Sadat, who quickly concluded that the road to resolution of the Egyptian–Israeli conflict ran through Washington, not Moscow. Relying on what came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy," Kissinger pressed both Tel Aviv and Cairo, step by grudging step, toward a disengagement agreement in the Sinai and then raised the possibility of preliminary conversations about a broader peace settlement. Kissinger's breakthrough on the Egyptian–Israeli front was a crucial factor in OPEC's decision to lift its oil embargo in the spring of 1974, but Nixon's resignation the following August and his replacement by the inexperienced Gerald Ford dissipated America's diplomatic momentum at both the regional and global levels. Although Ford's defeat at the polls in November 1976 stemmed in large measure from the dismal state of an American economy beset by stagflation, the stalemated peace process in the

31 Victor Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 179–83; Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 238–41.

32 Alexander Haig, quoted in Gerald S. Strober and Deborah H. Strober, *Nixon: An Oral History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 154–55.

33 Telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and Anatolii Dobrynin, October 27, 1973, US Department of State Electronic Reading Room, "Kissinger Transcripts," <http://foia.state.gov/documents/kissinger/0000C147>.

Middle East and the widely shared perception that détente had become a one-way street favoring the Kremlin helped Jimmy Carter emerge victorious on election day.

Eager to break the deadlock in the Middle East and sustain détente with the Soviet Union, the Carter administration proposed to convene a peace conference at Geneva, where Washington and Moscow could sit down with their regional clients to hammer out a comprehensive settlement. Menachem Begin, Israel's newly elected prime minister, was dead set against the Geneva Conference, not least because representatives of the PLO were likely to be present. For his part, Sadat worried that Carter, in his eagerness to preserve détente, would strike a deal with Brezhnev that might jeopardize Egypt's rapprochement with the United States. In a move even more unexpected than Nixon's opening to China six years earlier, Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, where he embraced Begin and announced that Egypt was willing to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.

Carter was delighted by this turn of events, and after bilateral Israeli-Egyptian conversations reached an impasse in the spring of 1978, he invited Sadat and Begin to a summit meeting at Camp David in September. The



22. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat (left) and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin (right) with US president Jimmy Carter at the White House, March 26, 1979, after signing a peace treaty. Sadat's political courage made the Camp David Accords possible.

terms of a “peace for land” agreement took shape very quickly – Israel would withdraw from the Sinai in exchange for Egypt signing a formal peace treaty. The major sticking point was the fate of the occupied West Bank, where the Palestinians hoped to establish a homeland but where the Israelis were already establishing permanent settlements. Reluctant to make a separate peace, Sadat insisted that the proposed treaty must be contingent on Israel freezing the settlements and opening talks with the Palestinians. After thirteen days of brutal back and forth, Carter proudly unveiled the Camp David Accords on September 17. Sadat and Begin accepted in principle a bilateral peace agreement linked informally to a temporary halt on new Israeli settlements as the first step toward addressing the question of “Palestinian autonomy.” Denounced by the PLO and the Kremlin as a traitor to the Arab cause, Sadat signed the formal peace treaty with Israel on March 26, 1979, confirming that, a quarter-century after Nasser seized power in Cairo, Egypt had in effect changed sides in the Cold War and abandoned pan-Arab nationalism.

The Cold War in the Middle East

By the spring of 1979, however, America’s triumph over Soviet-backed revolutionary nationalism in Egypt looked more and more like a pyrrhic victory. While Nixon, Ford, and Carter were building an unprecedented partnership with Sadat, the Soviets were strengthening their ties with Arab radicals. Indeed, during the 1970s, the Kremlin established a military alliance with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, restocked the Syrian arsenal that Hafez al-Assad had squandered in his ill-advised war against Israel, and endorsed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Moreover, while the Americans and Soviets jockeyed for position among Arab moderates and radicals, both Washington and Moscow faced new challenges from an unexpected quarter – radical Islam. For many devout Muslims, Nasser’s defeat in the June 1967 war was proof of the bankruptcy of his secular model of reform through Westernization, and by the mid-1970s an Islamic revival was underway throughout the region. In Egypt, the resurgent Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni group whose top leaders had been executed by Nasser, challenged the legitimacy of Sadat’s one-party state, while in Lebanon the downtrodden Shi’a Muslims took up arms against the American-backed Christian-led regime in Beirut. Meanwhile, the Muslim populations of Soviet Central Asia were growing restless after six decades of Communist rule and Islamic guerrillas were mobilizing against the Kremlin-backed regime next door in Afghanistan.

The hotbed of the Islamic revival, however, was Iran, where Shi'a clerics loyal to the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini preached increasingly vitriolic sermons against the Shah, whose pro-Western "White Revolution" they regarded as antithetical to the principles of Islam.

The impending crisis undermined one of the key operating assumptions of American policymakers, who expected Iran to fill the strategic vacuum in the Persian Gulf after Britain relinquished its empire east of Suez in 1971. To this end, the Nixon and Ford administrations sold the Shah nearly \$11 billion in US weapons, paid for with rising oil revenues generated by the OPEC price hikes following the October 1973 war. In September 1978, the American-equipped Iranian army fired into a crowd of pro-Khomeini demonstrators in Tehran, leaving 400 dead and 4,000 wounded. Five months later, a full-blown Islamic revolution forced the Shah to seek asylum in Egypt while Khomeini returned home in triumph, vowing to settle old scores with America, which he labeled "the Great Satan." Islam, which US officials had touted as the antidote to Soviet subversion in the Middle East just two decades earlier, had suddenly become more dangerous to American interests in the region than Communism.³⁴

From the Suez crisis through the Camp David Accords, the US strategy in the Middle East remained quite consistent. Determined to protect Western access to Persian Gulf oil and promote the security of Israel, Washington sought to reduce Moscow's influence in the region and combat pan-Arab radicalism from Cairo to Damascus. American tactics varied from administration to administration. Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon, Kennedy wooed Egypt with economic aid, and Johnson recruited Israel as a partner in the battle against national liberation movements in the Third World. Nixon, Ford, and Carter each hoped that some variant of Soviet-American détente would prevent the increasingly volatile region from becoming the central arena of the Cold War during the 1970s.

Soviet policies toward the Middle East, by contrast, shifted in noticeable ways during the quarter-century after the Suez Crisis. Long before he was removed in an October 1964 palace coup, Khrushchev realized that Nasserism, Ba'athism, and other forms of Arab nationalism could be anti-Western without necessarily being pro-Soviet. Brezhnev and Kosygin were appalled by Nasser's catastrophic defeat in June 1967, stunned by Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt five years later, and frustrated by

³⁴ For further analysis of the situations in Iran and Afghanistan, see Amin Saikal's chapter in volume III.

their virtual exclusion from the American-backed Arab–Israeli peace process after the October 1973 war. By the late 1970s, Moscow’s bold embrace of wars of national liberation throughout the Arab world had been reduced to a series of spoiling operations mounted by unreliable clients like Iraq, Syria, and the PLO. More importantly, both Soviet and American officials had become so preoccupied with their superpower rivalry that they paid far too little attention to regional dynamics and underestimated the significance of the emerging threat represented by radical Islam.

Cuba and the Cold War, 1959–1980

PIERO GLEIJESES

Cuba's role in the world since 1959 is without precedent. No other Third World country has projected its military power beyond its immediate neighborhood. Brazil sent a small troop to the Dominican Republic in 1965 as the United States' junior partner; Argentina's generals briefly helped Anastasio Somoza's defeated cohorts in 1980–81 as they sought to regain a foothold in Nicaragua; Vietnam's soldiers never ventured beyond Indochina; China's military activities outside Asia have been limited to the supply of weapons and the dispatch of a few hundred instructors to Africa. During the Cold War, extra-continental military interventions were the preserve of the two superpowers, a few West European countries, and Cuba. Moreover, West European military interventions in the thirty years between the rise of Fidel Castro and the end of the Cold War pale in size and daring compared to those of Cuba. The dispatch of 36,000 Cuban soldiers to Angola between November 1975 and April 1976 stunned the world; in early 1978, 12,000 Cuban soldiers went to Ethiopia; by 1988, there were 55,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola. Even the Soviet Union sent far fewer troops beyond its immediate neighborhood than did Cuba. In this regard, Cuba is second only to the United States.

This chapter focuses on those regions of the world where Cuba's actions had an important, tangible impact – Latin America and Africa. It analyzes Havana's motivations and the extent to which its policy was a function of Soviet demands. It assesses Cuba's relations with the United States and discusses how Cuba affected the course of the Cold War.¹

¹ This chapter is drawn from my research in the archives of Cuba, the United States, Britain, Belgium, Germany (including the former German Democratic Republic), and South Africa.

Origins

President Dwight Eisenhower did not hesitate to recognize the government established by Fidel Castro. On January 7, 1959, six days after Fulgencio Batista had fled Cuba, the White House extended the hand of friendship to the victorious guerrillas. Within a year, however, Eisenhower had decided that Castro must go. It was not Castro's record on political democracy that bothered the Americans. US presidents, including Eisenhower, had maintained good relations with the worst dictators of the hemisphere – as long as they accepted US hegemony. Castro, however, would not bow to the United States. "He is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction," a US official noted in April 1959.² "He is inspired by a messianic sense of mission to aid his people," a National Intelligence Estimate reported two months later.³ Even though he did not have a clear blueprint of the Cuba he wanted to create, Castro dreamed of a sweeping revolution that would uproot his country's oppressive socio-economic structure. He dreamed of a Cuba that would be free of the United States, which had dominated the island since 1898 when it had intervened in the Cuban-Spanish war, robbing the Cubans of the independence they were achieving on the battlefield. (Washington forced the Cubans to accept the Platt amendment, which granted the United States the right to intervene militarily and maintain naval bases on Cuban soil; today the Platt amendment lives on, at Guantanamo.)

In 1959, Castro had no assurances whatsoever that the Soviet Union would befriend Cuba, a fragile outpost in the American backyard. He might have accepted a *modus vivendi* with Washington that promised Cuba complete independence in domestic policy, while setting some limits on its foreign policy. The Eisenhower administration, however, insisted that Cuba remain firmly within the US sphere of influence. By early 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was working on what would become the Bay of Pigs invasion. In April 1961, three months after John Kennedy's inauguration, some 1,300 CIA-trained Cuban exiles stormed a Cuban beach, only to surrender en masse three days later.

2 "Unofficial Visit of Prime Minister Castro of Cuba to Washington – A Tentative Evaluation," enclosed in Herter to Eisenhower, April 23, 1959, US Department of State; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), vol. VI, 483 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

3 Special National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959," June 30, 1959, 3, National Security Archive, Washington, DC (hereafter, NSA).

Flush from victory at the Bay of Pigs, Castro tendered an olive branch to the United States. On August 17, 1961, Che Guevara told a close aide of Kennedy that Cuba wanted to explore a *modus vivendi* with the United States. Kennedy was not interested. A few months later, on the president's orders, the CIA launched Operation Mongoose, a program of paramilitary operations, economic warfare, and sabotage designed to visit what Kennedy's adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, has called the "terrors of the earth"⁴ on Fidel Castro.

Castro enjoyed widespread support among the Cuban population, as the CIA acknowledged, but he understood that only strong Soviet backing could protect his fledgling revolution from the United States. The fate of the Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz, overthrown by the CIA in 1954, was a bitter reminder of what befell errant presidents in the US sphere. In January 1959, the Soviet leaders knew very little about Castro except that he was not a Communist and his country was in the heart of the American empire. For several months, their only contact was through leaders of the Cuban Communist Party visiting Moscow to vouch for the revolutionary credentials of the new government. In October 1959, a KGB official arrived in Havana, establishing the first direct link between the Kremlin and the new Cuban leadership. Soon, the tempo accelerated: in March 1960 Moscow approved a Cuban request for weapons. That same month, a handful of Soviet officers arrived in Havana to help organize the Cuban armed forces. Diplomatic relations were established on May 8. Over the next year, the relationship grew close and ebullient as Soviet bloc arms and economic aid arrived. Castro was charismatic, he seemed steadfast, he worked well with the Cuban Communists, and he had humiliated the United States at the Bay of Pigs. The Soviet Union would transform the island into a socialist showcase in Latin America. The Soviets' enthusiasm was all the greater because they underestimated the economic cost of the friendship.

It was the missile crisis that brought the honeymoon to an abrupt end. Thirty years later, in 1992, Kennedy's defense secretary, Robert McNamara, finally understood why the Soviets and the Cubans had decided to place missiles in Cuba: "I want to state quite frankly with hindsight, if I had been a Cuban leader [in the summer of 1962], I think I might have expected a US invasion. ... And I should say, as well, if I had been a Soviet leader at the time, I might have come to the same conclusion."⁵ As McNamara admitted, Castro

4 Arthur Schlesinger, *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (New York: Ballantine, 1979), 516.

5 Robert McNamara, in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press, 1992), xi–xii.

had legitimate concerns for his country's security. Added to this was the Kremlin's desire to close the "missile gap," America's well-publicized overwhelming superiority in strategic weapons.

Kennedy learned that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 16, 1962. On October 24, the US Navy quarantined the island. Four days later, when Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, he did not consult Castro. The honeymoon was over. The Cubans confronted their vulnerability: if the United States attacked them (there had been, as McNamara pointed out, "no non-invasion guarantee"⁶), the Soviet Union would not protect them. As Castro told a high-level delegation from the German Democratic Republic in 1968, "The Soviet Union has given us weapons. We are and will be forever thankful ... but if the imperialists attack Cuba, we can count only on ourselves."⁷ The missile crisis was followed by a brief détente between the superpowers, but this did not extend to Cuba, where the paramilitary raids, the sabotage operations, and the efforts to cripple the economy continued. So, too, did the attempts to assassinate Castro. US officials were no longer confident that they could eliminate him, but they were determined to teach the Latin Americans that the price of following Cuba's example would be high. "Cuba was the key to all of Latin America," the director of the Central Intelligence Agency told Kennedy in 1962. "If Cuba succeeds, we can expect most of Latin America to fall."⁸

While Kennedy promoted subversion in Cuba, Castro promoted revolution in Latin America. Castro argued that "the virus of revolution is not carried in submarines or ships. It is wafted instead on the ethereal waves of ideas. ... The power of Cuba is the power of its revolutionary ideas, the power of its example."⁹ The CIA agreed. "The extensive influence of 'Castroism' is not a function of Cuba's power," it noted in mid-1961. "Castro's shadow looms large because social and economic conditions throughout Latin America invite opposition to ruling authority and encourage agitation for radical change."¹⁰ Cuba, however, did not rely just on the power of its example. "By 1961–1962,

6 Robert McNamara, in James Blight, Bruce Allyn, and David Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 384.

7 "Aus der Aussprache mit Genossem Fidel Castro am 14. November 1968 während des Mittagessens im Gürtel von Havanna," DY30 IVA 2/20/205, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (hereafter, SAPMO).

8 McCone, memorandum of meeting with president, August 23, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. X, 955.

9 Fidel Castro, *Revolución* (Havana), February 23, 1963, 4.

10 NIE, "Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba," July 18, 1961, 5, box 8/9, National Security Files (NSF), NIE, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBJL).

Cuban support began taking many forms,” a CIA study noted, “ranging from inspiration and training to such tangibles as financing and communications support as well as some military assistance.” Most significant was military training. US intelligence estimated that between 1961 and 1964 “at least” 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans received “either guerrilla warfare training or political indoctrination in Cuba.”¹¹

By 1964, the guerrillas in Latin America had suffered a string of setbacks, and Cuban support for them had become a source of discord with the Soviet Union. The Cubans resented Moscow’s growing antipathy for armed struggle in Latin America, and they complained about the shoddy equipment the Soviets sent them. The Soviets were alarmed that Cuba was a far greater economic burden than anticipated, and they were unhappy that Castro’s support for guerrilla warfare in Latin America complicated their relations with the United States and Latin American governments. Most Latin American Communist parties, moreover, had come to resent Havana’s encouragement of armed struggle.

Castro did not bend. At a meeting of Communist parties in Moscow in March 1965, Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother and the minister of defense, stressed that it was imperative “to organize a global movement of solidarity with the guerrillas in Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala who ... are fighting heroically for the independence of their countries.”¹²

Africa: the beginnings

Castro not only helped the insurgents in Latin America prepare a new revolutionary offensive. He also turned to Africa. Even before coming to power, the Cuban revolutionaries had seen similarities between the Algerian revolution against French rule and their own struggle against Batista and the United States. In December 1961, a Cuban ship unloaded weapons at Casablanca for the Algerian rebels. It returned to Havana with seventy-six wounded Algerian fighters and twenty orphans from refugee camps. In May 1963, after Algeria had gained its independence, a 55-person Cuban medical mission arrived in Algiers to establish a program of free health care for the Algerian people. “It was like a beggar offering his help, but we knew that the Algerian people needed it even more than we did, and that they deserved it,” explained the

11 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America, 1959–1968,” February 16, 1968, box 19, National Security File Country File (NSFCF), LBJL.

12 “Discurso pronunciado en la reunión consultiva de los Partidos Comunistas y Obreros que se celebra en Moscú,” March 3, 1965, 3, Oficina Secreta 2do Sec CC PCC, Havana (hereafter, OS).

minister of public health.¹³ In October 1963, when Algeria was threatened by Morocco, the Cubans rushed a force of 686 men with heavy weapons to the Algerians, jeopardizing a contract Morocco had just signed with Havana to buy 1 million tons of Cuban sugar for \$184 million, a considerable amount of hard currency at a time when the United States was trying to cripple Cuba's economy.

Cuba's interest in sub-Saharan Africa quickened in late 1964. This was the moment of the great illusion when the Cubans, and many others, believed that revolution beckoned in Africa. Guerrillas were fighting the Portuguese in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. In Congo Brazzaville, a new government proclaimed its revolutionary sympathies. Above all, there was Zaire, where armed revolt threatened the corrupt pro-American regime that Eisenhower and Kennedy had laboriously put in place.¹⁴ To save the Zairean regime, the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson raised an army of approximately 1,000 white mercenaries in a major covert operation that provoked a wave of revulsion even among African leaders friendly to the United States. In December 1964, Che Guevara went on a three-month trip to Africa. The following February, in Tanzania, he offered the Zairean rebels "about thirty instructors and all the weapons we could spare." They accepted "with delight." Che left with "the joy of having found people ready to fight to the finish. Our next task was to select a group of black Cubans – all volunteers – to join the struggle in Zaire."¹⁵ From April to July 1965, approximately 120 Cubans, led by Che, entered Zaire. In August, 250 Cubans, under Jorge Risquet, arrived in neighboring Congo Brazzaville at the request of that country's government, which feared an attack by the CIA's mercenaries; the column would also, if possible, assist Che in Zaire.

But Central Africa was not ready for revolution. By the time the Cubans arrived in Zaire, the mercenaries had broken the resolve of the rebels, leaving Che no choice by November 1965 but to withdraw. In Congo Brazzaville, Risquet's column saved the host government from a military coup in June 1966 and trained the rebels of Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) before withdrawing in December 1966.

The late 1960s were a period of deepening maturity in Cuba's relationship with Africa. No longer deluded that revolution was around the corner, the

13 José Ramón Machado Ventura, note to author, Havana, July 12, 1995.

14 I refer to the former French colony as Congo Brazzaville and the former Belgian colony as Zaire.

15 Che Guevara, "Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (Congo)," [Dar es Salaam, c. December 1965], 13–14, private collection, Havana.



23. Fidel Castro (left), Raúl Castro, and Che Guevara (right) in October 1963, finalizing the plan to send Cuban troops to Algeria to protect it from Moroccan aggression.

Cubans were learning about the continent. In those years, the focus of Havana's attention in Africa was Guinea-Bissau, where rebels were fighting for independence from Portugal. At their request, in 1966 Cuban military instructors and doctors arrived in Guinea-Bissau, where they remained until the end of the war in 1974. This was the longest and most successful Cuban intervention in Africa before the dispatch of troops to Angola in 1975.

Relations with Moscow

Whereas Cuba's support for armed struggle in Latin America in the 1960s provoked the wrath of the United States and angered Moscow, Cuba's activities in Africa drew much less heat. There, Cuban and Soviet policies ran along parallel paths: they supported the same movements and governments. US officials knew that the Cubans were in Africa, but they were confident that a handful of Cubans could not be effective in distant, alien countries. Washington was focused, instead, on Cuban activities in Latin America where, in 1966–67, Cuba continued to fan the flame of armed struggle. By 1968, however, the guerrillas had been crushed in Bolivia, virtually wiped

out in Guatemala, and brutally punished in Colombia and Venezuela. These defeats, and Che's death, taught Havana that a few brave men could not ignite armed struggle in Latin America. "By 1970 Cuban assistance to guerrilla groups ... had been cut back to very low levels," US officials concluded.¹⁶

This removed a major irritant in Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union, which had become increasingly strained. In the mid- and late 1960s, while US policymakers publicly lambasted Castro as a Soviet puppet, US intelligence analysts quietly pointed to Castro's resistance to Soviet advice and his open criticism of the Soviet Union. "He has no intention of subordinating himself to Soviet discipline and direction, and he has increasingly disagreed with Soviet concepts, strategies and theories," a 1968 study concluded, reflecting the consensus of the intelligence community.¹⁷ Castro had no compunction about purging those who were most loyal to Moscow or about pursuing economic policies that ran counter to Soviet advice. Soviet officials "muttered about pouring funds down the Cuban rathole" and footed the bill, the State Department noted.¹⁸ Castro criticized the Soviet Union as dogmatic and opportunistic, niggardly in its aid to Third World governments and liberation movements, and overeager to seek accommodation with the United States. He made no secret of his displeasure with the inadequacy of Moscow's support of North Vietnam, and in Latin America he actively pursued policies contrary to Moscow's wishes. "If they gave us any advice, we'd say that they were interfering in our internal affairs," Raúl Castro later remarked, "but we didn't hesitate to express our opinions about their internal affairs."¹⁹

To explain why the Soviets put up with "their recalcitrant Cuban ally," US intelligence reports noted that they were "inhibited by Castro's intractability."²⁰ The Soviets still saw advantages in their relations with Cuba, a 1967 study observed – as a symbol of Soviet ability to support even "remote allies" and for its "nuisance value vis-a-vis the US." Above all, they drew back from the political and psychological cost of a break: "How could the Soviets pull out of Cuba and look at the world or themselves in the morning? It would be a confession of monumental failure – the first and only Socialist enterprise in the

16 US Department of State (DOS), "Cuban Presence in Africa," December 28, 1977, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 4.

17 "National Policy Paper – Cuba: United States Policy," draft, July 15, 1968, 16, FOIA.

18 DOS, "Soviet Intentions toward Cuba," March 1965, box 33/37, NSFCF, LBJL.

19 Memorandum of conversation, Raúl Castro, Mengistu *et al.*, Addis Ababa, January 7, 1978, 61, OS.

20 Thomas Hughes to the Secretary of State, "Soviet Intentions toward Cuba," March 12, 1965, box 33/37, NSFCF, LBJL.

New World abandoned – and it would seriously damage Soviet prestige and be widely interpreted as a victory of sorts for the United States.”²¹

By the early 1970s, however, Castro became less intractable. Reeling from the twin failures of his revolutionary offensive in Latin America and his economic policies at home, he softened toward the Kremlin. Cuban criticism of Soviet policies ceased, and Havana acknowledged Moscow’s primacy within the socialist bloc. At the same time, Havana’s abandonment of its revolutionary offensive in Latin America eased relations with the United States. By 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger concluded that US policy toward Cuba had become counterproductive. West European and Latin American governments increasingly resented Washington’s heavy-handed pressure to enlist them in its crusade against Cuba, and US public opinion, spearheaded by businesses interested in the growing Cuban market, now favored peaceful coexistence with the island. Kissinger proposed secret negotiations aimed at normalizing relations. In a secret meeting on July 9, 1975, Cuban and US representatives discussed steps that would lead to an improvement of relations and, eventually, full bilateral ties. Four months later, Cuban troops landed in Angola.

Angola

When the Portuguese dictatorship collapsed in April 1974, there were three rival independence movements in Angola: Neto’s MPLA, Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Although Portugal and the three movements agreed that a transitional government would rule until independence on November 11, 1975, civil war erupted in the spring of 1975. In July, Pretoria and Washington began parallel covert operations in Angola, first by supplying weapons to both FNLA and UNITA, and then, in late August, by sending military instructors. South Africa and the United States were not pursuing identical ends in Angola, but both agreed that the MPLA had to be defeated. Pretoria wanted to shore up apartheid at home and eliminate any threat to its illegal rule over Namibia, sandwiched between South Africa and Angola. South African officials were well aware of the MPLA’s implacable hostility to apartheid and of its commitment to assist

²¹ CIA, Board of National Estimates, “Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba,” November 21, 1967, FOIA.

the liberation movements of southern Africa. (By contrast, UNITA and FNLA had offered Pretoria their friendship.) Although US officials knew that an MPLA victory would not threaten US strategic or economic interests, Kissinger cast the struggle in stark Cold War terms: the freedom-loving FNLA and UNITA would crush the Soviet-backed MPLA. He believed that success in Angola would provide a cheap boost to the prestige of the United States and to his own prestige, pummeled by the fall of South Vietnam a few months earlier.

The first Cuban instructors for the MPLA arrived in Luanda at the end of August, but Soviet aid to the MPLA was very limited because Moscow distrusted Neto and did not want to jeopardize the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations with the United States. By September, Washington and Pretoria realized that the MPLA was winning the civil war, not because of Cuban aid (no Cubans were yet fighting in Angola) or superior weapons (the rival coalition had a slight edge, thanks to US and South African largesse), but because, as the CIA station chief in Luanda noted, the MPLA was "more effective, better educated, better trained, and better motivated."²²

Washington urged Pretoria, which might have hesitated, to intervene. On October 14, South African troops invaded Angola, transforming the civil war into an international conflict.

As the South Africans raced toward Luanda, MPLA resistance crumbled. They would have seized the capital had not Castro decided on November 4, to respond to the MPLA's desperate appeals for troops. The Cuban forces, despite their initial inferiority in numbers and weapons, halted the South African onslaught. The official South African historian of the war writes, "The Cubans rarely surrendered and, quite simply, fought cheerfully until death."²³ As the South African operation unraveled and credible evidence surfaced in the Western press that Washington and Pretoria had been working together in Angola, the White House drew back. US officials claimed that they had nothing to do with the South Africans and condemned Pretoria's intervention in Angola. Betrayed by the United States, pilloried as aggressors throughout the world, and threatened by growing numbers of Cuban soldiers, the South Africans gave up. In March 1976, they withdrew from Angola. The US-South African gambit had failed.

22 Robert Hultslander (CIA station chief, Luanda, 1975), fax to author, December 22, 1998.

23 F.J. du Toit Spies, *Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976* (Pretoria: S. A. Weermag, 1989), 108.



24. Four heads of state – Agostinho Neto of Angola, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Luís Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, and Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea – at the grave of Amílcar Cabral, who led the independence movement of Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau and Guinea were the only two countries that sent troops to fight alongside the Cubans in Angola. Conakry, March 1976.

The administration of Gerald Ford responded to the debacle in Angola by unleashing a torrent of abuse against Havana, but Jimmy Carter, upon assuming the presidency in January 1977, changed course and announced that he would seek to normalize relations with Cuba. Relations improved, but Washington insisted that Havana withdraw its troops from Angola, and Havana would not budge. In December 1977, two US congressmen who favored rapprochement with Cuba had a lengthy meeting with Castro. They told him that “though President Carter was ‘eager’ to normalize relations, some willingness to deescalate Cuban involvement in Angola was needed.” Castro gave no ground. Angola was threatened by South Africa and Zaire, he said. “The Cuban mission in Angola was the defense of the country.” The congressman insisted: “President Carter simply wanted a statement of Cuba’s intention to deescalate.” Castro replied that “this could not be done unilaterally ... The Angolan government had to decide this, since the Cubans were not there on their

own account. ... If the restoration of relations [with the United States] was presented in the Angolan context, things would not advance."²⁴ This was the constant refrain: Cuba would not let the United States determine its policy in Africa. What this meant would soon be clear.

The Horn of Africa

In Ethiopia, less than two weeks after Carter's inauguration, the military junta that had overthrown Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 turned further to the left, quashing any lingering US hope of retaining influence there. In July 1977, the junta was rocked by Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden, a region in eastern Ethiopia inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The invasion had been encouraged by ambivalent signals from Washington. As the National Security Council (NSC) specialist on the Horn wrote in 1980, "The crucial decision [to invade] seems to have been taken only ... when the Somalis concluded they had a good chance of securing American military aid."²⁵ The Somalis made swift progress, and in late August 1977 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told the Chinese foreign minister, "I think they [the Somalis] will succeed ... they ... will be in control of the Ogaden."²⁶ Ethiopia's leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, turned to Cuba, which had begun sending military instructors and doctors in April. He asked for troops.

Castro's reply was negative. A secret Cuban military history notes, "it did not seem possible that a small country like Cuba could maintain two important military missions in Africa."²⁷ In an August 16 cable, Castro told the head of the Cuban military mission in Addis Ababa, "We absolutely cannot agree to send Cuban military forces to fight in Ethiopia. You must convince Mengistu of this reality. ... Despite our sympathy for the Ethiopian revolution and our profound indignation at the cowardly and criminal aggression to which it has fallen victim, it is frankly impossible for Cuba to do more in the present

24 "Representatives Fred Richmond and Richard Nolan, Discussions with Cuban President Fidel Castro," enclosed in Richmond to Carter, December 16, 1977, box CO-20, White House Central File, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta (hereafter, JCL).

25 Paul Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 3, 1980, box 5, Horn, Staff Material, NSA, Brzezinski Collection, JCL.

26 Memorandum of conversation, Cyrus Vance, Huang Hua *et al.*, August 23, 1977, 14, FOIA.

27 Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, "Las misiones internacionalistas desarrolladas por las FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberanía de los pueblos," nd, 65, Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana (hereafter, CIFAR).

circumstances. You cannot imagine how hard it is for us to constantly rebuff these requests.”²⁸

However, as the Ethiopians’ military situation deteriorated, the Cubans reconsidered. On November 25, 1977, Castro decided to send troops to Ethiopia to help repel the attackers. Two days later, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, wrote Castro a warm message expressing “our complete agreement with your policy. We are pleased that our assessment of events in Ethiopia coincides with yours, and we sincerely thank you for your timely decision to extend internationalist assistance to Socialist Ethiopia.”²⁹ Over the next three months, 12,000 Cuban soldiers arrived in Ethiopia and helped defeat the Somalis.

The crisis in the Horn marked the end of the tentative rapprochement between Washington and Havana; Cuba’s continuing presence in Angola and support for the liberation movements of Namibia and Zimbabwe haunted the Carter administration. Castro was blunt: Cuba would not modify its policy in Africa in response to US threats or blandishments. “We feel it is deeply immoral to use the blockade [the US embargo] as a means of pressuring Cuba,” he told two Carter emissaries in December 1978. “There should be no mistake – we cannot be pressured, impressed, bribed, or bought ... Perhaps because the U.S. is a great power, it feels it can do what it wants and what is good for it. It seems to be saying that there are two laws, two sets of rules and two kinds of logic, one for the U.S. and one for other countries. Perhaps it is idealistic of me, but I never accepted the universal prerogatives of the U.S. – I never accepted and never will accept the existence of a different law and different rules.” And he concluded, “I hope history will bear witness to the shame of the United States which for twenty years has not allowed sales of medicines needed to save lives. ... History will bear witness to your shame.”³⁰

US–Cuban relations deteriorated further in the remaining two years of the Carter administration. Through late 1978, US officials considered Cuba’s policy in Africa “the most intractable obstacle to significant improvement in bilateral relations,”³¹ but following the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in the summer of 1979, Central America moved to the eye of the storm. By the time Carter stepped down, relations with Cuba were no better than they had been

28 Fidel Castro to Arnaldo Ochoa, August 16, 1977, CIFAR.

29 Leonid Brezhnev to Fidel Castro, November 27, 1977, CIFAR.

30 Memorandum of conversation, Peter Tarnoff, Robert Pastor, and Fidel Castro, December 3–4, 1978, 5, 9–10, 25, Vertical File: Cuba, JCL. On May 15, 1964, the United States banned the export of medicines to Cuba.

31 DOS, “Cuban Presence in Africa,” December 28, 1978, 19, FOIA.

in Ford's last year. They would worsen through the 1980s, as Havana and Washington clashed in southern Africa and Central America.

Castro's motivations

US intelligence analysts in the 1960s were determined to figure out what was motivating Cuban foreign policy. What is striking about their conclusions is how similar they are to the explanation that emerges from the Cuban documents themselves. Not once did US intelligence reports suggest that Cuba was acting in Latin America or Africa at the behest of the Soviet Union. Occasionally, they referred to Castro's ego – "his thirst for self-aggrandizement"³² – as a motivating factor for his foreign-policy activism, but they consistently stressed that self-defense and revolutionary fervor were his main motivations. They acknowledged that Castro had repeatedly offered to explore a *modus vivendi* with the United States – in 1961, 1963, and 1964. With one fleeting and "very tenuous"³³ exception in October–November 1963, he had been rebuffed. The American response was instead to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro, to launch paramilitary operations against Cuba, and to cripple the island's economy.

The Cuban leaders concluded that the best defense was offense – not by attacking the United States directly, which would be suicidal, but by assisting revolutionary forces in the Third World, thereby gaining friends and weakening US influence. When Che Guevara went to Africa in December 1964, Thomas Hughes, the director of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research (INR), noted that this "three-month trip was part of an important new Cuban strategy." The strategy, he argued, was based on Cuba's belief that Africa was ready for revolution and that it was in Cuba's interest to spread revolution there: it would win Havana new friends and it would challenge US influence on the continent.³⁴ "It was almost a reflex," Che's second-in-command in Zaire remarked. "Cuba defends itself by attacking its aggressor. This was our philosophy. The Yankees were attacking us from every side, so we had to challenge them everywhere. We had to divide their forces, so that

32 George Denney to the Secretary of State, "Cuban Foreign Policy," September 15, 1967, 4, Pol 1 Cuba, Subject – Numeric Files: 1963–73, RG 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter, NA).

33 McGeorge Bundy, quoted in Chase, "Meeting with the President, December 19, 1963," *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, 907.

34 Thomas Hughes to the Secretary of State, "Che Guevara's African Venture," April 19, 1965, box 20, NSFCF, LBJL.

they wouldn't be able to descend on us, or any other country, with all their might."³⁵

But to explain Cuban activism in the 1960s merely in terms of self-defense would be to distort reality – a mistake US intelligence analysts did not make. There was a second motive force, as the CIA and INR freely acknowledged: Castro's "sense of revolutionary mission."³⁶ Report after report stressed the same point: Castro was "a compulsive revolutionary,"³⁷ a man with a "fanatical devotion to his cause,"³⁸ who was "inspired by a messianic sense of mission."³⁹ He believed that he was "engaged in a great crusade."⁴⁰

History, geography, culture, and language made Latin America the Cubans' natural habitat, the place closest to Castro's and his followers' hearts, the first place where they tried to spread revolution. But Latin America was also where their freedom of movement was most circumscribed. Castro was, as the CIA observed, "canny enough to keep his risks low" in the backyard of the United States.⁴¹ This is why fewer than forty Cubans fought in Latin America in the 1960s and why Cuba was extremely cautious about sending weapons to Latin American rebels.

In Africa, Cuba incurred fewer risks. Whereas in Latin America Havana challenged legal governments, flouted international law, and faced the condemnation of the governments of the hemisphere, in Africa it confronted colonial powers or defended established states. Above all, in Africa there was much less risk of a head-on collision with the United States. US officials barely noted the Cubans in Africa, until Cuban troops landed in Angola in November 1975.

Moreover, the Cuban leaders were convinced that their country had a special empathy for the Third World beyond the confines of Latin America and a special role to play there. The Soviets and their East European allies were white and, by Third World standards, rich; the Chinese exhibited the hubris of a rising great power, and they were unable to adapt to African and Latin American culture. By contrast, Cuba was nonwhite, poor, threatened by a powerful enemy, and culturally Latin American and African. It was,

35 Interview with Víctor Dreke, Havana, July 11, 1994.

36 Denney to the Secretary of State, "Cuban Foreign Policy," 5.

37 Special NIE, "Cuba: Castro's Problems and Prospects over the Next Year or Two," June 27, 1968, 3, box 8/9, NSF, NIE, LBJL.

38 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "Cuban Subversive Policy and the Bolivian Guerrilla Episode," May 1968, 3, box 19, NSF, LBJL.

39 Special NIE, "The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959," June 30, 1959, 3, NSA.

40 NIE, "The Situation in Cuba," June 14, 1960, 9, NSA.

41 Special NIE, "Cuba: Castro's Problems and Prospects over the Next Year or Two," June 27, 1968, 3, NSF, NIE, box 8/9, LBJL.

therefore, a unique hybrid: a socialist country with a Third World sensibility. This mattered in a world that was dominated, as Castro rightly understood, by the “conflict between privileged and underprivileged, humanity against ‘imperialism’”⁴² and where the major fault line was not between socialist and capitalist states but between developed and underdeveloped countries.

These, then, were the dual motivations of Cuban activism in the 1960s: self-preservation and revolutionary idealism. When Realpolitik clashed with revolutionary duty, sometimes the former prevailed: the Mexican government did not join the US crusade against Cuba, and in return Cuba did not criticize Mexico’s corrupt and repressive regime or support armed struggle against it. At other times revolutionary duty prevailed: in 1961, Cuba risked the wrath of the French president, Charles de Gaulle, by helping the Algerian rebels, and, in 1963, it went to the defense of the Algerian Republic, even though this jeopardized an important sugar contract with Morocco.

It is impossible to know what would have happened to Cuba’s foreign-policy activism in the 1960s had the costs suddenly escalated, that is, had Kennedy or Johnson been willing to consider a *modus vivendi* with Castro if he abandoned his support for revolution abroad. INR director Hughes wrestled with this question in the spring of 1964:

On the one hand they [Cuba’s leaders] are still dedicated revolutionaries. ... Many would rather be remembered as revolutionary martyrs than economic planners. Yet on the other hand these same men are aware that the current pressing problems demand amelioration that can only be brought by muting the call to revolution, by attempting to reach live and let live arrangements with the US, and by widening trade and diplomatic contacts with the free world. Tensions between the two paths, between peaceful coexistence and the call for violent revolution will continue to exist within the Cuban hierarchy, both within and between individuals, for the foreseeable future.⁴³

In the 1960s, Cuba did not have to choose between Realpolitik and idealism because the United States consistently rebuffed its attempts to discuss a rapprochement. Realpolitik and idealism ran along parallel tracks as the main motivations of Cuba’s foreign policy.

But does this hold true for the 1970s? More precisely, does it help explain the dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola in November 1975? Two difficulties are apparent. First, the argument of self-defense loses much of its power because,

42 “National Policy Paper – Cuba: United States Policy,” draft, July 15, 1968, 15 (quoting Castro), FOIA.

43 Hughes to the Secretary of State, “Cuba in 1964,” April 17, 1964, 10–11, FOIA.

by 1975, the United States had decided to seek accommodation with Cuba. Furthermore, whereas Castro's fierce independence from the Soviet Union in the 1960s was evident for all to see, by the early 1970s Cuban criticism of Soviet policies had ended. This may suggest that the Cubans intervened in Angola in response to Soviet demands.

This might seem plausible – until you study the documents. Havana's intervention in Angola was in fact a sterling example both of Cuban independence from the Soviet Union and of Cuban idealism. It is now beyond question that, as a Soviet official states in his memoirs, the Cubans sent their troops "on their own initiative and without consulting us."⁴⁴ The evidence is so compelling that even Kissinger, who habitually dismissed the Cubans as Soviet proxies, has reconsidered. "At the time we thought he [Castro] was operating as a Soviet surrogate," he writes in his memoirs. "We could not imagine that he would act so provocatively so far from home unless he was pressured by Moscow to repay the Soviet Union for its military and economic support. Evidence now available suggests that the opposite was the case."⁴⁵

What motivated Castro's bold move in Angola? Not Cuba's narrow interests; not realpolitik. By deciding to send troops Castro challenged Brezhnev, who opposed the dispatch of Cuban soldiers to Angola. He faced a serious military risk: Pretoria, urged on by Washington, might have escalated, and the Cuban soldiers might have faced the full South African army without any guarantee of Soviet assistance; indeed, it took two months for Moscow to begin providing very needed logistical support to airlift Cuban troops to Angola. Furthermore, the dispatch of Cuban troops jeopardized relations with the West at a moment when they were markedly improving: the United States was probing a *modus vivendi*; the Organization of American States had just lifted the sanctions it had imposed in 1964; and West European governments were offering Havana low-interest loans and development aid. Realpolitik required Cuba to rebuff Luanda's appeals. Had he been a client of the Soviet Union, Castro would have held back.

Castro sent troops because he understood that the victory of the Pretoria–Washington axis would have meant the victory of apartheid, tightening the grip of white domination over the people of southern Africa. It was a defining moment. As Kissinger now says: Castro "was probably the most genuine revolutionary leader then in power."⁴⁶

44 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1995), 362.

45 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 816.

46 Kissinger, *Years*, 785.

The contrast between the Soviet reaction to the dispatch of Cuban troops to Angola in November 1975 and to Ethiopia in November 1977 is stark: in Angola, Cuba acted without even informing the Soviet Union, whereas in Ethiopia there was close consultation; in Angola, for two harrowing months the Cubans operated without any logistical support from the Soviet Union, whereas in Ethiopia Moscow supported the airlift of Cuban troops from day one; in Angola, the Cubans planned military operations without any Soviet input, whereas in Ethiopia, Soviets and Cubans worked together to help the Ethiopians plan military operations. As Castro told Neto, "In Angola we took the initiative, we acted on our own ... It was a decision full of risks. In Ethiopia, our actions were coordinated from the very beginning with the Soviets."⁴⁷

That Havana and Moscow agreed about what policy to pursue in Ethiopia does not mean that the Cubans were subservient to the Soviets. Arguably, the key to explaining Cuban motivations is provided by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who told Carter in March 1977, "Castro ended up more favorably impressed by the Ethiopians. He found the Somalis, who pressed their longstanding territorial demands on Ethiopia, more irredentist than socialist."⁴⁸ Indeed, Castro had been very impressed by the Ethiopian revolution, and by Mengistu, whom he had met in March 1977. He told East German leader Erich Honecker, "a real revolution is taking place in Ethiopia. In this former feudal empire the land has been given to the peasants ... Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, honest and convinced revolutionary leader."⁴⁹ Hundreds of Cuban documents covering the critical period from late 1976 through the spring of 1978 make clear that Castro's feelings were shared by the three top Cuban officials in Addis Ababa: the ambassador, the head of the military mission, and the head of intelligence. With hindsight, we know that the Cubans' impression of what was happening in Ethiopia was wrong. But this was not clear in 1977: though the process was undeniably bloody, the Ethiopian junta had decreed a radical agrarian reform and had taken unprecedented steps to foster the cultural rights of the non-Amhara population.

While the evidence is not conclusive – this would require the minutes of conversations among Cuban leaders or between Cuban and Soviet leaders in the days preceding the decision – it strongly suggests that the Cubans

47 Memorandum of conversation, Fidel Castro, Agostinho Neto, Havana, January 24, 1979, 23, Archivo del Consejo de Estado, Havana, Cuba.

48 Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, [March 1977], FOIA.

49 "Niederschrift über das Gespräch zwischen Genossen Erich Honecker und Genossen Fidel Castro am Sonntag, dem 3. April 1977, von 11.00 bis 13.30 Uhr und von 15.45 bis 18.00 Uhr, im Hause des ZK," April 3, 1977, 20–21, 23, DY30 JIV 2/201/1292, SAPMO.

intervened because they believed, as Cuban intelligence stated in March 1977, that “the social and economic measures adopted by the country’s [Ethiopia’s] leadership are the most progressive we have seen in any underdeveloped country since the triumph of the Cuban revolution.”⁵⁰ The Cubans considered the Somali invasion “unjustified and criminal,”⁵¹ and they correctly understood that it had been encouraged by Washington. They knew that Mogadishu had violated the most sacred principle of the Organization of African Unity – the respect for the borders inherited at the time of independence. Without this principle, there could be no peace in Africa. As the NSC specialist on the Horn told Brzezinski, “The Soviets and Cubans have legality and African sentiment on their side in Ethiopia – they are helping an African country defend its territorial integrity and countering aggression.”⁵²

In my years of research on Cuban foreign policy I have not discovered one instance in which Cuba intervened in another country at Moscow’s behest. As an NSC interagency study concluded in August 1978, “Cuba is not involved in Africa solely or even primarily because of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Rather, Havana’s African policy reflects its activist revolutionary ethos and its determination to expand its own political influence in the Third World at the expense of the West (read U.S.).”⁵³ Castro did not send troops to Ethiopia to do the Soviets’ bidding, but Soviet military and logistical support allowed him to pursue the course he wanted to take. Cuban actions in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s – small-scale operations involving a limited number of people – were conducted without direct Soviet assistance, as was the dispatch of the first Cuban troops to Angola, but they would not have been possible without the military and economic aid that Moscow gave to the island. Cuba’s ability to act independently was made possible by the existence of a friendly superpower on which it depended for its economic and military lifeline, a situation reminiscent of the fact that Israel’s freedom of maneuver has been made possible by the support of the United States. Although Cuba and Israel have very different foreign policies, they have one thing in common: this economic and military dependence did not translate into being a client.

50 “Síntesis analítica sobre la revolución etiopica. Propositiones” [early March 1977], CIFAR.

51 Fidel Castro to Neto, March 7, 1978, CIFAR.

52 Henze to Brzezinski, March 1, 1978, box 1, Horn, Staff Material, NSA, Brzezinski Collection, JCL.

53 “Response, Presidential Review Memorandum 36: Soviet–Cuban Presence in Africa,” August 18, 1978, 15, NSA.

Cuba and the Cold War

This brings us to the interesting question: How did the existence of a Soviet ally in the very heart of the US empire affect the Cold War? Surprisingly, the impact was minor in the 1960s, with one major exception: in 1962, Kennedy's reckless policy of aggression against Cuba precipitated the decision to install missiles in the island and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. But the tentative *détente* between Moscow and Washington that followed the missile crisis was not influenced by Cuban actions. Cuba's support for armed struggle in Latin America was only an irritant in relations between the two superpowers. It did, however, change US policy in the hemisphere. The fear of a second Cuba haunted US policymakers, particularly in the early 1960s; it was midwife to the Alliance for Progress and triggered Kennedy's decision to strengthen Latin America's two most repressive institutions – the military and the police.

It was in the 1970s that Cuban foreign policy did significantly influence – twice – relations between the superpowers. The Ford administration responded to the Cuban victory in Angola by placing the SALT II negotiations and *détente* in the deep freeze. Cuba, it claimed, was a Soviet proxy, and the Cuban intervention a gross violation of the rules of *détente*. Two years later, the Carter administration responded in a similar way to Cuba's intervention in Ethiopia. In Brzezinski's famous expression, "SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden."⁵⁴

Clearly, Cuba's actions in Angola and Ethiopia damaged *détente*. But what lay behind America's anger? If indeed the "rules" of *détente* were violated in Angola, the principal culprit was the United States, which had encouraged South Africa to invade. It was this invasion that persuaded Castro to send troops. In the Horn, US ambivalence encouraged the Somalis to invade Ethiopia, threatening the principle of the inviolability of the territorial integrity of African states. The Cuban troops upheld that principle. What died in the sands of the Ogaden was the delusion of a one-sided *détente*, in which the enemies of the United States did not have the right to send troops anywhere, whatever the provocation, whatever the violation of international law, whereas the friends of the United States did, as, for example, when the French and Belgians sent troops to Zaire in 1978 (aboard US planes) and the South Africans invaded Angola in 1975.

⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), 189.

What did the Soviets gain from their alliance with Cuba? Not much. Khrushchev's attempt to use Cuba to close the missile gap ended in abject failure. Soviet hopes that Cuba would be a springboard for further advances in Latin America backfired – Havana's support for armed struggle hindered Moscow's diplomatic efforts in Latin America in the 1960s. Angola and Ethiopia became a drain on scarce Soviet resources; true, they bought billions of dollars of Soviet weapons, but mostly on credit, and the debts were never paid. The major benefit that the Soviet Union derived from its alliance with Cuba – an obstreperous, proud, and difficult ally that did not shy from confrontation – was enhanced prestige in the Third World.

If we view the Cold War as a global struggle rather than merely a bipolar one, Cuban foreign policy had a profound impact. In this struggle, Castro's battalions included tens of thousands of Cuban doctors and other aid workers who labored in some of the poorest regions of the world, at no cost or at very little cost to the host country. And they included the tens of thousands of underprivileged youths from Latin America, Africa, and Asia who studied in Cuba, all expenses paid. This aid began in the 1960s, became massive in the late 1970s, and continues despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Cuba's support for armed struggle failed in Latin America, but not in Africa: Cuban troops helped restrain Morocco in 1963; they provided valuable aid to the MPLA in Congo Brazzaville in 1965–66; and they lent decisive assistance to the rebels of Guinea-Bissau in their quest for independence. Havana's most impressive success was to change the course of southern African history in defiance of Washington's best efforts to stop it. In 1975, Cuba prevented the establishment of a government in Luanda beholden to the apartheid regime. Cuba's victory unleashed a tidal wave that washed over southern Africa. "Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban success in Angola," noted the *World*, South Africa's major black newspaper. "Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of realizing the dream of total liberation."⁵⁵

The impact was more than psychological. Cuba's victory forced Kissinger to turn against the white minority regime in Rhodesia and spurred Carter to tirelessly work for majority rule there. It also marked the real beginning of Namibia's war of independence. For the next twelve years, Cuba assisted the Namibian rebels, and Cuban troops helped the Angolan army hold the line against bruising South African incursions into Angola. Finally, in 1988, Cuban diplomatic skill combined with its prowess on the battlefield were

55 *World* (Johannesburg), February 24, 1976, 4.

instrumental in forcing Pretoria to withdraw from Angola and to agree to the independence of Namibia.

This was Cuba's contribution to what Castro has called "the most beautiful cause,"⁵⁶ the struggle against apartheid. There is no other instance in modern history in which a small, underdeveloped country has changed the course of events in a distant region – humiliating one superpower and repeatedly defying the other. There is no other instance in which an underdeveloped country has embarked on a program of technical assistance of such scope and generosity. The Cold War framed three decades of Castro's revolutionary zeal, but Castro's vision was always larger than it. For Castro, the battle against imperialism – his life's *raison d'être* – is more than the struggle against the United States: it is the war against despair and oppression in the Third World.

56 Fidel Castro, in "Indicaciones concretas del Comandante en Jefe que guiarán la actuación de la delegación cubana a las conversaciones en Luanda y las negociaciones en Londres (23-4-88)," 5, CIFAR.

The Sino-Soviet split

SERGEY RADCHENKO

By 1962, the once robust Sino-Soviet alliance had cracked up, revealing serious conflicts beneath the façade of Communist solidarity. This split was a remarkable development in a Cold War context. It was not the first time that the Soviets had fallen out with their allies: the Yugoslavs were thrown out of the “camp” in 1948; Hungary had tried but failed to leave in 1956; Albania quarreled with Moscow in 1961. But, in spite of their intrinsic importance, these issues were small compared to the red banner of Sino-Soviet unity, the symbol of the power and appeal of socialism worldwide. The demise of the alliance represented the broken promise of Marxism. Ideological unity and conformity were so essential to the Soviet-led socialist world that a quarrel between its two principal protagonists – the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China – undermined the legitimacy of the socialist camp as a whole, and of the intellectual notions that underpinned its existence.

So inexplicable did the split appear from a Marxist perspective that both Chinese and Soviet historians in retrospect would blame the debacle on the other side’s betrayal of Marxism.¹ But from a realist perspective, Marxism had nothing to do with the rift: the Soviet Union and China were great powers with divergent national interests. No amount of Communist propaganda could have reconciled these competing interests, so it was not surprising, indeed it had been predictable, that the Soviets and the Chinese would fall out and the alliance would crumble.² The realist perspective is simple and convenient; yet it does not fully explain the extremely intricate process of the Sino-Soviet split: how it was influenced by key personalities, how it related to the domestic environments of the Soviet Union and China, and how it was affected by cultural contexts of policymaking. These complex matters

1 For example, Oleg Borisov and Boris Koloskov, *Soviet Chinese Relations, 1945–1970* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975).

2 For example, David Floyd, *Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino Soviet Conflict* (New York and London: Frederick Praeger, 1963).

are addressed in this chapter – not to refute but rather to refine the realist paradigm, and to do justice to the twists and turns of the road, which, from 1962 to 1969, took the Soviet Union and China from a troubled alliance to a violent military confrontation.

The end of the alliance

On October 13, 1962, Nikita Khrushchev had told the departing Chinese ambassador, Liu Xiao, that “our most cherished dream is to get rid of the cold current which is separating us, and to return to the close and intimate relations we had before 1958.”³ But if Khrushchev had anyone to blame for the “cold current,” he could well blame himself, although he was too narrow-minded ever to admit that he had played a significant role in the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Since the historian Shu Guang Zhang has addressed Khrushchev’s misguided policies in volume I, we shall not spend too much time on the Soviet leader’s blunders here, except in the way of a short summary.

Between 1958 and 1962, Khrushchev’s disastrous handling of the Soviet relationship with China had seriously exacerbated the tensions in the alliance. He had angered Mao Zedong with his inconsiderate proposition to build a joint submarine flotilla and a military radio station on China’s soil. He had tacitly supported India in the 1959 Sino-Indian border war. In 1960, he had hastily withdrawn Soviet experts from China in a fit of rage. He had rallied his allies in Europe to criticize China in international forums. He had pulled out of a deal to deliver a prototype atomic bomb to the Chinese, and had desperately tried to stall the Chinese nuclear weapons program. From the Chinese perspective, these policies consistently spoke of Khrushchev’s high-handed arrogance and his chauvinistic disdain for China.

In late 1962, Khrushchev was portrayed in internal Chinese assessments as “a traitor, not a proletarian.”⁴ His loyalty to China was no longer taken for granted. “Who knows toward whom he will fire rockets one day? You never can tell,” said Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu to one audience in November 1962 – and such sentiments prevailed throughout the Chinese

3 Conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and Liu Xiao, October 13, 1962, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation], Moscow (hereafter, AVPRF): fond 0100, opis 55, papka 480, delo 4, list 34.

4 Cited in Wang Dong, *The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino Soviet Split, 1959–1962*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 49 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006), 65.

foreign-policy establishment.⁵ But this did not mean that the Sino-Soviet alliance was a dead letter in Beijing. Rather, Chinese policymakers believed that the realities of a bipolar world order and the intensity of the Soviet-US confrontation made continued Sino-Soviet cooperation indispensable to both their country and to Moscow. For all of Khrushchev's blunders, he was still considered to be on the same side of the barricades as the Chinese.

On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy learned that the Soviet Union had secretly stationed nuclear missiles in Cuba. Whatever Khrushchev's intentions, sending missiles to Cuba had been his personal decision; he had barely consulted with his colleagues in the Party Presidium, as James G. Hershberg explains.⁶ Khrushchev did not ask the Chinese for their opinion on the issue, nor did he inform them that a secret operation was underway. When Kennedy declared the naval quarantine of Cuba and demanded withdrawal of the missiles, the Soviet leader first wavered and then agreed to pull them out. Castro was not consulted, while the Chinese were once again completely out of the loop. Khrushchev bent over backwards to show how his handling of the Cuban missile crisis was a great triumph of Soviet foreign policy. But the Chinese accused him of capitulating and betraying the cause of the Cuban revolution.

Khrushchev resented the accusation. After all, he had pulled back from the brink to save the world from a nuclear catastrophe. He had avoided a world war. Would Mao not have done the same? In fact, Khrushchev believed that Mao was "afraid of war like the devil is of holy water."⁷ If so, the barrage of propaganda about Khrushchev's "capitulationism" was only a smoke screen for a sinister Chinese plot, which he could not quite decipher. Khrushchev explained his uncertainties in a meeting with the new Chinese ambassador, Pan Zili, shortly after New Year's Day of 1963: "We find the policy of the Chinese Communist Party somewhat hard to understand."⁸ Later he voiced his frustration at a party gathering: "On what question do we have disagreements with China? Ask me! I don't know, don't know!"⁹ Unable to fully make

5 *Ibid.* 6 On this matter, see James G. Hershberg's chapter in this volume.

7 Conversation between John Gollan and Nikita Khrushchev, January 2, 1963, CP/CENT/INT/02/04, Archives of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Labour History Archive and Study Centre, Manchester, UK.

8 Conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and Pan Zili, January 3, 1963, AVPRF: fond 0100, opis 55, papka 480, delo 4, list 13.

9 Nikita Khrushchev's speech to a Party Plenum, December 13, 1963, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii [Russian State Archive for Contemporary History], Moscow (hereafter, RGANI): fond 2, opis 1, delo 679, list 118.

sense of the hostile propaganda coming from Beijing, Khrushchev concluded that “the Chinese are dimwits.”¹⁰

Khrushchev’s difficulties had their root in a curious intellectual handicap. Soviet policymakers, Khrushchev among them, believed Marxism to be a scientific truth based on immutable and self-evident principles. As a Marxist, Khrushchev struggled against imperialism, aided national liberation movements, and strengthened the unity of the socialist camp. By definition, his policies could not be opportunistic, adventurist, or chauvinistic. By claiming a monopoly on absolute truth in politics, he overlooked the possibility that someone else might challenge his views using the same all-embracing and yet ambiguous Marxist banner.

In the fall of 1962, Mao’s perceptions exerted a decisive impact on China’s foreign-policy rhetoric. Nationwide statistics for 1962 indicated that China was well on its way to economic recovery after three years of chaos and famine caused by the “Great Leap Forward.” Mao had observed this reversal from the sidelines. He had distanced himself from economic policymaking after the traumatic debacle of his radical vision for China’s “Great Leap” into Communism. Having eyed the waves created by the headwinds of his ideological tirades, Mao had graciously permitted his comrades-in-leadership to steer the boat to the nearest shore. To increase productivity, Mao’s second-in-command, Liu Shaoqi, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary, Deng Xiaoping, had pragmatically endorsed new practices in the countryside under the banner of “farming as household responsibility.” Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had reached out to China’s wary intellectuals, silenced by the anti-rightist campaign, and had once again called for a united front with the national bourgeoisie. Sober voices in the foreign-policy establishment called for a less confrontational foreign policy and a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.¹¹ Mao was upset by these “revisionist” tendencies of his party comrades. He resented that his colleagues failed to consult with him on important issues, content with his semi-retirement.

In August 1962, Mao came back with force. At a party conference at Beidaihe, he drew attention to the importance of class struggle. Khrushchev had earlier put forward the notion that class struggle did not apply to an

10 Aleksandr Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS: 1954–1964* [Presidium of the CC CPSU: 1954–1964] (Moscow: Rosslen, 2003), 696.

11 Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chs. 11–12.



25. Mao Zedong and the man he purged twice, but who lived to succeed him, Deng Xiaoping.

advanced socialist society, where the party and people lived in harmony. Finding this view thoroughly fallacious, Mao announced that the Soviet retreat from class struggle amounted to revisionism and to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. He feared that the same fate might befall China one day if the rightist policies peddled under the banner of “adjustment” after the Great Leap were allowed to continue. The following month, at the 10th Party Plenum, Mao made his views clear: “We must acknowledge that classes will continue to exist for a long time. We must also acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of the restoration of reactionary classes.”¹² Mao’s radical pronouncements stemmed the tide of policy pragmatism. He wanted to assure the continuation of the Chinese

12. Cited in *Ibid.*, 283.

revolution at home and of a revolutionary outlook on relations with foreign countries – first and foremost the “revisionist” USSR.

Chinese criticism of Khrushchev’s performance in Cuba in November–December 1962 touched a sensitive chord. Khrushchev, no less than Mao, aspired to greatness and loathed public criticism. He used the occasions offered by party congresses in Eastern Europe to counter Chinese allegations in ways reminiscent of Stalin’s handling of the dispute with Yugoslavia. The Soviets clearly commanded the support of the Eastern Europeans; each congress was choreographed to isolate the Chinese delegate and praise the wisdom of Khrushchev’s foreign policy. Officials in Beijing resented the hard-handed Soviet tactics, which so clearly undermined Khrushchev’s claims of goodwill toward China.

In the fall of 1962, China and India went to war over their disputed mountain frontier. The borderline was less of an issue in the conflict, perhaps, than Beijing’s determination to show India who was the greater power in Asia. The war came at a bad time for Khrushchev who had just negotiated a deal to sell India MiG-21 jet fighters. He had also supplied India with helicopters and transport planes, and the Chinese sighted those Soviet planes on the border. The Soviet premier initially claimed that he wanted to keep India away from the US embrace but hurriedly cancelled the MiG deal when he learned of Chinese anger.¹³ Departing from previous neutrality in the conflict, the Soviet press then condemned India. Khrushchev wanted to convey the impression that he would go out on a limb for China: “In relations between us,” he stressed, “there is no place for neutrality ... We shall always be in one camp and share joys and sorrows.”¹⁴ These statements failed to impress Chinese policymakers who concluded that Khrushchev had “betrayed [an] ally.”¹⁵

Betrayal of Chinese interests, as Mao viewed it, was only a short distance from betrayal of Marxism. Was Soviet great power arrogance a cause or a symptom of Soviet revisionism? On the one hand, Khrushchev’s high-handed and reckless foreign-policy moves provided solid evidence for Mao’s theoretical denunciation of Soviet revisionism. If Khrushchev was a Russian chauvinist, he could not be a real Marxist, Mao thought, because Marxism and chauvinism were not compatible. On the other hand, ideology constrained the scope of permissible Chinese interpretations of Soviet behavior, so that Khrushchev’s

13 Conversation between Stepan Chervonenko and Zhou Enlai, October 8, 1962, AVPRF: fond 0100, opis 55, papka 480, delo 7, list 69.

14 Conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and Liu Xiao, October 13, 1962, AVPRF: fond 0100, opis 55, papka 480, delo 4, list 37.

15 Wang Dong, *The Quarrelling Brothers*, 64.

genuine gestures of goodwill toward China invariably encountered suspicions. If Khrushchev was not a real Marxist, the Chinese leaders thought, his claims of acting on the basis of Marxist solidarity with China could only be a fake pretension, a cover for Khrushchev's real, un-Marxist nature. The mutually reinforcing relationship between ideology and power in Sino-Soviet relations paralleled Chinese domestic developments in late summer of 1962 when the increasingly insecure Mao unleashed his struggle against the "revisionist" policies of his unduly self-confident colleagues. In both cases, Mao resorted to radical ideology to shape power relationships; yet, unquestionably, his radical ideas had their own dynamic and were not just a smoke screen for a brutal power struggle.

Fidel Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in April–May 1963 gave Khrushchev the opportunity to polish his revolutionary credentials, badly stained since the Cuban missile crisis. Castro agreed to mend fences and received assurances of further Soviet economic aid. In repeated discussions of China, Khrushchev went out of his way to convince Castro that the Soviets were better than the Chinese in struggling against imperialism, and he sensed that Castro agreed with his point of view. Khrushchev told Castro that he knew what the Sino-Soviet quarrel was really about: it was "a question of nationalism, a question of egoism. This is the main thing. They want to play the first fiddle."¹⁶ And then, he made a remarkable admission:

Even, say, among friends, 5–10 people are friends and one of them is the chief; they do not elect him, they simply recognize him for some sort of qualities ... [T]here will be different colours and different characters, and different mental capabilities among people, there will be inequality as in all species of nature.¹⁷

The Soviet Union was the birthplace of the socialist revolution; it had defeated Nazism; it had launched satellites into space. The Chinese could never match Soviet greatness, and Mao could never hope to wrestle the mantle of leadership from Khrushchev personally. Khrushchev was the chief. He played the "first fiddle."

In July 1963, a high-level Chinese party delegation arrived in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. None of the outstanding issues in Sino-Soviet relations were resolved, or even profitably discussed. The delegations talked past each other. The Chinese – Deng Xiaoping, Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, and Politburo member Kang Sheng – defended Mao's ideological position: Khrushchev wronged Iosif Stalin who had been a great "sword" for socialism;

¹⁶ Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS*, 720. ¹⁷ *Ibid.*

he substituted peaceful coexistence with the West for resolute struggle against imperialism; he abandoned national liberation movements and gave up on class struggle inside the Soviet Union. Peng Zhen voiced grievances about Soviet “great power chauvinism” and “bourgeois nationalism,” and blamed Moscow for ordering other parties about with the “arrogance of the father party” and even for trying to be the “god of the international communist movement.”¹⁸ The talks were suspended on July 20, 1963, and the Chinese delegation returned to Beijing. It was a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. Mao used the failure of the talks to show that he had been correct all along about Khrushchev’s irreparable revisionism. Khrushchev, for his part, had to show that his efforts to find a compromise with the United States could be successful in spite of the Chinese criticism. After the failed talks with the Chinese, he hurried to sign the Limited Test-Ban Treaty with US and British representatives, inaugurating détente in Soviet–American relations.

From conflict to confrontation

As Khrushchev pursued détente with the West with some success, Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to worse. In September 1963, the Chinese began publishing a series of polemical articles detailing Soviet violations of Marxism. The Soviets responded in kind. The battle lines were drawn and the two sides exchanged long-range ideological salvos. Many Western observers imagined that Sino-Soviet relations could not get any worse. But over the next few months they did.

On July 10, 1964, Mao told a visiting Japanese delegation that he appreciated Japan’s territorial claims against the Soviet Union. China, too, had suffered at the hands of Russian expansionism: “About a hundred years ago the area east of Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other points have become territories of the Soviet Union. We have not yet presented the bill for this list.”¹⁹ Mao Zedong probably had no intention of “reclaiming” Siberia and the Soviet Far East. As he explained to one foreign visitor, “this is called firing empty cannons to make him [Khrushchev] nervous.”²⁰

18 Peng Zhen’s speech at the July 1963 Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, July 15, 1963, National Security Archive, Washington DC, REEADD, October 26, 1962–64.

19 *Pravda*, September 2, 1964, 2–3.

20 Cited in Sergei Goncharov and Li Danhui, “EZhong Guanxi Zhong de ‘Lingtu Yaoqiu’ he ‘Bu Pingdeng Tiaoyue,’” [The “Territorial Demands” and “Unequal Treaties” in Sino Russian Relations] *Ershiye Shi*, No. 10 (2004), 110; the author’s conversations with Chen Jian.

Mao's comments were, of course, leaked to the press and in August reached Khrushchev, who was not inclined to interpret these claims philosophically. On August 19, the Soviet leader addressed his colleagues in the Presidium: "have you read [this] hideous document about borders? ... I read [it] yesterday and became indignant." In a passionate speech he condemned Mao's irredentism:

Let us look at these things. The Russian Tsar grabbed some territories. [Today] there is no tsar, and there are no Chinese feudal lords, there is no Chinese emperor. They [the Chinese] also grabbed territories, just like the Russian Tsar. It is not the Chinese who live there, but the Kyrgyz, the Uighurs, the Kazakhs. How did it happen that they ended up in China? It is a clear thing. Mao Zedong knows that the Chinese emperor conquered these territories.²¹

Mao's "unsettled bill" touched a sensitive chord. The Soviet Union inherited the vast territorial expanse of the Russian Empire. Stalin resorted to brutal piecemeal annexation of neighboring countries in a restless pursuit of territorial security. But in place of security the Soviet leadership grappled with a profound sense of insecurity, aggravated by collective Soviet memories of the Western intervention in the Civil War and the traumatic experience of the German invasion. Any hint of change to postwar borders aroused Moscow's ire and bitter resentment. This was the case for European borders, especially in the postwar context of the division of Germany. In Asia, the Soviets had felt reasonably secure since Japan's defeat in World War II – until Mao's unprecedented demarche. The specter of Chinese territorial claims to the underpopulated and yet strategically essential Siberia and Far East shocked Soviet leaders. Khrushchev likened Mao to Adolf Hitler for his expansionist views.²²

In October 1964, Khrushchev was overthrown by his Kremlin comrades, who were fed up with his erratic leadership and unnerving bureaucratic shake-ups. The split with China was low on the list of the ousted premier's sins, though he was not spared criticism on that account. The new thinking among the party heavyweights was that if Khrushchev had ordered about his own colleagues, and failed to consult with them on issues of importance, then one could not blame the Chinese for hating his arrogance. The key figures in the new leadership arrangement – First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin – both had very little experience in foreign affairs. Facing a complex international situation, Khrushchev's successors looked for guidance in ideological prescriptions and tried to rebuild Soviet relations with

21 Fursenko (ed.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS*, 849–50. 22 *Pravda*, September 20, 1964, 1.

foreign countries on a solid Marxist basis, which, they claimed, Khrushchev had opportunistically abandoned.

Brezhnev summarized the Soviet challenge in a speech in November 1964:

As far as the socialist system is concerned, our main task remains the strengthening of its unity, and of the cooperation and mutual help among fraternal countries, accepting the necessary conditions of respecting equal rights, independence and sovereignty. It is well known that in the past precisely these conditions were frequently not fulfilled. Let us honestly admit that up to now we have not fully freed ourselves from these kinds of problems. Not only pressure and unceremoniousness, but any posture of superiority, "fatherly" teaching, untactful questions or forgetting to consult in time on questions of common interest – all this must be resolutely eliminated from relations with fraternal countries and parties. Only on such a basis can a real friendship be strengthened, [and the] voluntary cooperation of the socialist countries be developed.²³

Brezhnev's and Kosygin's rediscovered enthusiasm for China was not shared by the wider foreign-policy community, certainly not by the experienced diplomats and China specialists in the Foreign Ministry who tended to be far more reserved about the prospect of a rapprochement with their eastern neighbour. But the skeptical voices from below were not heard at the top when in October–November 1964 the new Soviet leadership set out once again to heal the Sino-Soviet rift. It was thus with high hopes that Brezhnev and Kosygin welcomed a Chinese delegation, headed by Zhou Enlai, for talks in Moscow in early November 1964.

Mao made no secret of his disdain for the toppled Khrushchev, but the fall of the Soviet leader did not change the equation of power between the two states. The alliance was intrinsically unequal, a partnership of a superpower, endowed with military, economic, and technological advantages, and a junior partner haplessly limping along. In China, the news of Khrushchev's downfall was published alongside the announcement of the successful test of China's first atomic bomb. But one bomb did not compensate for the development gap. As before, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was, to borrow Mao's own words, that of a father and son. Beijing and Moscow operated in the same system of coordinates, defined by both sides' proclaimed adherence to Marxism. Their economic performance served to bolster their respective ideological postures.

23 Leonid Brezhnev's speech to a Party Plenum, November 14, 1964, RGANI: fond 2, opis 1, delo 758, list 19.

In this system of coordinates, Mao aspired but never matched Soviet achievements. To build the relationship with Moscow on the basis of equality, China needed either to outperform the USSR or to abandon the ideological system of coordinates. Mao hopelessly failed the first option but could not bring himself to consider the second. His ideological commitment to combating Soviet revisionism immensely constrained China's foreign-policy options and prevented an early Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Yet Mao agreed to send a delegation to Moscow to probe the intentions of the new Soviet leaders, and perhaps at the same time probe the intentions of his own comrades, some of whom, he may have suspected, shared neither his delusions of grandeur nor his leftist beliefs and would have not shrunk from pragmatically mending fences with the USSR, for all their shared resentment of Soviet arrogance.

By sending Zhou Enlai to Moscow in November 1964, Mao tested his loyalty. When Mao required it, Zhou was always able to put aside his pragmatism and embrace the chairman's radical ideas. He came to the talks prepared to struggle against revisionism. But before the premier had a chance to fire his guns at the negotiating table, an embarrassing incident ruined any prospects for an agreement. At a Kremlin reception on November 7, 1964, the Soviet defense minister, Rodion Malinovskii, evidently intoxicated, proposed to a member of the Chinese delegation, Marshal He Long, that they get rid of Mao Zedong just as the Soviets had thrown out Khrushchev. Then, he said, Sino-Soviet relations would necessarily improve.²⁴ He Long complained to Zhou Enlai who, in turn, protested to the Soviets. The Soviets tried to persuade the Chinese that Malinovskii did not represent the views of the Soviet leadership, while Zhou Enlai insisted that the defense minister's drunken remarks showed what the Soviets really thought about China and Mao Zedong.

The Malinovskii incident revealed the Soviets at their undiplomatic worst. No foreign delegation could tolerate such insults, especially a Chinese delegation keenly sensitive to any hint of Soviet disrespect. The Soviet leaders, judging from Brezhnev's subsequent explanations, never grasped how outrageous Malinovskii's behavior appeared to the Chinese. Brezhnev expressed "c[omrade] Malinovskii's apologies for the incorrectly formulated thought," but Malinovskii was not punished in any obvious way.²⁵ Insulting as Malinovskii's remarks were, their real importance can only be understood in the context of Chinese domestic politics. He Long and, in particular, Zhou

24 Andrei Aleksandrov Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva* [From Kollontai to Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 169.

25 Leonid Brezhnev's speech to a Party Plenum, November 14, 1964, RGANI: fond 2, opis 1, delo 758, list 16.

Enlai could not do anything less than vigorously defend Mao Zedong against the Soviet accusations. The chairman did not tolerate disloyalty.

Mao's demand for class struggle at the 10th CCP Plenum in September 1962 spurred a political campaign to save China from revisionism. The campaign entailed a series of initiatives, initially in the countryside, and, from early 1963 on, also in the cities, to eradicate grassroots corruption and suppress capitalist tendencies, which, Mao perceived, were on the rise throughout China and threatened her revolution. Yet the so-called Socialist Education Movement did not give the chairman any peace of mind. In early 1964, Mao became increasingly concerned that revisionism had already found its way into the party, and that the Socialist Education Movement, by focusing on low-level problems, overlooked the more fundamental danger of revisionism very close to the levers of power. In February 1964, he claimed that "there are some people who do not make a sound, but wait for the opportunity; therefore, one must heighten one's vigilance." If people like the ousted defense minister, Peng Dehuai, were allowed "like Khrushchev, to control the party, the army and the political power – well, today ... we could be done away with."²⁶

Mao thought that Marshall Peng, whom he had purged in 1959 for Peng's outspoken criticism of the Great Leap policies, was Khrushchev's ally inside the Chinese leadership. But Peng Dehuai's downfall had not made Mao feel more secure. In April 1964, he lamented that "Khrushchev has comrades inside the Chinese [Communist] Party," who aimed at removing Mao from the CCP leadership.²⁷ Mao's apprehension of this scenario probably became more pronounced after Khrushchev's fall from power. After having taken China through the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, he may have suspected that he could not count on unswerving loyalty from his comrades in power; what if they had been secretly plotting to overthrow him? Malinovskii's drunken remarks touched on a sensitive subject. Mao, after years at the apex of political power in China, after repeated rectification campaigns, and after removing his real and imagined opponents, was still not sure that he exercised absolute authority in his own party. He worried that one day he would find himself sidelined by a Soviet-style collective leadership with un-Maoist pluralism and intraparty democracy, and that his revolutionary legacy would be abandoned for the Soviet model of socialist development.

26 Li Danhui, "1964 nian: ZhongGuo guanxi yu Mao Zedong waijuan neiyao silu de zhuanbian" [1964: Sino-Soviet Relations and Mao Zedong's Turn towards the "Trouble Within, Problems Without" Mentality], in Luan Jinghe (ed.), *ZhongGuo guanxi de lishi yu xianshi* [History and Reality of Sino-Soviet Relations] (Kaifeng: Henan Daxue, 2004), 557–74.

27 *Ibid.*

In December 1964, Deng Xiaoping, concerned that Mao had been ill, suggested to the chairman that he not attend a routine conference to discuss the progress of the Socialist Education Movement. Mao took this as further evidence that his Politburo colleagues had decided to push him aside. He made a point of attending the conference, which began in mid-December and lasted until January 1965. During the sessions, Mao criticized Liu Shaoqi for limiting the purges to the corrupt cadres in the countryside. Mao believed the campaigns should target the higher ranks of the party bureaucracy – the “people in positions of authority within the party who take the capitalist road.” Though Liu usually deferred to Mao in such matters, this time the chairman’s chief deputy was more forceful in support of his own propositions. It appeared to the participants of the conference that Mao and Liu were at odds.²⁸ But what was at stake in this debate – Mao’s ideological convictions or simple power calculations? Mao identified himself with the revolution. He had made it possible. He sustained its momentum throughout the years. He saw any challenge to his personal power as a challenge to the revolution itself. Mao regarded the dispute with Liu Shaoqi as one aspect of a revolutionary struggle that he had to intensify. The Sino-Soviet split was another aspect that needed to be looked after.

The new Soviet leaders had no idea about these dramatic developments in China. After the November 1964 meeting failed miserably, they spent months debating the merits of a new approach to China. Premier Aleksei Kosygin still wanted to mend fences. Dismissing Brezhnev’s growing skepticism, Kosygin argued that the Soviet Union and China had no fundamental disagreements because both countries adhered to Marxist policies. Whatever disagreements they did have, these had to be put aside now, at a time when Washington was dramatically escalating its involvement in the Vietnam War: the two countries had to act together to oppose “US imperialism.” Cold War imperatives must prevent Sino-Soviet rupture at this time of danger, or so Kosygin thought. Perhaps, the prime minister was also keeping an eye on considerations of his own prestige. If he were to repair the Sino-Soviet alliance, Kosygin’s political standing in the Soviet leadership would certainly improve, and this was important in the context of a subtle competition for influence between himself and Brezhnev. For these reasons, Kosygin went to China in February 1965 to meet with Mao Zedong to work out their differences.

On February 11, Kosygin had his chance. In a long meeting with Mao he argued that “the most important thing to us is the union of forces. As a result

28 MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, 428.

of this, they [our forces] will be ten times bigger. ... [I]deology is stronger than any weapon."²⁹ Kosygin reportedly told Mao: "we are both Marxist-Leninists. Why can't we have a good talk?"³⁰ But the good talk went nowhere. Soviet participants in the conversation recalled that Mao was "emphatically sarcastic," at times even "insulting."³¹ In response to Kosygin's pleas for unity, Mao promised that his struggle against revisionism would continue for ten thousand years. Downplaying Cold War constraints, Mao confidently placed the Soviet Union on the other side of the barricades, next to the United States:

The US and the USSR are now deciding the world's destiny. Well, go ahead and decide. But within the next 10–15 years you will not be able to decide the world's destiny. It is in the hands of the nations of the world, and not in the hands of the imperialists, exploiters or revisionists.

World destiny, Mao thought, was in the hands of China, in his own hands. His struggle against revisionism was at the same time a struggle for recognition, a struggle for greatness, against Soviet efforts to keep China down and out.

Disappointed, Kosygin returned to Moscow to face growing skepticism about China. But remarkably, even after the failed meeting with Mao, Soviet leaders continued to initiate proposals for practical Sino-Soviet cooperation, such as provision aid to North Vietnam. On February 16, 1965, the Soviets probed China on the desirability of arranging another peace conference on Vietnam.³² On April 3, Brezhnev and Kosygin signed a letter to the Chinese and the Vietnamese with a proposal to meet at the highest level to discuss joint actions to oppose the escalatory actions of the United States. In the meantime, Soviet leaders peddled ideas for military cooperation with the Chinese despite the sorry state of Sino-Soviet relations. On February 27, 1965, Moscow requested Chinese permission to send forty-five transport planes via China to Vietnam with weapons and advisers.³³ Another Soviet proposal (on February 25) entailed the establishment of a Soviet air force base in Kunming in southern China with twelve MiG-21 aircraft to protect the Sino-Vietnamese

29 Conversation between Aleksei Kosygin and Mao Zedong, February 11, 1965, Archiwum Akt Nowych (Modern Records Archive), Warsaw, Poland, KC PZPR, XI A/10; obtained by Douglas Selvage; translation by Malgorzata Gnoinska.

30 Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: Zhongguo guanxi huiyilu* [Ten Years of Polemics, 1956–1966: Memoir of Sino-Soviet Relations] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1999), 915.

31 Oleg Troianovskii, *Chez gody i rassstoianiia: istoriia odnoi sem'i* [Through Years and Distances: One Family's History] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 352.

32 Conversation between Stepan Chervonenko and Liu Xiao, February 16, 1965, AVPRF: fond 0100, opis 58, papka 516, delo 5, list 29.

33 Conversation between Stepan Chervonenko and Zhou Enlai, April 13, 1965, AVPRF: opis 0100, fond 58, papka 516, delo 5, list 114.

border.³⁴ The idea behind these approaches, besides the obvious Soviet concern with the military situation in Vietnam, was to show the Chinese that they were not selling out to US imperialism.

Nearly all Soviet approaches regarding Vietnam encountered determined Chinese resistance. A new conference on Indochina did not get off the ground because, in Chinese opinion, the time was not ripe for Hanoi to negotiate – the US had to be defeated on the battlefield first. The Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese summit did not take place, Zhou Enlai explained, because the Chinese had their own channel of communication with Hanoi to discuss whatever concerns they had.³⁵ A Soviet request to permit passage of military transport planes through their airspace, moreover, angered the Chinese. Zhou Enlai said that the plan amounted to a military operation, and the Chinese had not been consulted in advance.³⁶ Soviet shipments of arms by rail was grudgingly allowed, but bureaucratic obstacles kept Soviet weapons at the border crossings for weeks. The Chinese feared that the massive flow of Soviet weapons into Vietnam would weaken Hanoi's dependence on China.

The Soviet proposal for an air force base in Kunming triggered a storm of indignation. Chinese leaders claimed that the real purpose of the twelve planes was not to cover the Sino-Vietnamese border against US incursions but to put China under Soviet military control. As absurd as this idea sounded to puzzled Kremlin policymakers, it indicated Chinese apprehension of a foreign military presence on Chinese soil, an apprehension rooted in the turbulent history of the late Qing and Republican China, when the country was overrun time and again by foreign troops. It also stemmed from more recent memories of Soviet meddling in Xinjiang and Manchuria since the 1920s. In fact, if Brezhnev and Kosygin had recalled the problems Khrushchev had in 1958, when the Soviet Union had put forward proposals for a joint submarine fleet and a Soviet-manned military radio station in China, they would have thought twice before proposing ambitious plans for military cooperation. But considerations of class solidarity at the time of the Vietnam War prevented the Kremlin from drawing proper conclusions from past Soviet experiences. Deng Xiaoping later smirked that “the Soviets forgot that we had a certain experience in this respect.” Kang Sheng drove the point home: “the Soviets do not respect the sovereignty of our country; ... they look upon our country as a province of the Soviet Union.”³⁷

34 *Ibid.*, list 141. 35 *Ibid.*, list 110. 36 *Ibid.*, list 114.

37 Conversation between Nicolae Ceaușescu and a Chinese delegation, July 26, 1965, Materials of Conference on European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, Budapest, Hungary, October 30–November 1, 2003.

Mao's resistance to a united front with the Soviets in spite of the Vietnam War reveals his strategic calculations. US involvement in Vietnam posed a potential security threat to China. In 1965, Chinese leaders repeatedly signalled to Washington through various channels their interest in containing the war in Southeast Asia, promising to stay out of the conflict as long as the Americans did not violate China's borders. Of course, no one in Beijing could be confident that the United States would heed these signals, but Mao felt reasonably sure that China itself would not come under American attack.³⁸ But Soviet military plans were another matter.

Since 1963, Mao had become increasingly concerned with a potential Soviet threat to Chinese security. He may have received intelligence of a military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border, or perhaps learned of Khrushchev's awkward attempts to bring Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in the summer of 1963. Moscow's improving relations with the West at the time of its worsening quarrel with Beijing would not have appeared particularly reassuring to Chinese policymakers – it looked to Mao as if the Soviets and the Americans were ganging up on his revolution. In February 1964, he told Kim Il Sung sarcastically that all of the measures the Soviet Union took to pressure China into submission had failed, “but there is still one – going to war.” By July, his sarcasm disappeared. He felt that “we cannot only pay attention to the East, and not to the North, only pay attention to imperialism and not revisionism, we must prepare for war on both sides.” In October 1964, Mao was clearly worried: “Can Khrushchev invade us or not,” “can [he] send troops to occupy Xinjiang, Manchuria, and even Inner Mongolia?”³⁹ To prepare for war, Mao called for the construction of a “third line” of defense – a massive effort to relocate crucial Chinese industries in the interior, faraway from all borders, including the border with the USSR. Indeed, by 1965, Mao was probably as much concerned with the Soviet threat in the north as with the American threat in the south. If so, it should not be surprising that he opted out of joint actions with the Soviet Union in Vietnam; if he did not, he might have been going to bed with an enemy.

38 James G. Hershberg and Chen Jian, “Informing the Enemy: Sino-American ‘Signaling’ and the Vietnam War, 1965,” in Priscilla Roberts (ed.), *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia* (Washington, DC, and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2006).

39 Li Danhui, “1964 nian: ZhongGuo guanxi yu Mao Zedong waijiao neiyao silu de zhuanbian,” 557–74.

The Cultural Revolution and Sino-Soviet military clashes

After his confrontation with Liu Shaoqi over the direction of the Socialist Education Movement, Mao began to prepare the ground for a showdown with his perceived enemies in China. These enemies were to be found in all positions of authority – among senior party officials, and among Mao's long-time revolutionary comrades. Mao chose a circuitous way of achieving his objectives. He encouraged a radical attack on the party bureaucracy under the pretext of a struggle with revisionism in the ruling circles. The campaign had been in planning since at least February 1965, though the opening shots were fired in November when Shanghai-based radicals, incited by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing (who was acting on Mao's instructions), criticized Wu Han, a prominent historian and deputy mayor of Beijing, for revisionism. In the struggle that followed, the mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen, tried to protect Wu Han but lost the battle to Mao whose real target was the party leadership. Peng Zhen was the first to find that nobody was safe when Mao orchestrated a full-scale purge of the Beijing Party Committee (including Peng) in May 1966. But as the movement, now called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, gained momentum, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping also felt the heat. Liu was branded "China's Khrushchev" and deposed; he was to die from medical neglect in a prison in Kaifeng in 1969. Deng lost his position, but not his life. Countless officials were publicly humiliated, tortured, imprisoned, and sometimes killed. The party center disintegrated by late 1966. The radical "Cultural Revolution Group" assumed unprecedented powers with Mao's blessing, and the country descended into chaos as millions of youths took to the streets to worship Chairman Mao and carry through their struggle against revisionism. Was the Cultural Revolution a struggle of ideas or a struggle for power? It was probably both: a complex interplay of Mao's concern for the fate of the Chinese revolution and for his own political power. The Cultural Revolution was born of the same ingredients that fueled Mao's previous anti-revisionist exploits in 1962 and 1964. Now the stakes were higher, and heads rolled on a far grander scale.

From the beginning, there was a clear anti-Soviet angle to the Cultural Revolution, since Mao made an explicit connection between Soviet "capitalist restoration" and Chinese revisionism. Radicals singled out Soviet-style revisionists in China as Moscow's allies who tried to help the USSR "climb on China's back" so as to again make China a "colony or semi-colony."⁴⁰ But Moscow

⁴⁰ *Renmin Ribao*, July 1, 1966, 3.

did not play any practical role in the power struggle; Soviet leaders, in fact, did not know what to make of events in China nor with whom to sympathize. By late 1965, the Chinese problem had lost its urgency for Moscow: rapprochement was nowhere in sight, but a turn for the worse was also not expected. The Soviet leaders eyed China with a new sense of confidence, in part because of their advances elsewhere in Asia. Soviet relations with Hanoi had improved substantially compared with those of the Khrushchev era (thanks, no doubt, to the persuasive power of Soviet aid). North Korea was not to be left behind: Kim Il Sung's visit to Vladivostok for talks with Brezhnev in the spring of 1966 laid the groundwork for better relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. In January 1966, the Soviet Union and Mongolia signed a treaty, permitting the stationing of Soviet military forces in that country. The same month Kosygin mediated the Indo-Pakistani conflict in a bid to gain influence with both countries. These foreign-policy achievements compensated for the Soviet failure to mend fences with China.

The Cultural Revolution dealt a major blow to Soviet complacency. The most visible aspect of the chaos – massive rallies of the Red Guards – projected an image of aggressive xenophobia. The revolutionary mobs besieged the Soviet embassy for days at a time. Plans were in the making to burn it down, but in August 1967, Zhou Enlai personally persuaded the leader of the Red Guards besieging the embassy, a pig-tailed girl of sixteen, to call off the attack.⁴¹ To the Soviets, it was not clear whether they faced unsanctioned mob violence or state policy. Moreover, reports were trickling in to Moscow about the buildup of Chinese forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier, the construction of roads leading to the border, and militant propaganda among the troops.

Faced with these threatening developments, the Soviet Politburo decided to upgrade defense capabilities in the East. A resolution was passed on February 4, 1967, to station troops in Mongolia, strengthen the Soviet forces in the Far East, Zabaikal'e, and Eastern Kazakhstan, and build protected command centers.⁴² The timing of these decisions is telling: they came in the immediate aftermath of Red Guard violence around the Soviet Embassy. Xenophobic demonstrations agitated Soviet leaders, though otherwise Moscow exercised patience. For example, the request to station troops in Mongolia had first been made in 1965 by the Mongolian government, which was even more

41 Ma Jisen, *The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005), 189.

42 On the stationing of the Soviet forces on the territory of the MPR, February 4, 1967, RGANI: fond 2, opis 3, delo 67, list 149.

apprehensive of Chinese intentions than the Soviets.⁴³ This request had been shelved for more than a year until the chaos of the Cultural Revolution made Soviet policymakers rethink their strategy toward China in the direction of more active military containment. Brezhnev summarized this strategy in one sentence: “we assume that the stronger the defense of our borders, the less danger there is of a really serious military confrontation on our eastern frontiers.”⁴⁴

This assumption worked against Moscow. The more forces the Soviet Union stationed along the frontier with China, the more Chinese leaders became convinced of aggressive Soviet intentions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deepened Beijing’s concerns. In response to the perceived Soviet threat, the Chinese military adopted the strategy of “active defense” that entailed a show of force to dissuade the opponent from hostile action. Active defense also helped Mao mobilize the Chinese population for his domestic agenda – revamping the power structure in the aftermath of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In the winter of 1968–69, the Central Military Commission approved a plan to create a border incident; in this context, on March 2, 1969, Chinese troops ambushed a Soviet border patrol near Zhenbao Island. The Soviets retaliated with force some days later; scores were killed on both sides. On August 13, 1969, another armed incident occurred on the Sino-Soviet border in Xinjiang, and a few days later Moscow made veiled threats of a preemptive nuclear strike against China.

In a tense atmosphere, Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met in Beijing airport on September 11 and assured each other that neither side wanted to go to war. They also agreed to reopen border talks in Beijing. But Mao was not convinced by the Soviet assurances and suspected that Moscow might launch a first strike on China, perhaps under the cover of the forthcoming border talks. In September–October, amid war fever, the People’s Liberation Army prepared for a Soviet invasion.⁴⁵ The attack did not come, and it is unlikely that plans for it were ever seriously entertained by the Soviet leadership. But the experience of 1969 left Mao intensely insecure. In an effort to counterbalance the Soviet threat, Mao turned to China’s former enemy, the United

43 Resolution of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party Politburo, December 1, 1965, Mongol Ardyn Khuvsgalt Namyn Arkhiv [Archive of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party]. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: fond 4, dans 28, kh/n 173b, khuu. 35–37.

44 Leonid Brezhnev’s speech to a Party Plenum, June 26, 1969, RGANI, fond 2, opis 3, delo 159, list 37.

45 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 59–65.



5. Sino-Soviet border clashes on the eastern and western sectors of the frontier, March and August 1969

States. The two countries mended fences in the early 1970s.⁴⁶ In the meantime, border talks failed to bring about any substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, which by 1970 had attained a degree of icy stability.

The Sino-Soviet split and new international scenarios

By the end of the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split transformed international politics. Fear of facing conflict on both the Western and Eastern fronts prompted Soviet leaders to choose the lesser of two evils, and by the turn of the decade the United States was seen as a more limited threat. Many factors shaped Soviet thinking. Moscow interpreted American setbacks in Vietnam and the US economic recession as sure signs of Washington's decline. Meanwhile, China's military buildup and displays of nuclear power served as constant reminders to Moscow of the Soviet Union's vulnerabilities in Siberia and the Far East. Despite their differences, Moscow and Washington could reach agreement on many issues of importance; for example, substantial progress was achieved in strategic arms-limitation talks. Negotiations with China proved more difficult; China was unpredictable and unstable. The lack of progress in the Sino-Soviet border talks suggested to Soviet leaders that China was not genuinely interested in a compromise. A Soviet reassessment of external threats underpinned Brezhnev's efforts – first subtle, and then increasingly blatant – to recruit the United States as an ally, or at least a fellow traveller, in the struggle against China. Similar developments occurred on the Chinese side. After the 1969 war scare, internal assessments in Beijing concluded that the USSR was China's greatest external threat. Mao moved swiftly toward a rapprochement with Washington, seeking improved relations with the United States as a measure of security against perceived Soviet expansionism.

These policy changes involved more than a simple change of threat perception. Since the early years of the Cold War, the United States had not only been the USSR's primary strategic opponent but its ideological adversary. The Cold War had been a struggle of ideas, not merely a confrontation of great powers. Previously, the Soviet Union had allied itself with ideological adversaries to counter a more immediate danger – during World War II, for example, the Kremlin embraced its capitalist foes to withstand the assault from Nazi Germany. In times of crisis Soviet policymakers were capable of

46 Yang Kuisong, "The Sino Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino American Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (August 2000), 21–52.



26. Soviet border guards at the Chinese border on the Ussuri river, May 1969. Skirmishes with China encouraged Soviet leaders to opt for *détente* with the United States.

shelving ideological prescriptions and acting on the basis of strictly realist calculations. The Sino-Soviet conflict created that kind of crisis. Ironically, Moscow played power politics against a former comrade in arms still bound to the Soviet Union by a treaty of alliance. The Chinese now also placed considerations of national interest above the revolutionary dimensions of their foreign policy. Devaluation of a common ideology as a meaningful point of reference in Beijing and Moscow marked a turning point for the Cold War and, as Chen Jian argues, possibly the beginning of its end.⁴⁷

47 See Chen Jian's chapter in volume III.

The forces that brought about this remarkable transformation had deep roots. The Sino-Soviet alliance contained the seeds of its own destruction. Shared Marxist ideology – the strength of the alliance – proved insufficient to hold it together. The principles of equality and fraternity that the alliance stood for were in practice difficult to achieve. Pretense of equality did not compensate for staggering inequalities: China was of course the underdog in the alliance. But whereas the Soviet leadership considered this state of affairs entirely natural, the Chinese resented bitterly such a state of perpetual subordination. Moreover, in place of fraternity, Chinese leaders too often encountered Soviet arrogance and great power pressure. It did not take a leap of imagination to connect Soviet blunders with Russia's historical record of expansion and imperialism in Asia. Meanwhile, Soviet leaders blamed the Chinese for monstrous ingratitude.

The importance of these fundamentals was not immediately apparent when Sino-Soviet relations turned sharply for the worse in the early 1960s. The larger problems were buried beneath a barrage of ideologically charged polemics. In retrospect, Deng Xiaoping, who had passionately defended Mao's revolutionary ideals in the polemical clashes with Moscow, characterized the rhetoric of the 1960s as "konghua" (empty words). As he told Mikhail Gorbachev on May 16, 1989, when the Soviet leader visited him in Beijing to mend fences: "From the mid-1960s, our relations deteriorated; they were practically broken off. It was not because of the ideological disputes; we do not think now that everything we said at that time was right. The basic problem was that the Chinese were not treated as equals and felt humiliated."⁴⁸ Deng thus pointed to what was the most important reason for the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance – its inequality.

The problems created by the inequality in the relationship were exacerbated by the cultural sensibilities of policymakers in both Beijing and Moscow. Soviet leaders occasionally made blatantly racist remarks about China. Khrushchev and Brezhnev cited the writings of early Russian explorers of China to illustrate how the Chinese had always been "sly" and "perfidious."⁴⁹ The impact of these stereotypes on policymakers in Moscow cannot be

48 Deng Xiaoping's Remarks to Mikhail Gorbachev, May 16, 1989, Leng Rong *et al.* (eds.), *Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975–1997* [Deng Xiaoping Chronology], vol. II (xia) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2004), 1275.

49 For instance, conversation between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, June 23, 1973, Brezhnev visit, June 18–25, 1973, Memoranda of conversations, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files: Europe–USSR, box 75, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. (Materials will be moving to Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California.)

quantified with precision, but their recurrence in Politburo discussions and memoranda of conversations between the Soviet leaders and foreign dignitaries suggests that subtle racism was a factor in policy formulation. Chinese stereotypes of Russia as aggressive and arrogant, though probably confirmed by Soviet actions in some instances, on other occasions precluded clear understanding of Soviet motives and policies.

Finally, the Sino-Soviet split was intrinsically related to the domestic context of policymaking in Beijing and Moscow. China was a factor in the Soviet power struggle, just as the Soviet Union was a factor in the Chinese power struggle. Mao's campaign against Soviet leaders and against Liu Shaoqi were closely connected. Soviet policymakers did not have the same dilemmas, but they, too, played the China card in internal political maneuvers; after Khrushchev's fall, a rapprochement with China briefly promised untold political dividends to anyone who could bring it about. The Sino-Soviet split also made it necessary for the Soviets to distinguish with greater precision genuine (or Soviet) socialism from a Chinese "perversion." Mao, for his part, employed his struggle against "Soviet revisionism" to effect a revolutionary transformation at home. In turn, upheavals in China made Sino-Soviet reconciliation very unlikely so long as Mao remained in control.

But this is not the same as to say that domestic politics drove foreign-policy decisions. Mao's revolution was only a means to an end, not an end in itself. The end was to bring to a close the Chinese "century of humiliation," to make China a great power in its own right. The Sino-Soviet alliance initially helped, but eventually hindered progress toward this goal. Over time, both Chinese and Soviet leaders came to realize that a true great power cannot have allies of equal rank.

Détente in the Nixon–Ford years, 1969–1976

ROBERT D. SCHULZINGER

President Richard M. Nixon declared in his inaugural address on January 20, 1969, that “after a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiations” with the Soviet Union.¹ Privately, he told the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, that in the United States “whenever elections approached, political leaders were tempted to take a belligerent anti-Communist line,” but that Nixon himself “did not consider such an approach to be in the interests of world peace or of Soviet–American relations.”²

These conciliatory words toward America’s Cold War rival seemed surprising at the time, since Nixon had played important parts in Congress from 1947 to 1952 and as vice president from 1953 to 1961 in shaping confrontational American policies toward the Soviet Union and Communism. As president, Nixon put aside his earlier criticism of the Communist system, choosing to focus instead on expanding areas of common interest between the Cold War rivals in order to promote what he characterized as a “structure of peace.” He developed personal relationships with Soviet leaders, and the United States and the Soviet Union reached a series of agreements on arms control, commercial relations, and political cooperation that fostered a fragile détente between them.

Nixon and Henry Kissinger, a former Harvard University professor of government who became his national security adviser, later secretary of state, and his principal foreign-policy lieutenant, believed that the international situation had changed dramatically in the previous decade. The United States and the Soviet Union were no longer the only powers that

1 Richard Nixon, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1969, *Public Papers of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1970), 3.

2 Memorandum of conversation, Nixon, Gromyko, *et al.*, October 22, 1970. US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (FRUS)* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), vol. I, 270 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

mattered, as Europe and Japan recovered their strength, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) emerged as a growing challenge in the world Communist movement.

Nixon and Kissinger started détente as a recognition of the relative, not absolute, decline of US power and the growth of multipolarity. They responded to European desires for improved economic relations and reduced political tensions with the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. They valued state sovereignty, and they believed that international stability required that great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union avoid interfering in the internal affairs of each other. This advocacy of the rights and responsibilities of great powers collided with a growing popular movement for human rights.

Détente succeeded at first, because it reduced popular anxieties about the dangers of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet even as it enjoyed widespread popularity in the years 1971–73, its foundations were weakened by Nixon's and Kissinger's personalities. The two men manipulated others and worked in secrecy. Détente encountered opposition from both those who wanted a more forthright stand against abuses of human rights and those who continued to fear Soviet military power. When Gerald R. Ford became president in 1974, détente was already losing popularity domestically. In the aftermath of the Communist victory in Vietnam, détente suffered even more. In fact, Nixon's, Kissinger's, and Ford's realistic assessment of growing multipolarity did not rest on a belief in US decline. The Helsinki Final Act, so reviled when it was signed in 1975, actually helped set in motion forces that led to the demise of Soviet-style Communism.

Intellectual foundations of détente

In 1967, Nixon observed the “winds of détente have blown so strongly from the East to the West that ... most Europeans no longer fear” a Soviet threat. As a result, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a long-time cornerstone of American Cold War policy, had weakened.³ Kissinger also believed that the United States no longer had the dominant world position it had enjoyed in the early days of the Cold War. The growing nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union had altered traditional ideas about the relationship between the use of or the threat of military force to achieve political ends. In the past, the greater a nation's military power, the greater its ability to influence others. Now, with both the United States and the Soviet

3 “Address by Richard Nixon to the Bohemian Club,” July 29, 1967, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, vol. I, 2.

Union capable of destroying each other, the threat to use nuclear weapons to achieve ordinary political aims had become less credible.

For Nixon and Kissinger, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 presented a dilemma. On the one hand, the suppression of “socialism with a human face” indicated that the Soviet Union still posed a threat to Europe and that the Cold War competition between East and West continued. On the other hand, both sides possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other, making nuclear war a grave danger. The two nuclear superpowers were mortal rivals, to be sure, but they also had common interests in managing their relationship to prevent war.

The promotion of “peace” became a central theme of the Nixon administration. Nixon campaigned for president on a platform of achieving “peace with honor” in Vietnam. He recognized a popular yearning for an end to the war in Vietnam and to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union. While president, he regularly asserted that he sought to create a “structure of peace,” which would apply to the whole world and which would reduce the terror of the Cold War. Peace with the Soviet Union principally meant the reduction of the danger of nuclear war.

Nixon was also responding to changes in European attitudes toward the Soviet Union. When he spoke of the winds of détente blowing across Europe, he referred to recent efforts by traditional NATO partners—France, West Germany, Italy, and Britain—to improve relations with the Soviet Union. These overtures combined political, military, and economic openings. The West German government led by the Social Democratic chancellor, Willy Brandt, launched its policy of *Ostpolitik* (policy toward the East) in 1970. The West German government stopped insisting that the East German government was illegitimate and should be isolated. It recognized the frontiers between East Germany and Poland. Kissinger alerted Nixon to the “worrisome ... long range” dangers of an *Ostpolitik* that might detach West Germany from its NATO allies.⁴ Across Europe, governments and citizens responded to French president Charles de Gaulle’s call for an end to threats or the use of force to resolve political differences in Europe. West German, Italian, French, and British firms invested in and exported goods to Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. American businesses feared being left behind by competitors in the increasingly prosperous Western European countries, and they demanded that the United States government do more to improve the climate between East and West.

4 Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 530.

In this new atmosphere, Nixon and Kissinger resolved to treat the Soviet Union as an ordinary state with reasonable national goals and interests. This meant that the United States would no longer highlight its objections to Communism as a social or political system inside the Soviet Union. It would avoid condemnations of the Soviet government's abuse of its citizens' human rights. It would expect the Soviet Union to show similar restraint in avoiding bombastic criticism of the American political and social system. All the while, the United States would continue to try to contain Communism and oppose the spread of Soviet global influence.

The Nixon-Kissinger relationship

Nixon and Kissinger developed a close personal relationship that profoundly affected the way in which they conducted their foreign policy. On many days they met together alone or with only a handful of aides present for hours, and they spoke at length to one another on the phone. They criticized officials, members of Congress, journalists, and the public. Each man came to office deeply suspicious of elected officeholders, foreign affairs officials, or members of the public who commented on foreign affairs. Nixon was uncomfortable with most people, hating direct disagreement or confrontation with subordinates. He believed that most permanent officials in the government opposed him and his policies. He told his cabinet in 1971, "we've checked and found that 96 percent of the bureaucracy are against us; they're bastards who are here to screw us."⁵

Kissinger was a surprising member of Nixon's inner circle because he had supported Nelson Rockefeller, Nixon's rival for the presidency. In addition, he had taught at Harvard and written extensively for the Council on Foreign Relations, two of the principal institutions of the Eastern establishment that Nixon distrusted. Unlike Nixon, Kissinger could be highly personable, and during his tenure as national security adviser and secretary of state, he often had excellent relations with news reporters. He had, however, other reasons to want to work behind the scenes. He quickly realized that the more he and Nixon spoke to one another, the more indispensable he seemed to become, especially when Kissinger joined the president in complaining about the inadequacies of others.

Kissinger's academic writings belonged to the Realist school of foreign-policy analysis. His research added to his sense that most Americans could not

5 "President's Talk to Cabinet, " June 29, 1971. H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putnam, 1994), 309.

be trusted to understand foreign affairs or to support what he believed to be a foreign policy that promoted American interests. Among the major tenets of Realism are the ideas that power matters most in international relations; ideology has little importance. Regrettably, from Kissinger's point of view, Americans paid too little attention to power relations in international affairs, and they stressed too often unworkable moral maxims or legalistic formulations. In 1968, he disparaged the idealism of American youth who "considered the management of power irrelevant, perhaps even immoral." A generation gap had opened between students opposed to American participation in the war in Vietnam and their elders whose remembered lesson of World War II was the danger of unchecked aggression. "Partly as a result of the generation gap," Kissinger wrote, "the American mood oscillates dangerously between being ashamed of power and expecting too much of it."⁶

During the 1960s, public discussion of Soviet–American relations often focused on efforts to cap the nuclear-arms race. Kissinger, however, expressed skepticism that arms-control agreements by themselves would reduce tension between the two nuclear superpowers. Concentration on arms control, he believed, got the story backward. Improved political relations, he argued, would lead to arms control. But since there was such widespread public support for arms control, Kissinger pursued it.

Nixon and Kissinger sought to embed US–Soviet agreements on arms control in a larger web of mutual interest. At his first press conference on February 6, 1969, Nixon explained that the United States wanted to go forward with the Soviets on political agreements and arms control. This policy became known as "linkage," in which the US government would connect progress in different areas. Kissinger explained that Nixon meant linkage to convey the idea that "there be enough movement in the political field to indicate that arms control negotiations do not unwittingly, instead of reducing the danger of war, offer a means by which conflict can be intensified."⁷

At its most ambitious, the Nixon administration expected that progress toward better bilateral relations with the Soviet Union would encourage the leaders of the Kremlin to apply pressure on the government of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam to agree to end the Vietnam War on terms the Americans would accept. These hopes proved to be illusory. The Soviet Union did not push North Vietnam very hard, and the North Vietnamese could resist Soviet pressure since they also enjoyed the backing of the PRC, Moscow's rival for leadership in the Communist world. Nixon and Kissinger

6 "Essay by Henry Kissinger," *FRUS, 1969–1976*, vol. I, 47. 7 Editorial note, *ibid.*, 58–59.

hoped to exploit this intra-Communist rivalry through “triangular diplomacy” among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

Triangular diplomacy failed in its original goal of gaining Soviet and Chinese pressure on Hanoi to settle the war in Vietnam on terms agreeable to the United States. Triangular diplomacy did, however, expand US–Soviet détente. American steps toward détente with the Soviet Union proceeded side by side with secret efforts to open relations with China. This behind-the-scenes diplomacy culminated in Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in July 1971, which paved the way for a celebrated visit by Nixon to China in February 1972. Soviet officials observed the burgeoning US–PRC rapprochement with alarm. They often warned Nixon and Kissinger against making friends with the Chinese at the Soviets’ expense. Nixon and Kissinger offered only tepid reassurances to the Soviet leadership that closer ties between Washington and Beijing would not harm Soviet interests. As the United States and China ended their decades’-long estrangement in 1971 and 1972, Soviet leaders became more inclined than they had been before to reach agreements with the United States.

Nixon and Kissinger built upon their views of politics and international affairs to develop détente. They responded to public anxieties about the costs and the dangers of the continuing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their methods became as important as their goals. They built their structure of peace in a way that shut out professional diplomats and cabinet secretaries ostensibly in charge of foreign affairs. Their tight control of foreign policy led to dramatic and unexpected breakthroughs. But their antagonism toward professional advisers also left them without vital support when opponents criticized détente.

Arms control and US–Soviet summit meetings, 1969–1972

In early 1969, at the beginning of the Nixon administration, National Security Adviser Kissinger informed the Soviet ambassador, Anatolii Dobrynin, that the president wanted to conduct business with the Soviet Union personally and directly through a “back channel” line of communication. Kissinger explained that he had the authority to speak for the US government regardless of what other officials said. The back channel became the principal means through which the United States and the Soviet Union communicated over the next five and one-half years. The back channel’s advantages were that it gave Kissinger and Nixon control over the setting of foreign policy, and its secrecy enabled them to make dramatic announcements which captured public

attention. The disadvantage of conducting foreign affairs through the back channel was that it was far too personal. By ignoring and undermining the professionals within the State Department, Nixon and Kissinger lost out on important technical advice. Their penchant for secrecy and their distrust of professional advice also made it harder than necessary for them to build support for their policies. When domestic opposition to elements of détente intensified, Nixon became vulnerable to complaints that the agreements he had signed were deeply flawed.

In the mid- and late 1960s, the race between the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy more intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and to develop anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) provoked worldwide public anxiety. As soon as he became president, Nixon tried to dampen these fears when he announced within days of taking office that US policy was to have “sufficiency” not “superiority” in nuclear weapons. He downsized the Johnson administration’s plan for a large ABM system directed against the Soviet Union, called Sentinel, to a smaller Safeguard system intended to be deployed against a possible threat from China.

In 1970 and 1971, Kissinger negotiated with Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko through the back channel. In a series of discussions with Dobrynin, Kissinger argued that the Soviet Union and the United States should try to reach an agreement, first, on limiting the potential deployment of ABMs and call a freeze on further deployment of ICBMs. In May 1971, Kissinger and Dobrynin reached what Kissinger called a “conceptual breakthrough” by separating ABM and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations. They promised to reach an agreement on an ABM treaty within the next year and make “progress” on SALT.⁸

Nixon announced in May 1971 that he would attend a Moscow summit meeting in May 1972. He and the Soviet Communist Party general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, would sign arms-control agreements worked out between the two sides over the previous year. During the fall and winter of 1971 and 1972, Kissinger used the back channel without the knowledge of the official US arms-negotiating team meeting with their Soviet counterparts in Helsinki. Kissinger told Dobrynin, “the main problem is to get concrete about something.”⁹ He believed that the fact of an agreement would do more than

8 Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), 146–47.

9 Kissinger, *White House Years*, 525.

anything to persuade the public that the United States had not been paralyzed by Vietnam; the actual details of an agreement were less important.

As Nixon and Kissinger prepared for the late-May summit in Moscow, they agreed to steer clear of discussions of human rights. Kissinger told Nixon, "I don't think it is proper for you to start lecturing them about freedom of speech." Nixon concurred: "oh no, no, no, no, no, no, no."¹⁰ Nixon's insistence that he personally negotiate the final terms of agreements to provide dramatic impact lent a frenzied and improvised tone to the Moscow summit meetings from May 23 to 29, 1972. Kissinger, Nixon, Gromyko, and Brezhnev hammered out the final details of several treaties, agreements, and statements in late-night bargaining sessions in the Kremlin and Brezhnev's country house. Nixon told Kissinger that Congress "will watch every line of the agreement to see if we were placed at a disadvantage," but like the national security adviser, he believed the fact of having reached an agreement was more important than the details of it.¹¹

Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT I) at an elaborate late-night ceremony on May 26. This agreement was a framework document in which each side froze the number of missiles it had as of the date of its signing. The United States would be allowed 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs, and the Soviets would be permitted 1,618 ICBMs and 950 SLBMs. Despite what appeared to be a Soviet advantage in SALT, the United States had no plans to increase the number of missiles in its current arsenal. While the Soviets were permitted to increase the number of their ICBMs to about 50 percent more than Americans had in 1972, the United States had an advantage in multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). This emerging MIRV technology allowed missiles to carry multiple warheads that would be easier to evade an enemy's defenses. SALT I had a term of five years, during which time the two sides agreed to work to develop a full-fledged treaty limiting, and possibly reducing, offensive nuclear arms.

Nixon and Brezhnev also signed an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They agreed that each party would construct no more than two ABM sites. One of them would protect the capital and the other would protect a missile base. These provisions allowed for each side to maintain a credible deterrent against a first strike that would permit national governments to continue to function in the event of war.

¹⁰ Transcript of telephone conversation between President Nixon and Kissinger, May 17, 1972, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 922.

¹¹ Memorandum of conversation, May 23, 1972, Kissinger Transcripts (KT) 100494, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter, DNSA). For additional discussion of the arms race and arms control, see William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in this volume.



27. US president Richard Nixon (left) and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at Nixon's home in San Clemente, California, in June 1973. Nixon saw détente as a key breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union.

The United States and the Soviet Union reached several other understandings that expanded détente. They signed agreements on reducing pollution and enhancing environmental quality, on cooperation in medicine, science, and technology, and on space exploration. They set up a joint commercial commission that would negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement. They agreed to convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a meeting the Soviets had long advocated as a way of finally acknowledging the international borders established in Europe after World War II. CSCE gained little attention when it was announced, but as it developed it became a major element in eroding public support for US–Soviet détente.

The two leaders issued a twelve-point statement of Basic Principles of Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, a document which broadly defined the ways in which they would treat each other in an era of détente. The Basic Principles committed each power to conduct “normal relations” on the basis of “peaceful coexistence” and the principles of “sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage.”¹²

12. Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 29, 1972, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, vol. I, 389.

Kissinger and Nixon thought the Basic Principles had at most a symbolic value. In a press briefing immediately after Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic Principles, Kissinger said the document represented “an aspiration and an attitude, and if either the aspiration or the attitude changes, then ... either side can change its course.”¹³ Unfortunately for the future of détente, Kissinger’s attitude toward the Basic Principles proved to be far too nonchalant. Domestic opponents of détente soon used the principle of equality to undermine support for several of the agreements Nixon had signed.

Public reaction to détente, 1972–1973

The meetings in Moscow solidified Nixon’s public position as a masterful statesman who had grown far beyond his early anti-Communism to usher in a new era of stability and peace and to dampen the tensions of the Cold War. Kissinger told senators that the SALT agreement was “not merely a technical accomplishment ... but it must be seen as a political event of some magnitude.” He encouraged lawmakers to drop what he considered to be sterile old habits of measuring who was ahead and who was behind in the arms race. “Catastrophe has resulted,” he warned “far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns.” He feared that the “paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen in the nuclear age.”¹⁴

Despite Kissinger’s warnings that the world stood on the brink of annihilation if Congress did not support the Nixon administration’s approach to arms control, détente faced serious challenges from domestic critics in the months and years following the summit. Opponents considered sufficiency in nuclear weapons to be a dangerous delusion. Representative John M. Ashbrook (R–Ohio), a conservative who was running against Nixon for the Republican presidential nomination, complained that SALT would “lock the Soviet Union into unchallengeable superiority, and plunge the United States and its allies into a decade of danger.”¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ “Congressional Briefing by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,” June 15, 1972, Frank Church Papers, box 166, folder 14, Boise State University Library, Boise, Idaho.

¹⁵ Quoted in Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 220.

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D–Washington) led the opposition to arms-control agreements and détente in general for the remainder of Nixon’s presidency. He insisted that the United States had accepted an unfavorable deal with SALT, one in which the United States had made commitments to limit its missiles but the Soviets had not made reciprocal ironclad guarantees. He told Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that “the total number of ICBM missiles [listed in SALT] represents a unilateral position on our part and does not represent a bilateral agreement with the Russians ... This kind of ambiguity can breed suspicion and lead to an unstable situation rather than to a more stable one.”¹⁶

Jackson used the equality provisions of the Basic Principles of US–Soviet relations to develop an amendment to the congressional joint resolution endorsing SALT. The amendment stipulated that the United States would sign a future treaty only if it guaranteed that the missile forces of each side be equal. It required that US SALT negotiators maintain “the principle of United States–Soviet equality reflected in the anti-ballistic missile treaty.” The amendment stated that the United States would consider any new deployment by the Soviet Union of weapons that could destroy American missiles to be contrary to American interests. In September, the Senate passed the amendment by a vote of fifty-six to thirty-five.¹⁷

Economic relations, emigration, and the Middle East, 1971–1974

While Jackson’s amendment to the congressional resolution in support of SALT indicated that not everyone favored Nixon’s approach to the Soviet Union, détente was popular in the United States in 1972. Improved relations between the two superpowers promised a more peaceful and more prosperous world. From 1971 to 1974, the two countries completed more than ten pacts dealing with World War II debts, shipping, taxes, and grain purchases. The most significant of these was the October 1972 bilateral trade agreement under which they opened commercial and trade offices in the other nation’s capital and the Soviet Union promised to pay its \$772 million World War II Lend Lease debt over the next thirty years. The United States promised to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union. (MFN status, a

16 US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missiles and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, June 20–July 8, 1972, 92nd Congress, 2nd session.

17 Public Law 92–448 as amended by Senator Jackson.

position enjoyed by most US trading partners, meant that the United States would grant a most-favored nation the lowest tariffs it extended to any other country.) But the Soviet Union would become a most-favored nation only with congressional approval.

Congress grew increasingly unhappy with Nixon's conduct of commercial relations with the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1973. Word spread that the Soviet Union had purchased one quarter of the American wheat supply, in part by using commercial credits supplied by the United States under its trade agreement. Wheat prices shot up in the United States and critics charged that the Soviets had engineered a "Great Grain Robbery" with the Nixon administration's connivance or negligence.

Unhappiness with the grain deal contributed to anti-détente sentiment. This hostility grew when the issue of Soviet mistreatment of its own citizens roused attention. In October 1972, Senator Jackson gained the support of seventy-two of his colleagues to pass an amendment to the Trade Reform Act that would deny the Soviet Union MFN status unless it permitted free emigration of its citizens. The issue of emigration from the Soviet Union had become embroiled in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies gave political and military support to the Arab nations after Israel's victory in the 1967 Six Day War against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Coinciding with this Communist support of the Arab side had been a rise in anti-Semitism throughout the Eastern bloc, which had prompted many Jews within the Soviet Union to seek to emigrate to the United States or Israel. Between 1968 and 1972, the number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union had exploded from 400 to 35,000 per year. Then, in August 1972, the Kremlin imposed a steep tax amounting to thousands of dollars on anyone wishing to leave.

In April 1973, Congressman Charles Vanik (D-Ohio) introduced in the Houses of Representatives an amendment to the trade bill similar to the one Jackson had sponsored in the Senate. It passed in December by a wide margin. This Jackson-Vanik amendment went through several revisions until both houses of Congress finally adopted it as part of an omnibus Trade Reform Act in 1974. The Soviet Union reacted angrily. It cut the number of Jewish emigrants from 35,000 in 1973 to 20,000 in 1974. It also canceled the 1972 trade agreement with the United States. The Jackson-Vanik amendment directly challenged the Nixon administration's policy of disregarding the Soviet Union's internal affairs or its restrictions on human rights. The amendment and the large issue of the Middle East played major roles in undermining détente throughout the rest of Nixon's term.

Watergate, the Middle East War, and the end of the Nixon administration, 1973–1974

In May 1973, the Senate began televised hearings on the June 1972 break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office complex. As public interest in Watergate intensified, General Secretary Brezhnev came to the United States for another summit meeting with Nixon from June 16 to June 24, 1973. They met at the White House, Camp David, and at the president's summer house in San Clemente, California. Nixon extended lavish hospitality for his Soviet guest, but the two men's conversations lacked the drama of the Moscow summit of May 1972, and they were overshadowed by the growing Watergate scandal.

At their meetings the leaders discussed nuclear arms, the status of the SALT negotiations, and the Middle East. They made little progress on nuclear arms or SALT. Much to Nixon's and Kissinger's discomfort, Brezhnev raised the issue of the Middle East. The Soviet leader said that his allies in Egypt and Syria found the continued Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula (Egyptian territory) and the Golan Heights (Syrian territory) increasingly galling. He urged the United States to apply pressure on Israel to withdraw. "If we agree on Israeli withdrawals, everything will fall in place," Brezhnev said. He added that he was "categorically opposed to a resumption of the war. But without agreed principles" of what a settlement should look like, Brezhnev said, he could not guarantee that a new war would not erupt.¹⁸

The two leaders signed an agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW). The PNW agreement was of indefinite duration and it committed the two countries to conduct themselves in ways "to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations." They promised to avoid threats against each other and each other's allies. They also agreed that if it appeared as if relations between them or other countries risked a nuclear conflict, they would "immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk."¹⁹

Like the Basic Principles of US–Soviet relations signed at the Moscow summit of 1972, the PNW agreement set forward the aspirations of both sides to work together in an era of détente. Each document held hidden dangers, not fully appreciated by their authors at the time of the signing. As

¹⁸ Memorandum of conversation, Nixon, Brezhnev, *et al.*, June 23, 1973, KT00765, DNSA.

¹⁹ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 334.

Raymond L. Garthoff, one of the American arms-control negotiators, noted in *Détente and Confrontation*, "the Basic Principles in 1972 and the PNW agreement of 1973 contributed to the launching and development of détente, but before long they also contributed to its failure."²⁰

The United States and the Soviet Union collaborated, but they also approached a confrontation as they backed opposing belligerents during the war between Israel and Egypt and Syria that began on October 6, 1973. The two nuclear superpowers worked together at the United Nations to call for a ceasefire, but it was slow in coming. The Egyptian and Syrian forces made great gains in the first five days of the war, capturing Israeli soldiers and driving scores of kilometers into Israeli-occupied positions. The Soviet Union sent arms to Egypt and Syria as a way of assuring its Arab allies of its support, and also to gain leverage with them to accept a ceasefire.

Israel's government, shocked by the success of the Arab armies, ran low on war *matériel*, and desperately applied to the United States to resupply its losses in planes, tanks, and ammunition. The United States airlifted military equipment on October 12. Once Israel was assured of American arms, it launched a counterattack.

Brezhnev then proposed to Nixon that the two sides jointly sponsor a ceasefire. Nixon sent Kissinger, who in September had become secretary of state in addition to continuing as national security adviser, to Moscow to work out the details. By the time Kissinger began meetings in the Kremlin on October 20, Israel's armed forces were threatening to advance on the Egyptian and Syrian capital cities. Kissinger's visit coincided with a climactic moment in the Watergate scandal. Nixon refused to turn over tapes of conversations he had had with aides discussing the break-in and the cover-up. He fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. This "Saturday Night massacre" provoked an outraged public to demand Nixon's impeachment.

Kissinger, Gromyko, and Brezhnev developed a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire and negotiations for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel delayed implementing the ceasefire until its forces had pressed their advantage against the Egyptian army. Egypt's president, Anwar Sadat, asked the Soviet Union and the United States jointly to send troops to enforce the ceasefire. The Soviets stepped up their airlift of supplies, and the United States responded by putting its Mediterranean forces on the highest level of alert. Kissinger eventually persuaded Israel to agree to a ceasefire on October 27.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 338.

Over the next several months, Kissinger traveled between the capitals of Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria to arrange an Israeli withdrawal from the territory it had captured at the end of the war. He convinced Israel to withdraw from the east bank of the Suez Canal, enabling Egypt to reopen that waterway, and from some Syrian territory on the Golan Heights.

Soviet–American cooperation during the October War demonstrated the ways détente operated. Both sides recognized that their need to avoid a confrontation that could lead to a catastrophic nuclear war took precedence over their commitments to their allies. Insofar as the two nuclear superpowers had followed through on their commitments to consult in the Basic Principles and PNW agreements, détente had worked. On the other hand, each side had threatened the other and had armed its allies. Supporters of Israel were especially distressed by the way in which the United States had cooperated with the Soviet Union to deny Israel the opportunity to rout the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. As Garthoff observes, “many politically significant supporters of Israeli interests thus became disenchanted with the policy of détente.”²¹

Congressional opponents of détente stepped up their campaign against Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the winter and spring of 1973 and 1974. Kissinger told his staff on March 18, 1974, that “the Soviets are getting nothing out of détente and what can I deliver in Moscow?” The Jackson–Vanik amendment to the trade bill had proven to be a far greater irritant to the development of détente than Kissinger had expected. Kissinger lamented that “Jackson has obviously been convinced that I am a hostile country.” Kissinger derided Jackson as one of “these bastards on [Capitol] Hill who ignore the fact that 400 Jews were leaving the Soviet Union in 1969 and now say that 30,000 a year is inconsequential.” Since the trade relationship with the Soviet Union now “is no good, SALT can’t go down the drain,” because if that happened détente would end.²²

Kissinger traveled to Moscow in March 1974 to try to make progress on SALT before Nixon’s June visit to the Soviet Union. The Soviets rejected his proposal that they allow equality in warheads by granting the Americans superiority in MIRVs. He also did not get Soviet agreement to a proposal for “offsetting symmetries,” in which the Soviet Union would have the advantage in ICBMs and the United States would have more MIRVs.

21 *Ibid.*, 406. For further discussion of US and Soviet policies in the Middle East, see Douglas Little’s chapter in this volume.

22 Secretary Kissinger’s staff meeting, March 18, 1974, KT01072. DNSA.

When Nixon visited the Soviet Union in late June, the days of his presidency were numbered as the Watergate scandal reached a crescendo. Nixon told Brezhnev not to worry about the Jackson–Vanik amendment. “On MFN,” Nixon said, “we will get it.” Brezhnev called his statement “a good sign.”²³ But SALT II was garnering serious criticism in the United States. Before Nixon left for Moscow, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger endorsed Senator Jackson’s position on equality of weapons systems in SALT, thereby publicly undercutting Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policy of sufficiency. Paul Nitze, a veteran foreign-policy adviser who deeply distrusted the Soviet Union’s military intentions, resigned from the US SALT negotiating team. He said that “the traumatic events now unfolding” in the Watergate scandal might encourage Nixon to agree to a disadvantageous SALT treaty with the Soviets just to obtain favorable publicity.²⁴

Nixon and Brezhnev made no progress on the details of offensive weapons systems. They amended the ABM Treaty, reducing the number of sites each side could have from two to one. They also signed agreements on commercial, technological, energy, housing, and medical research cooperation, but these accords generated little of the earlier excitement over improving US–Soviet relations. The public was not impressed with their work. Commentators considered the trip to be part of a clumsy effort by Nixon to revive his fading fortunes as a foreign-policy leader. On August 9, 1974, five weeks after Nixon returned from the Soviet Union, he was forced to resign the presidency rather than be convicted in the Senate on three articles of impeachment likely to be approved by the House of Representatives.

The Ford administration and the decline of détente, 1974–1976

Détente did not die with the end of Nixon’s presidency, but it was encountering stiffer opposition. Vice President Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon and vowed to continue the foreign policies laid down by Nixon and Kissinger. Kissinger remained secretary of state and national security adviser.

In the first few months of Ford’s presidency, he pressed forward with US–Soviet negotiations on strategic arms. The new president met Brezhnev at the Siberian city of Vladivostok in late November and early December 1974, and the two men promised to sign a SALT II agreement within a year. This treaty

23 Memorandum of conversation, Nixon, Brezhnev, Kissinger, Gromyko, *et al.*, June 28, 1974, KT01232, DNSA.

24 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 411.

would limit each side's nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBM's, SLBMs, and long-range bombers) to 2,200. Ford told Brezhnev that a signed SALT II agreement before the 1976 election would strengthen détente and prevent "people such as Senator Jackson" from undercutting favorable trends in US–Soviet relations.²⁵

But support for détente, diminishing in 1974, declined even more over the remainder of Ford's term. A series of events at home and abroad undermined Ford's public standing and seriously shook the confidence of administration officials. Opposition Democrats, already in the majority in both houses of Congress, made large gains in the congressional elections of November 1974. In 1975, the Ford administration was preoccupied with the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. In March, the armed forces of North Vietnam intensified an offensive against the South, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam retreated in disarray from positions it held in the northern part of the country. In late April, North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front troops surrounded Saigon, forcing the last Americans to leave. On April 30, the Communist forces captured the presidential palace in Saigon and declared victory in the war. The mood in Washington was grim in the wake of the revolutionaries' triumph in Vietnam. Philip Habib, one of Kissinger's top deputies, said in May 1975 that long-time allies who had prospered under US military alliances and support "are all concerned that the U.S. shield does not provide them the protection they think is necessary for their own development."²⁶

For the remainder of 1975, the Ford administration became more confrontational toward the Soviet Union and its allies. In July, Kissinger insisted that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provide additional financial and military aid to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), one of three armed factions trying to supplant the Portuguese authorities in that West African country. Kissinger advocated intervention in the Angolan civil war as a counter to the Soviet Union which supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), a rival faction. Kissinger believed that the Soviets supported the MPLA because they felt emboldened by the American defeat in Vietnam. US intervention in Angola generated public fear of involvement in another distant war, similar to Vietnam, and in December, Congress blocked additional CIA funding for the FNLA.

In the summer of 1975, Ford was criticized when he continued Nixon's policy and did not ridicule the Soviets' record on human rights. Ford declined to meet with expelled Soviet dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The

²⁵ Quoted in Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 371.

²⁶ Secretary Kissinger's staff meeting, May 7, 1975, KT101611, DNSA.

novelist was widely admired in the United States for his vigorous condemnations of the Kremlin's history of repression. Domestic foes of détente accused Ford of hurting the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn then further eroded American support for détente when he denounced the upcoming CSCE meeting in Helsinki as a "betrayal of Eastern Europe."²⁷

The Helsinki ceremony of August 2, 1975, at which representatives from thirty-five states in Europe and North America signed the Final Act of the CSCE, reflected the culmination of years of negotiations. The Soviets had originally proposed a meeting to resolve all disputes in Europe in the mid-1950s, and they agreed to US participation in the talks in the early 1970s. At the insistence of several Western European and neutral countries, the scope of the discussions expanded from traditional security concerns over borders and the use of force (what came to be known as Basket I of the Helsinki Final Act) to include trade and scientific cooperation (Basket II), and humanitarian and other fields (Basket III).

American foes of the Helsinki agreements did not like the Final Act's recognition of prevailing territorial borders in Europe. Many Americans of Eastern European ancestry were fiercely anti-Communist and opposed to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. They complained that the acknowledgment of current borders validated the 1940 Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. These criticisms of the Helsinki Final Act made Ford's trip to the conference unpopular, and he sought to recover by adopting a more confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union. When he spoke to the delegates there, he reversed Nixon's practice of refraining from criticizing Soviet domestic policies. He looked directly at Brezhnev during his speech and insisted that the Soviets "realize the deep devotion of the American people and their government to human rights and fundamental freedoms."²⁸

Still, Ford's statements at Helsinki did not calm critics of CSCE. To Helsinki's opponents, it seemed that the Final Act condemned the Eastern European and Baltic states to permanent domination by the Soviet Union. Senator Jackson predicted that the human rights provisions of Helsinki were "so imprecise and so hedged" that they would never be implemented. Former California governor Ronald Reagan, who was preparing to challenge Ford

27 Quoted in Anne Hessing Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 32.

28 Quoted in Robert Greene, *The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 153.

for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, asserted that “all Americans should be against” the Helsinki Final Act.²⁹

The attacks on détente and on Kissinger as the architect of US foreign policy continued after Helsinki. Some of them came from within the administration. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger sided with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who argued that the arms-control agreements of recent years had left the United States in a militarily inferior position to that of the Soviet Union. In early November, Ford replaced Schlesinger as secretary of defense with White House chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld. To assuage the concerns of Kissinger’s opponents, Ford replaced him as national security adviser. Kissinger remained secretary of state, but his authority was clearly diminished. Reagan continued to assail détente as a “one way street” and complained that “Henry Kissinger’s recent stewardship has coincided with the loss of U.S. military supremacy.”³⁰ In February 1976, Ford explained that officials in his administration would no longer use the word “détente” to characterize US–Soviet relations.

Brezhnev did not visit the United States after the Vladivostok meeting of November 1974. Nor did the United States and the Soviet Union sign the SALT II Treaty by 1976, as they had promised at Vladivostok. Presidential politics interfered with further progress toward détente. The way in which Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger conducted détente became a contentious issue during the presidential election campaign of 1976. Jimmy Carter, the Democratic Party’s candidate, assailed the three leaders for acquiescing to the Soviet Union’s mistreatment of its own citizens. Carter condemned Ford for declining to meet with Solzhenitsyn in the summer of 1975. Carter said that the Soviets had known what they wanted to achieve from détente, but “we have not known what we’ve wanted and we’ve been out-traded in almost every instance.”³¹ Ford blundered in a televised debate with Carter when the president, attempting to defend the Helsinki Final Act, denied that the Soviet Union dominated Eastern Europe. The Democratic challenger retorted that he would like to see the president convince Hungarian-, Czech-, or Polish-Americans that their former homelands did not live under Soviet control. Carter defeated Ford in November 1976, and he owed his election in part to the public’s sense that détente gave unfair military advantages to

29 Quoted in Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 436, 437.

30 Statement by Ronald Reagan at Orlando, Florida, March 4, 1976, box 26, Ronald Reagan folder, Robert Hartman Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

31 Second Carter–Ford Presidential Debate, October 6, 1976, The American Presidency Project, www.presidency.uscb.edu.

the Soviet Union while betraying traditional American commitments to expand human rights abroad.

Assessments of détente

When Richard Nixon left office in August 1974, newspaper commentators were scathing in their denunciations of his domestic abuses of power. They also, however, gave him high marks for reducing the danger of nuclear war and making the world safer. An August 12, 1974, editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor*, a paper highly critical of Nixon's abuse of power, noted that "Nixon risked alienating many of his long-time Cold War supporters by opening America's door to the Communist world."³² But détente had lost much of its domestic popularity by the time Gerald Ford traveled to Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the CSCE. By then, the public mood in the United States had turned sour and a significant number of Americans believed that the Soviet Union was in the stronger position in the Cold War.

Paradoxically, the Helsinki process undermined Soviet power. Helsinki transformed the discussion of behavior throughout Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union over the next decade. After Helsinki, the protection and advancement of human rights within countries became generally accepted international standards. The political scientist Daniel C. Thomas expressed a widely accepted point of view when he observed in 2001 that this emphasis on human rights "contributed significantly to the demise of Communist rule in 1989–1990."³³

Yet the end of Soviet-style Communism was not visible on the horizon in the decade after Nixon left office. Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy gradually lost popularity in the late 1970s and 1980s. Some of the criticism involved complaints about their deceptive and manipulative style. Garthoff's *Détente and Confrontation* praised Nixon and Kissinger for initiating détente, but Garthoff argued that they undermined support for it by their secretive style and by their belittling the advice of foreign affairs experts.

Later observers, who benefited from the abundance of original documentation on the Nixon and Ford presidencies that became available in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, noted that these men conducted foreign affairs in order to maintain what the historian Jeremi Suri

32. *Christian Science Monitor*, August 12, 1974, editorial page.

33. Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 272.

characterized as “a conservative world order.” This arrangement “addressed the fears and served the interests of the largest states.”³⁴ While Nixon and Kissinger spoke often about the changing circumstances of the Cold War in which the United States no longer had unrivaled military superiority over the Soviet Union, they expected to manage a prolonged, even indefinite rivalry with the Kremlin. Jussi Hanhimäki, one of Kissinger’s biographers, concluded that the policy of détente with the Soviet Union was essentially backward looking and lacked “understanding of the underlying forces that were shaping the direction of international relations in the 1970s.”³⁵ Popular movements for political freedom and economic prosperity were surfacing in the Communist world and they would culminate in the unexpected collapse of Soviet rule and the end of the Cold War a decade later. Other subsequent observers have been even more critical. The historian Jeffrey Kimball concluded that “the Nixinger grand design was not well conceived in the beginning, was not fully realized in the end, and was as much, if not more, a product of reaction, improvisation, bureaucratic infighting, and political and economic realities, as it was proactive, farsighted planning and wise coolheaded statesmanship.”³⁶

Negative assessments such as these raise serious questions about the quality of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s statesmanship. They also are retrospective judgments made in the post-Cold War era through the prism of the end of Soviet-style Communism. The end of the Cold War has led other historians to more favorable judgments of détente. John Lewis Gaddis argued in 2005 that “détente did not free the world from crises, but the new spirit of cooperation, did seem to limit their frequency and severity.”³⁷ The leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union committed themselves to manage their nations’ relations responsibly. They recognized that each was a legitimate state. Henceforth, they would compete for influence throughout the world, but they would limit their rivalry and reduce the danger of nuclear war between them. They would expand trade, cultural, and scientific relations in order to modulate the acrimony in their day-to-day relations. Robert Dallek in his 2007 joint biography of Kissinger and Nixon harshly criticized the two for their secretiveness and

34 Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 258.

35 Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 490.

36 Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon’s Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 370.

37 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 198.

manipulations of others. He also characterized détente as one of the central elements of US policy toward the Soviet Union. Dallek observed that “détente did not end the Cold War, but in conjunction with containment and deterrence ... it set a process in motion that came to fruition under Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the 1980s.”³⁸

38 Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 618.

Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War

FRANCIS J. GAVIN

At first glance, understanding the dynamics of how nuclear weapons spread during the Cold War, and what was done to slow this proliferation, should not be difficult. Weren't nuclear weapons a threat to international stability, inducing widespread support for efforts to hem in this menace to world peace? The real story was not so simple. As scholars have long recognized, nuclear weapons influenced international politics in complex and often contradictory ways during the Cold War. On the one hand, atomic weapons have an enormous destructive power – the capacity to kill millions of people and destroy the fabric of civilized life. On the other, this weapon of terror, may have induced caution among the states that possessed them. Many analysts believe the prospect of mutual destruction prevented World War III, serving as a foundation for what John Lewis Gaddis famously labeled “the Long Peace.”¹

This dilemma was just one of many that policymakers, strategists, and outside observers wrestled with as they tried to understand the military and political purposes of such fearful weapons. These issues were never resolved during the Cold War, as analysts joined government officials in devising the most intricate, sophisticated military strategies for weapons they hoped would never be employed and believed had no meaningful battlefield purpose. These fears also inspired millions around the world to join grassroots, nongovernmental efforts to prevent the bomb from ever being used.

This essay explores the history of efforts to come to terms with the puzzles and tradeoffs involved in confronting nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War. Many of these dilemmas have still not been resolved. For example, scholars vigorously debate whether

1 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” *International Security*, 10 (Spring 1986), 99–142.

proliferation threatens global security or stabilizes international politics and prevents war. Questions persist as to the reasons why states attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, the leading explanations being security, prestige, or bureaucratic/organizational impulse. Disagreement continues over whether the bipolar structure of the international system during the Cold War encouraged or hindered nuclear proliferation. Perhaps most maddening, no one has been able to accurately predict the “who and when” aspect of proliferation. Forecasters have almost always been caught off guard by who did, and did not, enter the nuclear club. Fears of tipping points, nuclear dominoes, and proliferation epidemics have existed from the start of the nuclear age, with worry accelerating in recent years, despite the fact that there are far fewer nuclear powers today than anyone could have reasonably hoped for thirty or forty years ago. Similarly, fears of rogue states with atomic weapons and nuclear terrorism have worried policymakers since the earliest days of the atomic age.

As this chapter reveals, nowhere are these nuclear puzzles more challenging than in the area of non-proliferation policy. If nuclear proliferation should and can be stopped – not universally held beliefs, particularly in the earlier part of the Cold War – what were the best policies to achieve this goal, appeasement or force? Did it make sense to apply the same non-proliferation policy toward democratic, neutral Sweden as toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? These dilemmas were especially sharp when viewed through the contours of the Cold War alliance system. Arms-control advocates argued that global non-proliferation could only be achieved when states that already had nuclear weapons reduced and eventually eliminated their stocks of atomic weapons, avoided anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses, and promised never to use nuclear weapons first. Countries that were asked to forgo these weapons, however, demanded robust and credible protection from the superpowers’ nuclear umbrella in return for their abstinence. In the US case, providing extended deterrence to states like West Germany, Japan, and South Korea demanded strategic superiority and a willingness to craft military strategies based on the early and massive use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviet Union.

The most intriguing feature of non-proliferation, however, was that it became a shared goal of two bitter Cold War enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, they pursued it at the expense of, among others, their closest friends and allies. A West German official complained that US efforts to enlist the Soviet Union in non-proliferation lent to “concessions from the wrong side and to the wrong

address.”² This shared interest, however, proved so powerful that at times it trumped traditional Cold War rivalries, attitudes, and policies; it also provided much of the impetus to détente.

Nuclear non-proliferation and the early Cold War

In the early days of the Cold War, neither US nor Soviet officials pursued non-proliferation efforts with any vigor. In hindsight, their policies appear unsophisticated and unrealistic. Some American officials believed the United States could maintain its nuclear monopoly indefinitely, while others proposed preventative war against the Soviets before they acquired their own weapons. For their part, the Soviets saw disarmament proposals as a propaganda tool while engaging in espionage and a full-scale crash program to develop their own atomic bomb. Despite the terrible destruction brought by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the epoch-changing nature of these new weapons went largely unrecognized or misunderstood in official military circles during the first years of the Cold War.

There were attempts to regulate this fearsome new weapon, although it is difficult to gauge how serious these efforts were. In January 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was created during the first meeting of the UN General Assembly. During this session, the United States submitted the Baruch Plan, based on the Acheson–Lilienthal Report, which proposed UN control of all uranium-235 and plutonium facilities, extensive monitoring in all member states, and eventually global disarmament. The Soviets responded on June 19, 1946, with what came to be known as the Gromyko Plan, which required the United States to disarm. The United States modified the Baruch Plan and President Harry S. Truman signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and banned all sharing of nuclear technology and information, even with Britain.

Cold War tensions between the superpowers increased and even half-hearted disarmament and arms-control efforts were largely dropped. Members of the Western alliance were stunned when the Soviets tested an atomic device on August 29, 1949, and, less than four years later, developed a hydrogen, or thermonuclear, bomb. Britain tested its own nuclear device

2 Matthias Peter and Harald Rosenbach (eds.), *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1966* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), vol. II. “Notes of Ambassador Schnippenkoetter: Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NP),” September 7, 1966, Document 277.

in October 1952. The United States also continued to build its nuclear stockpile, a long moribund UNAEC was formally dissolved, and by the end of the Truman administration little hope existed for any bilateral or international effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The war on the Korean Peninsula generated new fears that atomic weapons could be used again.

US president Dwight D. Eisenhower's non-proliferation legacy was mixed at best. On December 8, 1953, Eisenhower announced his Atoms for Peace program, which envisioned the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes through international channels. Eisenhower's plan was criticized for its naïve belief that knowledge and technology provided to countries for their civilian nuclear efforts would not advance their weapons programs. While the United States provided civilian technology to dozens of countries, it did require most of them to adhere to safeguards and inspections. Most importantly, the Atoms for Peace program led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors global proliferation to this day.

On the other hand, Eisenhower's defense strategy did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in future military conflicts; in fact, the president believed general war was inevitable if the Soviets and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) clashed in Europe.³ As late as 1960, Eisenhower told Robert Bowie "we must be ready to throw the book at the Russians should they jump us." We would be fooling our allies and ourselves, Eisenhower continued, if "we said we could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons."⁴ This view had implications for the spread of atomic weapons. As the historian Marc Trachtenberg has pointed out, Eisenhower not only did not discourage nuclear proliferation; he actively sought to share nuclear weapons with close NATO allies. The military strategy of massive retaliation called for immense and preemptive use of nuclear weapons if there was clear evidence the Soviet Union was planning to attack. This meant authorization for the use of US nuclear weapons was pre-delegated to non-American forces, including the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Eisenhower also strongly supported the European Atomic Energy Agency (Eurotam) and the so-called France–Italy–Germany (FIG) agreements to

³ See David Holloway's chapter in volume I.

⁴ "Minutes of Meeting between D. Eisenhower and R. Bowie," August 16, 1960, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), vol. VII, 614 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

advance nuclear cooperation in Europe. According to Trachtenberg, the administration's attitude toward nuclear sharing went beyond Britain and France to include the FRG.⁵

Fears that the FRG would gain access to nuclear weapons prompted both the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies to propose non-proliferation agreements for Europe. On November 17, 1956, the Soviet prime minister, Nikolai Bulganin, announced a comprehensive disarmament plan that required the destruction of all nuclear forces. After the United States rejected the proposal as propaganda, Bulganin proposed a less ambitious plan that prohibited nuclear weapons tests and created a collective security arrangement that included a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On October 9, 1957, Poland's minister of foreign affairs, Adam Rapacki, proposed a nuclear-weapons-free zone for central Europe. Rapacki modified the proposal twice more in response to criticism from NATO, proposing a nuclear freeze and gradual reductions. The United States and its NATO allies rejected these proposals on the grounds they did nothing to counter the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional military forces, nor did they make any substantial progress toward German reunification. Soviet unhappiness about the FRG's increased access to nuclear weapons was one of the reasons that the Soviet premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, initiated pressure on Berlin.⁶

Despite these proposals and tensions, it is surprising to see how little attention was paid to the issue of nuclear proliferation among journalists, academics, and strategists at that time. Most of the so-called "wizards of Armageddon" studied the effects of the strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States and spent very little time thinking about what was then called the "Nth country" problem. The so-called bomber and missile gap, the tradeoffs between nuclear and conventional forces, the fear of an arms race, the nature of strategic vulnerability, the requirements of deterrence, and the merits of different nuclear strategies occupied the time of policymakers and strategists.

While the strategic community was slow to understand the importance of nuclear proliferation, by the late 1950s and early 1960s profound changes in world politics were forcing policymakers to confront new nuclear challenges. US and Soviet officials began to recognize that their early, lackadaisical

5 Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), esp. 146-211.

6 *Ibid.*, 246-47.

attitudes toward non-proliferation were no longer prudent. The question of who would and would not get access to nuclear weapons became an issue of fundamental importance, not only between the superpowers, but also within each alliance and the non-aligned world as well.

The road to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Prospects for effective global nuclear non-proliferation policies improved in the early 1960s. There were four reasons for this change. First, as Lawrence Wittner has shown in his path-breaking work, *Resisting the Bomb*, grassroots antinuclear groups gained popularity throughout the world. The development of thermonuclear weapons, and the dangers associated with nuclear testing, brought emerging environmental groups together with peace advocates to demand governments ban the bomb. Nongovernmental organizations in the West, as well as political leaders from the Non-Aligned Movement, were especially important in advocating a nuclear test-ban treaty.⁷ This grassroots, global antinuclear movement was to expand and increase its influence in the decades to come.

Second, the tense confrontations between the Soviets and Americans between 1958 and 1962, initially over the status of Berlin and culminating in the Cuban missile crisis, brought the world close to the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945. Approaching the nuclear precipice – the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, called it “the most dangerous crisis the world has ever seen,” the only time when the nuclear superpowers came “eyeball to eyeball” – both the Soviets and the Americans recognized the need to reduce tensions, halt arms racing, and limit the chances of an accidental nuclear war.⁸ A world with fewer nuclear weapons and fewer atomic powers, it was thought, would be much safer. Both governments increasingly made bilateral and global nuclear-arms control a priority after the October 1962 missile crisis. This led to the third factor – the idea that if proliferation was not stopped, there could be a domino, snowball, or tipping point phenomenon resulting in dozens of new atomic powers. President John F. Kennedy told the world in 1963 that he “was haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty.”⁹

7 Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

8 See William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg’s chapter in this volume.

9 “President’s News Conference, 21 March 1963,” *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Kennedy* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 280.

The fourth and most important reason for the shift toward stronger non-proliferation policies was geopolitical. Until the early 1960s, it could be argued that the countries that had developed nuclear weapons – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France – were status quo powers, unlikely to change postwar borders through force. Other potential proliferators – Sweden, India, Australia, even Israel – had understandable (if controversial) security motivations to acquire weapons for defensive and deterrent purposes. However, two other potential nuclear powers, the FRG and PRC, fell into a much different category. The possibility that either or both of these states would gain access to nuclear weapons threatened the stability of Europe and East Asia and challenged both American and Soviet interests.

The FRG was a divided land, only a generation removed from the Nazi legacy of terror and war, feared by its Eastern bloc neighbors, and mistrusted even by its closest European allies. The FRG demonstrated an interest throughout the 1950s in having access to the most modern weapons available.¹⁰ Policymakers in the United States worried about the political consequences of openly discriminating against West Germany, especially when Britain and France were atomic powers. The efforts to make the FRG feel it could participate in nuclear decisionmaking, without actually giving them the bomb, created much anxiety in both the East and the West. Even more alarming to the Soviets, as we have seen, was the attitude of President Eisenhower, who believed that a nuclear-armed FRG was inevitable.

The German question was at the heart of almost all discussions over what to do about nuclear proliferation. As the 1960s progressed, most everyone came to believe that the FRG could not be allowed to possess its own nuclear weapons. The Berlin crisis made it quite clear that the Soviets would simply not stand for a nuclearized Bundeswehr. In the words of a US official, "German national nuclear capability is virtually a Soviet obsession, based upon a deep-seated emotional fear of resurgent German militarism."¹¹ Could the United States, however, tell the FRG it could never have the most modern weapons, while neighbors France, Britain, and the Soviet Union continued to build their stockpiles? How would the Germans react when smaller or less economically advanced countries like Israel and India attained nuclear status and the security and respect that came with it? US officials, like

¹⁰ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 232–38.

¹¹ "The Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty," December 12, 1964, p.14, box 2, Committee on Non Proliferation, National Security Files (NSF), National Security Council (NSC), 2, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, University of Texas, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBJL).

Under Secretary of State George Ball, realized it was not “safe to isolate Germany or leave it with a permanent sense of grievance,” which could result from “her forced exclusion from the nuclear club.” Such policies, Ball noted, “would provide a fertile ground for demagogues.”¹² Ball and others proposed nuclear-sharing schemes such as the multilateral force (MLF) that they believed would satisfy West German needs.¹³ Others believed the MLF would only encourage the FRG’s nuclear ambitions. Resolving this dilemma – preventing a German national nuclear force without awakening dangerous resentments – created a great political struggle, both within the NATO alliance and between the United States and the Soviet Union.

At least the FRG was a liberal democracy. China was in many ways the original rogue state. Veering between the ironclad rule of Mao Zedong and the anarchy of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, China’s successful program to develop its own atomic weapons worried its neighbors and both Cold War superpowers. China, with a population of more than 700 million by the early 1960s, had already fought the United States in Korea, attacked India, and threatened Taiwan, Indochina, and Indonesia. The PRC’s emerging nuclear status threatened the US position in East Asia and could affect the escalating conflict in Vietnam. President Kennedy had considered a nuclear-armed China a grave threat that would “so upset the world political scene [that] it would be intolerable.”¹⁴ In November 1962, US national security adviser McGeorge Bundy said that Chinese nuclear weapons would be “the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.”¹⁵ Mao’s internal policies had led to the death of millions of his own citizens, and he had already declared that he did not fear nuclear war with the United States: “If the worse came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become

12 Couve de Murville, Charles Lucet, George Ball, and Charles Bohlen, “Memorandum of conversation,” December 2, 1964, box 7, lot 67D2, RG 59, US National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter, USNA).

13 The multilateral force, or MLF, was a US proposal, originally floated by the Eisenhower administration, and taken up with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to produce a fleet of surface ships and submarines manned by international NATO crews and armed with ballistic nuclear missiles.

14 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson. “Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” *International Security*, 25 3 (Winter 2000), 54–99.

15 “Memorandum from M. Bundy to J. Kennedy,” November 8, 1962, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. VII, 598.

socialist.”¹⁶ From the US perspective, a nuclear-armed PRC could become even more aggressive and harder to deter. According to one analyst, the Chinese appeared “determined to eject the United States from Asia” and were sure to “exploit their nuclear weapons for this end.” By 1970, China would have “thermonuclear weapons,” and by 1980, “it [would] be necessary to think in terms of a possible 100 million U.S. deaths whenever a serious conflict with China threatens.”¹⁷ China’s attitude toward the Soviet Union was hardly better, as the bitter rhetoric between these ideological and geopolitical competitors threatened to spill over into conflict throughout the 1960s. Tensions grew so heated between these former allies that by 1969, the Soviet Union contemplated a “pre-emptive strike” against China’s nuclear forces.¹⁸

Concerns about West Germany and China motivated the Soviet Union and the United States to seek a common stance in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy administration began distancing itself from Eisenhower’s willingness to share nuclear weapons within NATO. Secretary of State Rusk told Khrushchev, “the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability.”¹⁹ Kremlin leaders, of course, concurred. An FRG with nuclear weapons was a grave threat to their interests in Europe. Moreover, they shared a long and often disputed border with China. As relations with the PRC deteriorated, they faced the possibility of nuclear-armed adversaries on two fronts. Furthermore, most prospective proliferators were in the Soviet Union’s near abroad, in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The superpowers had compelling reasons to cooperate on nuclear non-proliferation.

They also increasingly recognized that uncontrolled nuclear proliferation offered challenges that went beyond traditional geopolitical concerns such as China and Germany. By the mid-1960s, nuclear experts sensed that major powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, understood the responsibilities of nuclear ownership and recognized the deadly logic of mutual vulnerability and deterrence, but they wondered whether the same

16 Mao Zedong, “We Must Not Fear Nuclear War,” as cited in Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 137.

17 “China as a Nuclear Power (Some Thoughts prior to the Chinese Test),” October 7, 1964, box 5, Committee on Non Proliferation, NSF, NSC, LBJL.

18 See William Burr (ed.), National Security Archive Briefing Book, *The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969: U.S. Reactions and Diplomatic Maneuvers*, June 12, 2001, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/.

19 “Record of D. Rusk and N. Khrushchev Meeting,” August 8, 1963, *FRUS, 1961–1963*, vol. XV, 567.

would hold for smaller, less developed countries, or even non-state actors. In 1965, analyst Fred Iklé warned that if proliferation went beyond the “middle powers,” it could lead to “owners of nuclear weapons who cannot be deterred because they feel they have nothing to lose.” These might include a group “fanatically dedicated to some revolutionary cause which may have no concern for the survival of their country ... To carry out such ‘nuclear anarchism’ or acts of personal revenge, modern delivery systems would not be needed; it would suffice if the weapons could be sneaked close enough to a target clandestinely.”²⁰ A study led by Thomas Schelling in 1963 argued that the future would hold complex or unforeseen nuclear threats. “(N)uclear weapons will become increasingly economical for smaller countries to produce” and may become available by “theft, commercial purchase, or diplomatic trading.” These new nuclear powers would not need sophisticated strategic forces or ballistic missiles. “A fishing boat or a cheap airplane might have been an adequate means of delivery for, say, the Algerian Nationalists against Marseilles, or Castro’s Cuba against Baltimore or Miami.”²¹

The Soviet Union and the United States had to overcome significant barriers before they could negotiate a nuclear non-proliferation policy, and they moved slowly at first, building upon earlier international efforts. In 1961, Ireland proposed a UN resolution, the Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, which banned the spread of nuclear technology to additional states and prohibited all countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1962, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was formed to encourage the Soviet Union and the United States to adopt arms-control measures. A year before, President Kennedy created a new agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) headed by William Foster, and the same year named John McCloy as his special adviser on disarmament. McCloy negotiated a set of arms-control principles with his Soviet counterpart, Valerian Zorin, in September 1961. The McCloy–Zorin principles, as they were called, built upon the efforts of others such as British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, to pave the way for serious negotiations to ban nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union, United States, and Britain negotiated a Limited Test-Ban Treaty that was opened for signature on August 5, 1963. The treaty was not

20 Fred C. Iklé, “Possible Consequences of a Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” January 2, 1965, box 7, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NSF, NSC, LBJL.

21 “A Report on Strategic Developments over the Next Decade for the Interagency Panel,” October 1963, 51–53, box 376, NSF, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter, JFKL).

perfect. The Soviets and Americans disagreed about the number and types of inspections that would be allowed, and underground tests were not banned. Nothing was done about China's emerging nuclear program. More ambitious arms-control measures, such as a comprehensive test ban or limitations on the growth of strategic weapons, were beyond the reach of the superpowers for the time being.

The Limited Test-Ban Treaty, however, was a good start toward the goal of a global non-proliferation regime, and its timing was propitious. By the mid-1960s, several developed and developing states were considering or actually constructing active nuclear weapons programs. In Europe, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Yugoslavia, and even Romania were seen as candidates for the bomb. It was speculated that Brazil, Argentina, and perhaps Mexico were motivated to develop atomic weapons as well. Regional arms races in the Middle East and South Asia were feared if Israel and India successfully tested a weapon. China's capabilities and the conflict in Vietnam made East Asia fertile soil for new nuclear powers, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and even Australia.²² There was great concern that China's test – which took place in October 1964 – could initiate a nuclear domino effect if vigorous action were not taken.²³ Not only might this destabilize key regions of the globe by initiating local arms races; the increased number of smaller states acquiring nuclear weapons could put pressure on West Germany to follow suit.

President Lyndon B. Johnson signaled a renewed US commitment to non-proliferation on January 21, 1964, in a message to the ENDC calling for a worldwide treaty based on the Irish resolution. Real movement on the policy front, however, did not come until exactly one year later, when the blue ribbon Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, or Gilpatric committee, delivered its findings to the White House. This committee of influential officials had been put together to construct a new US non-proliferation policy in the wake of the PRC's atomic test in October 1964. The group explored a broad menu of alternatives. On the one hand, it considered the consequences of accepting or even aiding nuclear proliferation. At the other end of the spectrum, the group weighed the implications of a far tougher non-proliferation policy. The committee examined a wide range of policies,

22 R. Murray, "Problems of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe," December 7, 1964, Document #CK3100281620, 1, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter, DDRS), www.columbia.edu.

23 Henry Rowen, "Memorandum – India's Nuclear Problem," December 24, 1964, Document #CK3100154493, DDRS.

including appeasement, sanctions against emerging nuclear powers, preemption against the PRC, and even sabotaging French nuclear-testing sites.²⁴

There were divergent views within the US government, including skepticism in some quarters about whether nuclear non-proliferation was even desirable. State Department official George McGhee suggested in 1961 that it would be advantageous "if a friendly Asian power beat Communist China to the punch" by testing a nuclear device first, and there was "no likelier candidate than India."²⁵ Dean Rusk argued that it "was easy for the U.S. to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently." For the secretary of state, "non-proliferation [was] not the overriding element in U.S. relations with the rest of the world."²⁶ A briefing paper for the Gilpatric committee wondered if it was in "the U.S. interest in all cases" to prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, "or might it be in the U.S. interest for particular nations to acquire such capability?"²⁷

The committee, however, concluded, "preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest, despite the difficult decisions that will be required." The report "as a matter of great urgency" recommended the administration "substantially increase the scope and intensity" of its non-proliferation efforts. "The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons." A program that included formalizing multilateral agreements, applying pressure on individual states considering nuclear acquisition, and making changes to the United States' own policies was recommended.²⁸

In order to implement the committee's recommendations, controversial policies would have to be adopted. The Soviet Union would have to be accepted as the key partner in a global effort to stem the spread of atomic weapons. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and regional nuclear-free zones would have to be supported. Nonnuclear powers would have to be given something in return for their pledge to abstain from acquiring nuclear

24 Roger Fisher, "Memo on Possible Action: Action Directed against Further French Atmospheric Tests," December 19, 1964, box 10, Personal Papers of Roswell Gilpatric (hereafter, PPRG), JFKL.

25 "Memorandum from G. McGhee to D. Rusk," September 13, 1961, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Files, India, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

26 "Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non Proliferation," 7 January 1965, box 24, lot 67D2, RG 59, USNA.

27 Untitled memo, box 5, Committee on Non Proliferation, Selected Issues, NSF, LBJL.

28 "Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation," January 21, 1965, Box 8, NSF, LBJL.

weapons. Neutrals like India would have to be offered some form of guarantee against nuclear attack. Japan would have to be reassured. Israel's and Egypt's nuclear ambitions would need to be confronted. Carrots and sticks would have to be employed both to appease and deter potential proliferators. On the most controversial question of all, the status of the MLF and its relationship to West Germany's nuclear ambitions, the committee was divided. Most of its members understood, however, that the MLF would have to be sacrificed to obtain the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the Soviet Union.

The Gilpatric committee's conclusions were controversial, especially among those in the US State Department who supported the MLF. Secretary of State Rusk argued the report was as "explosive as a nuclear weapon" and worked to keep it secret. President Johnson, however, strongly supported the group's recommendations, and the thrust of the committee's findings became official US non-proliferation policy when Johnson approved National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 335, "Preparation of Arms Control Program." The policy built upon the president's speech celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations, where he had called upon other governments to join the United States to negotiate "an effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind." With NSAM 335, Johnson ordered a program to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. He assigned the task to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and gave it direct access to the White House, an arrangement that signaled Johnson's keen interest and that prevented the State Department from sabotaging the effort.²⁹

The United States submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the ENDC on August 17, 1965. The Soviet Union made its own proposal to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1965. The proposals were similar except for one key provision – how they viewed collective nuclear forces such as the MLF or the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). While the US proposal allowed for the MLF, the Soviet plan prohibited nonnuclear-weapon states from participating in "the ownership, control, or use of nuclear weapons." The Soviet draft even challenged the right of nonnuclear states in an alliance to participate in nuclear planning and targeting. Soviet and American negotiators wrestled over the precise language governing US-NATO nuclear arrangements for almost two years. The difficulty of these negotiations surpassed only the problem both superpowers had in convincing their alliance partners and neutrals to embrace the treaty.

29 "National Security Action Memo 335: Preparation of Arms Control Program," June 28, 1965, www.liblib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam335.asp.

A non-proliferation treaty faced great challenges, particularly within the Western Alliance. Japan expressed grave concerns about the PRC's nuclear status and indicated it was interested in its own atomic weapons. Britain was adamant that there must be a treaty at any cost, even if it jeopardized the FRG's interests. France's position was most vexing. De Gaulle did not believe that states could be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons if they really wanted them, and he did not support the treaty. On the other hand, France was adamantly opposed to the possession of nuclear weapons by the FRG. Furthermore, de Gaulle supported the Soviet position on the MLF and did whatever he could to undermine the scheme.

The West Germans were not pleased with the renewed focus on their intentions in the nuclear field. Hadn't the FRG already promised, West German officials complained, not to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons in the Paris Accords of 1954? Why should the FRG, its leaders asked, sign an agreement without something tangible from the Soviets in return? The FRG was bitterly disappointed that none of her "allies" were making an effort to link non-proliferation to a European settlement beneficial to Germany. Furthermore, West Germany had an emerging civilian nuclear sector, and it did not want to see an NPT harm its economic interests in this area.

The pressure to terminate talks regarding the MLF and to accept the NPT, combined with clashes over military and international monetary policy, brought US–West German relations to a low point in the late 1960s. The new chancellor of the FRG, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, accused the United States of "complicity" for its overtures to the Soviets on the NPT.³⁰ The former chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, publicly called the NPT proposals "the Morgenthau Plan squared." The FRG's attitude toward the NPT threatened a crisis between the blocs and within NATO.

Though less well known, the Soviet Union had its own difficulties with socialist countries over the issue of nuclear proliferation, resulting in similar alliance tensions. On January 17, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with its allies. The Soviets offered nuclear technology and information, including research reactors, to Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Egypt. The most important beneficiary of this policy, however, was China. In exchange for Chinese exports of uranium, the Soviets provided more than 10,000 experts, technical drawings,

30 "Conversation between the Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and the American Special Envoy McCloy," March 4, 1967, Document 87, *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1967.

and refined fuel. This aid is estimated to have expedited China's weapons program by ten to fifteen years.

This program was abruptly ended in the late 1950s, as relations between Russia and China deteriorated.³¹ In addition, promises to improve Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's atomic energy programs were not fulfilled. Khrushchev's concerns about China's military prowess and aggressive intentions created another source of tension with his allies. As the historian Douglas Selva has shown, in 1963 and 1964 the Soviet leader was willing to accommodate American desires for the MLF plan in order to achieve an NPT aimed at China. Eastern European countries, particularly Poland, were furious. They insisted that the NPT must guarantee the FRG's nonnuclear status. The Soviets heeded these concerns and once again made eliminating the MLF a key goal of an NPT.³²

The MLF issue and the looming appearance of new nuclear powers gave the non-proliferation question a sense of urgency throughout 1966. The evidence indicated both India and Israel would expand their efforts to build nuclear weapons in the absence of a global regime. While it was clear that the Soviets wanted a nuclear NPT, it was just as clear they would not accept an arrangement that allowed for a meaningful MLF. In the fall, negotiations intensified, with Gromyko and Rusk struggling to find compromise language that prevented the transfer of nuclear weapons to individual states but allowed for individual European national programs to be folded into a single larger European scheme. The United States wanted to protect existing US-NATO nuclear arrangements and allow for the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

A rough understanding between the Soviets and the Americans on treaty language and interpretation emerged during the winter of 1966/67. That did not mean, however, that a working treaty agreeable to all major powers was in sight. The West Germans continued to object to an NPT on a number of grounds, and demanded revision of key articles. The so-called Gaullist wing of the new government, led by Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, dismissed the treaty as a "Versailles of cosmic proportions."³³ Disagreements over the

31 See Sergey Radchenko's chapter in this volume.

32 Douglas Selva, *"The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1963-1965,"* Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 32 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001).

33 Shane Maddock, *"The Nth Country Conundrum: The American and Soviet Quest for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970,"* Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut (1997), 501.

inspection and safeguard regime, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the length of the treaty were sticking points for a number of countries. The non-aligned nations highlighted other problems with the treaty and demanded that the United States and the Soviets offer security guarantees, reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and direct the savings into economic aid for the underdeveloped world. These disagreements proved time-consuming and contentious. Negotiations dragged on throughout 1967 and the first half of 1968.

The superpowers were joined by sixty-two other states, giving preliminary approval to the NPT, when it was signed on July 1, 1968. The Johnson administration hoped for rapid ratification, both domestically and internationally, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 undermined those hopes. The US Senate voted in October 1968 to delay ratification, and key countries such as Italy, Israel, and the FRG refused to sign the treaty. As Richard M. Nixon succeeded Johnson as US president, the fate of the NPT was uncertain.

The Nixon administration was ambivalent toward both the NPT and the issue of nuclear proliferation in general. A briefing paper for Nixon argued that there were cases where "independent nuclear weapons capability might be desirable."³⁴ A National Security Council (NSC) memo pointed out that, regarding the NPT, the "problems with the FRG are understated."³⁵ A Kissinger aide claimed that "Henry believed that it was good to spread nuclear weapons around the world" and argued Japan and Israel would be better off with atomic weapons.³⁶ The president himself argued "treaties don't necessarily get us very much" and if countries wanted to "make their own weapons," they could "abrogate the treaty without sanction."³⁷ In the end, while the United States would continue to support the treaty, Nixon made it clear that he would "not pressure other nations to follow suit, especially the FRG."³⁸

Despite this ambivalence, the Nixon administration formally presented the NPT to the US Senate for advice and consent on February 5, 1969. After a vigorous internal debate and the victory of Willy Brandt's Social Democratic

34 "Summary of NPT Issues Paper," January 28, 1969, 1-2, box H-019, NSC Meetings File, Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), USNA (materials moving to Yorba Linda, California).

35 "Memorandum: H. Sonnenfeldt to H. Kissinger," January 27, 1969, box 366, NSF, NPMP, USNA.

36 Maddock, *The Nih Country Conundrum*, 523.

37 "Minutes of the National Security Council," January 29, 1969, 6, box H-12, NSC Draft minutes, NPMP, USNA.

38 "List of Actions Resulting from Meeting of the National Security Council," January 29, 1969, box H 019, NSC Meetings File, NPMP, USNA.

Party in national elections, West Germany signaled its intention to sign the treaty in November 1969. The last major hurdle was cleared for both the United States and the Soviet Union to sign, and both superpowers deposited the treaty on March 5, 1970.

The simple act of negotiating and signing a treaty did not, in itself, end the threat of nuclear proliferation. There were immediate setbacks. The Nixon administration did not make non-proliferation a priority. Israel's burgeoning weapons program was ignored, as were South Africa's nascent efforts. US-French nuclear cooperation was resumed. Western European companies offered advanced nuclear technology to potential proliferators, including Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan. India detonated a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, triggering considerable protest but few sanctions.

In spite of these problems, nuclear proliferation began to slow. Many potential proliferators suspended their weapons programs, and Japan, Australia, Sweden, and Egypt, among others, did not go nuclear as had been feared. Significantly, the complex and difficult NPT discussions helped spur other important arms-control negotiations. The Johnson administration pursued the so-called Outer Space Treaty, banning the militarization of space.



28. In May 1974, India became the second Third World country, after China, to successfully test a nuclear weapon. Here Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi visits the testing sites in Rajasthan. She is flanked by the defense minister, Krishna Chandra Pant (left), and Homi Sethna, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (right).

The first regional nuclear-free zone was established in Latin America through the Treaty of Tlatelolco in February 1967. Strategic arms-control talks were initiated between the Soviet Union and the United States during the summer of 1968, culminating in Nixon and Brezhnev signing treaties in Moscow on May 26, 1972, limiting both strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. While challenges remained, there was no denying the extraordinary shift in policies and attitudes against the horizontal and vertical spread of nuclear weapons that had taken place in little over a decade.

Proliferation puzzles

How did the new emphasis on non-proliferation influence Cold War global politics? And how effective was the NPT in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons? In the years since the treaty was signed, many critics have emerged and have pointed out the treaty's weaknesses. According to them, the original treaty did not create a rigorous enough inspections regime. Given the hopes for peaceful uses of atomic energy, not enough was done to recognize how easily civilian projects could be turned into weapons programs. Further, the treaty was inherently discriminatory, particularly against countries outside of the Cold War alliance system. The superpowers were not held to their promise to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to plan for their eventual elimination. Little was done to sanction new nuclear countries, such as Israel and India.

US non-proliferation policy was often a target of sharp criticism. Close allies, like West Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea, chafed at the pressure applied on them to forgo weapons, while other geopolitical interests seemed to cause the United States to overlook Israel's and Pakistan's efforts. Although few experts fully accepted the logic of Kenneth Waltz's argument that "more may be better," many observers in the United States argued that the robust nature of nuclear deterrence made undue attention to nuclear proliferation misguided. Even after the Cold War, the United States has been unwilling to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy. While countries including India, Russia, Israel, and even China have moved toward full or modified promises to eschew the first use of nuclear weapons, the United States still maintains its right to do so if it sees fit. These and other positions have caused critics to argue that US nuclear strategy undermined the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

What they ignore is how difficult it is to construct an effective global nuclear non-proliferation regime that is not riddled with puzzles and

paradoxes. As a 1964 Hudson Institute report explained, “retarding the spread of nuclear weapons” is a process where “the best may be the enemy of the good.” The study continued, an “attempt to get ‘everything’ may risk achieving substantially less than it would be possible with more modest ambitions.”³⁹ Most everyone believed that nuclear non-proliferation was an admirable principle. But constructing policies that generated worldwide support for it was difficult. How could states be convinced to forgo the perceived prestige and national security advantages that came with becoming a nuclear power?

What the critics have failed to fully understand is that any successful nuclear non-proliferation policy would be burdened with paradoxes and contradictions. Consider the US position toward nuclear strategy, non-first use, and anti-ballistic missile defenses as it related to its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation among its allies. On the one hand, the United States needed to emphasize “the political unattractiveness of nuclear weapons, to convince populations that they are ugly, dirty, immoral, illegal, dangerous, sickening and not very useful.” On the other hand, US policies undermined this message. “As one US expert noted at the time, having a nuclear sub visit Tokyo is like bringing a shiny new motorcycle home to show it off to your teenage son, while trying to convince him that he doesn’t want one.”⁴⁰

From Japan’s perspective, however, the issue was not quite so simple. Japan was near two enemies who had nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and China. If it was going to give up its own weapons, Japan needed a serious and credible commitment that the United States would protect it if attacked, even if it meant using nuclear weapons. This commitment could hardly be credible in the face of much larger Soviet and Chinese conventional forces without a robust nuclear capability. According to this logic, if the United States reduced its nuclear forces, it might actually encourage proliferation. A smaller US strategic force increased the incentives for small countries to become a “first rank nuclear power.”⁴¹ To keep Japan nonnuclear, a “clearly superior US nuclear capability in Asia” had to be maintained.⁴² The United States also needed to be willing to use its nuclear weapons first to protect allies surrounded by nuclear adversaries that also had conventional military superiority.

39 Hudson Institute, “Measures for Retarding the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Proposal to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,” March 13, 1964, 5, box 5, NSF, LBJL.

40 R. Fisher to S. Keeney, November 5, 1964, Box 5, NSF, LBJL.

41 “Problems Concerning Alternative Courses of Action,” undated, 3, box 1, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, NSF, LBJL.

42 “Japan’s Prospects in the Nuclear Weapons Field: Proposed US Courses of Action,” June 24, 1965, box 24, lot 67D2, RG 59, USNA.

Deploying strategic missile defenses would also have uncertain effects on nuclear proliferation. Building an ABM system might accelerate an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, a US ABM deployment could “decrease U.S. vulnerabilities to possible Chinese threats of attack and thereby enhance the credibility of our [US] commitments to Japan and other friendly nations.”⁴³ A limited ABM could be justified so that “those countries which fear the growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities should not feel that their only alternative is to create a costly nuclear arsenal themselves.”⁴⁴

In order to prevent proliferation, the superpowers had to guarantee allies and potential friends that they would come to their defense if attacked. Since few potential proliferators outside of the Eastern bloc were interested in any sort of guarantee from the Soviet Union, the burden fell upon the United States to craft military policies that would reassure countries such as Japan, West Germany, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan that they could live safely within the new non-proliferation regime. This led to expensive deployments of forces abroad, and justified the buildup of US nuclear capabilities. Security guarantees, however, threatened to pull the United States into regional conflicts it might have otherwise avoided.

What about states that did not want or trust superpower security commitments? And what factors motivated states whose primary concern was *not* the Cold War – diverse countries ranging from Argentina to Sweden? Much more historical research remains to be done to fully understand why some states forgo nuclear weapons while others embrace them.

The Cold War nuclear proliferation legacy

Despite great progress, we still know less than we would like about why states develop nuclear weapons and what policies are most effective at preventing nuclear proliferation. As we have seen, efforts during the Cold War to halt the spread of atomic weapons pulled policy in different, often contradictory, directions. Despite some failings and continuing puzzles and paradoxes, however, a strong case can be made that the NPT was a watershed event in international affairs with two major consequences. Negotiated between two ideological enemies, the NPT was a key part, for better or worse, of the

43 “Contingency Paper on the Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. ABM Deployment Decision,” August 25, 1967, box 231, Country File: USSR, NSF, LBJL.

44 “Telegram from the Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy in Paris,” September 14, 1967, box 1, NSF, Committee File, LBJL.

stabilization of power politics that began with the Limited Test-Ban Treaty in 1963 and was fully manifested in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. This comes through clearly in the Gilpatric committee deliberations. Neither the Soviets nor the Americans alone could halt proliferation, but “both ha[d] much to lose” if “lesser powers” acquired nuclear capabilities. The Soviet Union and the United States had “multiple, overlapping interests” that suggested the “timeliness of early steps to achieve an essentially bi-polar entente, resembling the Concert of Europe, the informal coalition based on limited mutuality of interests that kept the peace in Europe for more than half of the nineteenth century.”⁴⁵ The need to stem nuclear proliferation brought these bitter enemies together and helped give rise to détente.⁴⁶

Equally important, the treaty made nuclear non-proliferation a shared value of the international community in the same way human rights, anti-terrorism, and maintaining a stable international economic order have come to be seen as globally shared interests. While hard to quantify, it is clear that this global norm has helped slow (and in some cases, reverse) nuclear proliferation over the past few decades. In 1961, the famous strategist Hermann Kahn claimed that with “the kind of technology that is likely to be available in 1969, it may literally turn out that a Hottentot, an educated and technical Hottentot it is true, would be able to make bombs.”⁴⁷ What is striking, however, is how wrong the predictions made by Kahn, President Kennedy, and others turned out. Writing in 1985, the National Intelligence Council noted that for “almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb.” While “some proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments have taken place in the past two decades,” they did not have “the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence Community generally anticipated they would.”⁴⁸ Over time, non-proliferation, and not nuclear possession, has developed into a well-respected global norm. We have witnessed an extraordinary shift in attitudes about nuclear weapons from the earliest days of the nuclear age.

This points to another important but largely unrecognized fact: the history of the nuclear age is not the same thing as the history of the Cold War. While

45 “A Comparable Rationale for Course III (and Beyond)”, box 10, PPRG, JFKL.

46 See Jussi M. Hanhimäki’s chapter and Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in this volume.

47 “Into the Open,” *Time Magazine*, January 2, 1961, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,895206,00.html.

48 National Intelligence Council, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints,” September 1985, www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000453458/0000453458_0001.gif.

they obviously overlapped and interacted, different dynamics were at play in each arena. By the mid-1960s, the goal of non-proliferation at times made the Soviets and Americans less ideological rivals than realistic partners in what often appeared to be a concert or condominium to manage the most important military question in world politics. And when states like Britain, France, China, Israel, India, South Africa, and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, and others ranging from Brazil to Taiwan toyed with weapons programs, Cold War considerations were only one factor, and often not the most important motivation. Even though the nuclear programs that have caused the most worry in the past decade, those of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, began during the Cold War, the persistence of these programs after the disappearance of the Soviet Union reveals other motives were at play.

It is difficult to untangle the relationship between the two parallel drivers of postwar world politics, the Cold War and the nuclear revolution. Most historians would accept that no account of the Cold War is complete without understanding the influence of the bomb on world politics. But the history of the nuclear age reveals a narrative that is both part of yet outside the story of the US-Soviet rivalry. The Cold War is long finished, but the drama of the nuclear age continues, with untold, uncertain endings.

Intelligence in the Cold War

CHRISTOPHER ANDREW

Intelligence is probably the least understood aspect of the Cold War, sometimes sensationalised, often ignored. It is also the only profession in which a fictional character is far better known than any real practitioner, alive or dead. Cold War intelligence was, of course, not usually as exciting as the career of James Bond. Like all forms of information, the impact of intelligence is more often gradual than dramatic – though it does from time to time suddenly produce such spectacular revelations as the Soviet acquisition of the plans of the first US atomic bomb or the Soviet construction of missile sites in Cuba in 1962. Sometimes intelligence adds information of real importance to what is available from more conventional sources. Sometimes it adds little or nothing. But, whether intelligence is used, abused or simply ignored, historians of the Cold War can never afford to disregard it. The many studies of policy-making in East and West which fail to take intelligence into account are at best incomplete, at worst distorted.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT)

The starting point for any attempt to assess the role of intelligence during the Cold War is to recognise how much we still do not know. Signals intelligence is perhaps the prime example. Though SIGINT was far more voluminous than intelligence from human sources (HUMINT), it is still entirely absent from most histories of the Cold War. At the end of the Second World War, GCHQ (the British SIGINT agency) wanted to keep secret indefinitely the wartime ULTRA intelligence derived from breaking the German Enigma and other high-grade enemy ciphers but expected the secret to be uncovered within a few years.¹ It was already well known that the British cryptanalysts had broken

¹ Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), 1–3.

German ciphers during the First World War, and GCHQ believed that the clues to the even greater British code-breaking successes of the Second World War were too obvious for historians to miss. But, until the revelation of the ULTRA secret in 1973, historians remained so baffled by SIGINT that the clues were overlooked.

The study of the Cold War nowadays suffers from much the same neglect of SIGINT that diminished and sometimes distorted our understanding of Second World War intelligence a generation ago. Though most historians acknowledge the wartime significance of SIGINT, their interest in it usually ceases at V-J Day. None of Harry S. Truman's biographers, for example, mentions that he was so impressed by his brief experience of the wartime British-American SIGINT alliance that on 12 September 1945 he approved its peacetime continuation – and in so doing profoundly influenced the development of the Special Relationship. Throughout the Cold War (and beyond) the United States and Britain shared more secrets than any two independent powers had ever shared before. Their SIGINT accords of March 1946 and June 1948 (the latter known as the UKUSA agreement), which also involved Australia, Canada and New Zealand, still lack their rightful place in the historiography of the Cold War.² Though studies of Cold War US foreign policy invariably mention the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there is rarely any reference to the National Security Agency (NSA). At the end of the Cold War, President George Bush (the elder) publicly acknowledged that the SIGINT produced by NSA was a 'prime factor' in his foreign policy.³ The small circle of those in the know in Washington used to joke that NSA stood for 'No Such Agency'. Most histories of the Cold War reflect a similar amnesia.

The amnesiac approach to the role of SIGINT has distorted understanding of the Cold War in significant ways. That point is illustrated by the very first Cold War SIGINT to be declassified: the approximately 3,000 intercepted Soviet intelligence and other telegrams (code-named VENONA) for the period 1939 to 1948, partially decrypted by American and British code-breakers in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The decrypts have large implications for American political history as well as for Soviet-American relations. Through his outrageous exaggerations and inventions, Senator Joseph McCarthy

2 Christopher Andrew, 'The Making of the Anglo American SIGINT Alliance, 1940–1948', in James E. Dillard and Walter T. Hitchcock (eds.), *The Intelligence Revolution and Modern Warfare* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996).

3 Christopher Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 5 and ch. 13.

became, albeit unintentionally, the KGB's most successful Cold War agent of influence, making most American liberals sceptical of the significance of the Soviet intelligence offensive against the United States – despite its success in stealing the plans of the first atomic bomb. The evidence of Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, who had worked as couriers for Soviet intelligence, was widely but mistakenly ridiculed. VENONA provides compelling corroboration for both.⁴

Remarkably, the successes of US code-breakers at the beginning of the Cold War were far better known by their British allies than by the Truman administration. The VENONA secret was shared with Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, and all three British intelligence agencies but, due chiefly to the obstinacy of J. Edgar Hoover, not with President Truman or, until November 1952, the Central Intelligence Agency. When Kim Philby was posted to Washington as the representative of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1949, he was thus told that he could discuss VENONA with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but not with the CIA. Philby obeyed instructions not to mention the decrypts to the Agency but revealed them to his KGB case officer. Thanks to Philby and a Soviet agent in US SIGINT, William Weisband, Iosif Stalin was thus better informed than Truman about early Cold War American cryptanalysis.⁵

Though the highest-grade cipher systems of the Cold War were less vulnerable than those of the Second World War, the volume of SIGINT generated by both Soviet intelligence and the UKUSA alliance greatly increased. Much of the diplomatic traffic of Third World states was vulnerable to cryptanalysts in both East and West. On the eve of the 1956 Suez crisis, the British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, formally congratulated GCHQ on both the 'volume' and 'excellence' of its decrypts 'relating to all the countries of the Middle East. I am writing to let you know how valuable we have found this material ...'⁶ Soviet cryptanalysts seem to have been equally successful. There was probably never a year during the Cold War, at least from the 1950s onwards, when the KGB sent less than 100,000 diplomatic decrypts to the Central Committee

4 Though declassification of the VENONA decrypts began only in 1995, their existence and some of their contents had been known a decade earlier but ignored by most US historians. On the controversies aroused by VENONA since declassification, far greater in the US than in the UK, see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage* (San Francisco: Encounter, 2003).

5 Christopher Andrew, 'The VENONA Secret', in K. G. Robertson (ed.), *War, Resistance and Intelligence: Essays in Honour of M. R. D. Foot* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1999).

6 Selwyn Lloyd to E. M. Jones (Director, GCHQ), 30 September 1956, AIR 20/10621, UK National Archives, Kew, Richmond.

(chiefly, no doubt, to its International Department). By 1967, it was able to decrypt 152 cipher systems employed by a total of seventy-two states.⁷

The KGB owed much of its SIGINT success to its recruitment of cipher clerks and other personnel in foreign embassies in Moscow. Few, if any, embassies escaped some degree of KGB penetration. The US embassy was penetrated virtually continuously from the beginning of Soviet–American diplomatic relations in 1933 until at least the mid-1960s. Remarkably, most studies of US–Soviet relations continue to take no account of the haemorrhage of diplomatic secrets from the Moscow embassy for more than thirty years. Though security at the US embassy improved after the mid-1960s, that at many other Moscow embassies did not. Soviet SIGINT throughout the Cold War was also assisted by the penetration of foreign ministries in the West as well as the Third World. In 1945, the KGB’s Paris residency recruited a 23-year-old cipher officer, codenamed JOUR, in the Quai d’Orsay who was still active in the early 1980s. DARIO in the Italian Foreign Ministry had an almost equally long career as both KGB agent and talent-spotter. The incomplete evidence currently available suggests that, at a number of periods during the Cold War, France and Italy were conducting towards the Soviet Union something akin to open diplomacy. In 1983, for example, the French embassy in Moscow discovered that bugs in its teleprinters had been relaying all incoming and outgoing telegrams to the KGB for the past six years.⁸

Imagery intelligence (IMINT)

Intelligence operations served, in different ways, both to stabilise and to destabilise the Cold War. Perhaps the most important stabilising factor was the development of IMINT. Studies of the Cold War frequently forget the truth of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s dictum that intelligence on ‘what the Soviets *did not* have’ was often as important as information on what they did. Ignorance of a feared opponent invariably leads to an overestimation of the opponent’s strength. Shortage of reliable intelligence in the early 1950s generated the dangerous American myth of the ‘bomber gap’, soon followed by that of the ‘missile gap’ – the delusion that the Soviet Union was increasingly

7 Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘The KGB Reports to Gorbachev’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 11, 2 (1996), 228.

8 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1999; published in the United States as *The Sword and the Shield* by Basic Books, New York). On DARIO, see the additional information in the Italian edition, *L’Archivio Mitrokhin* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999), 693–94.



29. U2 spy plane in flight. The U2 overflights of Soviet territory started in 1956 and delivered critical intelligence about the military buildup of the USSR.

out-producing the United States in both long-range bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In 1955, US Air Force intelligence estimates calculated that by the end of the decade the Soviet Long-Range Air Force would be more powerful than the US Strategic Air Command, whose head, General Curtis LeMay, speculated irresponsibly about the possibility of a pre-emptive strike to prevent the Soviet Union achieving nuclear superiority.

The ability of both superpowers by the middle years of the Cold War to monitor each other's nuclear strike force was crucially dependent on a revolution in imagery intelligence, which began with the construction of the U-2, the world's first high-altitude spy-plane, fitted with the world's highest resolution cameras. U-2 missions over the Soviet Union, which began in 1956, followed four years later by the launch of the first spy satellites, convinced the Eisenhower administration that the Soviet nuclear strike force was not in fact overtaking that of the United States.⁹ Without the IMINT revolution, US policy to the Soviet Union would doubtless have continued to be confused by destabilising myths about the extent of Soviet nuclear capability. The course of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis would also have been different. But for IMINT

9 Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only*, chs. 6, 7.

from U-2s (whose interpretation owed much to top-secret documents supplied by the British–American agent in Moscow, Oleg Penkovskii),¹⁰ Nikita S. Khrushchev would almost certainly have achieved his ambition of concealing the construction of the missile bases until they were fully operational. The world would have come even closer to thermonuclear warfare.

After the missile crisis, the intelligence available to both East and West on the extent and deployment of their opponents' nuclear strike force became an essential element in stabilising the Cold War arms race. Without what were euphemistically termed 'national technical means' (NTMs), based on a combination of IMINT and SIGINT, verification of the arms-control and arms-limitation agreements of the later Cold War would have been impossible. The crucial importance of NTMs was explicitly recognised by the START treaty of 1989, which cut strategic nuclear arsenals by about 30 per cent and required both the United States and the Soviet Union 'not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party' and 'not to use concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means'. A protocol laid down detailed conditions designed to ensure that each side was able to monitor unhindered the other's missile telemetry.¹¹

Covert action

The intelligence operations that did most to embitter, rather than to stabilise, the Cold War involved the use of 'covert action': secret attempts to manipulate the course of events by methods ranging from bribing opinion-formers to paramilitary operations. Covert action played a central role in the establishment of the Soviet bloc in Eastern and Central Europe. The East German Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, announced to his inner circle after returning to Berlin from exile in Moscow on 30 April 1945, 'It's got to look democratic, but we must have everything under our control.' Because a democratic façade had to be preserved in all the states of the new Soviet bloc, the open use of force to exclude non-Communist parties from power had, so far as possible, to be avoided. Instead, Communist-controlled security

¹⁰ All the evaluations of the 'Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba' circulated to Excomm during the Cuban missile crisis carry the codeword IRONBARK – a reference to the documents on missile site construction supplied by Penkovskii which had been used in interpreting the U-2 imagery. Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992). On the missile crisis, see James G. Hershberg's chapter in this volume.

¹¹ START Treaty, 31 July 1989, Articles IX,X; Protocol on telemetric information (text published by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).

services, newly created in the image of the KGB (then known as the MGB) and overseen by Soviet 'advisers', helped to implement the postwar transition to so-called 'people's democracies' by intimidation behind the scenes. Finally, the one-party Stalinist regimes, purged of all visible dissent, were legitimised as 'people's democracies' by huge and fraudulent Communist majorities in elections rigged by the new security services.¹²

The United States began covert action on a very much smaller scale with the attempt, by bribery and other 'influence operations', to ensure the defeat of the Communists in the 1948 Italian general election. (Though the Italian Communists, who themselves received secret subsidies from Moscow via the KGB, did indeed lose the election, there is no evidence that US covert action had a significant influence on the outcome.) Within five years, the Korean War and the arrival of Eisenhower in the Oval Office had turned covert action into a major arm of US foreign policy. Between 1951 and 1975, there were, according to the 1976 Church Committee report, about 900 major covert actions, as well as many minor ones.

The apparent success of covert action in overthrowing supposedly pro-Soviet regimes in Iran and Guatemala during the first eighteen months of the Eisenhower administration led it to ignore the warning signs later left by other, less successful, operations. After a failed attempt to overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958, the future CIA deputy director for intelligence (DDI), Ray Cline, wrote prophetically:

The weak point in covert paramilitary action is that a single misfortune that reveals CIA's connection makes it necessary for the United States either to abandon the cause completely or convert to a policy of overt military intervention.¹³

Failure to learn that lesson led to humiliation at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. After the failed invasion by a CIA-backed 'Cuban brigade' of anti-Castro exiles, President John F. Kennedy despairingly asked his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, 'How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?' The American people, however, rallied round the flag and the president. It did not occur to Congress to investigate the debacle.

Fourteen years later, in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate, the mood had changed dramatically. The sensational disclosures during 1975, the

12 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*, paperback ed. (London: Sceptre, 1991), ch. 9.

13 Ray Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976), 182.

'Year of Intelligence', of CIA 'dirty tricks' – among them assassination plots against foreign statesmen (notably Fidel Castro) and illegal spying on US citizens during Operation CHAOS – caused widespread public revulsion. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee set up to investigate the abuses, declared: 'The Agency may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on the rampage.' A later congressional report concluded more accurately that the CIA, 'far from being out of control', had been 'utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs'.¹⁴

Alongside revelations of the real abuses of US covert action, there emerged other ill-founded allegations of CIA dirty tricks which, by dint of frequent repetition, became conventional wisdom and still appear in otherwise reliable Cold War histories. President Richard M. Nixon infamously told the CIA in 1970 to try to prevent the election of Chile's Marxist president, Salvador Allende, and to make the Chilean economy 'scream'. But, as recent research by Kristian Gustafson has demonstrated, the regularly repeated claims that the CIA orchestrated Allende's overthrow (and even his death) in 1973 and the rise of his successor, General Augusto Pinochet, are mistaken. The Chilean military's *amour propre* would have been offended by the notion that they either needed the United States to run the coup for them or were taking instructions from the CIA. As Pinochet acknowledged after the coup, 'he and his colleagues, as a matter of policy, had not given any hints to the U.S. as to their developing resolve to act'.¹⁵

The 'Year of Intelligence' also gave rise to bestselling but woefully inaccurate conspiracy theories – chief among them the claim, which a majority of Americans believed and the KGB did its best to encourage, that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of John F. Kennedy. If the CIA had been involved in killing its own president, it was reasonable to conclude that there were no limits to which the agency would not go to subvert foreign regimes and assassinate other statesmen who had incurred its displeasure. KGB 'active measures' (covert action) successfully promoted the belief that the methods that the CIA had used to attempt to kill Castro and destabilise his regime were being employed against 'progressive' governments around the world. Indira

¹⁴ The extensive literature on US covert action includes *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* [Church Committee], 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report no. 755 (26, April 1976); Gregory F. Treverton, *Covert Action* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only*.

¹⁵ Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: US Covert Operations in Chile 1964–1974* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

Gandhi was one of a number of Third World leaders who became obsessed by supposed CIA plots against them. In November 1973, she told Fidel Castro, 'What they [the CIA] have done to Allende they want to do to me also.' Tragically, Mrs Gandhi paid more attention to the imaginary menace of a CIA-supported assassination attempt than to the real threat from her own bodyguards, who murdered her in 1984.¹⁶

Just as the history of intelligence collection in the Cold War has been distorted by the neglect of SIGINT, so the history of covert action has been distorted by over-concentration on the US experience. No account of American Cold War policy in the Third World omits the role of the CIA. By contrast, covert action by the KGB passes almost unmentioned in most histories both of Soviet foreign relations and of developing countries. The result has been a curiously lopsided history of the secret Cold War in the Third World – the intelligence equivalent of the sound of one hand clapping. The admirable history of the Cold War by John Gaddis, for example, refers to CIA covert action in Chile, Cuba and Iran, but makes no reference to the extensive KGB operations in the same countries.

In reality, from at least the early 1960s onwards, the KGB played an even more active global role than the CIA. The belief that the Cold War could be won in the Third World transformed the agenda of Soviet intelligence. In 1961, the youthful and dynamic chairman of the KGB, Aleksandr Shelepin, won Khrushchev's support for the use of national liberation movements and other anti-imperialist forces in an aggressive new grand strategy against the 'Main Adversary' (the United States) in the Third World. Though Khrushchev was soon to replace Shelepin with the more compliant and less ambitious Vladimir Semichastnyi, the KGB's grand strategy survived. It was enthusiastically embraced by Iurii Andropov from the moment he succeeded Semichastnyi as KGB chairman in 1967.¹⁷

By contrast, the long-serving Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, as his almost equally long-serving ambassador in Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin,

16 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, ch. 14; Max Holland, 'The Lie that Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination', *Studies in Intelligence*, 11 (Fall/Winter 2001–2), www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London: Allen Lane and Penguin, 2005; published in the United States as *The World Was Going Our Way* by Basic Books, New York), 18, 326.

17 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 236–37; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, 10, 40; Nikolai Leonov, Eugenia Fediakova and Joaquín Fermandois, 'El general Nikolai Leonov en el CEP', *Estudios Públicos*, No. 73 (1999).

recalls, had limited interest in the Third World.¹⁸ At most of the main moments of Soviet penetration of the Third World, from the alliance with the first Communist 'bridgehead' in the western hemisphere (to quote the KGB's codename for Castro's Cuba) in the early 1960s to the final, disastrous defence of the Communist regime in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the KGB, usually supported by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, had greater influence than the Foreign Ministry. Castro preferred the company of Soviet intelligence officers to that of Soviet diplomats, telling the first KGB resident in Havana, Aleksandr Alekseev, that their meetings were a way of 'bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and every rule of protocol'. In 1962, largely at Castro's insistence, Alekseev replaced the unpopular Soviet ambassador. Other Latin American leaders who, like Castro, preferred KGB officers to Soviet diplomats included Allende in Chile, Juan José Torres in Bolivia, Omar Torrijos (not to be confused with his son) in Panama and José Figueres in Costa Rica. The first Soviet contact with Juan and Isabel Peron before their return to Argentina in 1973 was also made by the KGB rather than by a diplomat. KGB support for the Sandinistas began almost two decades before their conquest of power in Nicaragua in 1979.

In Asia, Africa and the Middle East, the main initiatives in Soviet policy during the 1960s and 1970s were also more frequently taken by the KGB than by the Foreign Ministry. India, the world's largest democracy, was described by General Oleg Kalugin, who in the mid-1970s was the youngest general in Soviet foreign intelligence, as 'a model of KGB infiltration of a Third World government'. As in India, most of the KGB's Third World operations led to transitory successes rather than enduring influence. That, however, was not how it seemed in the 1970s. Vladimir Kriuchkov, head of the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate (FCD) from 1974 to 1988, described the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as 'our natural allies'. In 1979, the NAM elected the unmistakably aligned Fidel Castro as its chairman – prompting a complaint from the KGB Havana residency that, 'F. Castro's vanity is becoming more and more noticeable.' Only a decade before the Soviet Union fell apart, the KGB leadership remained rashly optimistic about the success of its Third World operations. Andropov boasted in 1980 that the 'liberation' of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Afghanistan demonstrated that 'the

18 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 404–05; cf. N. S. Leonov, *Likholet: sekretnye missii* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 141.



30. Iurii Vladimirovich Andropov, a water engineer born in the Caucasus, was chairman of the KGB from 1967 to 1982.

Soviet Union is not merely talking about world revolution but is actually assisting it.¹⁹

Just as the KGB's enthusiasm for Castro a generation earlier had helped to launch the Soviet forward policy in the Third World, so the disastrous military intervention in Afghanistan, for which the KGB leadership bore much of the responsibility, was to bring it to an end. CIA covert action, in particular its supply of shoulder-launched Stinger missiles to the mujahedin beginning in the summer of 1986, probably hastened the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. During 1986, the CIA station in Islamabad co-ordinated the provision of over 60,000 tons of arms and other supplies to the mujahedin along more than 300 infiltration routes by trucks and mules. The station chief,

19 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, passim.



31. William Casey, a corporate lawyer from New York, was director of US Central Intelligence from 1981 to 1987.

Milton Bearden, complained that the agency ‘needed more mules than the world seemed prepared to breed’.²⁰

American covert action against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, first authorised by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981, was far less successful than against the Russians in Afghanistan. Secret CIA support for the inept Contra guerrilla campaign against the Sandinistas was revealed by the US media and banned by Congress. Robert Gates, then the CIA DDI

²⁰ Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB* (New York: Random House, 2004); quotation from p. 312; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, paperback ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 353–57, 375–77; Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II*, chs. 21, 22.

(head of analysis), reported to the director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, in December 1984 that covert support for the Contras was counter-productive and would 'result in further strengthening of the regime and a Communist Nicaragua'. The only way to overthrow the Sandinistas would be overt military support for the Contras combined with US airstrikes. Neither Casey nor Reagan was willing to face up to this uncomfortable truth. The attempt to circumvent the congressional ban led the White House into the black comedy of 'Iran-Contra' – an illegal attempt to divert to the Contras the proceeds of secret arms sales to Iran. The revelation of the Iran-Contra scandal in November 1986 provoked the most serious crisis of the Reagan presidency. Vice President George Bush dictated for his diary a sequence of staccato phrases which summed up the despondency in the White House: 'The administration is in disarray – foreign policy in disarray – cover-up – Who knew what when?'²¹

Scientific and technological intelligence (S&T)

The greatest success of Soviet bloc intelligence operations in the West during the Cold War was probably in the field of scientific and technological intelligence. Though the West had little to learn from Soviet technology, the Soviet Union had an enormous amount to learn from the West and from the US defence industry in particular. The plans of the first US atomic bomb, obtained for Moscow by British and American agents at the end of the Second World War and used to construct the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, were perhaps the most important scientific secret ever obtained by any intelligence service. The early development of Soviet radar, rocketry and jet propulsion was also heavily dependent on the covert acquisition of technology from the West.

For most of the Cold War, the American defence industry proved much easier to penetrate than the US federal government. By 1975, FCD Directorate T of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), which ran KGB S&T operations, had seventy-seven agents and forty-two confidential contacts working against American targets. SIGINT was also a major source. The SIGINT stations within the Washington, New York and San Francisco KGB residencies succeeded in intercepting the telephone and fax communications of a series of major US companies and laboratories. The United States was a more important – and more productive – S&T target than the rest of the world

21 Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only*, 478–93, 497; Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 339–48, 374.

combined. In 1980, 61.5 per cent of the S&T received by the Soviet Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which was mainly responsible for tasking in the military field, came from American sources (some outside the United States), 10.5 per cent from West Germany, 8 per cent from France, 7.5 per cent from Britain and 3 per cent from Japan. Documents provided by a French penetration agent in Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov, provided proof of the huge scale of Soviet S&T operations. In 1980, the VPK gave instructions for 3,617 S&T 'acquisition tasks', of which 1,085 were completed within a year, benefiting 3,396 Soviet research and development projects.²²

During the 1980s, there were increasing attempts to use S&T in the Soviet civilian economy. Kriuchkov told a meeting of senior FCD staff in 1984 that, 'In the last two years the quantity of material and samples handed over to civilian branches of industry has increased by half as much again.' This, he claimed, had been used 'to real economic effect', particularly in energy and food production. In reality, the sclerotic nature of Soviet management made it far harder to exploit S&T in the civilian economy than in military production.²³ The Soviet armed forces, by contrast, became dependent on S&T. According to one KGB report in 1979, over half the development projects of the Soviet defence industry were based on S&T from the West. The Pentagon estimated in the early 1980s that probably 70 per cent of all current Warsaw Pact weapons systems were based in varying degrees on Western – mainly US – technology.²⁴ Both sides in the Cold War – the Warsaw Pact as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – thus depended on American know-how. Intelligence is central to understanding the military as well as the political history of the Cold War.

Political intelligence analysis

The Soviet bloc had an inbuilt advantage over the West in intelligence collection. The authoritarian and secretive political systems of one-party

22 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 167–70, 280–87; Philip Hanson, *Soviet Industrial Espionage: Some New Information* (London: RIIA, 1987). On Vetrov, see also Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Le KGB dans le monde* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), 619–23.

23 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), *Instructions From the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990); slightly revised US edition published as *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 37, 49–50. East Germany found similar difficulty in exploiting Western S&T. See K. Macrakis, 'Does Effective Espionage Lead to Success in Science and Technology? Lessons from the East German Ministry of State Security', *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 1 (2004), 52–77.

24 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 280–87, 723–25.

states are, by their very nature, harder to penetrate than those of democracies. Equally, however, the Soviet bloc had an inbuilt disadvantage in intelligence assessment. In all one-party states, political intelligence analysis (unlike most S&T) is necessarily distorted by the insistent demands of political correctness. It thus acts as a mechanism for reinforcing, rather than correcting, the regimes' misconceptions of the outside world. Autocrats, by and large, are told what they want to hear. One British SIS chief defined his main role as, on the contrary, to 'tell the Prime Minister what the Prime Minister does not want to know'. Western intelligence agencies, of course, have sometimes fallen far short of this exalted calling. Though the politicisation of intelligence sometimes degrades assessment even within democratic systems, it is built into the structure of all authoritarian regimes.

The lowly status of Soviet intelligence analysis is reflected in the sparse references to it in the lengthy KGB Lexicon.²⁵ Soviet intelligence reports throughout, and for some years after, the Stalin era usually consisted of selective compilations of raw intelligence that conformed to the views of the political leadership. Though intelligence analysis improved under Andropov, it remained seriously undeveloped by Western standards. Nikolai Leonov, who was dismayed to be appointed in 1971 as deputy head of the FCD assessment department, Service 1, estimates that it had only 10 per cent of the importance of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence [Analysis]. Its prestige was correspondingly low. To be transferred there from an operational section, as happened to Leonov, was 'equivalent to moving from a guards regiment in the capital to the garrison in a provincial backwater'.²⁶ Vadim Kirpichenko, who later rose to become first deputy head of the FCD, recalls that pessimistic intelligence reports were kept from Brezhnev for fear that they 'would upset Leonid Ilyich'.²⁷ When Soviet policy suffered setbacks that could not be concealed, analysts knew they were on safe ground if they blamed them on imperialist machinations, particularly those of the United States, rather than failures of the Soviet system. As one FCD officer admitted at the end of the Cold War, 'In order to please our superiors, we sent in falsified and biased information, acting on the principle, "Blame everything on the Americans, and everything will be OK"'.²⁸

25 *KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer's Handbook*, ed. and intro. by Vasilii Mitrokhin (London: Frank Cass, 2002).

26 Leonov, *Likholet*, 120–22.

27 Interview with Vadim Kirpichenko, *Vremia Novostei*, 20 Dec. 2004; Cf. Leonov, *Likholet'e*, 129–31.

28 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, 722; *Izvestiia*, 24 Sept. 1991.

The damaging effects of political correctness were made worse by the KGB's recurrent tendency to conspiracy theory, which in times of crisis escalated into a paranoid tendency. Looking back on the Cold War, Sir Percy Cradock, former chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee and Margaret Thatcher's foreign policy adviser, rightly identified 'the main source of weakness' in the Soviet intelligence system as 'the attempt to force an excellent supply of information from the multifaceted West into an oversimplified framework of hostility and conspiracy theory'.²⁹

For most of the Cold War, one of the main weaknesses of Western intelligence analysis was its failure to grasp the degree to which political correctness and conspiracy theory degraded Soviet intelligence assessment. On 29 June 1960, Shelepin, the KGB chairman, personally delivered to Khrushchev a horrifyingly alarmist assessment of American policy that may have owed something to wild speculation by General Curtis LeMay:

In the CIA it is known that the leadership of the Pentagon is convinced of the need to initiate a war with the Soviet Union "as soon as possible" ... Right now the USA has the capability to wipe out Soviet missile bases and other military targets with its bomber forces. But over the next little while the defence forces of the Soviet Union will grow ... and the opportunity will disappear.

Khrushchev took the warning seriously. Less than a fortnight later he issued a public warning to the Pentagon 'not to forget that, as shown at the latest tests, we have rockets which can land in a preset square target 13,000 kilometres away'. In March 1962, the GRU claimed that the United States had actually taken the decision to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in September 1961 but had been deterred at the last moment by Soviet nuclear tests which showed that the USSR's nuclear arsenal was more powerful than the Pentagon had realised.³⁰

Had Western analysts in the early 1980s been aware of the KGB and GRU assessments of twenty years earlier, they would doubtless have been quicker to recognise the extent of Soviet fears of the Reagan administration. In a secret speech to a major KGB conference in May 1981, a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan's policies as a serious threat to world peace. He was followed by Andropov, who was to succeed him as general secretary eighteen

29 Sir Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), ch. 17.

30 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964* (London: John Murray, 1997), 51-52, 155, 168.

months later. To the astonishment of most of the audience, the KGB chairman announced that, by decision of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU were for the first time to collaborate in a global intelligence operation, code-named RYAN – a newly devised acronym for *Raketno-iadernoe napadenie* ('Nuclear Missile Attack'). RYAN's purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but non-existent, plans of the Reagan administration and its NATO allies to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union.³¹ 'Not since the end of the Second World War', Andropov informed foreign residencies, 'has the international situation been as explosive as it is now.'³² As Brezhnev's successor in November 1982, Andropov retained control over the KGB; his most frequent visitors were senior intelligence officers. Throughout his term as general secretary, RYAN remained the first priority of Soviet foreign intelligence. For several years Moscow succumbed to what its ambassador in Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, described as a 'paranoid interpretation' of Reagan's policy.³³

Intelligence operations in the rest of the Soviet bloc were distorted by the requirement to assist Operation RYAN. Markus Wolf, the able, long-serving head of the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA: GDR foreign intelligence service), found KGB liaison officers 'obsessed' by RYAN and the threat of a NATO first strike:

The HVA was ordered to uncover any Western plans for such a surprise attack, and we formed a special staff and situation centre, as well as emergency command centres, to do this ... Like most intelligence people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above.³⁴

Like Wolf, most KGB residencies in Western capitals were less alarmist than Andropov and KGB headquarters. When Oleg Gordievskii, who had been recruited as a British agent in the KGB in 1974, joined the London residency in June 1982, he found all his colleagues in Line PR (political intelligence) sceptical about Operation RYAN. None, however, was willing to risk his career by challenging the Centre's assessment. RYAN thus created a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment. Residencies were, in effect, ordered to search out alarming information. The Centre was duly

³¹ Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), *Instructions from the Centre*, ch. 4.

³² Oleg Kalugin, *My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West* (London: Smith Gryphon, 1994), 302–03. Kalugin considered Andropov's cable 'paranoid'.

³³ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 523.

³⁴ Markus Wolf (with Anne McElvoy), *Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1997), 222.

alarmed by what they supplied and demanded more. The Washington resident, Stanislav Androssov, among others, was at pains to provide it. Alarm within the Centre reached a climax during the NATO exercise 'Able Archer 83', held in November 1983 to practise nuclear release procedures. For a time the KGB leadership was haunted by the fear that the exercise might be intended as cover for a real nuclear first strike. Some FCD officers stationed in the West were by now more concerned by the alarmism in the Centre than by the threat of a Western surprise attack.³⁵

The first reliable intelligence on RYAN to reach the West came from Oleg Gordievskii. Following his posting to London, Gordievskii was able to supply not merely oral information but also RYAN directives from the Centre which he regularly smuggled out of the residency.³⁶ Though his case officer, who later rose to become chief of SIS, was initially 'astonished and scarcely able to believe' the intelligence he provided,³⁷ it was quickly accepted as of vital importance by the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and her foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, as well as by the British intelligence community. When the intelligence was shared with Washington, however, a major difference of view quickly emerged. On the British side, as Howe wrote later, during Able Archer 'Gordievsk[y] left us in no doubt of the extraordinary but genuine Russian fear of real-life nuclear strike'.³⁸ Most CIA analysts disagreed – probably because of the difficulty they found in crediting the role of conspiracy theory in Soviet intelligence analysis.³⁹ Later reassessment of the intelligence from Gordievskii and other sources led to a drastic revision of that conclusion. Robert Gates writes in his memoirs:

Information about the peculiar and remarkably skewed frame of mind of Soviet leaders during those times that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union makes me think there is a good chance – with all of the other events in 1983 – that they really felt a NATO attack was at least possible ...

US intelligence had failed to grasp the true extent of their anxieties. A re-examination of the whole episode by the president's Foreign Intelligence

35 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 582–605; Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), *Instructions from the Centre*, ch. 4; Yuri Shvets, *Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 29, 74–75.

36 Some of the KGB RYAN directives are published in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), *Instructions from the Centre*, ch. 4.

37 Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 262.

38 Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 349–50.

39 'Implications of Recent Soviet Military Political Activities', Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 11 10 84/JX.

Advisory Board in 1990 concluded that the intelligence community's confidence that this had all been Soviet posturing for political effect was misplaced.⁴⁰

There is no better evidence of the extent of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in foreign policy after he became general secretary in March 1985 than his dissatisfaction with the bias of the KGB's political reporting. In December 1985, Viktor Chebrikov, KGB chairman since 1982, summoned a meeting of the KGB leadership to discuss a stern memorandum from Gorbachev 'on the impermissibility of distortions of the factual state of affairs in messages and informational reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU and other ruling bodies' – a damning indictment of its previous political correctness. The conferees sycophantically agreed on the need to avoid sycophantic reporting and declared the duty of the KGB both at home and abroad to fulfil 'the Leninist requirement that we need only the whole truth'.⁴¹ According to Leonid Shebarshin, who succeeded Kriuchkov as head of foreign intelligence in 1988, the FCD 'no longer had to present its views in a falsely positive light'⁴² – though it is difficult to believe that all its officers instantly threw off the habits of a lifetime.

Intelligence asymmetry in East and West

In KGB jargon, the United States was the 'Main Adversary' (*glavnyi protivnik*) – just as the CIA regarded its main adversary as the Soviet Union. Unlike Western intelligence agencies, however, the KGB had not one but two 'Main Adversaries'. The second was what the KGB called 'ideological sabotage' – anything which threatened to undermine the authority of the Communist one-party states in and beyond the Soviet bloc.

The asymmetry between the priorities of the intelligence communities in East and West reflected their radically different roles within the states they served. The Cheka, founded six weeks after the Bolshevik Revolution, and its successor agencies were central to the functioning of the Soviet system in ways that intelligence communities never were to the government of Western states. Their fundamental role within the one-party state was to monitor and repress dissent in all its forms, whether by violence or more sophisticated systems of social control involving huge surveillance networks. Informers in

40 Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 273.

41 Garthoff, 'The KGB Reports to Gorbachev', 226–27.

42 Interview with Leonid Shebarshin, *Daily Telegraph*, 1 December 1992.

the German Democratic Republic were seven times more numerous even than in Nazi Germany. The KGB and its intelligence allies played a central role in the suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the pressure on the Polish Communist regime to strangle the democratic Solidarity movement in 1981. More of the KGB's elite corps of illegals (deep-cover intelligence personnel posing as foreign nationals) were used to penetrate dissident movements within the Soviet bloc than were ever deployed against the United States or other Western targets during the Cold War.

The war against the dissidents was a major part of KGB foreign as well as domestic operations. Indeed, some of the most important of the foreign operations were jointly devised by senior officers of the First Chief and Fifth Directorates, responsible respectively for foreign intelligence and countering ideological subversion. Early in 1977, for example, no less than thirty-two 'active measures' designed to discredit and demoralise the leading dissident, Andrei Sakharov ('Public Enemy Number One', as Andropov described him), and his wife, Elena Bonner, were either in progress or about to commence both within the Soviet Union and abroad. Seeking to discredit every well-known dissident who managed to get to the West was a major KGB priority – irrespective of whether the dissident's profession had, in Western terms, anything to do with politics at all. At the world chess championship in the Philippines in 1978, when the dissident Viktor Korchnoi committed the unforgivable sin of challenging the orthodox Anatolii Karpov, the KGB sent eighteen operations officers to try to ensure his defeat.⁴³

Only when the vast apparatus of Soviet social control began to be dismantled under Gorbachev did the full extent of the KGB's importance to the survival of the USSR become clear. The manifesto of the hard-line leaders of the August 1991 coup, of which the KGB chairman, Vladimir Kriuchkov, was the chief organiser, implicitly acknowledged that the relaxation of the campaign against ideological subversion had shaken the foundations of the one-party state: 'Authority at all levels has lost the confidence of the population ... The country has in effect become ungovernable.' Crucial to the change of mood was declining respect for the intimidatory power of the KGB, which had hitherto been able to strangle any Moscow demonstration at birth. The most striking symbol of the collapse of the August coup was the toppling of the giant statue of the founder of the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, from its plinth in the middle of the square outside KGB headquarters. A large crowd, which

43 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive*, chs. 15, 16, 19, 20, 31.

a few years earlier would never have dared to assemble, encircled the Lubyanka and cheered enthusiastically as 'Iron Feliks' was borne away, dangling in a noose suspended from a huge crane supplied by the Moscow city government.

Intelligence and the Cold War

The Cold War was a global conflict between intelligence agencies as well as governments. From the construction of the Soviet bloc in the aftermath of the Second World War to the war in Afghanistan and US operations against the Sandinistas in the 1980s, the course of that global conflict cannot be adequately interpreted without an understanding of its intelligence dimension. Attempting to resolve the most difficult problem posed by the Cold War – why it did not end in hot war – also requires an understanding of the stabilising role of secret 'national technical means' based on a combination of IMINT and SIGINT. There were major differences, however, between intelligence assessment, as well as the priority given to scientific and technological intelligence, in East and West. Intelligence communities also had a far more central role in the one-party states of the Soviet bloc than in Western democracies, even at their most irresponsible. At the end of the Cold War, the speed of the collapse of the Soviet system took almost all observers (including Western intelligence agencies) by surprise. What now seems most remarkable, however, is less the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 than its survival for almost seventy-five years. Without the KGB's immense system of surveillance and social control, the Soviet era would have been significantly shorter. The KGB's most enduring achievement was thus to sustain the longest-lasting one-party state of the twentieth century. By postponing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the KGB also prolonged the Cold War.

Reading, viewing, and tuning in to the Cold War

NICHOLAS J. CULL

For many years the historiography of Cold War culture was dominated by two rather parochial clichés. The first held that studying the Cold War and culture meant discussing the impact of the McCarthy-era purges on cultural production in the United States; the second, that it meant the study of films or literature with explicit Cold War content. Recent scholarship has taken a much broader approach. Within the United States, the Cold War has provided the dominant framework for thinking about culture in the 1950s. President Harry S. Truman's notion of containment is now as readily applied to the lives of American women of the era as to their government's relations with the Soviet Union.¹ Beyond this, the cultural Cold War has emerged as a major concern of international history. The literature, film, and broadcasting of the Cold War period is at last being understood by historians, as it was by protagonists, not only as a product of the politics of the era but also as a front in the Cold War as real as that which divided Berlin, bisected Korea, or ran through the straits of Miami. With this in mind, this chapter will consider, first, how the governments of East and West shaped culture during the Cold War and, then, how writers, filmmakers, and broadcasters responded to the conflict. The analysis will focus on the middle years of the conflict, but the conclusion will examine the ways in which these influences played out in the 1980s.

The Soviet propaganda machine

By 1962, the world had become used to the cultural manifestations of the clash between East and West.² International exchanges of exhibitions, intellectuals,

I am grateful to Tony Shaw and James Chapman for their feedback on and engagement with this chapter.

¹ For example, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

² See Jessica C. E. Gienow Hecht's chapter in volume I.

and artists, and the intense competition to boost one's own prestige and diminish that of the enemy had transformed culture into war by other means. The old professionals in the culture game were the Soviets. The Soviet Union had been exporting its political culture since founding the state-run International Book Company (known by its Russian abbreviation as *Mezhkniga*) in 1923 and had followed it up by creating the All-Union Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (*Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo kulturnykh svyazei s zagranitse*, known by the acronym VOKS) in 1925. The Communist International (also known as the Third International) had sought to coordinate the leadership of Communist parties around the world, though purges crippled this organization long before Iosif Stalin formally closed it down as a gesture of goodwill to his wartime allies.

In the postwar period, Moscow's international political propaganda was the province of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of COMINFORM (the Communist Information Bureau set up in 1947 to coordinate the efforts of local Communist parties around the world). The system had its problems. The competing bureaucracies struggled to settle the issue of the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1953, the ministry assumed direction of VOKS through a new Department for Ties with Foreign Communist Parties. In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev launched a major cultural offensive around the world, which taken alongside his simultaneous denunciation of Stalin, looks rather like a re-branding campaign by a twenty-first century multinational corporation. He dissolved COMINFORM and, in 1957, replaced VOKS with the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD) outside the foreign ministry. He also created a new State Committee for Cultural Ties (GKKS) to administer cultural relations with all states, rather than just other Communist countries. This structure was further complicated by the presence of a host of front organizations reaching out in the name of youth or peace or both. The final player in Moscow's propaganda line-up throughout the period was the KGB, which covertly subsidized sympathetic newspapers across the developing world and planted disinformation stories.³

In the 1960s, the Soviet state added another layer of international propaganda organizations. In 1961, Moscow created an international press agency, Novosti (News), in order to extend the reach of its version of Soviet and foreign news. Three years later, the SSOD, the Soviet Writers', Journalists',

3 Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 238.

and Composers' Unions, and Novosti launched a new international radio station called Radio Peace and Progress that purported to be independent of the government. Few overseas listeners seem to have been persuaded. The structures of Soviet propaganda were not stable for long. In 1967, Leonid Brezhnev replaced GKKS with a Department of Cultural Relations within the Foreign Ministry, but the pace of Soviet cultural outreach did not slacken.⁴

Soviet initiatives in the middle years of the Cold War included displays of technology, the export of certain prestige motion pictures, the mass production of cheap editions of classic Russian literature, and spectacular examples of Soviet ballet. Ironically, movies shown in the West such as *The Cranes Are Flying* (Mikhail Kalatozov, dir., 1957) or *Ballad of a Soldier* (Grigori Chukhrai, dir., 1959) reflected a freedom of form that was frowned on in party circles at home.⁵ Literature and ballet which tapped into the Russia past revealed a culture of depth, vigor, and sophistication that belied the tired, grey image of the period immediately following World War II. The Soviet regional minorities were always prominently represented in the international version of life in the USSR as, in public at least, the Soviet Union always celebrated diversity. In such images the maidens were always smiling, the economy was always thriving, and the technology always worked. Moscow found its trump card in its triumph in space from the launch of Sputnik, through the first manned flight in 1961 to the spacewalks of the mid-1960s. The whole effort both challenged stereotypes and concealed truths about the USSR.⁶ When audiences failed to respond to Soviet overtures with the requisite admiration, the KGB simply paid for the necessary demonstrations. It helped the Kremlin if their population believed that the USSR was the envy of the world.⁷

The achievements of the Soviet cultural and propaganda offensive during the middle years of the Cold War exceeded the simple objective of selling the Soviet system or reassuring audiences at home. Although the USSR sprang from an internationalist ideology, Moscow leaders painted the United States government as the one-size-fits-all universalists, while presenting themselves as the friends to local nationalism. The USSR enabled the leaders of African liberation movements to speak to their own peoples over the channels of

4 Nigel Gould Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History*, 27 (2003), 193–214, esp. 203, 205–06.

5 Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*, 241.

6 Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 336.

7 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for The Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).



32. The Soviets were eager to show their progress in education. Here foreign students at the newly opened Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow, 1961.

Radio Moscow. By sponsoring Third World nationalism, Moscow hitched its star to one of the big stories of the era and also exacerbated the tendency in Washington to see every nationalist as a Communist and thereby bungle its relations with much of the developing world as a result. If America's own polls are to be believed, the Soviet effort convinced many that the USSR was the wave of the future. Soviet prestige waxed full with its sporting triumphs, international development projects, and recruitment of foreign students to institutions like Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

Yet Soviet outreach had its unintended consequences. It opened the Soviet Union to international influences. Khrushchev probably misjudged the relative benefits and costs of international exchange. His cultural agreements with the Western powers in the late 1950s allowed the Soviets to mount exhibitions in New York, London, and elsewhere, but few people came, whereas the reciprocal events, like the American National exhibition held in Moscow in the summer of 1959, electrified the masses and suggested something of the abundance that flowed from the capitalist system. The evidence of Western

prosperity became a ticking time bomb for Moscow. At some point Soviet citizens would demand more than the party could provide.⁸

The US propaganda machine

It could be said that Stalin founded two global propaganda machines, as the US government's Cold War propaganda structure was created in direct response to the scale of Soviet activity. US international propaganda flourished during World War II with institutions like Voice of America radio and the Office of War Information, but the entire effort very nearly folded at the war's end. The ubiquity of Soviet propaganda motivated postwar initiatives like the Fulbright exchanges, the information component to the Marshall Plan, and the wholesale authorization of peacetime propaganda overseas in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mounted its own covert campaign and established Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to use exiles to broadcast propaganda into the Eastern bloc. Yet these efforts were uncoordinated. The threat of Soviet propaganda remained undiminished. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded by establishing the United States Information Agency (USIA) to conduct all overt US information work around the world. As in the USSR, the US information machine had its turf wars. Senator William Fulbright contrived to keep the administration of culture and exchange at the State Department where it remained until 1978. Staff at both USIA and the State Department had wasted much energy on infighting in the interim.⁹

USIA's achievements in the mid-Cold War period included massive programs to translate and publish "helpful" books and promote the teaching of English. USIA worked hard to present the African-American civil rights movement to the world, spinning the story as one of the heroic federal government coming to rescue brave black citizens from localized prejudice. USIA also managed to turn the death of President John F. Kennedy into an opportunity to accentuate the best in America. Voice of America carried American popular music and achieved success broadcasting jazz into the Eastern bloc. USIA and the State Department sponsored tours by jazz musicians, reaching out especially to Africa. In the field of film and television, USIA created documentaries and disseminated them to new and content-hungry TV stations in developing

8 Gould Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," 213. See also Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain* (New York: Macmillan, 1995), 210, 213.

9 For a full account, see Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

countries or placed them in cinemas around the world as supporting fare for the biggest Hollywood hits of the era. USIA also secretly subsidized several international newsreels and even created feature material for key audiences, as in 1965 when the agency launched a propaganda soap opera for Mexico called *Nuestro Barrio* (Our Neighborhood) about the struggle between a young doctor and an evil oligarch. The show reportedly soon topped the ratings in Mexico and across Central America.¹⁰ In support of such work, USIA re-branded its activities to allow a clear contrast with Soviet propaganda. From 1965 onwards, USIA commonly called its work Public Diplomacy. There is, however, little evidence that contemporary audiences drew great distinctions between Soviet propaganda and US public diplomacy. Both seem to have been taken with a pinch of salt.

Unlike the Soviet Union's ideological warriors, America's "public diplomats" had to coexist with a lively commercial media emanating from their country. USIA and the State Department worked to enable US culture to reach places where the commercial US media would not or could not go and to balance portrayals of America in countries where the commercial US media could be freely accessed. This meant that in the East and global South, the United States had to overcome stereotypes of heartless capitalism propagated by the Soviets, while in the West the United States had to overcome the impressions of ubiquitous violence and lax morals created by its own popular culture.

USIA had both friends and enemies in the commercial media. News organizations like the Associated Press and Scripps Howard disliked any government role in the news business and lobbied against Voice of America. Hollywood was initially more sympathetic, with the major studios agreeing in the 1950s to shape their output with foreign sensibilities in mind. USIA happily guided script decisions in many export-oriented films. But USIA's informal arrangements with Hollywood did not endure in the 1960s. From the Kennedy years onwards, the gap between the ways in which the US government wished the country to be seen and the images favored by Hollywood remained a major concern for USIA.¹¹

European international propaganda: East and West

The European nations had been in the national projection business even longer than the USSR. In the 1880s private groups in France, Germany, and

¹⁰ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 240.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 84, 184–85, 207, 301–02.

Italy established cultural diplomacy organizations. Britain came late with its quasi nongovernmental British Council in 1934 and foreign-language broadcasts by the BBC which began in 1938. This work continued into the postwar period and acquired a Cold War imperative along with an increased emphasis on cultivating the developing world. West Germany established a new organization: the Goethe Institute, to make a clean break with Nazi cultural propaganda. Student exchanges and overseas student recruitment emerged as a favorite technique of the European cultural propagandists. Europeans also paid particular attention to the idea of establishing twinning agreements between towns across international lines. Such arrangements were an important mechanism of overcoming historical antipathies and building a sense of Europeaness in the shadow of the USSR, but were also used to reach out across Cold War fault lines.

West European cultural diplomacy organizations presented their respective political culture inside the Eastern bloc; Britain and France mounted exhibitions in Moscow in the years following the American exhibition. But these efforts were not simply a product of the Cold War. The British and French were still competing with one another to expand influence and reap material profits. France spent far and away the most money, but the bulk of its budget was allocated to promote French language and culture in its former colonial zone in West Africa.

Eastern European governments set up their own cultural offices, sent cultural attaches abroad, and opened their own exhibition pavilions. They exported their film and television programs, with Czechoslovakia making its mark in the world of animation. They especially focused on sports. Romania's gymnasts, Czechoslovakia's ice hockey team, and East Germany's weight lifters were all presented as symbols of the health and vitality of their system. Sporting events like the contest between the East and West German soccer teams in the first round of the 1974 soccer World Cup gained immense propaganda significance (this particular match was won by East Germany 1-0, but West Germany went on to win the championship). Sometimes sports were a proxy for resistance within the Warsaw Pact. During the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, held in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Hungarian and Soviet water polo teams fought so fiercely during their match that it became known as the "blood in the water" match. Hungary went on to clinch the gold medal.

The Cold War cast a shadow over global artistic production. There were moments when art became especially politicized. America's radio stations RFE and RL disseminated the works of dissidents like Boris Pasternak or Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and in the same way the Soviet Union used art and literature to

publicize America's negative stories from the plight of Vietnamese peasants to the fate of the popularly elected leftist Salvador Allende regime in Chile. US and British propaganda bureaucracies both worked to ensure that the work of the most influential English-language voice of the Cold War – George Orwell – was as widely translated and disseminated as possible. *Animal Farm* and *1984* were invaluable to the Western cause.¹² But Cold War culture was more than this. Artists and audiences across the world gravitated toward certain shared themes which, while already present in the culture, achieved a special prominence in the period and provided a mechanism through which the Cold War experience could be explored. Three broad subjects stand out as characteristic of the era: destruction (and especially nuclear destruction), espionage, and epic renderings of history and fantasy. Stories woven around all three subjects evolved during the period and serve as a window on the development of Cold War attitudes among artists and audiences alike.

Themes of destruction

As soon as the news broke of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Western writers began to ruminate about the horrible potential of nuclear annihilation. The idea had surfaced in Anglo-American fiction as early as 1895, but now nuclear destruction and its consequences became a major theme in Western culture. Almost always the nuclear theme served as a critique of Cold War logic and a plea for peace. Important early manifestations included John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, (1946), and Leonard Engel and Emanuel S. Piller's imagined account of full-scale nuclear war called *World Aflame: The Russian American War of 1950* (1947).

The American imagination ran riot around nuclear fears. Nuclear tests created armies of giant ants in the horror movie *Them!* (Gordon Douglas, dir., 1954), stolen nuclear materials immolate the femme fatale in *Kiss Me Deadly* (Robert Aldrich, dir., 1955), and nuclear war inaugurated a new dark age in Walter M. Miller's remarkable novel *A Canticle for Liebowitz* (1955–59). On the lighter side, in 1959, the satirical songwriter Tom Lehrer released his pastiche hymn "We'll All Go Together When We Go," with such memorable lyrics as: "When the air becomes uranious, we will all go simultaneous ..." It was much the same story elsewhere in the West. Britain produced the thriller *Seven Days to Noon* (John Boulting and Roy Boulting, dirs., 1950) in which a mad scientist tries

12 Daniel J. Leab, *Orwell Subverted: The CIA and the Filming of Animal Farm* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

to use a bomb to blackmail the world into disarmament, while Roald Dahl's first novel, *Sometime Never* (1948), contained vivid descriptions of nuclear devastations during World Wars III and IV. Nevil Shute's *On the Beach* (1957) (filmed by Stanley Kramer in 1959) imagined Australia's wait for inevitable death following a nuclear war elsewhere in the world. France produced both Alain Resnais's film *Hiroshima Mon Amour* [Hiroshima My Love] (1959) and the black humor of designer Louis Réard, who dubbed his two-piece swimsuit the "Bikini" (1946) to compare the garment's impact to the US nuclear test at the Pacific atoll of the same name. Japan – whose population knew nuclear devastation at first hand – fixated on the issue. Japanese comics and movies were full of nuclear blasts creating monsters, the most famous being *Gojira* [Anglicized as *Godzilla*] (Ishirô Honda, dir., 1954). In 1972/73, Japan was gripped by the publication of *Hadashi no Gen* [Barefoot Gen], a powerful memoir of the impact of the atomic bomb in *Manga* form by a Hiroshima survivor.

The Cuban missile crisis spurred a series of major films in the West about the danger of a rogue individual or a systems failure triggering a nuclear apocalypse. The most innovative was *Doctor Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* (Stanley Kubrick, dir., 1964). Similar scenarios were played straight in *Fail-Safe* (Sidney Lumet, dir., 1964). Two major American superheroes created in the 1960s – Spiderman and The Incredible Hulk – gained their powers from nuclear-related accidents. American nuclear fears were also directed toward China, the most extreme example being *Battle Beneath the Earth* (Montgomery Tully, dir., 1967) in which a rogue "Red Chinese" general attempts to attack the US mainland by tunneling under the Pacific Ocean and placing atomic bombs under American military bases.

In Britain, the documentary filmmaker Peter Watkins made *The War Game* (1965) in which he dramatized the effects of a nuclear bomb on London. The BBC thought it too intense to screen on television for another twenty years, but the film was shown theatrically and won the best documentary Oscar. Humorist Spike Milligan created *The Bedsitting Room* (Richard Lester, dir., 1969), a black comedy set in a British nuclear wasteland.

In stark contrast to the West, in the Eastern bloc the subject of nuclear devastation was officially taboo, appearing only in veiled form in science fiction.¹³ The regimes hated to allow their populations to dwell on questions which the party could not readily answer. The nuclear theme was explicit only

13 See Arkady Strugatsky and Boris Strugatsky, *Obitaemyi ostrov* [Inhabited Island], (1971), published in the West as *Prisoners of Power* (1977). The theme has also been detected in *Stalker* (Andre Tarkovsky, dir., 1979).

in anti-American treatments of the legacy of World War II such as the 1974 film co-produced with Japan, *Moskva, liubov moia* [Moscow my Love] (Aleksandr Mitta and Kenzi Yesida, dirs.), in which a Japanese dancer finds happiness with a Soviet sculptor only to expire from cancer, traced to her mother's presence at Hiroshima before her birth.

Themes of espionage

While nuclear culture argued for peace and restraint, stories of espionage and paranoia shaped the logic of the Cold War conflict and mobilized populations to support (or at least tolerate) their secret states. These stories had deep roots. In West and East alike, spy stories had been an important part of culture during World War II. They were a resource as ready for Cold War deployment as the unfired shells and stockpiled weapons on the inventories of Moscow and Washington.

With the coming of the Cold War, the "enemy" as portrayed in World War II/Great Patriotic War culture simply transmuted from a Nazi into an American or Russian. The first American Cold War film – *Iron Curtain* (William A. Wellman, dir., 1948) – not only played like a remake of *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* (Anatole Litvak, dir., 1939), it had the same writer, Milton Krims. In the United States, this change was driven both by the personal politics of studio bosses like Darryl F. Zanuck and by the eternal quest for box office novelty value. In the Soviet Union, writers of thrillers were more or less obliged to seek out American villains when the minister of cinema, Ivan Bolshakov, let it be known that the time had come to move beyond "Great Patriotic War" stories.¹⁴ Moscow won the dubious distinction of creating the first Cold War hate film with *Russkii vopros* [The Russian Question] (Mikhail Romm, dir., 1947) from a play of the same year by Konstantin Simonov, which dealt with the corruption of the US press rather than spies. Soviet spy stories followed and Hollywood was not far behind. The lead time on film production meant that the respective spy cycles spawned by the state-controlled Soviet industry and patriotic American industry appeared without reference to each other. Each needed the other as an enemy at the same moment. The confluence of mutual prejudice and paranoia would be repeated in the early 1980s.

Notable Russian offerings included *Vstrecha na Elbe* [Meeting on the Elbe] (Grigori Alexandrov and Aleksei Utkin, dirs., 1949), *Sud chesti* [Court of

14 Jay Leyda, *Kino: A History of Russian and Soviet Film* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 398.

Honor] (Abram Room, dir., 1949), and *Sekretnaia missiia* [Secret Mission] (Mikhail Romm, dir., 1950). America's spy cycle included *I Married a Communist* (Robert Stevens, dir., 1949), *My Son John* (Leo McCarey, dir., 1952), and the Red-busting TV show *I Led Three Lives* (1953–56). Themes of paranoia associated with the Cold War were widely disseminated, in science fiction thrillers as *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (Don Seigel, dir., 1956), and were manipulated in *The Manchurian Candidate* (John Frankenheimer, dir., 1962).

The epicenter of Cold War spy fiction was the United Kingdom. Spy stories became a veritable industry led by intelligence veterans Graham Greene, John LeCarré, and Ian Fleming. This reflected both historical roots – Britain had been thinking about Russian spies since the days of Rudyard Kipling – and contemporary needs. It is easy to read the potency of James Bond as an antidote to the loss of power experienced by the country as a whole. Moreover, espionage stories provided a way to preserve the trope of British opposition to totalitarianism and maintain the political certainties of World War II. Then there was the real world of espionage in which Britain played a special role assisting the United States and fell victim to high-placed enemies within. The spy became an archetypal figure, like America's cowboy, through whom the dramas of national life could be played out.

British spy fiction evolved with the Cold War. In the 1960s, key figures in the genre turned away from Cold War rabble-rousing and began to offer a more complex commentary and reflect the same yearning for peace as that seen in the nuclear destruction narratives. The Communist villains in Ian Fleming's early Bond novels gave way to movies in which Bond battled international crime syndicates, and East and West had to learn to cooperate. Interestingly, the shift in fiction anticipated the genuine political movement to détente. The more serious novels and films such as John Le Carré's *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold* (novel 1963, film 1965), Len Deighton's *The Ipcress File* (novel 1962, film 1965), and Graham Greene's *The Human Factor* (novel 1978, film 1979) presented real moral ambiguity and asked whether the conflict had reduced its players to brute equivalence. Secret agents abounded in increasingly spoofed or tongue-in-cheek form in the adventure television serials of the 1960s, including *The Avengers* (1962–69) and *Danger Man* (1964–68), and even children's programs, as with the glamorous agent Lady Penelope in *Thunderbirds* (1964–65). The genre turned in on itself in the remarkable cult show *The Prisoner* (1967–68) in which an agent (played by *Danger Man*'s Patrick McGeehan) was imprisoned in a mysterious village. It is never clear whether the island is in the East or West, and it did not matter.

This was an exploration of the relationship between individual autonomy and state power.

The United States absorbed most of its spy culture from Britain but also produced homegrown fare, which seemed rather less reflexive and certainly less revealing of any national state of mind toward the Cold War. There were high-budget adventure movies, like Alfred Hitchcock's *North By Northwest* (1959) or *Torn Curtain* (1966), in which Cold War espionage merely provided the logic for placing the hero in jeopardy. There was a steady stream of novels, including full-blown series like Donald Hamilton's long-running Matt Helm stories (1960–93), and by the end of the decade American spy novels had a special taste for Chinese villains and often depicted Americans and Russians teaming up to defeat them.¹⁵ From the mid-1960s on, American culture displayed a penchant for spy spoofs such as the movie *Our Man Flint* (Daniel Mann, dir., 1966) or the risible movie adaptations of Matt Helm. TV series in this vein included *The Man from UNCLE* (1964–68), which gave its American hero a Russian partner, *I Spy* (1965–68), and *Get Smart* (1965–70) with its famous range of wacky gadgets. American children's television delivered the animated *Bullwinkle Show* (1961–73) in which a squirrel and a dimwitted moose foil the plans of stereotyped Soviet spies. These spoofs could be loosely read as reactions against the Cold War stories of the 1950s, albeit while retaining certain stereotypes of evil Russians and Chinese and their cloak-and-dagger intrigue. There was still plenty of mileage in the formal Cold War thriller. In the 1970s, Robert Ludlum began to publish highly successful spy stories, many with a Cold War setting.

Secret agents also loomed large in the Eastern European popular culture. Spy stories had deep roots here, too: Poland had Konrad Wallenrod, the hero of Adam Mickiewicz's great narrative poem of 1828, who lived undetected amid and eventually destroyed the Teutonic Knights. But heritage alone cannot explain the proliferation of the Eastern spy story. Given the pervasive censorship restrictions around the Warsaw Pact, spy fiction must also have been thought useful by the authorities. Bulgaria produced the first great Eastern agent in the form of counter-spy Avakum Zakhov, the creation of Bulgarian writer Andrei Gulyashiki, and a favorite in books and on television across the Soviet bloc from his debut in 1959 in the novel *Sluchayat v Momchilovo* [The Momchilovo Affair].¹⁶ Although his cerebral character was

15 George H. Lewis, "Spy Fiction American Style," *Journal of Communication*, 25, 4 (1975), 132–37.

16 Published in English in 1968 as the *Zakhov Mission* (London: Cassell, 1968).

closer to Sherlock Holmes, Zakhov was touted as the Communist James Bond, and Gulyashiki obligingly introduced “agent 07” as a character in Zakhov’s world in his 1966 novel *Sreshu 07* (published in English as *Avakoum Zakhov versus 07*). Agent 07 survived the encounter, chastened by his brush with a better man.¹⁷

Unlike the Western spy stories, Eastern espionage fiction did not shift with the evolution of the Cold War and did not become either subversive fantasy or critical of the state. The Eastern spy story remained a cultural form in which the state was showing its value by secretly protecting the people. Several of the most influential stories did not take place in the Cold War at all, but in the moral certainty of World War II. The contemporary concerns that propelled post-Cuban missile crisis Western narratives into relativism or satire were dodged and the secret state was no less glorified for the historical setting. Poland provided the much-loved character *Kapitan Kloss*, a Polish secret agent operating within the Nazi Abwehr. Kloss appeared in live television plays and twenty comic books but is best remembered from the much-repeated eighteen-episode adventure series *Stawka większa niż życie* [More than Life Is at Stake] (1967–68).

Soviet spy fiction displayed similar trends. The USSR produced its equivalent to Poland’s *Kapitan Kloss* in *Standartenführer Otto von Stirlitz*, alias of gallant Russian spy Maksim Isaev, operating in the inner circles of Nazi power. Stirlitz/Isaev was the creation of Iulian Semenov, who produced a string of novels about the character, beginning in 1965 with *Parol ne nuzhen* [No Password Necessary]. Many were adapted to the screen, most notably in 1973 when the television mini-series *Semnadsat mgnovenii vesny* [Seventeen Moments of Spring] (Tatiana Lioznova, dir.) held Russian audiences spellbound. The plot included a fiendish plan by the United States to make a separate peace with the Nazis. Stirlitz survived his wartime adventures to take part in the Cold War and gained Soviet immortality by becoming a stock figure in jokes.

East Germany produced an adaptation of the adventures of a “real life” spy in *Streng geheim!* [Top Secret!] (János Veiczi, dir., 1963) but scored its biggest hit with the television series *Das Unsichtbare Visier* [The Invisible Visor] (1973–76), starring Armin Müller-Stahl as the agent Achim Detjen. The Stasi reported a wave of new recruits to its ranks citing Detjen as their inspiration. The East German TV bosses hoped that the show would live on for years in sequels and re-runs, but their hopes were dashed when its star defected to

17 Andrei Gulyashiki, *Avakoum Zakhov versus 07* (Sydney, Australia: Scripts, 1967).

the West. Ironically, Müller-Stahl found his niche in Hollywood playing villains in the Cold War films of the 1980s.¹⁸

Epics of history and fantasy

The third major category of Cold War stories was epic renderings of history and fantasy: stories depicting the past or future in real or imagined worlds told on an immense canvas, frequently with a strong dose of morality and self-righteousness. At the outset of the conflict, such epics helped to sustain wartime cohesion and cement loyalties and identities. As the Cold War progressed, history and fantasy allowed vicarious participation in events and mobilized people behind their leaders' projects through grand narratives of good versus evil and tales of national destiny. In time, as the conflict weighed heavily on its participants, both history and fantasy also provided a language for dissent.

In American television, literature, and film, the Cold War underpinned the production of science fantasy and historically inspired fiction. Biblical/classical epics, war, and western genres all carried obvious ideological freight. The epic had its roots in nineteenth-century pageants and a distinguished career in the silent era, but the Cold War cinema took it to new heights as it became a stage on which the cultural power of America could be displayed. The government did not need to ask Hollywood to do this, but the spirit of national certainty and righteousness which animated Washington was just as much a part of Hollywood life. Major directors, producers, and executives, including Cecil B. DeMille, Daryl F. Zanuck, and the president of the Motion Picture Association of America, Eric Johnston, were true believers in the need for movies to play a role in rallying the nation and disseminating American values around the world.

Cold War Hollywood produced a new generation of biblical and classically themed films. While the stories suggested an American ambivalence toward empire, the films themselves were part of an imperial system displaying the cultural power of the society capable of mounting such a spectacle and showcasing America's religiosity in contrast to Soviet hostility to faith. Cecil B. DeMille presented his remake of *The Ten Commandments* in 1956 as an attempt to assert the common tradition of Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the face of God-less Communism. More than this, American diplomats encouraged the making of biblical epics because the necessary locations happened to

18 I owe this story to Patrick Major of the University of Warwick.

be in places where US investment could make a real political difference, most especially in Italy, the one European country where the Communists had a chance to come to power constitutionally. Use of the classical genre to challenge the Cold War status quo was rare, though Stanley Kubrick's *Spartacus* (1960) was open to radical interpretations and suffered during the production process as a result.¹⁹

The epic war film allowed Hollywood to stage stories of glory on a grand scale and to inject contemporary comment, too. Films of the late 1940s and early 1950s typically included a recruiting scene in which an authority figure spoke of the necessity for each generation to defend democracy, and directors enjoyed the help of the Pentagon to stage mass battle scenes. War films raised some diplomatic difficulties, especially as the villains – Germany and Japan – were now Cold War allies. Hollywood provided a succession of “good Germans” and films like *The Enemy Below* (Dick Powell, dir., 1957) ended with hope for future friendship. Noble Japanese appeared somewhat later. But the American war film was transformed by the Vietnam War. As audiences stayed away from flag-waving pictures like John Wayne's *The Green Berets* in 1968, Hollywood injected counter-cultural satire into its war movies or told stories that could be read as either indictments or celebrations of militarism, the best example being *Patton* (Franklin J. Schaffner, dir., 1970).

The genre of western movies followed much the same trajectory as the war story with films in the immediate postwar period highlighting the “need” for military preparedness. The western that had previously dwelt on the heroic individual now celebrated team work and romanticized army life in a succession of cavalry westerns. As the Cold War shifted to the Third World in the late 1950s, so westerns depicted American heroes saving Mexican farmers from bandits who appeared as thinly disguised Communists. The special status of the western within the American imagination meant that it provided an ideal space to explore responses to the experience of American power, and hence the western was transformed by the US experience in Vietnam into a major site for the reexamination of the sins of America's past and present. Hollywood restaged My Lai by proxy in the West in films like *Soldier Blue* (Ralph Nelson, dir., 1970) in which the 7th Cavalry was seen massacring Native American women and children, long before it tackled such issues head-on in an explicit representation of Vietnam.

¹⁹ The 1960s produced one oddity, a contemporary religious film called *Shoes of the Fisherman* (Michael Anderson, dir., 1968), in which a Ukrainian dissident (played by Anthony Quinn) becomes pope. It all seemed terribly far fetched until the election of John Paul II just ten years later.



33. Science fiction provided a fertile medium in which to discuss the fears raised by the Cold War, as with Robert Wise's 1951 film, *The Day the Earth Stood Still*, in which aliens help to prevent a nuclear war.

American science fiction also displayed both patriotism and dissent. The epic fantasy films of the 1950s like *This Island Earth* (Joseph M. Newman, dir., 1955) openly displayed the familiar Cold War themes. The world is pulled from the brink of a nuclear war by an alien in *The Day the Earth Stood Still* (1951). American television in the 1960s provided *Star Trek* (1966–69), which mixed both the imperial spirit to “boldly go where no man has gone before” and a pseudo-Soviet enemy in the Klingons, with challenges to Cold War thinking as a Russian crew member and episodes which critiqued the arms race and the balance of terror.²⁰ When, in the 1970s, Hollywood could no longer display the religiosity of the epic, the patriotic certainty of the war film and the grand narrative of the western, these genres reappeared in hybrid

20 See Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “Cold War Pop Culture and the Image of U.S. Foreign Policy: The perspective of the Original *Star Trek* Series,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7 (2005), 74–103. See also Rick Worland, “Captain Kirk: Cold Warrior,” *Journal of Popular Film and Television*, 16, 3 (1988), 109–17.

science fiction form utterly extracted from any political context. The best example of this was *Star Wars* (George Lucas, dir., 1977).

Western Europe also produced Cold War epic histories and fantasies rallying the population for confrontation with the Soviet Union. Innumerable war stories sustained an anti-totalitarian ideology. British science fiction was populated by invading totalitarian races from the Treens of *The Eagle's* Dan Dare comic strip (1957–69) to the Daleks of BBC TV's *Doctor Who* (1963–89, 2005–). As World War II receded and the Cold War came into question, such stories were increasingly told with a knowing irony that sometimes bordered on camp. The most expansive epic of the period was J.R.R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* trilogy. While Tolkien resisted all attempts to impose allegory on his work and denied that his "Ring of Power" was a cipher for the atomic bomb, his story of virtuous individuals struggling against powers of darkness played into the Cold War self-consciousness of Europeans and Americans. Much of the plot concerned forging and maintaining alliances in ways that would have been instantly recognizable to the politicians of the era.

The Soviet bloc's own epic storytelling trod surprisingly similar terrain to Western culture. Science fiction played a prominent role and innumerable epic dramas recalled the glories of the past. In Brezhnev's Russia, the cult of the "Great Patriotic War" reached unprecedented heights – quite literally – with the erection of vast war memorials and the creation of movies to match. The war continued to be offered to the people as the source of certainty and unity well into the 1970s. It was much the same story in East German film and television with numerous tales of heroic German Communist resistance to Nazi tyranny. The state control of the media in the East meant that any criticism had to be far more veiled than in the West, but nonetheless, some filmmakers used historical stories to air dissent. In Poland, myths of the war (and the ideological foundations of that state) were laid bare in films like *Popiół i diament* [Ashes and Diamonds] (Andrzej Wajda, dir., 1958) and the bleak POW segment of *Eroica* (Andrzej Munk, dir., 1957). In Hungary, director Miklós Jancsó's chose stories that on the surface explored the revolutionary past but underneath allowed Austrian or White Russian villains to stand in for the USSR of 1956. Such films questioned the certainties of the revolution, the Communist state, and the Cold War division of the world, but they were but a shadow of the dissent that would erupt in the later 1970s.²¹

21 On Jancsó, see *Kinoeye* 3 (February 2003), esp. Andrew James Horton, "The Aura of History: Jancsó's depictions of the year 1919."

The years of détente saw a strange phenomenon in Cold War filmmaking – the East–West co-production. Some of the movies created in this way self-consciously tackled themes of interdependence. In the Italian–Soviet co-production *The Red Tent* (Mikhail Kalatozov, dir., 1969), a Soviet icebreaker strives to rescue the survivors of the *Italia* airship expedition to the North Pole.²² *Waterloo* (Sergei Bondarchuk, dir., 1970), also a Soviet–Italian co-production, recalled the international coalition against Napoleon. The only big US–Soviet co-production was Twentieth Century Fox’s remake of *The Blue Bird* (George Cukor, dir., 1976), made in the USSR and starring Elizabeth Taylor, character actors from both sides of the Iron Curtain, and a line up of Soviet ballet talent. It took millions to make and flopped miserably.

Helsinki: the watershed

An examination of the state of play in the cultural Cold War as of the early 1970s reveals striking successes for the Soviets everywhere except Europe and North America. American prosperity and complacency were eroded by the oil shocks, civil unrest, and visible humiliations of Vietnam and Watergate. In contrast, Soviet woes were largely private. For the developing world, Moscow rode high. The USSR continued to sponsor revolutionary nationalist projects and to paint the United States as the universalist power with the imperial agenda. This was especially manifest in the politics around the United National Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), that under the leadership of its director-general, Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, launched a campaign for a New World International Communication Order (NWICO). NWICO promised worldwide protection for international journalistic standards, but also pledged to defend the right to national regulation. The United States detected a Soviet ploy to establish a right to censorship in the name of resistance to the growing power of the Anglo-American communications industries and quit UNESCO in the early 1980s.²³

The Soviets also seemed to dominate the diplomatic negotiating tables. On August 1, 1975, President Gerald Ford, Leonid Brezhnev, and leaders of thirty-three other states from East and West met in Helsinki, Finland, and signed the

22 For a case study of this film, see Paula A. Michaels, “Mikhail Kalatozov’s *The Red Tent*: A Study in International Co production across the Iron Curtain,” *Historical Journal of Film Radio and Television*, 26, 3 (2006), 311–26.

23 On UNESCO, see William Preston, Jr., Edward S. Herman, and Herbert I. Schiller, *Hope & Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945–1985*. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act was the pinnacle of détente and the fruit of two and a half years of negotiation. The accords recognized European boundaries and established principles for East–West trade and scientific cooperation. Brezhnev could proudly show his own people America’s acquiescence to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and their acceptance of the principle of non-intervention. President Ford paid the price for this in the election of 1976.

But Helsinki was the watershed. In the long term, the Helsinki Accords transformed the Soviet state and its satellites. The Final Act included a so-called “Third Basket” of principles that dealt with promoting East–West contact in the personal (including tourism and freedom of travel), informational, educational, and cultural fields. The document stressed the need for more exchanges. It opened the way for the greater flow of Soviet ideas westward and the spread of Western culture and ideas into the Soviet orbit. The Helsinki principles meant that authors could contact foreign publishers and printed materials could be freely distributed. They also allowed for direct contact between parties arranging educational exchanges and encouraged extensive reform of the working conditions for Western journalists in the East.

The cultural elements of Helsinki were refined and broadened still further at a series of CSCE meetings in Madrid from 1980 to 1983. While the Soviet government dragged its feet, it was obliged to implement these reforms. The numbers of people involved in student exchanges jumped dramatically, and cultural figures found it much easier to travel. Major appearances of Western artists in the East included a legendary concert by the British singer Elton John who stunned his hosts by performing the officially forbidden Beatles number “Back in the USSR” as his encore. The Soviet leaders who thought they would lose little from acceding to increased information flows had clearly miscalculated. As the Soviet economy stalled, the doors opened by Helsinki revealed to the world the grim reality behind the official image of the worker’s paradise. The positive image which the Soviets had nurtured at such expense around the world withered away.

Helsinki brought a yet more significant blow to the Soviet system. Following pressure from the countries of the European Economic Community, the “First Basket” of the Helsinki Accords included a pledge by all signatories to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.” While in the short term the Soviets could reap credit from having publicly embraced such principles, the undertaking opened the Kremlin to a new level of domestic and international criticism when it and its allies systematically ignored their obligations. After 1975, national “Helsinki Watch” committees sprung up

around the world to monitor compliance with the accords, including committees inside the Soviet Union and its satellites. In 1982, the national committees formed an International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. The Helsinki Watch committee in the United States developed into the NGO Human Rights Watch. Helsinki proved a double-edged sword for Moscow: a short-term success bought at the price of the concession of principles that inspired a generation of dissidents, defined a standard by which the USSR could be judged, and facilitated the exchange of ideas across an increasingly transparent Iron Curtain.²⁴

Culture and the second Cold War

The second Cold War of the 1980s brought a renewed propaganda battle in which one of the West's strongest tactics was to point to the post-Helsinki dissident movements in the East. The period also saw a resurgence of themes of the Truman/Stalin period in the fiction of both East and West. American political culture reflected the popular culture of the previous phases of the Cold War. Patriotic genres were rediscovered. Empty, ambiguous, or even dissenting stories were given new meanings. President Ronald Reagan echoed *Star Wars* when he spoke of fighting an evil empire, and Senator Edward Kennedy appropriated the film's title to mock the administration's strategic defense initiative. Ironically, the nickname stuck and seems to have rather enhanced the image of that project.²⁵

Western popular culture in the second Cold War delivered some new twists on old themes, as the spy thriller overcame its preoccupation with the dark side of human nature to embrace a fixation with technology in the new genre of techno-thriller. Pulp fiction writers and readers embraced the post-nuclear war survivalist story. These new genres displayed a right-wing bias, but there was no shortage of books or films maintaining the spirit of dissent seen in the 1960s and 1970s. Opposition to nuclear weapons flourished. But Western governments had found a way to wage the Cold War in the presence of public skepticism and dissent.

In the new propaganda war between East and West, sports became especially politicized. The United States boycotted the Moscow Olympics in 1980,

24 For a sustained analysis, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Rosemary Foot's chapter in volume III.

25 See Peter Kramer, "Star Wars," in David Ellwood (ed.), *The Movies as History: Visions of the Twentieth Century* (Stroud, UK: Sutton, 2000).

and the Soviet Union stayed away from the Olympic Games when they were held in Los Angeles in 1984. The Soviets also made extensive use of disinformation, circulating damaging rumors of assorted conspiracies and assassination plots, most famously claiming that the AIDS virus had been created in an American bio-war lab. The United States responded with an inter-agency effort to expose Soviet fabrications, and President Reagan told Mikhail Gorbachev that he needed to cease Soviet disinformation practices.

The international exchanges survived the renewal of tension. They became ever more significant avenues for increasing Soviet awareness of the West and allowed the world to see exactly what was happening in the East. As the Soviet economy fell ever further short of Moscow's promise, the dissident impulses which had been coded in the novels and films of the 1960s and 1970s became explicit as Helsinki energized a new generation of protest. Filmmakers like Poland's Andrzej Wajda were feted around the world. Meanwhile, American popular culture in the form of blockbuster movies and hit television shows waxed ever stronger presenting a vision of how life might be different.

Western broadcasters played a special role in the denouement of the Cold War. In April 1986, the BBC, RFE/RL, and Voice of America hit home as never before when they carried news of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant near Kiev to a country whose government remained silent on the story for many days thereafter. As change gathered pace inside the Soviet Union, Western broadcasters told the people of the East what they were missing materially and politically in the West, encouraged dissent, and enabled the dissidents and their countrymen to watch the progress of their neighbors as they too struggled for a better life. A chain reaction followed. It was fitting that the Cold War, which had for so much of its course rendered the people impotent spectators, ended with the people acting and governments, both East and West, watching in amazement.

Popular culture had played an unprecedented role in the Cold War. It was mobilized and manipulated by the bureaucracies of the era, it was deployed by the artists who wished to engage with the great issues of the conflict, and it became a space in which dissenting views could be developed and disseminated. Some of the cultural works created in the process – the writing of Orwell or Greene, the movies of Wajda or Kubrick – transcend their Cold War context, too, but plenty of other Cold War texts merely show the willingness of artists to toe the official line or pander to the prejudice of the masses. There is a certain parallelism between the propaganda of the two blocs in the Cold War. They faced much the same internal turf wars. They traded in similar stereotypes. Both became adept at speaking without really

learning to listen to their target audiences. The United States won the race for the image and reality of material prosperity and the USSR manifestly lost, but there was an irony in the victory. In success, the US government neglected its tools of diplomacy, slashing budgets to gain a swift peace dividend and downgrading USIA by folding it into the State Department. The experience of “victory” in the cultural Cold War became a crude talisman of American rectitude rather than a wake-up call to remain engaged with ordinary people around the world. Other players – specifically the European agencies of public diplomacy – fared much better in the post-Cold War world.

Counter-cultures: the rebellions against the Cold War order, 1965–1975

JEREMI SURI

In *The Feminine Mystique* – Betty Friedan’s 1963 attack on domesticity – the author describes how she “gradually, without seeing it clearly for quite a while ... came to realize that something is very wrong with the way American women are trying to live their lives today.”¹ Despite the outward appearances of wealth and contentment, she argued that the Cold War was killing happiness. Women, in particular, faced strong public pressures to conform with a family image that emphasized a finely manicured suburban home, pampered children, and an ever-present “housewife heroine.”² This was the asserted core of the good American life. This was the cradle of freedom. This was, in the words of Adlai Stevenson, the “assignment” for “wives and mothers”: “Western marriage and motherhood are yet another instance of the emergence of individual freedom in our Western society. Their basis is the recognition in women as well as men of the primacy of personality and individuality.”³

Friedan disagreed, and she was not alone. Surveys, interviews, and observations revealed that countless women suffered from a problem that had no name within the standard lexicon of society at the time. They had achieved the “good life,” and yet they felt unfulfilled. Friedan quoted one particularly articulate young mother:

An expanded draft version of this chapter appeared as “The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960–1975,” in *The American Historical Review* 114:1 (February 2009), 45–68.

- 1 Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1983, originally published in 1963), 11.
- 2 Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 33–68. For a very insightful analysis of Friedan’s writing and advocacy, and the limits of her vision of social change, see Daniel Horowitz, *Betty Friedan and the Making of “The Feminine Mystique”: The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).
- 3 Adlai E. Stevenson, “A Purpose for Modern Woman,” *Women’s Home Companion* (September 1955), 30–31, excerpted at www.wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/resources/documents/ch32_04.htm.

I've tried everything women are supposed to do – hobbies, gardening, pickling, canning, being very social with my neighbors, joining committees, running PTA teas. I can do it all, and I like it, but it doesn't leave you anything to think about – any feeling of who you are. I never had any career ambitions. I love the kids and Bob and my home. There's no problem you can even put a name to. But I'm desperate. I begin to feel I have no personality.⁴

These were the words of the counter-culture, emerging within the United States, Western Europe, and many Communist societies during the middle 1960s. Existential angst was not unique to the period, but it became pervasive in a context of heightened promises about a better life and strong fears about the political implications of social deviance. Ideological competition in the Cold War encouraged citizens to look beyond material factors alone and seek a deeper meaning in their daily activities. Many women, however, did not feel freer in the modern kitchens that American vice president Richard M. Nixon extolled as symbols of capitalist accomplishment.⁵ Many men did not feel freer as they went to their daily jobs in the large-scale industries that underwrote the costs of new global responsibilities. Many students did not feel freer as they attended mass institutions of higher education, particularly universities.⁶ An international counter-culture developed in response to dissatisfaction with the dominant culture of the Cold War. On the model of Friedan's writing, it gave voice to criticisms of the basic social assumptions – about work, marriage, and family – connected to the politics of the era.⁷

Leaders confront the counter-culture

One must distinguish the counter-culture from various other resistance movements. Many citizens residing in colonial and postcolonial territories had long opposed the great power politics that, in their eyes, contributed to imperial domination over their societies. Nationalist leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru in India, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam were not part of the counter-culture because they never accepted the initial Cold War

4 Quoted in Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 21.

5 On the famous Khrushchev–Nixon “kitchen debate” of 1959, see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 416–18.

6 See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 88–130.

7 Theodore Roszak popularized the term “Counter Culture” in his book, *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969). My use of the term draws on Roszak but places it in a broader historical and geographic framework.

framework surrounding Friedan's disillusion. The same could be said for many domestic actors within Western societies, particularly early civil-rights activists. Although figures like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., supported the basic tenets of liberal democracy, others – including Robert F. Williams in the United States and Frantz Fanon in Algeria – did not. They were not part of the counter-culture because they advocated full-scale revolution. Social and political change was not enough for them; they wanted to destroy society and rebuild it from the ground up.⁸

The enormous influence of the counter-culture derived from its powerful presence within mainstream society. By the middle of the 1960s, Friedan's problem with no name had become a focus of discussion among leading journalists, intellectuals, and even policymakers. Unlike the Third World nationalists or domestic radicals whom one could dismiss as extreme figures, the suburban housewives, corporate employees, and college students who questioned basic social assumptions were core political constituencies. They were the future of each society – the people whom leaders claimed to serve. These "children of a generally affluent generation – West or East," according to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Richard Helms, "are deeply engrossed in the search for some newer means of arriving at moral values." "For the moment," he warned President Lyndon B. Johnson, "they seem to have settled on a reaffirmation of the dignity of the individual. Most commentators agree that Society's values are in flux; if this is so, restless youth are symptomatic of a deeper current than their numbers alone suggest." The president's special assistant for national security affairs, Walt Rostow, affirmed this judgment, pointing to the "conflict of 'ardent youth' and big machines, causing increasing numbers of young people to ask: 'Where do I fit?'"⁹

These sentiments were not unique to American leaders. As early as 1960, the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, lamented what he called the "most important problem of our epoch" – the "inner political" weakness and superficiality of daily life in the Cold War. East-West rivalries and the

8 See Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Life* (London: Granta Books, 2000).

9 Notes of Cabinet Meeting, September 18, 1968, and Attachment A, Folder: Cabinet Meeting, 9/18/68, box 15, Cabinet Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter, LBJL). See also CIA report, "Restless Youth," September 1968, folder: Youth and Student Movements, box 13, Files of Walt W. Rostow, National Security File, LBJL. Martin Klimke offers an excellent discussion of these materials and the Johnson administration's views of the counter culture: *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

nuclear-arms race encouraged what he derided as an empty “materialism.” Adenauer longed to reawaken public interest in what he called the “Christian” belief in the simple devout life, free from military tensions, superficial consumerism, and impersonal bureaucratic institutions.¹⁰ One of Adenauer’s rivals and successors, Willy Brandt, shared this perspective. In September 1968, when he served as West German foreign minister, Brandt observed that: “Young people in many of our countries do not understand why we, the older ones, cannot cope with the problems of an age dominated by science. Not force, but reason alone, can give them an answer.” Brandt argued that peace between Cold War rivals was necessary for restoring domestic tranquility among a young discontented generation of citizens.¹¹

Soviet leaders had similar concerns about the evidence of growing public disillusionment, despite the repressive control over information in their country. The official Soviet youth journal, *Komsomolskaia pravda*, called attention to problems with the “psychology of contemporary young people.” They had apparently lost the combination of pervasive fear and intensive nationalism that had motivated conformity, and even public enthusiasm, during the years after World War II.¹² A public survey conducted by Soviet authorities in 1964 revealed that more than four out of every five students refused, despite severe threats, to heed the leadership’s call for the cultivation of “virgin lands” and other patriotic Communist projects. Government leaders, particularly KGB director Iurii Andropov, became obsessed with the regime’s domestic vulnerabilities.¹³

10 Konrad Adenauer an dem Herrn Staatssekretär, 9. Dezember 1960, Ordnung III/50, Adenauer Nachlaß, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf, Germany (hereafter, Adenauer papers). See also Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers auf dem Festakt anlässlich der 10. Sommertagung des Politischen Clubs an der Evangelischen Akademie, Tutzing, 19. Juli 1963 (Unkorrigiertes Manuskript), 02.31, 1963/Band 1, Reden, Interviews, Aufsätze, Adenauer papers; Adenauer Rede in der Freien Universität, West Berlin, 5. Dezember 1958, 16.25, 1958/Band 2, Adenauer papers; Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949,” *Journal of Modern History*, 67 (June 1995), 287–307.

11 Speech by Willy Brandt at the Conference of Non-Nuclear States in Genf, September 3, 1968, box 288, Egon Bahr’s Nachlaß, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany (hereafter, Bahr papers). See also Bahr Entwurf für *Christ und Welt*, Februar 1965, box 9B, Bahr papers; Bahr an Brandt, 15. November 1966, Box 352, Bahr papers.

12 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 27, 1961.

13 “*Molodoi ukhoditiz kolkhozov v goroda*” [Youth Goes from the Collective Farms to the Cities], December 1, 1964, box 80-1-497, fond 300, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Open Society Archives, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (hereafter, RFE/RL papers). See also “*Molodei Sovetskovo soiuza*” [Youth of the Soviet Union] 5–6 November 1962, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, box 80 1 497, fond 300, RFE/RL Papers; Michael Scammell (ed.), *The Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents Reveal One Man’s Fight against the Monolith*, trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Chicago: edition q, 1995), esp. xvii–xxxv; Suri, *Power and Protest*, 105–14.

An uprising by citizens in the Russian city of Novocherkassk confirmed these fears. On June 2, 1962, local workers, joined by their families and area youth, seized Communist Party headquarters and the central police station. They demanded reduced food prices, better work conditions, and, most significant, a change in political leadership. In the eyes of many protesters, local authorities were out of touch with the needs and wants of society. They enforced an ideological order that contributed to growing public discontent. To control unrest in Novocherkassk and its “spillover” into other areas, the Soviet army deployed brute force, killing twenty civilians and injuring many more as soldiers fired into crowds of demonstrators. Soviet leaders put down the protests, but they never recovered from the anger and resentment inflamed by these events.¹⁴

Despite the violence, the citizens who challenged established authorities in the Soviet Union, West Germany, the United States, and other countries lived better lives than prior generations. These were privileged men and women who had unprecedented access to consumer goods, education, and leisure time. They also lived relatively secure lives, even in Communist societies, generally free from the domestic terror of the Stalinist years in the Soviet Union and the deprivations of economic depression in the United States and Western Europe. This was a revolt, in many cases, of the privileged against the leaders who conferred privileges.¹⁵

The counter-culture was not about material needs. It focused on unrealized spiritual and ideological demands that citizens believed the Cold War, and its dominant leaders, stymied. Competition between capitalism and Communism limited the perceived space for creative programs that combined or subverted the two systems. Foreign interventions also diverted resources and energies from domestic reforms. Most damning, the inherited logics of military and diplomatic strategy gave legitimacy to a group of Cold War “wise men,” while undermining the respectability of innovative political leaders who were not “present at the creation.”¹⁶

14 For the best account of the events in Novocherkassk, see Samuel H. Baron, *Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherkassk, 1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), esp. 1–127. On the legitimacy crisis confronting Soviet leaders in the 1960s, see Jeremi Suri, “The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964–1972,” *Contemporary European History*, 15 (May 2006), 133–58.

15 This point is echoed in Jessica C. E. Gienow Hecht’s chapter in volume I. See also Nicholas Cull’s chapter in this volume.

16 For more on the Cold War “wise men,” see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

The experience of World War II and its aftermath provided figures from that generation with a political gravity that younger citizens acknowledged but also resented. Students for a Democratic Society in the United States was one of many groups to proclaim that the world faced new challenges – civil rights, nuclear-arms control, decolonization, and others – that the elder statesmen, for all their experience, were unprepared to address. According to this argument, the “wise men” emphasized toughness, rather than peaceful cooperation. The “wise men” focused on military power, not social change. Most of all, the “wise men” were part of a conservative old culture of suits and big band dances, not a new culture of jeans and rock’n’roll. The “wise men” sought to preserve their way of life against challenges from within; the new men and women sought to transform basic assumptions about politics, foreign policy, and daily life. The new men and women also sought to consume a popular culture of personal freedom more fully, without the traditional restrictions imposed by an inherited culture of self-control and public discipline. Dissent was ideological, and it was fun.¹⁷

Rising expectations and Cold War contradictions

In his analysis of the Old Regime on the eve of the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s. Privileged citizens, benefiting from improved material lives, had rising social and cultural expectations. Relative stability and prosperity encouraged increasing demands. The political moderation that supported stability and prosperity came under attack for its very moderation. This is precisely what Tocqueville meant when he pointed to the perils of reform after decades of war and deprivation. The promise of a better life encouraged growing demands among an educated generation of men and women that gradual social improvement could not sustain. Suburban wives had much more than their mothers, but it was not enough. West German students lived more secure lives than their parents, but it was not enough. Soviet laborers had better working conditions

The penetrating phrase “present at the creation” comes, of course, from Dean Acheson’s memoirs: *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

- ¹⁷ See Students for a Democratic Society, *The Port Huron Statement* (New York: Students for a Democratic Society, 1962), esp. 1–9; Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York: Bantam, 1987); Paul Berman, *A Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).

than their predecessors, but it was not enough. Citizens blamed their leaders, not their unrealistic expectations, for the limits in their lives.¹⁸

These popular frustrations were not only a reaction to the Cold War. They were inspired by Cold War rhetoric and encouraged by Cold War leaders – often the same figures the counter-culture would later attack. The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, offers the best example of this dynamic. In his famous “secret speech” of February 1956, he exposed the horrors of Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union and legitimized freer public expression. Khrushchev explained that the fear and terror of prior years, accompanied by a vicious Stalinist “cult,” were “a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development.”¹⁹ Excessive repression had undermined Communist ideals and it had weakened the Soviet Union in its competition with the United States. Losing its best minds to the Gulag, Moscow could not hope to match Western creativity. The Soviet Union needed to encourage limited new freedoms for the sake of Cold War competition.

Following this logic, Khrushchev temporarily opened up the Communist system, encouraging more innovation and achievement. He disbanded the Gulags, sending prisoners home with amnesty so they could contribute to society. He created new “science cities” where scholars could conduct research with generous resources and freer access to information than they enjoyed before. Most significant, Khrushchev allowed authors, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, to publish literature that he believed would discredit the Stalinist past and inspire new hope. “In the last years,” Khrushchev explained, “when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all this acted upon the development of economy and culture.”²⁰ Khrushchev promised that his program of openness – “the thaw,” as many referred to it – would produce the first truly Communist society. It would “erase

18 See Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), esp. 226–31. On the role of affluence, not deprivation, in the counter-culture, see Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. 80–95.

19 Nikita Khrushchev, Special Report to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, trans. by US State Department, repr. in Strobe Talbott (ed. and trans.), *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), 612–13.

20 *Ibid.*

the essential distinctions between town and country and later on between mental and physical labor.”²¹

Khrushchev’s policies allowed more freedom for Soviet citizens, and they catapulted popular expectations. He expected to strengthen Soviet rule through these means. Instead, he nurtured a dissident counter-culture. Free of Stalinist terror, citizens could congregate and share their criticisms of the regime. They could organize low-level resistance, often by refusing to follow orders or dropping out of mandatory activities. Most troublesome for Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Kremlin, citizens felt empowered to question the basic legitimacy of the regime. Solzhenitsyn, the former Gulag prisoner whose writing Khrushchev initially approved for publication, made the Gulag into a metaphor for the Soviet Union as a whole. One of Solzhenitsyn’s protagonists, Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, employed the existential language that became a hallmark for the counter-culture, and its attacks on leaders like Khrushchev:

Shukhov stared at the ceiling and said nothing. He no longer knew whether he wanted to be free or not. To begin with, he’d wanted it very much, and counted up every evening how many days he still had to serve. Then he’d got fed up with it. And still later it had gradually dawned on him that people like himself were not allowed to go home but were packed off into exile. And there was no knowing where the living was easier – here or there. The one thing he might want to ask God for was to let him go home. But *they* wouldn’t let him go home.²²

The public circulation of Solzhenitsyn’s *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and the enormous attention that it drew, inspired countless other attacks on Soviet authority from scientists, students, and ordinary citizens. Zhores Medvedev, a Soviet biologist who criticized the regime, called Solzhenitsyn’s writing “a literary miracle” that had “everybody” talking.²³ “It has become clear,” one reader of *Ivan Denisovich* explained in 1962, “that since the appearance of Solzhenitsyn’s book we will never again be able to write as we have done till now.”²⁴

21 Nikita Khrushchev, Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered at the XXIIInd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 18, 1961, trans., by Soviet Novosti Press Agency (London: Farleigh Press, 1961), 23.

22 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, trans. by H. T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991, originally published in Russian in 1962), 178.

23 Zhores A. Medvedev, *Ten Years after Ivan Denisovich*, trans. by Hilary Steinberg (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4, 6.

24 Gregori Boklanov, quoted in Cornelia Gerstenmaier, *The Voices of the Silent*, trans. by Susan Hecker (New York: Hart, 1972), 67. For more evidence of Solzhenitsyn’s enormous influence among Soviet citizens, see Leopold Labedz (ed.), *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record*, enlarged ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).

The government-authorized publication of Solzhenitsyn's book reflected the Cold War pressures on Khrushchev to encourage creativity and some public openness. The reception of the book, however, undermined Khrushchev's purposes – namely the protection of his authority and the strengthening of the Communist system. Cold War politics, in this sense, created a contradictory Cold War culture. The attempt to assure power through openness undermined power. The pressures on leaders to encourage innovation undermined leaders. International Cold War competition created space for the emergence of widespread dissent, even in Communist societies.

Khrushchev's predicament was emblematic, but hardly unique. In West Berlin – the strategic center for Soviet–American conflict – a similar dynamic took shape. At the end of World War II, the United States and the newly created Federal Republic of (West) Germany collaborated to sponsor a self-consciously democratic school: the Free University. Unlike its German counterparts, this institution encouraged student governance. It also emphasized experimental courses and approaches to teaching. The Free University set a new model for post-Fascist education in Germany, and it also served as a showcase for the freedom and dynamism that the sponsoring governments intended to display in West Berlin. The Free University was part of a cultural “magnet” strategy, designed to encourage citizens living under repressive Communist rule to embrace liberal-capitalism. In the unique context of West Berlin – where citizens from the Eastern and Western halves of the city could interact before the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 – this involved the direct attraction of East German men and women through the Free University. Between 1949 and 1961, more than a third of the students attending the institution were citizens of the Communist state.²⁵

Democratic education at the Free University helped to subvert Communist authority. The freedom and wealth on display in this institution convinced disgruntled East Germans – particularly the young and ambitious – to defect to the West. In the late 1950s, more than one hundred Communist citizens fled to the Federal Republic each day. Many of them were enrolled at the Free University.²⁶

25 See James F. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin: A Political History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 1–176. On the American “magnet” strategy in Europe, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 235–37; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 64–69.

26 Alexandra Richie, *Faust's Metropolis: A History of Berlin* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1998), 715–16.

The most famous of these student refugees was Rudolf “Rudi” Dutschke. He came from the East German province of Brandenburg. The Communist government had barred him from higher education when he refused to participate in mandatory military service during the late 1950s. As a consequence, Dutschke attended the Free University – the only post-secondary institution from which he was not barred. In 1961, he fled to West Berlin, continuing his studies in sociology, philosophy, and political science at the Free University.²⁷

Dutschke’s defection was a Cold War victory for the West, but it also produced a profound challenge to Cold War policy. By the second half of the 1960s, he became a leader of student protests against the West German government, American influence, and what he called the elements of “Fascism” built into capitalist democracy. He condemned the Federal Republic’s conservative political culture, its support for repressive foreign regimes (especially the shah’s monarchy in Iran), and Bonn’s association with the brutal American war in Vietnam. In his diary, Dutschke expressed his desire to create a “third front,” a counter-culture, to challenge dominant capitalist and Communist authorities.²⁸ Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, and idealized images of brave Vietnamese peasant fighters became inspirational symbols for a revolution against not just political institutions, but the basic organization of society. Dutschke proclaimed an “historic opening” for a global “emancipatory struggle and national self-determination.”²⁹

Dutschke’s words articulated the frustrations of many young educated citizens throughout Western Europe who wanted more idealism and less association with Cold War ventures in Vietnam and other places. In February 1968, ten thousand people from various American-allied countries attended a student-organized “Vietnam Congress” at the Free University, designed to mobilize participants for “solidarity” and “revolutionary struggle.”³⁰ Public

27 See Ulrich Chaussy, *Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke: eine Biographie* (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1993); Gretchen Dutschke, *Wir hatten ein barbarisches, schönes Leben: Rudi Dutschke, eine Biographie* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1996); Bernd Rabehl, *Rudi Dutschke: Revolutionär im geteilten Deutschland* (Dresden: Edition Antaios, 2002).

28 Rudi Dutschkes Tagebuch, 7. Juni 1967, in Rudi Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch: Reden, Schriften und Tagebücher aus zwanzig Jahren* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1980), 70.

29 Dutschke, “Rebellion der Studenten,” (1968), in *Mein langer Marsch*, 68–69. See also Jeremi Suri, “The Cultural Contradictions of Cold War Education: The Case of West Berlin,” *Cold War History*, 4 (April 2004), 1–20.

30 Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch*, 122, 71–72. See also Gerhard Bauß, *Die Studentenbewegung der sechziger Jahre* (Cologne: Pahl Rugenstein Verlag, 1977), 95; Bernd Rabehl, *Am Ende der Utopie: Die politische Geschichte der Freien Universität Berlin* (Berlin: Argon, 1988), 256–68.

protests spread throughout the continent, employing the “third front” rhetoric of Dutschke and others.³¹

In the United States public demonstrations focused on Vietnam and civil rights, but they also employed the attacks on Cold War “imperialism” and “Fascism” that motivated the counter-culture in Western Europe. Antiwar protesters on university campuses throughout America looked to Third World revolutionaries for examples of “liberation.” Advocates of Black Power took inspiration from nationalist movements in Africa that attacked the foreign and domestic “colonialism” of white rule. Dutschke’s “third front” became the solution of choice for citizens struggling with the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations during a decade of unprecedented social improvements.

Herbert Marcuse, a German émigré to the United States who became one of the most recognized philosophers of the counter-culture, captured this common revolt against Cold War authority. He described what he perceived as the “genuine solidarity” among “young radicals” that drew its “elemental, instinctual, creative force” from guerrilla fighters in the Third World and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, not the traditional centers of influence. Western claims of progress had, according to Marcuse, lost their popular appeal.³²

For all the violence in Vietnam and other parts of the Third World, the international system had become more stable and less prone to nuclear crisis in the 1960s. For all the continued racism in America and other societies, laws and attitudes had, in fact, changed in powerful ways to protect traditionally disenfranchised groups. This was significant progress, encouraged by Cold War competition. In their desire to make their societies stronger, more creative, and more attractive, leaders worked to make their societies better. Promises of reform in this ideologically overheated environment, however, mobilized citizens beyond the aims of their leaders. Solzhenitsyn’s readers, Dutschke’s followers, and Marcuse’s radicals were empowered by the Cold War reforms they condemned as insufficient. The Cold War provided space for the counter-culture in universities, in public literature, and in other social settings. It even encouraged a counter-culture that showcased freedom and creativity.³³

By the end of the 1960s, creativity had turned to revolt in nearly every major state. The countries most deeply penetrated by the Cold War confronted pervasive dissent and disaffection, especially among the young. Attempts

31 See Suri, *Power and Protest*, 164–212.

32 Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), 86, 88.

33 On the encouragement of the “rebel” image as a symbol of American freedom in the Cold War, see Leerom Medovoi, *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), esp. 1–51.

by leaders to mobilize their publics for domestic reform and international competition had produced spiraling domestic contention and aspirations to international solidarity among critics. The Cold War had globalized a set of ideological debates, and now a cohort of ideological dissidents.³⁴

Counter-cultural violence and backlash

The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed escalating violence in many societies. Nearly everywhere, established authorities found themselves under siege. National leaders could not travel within large sections of their own countries, for fear of embarrassing protests and personal attacks. Local figures – mayors, businesspeople, and teachers – confronted unprecedented challenges from citizens, customers, and students. Drug usage and crime rose across communities.³⁵ The British foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, captured the sense of widespread domestic upheaval when he confided to his diary: “The 10 pm television news presents a depressing picture.” “The great difficulty of the world,” Stewart lamented, “is the moral deficiencies of what should be the free world ... Germany distracted, France selfish, ourselves aimless, U.S.A. in torment.”³⁶ The CIA confirmed this dark assessment, predicting: “The social and political malaise that underlies much of present-day dissidence will not be speedily cured; there are, in fact, striking parallels between the situation today and the conditions of cynicism, despair, and disposition toward violence which existed after World War I and which later helped produce Fascism and National Socialism on the Continent.”³⁷

The turn to violence among members of the counter-culture in various societies, and their opponents, created nightmarish premonitions. It also severed many of the connections between moderate leaders and critics that had supported effective political reform in prior years. In place of the collaboration between Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and President Johnson, open war among the supporters of men like Black Power advocate Stokely Carmichael and southern segregationist George Wallace dominated the years after 1967.

34 This point follows the analysis in Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), esp. 110–206.

35 For the data on the cross national increase in crime during the late 1960s, see Ted Robert Gurr and Erika Gurr, “Crime in Western Societies, 1945–1974,” www.icpsr.umich.edu.

36 Michael Stewart, handwritten diary, April 17, 1968, STWT 8/1/5, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill College, Cambridge, England.

37 CIA report, “Restless Youth,” 37.



34. A crowd of activists give the Black Power salute at a rally for the US Black Panther Party, 1969. Radical African-American leaders made the US political establishment feel that it was under siege.

Violent altercations, riots, and even acts of terrorism engulfed major cities across the United States, Western Europe, and other parts of the world. Cultural dissent produced domestic bloodletting and death. The violence of foreign wars in Vietnam and other places had now come home.

This descent into violence, though shocking, was the extension of the debates begun earlier in the 1960s. If the dominant Cold War culture was

stagnant and repressive, as critics claimed, it had to be destroyed and replaced. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of entrenched figures required force. Public violence appeared as a necessary tool to unseat violent oppressors. This is where the image of peasant revolutionaries in Vietnam looked so appealing. This is where the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in China, initially triggered by Mao Zedong, offered inspiration. Here was a society violently turning itself upside down to eradicate vestiges of an old culture. Here was a society that made violence a purifying force, cleansing itself of “backward” traditions. The Chinese Cultural Revolution was, in fact, one of the most brutal and self-defeating political enterprises of the twentieth century. Its shrill attacks on established wisdom, however, made it attractive for those seeking to change the basic relations between citizens in society. Herbert Marcuse was only one of many to point to China as a model for “liberation.”³⁸

Counter-cultural groups formed in the early 1970s that treated violence as a means for proving cultural authenticity in an international environment filled with lies. Putting one’s life (and the lives of others) on the line demonstrated a depth of personal courage and truthfulness that these critics claimed Cold War society lacked. Instead of working with the “machine” for personal benefit, intelligent young men and women pledged to place their bodies, literally, on the gears – to stop the normal functioning of society with their blood. The Weather Underground embodied this idealization of violence in the United States. Formed in 1969 to promote an “armed struggle” against capitalist society, members of the group declared the need for “a movement that fights, not just talks about fighting.” The Red Army Faction emerged in West Germany as a more deadly counterpart. First organized in 1970, it proclaimed: “We will not talk about armed propaganda, we will do it.”³⁹

These two groups, and those in other countries, mixed counter-cultural politics with paramilitary behavior. They lived communal lifestyles, but they enforced military discipline. They called for political openness, but they violently attacked their critics. They tried to appeal to the public, but they prepared to kill innocent, even sympathetic, citizens in the pursuit of their cause. This is the point when rebels turned into terrorists. This is also the point when violence grew from a tool for resistance into a defining element of the counter-culture. It took on symbolic value as a total rejection of standard, “civilized” authority. It became a marker of status for a small group of men and

38 Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, viii.

39 Quotations from Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 21.

women who came to think of themselves as guerrilla fighters, battling to save society from itself.⁴⁰

This domestic terrorism elicited firm reactions from state authorities and their supporters. They deployed overwhelming force against what they perceived as an apocalyptic threat – violent revolution from within, and domestic terrorism against innocent civilians. State authorities also discredited violent critics by denying them obvious influence on policy. The United States continued to fight in Vietnam, despite resistance at home, for four additional years. The Soviet Union ordered an invasion of Czechoslovakia to repress the reforming government there, despite strong opposition to such a move within the Eastern bloc. The West German government maintained its close partnership with Washington, despite widespread anti-American sentiment. Counter-cultural violence sparked a backlash that raised resistance to change in both domestic and foreign policy.

The backlash was often much more violent than the initial counter-cultural attacks. The August 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago offered the most publicized evidence of this dynamic. As groups like the Youth International Party (“Yippies”) converged on the city to condemn mainstream politics, in general, and the Democratic Party’s continued support for the Vietnam War, in particular, local police prepared to attack the protesters. Abbie Hoffman and other counter-cultural critics mocked and provoked the police, but the response by law enforcement officials was out of proportion to the instigation. Mayor Richard Daley mobilized his entire police force, as well as members of the National Guard, for demonstrations that never included more than 7,000 protesters. Determined to preempt counter-cultural violence, the Chicago police attacked mobs with nightsticks and other implements. They did not wait for the young men and women in the streets to become disruptive. State authorities violently crushed a perceived threat from politically engaged citizens.⁴¹

Events in Chicago mirrored the expansion of police powers in West Germany and other democratic societies. Counter-cultural disorder created a perceived “emergency” that justified violent, often undemocratic, reactions. Police forces entered university campuses, business offices, and private homes to search for evidence of brewing conspiracy. Domestic intelligence agencies – most notoriously the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United

⁴⁰ See the excellent analysis of this point in Varon, *Bringing the War Home*, esp. 196–289.

⁴¹ See the balanced and evocative book by David Farber, *Chicago ’68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).



35. French police using force during the student demonstrations in Paris in May 1968. The violent backlash against the counter-culture militarized daily life in the Cold War.

States – increased their surveillance of suspected individuals. Washington, DC, West Berlin, Paris, and Mexico City came under virtual martial law during periods of heightened unrest, as regular army soldiers walked the streets to assure order. The violent backlash against the counter-culture militarized daily life in the Cold War.⁴²

In the Communist countries, where politics were already militarized, the domestic deployment of armed forces also expanded. Chairman Mao Zedong had initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. As the country careened into chaos during the late 1960s, however, he turned to the People's Liberation Army to restore order and assure his continued power. Mao used the military to repress the Red Guards he had sent into the streets. Despite his earlier calls for breaking traditional institutions, Mao warned in 1968 of emerging "anarchy." To reverse this course, he affirmed that "the army is the fundamental pillar of the Cultural Revolution."⁴³

42 See Suri, *Power and Protest*, 164–212.

43 *People's Daily* editorial, March 1, 1968, in Jerome Chen (ed.), *Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 152; Simon Leys, *The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution*, trans. by Carol Appleyard and Patrick Goode (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977, originally published in 1971), 106–07. See also Suri, *Power and Protest*, 206–11.

The Soviet Union never returned to the terror of the Stalinist years, but under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's leadership, the KGB stepped up its efforts to identify, discredit, and eliminate dissident voices in the early 1970s. The Kremlin's tolerance for domestic criticism diminished as the regime grew more anxious about internal unrest. Brezhnev, in particular, relied on the image of a strengthening Soviet military to bolster his legitimacy (including countless medals he awarded himself) and assure Communist authority. The counter-culture attacked militarization but, ironically, it inspired more of the same.⁴⁴

"Law and order"

If leaders promising to "pay any price" and build Communism dominated the early 1960s, figures pledged to "law and order" shaped the early 1970s. President Nixon popularized the phrase in the United States, but his counterparts in West Germany, the Soviet Union, and other countries used similar terms. In the wake of the counter-culture, leaders rebuilt their authority around commitments to restore rationality, reasonableness, and domestic peace. As best as we can tell, this is what a "silent majority" of people wanted in many societies, following years of upheaval and violence. Nixon captured this sentiment in his inaugural address of January 20, 1969. Addressing "America's youth" and "the people of the world," the new president argued: "We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another – until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices." "For all our people," Nixon continued, "we will set as our goal the decent order that makes progress possible and our lives secure."⁴⁵ Nixon's words received favorable attention at home and abroad, including China, where Mao Zedong sought to rein in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and open relations with the United States.⁴⁶

44 See Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Sem' vozhdiei: galereia liderov SSSR* [Seven Leaders: The Gallery of the Leaders of the USSR], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. II, esp. 41–42; Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism,'" 150–58.

45 Richard Nixon, Inaugural Address, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1971), 1–2 [hereafter, *ppp*]. On the "Silent Majority," see Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), esp., 324–414; Bruce J. Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society and Politics* (New York: Free Press, 2001), esp. 23–117.

46 See Mao Zedong's comments on an article in *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi*, January 1969, trans. in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 11 (Winter 1998), 161; Mao Zedong's speech at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Central Committee, April 28, 1969, trans. in *ibid.*, 164–65.

“Law and order” was more than just a reaction to disorder and upheaval. It represented a new kind of counter-culture in the 1970s, one that rejected *both* the standard ideological rhetoric of the Cold War and the oppositional claims of figures like Betty Friedan, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Rudi Dutschke. “Law and order” meant a return to something more basic – commitment to civility, faith in moderation, and loyalty to nation. These beliefs did not challenge the Cold War *per se*, but they reframed the conflict in terms of limits rather than possibilities. Instead of proclaiming a mission to improve the lives of diverse people at home and abroad, “law and order” focused on restraining the excesses of the last decades that in Vietnam, on university campuses, and in countless other locales had brought despair and disillusion. “Law and order” was about a sober political and social reassessment that lowered popular expectations and encouraged citizens to accept an imperfect world.⁴⁷

This rhetoric appealed to some of the racist, chauvinist, and ethnocentric instincts that characterized the backlash against the counter-culture. In doing so, it rejected the faith in the possibilities of liberal capitalist and communist “development” that underpinned earlier Cold War conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union continued to intervene overseas – and Moscow, in fact, increased its activities in the Third World – but these undertakings lacked the optimism of prior ventures.⁴⁸ The leaders and citizens of the superpowers acted in response to local and allied pressures, often to protect face more than pursue global change. There were exceptions (particularly massive Soviet support for an Ethiopian revolution that promised to lead the African continent to Communism), but the 1970s was *not* a decade of grand projects or grand expectations.⁴⁹ The counter-culture of these years rejected the ambitions shared by advocates and opponents of Cold War policy in prior decades.

Proponents of “law and order” told activists like Betty Friedan that they were indeed mistaken to expect happiness in Cold War suburbia. They were also wrong to pursue an alternative form of liberation. Instead, they should accept their lives as they were and protect what they had against worse possibilities. A culture of pessimism and limits replaced the Cold War culture of optimism and possibilities.

47 See Michael W. Flamm, *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), esp. 31–50, 162–78; Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 153–83.

48 See the chapters by Michael E. Latham, Fredrik Logevall, Douglas Little, and Piero Gleijeses in this volume; see also the chapters by Nancy Mitchell, Vladislav M. Zubok, Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, John H. Coatsworth, and Amin Saikal in volume III.

49 See Westad, *The Global Cold War*, esp. 250–87.

Détente

This was the social and cultural context for the foreign policy of détente in the 1970s. Scholars of détente generally point to the importance of near nuclear parity and a general balance of power in bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to embrace more stable relations. They also point to the growing rift between Moscow and Beijing, and the opening this created for Washington to position itself between these two states. American desperation to end the Vietnam War surely contributed to détente as well, encouraging citizens and leaders in the United States to accept a less ideologically strident foreign policy.⁵⁰

President Nixon and his special assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, embraced these strategic transformations, and they attempted to turn them to American advantage. They sought to use improved great power relations for more effective leverage over local events around the globe, with less direct American force. This was the basis for the “Nixon Doctrine,” designed to avoid making countries “so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.”⁵¹ Amidst powerful domestic and allied dissent against American interventions, détente was an attempt to compensate for internal weakness with diplomatic acumen. It was a reaction to domestic pressures for peace and fears of continued Cold War militarization. “We were,” Kissinger explained, “in a delicate balancing act: to be committed to peace without letting the quest for it become a form of moral disarmament, surrendering all other values; to be prepared to defend freedom while making clear that unconstrained rivalry could risk everything, including freedom, in a nuclear holocaust.”⁵²

In his memoirs, Kissinger immediately turns from this description of détente to a discussion about the need to “outmaneuver” domestic dissent – from “liberals” who wanted to see more commitment to peace and reform in American actions, and “conservatives” who demanded stronger confrontation

50 See Robert Schulzinger’s chapter in this volume; Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. 55–67; Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), esp. 52–74; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 272–341; Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

51 Richard Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, PPP: Richard Nixon, 1969, 548. For a fuller statement of the “Nixon Doctrine,” see Richard Nixon, Annual Foreign Policy Report, February 18, 1970, in *ibid.*, 1970, 118–19.

52 Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 1254.

with Communism.⁵³ Political leaders in West Germany, Britain, and other states faced the same dichotomous pressures. The counter-culture's attack on Cold War assumptions, and the backlash against this challenge, inflamed these debates. The domestic violence and extremism of the period made it difficult to build bridges between points of view. In contrast to their predecessors, leaders in the 1970s had to formulate international policy at a time when their authority was deeply contested at home. President Nixon and West German chancellor Willy Brandt, two of the most powerful international leaders of the 1970s, both resigned from office due to domestic scandals, inflamed by public distrust of leaders. The making of détente reflected the unmaking of the Cold War consensus.

Kissinger admitted this. When asked in 1971 "where the administration wants to end up after four years?" he invoked both the crisis of values and the new international environment that characterized the period. "This administration came into office when the intellectual capital of US postwar policy had been used up and when the conditions determining postwar US policy had been altered," he explained.

We had to adjust our foreign policy to the new facts of life. It is beyond the physical and psychological capacity of the US to make itself responsible for every part of the world. We hope in the first term to clear away the underbush of the old period. In the second term, we could try to construct a new international settlement – which will be more stable, less crisis-conscious, and less dependent on decisions in one capital.⁵⁴

The "underbush of the old period" included the assumptions about omnipotent power that the counter-culture condemned. Constructing a "new international settlement" meant applying "law and order" to foreign policy, providing a framework for rationality, reasonableness, and moderation in the relations between societies – despite the contrary pressures at home. Frequent "back channel" communications between leaders would encourage cooperation, establish basic norms for international conduct, and insulate policy from domestic interference. This was an effort, Kissinger and the Soviet ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin agreed, to make international civility "irreversible."⁵⁵

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1255.

⁵⁴ Memorandum of conversation between Henry Kissinger and a group of Fellows from the Harvard Center for International Affairs, December 7, 1971, Digital National Security Archive Document Database, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu> (accessed July 26, 2006).

⁵⁵ Memorandum of conversation between Leonid Brezhnev, Anatolii Dobrynin, Henry Kissinger, *et al.*, Moscow, October 24, 1974, 11:00 am–2:00 pm, folder: 11/74, Japan,

The two superpowers formalized their commitment to international “law and order,” rather than revolutionary change, in the Agreement on Basic Principles – officially “The Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” – signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972. The document spoke explicitly about “rules of conduct” that would assure “peaceful coexistence” and avoid any “dangerous exacerbation” of relations.⁵⁶ It encouraged consultation among state leaders, and it diminished the importance of ideology, nationalism, and other moral claims. The Agreement on Basic Principles aimed to silence cold warriors and counter-cultural critics at the same time.

In addition to basic strategic considerations, détente represented an effort to build a new culture for international affairs. It was, in this sense, the foreign mirror of domestic change. Internal discontent and disorder forced leaders to reconceptualize their foreign-policy aims and capabilities. Challenges to assumed Cold War values motivated policies that did not hinge on traditional ideological claims. Men like Kissinger and Dobrynin feared the backlash as much as the counter-culture, and they worked to craft a new middle ground. They emphasized “law and order” in the international system. They attempted to isolate policy from public influence. They defined themselves against both the counter-culture of the late 1960s and its opponents.⁵⁷

Counter-cultures and the Cold War

Betty Friedan’s famous attack on domesticity was about more than feminism. Her words captured an emerging revolt against authority around the world. Unlike most prior resistance to the dominant Cold War ideas and policies, this rebellion came from within – from the universities, the literary circles, and even the bedrooms of mainstream society. This was Friedan’s central insight. Those who appeared to benefit most from the politics of the time were dissatisfied. They were empowered, because of their social centrality, to

Korea, USSR, box A6, Kissinger–Scowcroft Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. See also memorandum of conversation between Leonid Brezhnev, Anatolii Dobrynin, Henry Kissinger, *et al.*, Moscow, October 26, 1974, 7:10pm–10:20 pm, *ibid.* These two documents are also reprinted in William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts* (New York: New Press, 1998), 327–55.

56 “Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” May 29, 1972, repr. in *The U.S. Department of State of Bulletin* 66 (June 26, 1972), 898–99.

57 See Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), esp. 197–248.

demand more. They were motivated, because of their rising expectations, to reject cultural limitations.

In the 1960s and 1970s, an international counter-culture, comprising countless local groups, exposed the problem that had no name. The counter-culture challenged not only existing authority, but also the basic assumptions about the “good life” that underpinned social order. The Cold War policies condemned for stagnating social change actually encouraged and legitimized this counter-culture. State leaders sponsored education and innovation for more effective competition against international adversaries. They also made broad ideological claims that they could not fulfill. Citizens, particularly privileged young citizens, now had the means and the motivation to challenge their leaders for failing to meet their stated goals. In nearly every major society, men and women asked why government policies did not produce the promised outcomes, why their country was falling short. A wide spectrum of citizens – from street protesters to members of the “Silent Majority” – questioned not just the competence of their leaders, but also their values.

This was the central contradiction of the Cold War between 1965 and 1975. The pressures for international competition inspired domestic contention. As states built external strength they diminished their internal cohesiveness. Observers frequently treat the social history of the counter-culture as something separate from the political history of the Cold War, but the two were, in fact, deeply intertwined. Cold War ideas, resources, and institutions made the counter-culture. The counter-culture, in turn, unmade these ideas, resources, and institutions. The backlash against the counter-culture furthered this process by contributing to widespread violence and division. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War became more stable in traditional areas of great power conflict, but it grew more disruptive within societies.

Although the counter-culture did not revolutionize the world, it exerted a powerful influence on Cold War policies. Leaders abandoned grand ideological projects and turned to promises of “law and order.” At home and abroad, they emphasized rationality and reasonableness. Détente rejected the old political assumptions as well as the radical calls for something new. The counter-culture was both a product of the Cold War and an agent in its transformation.

The structure of great power politics, 1963–1975

MARC TRACHTENBERG

John F. Kennedy's most basic goal as president of the United States was to reach a political understanding with the Soviet Union. That understanding would be based on a simple principle: the United States and the Soviet Union were both very great powers and therefore needed to respect each other's most basic interests. The US government was thus prepared, for its part, to recognize the USSR's special position in Eastern Europe. The United States would, moreover, see to it that West Germany would not become a nuclear power. In exchange, the Soviets would also have to accept the status quo in Central Europe, especially in Berlin. If a settlement of that sort could be worked out, the situation in Central Europe would be stabilized. The great problem that lay at the heart of the Cold War would be resolved.

But to reach a settlement based on those principles, Kennedy had to get both the USSR and his own allies in Europe to accept this sort of arrangement. The Soviets, however, were not particularly receptive when it became clear to them, beginning in mid-1961, what the president had in mind. The Americans, in their view, were making concessions because they were afraid the Berlin crisis would lead to war. Why not see what more they might get by keeping the crisis going?

As for the Europeans, they by no means welcomed the new Kennedy policy with open arms. The West German government was especially distraught. Germany was divided and there was obviously not much anyone could do about it. But for years the German government – the conservative government that Konrad Adenauer had led since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 – had insisted that those “realities” could not be officially recognized. To do so would put a kind of seal of approval on the division of the country. Nor was the Adenauer government pleased by what the Americans had in mind with

A more heavily footnoted version of this paper is available online at [www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/chcw\(long\).doc](http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/chcw(long).doc).

regard to Germany's nuclear status. A Germany with no nuclear forces under its own control would be utterly dependent on the United States for its security. Could any great nation rely so totally on a foreign power for its protection and accept the sort of extreme political dependence that such a situation implied? The Germans, of course, knew they had to pay a price for what their country had done during the Hitler period, and that meant that for the time being certain constraints in this area had to be accepted. But the German government also felt it had to try to keep the Federal Republic's nuclear options open. It thus did not take kindly to the idea of formalizing Germany's nonnuclear status, above all as part of a general settlement with the USSR.

The French, for other reasons, did not like the way Kennedy was playing the Western hand. It was not that they objected in principle to the sort of understanding with the Soviets he had in mind, but they felt he was giving away too much too quickly at a time when a lot more in the way of backbone was in order. Even the British were somewhat taken aback, in late 1961, by the Kennedy policy. But the president was prepared to move ahead regardless: the Europeans would have to "come along or stay behind."¹

He was particularly rough with the Germans. The conflict came to a head in early 1963. If the Germans wanted to pursue an independent policy – a policy based on a strong alignment with the France of Charles de Gaulle, a policy, that is, with a distinct anti-American edge – they could just forget about American military protection. If they wanted the United States to provide for their security, they would have to follow America's political lead. They would have to cooperate, in other words, with the policy Kennedy was now pursuing vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. And the Germans made their choice. Adenauer was forced out as chancellor and the Federal Republic more or less formally declared its loyalty to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to the United States.

By that point, the conflict with the USSR had come to a head. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was the climax of the great Berlin crisis of 1958–62.² The Soviets had not been willing to make peace on Kennedy's terms and they had in effect threatened war. But now, after the missile crisis, that Soviet policy was clearly bankrupt. The Soviets were still unwilling to make a formal deal, but the major powers reached certain more or less tacit understandings: the status quo in Berlin would be respected and Germany

1 Memorandum from J. F. Kennedy to D. Rusk, August 21, 1961, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1971), vol. XIV, 359 (hereafter, *FRUS*, with year and volume number).

2 See James Hershberg's chapter in this volume.

would be kept nonnuclear. Indeed, one of the main goals of the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of July 1963 – a treaty which the Germans were essentially made to sign – was to make it harder for West Germany to build nuclear weapons.³ But this was not a simple gift to the Soviets. It was linked to other understandings, most notably relating to Berlin, that mainly benefited the Western powers.

Taken as a bloc, those understandings provided the basis for a relatively stable international order. But many Germans – the German “Gaullists,” as now ex-Chancellor Adenauer and those who basically shared his views were called – were bitter about the course that events had taken. German interests, as they saw it, had been sacrificed so that the United States could pursue its own goals. But in West Germany in 1963 that was a minority view, even in Adenauer’s own party. Most Germans were coming to see things in a rather different light.

It was important, Kennedy argued, in a speech he gave during his famous visit to Berlin in June 1963, “to face the facts as they are, not to involve ourselves in self-deception.” It was “not enough,” he said, “to mark time, to adhere to a status quo, while awaiting a change for the better.”⁴ His meaning was clear: the rigid German policy of the past had to be abandoned. But the Germans, by and large, were not appalled by those remarks. The Adenauer approach had not brought reunification any closer, so maybe it was time for something new. There was also a certain sense that the Federal Republic could not be too out of step with her Western partners, none of whom were (as de Gaulle often put it) in any rush to see Germany reunified. The Federal Republic could not afford to pursue a totally independent policy. She had to frame her policy with an eye to what her allies, especially the Americans, were willing to support.

Egon Bahr, chief adviser to Willy Brandt, mayor of West Berlin and the leading figure in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), made the key point in a famous speech he gave in July 1963, just three weeks after Kennedy’s visit to Berlin. The Americans were pursuing a peace policy, and if the Germans did not want to just sit on the sidelines as America pursued that policy, they would have to pursue an active *détente* policy of their own.⁵ A policy that sought to relax tensions in Central Europe might eventually lead to major changes in the Cold War status quo. At the very least, in the view of people like Bahr, better relations

3 For more on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, see Francis J. Gavin’s chapter in this volume.

4 Address at the Free University of Berlin, June 26, 1963, *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy: 1963* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 527.

5 Bahr Tutzung speech, July 15, 1963, *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, 4th series (Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner, 1978), vol. IX, part 2, 572–75.

with the Soviet Union might reduce the Federal Republic's extraordinary dependence on America and thus might make it possible for the Germans to pursue a policy based more on their own national interests.

By the end of the decade, Brandt had become chancellor and Bahr was his right-hand man. Their way of thinking had strong support not just in their own party but also in the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the junior partner in the governing coalition. It was also supported to one degree or another by important elements in the conservative parties. Brandt and Bahr were thus able to pursue their policy of improving relations with the east – their *Ostpolitik*. The Soviets were receptive, their Western partners were supportive (for the time being at least), and by 1973 a whole package of agreements



36. US secretary of state Henry Kissinger and West German chancellor Willy Brandt in Bonn, March 1974. Kissinger never fully trusted Brandt's Western orientation.

had been signed and ratified: treaties providing for the “inviolability” of existing borders in Central Europe; a treaty establishing a framework for relations between the two German states; a four-power treaty securing the status quo in Berlin; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whose importance for the Soviets lay mainly in the fact that it would help keep Germany nonnuclear.

This was very similar to what Kennedy had wanted, and it is tempting to view the *Ostpolitik* treaties as just the icing on the cake – to assume that the system of great power relations in Europe, the heart of the international political system, was already quite stable, and that the only difference now was that this fact was getting a kind of formal recognition. But the system had a basic structural flaw: the military foundation on which it rested was not rock-solid. How stable it would end up being would depend, in large measure, on how that military problem was dealt with.

The NATO nuclear problem

During the Cold War, Western Europe lived in the shadow of Soviet military power and the NATO countries obviously had to be concerned with the military balance on the continent. If there were no effective counterweight to Soviet power in Europe, the Europeans would be at the mercy of the USSR. Even if the Red Army never actually invaded Western Europe, an imbalance of military power, it was assumed, would almost certainly have far-reaching political consequences.

What sort of counterweight could be put in place? During the heyday of American nuclear superiority, the period from late 1952 through mid-1963, the Soviets could be deterred from invading Western Europe by the threat of US nuclear retaliation. This was a threat the US government might actually execute in extreme circumstances: if the attack was massive enough and was launched quickly enough, the United States would not suffer really heavy damage from whatever counterattack the Soviets were able to mount. But by September 1963, the US government had reached the conclusion that even if the United States were to “attack the USSR first, the loss to the United States would be unacceptable to political leaders.” It was understood at once that Washington could no longer, even in theory, respond to an act of aggression in Europe with a full-scale attack on the USSR.⁶

⁶ Summary record of NSC meeting, September 12, 1963 (Report of Net Evaluation Subcommittee), *FRUS*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, 499–500.

How then could NATO Europe be protected? In principle, the European countries could build deterrent forces of their own and, in fact, a number of NATO countries wanted to go in that direction. The Germans, in particular, were interested in building a nuclear force they themselves would control. Adenauer, for example, certainly wanted Germany to have nuclear weapons – “we must produce them,” he said in 1957 – and Ludwig Erhard, who succeeded him as chancellor, told President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 that “it was impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent.”⁷ The Germans very much wanted to keep their nuclear options open; it was for this reason that many German leaders in the late 1960s did not want their country to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But the Soviets were dead set against the very idea of a German nuclear force and opposed anything that pointed in that direction. This was one issue, it seemed, that the USSR might actually go to war over. As for the Federal Republic’s allies, the British were totally opposed to the notion of a German nuclear capability from the very outset. The French attitude, somewhat ambivalent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, hardened dramatically after Franco-German relations went downhill in 1963. By the mid-1960s, de Gaulle was very much against the idea of the Germans getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

And the Americans, by that time, were absolutely determined to keep the Federal Republic from acquiring a nuclear force. President Johnson had no doubt that the Germans would want to build such a force as soon as they could, but he also thought it would be disastrous if Germany went nuclear. The US government tried to deal with this problem by pushing its plan for a “multilateral force” (MLF); the huge effort it put into that very dubious project, especially in 1964, is a good measure of the seriousness with which it took this problem. It eventually gave up on that idea and thus needed to deal with the problem in a more direct way – namely, by laying down the law to the Germans. They were warned that their country “might well be destroyed” if they tried to develop an independent nuclear capability.⁸ They could scarcely resist this sort of pressure, and by the end of the decade it was clear that the Federal Republic was not going to become a nuclear power.

But if a German nuclear deterrent was out of the question, and if the American nuclear deterrent could no longer, in itself, keep the Red Army at

7 Konrad Adenauer, quoted in Hans Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer*, vol. II (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1991), 396; Memorandum of conversation between L. B. Johnson and L. Erhard, December 20, 1965, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, 291.

8 Meeting between W. W. Rostow and R. Barzel, February 23, 1968, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, vol. XV, 637.

bay, how then could Europe be protected? US leaders thought that NATO needed to move away from nuclear deterrence and should instead place much greater emphasis on conventional forces. But there were two problems with the conventional strategy. First of all, the forces needed to sustain such a strategy were simply not available. Throughout the 1960s, the United States, and Britain as well, were under pressure to cut back on their military presence in Central Europe for balance-of-payments and other reasons, some connected with the Vietnam War. Indeed, and despite the emphasis American leaders placed on conventional forces at that time, US force levels in Europe declined substantially during that period, and the NATO defense ministers were told in 1968 to get ready for yet further cuts. France's withdrawal in 1966 from the NATO military system, of course, further aggravated the problem.

The second problem was more basic: no matter what sort of conventional defense was put in place, NATO would still have to worry about the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. People wanted to build up NATO's conventional defenses because they assumed the United States would not be willing to use nuclear weapons against the USSR no matter what was happening in a conventional war for fear of provoking a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. But would the threat of escalation be any less great if nuclear weapons were used in response to a Soviet *nuclear* attack on Europe? Why would the United States be more likely, in such circumstances, to take action that could lead to a Soviet attack on America? Wouldn't the Americans in that case be likely to accept defeat, or at most to use nuclear weapons only against battlefield targets and targets in Eastern Europe, avoiding Soviet territory entirely? But if Soviet territory was treated as a "sanctuary," then what exactly was the USSR being threatened with? What deterrent value would the Western forces then have?

US officials generally dismissed this problem out of hand. But the Europeans were not convinced that a nuclear war in which the two superpowers' homelands were spared was simply out of the question and their concerns had some basis in fact. The Soviets, it seems, had by no means ruled out the possibility of a war in which "the use of nuclear weapons would remain restricted to the theater level, leaving both homelands inviolate."⁹

That meant that the nuclear issue could not be dismissed as unreal. One could not just assume that nuclear weapons were "unusable" for both sides, that the two nuclear arsenals simply "cancelled each other out," and that the

9 William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 69.

conventional balance was the only thing that really mattered. One had to think about how nuclear weapons would be used, if a conventional defense proved ineffective or if the enemy used nuclear weapons first in a European war. It made little sense to launch an all-out attack in such circumstances; if nuclear weapons were used at all, they would obviously have to be used in a more limited and more controlled way. And NATO, in fact, adopted a strategy of controlled escalation. But how would that strategy work? What “philosophy” would govern the use of NATO’s nuclear forces?

The key issue here had to do with tactical nuclear weapons – that is, with the question of how the thousands of such weapons NATO had in Europe would be used in the event of war. But the NATO countries had a hard time coming up with an answer to this question. The basic problem was clear enough. On the one hand, if the goal was to deter a Soviet attack on Europe, the USSR itself could not be treated as a “sanctuary.” Use of the weapons, it was sometimes argued, would therefore have to be part of a process, perhaps a process no one could fully control, that might conceivably lead to nuclear attacks on the USSR itself. Those attacks, to be sure, might in turn lead to a Soviet nuclear strike on the United States. But as long as there was only a *chance* of this happening – as long as the US government did not have to take action that it knew with absolute certainty would lead to a general nuclear war – NATO, the argument ran, should be willing to run the risk.

On the other hand, there was a real aversion, not just on the part of the Americans but in practice on the part of the Europeans as well, to deliberately running any serious risk of general nuclear war. Given what was at stake, a strategy of that sort seemed utterly irresponsible. The risk of escalation was not a phenomenon to be exploited; it was a danger to be minimized. The Americans had no stomach for engaging in what Thomas Schelling called a “competition in risk taking” – for deliberately playing on the possibility that events might spin out of control, and thus for arranging things so that no one could be sure that the conflict would not escalate. Nor were the Europeans really committed to such a strategy: as US leaders sometimes pointed out, whatever the Europeans said in peacetime, if the moment of truth ever came they would draw back from any use of nuclear weapons.

So the Americans wanted to keep the lid on the escalatory process – or, as they put it even in official pronouncements, to keep the fighting at the “lowest level of violence consistent with NATO’s objectives.”¹⁰ But this seemed to

¹⁰ Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, “The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe” (April 1974), www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/237.pdf, 1.

imply that if the Soviet attack was limited to Europe, the American response would also be limited to Europe. The USSR and the United States would be treated as “sanctuaries,” but both Eastern and Western Europe would be incinerated. The problem here, of course, is that with this sort of strategy – with the Soviet homeland insured against attack – NATO’s nuclear forces would have little deterrent value. This strategy, moreover, would give the Soviets the upper hand in a crisis: if the two sides were faced with the prospect of a Europe-only war, it was obvious which side would be more likely to draw back. And there was yet another problem with such a strategy, one that contemplated a war in which Europe would be destroyed but America would get off virtually scot-free: it was bound to poison relations between the United States and the European allies, especially if East–West relations were bad and the threat of war had to be taken seriously.

Thus, the problem of controlled escalation had no easy solution. In fact, the US government in this middle period of the Cold War had no clear sense for how the escalatory process was to be managed, and, in particular, for the role tactical nuclear weapons were to play. In 1965, for example, the US secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, told his German counterpart “that in his judgment there exists no rational plan for the use of nuclear weapons now located in Europe.” In 1971, Henry Kissinger, President Richard M. Nixon’s national security advisor, complained that “we still don’t have a clear doctrine for their use.”¹¹ In Kissinger’s view, if such issues were not taken seriously – if the United States gave the impression that it was “not interested in fighting” – then the other side would conclude that the United States was just bluffing. Deterrence, he thought, had “to be based on a war-fighting capability.”¹²

So the whole military situation was far from satisfactory. It was clear that the security of the NATO allies, and especially West Germany, did not rest on a solid military foundation. As Johnson was told by his top advisers in 1966, there were “gaping holes in all strategic options”: massive retaliation would be “virtually suicidal”; an effective conventional defense “seems less attainable than heretofore”; and “tactical nuclear war” was “full of uncertainties.”¹³ President Nixon, in 1970, felt the same way. Outside observers often made the

¹¹ Harlan Cleveland to State Department, November 29, 1965, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XIII, 280; NSC meeting, August 13, 1971, 3, Kissinger Transcripts (KT), Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do>, item number KT00332 (hereafter, DNSA).

¹² Minutes of Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) meeting, February 22, 1971, 5, DNSA/KT00236.

¹³ R. McNamara and D. Rusk to L. B. Johnson, May 28, 1966, *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XIII, 402–03.

same point. Lawrence Freedman's view was typical: "An inadequate conventional defense backed by an incredible nuclear guarantee," – he said, was what the NATO strategy of "flexible response" really boiled down to.¹⁴

The assumption, in other words, was that nuclear deterrence was something of a sham. The United States would never launch a fall-scale nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in the event of a European war. Kissinger himself, in a famous speech, later admitted that the United States' "strategic assurances" had been empty.¹⁵ Even the tactical nuclear option was unreal. "We will never use the tactical nuclears," Nixon said. The "nuclear umbrella in NATO," in his view, was "a lot of crap."¹⁶

What all this meant was that in strategic terms, the Western position was not very strong. In the event of a crisis, the West would be at a disadvantage; the Soviets would have the upper hand. The NATO powers thus had an enormous incentive to make sure that they did not come anywhere near the point where an armed conflict was a real possibility. They had an enormous incentive, that is, to reach a political accommodation with the USSR.

The point applied with particular force to the case of West Germany. Brandt thought in 1968 that "West Germany cannot really depend on the Americans"; he thought that "as things now stand the United States would not be in a position to meet by military means a serious Soviet military offensive in Europe."¹⁷ The implication was that Germany could not afford to risk a confrontation with the USSR – that it instead needed to try to mend fences with its great neighbor to the east. Bahr was even more explicit. With nuclear parity, he told Kissinger, the Americans would certainly not launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union "if the Russians took Hamburg." Détente, he said, was "our only option."¹⁸ His country thus had a strong "structural incentive," as one astute German observer put it, to pursue a "policy of partial appeasement."¹⁹

14 Lawrence Freedman, "NATO Myths," *Foreign Policy*, 45 (Winter 1981–82), 55.

15 Henry Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977–1980* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1981), 240.

16 Summary record of NSC meeting, November 19, 1970, 9, DNSA/KT00211; NSC meeting, February 19, 1969, quoted in William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7 (2005), 48 n. 31.

17 "Foreign Minister Brandt's Musings on West German Foreign Policy before Visiting Paris," September 13, 1968, CIA Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov/), document number EO 2002–00148.

18 Bahr's account, as reported in Dana Allin, *Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969–1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 40.

19 Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), 23.

But a source of weakness for the West was a source of strength for the Soviets. The structural incentives cut both ways. The Western countries, and especially the Germans, might feel that they needed to ease tensions with the USSR. But the Soviets might feel freer to take a tougher line in their dealings with the Western powers, especially on European questions.

What sort of policy would the USSR pursue in such circumstances? The West was basically content to live with things as they were. A threat to the status quo could therefore only come from the East. But would the Soviets try to take advantage of the position they enjoyed? Would they try to draw Western Europe in some way or other into their sphere of influence? Or would they pursue a more relaxed policy, a policy aimed basically at stabilizing the status quo?

The Soviet choice

Given the basic structural weaknesses in the Western system, which way would the Soviets go? Would the Kremlin try to exploit NATO's vulnerabilities by pursuing a forward policy in Central Europe or would it seek instead to stabilize the existing system? As the Soviets grappled with this question, they were pulled in more than one direction. The USSR, to be sure, clearly had a certain interest in expanding its influence in Western Europe. The Soviets would obviously not be upset if the countries there had to live more in the shadow of Soviet power – if the Europeans, that is, had to be more sensitive to Soviet wishes, more accommodating politically, militarily, and economically. The USSR might therefore want to “Finlandize” Western Europe – that is, draw that part of the world, to one degree or another, into the Soviet orbit.

This kind of thinking did, in fact, play a certain role in shaping Soviet policy, especially on the German question, and above all on the German nuclear question. The Federal Republic, clearly, was to have a special status in this area. Not only, in the Soviet view, would West Germany not be allowed to develop a nuclear force of its own. Not only would it not be allowed to participate in any sort of NATO nuclear force, even a force that was something of a charade – a force, like the MLF, explicitly designed to prevent that country from getting its finger on the nuclear trigger. But the Germans, ideally, would not even be allowed to take part in NATO nuclear planning. And later on, in the post-1979 period, Soviet leaders strongly objected to the stationing of medium-range American missiles in Western Europe, including West Germany, even though Soviet missiles had been targeting that area

for years. In their view, they had a certain *droit de regard* over that whole region, especially where defense issues were concerned.

And the Soviets could achieve those general goals, in principle, by building up their military power. During the Brezhnev period (1964–82), the Soviets made an enormous effort in this area, steadily building up their forces at every level – strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional – and straining every muscle to do it. The defense burden was very high: defense spending accounted for a much higher share of the national income than it did in the West.

Observers in the West were bound to ask why the USSR was making that kind of effort. If détente was “truly the Soviet purpose in Europe,” one analyst wondered, “then why the steady and unprecedented military build-up at the same time?”²⁰ The USSR was Clausewitzian to the core: military forces were of value, in large measure, because of the political shadows they cast. If the Soviets were making a major military effort, then presumably this was because they had some major political purpose in mind. And what could that purpose be if not to deepen Soviet influence in Western Europe?

But while the temptation to push ahead in Europe clearly played a certain role, it was not the only factor that entered into the equation. There was, in fact, a whole series of reasons why the Soviet Union might be expected to pursue a less ambitious policy.

First of all, if one were trying to predict the course of Soviet foreign policy, the basic character of the regime would certainly have to be taken into account. Over the years, the USSR had lost most of its revolutionary élan. By the 1970s, the regime had become heavily bureaucratic and conservative, and this was bound to affect the way the Soviet leaders dealt with other countries.

The Soviets, moreover, had a lot to worry about at home. “The Soviet economy,” as one scholar put it, “seemed to be gradually running out of steam, being dragged to stagnation and decline by some inexorable underlying process.”²¹ American analysts at the time had the sense that a “crisis” was beginning. From the 1960s on, the Soviet leadership itself was receiving “confidential reports critical of the economy’s performance.”²² But those

20 Eliot Goodman, “Disparities in East–West Relations,” *Survey*, 19 (1973), 89.

21 Gertrude Schroeder, “Reflections on Economic Sovietology,” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 11 (1995), 209, 225.

22 For the view of US experts at the time, see *ibid.*, 223–24. Note, in particular, the round table discussion on “Soviet Economic Performance and Reform,” in the *Slavic Review*, 25, 2 (June 1966), esp. 233, 234 (where the term “crisis” was used). The quotation is from Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Memoir Literature,” *Europe–Asia Studies*, 49, 2 (March 1997), 260.

warnings were ignored: the regime seemed unable to deal with the problem. The impact on Soviet foreign policy was enormous. Not only was the self-confidence of the regime shaken, but the Soviets now had to worry more about the USSR's long-term ability to sustain a costly military rivalry with a coalition of much richer and more technologically advanced powers. Consequently, Soviet leaders were under greater pressure thus to avoid actions that might provoke a massive increase in US defense spending. Because of the economic problem, they had a greater incentive to ease tensions with the West, especially since that might help them get access to Western technology and credits, which were particularly important given the nature of the economic problem they faced.

Geopolitical factors, especially the conflict with China, were bound to loom large in Soviet thinking. If the Chinese were hostile, the Soviets would obviously want to improve their relations with the West. The Soviet leadership had a certain interest in getting the United States to side with the USSR in its conflict with China, or at the very least in preventing the Americans from forming a *de facto* alliance with the Chinese. But to have any chance at all of achieving those goals, they would have to pursue a relatively moderate course of action in other areas, above all in Europe.

The Soviets, in other words, might be tempted in such circumstances to think in terms of a US-Soviet "condominium," and that kind of thinking might have had a certain bearing on how specific political issues, and especially European issues, were approached. They might, for example, be attracted to the idea of a divided Europe, with the USSR controlling the east and the Americans and their friends controlling the west. An American withdrawal from Europe might lead to some kind of European nuclear force and thus possibly to a German finger on the nuclear trigger. It might be better, therefore, to keep the Americans in, so that West Germany could be contained in a structure dominated by American power. Even a Germany unified under Communist rule might not make much sense from the Soviet point of view, given what had happened with China. "We don't need a united Germany at all," Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko told one of his advisers in 1977, "not even a socialist one. The united socialist China is enough for us."²³

So the Soviets were pulled in both directions: toward exploiting the position they had acquired and toward reaching an accommodation with the West. Which way would they go? The answer might depend to a certain degree on decisions the Western governments made – above all on the policies pursued

23 Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993), 238–39.

by West Germany and the United States. How did those governments try to deal with the USSR during this period, and what effect, if any, did their policies have on Soviet behavior?

What effect, in particular, did the German *Ostpolitik*, certainly one of the most important developments of the period, have on the way the Soviets struck the balance? The Brandt government began with a policy of accepting the status quo, and few people outside Germany had any problem with that policy. But by 1973, with the ratification of the basic treaty between the two Germanies, the goals that the German government had set for itself in that initial period had been achieved, and the question now was what would come next. And many people, both inside and outside Germany, were convinced, not without reason, that Brandt and his associates wanted to go much further: that they wanted to end the bloc system, dissolve both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and get both American and Soviet forces out of Central Europe. But with the US troops gone, would Germany really be secure? The Red Army, after all, would not be that far away and paper guarantees were no substitute for military hardware. Brandt and Bahr seemed to reject “Cold War thinking” of that sort. Peace, the argument ran, needed to be based more on trust and less on military power. But that was still a minority view in Germany. The SPD was itself divided on the issue, and its coalition partner, the FDP, would not go along with that policy. And this, it seems, was one of the main factors that led to Brandt’s fall from power in 1974.

What effect did all this have on the USSR? A Soviet hardliner could interpret the Brandt phenomenon – not just the move toward détente, but even more Brandt’s apparent willingness to move toward a “European peace order” in which NATO would no longer exist – as a direct result of the buildup of Soviet military power, as indeed it was to a certain degree. It could be interpreted, in other words, as a good example of “Finlandization” in action. On the other hand, a Soviet leader interested in reaching an accommodation with the West could view the Brandt phenomenon in a very different light – as proving that Germany posed no threat, that a moderate policy was workable, and that there were governments in the West that would cooperate with such a policy. “Without *Ostpolitik* no Gorbachev!” – that was how a key mid-level Soviet policymaker later put the point.²⁴ But since both arguments could be made and neither was intrinsically more compelling than the other, it is hard to see

²⁴ Valentin Falin, quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York, Random House, 1993), 119.

how the Brandt policy could have played a major role in determining how the Soviets struck the balance.

The same general point can be made about US policy during the Johnson period (1964–68). Johnson wanted peace and was determined, especially toward the end of his term of office, to move ahead, above all on arms control. Non-proliferation was taken quite seriously as a goal, and Johnson also very much wanted to reach a strategic arms-limitation agreement with the Soviets. In 1968, his last year in office, he tried hard to get the arms negotiations started; even the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August did little to slow him down. The plan for a Johnson visit to the USSR to begin talks on this subject was dropped only after it was made clear to the Soviets in December that the incoming Nixon administration very much disapproved of the idea.

What impact did that policy have on Soviet behavior? Again, one can argue both sides of the issue. On the one hand, with regard to arms control, Johnson in late 1968 focused on strategic weapons – that is, on an area where the stability of the balance was never really in danger. The truly important military questions – above all, those relating to the defense of Europe, an area where there really was a stability problem – did not receive much attention. The administration, in fact, seemed willing to give away the store in what came to be called the “Eurostrategic” area: it was prepared to enter into an agreement that would allow the Soviets to keep the large number of missiles they had targeted on Western Europe, but which would prevent the United States from deploying any missiles of its own on European soil.²⁵ This sort of policy would scarcely deter the Soviets from trying to “Finlandize” Western Europe. If anything, it would have the opposite effect.

On the other hand, Soviet leaders interested in reaching an accommodation with the United States might have reacted positively to the Johnson policy. They might, in particular, have been encouraged by Johnson’s policy of keeping German power limited. The basic idea that the two superpowers had overlapping interests in this area was by no means new. John Foster Dulles himself, despite his reputation as a hardliner, thought that the United States and the Soviet Union had a common interest in making sure that Germany, whether united or divided, was kept under “some measure of external control.”²⁶ But under Johnson that attitude was blunter, cruder, and less nuanced than it had been under Dwight D. Eisenhower or even under

25 “Strategic Missile Talks: Basic Position Paper,” August 24, 1968, *FRUS*, 1964–68, vol. XI, 706.

26 Notes of NSC meeting, February 6, 1958, 7–8, box 9, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

Kennedy. And the Soviets could reasonably see that policy as providing the basis for a political understanding between the two superpowers. Again, the policy could cut both ways, and what effect it had in practice would depend on how the Soviets were disposed to approach the general problem of their relations with the West.

Can the same be said of US policy during the Nixon period (1969–74)? In principle, Nixon and Kissinger wanted a world where the major powers, pursuing their interests “rationally and predictably,” balanced each other’s power and kept each other in check. The US government would balance between the other great states. It needed to be able to maneuver between the Soviet Union and China; it had to make sure that each of the Communist giants understood it had something to gain from better relations with the United States and something to lose if relations with Washington were to deteriorate.

Thus, the US opening to China, Kissinger later insisted, was not directed against the USSR. The aim was “not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a balancing position to use for constructive ends – to give each Communist power a stake in better relations with us.”²⁷ That meant that the United States had to pursue a relatively complex and nuanced policy, not too militant, but not too committed to “peace” either. “If the quest for peace,” Kissinger wrote, “turns into the *sole* objective of policy, the fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless.”²⁸ The United States should, therefore, be willing to use its power, but in a relatively measured way, in order to bring about the sort of “global equilibrium” that could serve as the basis of a stable international order.²⁹

This, of course, was quite different from the policy Johnson had pursued. Nixon and Kissinger obviously disliked the image of the United States as a “reluctant giant,” “seeking peace and reconciliation almost feverishly.” The Soviets were taking their measure of the United States, and the ability of the US government to influence the sorts of choices the Soviets would be making would depend on the conclusions they reached about the United States. The goal, therefore, was to structure the incentives within which the Soviets would operate – to dangle carrots and brandish sticks, so that when the Soviets made a calculation about the sort of policy that would be in their interest, they would reach what the Americans viewed as the right conclusion.

27 Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 192.

28 *Ibid.*, 70; emphasis his.

29 On US policy in this period, see Robert D. Schulzinger’s chapter in this volume.

So that was the theory, and if the policy had actually worked that way, it might have had a major impact on Soviet behavior. The problem was that American policy, as it took shape in practice, was not really cut from that cloth. The US government, during the Nixon–Kissinger period, was not actually interested in balancing *between* the Soviet Union and China. It was interested instead in balancing *against* the USSR, by helping China build up its power and by entering into a tacit alliance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But that policy, US leaders understood, could not be pursued in a straightforward way. The United States needed to make sure the Soviets did not attack China before it became strong enough to deter the USSR on its own. To do that, the United States not only needed to develop a certain relationship with China; it also needed to try to hold back the Soviets by pursuing a *détente* policy with the USSR at the same time. The American strategy, as Kissinger told French president Georges Pompidou in May 1973, was “perhaps complex, but it was not stupid.” The goal was to “gain time, to



37. US president Richard Nixon meets Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing, February 21, 1972. Nixon hoped to use China to balance Soviet power.

paralyze the USSR.”³⁰ This, Kissinger admitted (especially in talks with the Chinese), was not a particularly heroic policy, but the US government needed to use such “complicated methods.” It needed to “maneuver,” not just because of the Soviet threat to China, but also because of its domestic situation, and because of the political situation in Europe as well.³¹

The United States, Kissinger said, had to engage in a lot of “shadow-boxing,” but it was important, he insisted, to “distinguish between appearances and reality.”³² The US government had “no illusions about the world today.”³³ The West, in his view, had to be on its “guard against détente.” Indeed, it had to be prepared to use détente “quite cold-bloodedly to justify as hard a policy line” as it could.³⁴

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, as Kissinger himself admitted in 1974, that the Soviets were “getting nothing from détente.” The United States was “pushing them everywhere.” The Soviets, on the other hand, had “tried to be fairly reasonable all across the board.” You could not find a single place, Kissinger said, “where they have really tried to make serious trouble for us. Even in the Middle East where our political strategy put them in an awful bind, they haven’t really tried to screw us. Their tactics haven’t been exactly brilliant but they haven’t been particularly destructive either.”³⁵

The Nixon–Kissinger policy in theory was supposed to draw the Soviet Union into a closer, more cooperative relationship with the West. But there was a huge gap between rhetoric and reality, and the Soviets could scarcely be expected to respond positively to the policy the US government actually pursued during that period. The rhetoric of détente might serve US political purposes in the short run, but in the long run the chickens would probably come home to roost. There was a good chance the Soviets would feel that they had been played for fools and would react accordingly.

30 Quoted in Georges-Henri Soutou, “Georges Pompidou and U.S.–European Relations,” in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 181.

31 See various documents in William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 94, 177–78, 303, 386.

32 Memorandum of conversation, Kissinger–Deng meeting, November 26, 1974, in Burr, *Kissinger Transcripts*, 290.

33 Memorandum of conversation, Kissinger–Debré meeting, July 11, 1972, 2, DNSA/KT00525.

34 Kissinger meeting with high British officials, April 19, 1973, 4, DNSA/KT00707 (second document at that location).

35 Kissinger meeting with State Department and White House officials, March 18, 1974, in Burr, *Kissinger Transcripts*, 224–25.

A stable system?

The détente policy was thus something of a charade. Kissinger and Nixon had not set out to build a “global structure of peace” based on cooperation with the USSR. Their goal instead was to keep the Soviets in line by making sure they had to worry about a strong China on their Asian border. The US government, that is, as Kissinger told Pompidou in May 1973, was interested in “playing China against the Soviet Union.” It therefore wanted to prevent the Soviets from “destroying China.” To do that, the Americans needed to develop a certain political relationship with the PRC, so that the Soviets could not be sure the United States would remain passive if China were attacked. But that would take time, and while that relationship was developing, the USSR would somehow have to be kept from attacking that country. That was why US policy could not “*seem* to be directed against the Soviet Union”; that was why détente had to be “carried on in parallel with the Soviet Union”; that was why (as he told the Chinese) the US government needed to “do enough with the Soviet Union to maintain a *formal* symmetry.” While China was making its way through the danger zone, the United States could not seem to be ganging up with that country against the USSR.³⁶ The United States had to make it seem that it was also developing a relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets had to be made to feel they had something to lose if they moved against China.

The focus was thus on appearances, not substance. Kissinger and Nixon were not really interested in working with the Soviets on fundamental political problems. The Arab–Israeli question, for example, was obviously of central importance for all sorts of reasons, and it seemed that the USSR, especially after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was willing to cooperate with the United States in working out a solution. But the US government was not interested in collaborating with the Soviets in this area no matter what position they took. Indeed, as Kissinger himself said, the United States was not particularly interested in the “merits of the dispute.” “Our whole policy,” he said, was to avoid “settling it cooperatively with the Soviet Union.”³⁷

The most important US–Soviet negotiations thus dealt not with political but with military questions. A number of agreements were reached in that latter area, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements,

36 Memoranda of conversation, Kissinger–Pompidou meeting, May 18, 1973, 4, DNSA/KT00728; and Kissinger–Huang meeting, August 4, 1972, in Burr, *Kissinger Transcripts*, 73; emphasis added.

37 Memoranda of conversation, Kissinger–Mao meeting, November 12, 1973, and Kissinger–Deng meeting, October 20, 1975, in Burr, *Kissinger Transcripts*, 188, 382.

limiting the size of each side's strategic nuclear arsenals, were considered quite important at the time. Looking back, though, it appears that their importance had to do mainly with what those agreements seemed to symbolize. They made it seem that the two sides were determined to move away from the Cold War and put their relations on a more solid basis.

But putting symbolism aside, it is hard to see how the SALT agreements had a major stabilizing effect. With or without an agreement, neither side could hope to disarm the other. With or without an agreement, neither side had any incentive to preempt. In such circumstances, what exactly could an agreement in this area hope to accomplish? How exactly could a strategic arms agreement make for a more stable international order? But those fundamental questions were not addressed. The negotiations on offensive weapons, Schelling later wrote, were evidently not governed by any "guiding philosophy." Arms control, he said, was pursued "for its own sake, not for the sake of peace and confidence."³⁸ It is difficult to quarrel with those judgments. In fact, it is hard to see how even the agreement limiting the deployment of defensive anti-ballistic missile systems – the famous Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 – played a major role in stabilizing the US–Soviet strategic relationship. Given that ABM systems could easily and cheaply be overwhelmed by additional offensive weapons, even a massive defensive effort was bound to be futile and would have had little impact on that relationship.

But the arms-control negotiations and the SALT agreements were considered extremely important. Strategic arms control was viewed as the heart of the détente process. It seemed that the two great powers were dealing seriously with the military side of the Cold War, and that made it easier to ignore the fact that the really important military problems, the problems relating to the defense of Europe, were not being dealt with effectively.

Kissinger, of course, understood those problems – not just the military problems in the narrow sense, but the whole complex of problems, political as well as military, rooted in the waning of the American nuclear guarantee. This set of issues had been his main concern as a scholar since the mid-1950s, and those problems were certainly on his mind when he was in power in Washington. Even in December 1976, on the eve of his departure from office, he had no doubt that the European defense problem – and problems relating to the defense of other regions as well – were still of overwhelming importance.

³⁸ Thomas Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs*, 64 (1985–86), 225, 228.

But did the European defense problem really have to be taken so seriously? No one, after all, thought the Soviets were about to invade Western Europe. The real problem was less overt. The West, even in the official view, had to worry instead about “a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures.”³⁹ But if that was all there was to the threat, how much danger were the Western countries really facing? Kissinger himself might have thought that Europe was on the verge of an “abyss,” that Brandt, if he continued on his present course, would end up giving the Soviets a “veto over German policy,” and that in about five years the point would “be reached where no German Chancellor [could] afford the hostility of the Soviet Union.”⁴⁰ But while those fears were not absurd, they seem exaggerated, and not just in retrospect. The real risk was probably never that great.

But that is not the same as saying that there was nothing to be worried about. Maybe the Soviets would never use nuclear weapons in Europe. Maybe they would calculate that the risk was just too great – that no one, not even the Americans themselves, could tell what the US government would do if those weapons were actually used, and maybe that core uncertainty would have a very powerful deterrent effect. But it was also possible that the Soviets would come to the conclusion that America would never attack Soviet territory, no matter what the Red Army was doing in Europe; maybe they would somehow try to take advantage of that situation. Who could tell what they would do five or ten years down the road? Who could tell how the Western countries would assess the threat or how they would deal with it? Events could take their course in all kinds of ways, and no one could predict with any confidence how things would develop.

Extreme pessimism may not have been warranted, but there was no deep stability in this system. There were just too many unresolved questions – questions about the future of the USSR and the future course of Soviet policy, about the future of Europe and the future of the US commitment to Europe, even about the future of the Sino-Soviet relationship. And one has the sense, studying this period, that those issues would not be left hanging forever – that sooner or later those questions would be answered, and that change, perhaps even fundamental change, was inevitable. But what sort of world would emerge as that process ran its course? Change there would be, but to what?

39 Richard Nixon, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: Building for Peace,” February 25, 1971, *Department of State Bulletin*, March 22, 1971, 342.

40 Memoranda of conversation, Kissinger meeting with “Wise Men,” November 28, 1973, 31, DNSA/KT00928; Kissinger–Zhou meeting, November 11, 1973, in Burr, *Kissinger Transcripts*, 175; and Kissinger–Jobert meeting, May 22, 1973, 13, DNSA/KT00736.

The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century

WILFRIED LOTH

The Cold War was not only about power politics, security, and hegemony – it was also a conflict between differing theories of how to organize economies and societies at the various stages of industrial development. Ideologies and belief systems helped define the Cold War's front lines, but social conflict also largely determined its course and outcome. Beginning with the Marxist challenge to the capitalist system, multiple social concepts emerged during the course of the Cold War without any clear favorite model emerging. In the long run, however, collectivist and centrally planned economies showed some strengths in modernizing less developed societies albeit at great costs, whereas free-market economies showed greater productivity, at least after having accepted state-run systems of social welfare and a certain degree of planning at the national and international levels. That political freedom favored productivity and innovation ought to be one of the major lessons of the twentieth century.

Capitalist system, Marxist movement, and Soviet power

For Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, history was a story of class struggle. From their nineteenth-century perspective, they saw only two classes exercising an influence on history: the bourgeoisie that dominated society, and the proletariat that was exploited by it. The future, Marx and Engels believed, belonged to the proletariat. They predicted that the concentration of capital would continually increase, as would the exploitation and impoverishment of the proletariat. Finally, there would come a point when there would be no one left who could afford to buy the products of the few remaining big capitalists, and when the ever-expanding working class could no longer contain its

indignation. That would be the hour of the revolution, the hour of the “proletariat’s elevation to the dominant class,” according to *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” would not, however, be long-lasting, since the working class would proceed to eliminate the old conditions of production and thereby also put an end to “the existential conditions of class conflict, to classes altogether.” The rule of the working class would thus lead to the classless society in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”¹

Here was a message that industrial workers were happy to hear. It addressed everyday experiences in the industrial world such as the significant difference in income between workers and factory owners; the cultural conflicts between the workers’ milieu and bourgeois society; the continual concentration of capital; and the cycle of economic depression. The message of *The Communist Manifesto* offered those who were dissatisfied with existing conditions a plausible explanation of the contemporary situation as well as prospects for its alteration. The workers’ future dominance, a prediction seemingly based in science, offered consolation in the face of the present day’s misery. At the same time, it promoted self-assurance and a rebellious spirit. The prospect of eliminating class-based society added moral energy to the struggle against business-owners and attracted dissatisfied intellectuals.

Hence, it was no accident that Marxism found much resonance with workers and that, with the expansion of industrial capitalism and mass politics in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a Marxist movement sought to eliminate the capitalist system through revolutionary battle. Not every faction within the workers’ movement embraced socialist ideas, nor did every socialist follow the teachings of Marx and Engels, but their adherents frequently constituted an agenda-setting majority within the various socialist parties. In 1891, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the strongest and most influential contingent of the “Second Socialist Internationale,” adopted its Erfurt Program, which echoed the notion of a world polarized by capital concentration and proletarian exploitation, and supported the goal of “abolishing class dominance.”² Likewise, at their founding congress in 1905, French socialists defined themselves as “a party of class struggle and revolution.”³ It did not seem to matter that Marx and Engels had

1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Vol. IV (Berlin: Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 1957), 481ff.

2 Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitag des Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, abgehalten zu Erfurt vom 14. bis 20. Oktober 1891 (Berlin, 1891), 3ff.

3 Georges Lefranc, *Le mouvement socialiste sous la troisième république* (Paris: Payot, 1977), 124.

omitted many considerations in their grand analyses, such as the role of all of the other classes and groups seen in contemporary society, the consequences of productivity increases, or the momentum of ideas. On the contrary, it was the superficial unambiguity of the Marxist schema that powered its widespread resonance.

The revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power in Russia in November 1917 had little to do with the prognostications of Marx and Engels, for Russia was not an advanced industrial society. The industrial working class constituted only a small minority there, and in fact the workers' and soldiers' committees that formed following the abdication of the tsar did not even contemplate taking power on a national scale. In these circumstances, Vladimir Ilich Lenin relied on the idea of the *avant-garde*, a party elite that was to guide the working class along the path of revolution. An assisted socialist revolution in backward Russia would then spark revolution in the main European industrial countries that had long since been "ripe" for it, above all imperial Germany. In reality, the leaders of the October Revolution only managed to remain in power over the long term by relying on armed force and systematic centralization, submitting to a popular desire for an end to the Great War, inflicting rigid terror against all kinds of perceived enemies, and by deftly managing sequential crises.

Lenin's dream of world revolution went unfulfilled. There was, however, a socialist-inspired revolution in Germany and the proclamation of a soviet republic in Hungary. Although neither of those enjoyed lasting success and subsequent attempts failed, it was the case that national Communist parties established themselves practically everywhere, and submitted themselves to the leadership of the Russian *avant-garde*. Large segments of the socialist workers' movement joined the Communist International (normally referred to as the 'Comintern') in the hope of one day realizing the revolution. New revolutionary movements appeared in the countries of the former Habsburg Empire; in Cuba, Mexico, and elsewhere in South America; as well as in China and Indonesia. Even in Australia and in the United States, small numbers of radicalized workers founded local Communist parties. Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders, who had in the meantime become the state party of the Soviet Union, dictated the policies of the foreign parties under their authority and organized them in the image of the successful Bolsheviks. In 1922, there were some sixty-one of these parties, and 440,000 members of the Comintern outside the Soviet Union.

Some authors see the beginnings of the Cold War in this cooperation of Soviet state power with the international revolutionary movement. That view

is inaccurate in the sense that Communist revolutionary strategies were aimed primarily at seizing power in individual countries, and only then unleashing the world revolution. Furthermore, neither the occasional formation of anti-Bolshevik fronts, nor the liberal-democratic internationalism of the American president, Woodrow Wilson, after World War I, constituted a foe for the international Communist world movement. There existed ideological antagonism, but not a geopolitical threat. Thus, one cannot speak of an international East–West conflict before the formation of the anti-Nazi coalition during World War II.

It is the case, however, that the link between Soviet power and an international movement that sought to topple the bourgeois-capitalist order meant that East–West tensions had social and domestic ramifications in addition to the ideological one. The dictators of the Soviet Union (and later of the other Communist states) regarded themselves as the *avant-garde* of a world revolutionary movement that sooner or later would also emerge in the capitalist countries. Their dictatorial regimes were not merely held together by force and terror, since they could depend on those who benefited in terms of material gain and social status from the establishment of Communist regimes. At the same time, there were Communist movements of varied significance in the countries beyond the Soviet Union, and these movements counted on the support of Moscow. Thus, those who felt threatened by the Soviet Union feared not only for their independence, but also for their assets and their entire way of life.

The partnership between a revolutionary movement and Soviet state power was not without its tensions and frictions. As early as Lenin's time, the Soviet leadership forced the other Communist parties to accept modes of organization and strategic concepts that did not necessarily correspond to circumstances in their own countries. When in doubt, revolutionary ambitions in individual countries were subordinated to the interests of the Soviet Union, and after the collapse of hopes for a rapid world revolution, those ambitions were no longer at the center of Moscow's policies. Once Communists had taken power in other countries, especially after 1945, traditional conflicts between states as well as other conflicts of interest continued inside the boundaries of the socialist camp. Preserving the authority of the Soviet leadership over the Communist world movement was an unending task, for "renegades" repeatedly popped up and required neutralization by the Soviets. Under Iosif Stalin, such people often faced physical liquidation. Additionally, there were always convinced Marxists who rejected Soviet leadership from the outset exactly because they took their Marxism seriously;

they regarded Lenin's voluntaristic construction of history as an adventurous departure from orthodoxy. Likewise, there were those who sympathized with the Soviet Union but who did not subordinate themselves to any party discipline, and who did not want to tie themselves down ideologically. Connections between the Communist world movement and national societies were thus fluid.

The Great Depression that followed the Wall Street crash of 1929 brought the Communist movement new adherents and sympathizers. This world economic crisis had been set off by a crisis of overproduction in the United States and led to persistent unemployment at levels previously unimaginable. At the deepest point of the crisis (1932–33), some 22 percent of British workers were idle, 27 percent of those in North America, 32 percent in Denmark, and no less than 44 percent in Germany. After this collapse, employment levels recovered only gradually. In Britain, for example, a hard core of 16 to 17 percent remained jobless, as did some 20 percent in Denmark.⁴ In contrast, unemployment was nonexistent in the Soviet Union. Indeed, Stalin could point to new achievements year by year in the industrialization of the country. The Marxist crisis theory thus gained plausibility, and many of the unemployed as well as intellectuals set their hopes on the Soviet model as an alternative to the discredited liberal system.

More than Communism, however, it was the Fascists who really profited from the world economic crisis. One after the other, liberal regimes on the European continent were replaced by authoritarian ones or by totalitarian forms of mass mobilization. When this occurred in Germany, the interests of the Soviet state and of Communist sympathizers once again converged. The general interest in countering Fascist threats and containing the expansion of National Socialist Germany reunited them in a common front. At the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935, the Communist parties were obliged to commit themselves to the so-called "Popular Front" strategy. Up to that point, they had been instructed to direct their "main thrust" against social democrats and to win the support of workers who were oriented toward social democracy. Now, however, they were to ally themselves not only with the social democrats but also with all anti-Fascist forces, including those of the Right. In France, the Communists thus proceeded to support a moderately leftist anti-Fascist government that initiated social reforms such as the forty-hour week and annual paid vacation. In Spain,

4 Walt W. Rostow, *The World Economy: History and Prospect* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978), 270.

Communists participated in the defense of the republic against the uprising of a fascistically oriented military. This brought them new adherents and new sympathy. In France, the number of party members rose from 30,000 in 1932 to 330,000 in 1936, the first year of the Popular Front government, while the number of votes they registered jumped from 700,000 to 1.5 million. Literary figures such as Arthur Koestler and André Malraux became involved in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the Communists.

The alliance between Communists and Western democratic forces was plagued by tensions because the former did not by any means give up their hopes for revolutionary upheaval, and hence sought unceasingly to bring the Popular Front under their control. There came a break in the anti-Fascist alliance in August 1939 when Stalin, in an abrupt modification of his containment policy, made a pact with Hitler. The Communist Party (which had been banned in Germany since 1933 and faced persecution there) was now ostracized in the democratic countries. In France, it was banned. The Italian socialists in exile broke their ties to the Communists. After the victory of Francisco Franco's forces in Spain, a cruel persecution of the Left ensued.

The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 led to a new and expanded version of the Popular Front program. It was now to extend to all countries occupied by the National Socialists and was to encompass all national forces fighting Nazism, and not only the Left. Communists therefore participated in the diverse national resistance movements and subordinated themselves to non-Communist leaders where power dynamics necessitated it. In France, the Communists acknowledged the authority of General Charles de Gaulle. In Italy, they joined the 'Committee of National Liberation' and subordinated themselves to the 'Corps of Volunteers.' In order to reduce mistrust on the part of his new Western allies, Stalin even took the step of officially disbanding the Comintern on May 15, 1943. Covertly, foreign party leaders were still required to follow his directives.

Communists played a major role in resisting the National Socialists, and the contribution of the Red Army to the defeat of Germany and its allies was tremendous. The Soviet Union paid for this victory, clutched from the jaws of defeat, with no fewer than 27 million lives, perhaps half the total killed in World War II. Both the Communists' resistance to the Nazis throughout Europe and the decisive role of the Soviet Union brought the Communist parties new members and newfound sympathy in the liberated countries of Europe. The idea of a broad coalition of anti-Fascist forces gained much acceptance. At the beginning of 1944, Ivan Maiskii, returning to Moscow after serving as Soviet ambassador in London, perceived signs that government

in the liberated countries would now move in the direction of “a broad democracy in the spirit of the Popular Front idea.” As he said, “There are grounds for assuming that these principles will prevail in countries such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and Czechoslovakia without external pressure.” Elsewhere, the victorious powers, “primarily the USSR, the USA, and England,” would need to provide assistance.⁵

It was indeed the case that the Communists managed to make significant gains in the first elections held after the war. In Finland, the Communist-directed People’s Democratic Union won a surprising 24 percent of the vote in March 1945. In France, the Communists became the largest party with more than 26 percent of the vote in October 1945. In Czechoslovakia, they gained 38 percent in May 1946, *after* the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces. In Italy, they registered 19 percent in June 1946. In Scandinavia and in the smaller West European states, the Communist vote ranged between 10 and 13 percent in the period.

The context for these electoral successes was a general shift to the Left in the European political spectrum. After the British Labour Party achieved an impressive victory at the polls in July 1945, social democratic parties in other states also increased their share of the vote and some of the new Christian democratic parties secured their victories under the banner of a “Christian socialism.” As the failure of liberalism had now been followed by a failure of Fascism, many Europeans saw their countries on the path to social democracy, not to be built through revolutionary upheaval, but rather by the nationalization of key industries and by the expansion of the welfare state.

This prospect was all the more attractive given that the consequences of the Great Depression had never really been overcome in any European country. Only in Germany had unemployment been eliminated by the end of the 1930s, and the devastation of war had then reduced the country’s productive capacity to ashes. Germany had lost 13 percent of its capital equipment, Italy 8 percent, and France 7 percent. The monstrous loss of human life – more than 17 million dead in the European countries alone – signified further decreases in future production potential. One year after the end of the war, by which time transportation systems had largely been reestablished and many American loans had already begun to flow into reconstruction, total production in Britain and in the Scandinavian countries was only marginally above prewar levels. In France and in the Benelux countries, the figure was 89 percent, in

5 Report, I. Maiskii to V. Molotov, January 11, 1944, *Istochnik*, No. 4, (1995), 124–44.

southern and Eastern Europe approximately 60 percent, and in Germany still only 40 percent.⁶

The policy of containment and the triumph of the affluent society

In the United States, the leftward trend of postwar European politics caused many to worry that the Communists might seize power in several countries. A strong socialist workers' movement had never existed in the United States because of the primacy of race issues over class issues, and the Communists remained a small splinter party of utopians. Consequently, Americans did not appreciate that a strong majority in favor of socialist reforms was coalescing in Europe, and the large vote gains by the Communists frightened those on the other side of the Atlantic. The danger posed by the Communists appeared all the greater while the war's lasting depravations impeded reconstruction efforts. It seemed certain that the Communists would exploit the impoverishment of Europe for their own purposes. As the assistant secretary for economic affairs at the State Department, William Clayton, put it in a memorandum of March 5, 1947: "Full of hunger, economic misery, and frustration," the majority of European countries were standing "on the very brink and may be pushed over at any time; others are gravely threatened." It was already possible to see that Communists would seize power in Greece and France in the wake of economic collapse in those countries.⁷

As a consequence of this view, the first tool of America's containment policy was economic. The Marshall Plan was intended to promote the resuscitation of Europe to such an extent that revolutionary programs would lose their appeal. The plan thus constituted an economic crisis response with a geostrategic rationale. Economic support for the European countries was desirable in any case in order to revive them as trading partners and foreign markets, and in order to prevent a lasting crisis of overproduction after the cessation of war-footing economic policy. That such motivations converged as a coherent plan in the spring of 1947 – following a series of individual measures – was the result of fears that the impoverishment of Europe might bring Soviet hegemony as far as the eastern shores of the Atlantic. Structural reform of Europe's economies was intended to guarantee that the Western

6 Quoted from the compilation in Walter Lipgens, *A History of European Integration 1945–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 8.

7 Published in Ellen Clayton Garwood, *Will Clayton: A Short Biography* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 115–18.

model would enjoy higher long-run productivity (and thus also legitimacy) than the Communist alternative.

Yet, fears of Communist takeover due to economic privation were greatly exaggerated. Reconstruction actually progressed rapidly after 1946. As early as 1947, most European countries had retrieved the industrial production levels of 1938; the very hard winter of 1946–47 was followed by an exceptionally good harvest in 1947–48, prior to the first deliveries of the Marshall Plan. The Communists did not aim to exploit economic distress but, on the contrary, urged workers to refrain from demanding wage increases so as not to endanger reconstruction. Nevertheless, the Marshall Plan propagated a vision of the future that countered the Marxist one: the model of a liberal society, founded on a market economy and parliamentary democracy, the needs of an advanced industrial society met by state planning for modernization, state-organized social equalization, and the greatest possible integration of national economies within a multilateral free-trade system. It was the American ideal in its ultimately successful New Deal variant rather than a resumption of prewar liberalism, and during conflict-filled negotiations with the democratic governments of Europe it developed into the Western societal model. In the debates on the Marshall Plan, the West perceived itself as an association of powers and as a societal vision, which stood opposed to the embodiment of the Marxist version in the Soviet Union.

Contrary to Western perceptions, the Soviets' campaign against the Marshall Plan was not connected to a turn away from the expanded Popular Front strategy. Yet, intense pent-up frustration over lack of consumer goods during the reconstruction period produced large strike movements in the autumn and winter of 1947, leading to the Communists' long-term isolation in the West. It was impossible for them to get back into government in France or Italy; even in Finland, they found themselves in the opposition once again after the elections of July 1948. This meant that the movement for social democracy lost its parliamentary majority almost everywhere, and that the expansion of the social welfare state proceeded less rapidly than its adherents had expected. Many spoke of a "restoration" of the old order, but, in fact, participation in the Marshall Plan pushed reforms onto a liberal course and promoted the integration of recipient countries into a wider economic and political association.

Two political circumstances strengthened the productivity promoted by the Marshall Plan. First, the outbreak of the Korean War generated a massive demand for capital goods. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was able to satisfy that demand all the more effectively because its productive capacity

was not tied up in the armaments sector. Thus, the FRG was able not only to regain market share lost during the war, but also to achieve a strong long-term position in the world market. Second, the supranational nature of the Schuman Plan offered Western Europeans a guarantee that the liberation of German production from the constraints of the Allies' occupation regime would not lead to the return of German political hegemony over the continent. Only by these means was German reconstruction made palatable to its European neighbors in terms of security policy and domestic public opinion.

The newfound climate of trust among the countries of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was further strengthened by the high growth rates that Marshall aid had brought about. In order to avoid jeopardizing reconstruction, workers had to restrain their pay demands, entrepreneurs could not seek quick profits, and consumers had to accept higher prices for foodstuffs and other necessities. Investors were forced to accept that the war had obliterated their wealth, and those who depended upon the welfare state had to be satisfied with more modest aid. All of these strictures were easier to bear when the communal pie was getting larger and larger. Thus, high growth rates helped limit dissatisfaction and created a wide consensus about the desirability of reconstruction. It was indeed the case that this consensus remained vague and varied somewhat from country to country within the OEEC. The impression that the benefits of reconstruction were more or less fairly distributed was sufficient to avoid struggles over distribution that would have threatened its success. Unemployment rates fell, and during the 1960s, full employment was achieved almost everywhere in Western Europe.

On the basis of these indices, Western European reconstruction turned into long-term growth. Industrial production expanded at an annual average of 7.1 percent from 1950 to 1970. During the same period, gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual rate of 5.5 percent overall and 4.4 percent per capita. These figures reflect advancing industrialization as well as significant rises in productivity and income. In 1970, output per capita was almost two and a half times greater than in 1950, and per capita income had grown at an average of 4.5 percent per year. This growth was more than twice as fast as the rate seen in the United States and exceeded anything previously known in Europe. In the two decades from 1950 to 1970, annual per capita income rose between 250 and 400 percent.⁸

8 Derek H. Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914–1990* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 124, 130, 133.

The rapid rise in real income produced an expansion of consumption. Living standards grew significantly. Durable consumer goods such as refrigerators, televisions, and automobiles became ubiquitous mass-market products, as did one-time luxuries like high-value foodstuffs, tasteful clothing, vacation trips, and investments in social welfare. There was an expansion of education, the disparity between the urban world and the countryside faded, and local and national governments assumed more and more public responsibilities. The diversification of professions, increasing mobility, and widely accessible free-time activities led to a far-reaching dissolution of traditional social milieus. The traditional distinct circles of peasant, bourgeois, and working-class culture faded into history. Instead, a consumer society arose in which differences within existing class cultures became stronger, while the lines between those class cultures began to blur. Now, fine differences in taste and style characterized the many social groupings more strongly than did material contradictions or distinct class consciousness. Western Europe was developing into an advanced industrial society along the lines of the United States.

At the same time, growing prosperity promoted the stabilization of the democratic order. This was especially the case in West Germany, Austria, and Italy, where democracy had been reintroduced under the supervision of the victorious Allied powers, and where embedding the habits of democracy in local society was a major challenge. In those countries with stronger democratic traditions, economic success also preempted the rise of radicalism. The Communists, who in any event no longer held any realistic revolutionary prospects, lost up to two-thirds of their support. In France and Italy, where they did manage to retain the support of 20 to 30 percent of the electorate for a long time, the Communists languished in the isolation of a counter-culture. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet forces in November 1956, most intellectuals also gave up on Soviet Communism. In the social democratic parties, the Marxist prediction of ever-growing antagonism between capital and the masses lost its plausibility. German social democracy established a pluralistic basis for itself in the Bad Godesberg Program of 1959.

Aside from the dictatorships in southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, and, after 1967, Greece), the calculus behind America's containment strategy worked out on a grand scale. Western Europe became "safe for democracy," and at the same time developed into an exceptionally productive trading partner. The region was less susceptible than ever to revolutionary seizures of power based on class conflict; on the contrary, Western Europe became increasingly attractive to the societies of the Eastern bloc.

The competition between the systems

For many contemporaries, these developments were all the more surprising given that they had experienced the failure of many liberal democracies after World War I, as well as difficulty in overcoming the effects of the Great Depression. Moreover, not a few observers had been nervously asking themselves whether a planned economy might not be superior to a market economy after all. It was true that Stalin had brought about a powerful achievement in terms of industrialization. In the twelve years from 1928 to 1940, industrial production in the USSR had risen sharply, while agriculture had been relegated to second place in its contribution to GDP.⁹

Soviet reconstruction also achieved quick and impressive results after the massive destruction of the war. As early as 1945, industrial production had already reached 92 percent of the prewar level. In 1950, it reached 173 percent, some 25 percent more than had been anticipated in the four-year plan of 1946.¹⁰ From 1951 to 1965, agricultural production grew by an average of 4.1 percent per year, the productivity of industry by 6.4 percent, and real income per capita by 5.5 percent.¹¹ Likewise, there was a tangible economic recovery in the countries under Soviet control. Although the war's devastation was significantly graver east of the Iron Curtain than in the Western European countries, and participation in the Marshall program was out of the question due to Soviet opposition, prewar levels of industrial production returned three or four years after the war's conclusion. Throughout the region, reconstruction translated into sustained growth, supported by a planned economic model which all of the Eastern bloc countries adopted from the Soviets. Between 1950 and 1970, annual GDP growth rates averaged some 7 percent.¹² Altogether, the modernization of the Eastern Bloc proceeded even more rapidly than that of Western Europe.

The West's own achievement of the affluent society soon made Westerners forget the successes of reconstruction in the East. Nikita Khrushchev, however, took the impressive growth rates in Eastern European industrial production as confirmation that the Soviet system was superior to the Western

9 Helmut Altrichter, *Kleine Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001), 84.

10 Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), 298.

11 Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998), 1174.

12 Aldcroft, *European Economy*, 130, 173ff.

one. He thus had high hopes for the victory of socialism by catching up to the West and then surpassing it, with the East bloc developing a society characterized by prosperity and consumption: "We'll bury you," he told Western representatives at a reception in November 1956.¹³ What he meant was that the Communists would still be around when capitalism was sent to its grave, and that sooner or later, the people of the West would come to realize the advantages of the Soviet model. He added a prediction to the 1961 program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union saying that industrial production in the Soviet Union would surpass that of the United States in ten years and would increase sixfold over the next twenty years. In the 1970s, the USSR would thus enjoy a living standard "higher than that of any capitalist country."¹⁴

Khrushchev's optimism seemed all the more justified given that the crisis of the European liberal system in the 1930s and 1940s had eventually resulted in the loss of the colonies that had added to the strength of the great powers during the height of imperialism. It was often the case that the colonial struggle for independence went hand in hand with an orientation toward the Leninist variant of Marxism. Because such liberation projects were initially the preserve of small Western-educated elites in colonial society, the successful model of the Bolshevik professional revolutionary was appealing. The 1949 victory of Mao Zedong's Communists in China, after a long conflict, served as an inspiration, as did the persistent struggle of the Vietnamese revolutionaries led by Ho Chi Minh, first against French colonial masters and later against American forces. After 1959, Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba developed into an attractive model for revolutionary movements in the southern hemisphere. Even though the Soviet leadership was never able to bring these various revolutionary movements and regimes under its control, there were still good reasons to assign them to the Soviet column when undertaking a "global assessment of power relations," as the Marxists' dialectical view of the world put it. Power rivalries in the Third World thus produced additional Cold War tensions.

However, the impressive industrialization of the Soviet Union suffered from two structural flaws. First, the agricultural sector had been severely hampered by forced collectivization, and investment was lopsidedly allocated to heavy industry and to the arms industry. The result was that the production

13 Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York and London: Norton, 1973), 437.

14 Altrichter, *Kleine Geschichte*, 145ff.

of consumer goods was meager, and standards of living and consumption levels of the masses in both urban and rural areas deteriorated during the 1930s. This situation could not be redressed very rapidly by means of progress in industrialization. The beginnings of a pronounced emphasis on consumer goods in the initial postwar years were snuffed out by the advent of the Cold War and by a tendency to invest in major prestige projects. Agricultural prices were held artificially low, and collective farms, which had previously used the structures of the traditional village, proliferated and expanded rapidly. These factors continually hindered productivity in the agricultural sector. Hence, by 1950, agricultural production and the incomes of non-agricultural workers had only reached prewar levels. It was not until 1953 or 1954 that non-agricultural workers earned as much as they had in 1928.¹⁵ In 1965, the Soviet Union's gross national product (GNP) was about 45 percent as large as that of the United States.¹⁶

Developments were similar in the countries which had adopted the Soviet model after 1945. They were, at least initially, spared the collectivization of agriculture, but Moscow also imposed high reparations on East Germany, Hungary, and Romania which reduced returns on output. In order to achieve ambitious planning goals, it was typically the case that more was invested in large industrial projects than could be justified in terms of well-balanced growth in consumption. While there were great differences among the various Eastern bloc states, rates of growth in private consumption were only half as high as in the West. On the other hand, poverty vanished, public transportation systems were expanded, and washing machines, refrigerators, and television sets gradually made their appearance in households. Still, skilled workers usually had to accept a certain decline in living standards, while prices and the selection of goods were determined not by the market but by bureaucracies. Hence, quality often left something to be desired, and there was a chronic shortage of the most popular goods, which fetched correspondingly high prices. Only a minority could afford an automobile in this period. The peoples of the Eastern bloc experienced progress toward a modern consumer society, but there remained a significant gap between them and the consumer societies of the West.¹⁷

Most obvious was the contrast between developments in West Germany and in East Germany. Before the war, consumption levels in the central region of Germany had not been significantly lower than in the western and southern

15 Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, 697, 707.

16 Altrichter, *Kleine Geschichte*, 145.

17 Aldcroft, *European Economy*, 177ff.

regions of the country. Yet, in the mid-1960s, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had rates only 60 percent of those of the West Germans. Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain took note of this disparity. From the foundation of the GDR, a steady stream of refugees headed west. It was not just fear of repression that caused them to abandon the German "workers' and peasants' state"; many simply wanted to enjoy better living conditions and greater personal freedom. Year after year, between 200,000 and 300,000 people left the GDR for the Federal Republic, mostly via Berlin where one could simply decamp from the eastern sector to one of the western ones. By the summer of 1961, some 2.7 million people had left the East German state, a figure amounting to 15 percent of its 1950 population.

This steady exodus was all the more problematic for the GDR because it was mostly the young and well educated who were leaving. Not only did this hamper productivity growth in the GDR and give extra impetus to that in the FRG, it also unsparingly highlighted the illusionary character of Communist promises for the future. The GDR's refugee problem was therefore of decisive strategic importance for the whole Communist movement. As Soviet deputy prime minister Anastas Mikoyan explained in a conversation with functionaries of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party (SED) in June 1961: "The GDR, Germany, is the country in which it must be decided whether Marxism-Leninism is right, that communism is the higher, better form of social organization for industrial states as well ... If socialism does not triumph in the GDR, if communism does not prove itself superior and viable here, then we have not triumphed."¹⁸

The Soviet Union therefore assisted the GDR economically, not only for strategic military reasons, but also because of the significance of a successful socialist Germany to the whole bloc. Above all, however, the Soviets helped the GDR by granting approval for the building the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Overnight, the barrier cut off the flow of refugees and enabled the GDR to survive direct comparison with the Federal Republic. Yet, the Wall also made clear that the Eastern side could not win the competition between the systems, a competition it had itself declared.

Moreover, it was now apparent to most observers that the Communist regimes could only survive over the long term if they shielded themselves from Western influences. Whereas Western societies enjoyed growing affluence and a new self-confidence, the leaders in the East had to concentrate on

¹⁸ Quoted in Michael Lemke, *Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963. Interessen und Handlungsspielräume der SED im Ost West Konflikt* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 161ff.

preserving their regimes with a mixture of concession and force. The prospect of revolution in the West had definitively proven to be an ideological fantasy, and the containment of encroaching capitalism, rather than revolutionary expansion, now became the Eastern bloc's strategic priority. That which was still officially called the "class struggle" was, in reality, self-defense by men in power of the Eastern bloc regimes against the forces of freedom. In 1958, Milovan Djilas correctly characterized those leaders as a "new class," one which had constituted itself in the aftermath of the Communist seizure of power.

The different ways by which the countries of the East and West profited from the transition to consumer societies became evident when, in the late 1960s, growing prosperity gave rise to a lifestyle revolution for the West's younger generation or, to be more exact, for the student elite of that generation. True, some young Westerners temporarily revived interest in Marxist ideology, but this did not translate into support for the Soviet Union. Instead, the "children of Karl Marx and Coca-Cola" actually accelerated the trends of individualization, democratization, and consumer orientation in the West. In the East, student protests were instinctively interpreted as attacks on the dictatorship of the Communist Party. In Czechoslovakia, student protests coalesced as a movement for a more open form of socialism which, in August 1968, was snuffed out by the tanks of the Warsaw Pact. In the USSR meanwhile, a broad stratum of university graduates imbued with skepticism toward the ruling ideology began long careers in the institutions of the state.

The Soviet model on the defensive

For a time, closing the borders and suppressing opposition of the Prague Spring allowed the Eastern bloc's "new class" to escape the general tendency toward "westernization." In the long term, however, isolation could not be sustained. In order to keep the gap in living standards from growing still larger and to keep popular dissatisfaction below a critical threshold, the regimes of the Soviet bloc were compelled to seek credit from and expand trade relations with the West. Loans were to be had, however, only if the Eastern bloc were to open itself, at least partially, to exchanges of "people, ideas, and views," as Western diplomats put it at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Additionally, Radio Free Europe and Western television, which could be received in countries close to the border between the blocs, provided continual information about conditions in the West and the Western view of things, and efforts to jam the signals were not successful.

The leaders of “real existing socialism” thereby found themselves in a dilemma: if they persisted too strongly in sealing off their societies, there would be the menace of unrest due to the backwardness of social conditions. However, if they chose the path of exchange with the West, they could be faced with the destabilization of their regimes due to Western influences. East German foreign minister Otto Winzer insightfully called the West’s policy of détente “aggression in slippers.”¹⁹ Expansion of relations with the West was thus controversial within the Communist leadership. Openness was inextricably associated with the transformation of the socialist regimes, and it remained an open question as to whether this transformation could be appropriately managed. As KGB chief Iurii Andropov secretly informed Willy Brandt’s adviser, Egon Bahr, in February of 1970, “You have no idea at all what is going on within the leadership [of the USSR]. You must give us time. It’s more difficult for us than for you.”²⁰

In order to evade the choice between openness and impoverishment, many of the Eastern leaders chose to focus more intensively on promoting consumption. Western credits were not invested to modernize the economy but instead were spent directly to eliminate supply bottlenecks, to raise wages, and to expand social welfare. Such a course was set by János Kádár in Hungary as early as 1963. In Poland, the emphasis on consumption began after the large strike movement of December 1970, which was sparked by frustration over the lack of consumer goods and the high price of foodstuffs. Again and again, party head Edward Gierek found himself having to make economic concessions to the workers that hindered the success of his modernization program. After Erich Honecker replaced Walter Ulbricht as leader of the GDR in May 1971, a social welfare and prosperity program was put in effect with the aim of preventing disruptions such as those witnessed in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The crisis-avoidance strategy developed by Kádár, Gierek, and Honecker was only temporarily successful. Kádár became so popular that he could allow a certain amount of openness in the media and an extensive easing of repression. In the early 1970s, contemporaries spoke of “goulash communism.” In Poland, where the supply of goods remained more strained, the authorities managed to hold on for another decade, until a new nationwide strike movement arose in the summer of 1980. Even after the emergence of the *Solidarność* movement east of the River Oder, everything remained quiet in the GDR. It was the case, however, that the Communists who emphasized prosperity had to pay for

19 Egon Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit* (Munich: Karl Blessing, 1996), 157.

20 Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit*, 305ff.

their consumer orientation with an increasing relative lag in productivity and with growing financial dependence on the West. The Soviet leadership around Leonid Brezhnev watched with growing concern as the GDR grew dependent on the steady importation of West German currency. The Soviet ambassador to the Federal Republic, Iulii Kvitsinskii, described this process with a catchy image: "Deeper and deeper, the GDR was swallowing the golden fishhook from which it could no longer free itself."²¹

The West's new approach to the Eastern bloc could be attributed to its economic prosperity. On the one hand, that prosperity was the foundation for the self-confidence required to pursue a policy of open borders and open competition. On the other, it also put Western governments in a position to provide attractive loans to the East, thereby nurturing economic ties. There was, then, a chronological as well as a causational connection between the West's transition to a consumer society and the intensification of the West's détente policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This corresponded with the East's increased interest in economic cooperation.

Although the end of the West's postwar boom period of high growth and full employment came in 1973–74, it changed nothing in this dynamic. The people of the West saw the recession of 1974–75 for what it was – the end of an exceptional situation that had arisen from the coincidence of postwar reconstruction, the creation of transnational institutions to promote growth and technological innovation, and low energy costs. The more modest growth rates to which people now had to become accustomed nonetheless constituted continued economic expansion. While unemployment became a chronic problem, it could be mitigated by the advanced social welfare systems now in place. Due to rigid social welfare regulations and a decline in technological innovation, Western Europe found it more difficult to compete internationally. Yet by 1979, an average GDP growth rate of 3.9 percent was once again achieved. Following another decline at the beginning of the 1980s, the level returned to 3.7 percent in 1988.²²

Positive economic conditions put Western Europeans in a position to pursue their form of détente even as the Americans again embraced an agenda of isolating the East and intensifying the arms race. In December 1981, the West German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was able to negotiate increased travel opportunities for GDR citizens in exchange for the extension of overdraft

21 Quoted in Peter Bender, *Fall und Aufstieg. Deutschland zwischen Kriegsende, Teilung und Vereinigung* (Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2002), 64.

22 Aldcroft, *European Economy*, 245. See also John W. Young's chapter in volume III.

provisions in trade between the two German states. Under his successor Helmut Kohl, West German banks offered an attractive loan of some one billion marks to the GDR in June 1983, which saved the Communist regime from looming insolvency. Further liberalization of travel followed: in 1987, some 1.2 million East Germans were allowed to visit the Federal Republic, five times as many as the previous year. The number of trips to the West by GDR citizens of retirement age rose from 1.5 million in 1986 to 3.8 million in 1987 and 6.7 million in 1988. Around 30,000 East Germans received permission to emigrate permanently each year. The foreign currency received by the East German government in exchange for permitting such emigration, and for the release of political prisoners, became an indispensable source of income.

The Eastern bloc did not suffer from the rise in energy prices during 1973–74. In fact, the opposite was true because, as net exporters of energy, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Poland profited from price increases. The Soviets and Romanians exploited their oil reserves more intensively, while Poland benefited from higher demand for coal. However, this source of revenue, and secret subsidies to the other states of Comecon (the East's multinational economic organization) made possible by energy exports, could only temporarily hide the creeping exhaustion of the economies of the socialist countries. The Eastern regimes did not know how to use Western loans effectively. Even in cases where those funds were not used directly to promote consumption, there was a lack of qualified personnel and economic infrastructure to produce manufactured goods that would be competitive on the world market. Heavy industry, especially the arms industry, drained away scarce resources of capital and skilled labor, and the easy availability of oil and gas led to careless investment in energy-intensive sectors. Moreover, the sluggish state economic bureaucracies did not recognize the growing importance of microcomputers and microelectronics. In 1987, there were only about 200,000 microcomputers in use in the Soviet Union, compared to some 25 million of more advanced design in the United States.²³

Eventually all of the Eastern bloc countries found themselves in a debt crisis. They could not export enough competitive products to pay for their imports and service their debts. Mounting interest repayments ate away at the funds available for internal investment, thus putting a brake on growth and obliging reductions in consumption. In Poland, the first socialist country to be hit by this dilemma, the Ministry of Internal Trade acknowledged in March 1979 that some 280 products were not available in quantities sufficient to meet

23 Aldridge, *European Economy*, 266; see also David Reynolds's chapter in volume III.

demand.²⁴ Consequently, various essential consumer products were rationed. Long lines in front of shops once again became part of everyday experience, and the waiting periods for desired goods became longer and longer.

Those countries in the Third World where direct or indirect Soviet support had established leftist regimes also wound up with severe debt problems. They not only thoughtlessly accumulated large debts by borrowing petrodollars but also had to pay much higher energy prices. Their growing insolvency undermined their ambitious development goals.

At the same time, the Kremlin experienced more and more difficulty providing assistance to its friends in the southern hemisphere. The Red Army, bogged down in support of an unpopular ally in Afghanistan, engendered growing skepticism in the USSR about the efficacy and wisdom of Moscow's other adventures in the Third World. It was hard to see that the Kremlin was gaining much from its vast expenditures in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (as well as Cuba and Nicaragua). Instead, these commitments set back the creation of "real existing socialism" inside the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the Soviet bloc

Collectively, the Eastern bloc countries slid into an economic crisis with no easy exit, especially not for state-dominated, centrally planned economies. Whereas in 1970 net material production in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had risen by 8 percent on average, average increases dropped to 2.1 percent in 1979. Growth in all sectors shrank to historic lows.²⁵ In the last three years of the Brezhnev era (1979 to 1982), the number of those in work grew by only 1.4 percent, while worker productivity grew by only 2.3 percent and gross capital investment by only 2.2 percent. Shortages developed in two decisive production factors – labor and capital.²⁶ Aging machinery made for high repair costs, while a workforce with little motivation and often insufficient qualifications wasted its time on unproductive endeavors. Even in weapons technology, the Soviet Union was no longer able to compete with the United States. Accidents such as the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 had immediate and dramatic effects on the supply of goods. The fall in oil prices in the second half of the 1980s also led to a worsening of the foreign trade balance.

In light of the growing communication between East and West, the leaders of the Communist dictatorships were no longer in a position to reassure their

²⁴ Aldridge, *European Economy*., 262. ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 257.

²⁶ Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, 886ff.

populations with promises of a better future. Instead, the frustration over new bottlenecks and numerous sharp reductions in living standards found expression in broad protest movements which immediately called into question the legitimacy of “real existing socialism.” In Poland, this had been the case since 1980, and, there, the imposition of martial law had been unable to suppress frustration over the long term. When renewed worker unrest in the spring of 1989 inspired the transition to a multiparty system, a general rejection of the ruling order occurred right across the Eastern bloc; first in Hungary, then in the GDR, and then almost simultaneously in the other satellite states. In the Soviet Union, where halfhearted reforms only served to worsen the supply of goods, dissatisfaction encouraged nationalist movements in all directions. Everywhere in the socialist sphere, frustration with material conditions and embitterment toward the political leadership produced the fundamental delegitimization of the ruling order.²⁷

The leaderships of the Communist parties either sought salvation in reforms which amounted to adoption of the Western societal model, or capitulated when they were rejected by a working class that they had so long claimed to represent. No more illusions could be maintained in light of the standards of societal openness established by the West, the technological revolution in communications, and the reforms instituted by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The peoples of the Eastern bloc liberated themselves from the shackles of a rigid system, sometimes with the cooperation of their leaders, but for the most part at their expense. The people of the GDR, where the Iron Curtain was literally pulled down, quickly voted for annexation into the Federal Republic and the wondrous prosperity of the West that now lay before them.

In retrospect, the implosion of the Soviet bloc was a belated shattering of the illusions and self-deceptions that the leaders of the October Revolution had imposed on post-tsarist Russia, and which thereafter had been believed by generations of Communists the world over. Communist elites nonetheless sought to preserve their leadership role. They failed when a new stage of technological development made apparent to everyone the limited potential of a centrally directed collectivist economy in a strongly interlinked world. The Cold War thus not only had its roots in the conflicts of modern industrial society; it was also made obsolete by the further development of that society.

27 See the chapters by Archie Brown, Alex Pravda, Jacques Lévesque, and Helga Haftendorn in volume III.

Bibliographical essay

The bibliographical essays in the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* aim at being selective and critical overviews of the literature available in each subfield of historical investigation. The entries are written by the authors of the chapters in the main text, with additions, deletions, and cross-references suggested by the editors. Readers may want to look at the bibliographical entries in more than one volume to get an overview of the literature on a particular issue or region.

I. Grand strategies in the Cold War

The best edition of Thucydides is Robert B. Strassler (ed.), *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, revised edition of the Richard Crawley translation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). For modern accounts, see Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Viking, 2003), and Victor Davis Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and the Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 2005). Louis J. Halle, in his *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), was one of the first Cold War historians to draw on ancient analogies, including Thucydides.

Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), stresses Iosif Stalin's grand strategic skills, but is thin on the Cold War years. For these, see Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). See also, on Nikita Khrushchev, William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006). The best overall history of Soviet grand strategy during the Cold War is now Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Patrick O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), explains the failure to shape an effective peacetime grand strategy after World War I. For Franklin D. Roosevelt, see Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945*

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), and, for Harry S. Truman, Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), covers the origins and evolution of the Cold War through 1962. For containment, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), shows why the post-World War II settlement in Europe proved more durable than its post-World War I predecessor. For the expansion of the Cold War to Asia, see Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), and McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), trace the development of Soviet and American strategy regarding nuclear weapons. For superpower strategies in the Third World, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), shows how protest movements of the 1960s encouraged Soviet, American, and Chinese efforts to formalize the Cold War stalemate. Margaret MacMillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007), documents the Sino-American rapprochement that was part of this process. Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), discusses domestic mobilization for the Cold War inside the United States, while Matthew J. Quimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), examines economic and geopolitical crises within the Soviet Union during the era of détente. For the emerging issue of human rights, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Little has as yet been written on the role of grand strategy in ending the Cold War, but some preliminary attempts to consider these issues include Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991*, updated ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), as well as John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin, 2005), and the final chapters of Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*.

John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: Norton, 2007), seeks to place Reagan's strategy within a broad historical context, while Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005), focuses on that particular aspect of it. William Taubman is preparing the definitive biography of Mikhail Gorbachev; until it appears, the best sources for Gorbachev's strategy are his *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), and Anatoly

S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. by Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).

For Clausewitz's classic work, the only reliable edition is Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), which also contains informative essays by the editors and Bernard Brodie. Brodie's own analysis of Clausewitz's relevance to the Cold War and that of Thucydides is in his *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

2. Identity and the Cold War

The basic work on identity from social psychology is Henri Tajfel, "Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior," *Social Science Information/sur les sciences sociales*, 13 (1974), 65–93. See also John Turner and Henri Tajfel, "Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favoritism," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 9 (1979), 187–204, and Henri Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Tajfel's basic point is that groups form under even minimal provocation and that people quickly come to see the in-group as more competent, deserving, and moral than the out-group. People also tend to exaggerate the differences between the in-group and the out-group and to police the boundaries between them. For summaries of the research on identity, cohesion, and in-group bias, see Rose McDermott, "Psychological Approaches to Social Identity: Experimentation and Application," in Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott (eds.), *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and Leonie Huddy, "Group Relations and Political Cohesion," in David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 511–58. The topic is so important that there now is a journal *Self and Identity* devoted to it. The best application to international politics is Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, 49 (1995), 229–52. The importance of interaction for identity is stressed in Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), who argues that identities are central to international politics both in the foreign policies of specific states and in the characteristic nature of international politics prevailing in particular eras. David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), examines the role of identities in the Cold War.

Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955), makes a crucial argument that American political culture is distinctive because its social structure is unique: the country was formed by what he calls a "social fragment" as the founding population that wielded political and social power was essentially middle-class. Unlike Europe, the United States then never experienced feudalism (except for the South, which had a form of it), and therefore never experienced a bourgeois revolution or, concomitantly, working-class radicalism. This also gave the United States a distorted view of other countries, who experienced revolutions in the normal course of their history. Hartz extended his views by comparing the United States to other settler countries in *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964). Hartz's views have been subject to prolonged debate: for a recent summary and defense, see Philip Abbott

"Still Louis Hartz after All These Years," *Perspectives on Politics*, 3 (2005), 93–109, and the comments by Richard Iton and Sean Wilentz, *ibid.*, 117–20. See also *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963) and *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: Norton, 1996) by Seymour Martin Lipset, and Byron E. Shafer (ed.), *Is America Different?: A New Look at American Exceptionalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1991). For analyses of American identity based on survey data, see Donald Devine, *The Political Culture of the United States* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1972), and Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

The literature on the sources of American identity is large and contested. The role of the period before the American Revolution is stressed by Bernard Bailyn in his *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) and *The Origins of American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1968), and by Richard Merritt, *Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), shows that although the American colonies were indeed settled dominantly by people from Britain, there were four distinct waves of British immigration that brought with them different cultures and ideas. Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Knopf, 1998), sees events a century before the revolution as crucial. Samuel Huntington among others, *Who Are We? The Challenges to American National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), sees national identity forming only after the Civil War.

Ted Hopf, *The Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), provides a theoretically informed and empirically well-grounded study of changing Soviet and Russian identities, highlighting 1955 and 1999. He is particularly acute on the changes wrought by Khrushchev and the interconnections among domestic politics, conceptions of collective self, and foreign policies toward the Third World and the West. Hopf shows how the acceptance of a wider range of regimes abroad and a willingness to relax tensions with the West were linked to domestic reforms and how both were reciprocally linked to a broader sense of the Soviet self, a broadened definition of the social classes that supported the Soviet state, and a more relaxed view of class conflict.

Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), is a thorough, comprehensive, and even-handed analysis of the Nixon–Kissinger foreign policy, of which détente was the centerpiece. Like everyone else, he draws on Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994). Deeply scholarly, but informed by his knowledge as a former government official, Garthoff argues that the version of détente presented in the two volumes of Henry Kissinger's memoirs available when he wrote are extremely misleading, disguising as they do the degree to which at every turn the United States sought to thwart the Soviet Union's quest for equality, thereby undermining détente. Ironically, the third volume of Kissinger's memoirs, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), written after the fall of the Soviet Union, endorses Garthoff's analysis, although without mentioning it. Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Royal Institute

of International Affairs, 1988), is briefer, critical of the United States, and (correctly) stresses the incompatible aspirations and self-images involved. The role of the Third World in the Cold War is most fully developed in Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), which shows both the extent to which the conflict was waged in these areas and the ideological character of the struggle.

3. Economic aspects of the Cold War, 1962–1975

A pro-administration account of contemporary US economic policy, and the public rationale for it, can be found annually in *Economic Report of the President*, and for trade policy since 1963 in the annual reports of the US Trade Representative. The former is mostly devoted to domestic economic policy but typically includes a chapter on foreign economic policy, which is of course conditioned by domestic economic conditions and pressures. The president's proposed budget for the coming year, reflecting his administration's spending priorities, can be found in the annual *Budget of the United States*, along with recent data on actual spending under the same headings. The monthly *Federal Reserve Bulletin* also contains useful contemporary information and analyses.

Developments in the world economy seen from a non-US perspective can be found in the annual reports of the Bank for International Settlements; global trade developments are covered in *International Trade*, published annually by the secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Comparable data on foreign aid can be found in *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies*, published annually (during the 1960s) by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Data on US arms trade and estimates for that of the Soviet Union can be found in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers*, published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

Glimpses into the worldview and thought processes of key decisionmakers can often be found in their memoirs: See, for example, Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging the Peace*, volume II of his *The White House Years* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), and Richard Nixon *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978). John F. Kennedy was unable to produce memoirs, but partial substitutes can be found in Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper Row, 1965), and in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); both Sorensen and Schlesinger were close to Kennedy and worked for him in the White House. An entertaining discussion of foreign policy, especially foreign economic policy, can be found in *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), by George W. Ball, under secretary of state in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. See also Henry A. Kissinger's *The White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1979) and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982); and H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1994) for the Nixon administration. Francis Bator, deputy national security assistant for economics and for Europe in the Johnson administration, has written a series of recollections and reflections on Johnson's approach to foreign economic policy, in Kermit Gordon (ed.), *Agenda for the Nation: Papers on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues*

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1968), *Foreign Affairs* (1968), George L. Perry and James Tobin (eds.), *Economic Events, Ideas, and Policies: The 1960s and After* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), and Aaron Lobel and Robert Richardson Bowie (eds.), *Presidential Judgment: Foreign Policy Decision Making in the White House* (Hollis, NH: Hollis Pub., 2001).

A British perspective is provided by Harold Macmillan in *Pointing the Way, 1956–1961* (London: Macmillan, 1972) and *At the End of the Day, 1961–1963* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), by Harold Wilson, *A Personal Record: The Labour Government 1964–1970* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), and by Alec Cairncross, *The Wilson Years: A Treasury Diary 1964–1969* (London: Historian's Press, 1997). A French perspective is given in Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971). Allowance must be made for the likelihood that all memoirs are written with a historical legacy in mind, especially the last.

An overview of world economic growth during the past half-century (and more) can be found in Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: OECD, 2001). For a Federal Reserve insider's account of international monetary developments, see Robert Solomon, *The International Monetary System, 1945–1981: An Insider's View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). For an analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Kimberly Ann Elliot, and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). On the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations (concluded in 1967), see Ernest Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats: An Analysis of the Kennedy Round of Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1970); and on the interplay between trade policy and US domestic politics, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Economic Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), by Paula Stern. Thomas A. Schwartz has written authoritatively on Lyndon Johnson and Europe: *In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

For the performance of the Soviet economy, see Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure*, 6th ed. (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2001), and Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (New York: Longman, 2003). The classic study of the Soviet economy, which was parsimonious in providing data, is Abram Bergson, *The Economics of Soviet Planning* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964), and Bergson's *Productivity and the Social System: The USSR and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). See also Marshall I. Goldman, *Détente and Dollars: Doing Business with the Soviets* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), and the triennial compendia on the Soviet economy produced by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress. Anatolii F. Dobrynin provides an insider's view of US–Soviet relations in *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001). Krushchev's concerns about Soviet agriculture and excessive Soviet military spending, based on much Soviet archival material, are documented in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Krushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006).

See also entries under sections 6 and 7 in this bibliography, and relevant parts of the bibliographies in volumes I and III.

4. The Cuban missile crisis

For roughly a decade following the crisis, most accounts – by or based on information from government officials – celebrated JFK's "crisis management" and toughness dealing with his Kremlin adversary, and tended to emphasize the nuclear balance (as opposed to US hostility to Fidel Castro) as both causing the crisis and ordaining its resolution. See, e.g., Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: Bantam, 1966), Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), and, posthumously, Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: Norton, 1969). "To the whole world," Schlesinger declared (pp. 840–41), the crisis "displayed the ripening of an American leadership unsurpassed in the responsible management of power ... throughout the crisis [JFK] coolly and exactly measured the level of force necessary to deal with the level of threat. Defining a clear and limited objective, he moved with mathematical precision to accomplish it ... It was this combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated, that dazzled the world." Graham T. Allison consolidated Kennedy administration perspectives in *Essence of Decision* (New York: Little, Brown, 1971), the dominant secondary account for the next quarter-century.

The pendulum swung toward a harsher view in the 1970s. Vietnam, Watergate, and CIA scandals nourished skepticism toward hardline Cold War policies, and consequently JFK's handling of the crisis and Cuba. Exemplary texts include the November 1975 report of the US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, which divulged covert operations and schemes to kill Castro during the Kennedy years; Barton J. Bernstein, e.g., "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 95 (Spring 1980), 97–125, and Garry Wills, *The Kennedy Imprisonment* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982). In *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., acknowledged (p. 530) that the "record demands the revision of the conventional portraits of Kennedy during the crisis: both the popular view, at the time, of the unflinching leader fearlessly staring down the Russians until they blinked; and the later left-wing view of a man driven by psychic and political compulsions to demand unconditional surrender at whatever risk to mankind."

In the 1980s, the historiography swerved again due both to new evidence and political shifts. The uproar over Ronald Reagan's nuclear policies offered Kennedy loyalists a chance to rebut criticism of their hero. Arguing that Reagan was pushing US–Soviet relations back to the brink, former JFK aides cited his missile crisis posture as a model – *not* the Cold War toughness for which they once hailed him, but because, in fact, he had been the Excomm's leading *dove*, willing to make painful compromises (e.g., publicly trading the Jupiters) to avoid nuclear calamity. Contradicting earlier claims, they now argued that the nuclear balance was *not* decisive in 1962, but that, instead, US *conventional* superiority around Cuba forced Khrushchev to back down. See Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, George Ball, Roswell Gilpatric, Theodore Sorensen, and McGeorge Bundy, "The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Time*, 27 September 1982, Robert McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs*, 62, 1 (Fall 1983), 59–80, and McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival* (New York: Random House, 1988).

Gorbachev's *glasnost* and the demise of the Cold War (and the USSR) hastened the internationalization of missile crisis historiography beyond US sources to incorporate Soviet, Cuban, and other perspectives. A "critical oral history" project gathering US, Soviet, and Cuban veterans between 1987 and 1992 – and an encore in Havana in 2002 – yielded a series of publications: James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink*, 2nd ed. (New York: Noonday Press, 1990), James G. Blight, David A. Welch, and Bruce J. Allyn, *Cuba on the Brink* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), Generals Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR* (Chicago: edition q, 1994), James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, *Sad and Luminous Days* (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002).

Since the 1990s, the evidentiary floodgates have opened on various aspects of the crisis, even once taboo topics such as intelligence. Works presenting new findings include Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball* (New York: Random House, 1991), James A. Nathan (ed.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 53–155, Philip Nash, *The Other Missiles of October* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), and James G. Blight and David A. Welch (eds.), *Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

Fresh secondary accounts of the crisis have supplanted Allison's *Essence of Decision*, most importantly Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997). Others include *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), and *Missiles in Cuba* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), by Mark J. White, Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, rev. ed. (Reading, MA: Longman, 1999), Max Frankel, *High Noon in the Cold War* (New York: Presidio Press, 2004), Sheldon M. Stern, *The Week the World Stood Still* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), Don Munton and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), and Michael Dobbs, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War* (New York: Knopf, 2008, published after Chapter 4 was completed).

Important compilations of declassified records include Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: New Press, 1992; rev. ed., 1998); Mary McAuliffe (ed.), *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, October 1992); and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vols. X-XI and microfiche supplement (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996–98). For Excomm transcripts, see Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.), *The Kennedy Tapes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), *The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises* (New York: Norton, 2001), Vol. II, *September–October 21, 1962*, ed. Naftali and Zelikow, 391–614, and vol. III, *October 22–October 28, 1962*, ed. Zelikow and May; and Sheldon M. Stern, *Averting "The Final Failure"* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

On the Soviet dimension, see, besides Fursenko and Naftali's *"One Hell of a Gamble,"* William Taubman, *Khrushchev* (New York: Norton., 2003), Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War* (New York: Norton, 2006), Sergo Mikoyan, *Anatomiia Karibskogo krizisa* [The Anatomy of the Caribbean Crisis] (Moscow: Academia, 2006), and translated Russian documents available through the websites of the Cold War International History Project and National Security Archive. For other nations, see, e.g., L. V. Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave

Macmillan, 1999), and James G. Hershberg, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6, 2 3 (Spring Summer 2004), 3 20, 5 67.

5. Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate, 1963–1975

For overviews of the nuclear era, see McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), David G. Coleman and Joseph M. Siracusa, *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), and Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Lawrence S. Wittner's, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997) and *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) provide a thorough account of antinuclear movements during the period.

For a detailed topical breakdown of US nuclear spending, see Stephen Schwartz (ed.), *Atomic Audit: The Cost and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998). For decisions on strategic force levels, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. V, *The McNamara Ascendancy 1961–1965* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), and Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Programs of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980). For important studies of major ballistic missile systems, see Graham Spinardi, *From Polaris to Trident: The Development of Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), David Stumpf, *Titan II: A History of a Cold War Missile Program* (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), and Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1975). Donald MacKenzie, *Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), is a wonderful history of inertial guidance.

For US nuclear war planning and target strategy, see essays by David A. Rosenberg, including "Nuclear Planning," in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (eds.), *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). Fred M. Kaplan's *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991) is a path-breaking work on the RAND Corporation and nuclear war planning. For strategy during the early 1970s, see Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), and William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7 (2005), 34–78.

For the relationship between control of nuclear weapons and nuclear war planning, see Peter D. Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). Nina Tannenwald's *The Nuclear Taboo:*

The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) explores the problem of nuclear use. Lynn Eden, *Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear Weapons Devastation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), and Scott Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), are illuminating studies of nuclear weapons effects and safety issues. Bruce Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), reviews US and Soviet launch-on-warning policies since the 1970s.

For strategic intelligence and warning systems, see Jeffrey Richelson, *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), and *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999). For the Internet's origins in the efforts to improve nuclear command-and-control systems, see Roy Rosenzweig, "Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors & Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet," *American Historical Review*, 103 (December 1998), 1530–52.

Raymond Garthoff's *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994) remains the fullest account of détente and the SALT negotiations, but see also Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

English-language work on Kremlin decisionmaking and Soviet nuclear history is scarce, but of high quality. Steven Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), is one of the most valuable studies. Also essential is Pavel Podvig (ed.), *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). For Soviet nuclear policy in a broad historical context, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, new ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), as well as R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917–1991* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). Also important are Christoph Bluth, *Soviet Strategic Arms Policy before SALT* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Raymond Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).

For retrospective thinking by former top Soviet commanders, see John Battilega, "Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interviews," in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Getting MAD: Nuclear Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

For nuclear issues in US–European alliance relations, including nuclear sharing, NATO nuclear strategy, and the origins and development of flexible response, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Ivo Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), and Holga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967* (New York: Oxford University, 1996). Also valuable on US–European nuclear relations is Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). For the important Anglo-American nuclear relationship, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, *Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States, and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000).

On nuclear weapons and the Warsaw Pact, see Vojtech Mastny, Sven S. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2006). Also helpful is Christoph Bluth, "The Warsaw Pact and Military Security in Central Europe during the Cold War," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 17 (2004), 299–311.

6. US foreign policy from Kennedy to Johnson

For published sources, in addition to the variety of documents in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, see the transcripts of telephone conversations in Michael R. Beschloss (ed.), *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), and Michael R. Beschloss (ed.), *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964–1965* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). For the mood in the Kennedy White House, see Andrew Schlesinger and Stephen Schlesinger (eds.), *Journals, 1952–2000: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.* (New York: Penguin, 2007). See also the online recordings available at the sites for the Miller Center Presidential Recordings Project, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. For transcripts of JFK's Excomm meetings, see Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.), *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Be aware, however, that the editors have deleted many of the "umms," "uhhs," and sentence fragments, making the conversations and particularly the president's contributions seem more focused. For less edited transcripts, see "Documentation: White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security*, 10 (1985), 164–203.

Biographies that utilize newly available archival materials include Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1961* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 2003), and Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). More concise is James N. Giglio, *The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). Deeply researched and empathetic is Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006). For an essential perspective, see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003). Valuable are parts of Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2006* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2008), and Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). Other studies remain pertinent. More critical are Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). More sympathetic is Diane B. Kunz, *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Though hagiographic, early biographies by Kennedy's aides offer rich detail. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), and Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

For Kennedy, Johnson, and Vietnam, start with George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2002), Marilyn

B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), Lloyd C. Gardner, *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), and Walter LaFeber, *The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). On the politics of escalation, see Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). For the Vietnamese perspective, see Robert K. Brigham, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). On the Soviet connection, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, *Confronting Vietnam* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

For the Cuban missile crisis, see entries under section 4 of this bibliography.

Two key books are Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), and Stephen G. Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). See also Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1993).

For other Third World areas, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), offers the best overview. Also pertinent are portions of Peter L. Hahn and Mary A. Heiss (eds.), *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), and Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).

On relations with France and Germany, see Erin Mahan, *Kennedy, de Gaulle and Western Europe* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), Andreas Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and Frank Costigliola, *The United States and France: The Cold Alliance since World War II* (New York: Macmillan, 1992). For a sympathetic treatment of LBJ, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). For key monetary issues, see Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Still insightful is David P. Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

For the impact of masculine identity, see Robert G. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001). On the consequences of youthful rebellion, see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

7. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1975

To understand Khrushchev's foreign policy, it is important to understand the man and his career, during both his time in power and the years before that. For a full biography,

see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003). Khrushchev's memoirs have been published in three English-language volumes: Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974); and *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold Schecter and Vyacheslav Luchkov (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990). The full Russian version of the memoirs is N. S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniia: vremia, liudi, vlast* [Memoirs: Time, People, Power], 4 vols. (Moscow: Moskovskie novosti, 1999). A collection of articles including several on foreign and military policy is William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason (eds.), *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven, CT: Yale, 2000). For an additional list of sources concerning Khrushchev's foreign policy both before and after 1962, see the entries in section 15 of this bibliography.

Khrushchev's son has written two memoirs that devote extensive attention to his last years in power: Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), and *Khrushchev on Khrushchev* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990). Khrushchev's chief foreign-policy assistant's memoir is Oleg Troianovskii, *Cherez gody i rasstoianiiia* [Over Years, Over Distances] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997).

The best history of Khrushchev's foreign policy, based on sources from Russian archives, is Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006). See also the entries on the Cuban missile crisis in section 4 of this bibliography.

The vast literature on Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev years could be divided into memoir publications, some of which provide a great deal of analysis, and scholarly studies and interpretations of the period. The memoir literature was mainly written by Russian authors and published in Russia, and serious analytical studies done mainly in the United States and Britain. Two significant exceptions to this are the monograph by Vladislav M. Zubok, *The Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), and by Rudolf G. Pikhov, who had full access to Soviet documents as head of the Russian Archival Administration, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoriia vlasti, 1945–1991* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power, 1945–1991] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 2000).

Among the most valuable memoirs of the period are the books written by former members of the Central Committee who were intimately involved in foreign-policymaking. Two most interesting sources, one looking from the inside and one from outside at the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, are by a member of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatolii Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), and by veteran Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

Other memoirs of Soviet decisionmakers include the director of the Institute of USA and Canada, Georgii A. Arbatov's *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee Karen N. Brutents's *Tritsatsat let na staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years at the Old Square] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii

M. Kornienko's *Kholodnaia voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika* [Testimony of a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), and a volume of recollections of members of Brezhnev's inner circle edited by Iurii Aksiutin, *L. I. Brezhnev: materialy k biografii* [L. I. Brezhnev: Materials for a Biography] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991).

Two outstanding eyewitness accounts combining recollection and analysis are by veteran human rights activist Ludmila Alexeeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), and by chief Soviet arms-control negotiator Nikolai Detinov, and Alexander Saveliev, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), providing a detailed account of Soviet decisionmaking on military-industrial and arms-control issues.

Anyone interested in Soviet foreign policy during the Brezhnev years should consult the magisterial study of US-Soviet relations during détente based on extensive interviews and documents in both countries by Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994). Another classic study that has not lost its relevance is Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

Among the books that focus on Brezhnev as a leader and foreign policymaker more narrowly are the comparative analysis of Khrushchev and Brezhnev by George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), and a collection of essays on Soviet decision-making, *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), ed. Seweryn Bialer.

Among the recent books published after the end of the Cold War that are based on new sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain are publications by Richard Andersen, *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy during the Brezhnev Years* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (London: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002), and by Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996).

8. France, "Gaullism," and the Cold War

No single scholarly work specifically covers France's role throughout the Cold War. A broad account of France's postwar foreign policy can be found in Frédéric Bozo, *La Politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), and an overview on France's role during the first half of the Cold War is given in Georges-Henri Soutou, "France and the Cold War, 1944-1963," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12, 4 (December 2001), 35-52. For a classic (and sympathetic) analysis of de Gaulle's concept and the Cold War system, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's* (New York: Viking, 1974). For the testimony of a veteran French diplomat whose career covered most of the Cold War (with limited sympathy for "Gaullism"), see Henri Froment-Meurice, *Vu du Quai: Mémoires, 1945-1983* (Paris: Fayard, 1998). For a useful introduction to de Gaulle, see Claire Andrieu, Philippe Braud, and Guillaume Piketty, *Dictionnaire de Gaulle* (Paris: Robert

Laffont, 2006); for a biographical approach, see Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945–1970* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), and Eric Roussel, *Charles de Gaulle* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).

On France's policies and the origins of the Cold War under de Gaulle and his immediate successors, see John W. Young, *France, the Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944–1949* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), Pierre Gerbet (ed.), *Le Relèvement, 1944–1949* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1991), and Georges-Henri Soutou, "France," in David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe* (Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). On the "turn" of 1947, see Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza (eds.), *L'Année 1947* (Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po, 2000). On France, the German question and East–West relations in the early Cold War period, see Cyril Buffet, *Mourir pour Berlin: La France et l'Allemagne, 1945–1949* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), Geneviève Maelstaf, *Que faire de l'Allemagne? Les responsables français, le statut international de l'Allemagne et le problème de l'unité allemande (1945–1955)* (Paris: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1999), Michael Creswell, *A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), and Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question, 1945–1955," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 3 (Summer 2003), 5–28. On France, the Cold War, and the beginning of European integration, see Raymond Poidevin (ed.), *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne 1948–1950* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1986), and Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction de l'Europe 1944–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992). On France, the Cold War, and intra-West relations under the Fourth Republic, see Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). On the Fourth Republic, the Cold War, and decolonization, see Denise Artaud, Lawrence Kaplan and Mark Rubin (eds.), *Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954–1955* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990), and Irwin Wall, *France, the United States and the Algerian War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).

For a detailed account of de Gaulle's foreign policy between 1958 and 1969, see Maurice Vaisse, *La Grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle* (Paris: Fayard, 1998). On de Gaulle's early attempts at engaging the Soviet Union, see Thomas Gomart, *Double détente: Les relations franco-soviétiques de 1958 à 1964* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003). On the rise of Gaullist détente policies and the Franco-Soviet rapprochement, see Marie-Pierre Rey, *La Tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS à l'heure de la détente (1964–1974)* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991); on de Gaulle's détente concept, see also François Puaux, "L'originalité de la politique française de détente," in Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle*, vol. V, *L'Europe* (Paris: Plon, 1992), and Marie-Pierre Rey, "De Gaulle, l'URSS et la sécurité européenne, 1958–1969," in Maurice Vaisse (ed.), *De Gaulle et la Russie* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2006). On France's relations with the United States during the period, see Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), and Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France since 1940* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). On the interplay between de Gaulle's East West concept and his intra-West policies, see Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), "The NATO Crisis of 1966–1967:

A French Point of View,” in Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen Szabo, and Sam Wells (eds.), *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), and “Détente vs. Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1966–1967),” *Contemporary European History*, 7, 3 (1998), 343–60; on the interaction with Franco-German and West European policies, see Georges-Henri Soutou, *L’Alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), Benedikt Schoenborn, *La Mésentente apprivoisée: De Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963–1969* (Paris: PUF, 2007), and Corinne Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil (eds.), *Le Traité de l’Elysée et les relations franco-allemandes, 1945–1963–2003* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005). On de Gaulle and the German question, see Pierre Maillard, *De Gaulle et l’Allemagne: Le rêve inachevé* (Paris: Plon, 1990).

For an analysis of the influence of “Gaullism” after de Gaulle, see Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). On France’s policies in the 1970s, see Jacques Andréani, *Le Piège: Helsinki et la chute du communisme* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), Association Georges Pompidou, *Georges Pompidou et l’Europe* (Brussels: Complexe, 1995), Serge Bernstein and Jean-François Sirinelli (eds.), *Les Années Giscard: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Europe, 1974–1981* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2006), and Michèle Weinachter, *Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne: le double rêve inachevé* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004). On François Mitterrand’s France and the last chapter of the East–West conflict, see the following work by Frédéric Bozo: “Before the Wall: French Diplomacy and the last Decade of the Cold War,” in Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), “Mitterrand’s France, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification: A Reappraisal,” *Cold War History*, 7, 4 (November 2007), 455–78, and Mitterrand, *la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005) (English translation, Berghahn Books, 2009).

9. European integration and the Cold War

There is as yet little scholarship that directly addresses the issue of the interconnections between European integration and the Cold War. There are a few exceptions to this rule: Klaus Schwabe, “The Cold War and European Integration, 1947–63,” in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12, 4 (2001), a relevant chapter in Desmond Dinan (ed.) *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), N. Piers Ludlow (ed.), *European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik/Westpolitik, 1965–1973* (London: Routledge, 2007), and one substantial monograph in Italian, Massimiliano Guderzo’s *Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale: Gli Stati Uniti, l’Alleanza Atlantica e l’integrazione europea 1963–9* (Florence: AIDA, 2000). The two *Power in Europe* volumes, ed. Josef Becker and Franz Knipping, and Ennio di Nolfo (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986 & 1992), also cover both fields well. But in most cases, the connections have to be unearthed by reading works primarily focused on either the development of the integration process or Europe’s role within the wider Cold War.

The linkages between the two fields are at their most obvious in studies on the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is true of at least some of the scholarship on the Marshall Plan: see for

instance Michael Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). It is also the case for much of the literature on the foreign policies of individual Western European states in the early postwar era. For France, Gérard Bossuat's immensely detailed *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 1992) has been followed by a good English-language study: William Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–54* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). On Germany too, there is now a strong English-language account: Ronald Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). Georges-Henri Soutou's study of Franco-German relations, *L'Alliance Incertaine* (Paris: Fayard, 1996) is also very valuable. For Britain, John Baylis, *The Diplomacy of Pragmatism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), needs to be combined with Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), and John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). And for Italy, the best overview is provided by Antonio Varsori (ed.), *La politica estera italiana nel secondo dopoguerra (1943–57)* (Milan: LED, 1993). Two good edited volumes also provide a variety of detailed chapters on most of the individual players: David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University press, 1994), and Dominik Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Another fruitful approach is to concentrate on a number of the key biographies, since it was at the highest level of leadership that the interplay between the Cold War and European integration was often most apparent. These include Raymond Poidevin's *Robert Schuman: homme d'état, 1886–1963* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986), Hans-Peter Schwarz's two volumes on Adenauer (published in English by Berghahn books in 1995), Alan Bullock's still valuable study, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983), and Piero Craveri, *De Gasperi* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006). Also helpful in this regard are Alistair Horne's biography of Harold Macmillan, Eric Roussel's studies of de Gaulle, Pompidou and Monnet, Torsten Oppeland's study of Gerhard Schröder, Michel Dumoulin's work on Paul-Henri Spaak, Vincent Dujardin's biography of Pierre Harmel, and François Duchêne's *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York: Norton, 1994).

For a flavour of recent scholarship about the European Defence Community episode, Michel Dumoulin (ed.), *The European Defence Community* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), is useful, especially if supplemented with David Large, *Germans to the Front* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), and Spencer Mawby, *Containing Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999). And the wider context of US enthusiasm for German rearmament can best be understood from Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1993), Geir Lundestad, *Empire by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Also interesting, if much more specialised on the US approach, is Gunnar Skogmar, *The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).

A lot of the most recent work has focused on the 1960s. The challenge to both the Cold War status quo and European integration posed by de Gaulle is variously explored by

Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), Eckard Conze, *Die gaullistische Herausforderung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), Thomas Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson & Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), Wilfried Loth (ed.), *Crises and Compromises* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006), and James Ellison, *The United States, Britain and the Crises in Transatlantic Relations: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–68* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). On Brandt, there is new and detailed biography: Peter Merseburger, *Willy Brandt, 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist* (Stuttgart: DVA, 2002); there are also a number of shorter studies of his eastern policies, e.g. Gottfried Niedhart, “Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design,” *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute*, Supplement 1 (2001). Also useful on the 1970s is Jan van der Harst’s volume *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969–1975* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).

Historians have yet really to tackle the late Cold War in Western Europe. But partial and valuable exceptions include Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005), Kristina Spohr Readman, “Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western Diplomacy and Baltic Struggle for Independence in the Cold War Endgame,” *Cold War History*, 6, 1 (2006), and Marie-Pierre Rey, Frédéric Bozo, Leopoldo Nuti, and N. Piers Ludlow (eds.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal* (London: Routledge, 2008).

10. Détente in Europe, 1962–1975

For a general account that covers European détente in some detail, see Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: Soviet-American Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994). The most comprehensive overview of the development of European détente is the thematically structured John van Oudenaren, *European Détente: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), but for a good and brief narrative, readers should consult Wilfried Loth, *Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950–1991* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). For a sweeping interpretation stressing the interaction between domestic social movements and top policymakers as the root cause of détente, see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). See also Dana H. Allin, *Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969–1989* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), Jussi Hanhimäki, “Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective,” in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), and Tony Smith, “A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History*, 24, 4 (Fall 2000), 567–91.

There is no shortage of works on Charles de Gaulle. The most useful for this chapter were Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), Hugh Gough and John Horne (eds.), *De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France* (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), Erin Mahan, *Kennedy, de Gaulle and Western Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and N. Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the 1960s Crises: The Gaullist Challenge* (London: Routledge, 2006). Other useful works include: Michael M. Harrison, *Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*

(Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States* (New York: Twayne's, 1992), Philip Gordon, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

On West German policies in the 1960s and 1970s, see Ronald Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: The CDU/CSU and the West, 1949–1966* (London: Berghahn Books, 2004), Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A "Special Relationship?"* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), Avriell Pittman, *From Ostpolitik to Reunification* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German–Soviet Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). There is no satisfactory biography of Willy Brandt, but see Barbara Marshall, *Willy Brandt: A Political Biography* (London: Macmillan, 1997). For an interpretation of early Ostpolitik, see Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (London: Routledge, 2007).

American policy in Europe in the 1960s is covered extensively in Thomas A. Schwartz, *In the Shadow of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson and Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), but see also H. W. Brands, *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Diane B. Kunz, (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Policy in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). For the early 1970s, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), and William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration* (New York: New York: Hill and Wang, 1999). American policies toward Eastern Europe are covered in Bennett Kovrig, *Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe* (New York: New York University Press, 1991).

On moves towards détente within the Western bloc in the late 1960s, see Frédéric Bozo, "Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report," *Contemporary European History*, 7, 3 (1998), 343–60, and Andreas Wenger, "Crisis and Opportunity: NATO and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966–68," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6, 1 (Winter 2004), 22–74. For alliance politics in general, see Vojtech Mastny, "The New History of Cold War Alliances," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4, 2 (2002), 55–84. For a different account of NATO, see Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (London: Palgrave, 2000).

For a brief general treatment of developments in Eastern Europe, see G. Swain and N. Swain, *Eastern Europe since 1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). For other issues covered in this chapter, see Ronald J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* (London: Longman, 2002), Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1995), Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). In addition to Harrison's book cited above, the East German question has been treated effectively by Mary E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). See also Michael J. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany and the West: From Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

Press, 1991). For an account that focuses on the Warsaw Pact, the best and most recent is Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005).

For East West trade and other economic issues, see Randall W. Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet Bloc Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), Ian Jackson, *The Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East West Trade 1948–1963* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), Michael Mastanduno, *Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East West Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has attracted much attention in recent years, although mainly because of its assumed significance in undermining the totalitarian order in the Soviet bloc. For different accounts, see John Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1973–1975* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), and Vojtech Mastny, *Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986). For different outlooks on the American perspective on the CSCE, see Charles G. Stefan, “The Drafting of the Helsinki Final Act: A Personal View of the CSCE’s Geneva Phase (September 1973 until July 1975),” *SHAFFR Newsletter*, 31, 2 (June 2000), and Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “‘They Can Write it in Swahili’: Kissinger, the Soviets, and the Helsinki Accords, 1973–1975,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, I, 1 (Spring 2003), 37–58. On the long-term significance in Europe of the CSCE and détente in general, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), and Michael E. Smith, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

II. Eastern Europe: Stalinism to solidarity

A full-length study of many of issues discussed in this chapter is Barbara J Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings* (Budapest: Central European Press, 2003). For a clear overview of political and social uprisings in the region, see Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule* (Oxford: Berg, 2006).

On reemerging civil society, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981), and most notably John Keane (ed.), *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (London: Hutchinson, 1985), which contains Havel’s keynote essay.

The most important recent study of Hungary 1956 is Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and Stanford University Press, 2006). Two valuable retrospective collections are György Litván (ed.), *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression 1953–1963*, trans. from Hungarian by J. Bak and L. Legters, (London: Longman, 1996), and Tamas Aczel (ed.), *Ten Years After: A Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution* (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1966). For the general background, see Ferenc Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), and Ivan Berend, *The Hungarian Economic Reforms 1953–1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Critical and left-inclined writings include Marc Rakovski, *Towards an East European Marxism* (London: Allison & Busby, 1978), and Miklos Haraszti, *A Worker in a Worker's State: Piece-Rates in Hungary*, trans. from Hungarian by Michael Wright (London: Pelican Books, 1977).

The major collection on Czechoslovakia 1968, including numerous new documents from archives, is Jan Navrátil (ed.), *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (Budapest: Central European Press, 1998). Important further research from archives are Mark Kramer, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine," in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (eds.), *1968: The World Transformed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Kieran Williams, *The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Still very valuable is the monograph by H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). Two analyses by Western strategists are Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, *Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), and Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). The memoir of a major participant is Zdeněk Mlynář, *Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism*, trans. from Czech by Paul Wilson (London: C. Hurst, 1980).

For Poland, especially useful are Jacek Kurczewski, *The Resurrection of Rights in Poland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), by a legal sociologist, and Peter Raina, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954–1977* (London: Poets and Painters Press, 1978). The writings of a leading oppositionist are Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays* (Berkeley, CA: 1985), and his *Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives* (Berkeley, CA: 1988). We have valuable accounts of workers' protests in Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Jerzy Eisler, *Grudzień 1970: geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje* [December 1970: Origins, Course of Events, Outcomes] (Warsaw: Sensacje XX wieku, 2000).

The unique talks between Polish strikers and party officials are transcribed by Ewa Wacowska (ed.), *Rewolta Szczecińska i jej znaczenie* [The Szczecin Revolt and Its Significance] (Paris: Kultura, 1971). Subsequent worker-intellectual cooperation is described by Jan-Józef Lipski, *KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland, 1976–1981*, trans. from Polish by O. Amsterdamska and Gene M. Moore (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). Two overviews are Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, trans. from Polish by Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), and A. Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

On East Germany, see Z. Madarasz, *Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971–1989: A Precarious Stability* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), and a meticulous social history by Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). Perennial problems of Balkan nationalism are addressed by Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans* (London: Macmillan, 1970). Important studies of Romania are Dennis Deletant, *Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–89* (London: Hurst & Co., 1995), and

Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). On Bulgaria, see Richard Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

12. The Cold War and the transformation of the Mediterranean, 1960–1975

A truly comprehensive bibliography of the Cold War in the Mediterranean region would need to include a variety of national and topical histories each with voluminous literatures of their own. For the purpose of brevity, this review focuses on the Mediterranean as a region, on southern Europe, and on Africa's northern littoral. The reader is encouraged also to consult the excellent specialized entries found in the bibliographies for all of the volumes for this *Cambridge History*, especially sections 8, 9, 10 of the bibliography in this volume, section 19 of volume I and sections 2, 5, and 14 in volume III.

For the origins of the Cold War in the region, see E. Calandri, *Il Mediterraneo e la difesa dell'Occidente 1947–1956: Eredità imperiali e logiche di guerra fredda* (Firenze: Manent, 1997). For Italy, see B. Arcidiacono, *Le «précédent italien» et les origines de la guerre froide: Les Alliés et l'occupation de l'Italie 1943–1944* (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1984), A. Brogi, *A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff (eds.), *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture and Society, 1948–58* (Oxford and Washington, DC: Berg, 1995), and the still useful James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). For Spain, see Boris N. Liedtke, *Embracing a Dictatorship: US Relations with Spain, 1945–53* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). For Portugal, Luís Nuno Rodrigues has written several overviews; the formative period is covered in his *Salazar-Kennedy: A Crise de uma Aliança* (Capa mole: Editorial Notícias, 2002). For Greece, see Jon V. Kofas, *Under the Eagle's Claw: Exceptionalism in Postwar US–Greek Relations* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), and, for a different view, Howard Jones, *“A New Kind of War”: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For Turkey, see Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security interests, 1945–1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

In addition to more general studies of American diplomacy, subsequent developments in Washington's approach to southern Europe are explored in M. Guderzo, *Interesse nazionale e responsabilità globale: Gli Stati Uniti, l'Alleanza atlantica e l'integrazione europea negli anni di Johnson 1963–69* (Firenze: Manent, 2000), and L. Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a Sinistra. Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia* (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 1999). On Greece and the problem of Cyprus, see G. S. Kaloudis, *The Role of the United Nations in Cyprus from 1964 to 1979* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (London: Granada, 1985).

Consideration of the Mediterranean as a single region was most evident in considerations of military strategy. The Mediterranean's role in NATO is specifically examined in L. S. Kaplan, S. W. Clawson, R. Luraghi, *NATO and the Mediterranean* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1985), and S. Silvestri, M. Cremasco, *Il Fianco Sud della Nato* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1980).

On the Middle East and North Africa, see Jon B. Alterman, *Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956: Hopes Dashed* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), Nigel J. Ashton (ed.), *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–73* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007) (see also Ashton's excellent *Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–59* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). For Egypt, see also Laura James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Important specific studies of North Africa include Nicole Grimaud, *La Politique extérieure de l'Algérie* (Paris: Karthala, 1984), Abdelaziz Chneguir, *La politique extérieure de la Tunisie: 1956–1987* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), Ronald Bruce St. John, "Redefining the Libyan Revolution: The Changing Ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi," *Journal of North African Studies*, 13, 1, (March 2008), 91–106, and Massimiliano Cricco, *Il Petrolio dei Senussi. Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna in Libia dall'indipendenza a Gheddafi (1949–1973)* (Firenze: Polistampa, 2002). For Soviet policy with regard to the Algerian revolution, see E. Obichkina "Sovetskoe rukovodstvo i voina v Alzhire" [The Soviet Leadership and the War in Algeria], *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 1 (2000), 19–30. For Soviet diplomacy in the region, see Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). The covert aspect of Soviet policy in North Africa is discussed to some degree in Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2005).

Transition in Spain and foreign policy are dealt with by P. Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Methuen, 1986), V. Morales Lezcano V., *España de pequeña potencia a potencia media* (Madrid: Uned, 1991), and A. Marquina Barrio, *España en la Política de Seguridad Occidental: 1936–1986* (Madrid: Ed. Ejército, 1986). On the Portuguese revolution, see H. G. Ferreira, M. V. Marshall, *Portugal's Revolution: Ten Years On* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), T. Gallagher, *Portugal. A Twentieth-Century Interpretation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), and Bernardino Gomes and Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolução Portuguesa* (Lisbon: Don Quixote, 2008). The diplomatic effects of the Iberian transformation are analyzed in H. de la Torre (ed.), *Portugal, España y Africa en los últimos cien años* (Merida: Uned, 1992). The standard work in English on Italy is Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), but see also Silvio Lanaro, *Storia dell'Italia repubblicana* (Venice: Marsilio, 1997).

Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006) is good on Soviet policy toward the region. A critical account of Soviet influence on Egyptian decisionmaking has recently been elaborated by Isabella Ginor, "'Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes': Operation Kavkaz and the War of Attrition, 1969–70," *Cold War History*, 3, 1 (2002), 127–56; for a deeper analysis see also Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).

13. The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975

The Cold War in the Third World is the subject of a rich body of literature shaped by diverse interpretations and sources. For an international overview drawing on archives

from several different countries, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Other useful overviews include Mark T. Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), and Forrest D. Colburn, *The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

United States policy is broadly treated in Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss (eds.), *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), and in Gabriel Kolko's critical *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). For an account stressing the agency of Third World actors, see Zachary Karabell, *Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World, and the Cold War, 1946–1962* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999). On American ideology and modernization, see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (eds.), *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), and Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Kennedy and Johnson policies are analyzed in Diane Kunz, (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations during the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For US policy toward specific regions and countries, consult Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), Robert McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), and Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991). On the United States and the problem of race, see Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

Soviet relations with the Third World are treated in Roy Allison, *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Mark N. Katz (ed.), *The USSR and Marxist Revolutions in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Edward Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet (eds.), *The Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980*

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). More recent works, focused on Khrushchev and Brezhnev, include Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002), Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006), William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), and Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). On the USSR and Vietnam, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996). Nigel Jonathan Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Faith: Ideas, Interests, and the Soviet Experience in World Politics," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University (2002), analyzes Soviet ideology.

For the significance of the Third World in the wider contours of Chinese policy, Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), Kuo-kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), and Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), are very useful. On China and Vietnam, see Priscilla Roberts (ed.), *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia* (Washington, DC, and Stanford, CA: Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2006), and Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). For Africa, consult Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–93," *China Quarterly* (1995), 388–422, and Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (New York: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1988).

Other valuable studies, based on specific countries and cases, include Matthew Connolly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make the World Safe for Democracy: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), and John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

See also section 22 of the bibliography in volume I; sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 in this volume; and sections 2, 7, and 8 in volume III.

14. The Indochina wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975

Linguistic handicaps as well as the general unavailability of Vietnamese archival documentation give a regrettably skewed quality to any bibliographic essay published in the West. Although there are signs of change (on both counts), the process will be slow.

Still the most comprehensive treatment of the whole 1945–75 era is the vivid and journalistic account by Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), which in key respects holds up well. David W. P. Elliott, *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975*, 2 vols. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), is a superb in-depth examination of the struggle in a single province in

southern Vietnam. Other general histories include A. J. Langguth, *Our Vietnam: The War, 1954–1975* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), and George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001). Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), helpfully examines American policy in a broader regional context. Also useful on the entire period is Spencer Tucker (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History*, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), and Gareth Porter (ed.), *Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions*, 2 vols. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

The French war in Indochina has received comparatively less attention (including among French historians) than the American one that followed. See Yves Gras, *Histoire de la guerre d'Indochine* (Paris: Plon, 1992), Alain Ruscio, *La Guerre française d'Indochine* (Paris: Complexe, 1992), Philippe Devillers, *L'Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1952), Hugues Tertrais, *Le piastre et le fusil: Le coût de la guerre d'Indochine 1945–1954* (Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002), and Mark A. Lawrence and Fredrik Logevall (eds.), *The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). On early US involvement, the best recent studies are Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), and Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). For the climactic battle of Dien Bien Phu, two classic accounts are Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), and Pierre Rocolle, *Pourquoi Dien Bien Phu?* (Paris: L'Histoire Flammarion, 1968). For the wider regional context of the Indochinese developments in these years, see Christopher Goscha, *Thailand and the Vietnamese Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885–1954* (London: Routledge, 1999).

The “interregnum” after 1954 is covered well in several books, but see especially David L. Anderson, *Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), Kathryn Statler, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York: Knopf, 1986), and Seth Jacobs, *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

American involvement in Indochina expanded steadily after 1961 and so, as a result, has the literature on this later period. A hugely influential early account was David Halberstam's mesmerizing, sprawling *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972). On decisionmaking in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, see also Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), and David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). The Gulf of Tonkin crisis is expertly studied in Edwin Moise, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). An important year is examined in Ronald Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1992). For a Vietcong perspective centered in large part on these

years, see Truong Nhu Tang, *A Vietcong Memoir* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, 1985). And for a relentlessly combative revisionist examination of the period 1954–65, see Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Important studies of latter phase of the conflict, culminating with the fall of Saigon in 1975, include Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 2001), and Robert K. Brigham, *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). The Paris Accords are handled well in Pierre Asselin, *A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). On Cambodia and the rise of Pol Pot, see Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). And on the bitter divisions the war generated in the United States, a useful study is Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Washington, DC: Scholarly Resources, 2002).

Not to be missed, finally, are the important biographies and memoirs that have appeared in recent decades. See, for example, in addition to those listed above, William J. Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh: A Life* (New York: Hyperion, 2000), Pierre Brocheux, *Ho Chi Minh: A Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Daniel Hémery, *Ho Chi Minh, de l'Indochine au Vietnam* (Paris: Découvertes-Gallimard, 1990), Duong Van Mai Elliott, *The Sacred Willow: Four Generations in the Life of a Vietnamese Family* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), Bui Diem, with David Chanoff, *In the Jaws of History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), and Daniel Ellsberg, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers* (New York: Viking, 2002). Christian G. Appy ably gathers together various oral history perspectives in *Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides* (New York: Viking Press, 2003).

15. The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords

The best concise account of the geopolitical setting for Soviet–American rivalry in the region remains Peter Mansfield and Nicolas Pelham, *A History of the Middle East* (New York: Penguin, 2004). For an engaging examination of the broad social, cultural, and religious forces at work, see R. Stephen Humphreys, *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999). Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), details the rise of the petroleum industry and how it shaped Middle Eastern politics. William Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), is the definitive account of Britain's decline as a regional power, the creation of Israel, and the rise of nationalist movements in the Muslim world during the first years of the Cold War. Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East*

since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press), examines broad US interests and policies, while Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War II to Gorbachev* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), does the same for the USSR. For an overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Norton, 2001).

At the center of the Soviet American rivalry in the Middle East during the first decade of the Cold War stood Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose motives are examined in Said K. Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), and Laura M. James, *Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy* (London: Palgrave, 2006). Guy Laron, 'Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal,' Cold War International History Project, (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 55 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2007) uses Soviet sources to reconstruct decisionmaking in Cairo and Moscow. Abdel Magid Farid, *Nasser: The Final Years* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), provides key Egyptian documents from the 1960s, while Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), places Nasserism in the broader context of decolonization and national liberation.

To understand the causes and consequences of the Suez crisis, start with Keith Kyle, *Suez* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), a superb narrative emphasizing the importance of personalities. Other aspects of the 1956 showdown are explored in Diane Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), and Peter Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991). On the rise and fall of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). On the civil war in Lebanon and the upheaval in Iraq, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals 1958-1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), and William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), *A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).

For the early 1960s, see Warren Bass, *Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israeli Alliance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). The definitive account of the June 1967 War is Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), which draws on a rich array of Israeli and Egyptian sources. In his new book entitled simply *1967* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), Tom Segev makes extensive use of new materials from the Israeli archives to argue that the Six Day War resulted from a crisis of confidence among Israel's leaders, who overreacted to Nasser's bluster. For more on the 1967 war, see Richard B. Parker (ed.), *The Six Day War: A Retrospective* (Tallahassee, FL: University of Florida Press, 1996), which includes the recollections of Soviet and American officials, and Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984). On the late 1960s, see David Korn, *Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), Richard B. Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), and Isabella Ginor, "'Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes': Operation Kavkaz and the War of Attrition, 1969-70," *Cold War History*, 3, 1 (October 2002), 127-56.

On the 1970s, begin with the first two volumes of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, *The White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979) and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), which are especially good on the 1970 Black September Crisis and the October 1973 War. See also William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993) and Donald Neff, *Warriors against Israel: How Israel Won the Battle to Become America's Ally* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988). On Soviet policy during the 1970s, see Victor Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). The regional perspective is covered in an excellent biography of a key player, Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). See also Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006).

On the demise of Arab nationalism and rise of radical Islam, start with Fouad Ajami's classic account *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), captures the crisis and the chaos surrounding Khomeini's triumph over the Shah in 1978–79. For an inside account of Carter's response to the Iranian revolution, see Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985). Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), provides a broad overview of the symbiotic relationship that developed between academic experts and national security managers as they struggled to come to terms with radical change in the Muslim world during the Cold War.

16. Cuba and the Cold War, 1959–1980

Historians of Cuban foreign policy after 1959 are crippled by the fact that the Cuban archives are closed. The Cubans have declassified documents only on the missile crisis (see section 4 of this bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, none of the studies listed below uses Cuban documents.

The best biography of Fidel Castro, by far, is Tad Szulc's *Fidel: A Critical Portrait* (New York: Avon Books, 1987). Two more recent works should be noted: Leycester Coltman's *The Real Fidel Castro* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003) combines insights with factual errors; Ignacio Ramonet's *Cien Horas con Fidel*, 3rd rev. ed. (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 2006) is a very lengthy interview with Castro. Jon Lee Anderson's *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1997) uses a few Cuban documents but is of very uneven quality.

Three accounts of foreign policy written by Cuban protagonists are particularly valuable: Ernesto Che Guevara's *Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria: Congo*, ed. Aleyda March (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1999) is Guevara's history, written for Castro, of the Cuban column he led in eastern Zaire in 1965; Jorge Risquet, *El segundo frente del Che en el Congo. Historia del batallón Patricio Lumumba*, 2nd rev. ed. (Havana: Abril, 2006), is a very well-documented and compelling account of the activities of the Cuban column that Risquet led in the former

French Congo in 1965 66; José Gómez Abad, *Como el Che burló a la CIA* (Sevilla: R. D. Editores, 2006), which is written by a member of the Cuban intelligence services, is the only study of Cuban support for armed struggle in Latin America that is based on a large number of Cuban intelligence documents.

The best history of Castro's Cuba is Richard Gott, *Cuba: A New History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: Norton, 1997), is the only study of Cuban Soviet relations that relies on an important number of Soviet documents, but unfortunately it is marred by serious factual mistakes about the Cuban revolutionary process. For later years, see Jacques Lévesque, *L'URSS et la révolution cubaine* (Montreal: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976).

The best studies on US–Cuban relations are Wayne Smith, *The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of US–Cuban Relations since 1957* (New York: Norton, 1987), which focuses on the Carter years, and Lars Schoultz, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Also useful are Morris H. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and Don Bohning, *The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba 1959–1965* (Washington DC: Potomac, 2005). Henry Ryan, *The Fall of Che Guevara: A Story of Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), is the best study of the US response to the guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia led by Che Guevara. The only valuable study on Cuban–West European relations is Alistair Hennessy and George Lambie (eds.), *The Fractured Blockade: West European–Cuban Relations during the Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

Boris Goldenberg's, *Kommunismus in Lateinamerika* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971), is a superb analysis of the impact of the Cuban revolution on the Communist movement in Latin America in the 1960s. Richard Gott's *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), is the best book on armed struggle in Latin America in the 1960s. Régis Debray's *La critique des armes*, 2 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1974), covers armed struggle in Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s and is based on the author's privileged access to several guerrilla leaders and to Cuban officials. Also valuable is Daniel James (ed.), *The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Ché Guevara and Other Captured Documents* (New York: Stein and Day, 1968). Che Guevara's Bolivian diary, however, is far less informative than his account of the operation in Zaire; of the other captured diaries included in the volume, the most interesting is by Pombo.

Since 1994, I have been able to conduct research in the closed Cuban archives and photocopy thousands of pages of documents, mainly on Africa, but also, increasingly, on Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. See especially "The View from Havana," in Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser (eds.), *In From the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 112–33, "Cuba and the Independence of Namibia," *Cold War History* (May 2007), 285–303, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–88," *Journal of Cold War Studies* (Fall 2006), 98–146, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), "Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba," *International History Review* (Feb. 1996), 70–103.

Three additional works, though not focusing on Cuba, shed light on Cuba's foreign policy: F.J. du Toit Spies' *Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975 1976* (Pretoria: S.A. Weermag, 1989), Sophia du Preez's *Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975 1976* (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 1989), Nancy Mitchell, "Race and Realpolitik: Jimmy Carter and Africa" (forthcoming). Spies and du Preez offer the only two studies of the South African operation in Angola in 1975–76 that are based on South African documents. Mitchell combines an unprecedented array of sources and a sophisticated analysis to offer what is by far the best study on Carter's policy in Africa. She also has significant access to Cuban documents. (See also Mitchell's "Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia," *Cold War History*, May 2007, 263–83.)

17. The Sino-Soviet split

The Sino-Soviet split deservedly attracted the attention of political scientists and historians in the West as it developed, in the 1960s, from a war of words to a real border confrontation. Pioneer accounts include Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift, 1964–65* (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 1964), Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), and John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963–67* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). These books work best with a side-reader, a Chinese propaganda pamphlet, *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965).

The military clashes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 deepened interest in Sino-Soviet relations in the West, and the historiography thickened by leaps and bounds, with books like Alfred D. Low, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics* (London: Associated University Presses, 1976), and O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The Great Game* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971). Herbert J. Ellison (ed.), *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Seattle, WA, and London: University of Washington Press, 1982), offers an interesting analysis of the global impact of the split. Besides, this volume contains perhaps the best bibliographic essay of works on the Sino-Soviet split written up to 1982. To get a sense of the Chinese and the Soviet historiography of the split, it is enough to read, for example, Hsiao Fan et al. *Ugly Features of Soviet Social-Imperialism* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), and Oleg Borisov and Boris Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1945–1973: A Brief History* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).

Partial opening of the archives in the former Communist bloc in the early 1990s prompted scholarly reassessments of the Sino-Soviet split, and the emergence of new, nuanced interpretations, as in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), which overall rejects the rigidity of realist scholarship and emphasizes the role of domestic politics, personalities, and perceptions in the making of the confrontation. Domestic politics is also of primary concern in Lorenz Luthi's excellent *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2008), but decidedly less so in Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy,*

1962–1967 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), which blames the Sino-Soviet split on the inequality of the alliance.

In addition, a number of important articles appeared in English on the subject: Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (August 2000), 21–52; Wang Dong, *The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 49 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006), and Mikhail Prozumenshchikov, “The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (hereafter, *CWIHP Bulletin*) Nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–97). The *CWIHP Bulletin* has other articles pertinent to the subject; see <http://cwihp.si.edu>. Many Chinese articles on Sino-Soviet relations by, among others, Li Danhui, Niu Jun, Shen Zhihua, and Yang Kuisong, can be viewed (in Chinese) at the website of the International Cold War History Research Center at East China Normal University, www.coldwarchina.com.

Beyond comparatively thin new Cold War scholarship on the Sino-Soviet split, there is growing literature on adjacent subjects. Thus, an important recent book on the Chinese foreign policy – Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) – takes up the Sino-Soviet split as a function of Mao's domestic agenda, in particular, his preoccupation with the future of the Chinese revolution. Parallel arguments stand out in Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vol. III, *The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961–1966* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), a book concerned with a major domestic Chinese upheaval, which had a direct relevance for Sino-Soviet relations. Very much out of tune with these studies, but based on impressive research, is a controversial biography of Mao, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), which depicts the Sino-Soviet split as essentially a product of a power struggle between Beijing and Moscow.

Other important sources are volume XV of Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), in particular the chapter by Thomas Robinson; and John Lewis and Xue Litai, *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). Another useful book on China's foreign policy in the 1960s is Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International; distributed by Columbia University Press, 1998).

There is also a growing number of memoirs by Chinese participants in the policy-making process, of which the most noteworthy for our purpose is Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu* [Ten Year War of Words: A Memoir of Sino-Soviet Relations], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1999). Volumes II and III of Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976* [Zhou Enlai Chronology; 1949–1976] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1997), are both indispensable for thorough research on any aspect of Chinese foreign policy in the 1960s, including its Soviet angle. By the same token, former Soviet diplomats published a number of interesting accounts or memoirs of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s, including Aleksei A. Brezhnev, *Kitai: Tersniyti put k dobrososedstvu: vospominaniia i razmyshleniia*

[China: The Thorny Path to Good Neighborliness; Reminiscences and Reflections] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), Boris N. Vereshchagin, *V starom i novom Kitae: iz vospominanii diplomata* [In Old and New China: From the Reminiscences of a Diplomat] (Moscow: In-t Dalnego Vostoka, 1999), G. V. Kireev, *Rossiia Kitai: neizvestnye stranitsy pograniichnykh peregovorov* [Russia China: Unknown Pages from the Border Talks] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2006), and Vladimir Fedotov, *Polveka vmeste s Kitae: vospominania, zapisi, razmysleniia* [A Half-Century with China: Reminiscences, Notes, Reflections] (Moscow: Rosspen, 2005).

18. Détente in the Nixon–Ford years, 1969–1976

A rich body of documentary evidence on the Nixon administration's foreign policy has been made available. An excellent survey of that record is contained in Edward C. Keefer, "Key Sources for Nixon's Foreign Policy," *Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*, 38, 2 (August 2007), 27–30. For textual materials in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, consult the finding aids available at www.nixon.archives.gov/find/textual/presidential/nsc/kissinger/descriptions.html. Lists of tape recordings of President Richard Nixon's conversations are available at www.nixon.archives.gov/find/tapes.html. The National Security Archive has made copies available of thousands of pages of documents on the foreign policy of the Nixon administration in *The Kissinger Transcripts: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969–1977* (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2006.). This collection is available electronically from the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) (<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.html>). Major documents on détente from Soviet and United States archives are published in US Department of State, *Soviet–American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2007). For a list of volumes relevant to détente in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*, compiled by the Department of State, consult www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/.

For a general account of the policies and personalities of the Nixon administration, consult Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999). A comprehensive and critical discussion of Nixon's foreign policy is William P. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Nixon's Foreign Policy, 1968–1974* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

The global background of détente is treated in Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). The most detailed discussion of détente is found in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992). Other useful studies of détente and Soviet American relations are William P. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), John J. Moresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (Durham, NO: Duke University Press, 1985), Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), Richard W. Stevenson, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tension in U.S. Soviet Relations, 1953–1984* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

Arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union are covered in Gerard Smith's highly critical *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), Terry Terriff's analytical and supportive *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), George Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), which criticizes the bureaucratic infighting in the Nixon administration; and John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), which is based on interviews with the negotiators.

Economic aspects of détente are covered in Marshall Goldman, *Détente and Dollars: Doing Business with the Soviets* (New York: Basic Book, 1975), and Dan Morgan, *The Great Grain Robbery* (New York: Penguin, 1980).

Biographical studies of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are rich sources of insight into their ideas and conduct of foreign relations. The relationship between the two men is covered extensively in Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). For Nixon, see Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon*, Vol. II, *The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972*, and *Nixon*, vol. III, *Ruin and Recovery, 1973–1990* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989, 1991), Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basis Books, 1994), is highly critical of Nixon's and Kissinger's methods. Jonathan Aitken, *Nixon: A Life* (New York: Regnery, 1993), is highly favorable. For Kissinger, consult Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), which is based on an abundance of declassified documents; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), based on some documents and numerous interviews; and Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), based on extensive interviews with Kissinger and recently declassified documents.

The memoirs of the officials of the Nixon administration are essential sources. The most important are Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1978) and Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), and *Years of Renewal* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1999). Other useful memoirs are John Ehrlichman, *Witness to Power: The Nixon Years* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), H. R. Haldeman with Joseph DiMona, *The Ends of Power* (New York: Times Books, 1978), H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: Putman, 1994), H. R. Haldeman, *The Complete Multimedia Edition of the Haldeman Diaries* [CD-ROM] (Santa Monica, CA: Sony Electronic Publishing Company, 1994), Raymond Price, *With Nixon* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), William Safire, *Before the Fall: An Inside View of the pre-Watergate White House* (New York: Doubleday, 1975), Gerard C. Smith, *Disarming Diplomacy: The Memoirs of Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996).

Important memoirs from the Soviet side include Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York: Times Books and Random House, 1995), Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), and Georgii Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, 1992).

19. Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War

The scholarly work on nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation can be divided into three broad (and occasionally overlapping) categories. The first category and arguably the most influential work has been done by international relations scholars, typically from the political science and strategic studies fields. By far the most important book here is the debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (2nd ed.; New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). Sagan's article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb" *International Security*, 21, 3 (Winter 1996/97), 54–86, is also very important. Also useful are T. V. Paul's *Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 2000), and Nathan E. Busch, *No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky, 2004). There are many articles and collected essays written by strategists on these questions, but several edited volumes are particularly good: Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds.), *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), Victor Utgoff, *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), and Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James Wirtz, *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2000). The argument that nuclear non-proliferation has become an important global norm is laid out in Nina Tannenbaum's "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security*, 29, 4 (Spring 2005), 5–49.

The second category includes work written by policy participants, arms-control professionals and non-proliferation advocates (often associated with policy organizations and think tanks). The best works by participants include Raymond Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), Glenn T. Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Company, 1987), and George Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). For the most interesting and comprehensive report in the arms-control policy, see George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon Wolfsthal, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2004).

The third category is historical work. There is no comprehensive, global history of nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation, although Shane Maddock has written an excellent dissertation from the US perspective, "The Nth Country Conundrum: The American and Soviet Quest for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1970," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut (1997). There are terrific histories of both India's and Israel's nuclear programs: George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), and Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). The Soviet nuclear weapons program is chronicled in David Holloway's *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 1994), while China's program is explained in John Lewis and Litai Xue's *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988). The US reaction to China's nuclear detonation is best captured in William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson's account, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64," *International Security*, 25, 3 (Winter 2000/01), 54–99. For historical treatment's of President Johnson's nuclear non-proliferation policies, see Thomas Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Nuclear Proliferation and Rogue States before the Bush Doctrine," *International Security* (Winter 2005), 100–35. The change in Soviet nuclear non-proliferation policy is covered in Douglas Selva, *The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1963–1965*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 32 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001), 6, www.isn.ethz.ch/php/research/RelationsWithAllies/Wp32_Selva.pdf; William C. Potter "Nuclear Proliferation: U.S.–Soviet Cooperation" *Washington Quarterly*, 8, 1 (Winter 1985), 141–54; and Joseph Nye's "U.S.–Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime," in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.) *U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

The best works on the influence of nuclear weapons on international politics during the Cold War include Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1989), John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg (eds.), *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb* (New York: Oxford, 1999), and Marc Trachtenberg's two volumes *History and Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1991) and *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1999). For works that connect nuclear strategy to the question of proliferation and non-proliferation, see Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), and Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible Response: American Strategy in Europe during the 1960s," *International History Review* (December 2001), 847–75. Lawrence Wittner's *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1997) is essential for understanding the global rise of a grassroots movement against nuclear weapons.

20. Intelligence in the Cold War

In terms of a general approach, Sherman Kent, "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," in Donald P. Steury (ed.), *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays* (Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), is a seminal article (written in 1955 and originally classified) arguing that until intelligence had a serious literature it would be an immature profession. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), is a persuasive analysis of intelligence as integral to the power of the modern state. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): the first attempt at a general history; it does, however, require updating by the more specialized work below but is still a useful survey.

The history of Cold War intelligence is a fast-developing field. The best way to keep track of recent research is through the two leading academic journals: *Intelligence and National Security* (the first in the field) and *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*.

For the Soviet Union, see Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Allen Lane, 1999); published in the United States as *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2005); published in the United States as *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Kennedy, Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958–1964* (London: John Murray, New York, 1997): the first to use Soviet intelligence records for the missile crisis; Michael Scammell (ed.), *The Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents Reveal One Man's Fight against the Monolith*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Chicago: Edition Q, 1995), a documentary case study of the KGB's obsession with "ideological subversion"; N. S. Leonov, *Likholet: Sekretnye Missii* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), a very useful memoir; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), *Instructions from The Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), slightly revised US edition published as *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), and Raymond L. Garthoff, "The KGB Reports to Gorbachev", *Intelligence and National Security*, 11 2 (1996), 224–44.

For the United States, see Christopher Andrew, *For The President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (Washington, DC: History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: US Covert Operations in Chile 1964–1974* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007); Gregory Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), memoirs of a former DCI; Ben Fischer (ed.), *At Cold War's End: US Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989–1991* (Washington, DC: Ross & Perry Inc., 2001); Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2007), well-written, up-to-date sources, but unbalanced; see "Sins of Omission and Commission" by Jeffrey T. Richelson in the *Washington DeCoded* blog, September 11, 2007, www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2007/09/sins-of-omissio.html. Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB* (New York: Random House, 2004)

For the United Kingdom, see Richard J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001), Michael S. Goodman, *Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Atomic Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), Peter Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), Sir Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), Sir Lawrence

Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge, 2005), Philip H.J. Davies, *M16 and the Machinery of Spying* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), and Christopher Andrew, *The Centenary History of the Security Service, 1909–2009* (London and New York, 2009). Official histories of SIS (1909–1949) by Keith Jeffery and of the JIC (since 1936) by Michael S Goodman are in preparation.

On forms of intelligence collection, see – for HUMINT – Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968); Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, *The Spy Who Saved The World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), the first to gain access to the debriefs of the most important Western agent of the early Cold War, Oleg Penkovskii; Oleg Kalugin, *Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West* (London: Smith Gryphon, 1994); Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995), the autobiography of the most important Western agent of the later Cold War; Victor Cherkashin (with Gregory Feifer), *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Admiral Fulvio Martini, *Nome in codice, ULISSE: trent' anni di storia italiana nelle memorie di un protagonista dei servizi segreti* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999); and Pierre Lethier, *Argent Secret: L'espion de L'affaire Elf parle* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001).

For SIGINT, see Christopher Andrew, "The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, 1940–1948", in James E. Dillard and Walter T. Hitchcock (eds.), *The Intelligence Revolution and Modern Warfare* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996); George A. Brownell, *The Origins and Development of the National Security Agency* (Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1981), is the report which led to the foundation of NSA and is good on the later development of the SIGINT Alliance; Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties that Bind* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990); and Nicky Hager, *Secret Power* (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potten, 1996). By far the most closely studied SIGINT success of the Cold War is VENONA: see Roger Louis Benson and Michael Warner (eds.), *VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957* (Washington, DC: National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, 1996); John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) Nigel West, *Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War* (London: Harper Collins, 1999); Wilhelm Agrell, *Venona: Spåren från ett underrättelsekrig* (Lund: Historiska Media, 2003); Desmond Ball and David Horner, *Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network 1944–1950* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1998); and John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003). As yet, the study of SIGINT for most of the Cold War is in its infancy. Pioneering case studies include Matthew M. Aid and Cees Wiebes (eds.), *Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Beyond* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), David Stafford, *Spies beneath Berlin* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2003), and Jean-Marie Pontaut and Jérôme Dupuis, *Les Oreilles du Président: suite de la liste des 2000 personnes écoutées par François Mitterrand* (Paris: Fayard, 1996).

For IMINT, see Dino A Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1991), an insider's account; Dino A Brugioni, "The Unidentifieds", in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), *Inside CIA's Private World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Kevin D. Ruffner (ed.), *CORONA: America's First Satellite Program* (Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central

Intelligence Agency, 1995); Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998); and Jeffrey Richelson, *America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

21. Reading, viewing, and tuning in to the Cold War

The middle years of the cultural Cold War have not been well served by the historiography, which has focused on the earlier period. Important exceptions include David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004). Cultural dimensions are now regularly considered in the core journals of Cold War history, *Cold War History*, *The Journal of Cold War Studies*, and media history journals like *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*.

The mechanics of Soviet international propaganda in the Cold War are well discussed in Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy", *Diplomatic History*, 27 (2003), 193–214, but for sustained treatments the researcher should begin with Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960) and his follow-up *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1964), and Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda: A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), and *Soviet International Propaganda* (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982).

On US propaganda, Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) provides a complete overview using recently declassified material. Much the best volume on the cultural dimension is Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005). American and Western broadcasting during the Cold War are both treated in Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting and the Cold War* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997). An invaluable insight into the working of US cultural diplomacy may be gained from the memoir of Lyndon Johnson's assistant secretary of state for cultural relations, Charles Frankel, *High on Foggy Bottom: An Outsider's Insider View of Government* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). The story of US and Soviet exchanges has been told in Yale Richmond's two studies: *U.S.–Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958–1986: Who Wins?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), and *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). Leader exchanges are analyzed in Giles Scott-Smith's masterly *Networks of Empire: The U.S. State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950–70* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008).

European initiatives in the field of cultural diplomacy may be explored in Francis Donaldson, *The British Council: The First Fifty Years* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), and François Roche and Bernard Pigniau, *Histoires de diplomatie culturelle des origines à 1995* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1995). On German cultural diplomacy and language policy from the Weimar Republic to the early Federal Republic, see Eckard Michels, *Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1923–1960* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005).

While there is a wide literature on the content of Cold War culture, a magnificent starting point from the Anglo-American perspective that integrates culture and politics across the entire Cold War period is Fred Inglis, *The Cruel Peace: Everyday Life in the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1991). The story of the transformation of American culture during the middle Cold War/Vietnam period is explored in Tom Engelhardt, *The End of the Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

An excellent introduction to American Cold War culture may be found in Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). America's specific nuclear fears have been addressed by Paul S. Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), and Margot A. Henriksen, *Dr. Strangelove's America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), and, in a comprehensive work that includes global cultural responses, Paul Brians, *Nuclear Holocausts: Atomic War in Fiction 1895–1984* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1986), updated at www.wsu.edu/~brians/nuclear/.

For an introduction to Cold War cinema across the entire period in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), and his *Hollywood's Cold War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). On Cold War classical epics, see Martin M. Winkler (ed.) *Spartacus: Film and History* (London: Blackwells, 2007), and Sandra R. Joshel, Margaret Malamud, and Donald T. McGuire, Jr. (eds.), *Imperial Projections: Ancient Rome in Modern Popular Culture* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

Those seeking a scholarly treatment of film and TV spies should begin with James Chapman, *Licence to Thrill: A Cultural History of the James Bond Films* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), and his *Saints and Avengers: British Adventure Series of the 1960s* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). On spy literature more broadly, see John G. Cawelti and Bruce A. Rosenberg, *The Spy Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). A good starting point for understanding the evolution of American war films is the revised edition of Thomas Doherty, *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). The best starting point on the Western genre in the Cold War remains Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).

Points of entry in English into the culture of the USSR and Eastern Europe include Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). On Soviet attitudes towards the United States, see Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000). For Eastern European film, begin with Dina Iordanova, *Cinema of the Other Europe: The Industry and Artistry of East Central European Film* (London: Wallflower Press, 2003).

22. Counter-cultures: The rebellions against the Cold War order, 1965–1975

The historical literature on the counter cultures is dominated by works of cultural and social analysis. Some of the most insightful books in this genre are Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), and George Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987). Theodore Roszak popularized the term “counter-culture” in the late 1960s, and his writings remain valuable as sources of insight into the self-conception of Americans in the movement at the time. See Roszak's *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969). For a collection of international primary sources on the counter-cultures, accompanied by interpretive comments, see Jeremi Suri, *The Global Revolutions of 1968* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).

Historians are beginning to address the influence of the counter-cultures on political leaders across societies. For some of the works in this emerging field, see Samuel H. Baron, *Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherkassk, 1962* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach (eds.), *America, the Vietnam War, and the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

The social movements and politics of the 1960s have inspired a broad range of interpretive surveys, some of the most insightful include Paul Berman, *A Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), Terry H. Anderson, *The Sixties*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2006), Doug Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and New Left America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), Van Gosse, *Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretive History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Zhores A. Medvedev, *Ten Years after Ivan Denisovich*, trans. Hilary Steinberg (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1990), Wolfgang Kraushaar, *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000), Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey (ed.), *1968 – Von Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998), Rolf Uessler, *Die 68er: APO, Marx und freie Liebe* (Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1998), Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), Anita Chan, *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1985).

A number of authors have examined the comparative dynamics of protest across societies. For some of the most suggestive works, see Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), Carole Fink, Phillip Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.) *1968: The World Transformed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Gerard J. DeGroot (ed.), *Student Protest: The Sixties and After* (New York: Longman, 1998); Klimke, *The “Other” Alliance*; Marwick, *The Sixties*; Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of the New Left*; Suri, *Power and Protest*.

The literature on “law and order” politics is quite large and varied in focus. For some of the best works, see Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (eds.), *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), Joseph Crespino, *In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), Kevin M. Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), Michael W. Flamm, *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), Patrick Moreau, *Les Héritiers du III^e Reich: L’extrême Droite Allemande de 1945 à nos Jours* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), Jacques Schuster, *Heinrich Albertz – der Mann, der mehrere Leben lebte: eine Biographie* (Berlin: Alexander Fest Verlag, 1997), Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition, 1963–1969* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), Dmitri Volkogonov, *Семь Вождей: Галерея лидеров СССР* [Seven Bosses: A Gallery of Soviet Leaders], 2 vols. vol. II (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), and Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002).

The historiography on foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s, and détente in particular, is growing rapidly with the opening of new archival sources in numerous societies. For some of the most insightful books, see Robert D. Schulzinger, *A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), and Suri, *Power and Protest and Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).

23. The structure of great power politics, 1963–1975

Probably the best and most up-to-date introduction to great power politics in the middle period of the Cold War – the period, say, from 1962 to 1975 – is the section dealing with that period in Georges-Henri Soutou, *La Guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflit Est–Ouest 1943–1990* (Paris: Fayard, 2001). André Fontaine’s *Un seul lit pour deux rêves: Histoire de la “détente,” 1962–1981* (Paris: Fayard, 1981), an account by an astute and very well-informed French journalist, is also very much worth reading. For the latter part of this period, Raymond Garthoff’s very detailed study, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), is fundamental.

There is a vast literature on US European relations during this period. The middle chapters in Geir Lundestad's *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), provide a good introduction; the book also has a very useful bibliography. Josef Joffe's *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987) is another important work on the subject.

A number of recent studies deal with American foreign policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. On the Kennedy period, see the last two chapters in Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). On the Johnson period, see especially Thomas Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), and Frank Costigliola's important article, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and the 'End of the Cold War,'" in Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds.), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On Johnson's non-proliferation policy, see Francis Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security*, 29, 3 (Winter 2004–05), 100–35, and Hal Brands, "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 2 (Spring 2006), 83–113. On balance-of-payments and related issues and their political and military implications, see Francis Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), and Hubert Zimmermann, *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

On the Nixon–Kissinger period, perhaps the best introduction is Jussi Hanhimäki's historiographical survey, 'Dr. Kissinger' or 'Mr. Henry'? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting," *Diplomatic History*, 27, 5 (November 2003), 637–76. Hanhimäki's *Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) is a good scholarly analysis. See also the account by one of Kissinger's collaborators: William Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987). Kissinger's three enormous volumes of memoirs should also be noted; the first of the three – Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979) – is one of the most extraordinary political memoirs ever written.

For German foreign policy through 1963, Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer*, vol. II (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), is perhaps the best source. That volume is also available now in English translation. For the post-Adenauer period, see the sections on foreign policy in the following three volumes in the *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* series: Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition, 1963–1969* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1984), Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Jäger, and Werner Link, *Republik im Wandel, 1969–1974: Die Ära Brandt* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), and Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link, *Republik im Wandel, 1974 1982: Die Ära Schmidt* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987). In English, the most important work covering the Ostpolitik period is *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, by Timothy Garton Ash (New York, Random House, 1993). Note also Arne Hofmann, *The Emergence of Détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik* (New York: Routledge, 2007). On the internal politics of German foreign policy during that period, see especially

Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989).

On French policy for the period when de Gaulle was in charge, the most important studies are Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), and Frédéric Bozo, *Deux stratégies pour l'Europe: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique* (Paris: Plon, 1996). On the Pompidou period (1969–1974), see especially two important articles by Georges-Henri Soutou: "L'Attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l'Allemagne," in *Georges Pompidou et l'Europe* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1995), and "Georges Pompidou and U.S.–European Relations," in Marc Trachtenberg (ed.), *Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

On Soviet policy through 1964, see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), and Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, "One Hell of a Gamble": *Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), as well as the important new book by those authors, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York: Norton, 2006). The literature on the post-1964 period is still rather thin. For an overview, see the chapters on the Brezhnev period in Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Two older books are still quite useful: Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), and Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). A number of important works have come out in recent years dealing with specific aspects of Soviet policy during that period. See, in particular, Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), and Ilya V. Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996). Mary Sarotte's *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) is a major study of the détente / Ostpolitik period based largely on East German sources.

Two topics dominate the study of Chinese foreign policy during this period: the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s and the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. Thomas Robinson, "China Confronts the Soviet Union: War and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers," and Jonathan Pollack, "The Opening to America," both in Roderick MacFarquhar and John Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. XV, *Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), provide very good introductions to those two topics. On Sino-Americans relations, see also the relevant parts of Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), and Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

Military issues loomed large in this period. Anyone interested in getting some real insight into these issues should read Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), by far the most important work on the subject. The most important historical work in this area has been done by David Rosenberg. For this period, see especially his article "The History of World War III, 1945–1990: A Conceptual

Framework," in Robert David Johnson (ed.), *On Cultural Ground: Essays in International History*, (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1994). On nuclear strategy during the Nixon period, William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 3 (Summer 2005), 34–78, is a major archive-based study. On the evolution of NATO strategy during this period, see Jane Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); John Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), chapter 5; and Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). For European views on NATO strategy, see also Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), and Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), as well as the book by Frédéric Bozo, *Deux Stratégies pour l'Europe* noted above.

There is a vast literature on Soviet military strategy during this period; some key sources are listed in notes 18 and 20 of the Rosenberg article "World War III," cited above. Some recent historical work has been based on archival sources that have become available since the end of the Cold War. See, for example, the studies published in Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger, *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2006); note especially Mastny's article there on "Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning." The Warsaw Pact material in the former East German archives provided some important grist for the scholarly mills in this area. See, for example, Christoph Bluth, "Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact: Reinterpreting Military Doctrine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 18, 4 (December 1995), 55–77, and Beatrice Heuser, "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s: Findings in the East German Archives," *Comparative Strategy* 12, 4 (October 1993), 437–57. One important work, with some interesting new information on this subject, is William Odom's *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

As for arms control, the scholarly literature on the SALT negotiations remains surprisingly thin, despite all the archival material that has become available in the last decade. The best introduction to the subject is probably still John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1973).

24. The Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century

Any reflection on the relationship between the Cold War and the social and economic history of the twentieth century will profit from Eric Hobsbawm's thoughtful *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). More detailed narratives of the second half of the twentieth century, including aspects of social and cultural changes, are David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (London: Penguin Books 2000), and on crucial developments in Europe, Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

The best general accounts of the economic history of the twentieth century can still be found in the volumes of the *Penguin History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century*:

Gerd Hardach, *The First World War 1914–1918*, Derek H. Aldcroft, *From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929*, Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression 1929–1939*; Alan S. Milward, *War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945*; and Herman Van der Wee, *Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy 1945–1980*.

An updated survey on the economic development in Europe is offered in Derek H. Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914–1990* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Economic relations between states and societies are discussed in James Foreman-Peck, *A History of the World Economy: International Economic Relations since 1850* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).

Among the general accounts of the developments in the Soviet Union, Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), is a classic, whereas Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998), offers the most reliable integration of recent research, and Jörg Barberowski, *Der rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2003), discusses the dynamism of Stalinist terrorism.

The relations between economic, social, and political history during the emergence of the Cold War are discussed in Wilfried Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt: Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955*, rev. ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2000), and John J. Agnew and Nicholas Entrikin (eds.), *The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).

Stalin's postwar strategy is discussed in more detail in Wilfried Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child: The Soviet Union, the German Question, and the Founding of the GDR* (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1998).

On a special aspect of the change in the international system after World War II, see Roy Fraser Holland, *European Decolonisation 1918–1991* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987). On the far-reaching social changes after the post-World War II reconstruction, Jean Fourastié, *Les trente glorieuses ou la révolution invisible* (Paris: Fayard, 1979), is a classic. Updated details may be found in general accounts of the history of European countries, such as Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), L. P. Morris, *Eastern Europe since 1945* (London and Exeter: Heinemann Educational Books, 1984), René Rémond: *Notre siècle 1918–1988*, vol. VI, *Histoire de France* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), Edgar Wolfrum, *Die geglättete Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006).

On the consequences of the transition to consumer societies in the late 1960s, see Henri Mendras, *La Seconde Révolution française, 1965–1984* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), and Stephan Malinowski and Alexander Sedlmaier, "'1968' als Katalysator der Konsumgesellschaft," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 32 (2006), 238–67.

The final crisis of the Soviet system is discussed in Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor in Soviet Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), and, with more emphasis on the international relations, in Wilfried Loth, *Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950–1991* (Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave and St. Martin's Press, 2002).

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

Volume III of *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* examines the evolution of the conflict from the Helsinki Conference of 1975 until the Soviet collapse in 1991. A team of leading scholars analyzes the economic, social, cultural, religious, technological, and geopolitical factors that ended the Cold War and discusses the personalities and policies of key leaders such as Brezhnev, Reagan, Gorbachev, Thatcher, Kohl, and Deng Xiaoping. The authors show how events throughout the world shaped the evolution of Soviet–American relations and they explore the legacies of the superpower confrontation in a comparative and transnational perspective. Individual chapters examine how the Cold War affected and was affected by environmental issues, economic trends, patterns of consumption, human rights, and non-governmental organizations. The volume represents the new international history at its best, emphasizing broad social, economic, demographic, and strategic developments while keeping politics and human agency in focus.

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THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE
COLD WAR

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VOLUME III
Endings

★

Edited by
MELVYN P. LEFFLER
and
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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837217

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First published 2010

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

The Cambridge history of the Cold War / edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-521-83721-7

1. Cold War. 2. World politics – 1945–1989. 3. International relations – History –
20th century. I. Leffler, Melvyn P., 1945– II. Westad, Odd Arne. III. Tide.

D842.C295 2009

909.82'5–dc22

2009005508

ISBN 978-0-521-83721-7 Hardback

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Preface to volumes I, II, and III

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War has gradually become history. In people's memories, the epoch when a global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international affairs has taken on a role very much like that of the two twentieth-century world wars, as a thing of the past, but also as progenitor of everything that followed. As with the two world wars, we now also have the ability to see developments from the perspectives of the different participants in the struggle. Declassification, however incomplete, of a suggestive body of archival evidence from the former Communist world as well as from the West makes this possible. The time, therefore, is ripe to provide a comprehensive, systematic, analytic overview of the conflict that shaped the international system and that affected most of humankind during the second half of the twentieth century.

In this three-volume *Cambridge History*, the contributors seek to illuminate the causes, dynamics, and consequences of the Cold War. We want to elucidate how it evolved from the geopolitical, ideological, economic, and sociopolitical environment of the two world wars and the interwar era. We also seek to convey a greater appreciation of how the Cold War bequeathed conditions, challenges, and conflicts that shape developments in the international system today.

In order to accomplish the above goals, we take the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* (CHCW) far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs. We seek to clarify what mattered to the greatest number of people during the Cold War. Indeed, the end of the conflict cannot be grasped without understanding how markets, ideas, and cultural interactions affected political discourse, diplomatic events, and strategic thinking. Consequently, we shall deal at considerable length with the social, intellectual, and economic history of the twentieth century. We shall discuss demography and consumption, women and youth, science and technology, culture and race. The evolution of the Cold War cannot be comprehended without attention to such matters.

The *CHCW* is an international history, covering the period from a wide variety of geographical and national angles. While some chapters necessarily center on an individual state or a bilateral relationship, there are many more chapters that deal with a wider region or with global trends. Intellectually, therefore, the *CHCW* aspires to contribute to a transformation of the field from national – primarily American – views to a broader international approach.

The authors of the individual chapters have been selected because of their academic standing in the field of Cold War studies, regardless of their institutional affiliation, academic discipline, or national origin. Although the majority of contributors are historians, there are chapters written by political scientists, economists, and sociologists. While most contributors come from the main research universities in North America and Britain – where Cold War studies first blossomed as a field – the editors have also sought to engage scholars working in different universities and research centers around the globe. We have included a mixture of younger and more established scholars in the field, thereby seeking to illuminate how scholarship has evolved as well as where it is heading.

The *CHCW* aims at being comprehensive, comparative, and pluralist in its approach. The contributors have deliberately been drawn from various “schools” of thought and have been asked to put forward their own – often distinctive – lines of argument, while indicating the existence of alternative interpretations and approaches. Being a substantial work of reference, the *CHCW* provides detailed, synthetic accounts of key periods and major thematic topics, while striving for broad and original interpretations. The volumes constitute a scholarly project, written by academics for fellow academics as well as for policymakers, foreign-affairs personnel, military officers, and analysts of international relations. But we also hope the *CHCW* will serve as an introduction and reference point for advanced undergraduate students and for an educated lay public in many countries.

The present *Cambridge History* was first conceived in 2001 and has therefore been almost ten years in the making. It has been a large, multinational project, with seventy-three contributors from eighteen different countries. We have met for three conferences and had a large number of hours on the phone and in conference calls. Most chapters have been through three, if not four, different versions, and have been read and commented upon – in depth – not only by the editors, but also by other participants in the project. In the end, it was the spirit of collaboration among people of very different backgrounds and very different views that made it possible to bring this *Cambridge History* to completion in the form that it now has.

While the editors' first debt of gratitude therefore is to the contributors, a large number of others also deserve thanks. Jeffrey Byrne, our editorial assistant, did a remarkable job organizing meetings, keeping track of submissions, and finding maps and illustrative matter, all while completing his own doctoral thesis. He has been a model associate. Michael Watson, our editor at Cambridge University Press, helped keep the project on track throughout. Michael Devine, the director of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, worked hard to set up the conferences and provide essential funding for the project. At the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the wonderful administrative staff of the International History Department, the Cold War Studies Centre, and LSE IDEAS provided help far beyond the call of duty; Arne Westad is especially grateful to Carol Toms and Tiha Franulovic for all the assistance rendered him during a difficult period when he juggled the *CHCW* editorship with being head of department and research center director.

Both editors are grateful to those who helped fund and organize the three *CHCW* conferences, at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas; and at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Besides the Truman Library director, Michael Devine, we wish to thank the director of the Johnson Library, Betty Sue Flowers, the director of the History and Public Policy Program at the Wilson Center, Christian Ostermann, and the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton. We are also grateful to Philip Bobbitt, H. W. Brands, Diana Carlin, Francis J. Gavin, Mark Lawrence, William LeoGrande, Robert Littwak, William Roger Louis, Dennis Merrill, Louis Potts, Elspeth Rostow, Mary Sarotte, Strobe Talbott, Alan Tully, Steven Weinberg, and Samuel Wells.

Being editors of such a large scholarly undertaking has been exhausting and exhilarating in turns (and roughly in equal measure). The editors want to thank each other for good comradeship throughout, and our families, students, and colleagues for their patience, assistance, and good cheer. It has been a long process, and we hope that the end product will serve its audiences well.

Melvyn P. Leffler
and
Odd Arne Westad

Note on the text

All three volumes use the simplified form of the Library of Congress system of transliteration for Cyrillic alphabets (without diacritics, except for Serbian and Macedonian), Arabic, and Japanese (modified Hepburn), Pinyin (without diacritics) for Chinese, and McCune-Reischauer (with diacritics) for Korean. Translations within the text are those of the individual contributors to this volume unless otherwise specified in the footnotes.

The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century

JAN-WERNER MÜLLER

In retrospect, the mid-1970s seem like the high point of what one might call the crisis of the West – or at least the high point of an acute consciousness of crisis in the West. The famous report to the Trilateral Commission claimed that European countries might be in the process of becoming ‘ungovernable’: the oil shock of 1973 had brought the *trente glorieuses* of unprecedented growth and social peace to a definitive end; the hitherto unknown phenomenon of stagflation – combining high unemployment and runaway inflation – seemed there to stay. In fact, the conservative German philosopher Robert Spaemann claimed that the oil shock was, from the point of view of intellectual history, the most important event since the Second World War. Domestic and international terrorism, from Right and Left, were on the rise; and, not least, the high levels of social mobilisation and political contestation that had begun in the late 1960s continued unabated.¹

The 1968 phenomenon had not in any narrow sense ‘caused’ large-scale social and cultural transformations, but ‘1968’ became shorthand for them. Because changes there were: a new quasi-libertarian language of subjectivity – foreshadowing the ‘me decade’ – and a new politics of individual life-styles. All over Europe, the traditional family came under attack – in some countries, such as Italy, for the first time.² Students, the sons and daughters of the middle classes, who had been on the Right for most of the twentieth century (and highly active in the promotion of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s), all of a sudden were to be found on the Left. Most importantly, there was a widespread loss of belief in the capacity of societies for collective self-transformation through mass political action, whether inside or outside institutions such as parliaments. Instead, individual personal transformations mattered – as did the idea of a

This chapter partly draws on my *History of Political Thought in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

¹ See also Jeremi Suri’s chapter in volume II.

² Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy* (London: Penguin, 1990), 304.

whole socio-cultural reconstruction of society. The events of '68 and after called into question traditional concepts of the political, tearing down the ideological barricades between the public and the private, and making culture and everyday experiences explicitly politicised. The dramatic developments also completely sidelined established (and in a sense loyal) oppositions, such as the French Communist Party, which reacted with impotent fury to the students, as did some leading intellectual supporters of the Communist Party. In June 1968, the director Pier Paolo Pasolini had already published an anti-student poem in the magazine *Espresso* which began: 'Now the journalists of all the world (including / those of the television) / are licking your arses (as one still says in student / slang). Not me, my dears / You have the faces of spoilt rich brats.'³

The promise of liberation was followed by a sense of malaise – and what also appeared in the eyes of many observers to be a failure of nerve on the part of the West. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn declared in his 1978 address to the graduating class at Harvard that 'a decline in courage may be the most striking feature that an outside observer notices in the West today. The Western world has lost its civic courage, both as a whole and separately, in each country, in each government, in each political party.'⁴ This impression was not confined to cultural pessimists such as Solzhenitsyn. Liberal anti-totalitarians and Social Democrats felt that a Western postwar consensus had come apart: the generation of '68 appeared to despise parliamentarism and called for direct democracy, personal autonomy, and authenticity – values that seemed directly opposed to core goals of the 1950s and early 1960s, such as political stability through corporatism, high productivity, and social peace, and personal fulfilment through consumption. In the eyes of thinkers such as Raymond Aron, the hard-won gains for a more liberal political culture in countries such as France and Germany seemed to be squandered for nothing, weakening the West as a whole in the process.⁵

How then did the West get from what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas had called the 'legitimation crisis of late capitalism' and a widespread suspicion of liberalism to the supposed triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama in the late 1980s, and to the apparent vindication of apologists for capitalism such as Friedrich von Hayek? Was this a case of a rapid 'liberalisation' of European thought and of Western thought more generally – following

3 Quoted *ibid.*, 307.

4 Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, ed. by Ronald Berman (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980), 5.

5 Raymond Aron, 'Student Rebellion: Vision of the Future or Echo from the Past?', *Political Science Quarterly*, 84, 2 (1969), 289–310.

perhaps the example set by the turn of dissidents in the East to liberalism, as some observers have claimed? Or was it the victory of a neo-liberal conspiracy which had already begun on Mont Pèlerin in 1945, but whose chief conspirators – Hayek and Milton Friedman – conquered intellectual ‘hegemony’ only in the 1970s, as critics on the Left have often alleged? And, more interestingly from the perspective of a comprehensive history of the Cold War, what, if anything, was happening *between* East and West during those final years of the conflict? Is there such a thing as a *single* intellectual history – or at least a single European intellectual history – of the late twentieth century, when examined from the perspective of the end of the Cold War?

The Crisis of Democracy

The Crisis of Democracy was the matter-of-fact title of the influential *Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*, published in 1975. The report claimed to respond to a widespread perception of ‘the disintegration of civil order, the breakdown of social discipline, the debility of leaders, and the alienation of citizens’.⁶ The social scientists who had authored it feared a ‘bleak future for democratic government’; more specifically, they were concerned about an ‘overloading’ of governments by demands emanating from society, and in particular what one of the principal investigators, Samuel Huntington, was to describe as a ‘democratic surge’ afflicting the United States. Too many people wanting too many things *from* government and ultimately also too much participation *in* government made governing increasingly difficult, or so the diagnosis went.

In addition, Michel Crozier, Huntington, and Joji Watanuki stated in their introduction that ‘at the present time, a significant challenge comes from the intellectuals and related groups who assert their disgust with the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy and with the subservience of democratic government to “monopoly capitalism”’.⁷ They contrasted the rise of the ‘adversary culture’ of ‘value-oriented intellectuals’ bent on ‘the unmasking and delegitimation of established institutions’ with the presence of ‘increasing numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals’.⁸ Interestingly enough, while they listed a whole range of challenges – including the already widely debated shift to ‘post-materialist values’ – the supposed

6 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 2.

7 *Ibid.*, 6. 8 *Ibid.*, 7.

weakening of Western democracies appeared as an entirely domestic phenomenon; at the high point of détente, it seemed to have nothing to do with threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. Consequently, the proposed solutions to the ‘crisis of democracy’ were also fashioned in domestic terms – especially changes in economic policy and a novel conception of how the state should relate to society.

One possible response was indeed by what the *rapporteurs* for the Trilateral Commission had called the ‘policy-oriented intellectual’. Its greatest late twentieth-century representative was arguably the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann – not because he had vast influence on policy, but because he offered the most sophisticated theoretical justification for why policy should be shielded from widespread participation and essentially be left to technocrats. Luhmann’s ‘social systems theory’ – a kind of ‘radical functionalist sociology’, much influenced by Talcott Parsons, but also by older German right-wing social theorists – held that modern societies were divided into numerous systems running according to their own logic or ‘rationality’ (such as the economy, the arts, and the government).⁹ Systems served, above all, to reduce complexity; any interference from one system in another was *prima facie* counterproductive; and any expectation that governments could immediately realise ‘values’ from outside the system of the state administration itself constituted a kind of category mistake. The upshot of Luhmann’s theory was that the business of government should be left to bureaucrats. Social movement types, listening to nothing but their consciences, could inflict much damage on modern societies, if governments acceded to their misguided demands and illusionary hopes for participation in decision-making. Such a diagnosis often went along with contempt for members of the ‘adversary culture’. Luhmann’s teacher, the sociologist Helmut Schelsky, for instance, derided intellectuals as a new class of ‘high priests’ trying to gain power, while ‘others are actually doing the work’.¹⁰

Luhmann eventually became the prime theoretical adversary of Habermas, the most prominent heir to the German Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, who had kept his distance from the ‘68 rebels, but tried to hold on to, broadly speaking, social democratic hopes – including plans for further democratising the state administration and the economy. Habermas became arguably the most important philosopher for the environmental and feminist social

⁹ Chris Thornhill, *Political Theory in Modern Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2000), 174.

¹⁰ Helmut Schelsky, *Die Arbeit tun die anderen: Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975).

movements that emerged in the 1970s alongside the revolutionary *groupuscules* that the aftermath of '68 had produced. His primary concern was the protection of the integrity of what he called 'the lifeworld', that is, the realm of family and other interpersonal relations, as well as civil society, which ought to be shielded from the instrumental logic of the market and of the bureaucracy. The market and the state would always, to Habermas, have a tendency to 'colonise' the lifeworld; but social movements, pressure groups, and, not least, intellectuals in the public sphere could resist such a colonisation – and perhaps even achieve gradual decolonisation.

France's anti-totalitarian moment

A suspicion of bureaucracy and a demand for personal (as well as group) autonomy animated a whole range of intellectuals who had emerged from the upheavals of the late 1960s, but who did not want either to subscribe to orthodox Marxism (they viewed the established Communist Parties in Western Europe as themselves prime examples of bureaucratic ossification) or to invest in Maoist and similarly exotic hopes. Older philosophers, such as Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort in France, who had emerged from a Trotskyist background, advanced a critique of bureaucracy under state socialism, which could also inspire younger intellectuals looking for new forms of social organisation with autonomy as a central value. One of the watchwords of the mid- to late 1970s was *autogestion* (roughly, self-management), which was theorised in France by members of what came to be called *la deuxième gauche*. Pierre Rosanvallon and other intellectuals around the non-Communist, originally Christian trade union *Confédération française démocratique du travail* advanced a political agenda that was meant to invigorate the French Socialist Party, but also draw a clear line vis-à-vis the Communists.

The debates around *autogestion* eventually became enmeshed with the wide-ranging disputes about totalitarianism in mid-1970s France. By the early 1970s, the myths of Gaullism had been shattered – almost logically, it seemed, it was now time for what had always been Gaullism's great adversary in the Fifth Republic – Communism – to come under attack. Politically and culturally, the two had divided up the Republic, with the French Communist Party (*Parti communiste français*, or PCF) not offering just a 'counter-culture', but even a kind of potential 'counter-state'.¹¹ The major myth of Gaullism had of course

¹¹ Pierre Grémion, *Modernisation et progressisme: fin d'une époque 1968–1981* (Paris: Editions Esprit, 2005).

been General Charles de Gaulle himself, who left with a whimper in 1969, having lost what many considered a minor referendum – but, then again, there was a certain logic to the idea that a man who was supposed to embody *la France* could not possibly lose a popular vote.

Communism's myths had been more of a moral and intellectual nature, rather than personal; and so it was only logical that left-wing intellectuals themselves had to dismantle them. Many claimed to have been shaken out of their ideological slumber by what came to be known as the *choc Soljenitsyne*; arguably nowhere else did the publication of the *Gulag Archipelago* have such an impact as in France – but not because what Solzhenitsyn described had been completely unknown.¹² Rather, the attack on Communism was prompted at least partially by very concrete domestic concerns: in 1972, François Mitterrand had created the Union of the Left between Socialists and Communists, with a five-year 'Common Programme' for governing. In the run-up to the 1978 elections, there was a real sense that a Socialist–Communist government might actually come to power, which made it all the more important who would win the battle for political – and intellectual – dominance within the Socialist–Communist coalition. It was thus no accident that a new intellectual anti-Communism – though phrased in the language of 'anti-totalitarianism' – peaked at precisely this moment. The reaction of the Communist Party to Solzhenitsyn (PCF leader Georges Marchais claimed that the Russian dissident could, of course, publish in a socialist France – 'if he found a publisher'¹³) was widely interpreted as a sign of its authoritarianism; left-wing magazines like *Esprit* argued forcefully that the PCF had not really broken with its Stalinist past and that the Common Programme proposed a far too state-centric approach to building socialism.

Then the so-called New Philosophers burst onto the scene. Young and telegenic André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy produced a string of bestsellers, feted in popular magazines and on the small screen, in which they argued that socialism and Marxism and, in fact, all political thinking inspired by Hegel was fatally contaminated with authoritarianism. The ex-Maoist Glucksmann, especially, appeared as strident in his condemnation of more or less all recent philosophy as he had previously been in his endorsement of the Little Red Book. His polemic culminated in the notion that 'to think is to dominate', while Lévy exclaimed that the Gulag was simply 'the Enlightenment

12 The following draws partly on Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: France's Antitotalitarian Moment* (New York: Berghahn, 2004).

13 Quoted *ibid.*, 96.

minus tolerance'.¹⁴ Moreover, an opposition to the state as such as well as a thoroughgoing historical pessimism pervaded the literary output of the New Philosophers – to the extent that older liberals such as Aron consciously distanced themselves from *les nouveaux philosophes*, whom they suspected of black-and-white thinking, where black and white had simply changed places.¹⁵

Nevertheless, more serious intellectuals were moving in a similar direction. The historian François Furet, a brilliant organiser and institution-builder no less than an outstanding historian, relentlessly attacked Marxist interpretations of the French Revolution. He argued that totalitarianism had been present in the Revolution from the very start and that the Marxists were right to draw a direct line from 1789 to 1917 – except that the continuity in question was one of terrorism and even totalitarianism. Furet claimed that 'the work of Solzhenitsyn raised the question of the gulag everywhere in the depths of the revolutionary design . . . Today the gulag leads to a rethinking of the Terror by virtue of an identity in their projects.'¹⁶

So the revolutionary imagination appeared to have been depleted: the Russian Revolution was no longer the legitimate heir of the Jacobins. Rather, parts of the French Revolution had now retroactively been discredited by Stalinism; and revolutions elsewhere in the world – China and Cuba in particular – had lost their glow. As Michel Foucault put it in 1977:

For the first time, the Left, faced with what has just happened in China, this entire body of thought of the European Left, this revolutionary European thought which had its points of reference in the entire world and elaborated them in a determinate fashion, thus a thought that was oriented toward things that were situated outside itself, this thought has lost the historical reference points that it previously found in other parts of the world. It has lost its concrete points of support.¹⁷

Sartre died in 1980 and with him a certain model of the universal intellectual who could speak on anything, based purely on his moral stature. Aron, the sceptic, the sometimes pedantic-seeming academic, and, above all, the anti-Sartre, enjoyed a late and gratifying moment of recognition when his *Mémoires* appeared in 1982. What at least two generations of French intellectuals had taken as a moral-political catechism – that it was better to be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron – seemed to have been revoked on the Left Bank.

¹⁴ Quoted *ibid.*, 186.

¹⁵ Raymond Aron, 'Pour le Progrès: après la chute des idoles', *Commentaire*, 1 (1978), 233–43.

¹⁶ Quoted in Christofferson, *French Intellectuals*, 105–06.

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, "'Die Folter, das ist die Vernunft'", *Literaturmagazin*, 8 (December 1977), 67.

Human rights came to the forefront – even if, soon after, it was already questioned whether by themselves human rights would actually be sufficient to constitute a positive political programme. Marcel Gauchet, managing editor of *Le Débat*, which had been launched in 1980 and established itself quickly as France's premier intellectual magazine, questioned whether human rights were enough. He sought to continue a strong role for the state and what could broadly be called social democracy.¹⁸ Others extended the attack on the Left from orthodox Communism to strands of thought that were often subsumed under the category 'anti-humanism': something summed up as '68 thought' was globally indicted for being insufficiently sensitive to the worth of the human individual. All '68 philosophers, so the charge went, were really amoral Nietzscheans who ultimately believed in nothing but power.¹⁹

Undoubtedly, then, the intellectual climate had changed, although largely for reasons that had more to do with domestic French political factors. Even when Socialists and Communists finally triumphed in 1981, rather than realising anything resembling the Common Programme, or advancing on the road to self-management, François Mitterrand presided over a radical U-turn. Under intense pressure from financial markets, he and his prime minister abandoned their ambitious welfarist plans in 1984. As it turned out, the age of diminished expectations that had begun in the early 1970s could not be transcended with an act of political will. Both the dream of ever-continuing modernisation (shared, after all, by Right and Left) and the left-wing ideals of 'progressivism' had lost their hold. As Tony Judt has pointed out, anti-totalitarianism was not just revived anti-Communism or a loss of faith in any vision of violent revolutionary action. Anti-totalitarianism undermined a whole left-wing narrative about the twentieth century, as 'the traditional "progressive" insistence on treating attacks on Communism as implicit threats to all socially-ameliorative goals – i.e. the claim that Communism, Socialism, Social Democracy, nationalization, central planning and progressive social engineering were part of a common political project – began to work against itself'.²⁰ And what remained of socialism in France seemed rather uninspired: the more exciting ideals of the *deuxième gauche* were never put into practice, not least because Mitterrand was obsessed with destroying the political chances of Michel Rocard to succeed him as president.

18 Marcel Gauchet, 'Les droits de l'homme ne sont pas une politique', *Le Débat*, 3 (1980), 3–21.

19 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *La pensée 68: essai sur l'antihumanisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

20 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 561.

The neoconservative moment – in the United States and elsewhere

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the 1970s saw the rise of an intellectual phenomenon whose precise character – let alone policy implications – still causes much dispute today: neoconservatism. Neoconservatism emerged from the world of the ‘New York intellectuals’ – children of poor Jewish immigrants who had gone to City College, joined the anti-Stalinist Left, only then to turn into fierce liberal Cold Warriors, with some joining the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In other words, the milieu from which neoconservatism proper was to emerge had already been through one major experience of political disillusionment. The prominent neoconservative publicist Irving Kristol, for instance, had been a member of the Young People’s Socialist League, then went to the army, which, as he put it, ‘cured me of socialism. I decided that the proletariat was not my cup of tea, that one couldn’t really build socialism with them.’²¹

Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Nathan Glazer became successful editors, journalists, and university professors – while continuing their anti-Communist intellectual combat. All were fiercely proud of the United States (and its universities) – the country and the institution which had allowed them to ‘make it’ (to paraphrase a book title by a later neoconservative, Norman Podhoretz).²² The key moment in the intellectual formation of neoconservatism came with the rise of student radicalism, on the one hand, and the failure of the ambitious social programmes associated with Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, on the other. The students appeared to be attacking the very things that intellectuals such as Bell and Kristol believed in most: the university – and the idea of America itself. Partly in response, they founded *The Public Interest* in 1965. The magazine, while devoting much space to the unintended consequences of policies and taking culture and morality seriously, in a way that supposedly rationalist liberalism had not, eschewed any discussion of foreign policy. The topic of Vietnam was simply too controversial among a group that could still best be described as disillusioned social democrats.

Neoconservatism came into its own – and acquired a name – in the 1970s. Kristol, unlike Bell, decided to support President Richard M. Nixon. He also now used magazines such as *Commentary* and the op-ed page of the *Wall Street*

²¹ Quoted in Geoffrey Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 132.

²² Norman Podhoretz, *Making It* (New York: Random House, 1967).

Journal to propound strong doses of American nationalism and a pro-capitalist attitude that erstwhile allies such as Bell – who still described himself as a democratic socialist – found hard to accept. The term ‘neoconservatism’ itself was first applied by the Left as a term of opprobrium – but was eagerly appropriated by Kristol and others.

Eventually, neoconservatism also developed a distinctive view on foreign policy. In 1979, Georgetown professor Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had started her political career as a Democrat, famously drew a distinction between evil totalitarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union, and right-wing authoritarian ones. She argued that the administration of Jimmy Carter had been blinded by ‘modernization theory’: it interpreted revolutionary violence in countries such as Iran and Nicaragua as the birth pangs of modernity, when in fact such countries were turning sharply against the United States and possibly in a totalitarian direction, often directly or indirectly supported by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Carter supposedly adopted a naïvely moralising attitude to right-wing autocracies aligned with the United States, admonishing them to heed human rights. But, argued Kirkpatrick, ‘only intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent intelligent men of good will from perceiving the *facts* that traditional authoritarian governments are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with US interests’. This, it seemed, was the most serious charge against Carter: that he recklessly kept ignoring the American national interest.²³ Ronald Reagan appointed Kirkpatrick ambassador to the United Nations in 1981.

So, neoconservatives unashamedly propounded the national interest. But, above all, they exuded optimism. Unlike any European conservatism, they did not have, broadly speaking, a negative view of human nature. Unlike libertarianism, they did not completely reject government beyond some absolute minimum. As an editor of *The Public Interest* was to point out: where the libertarians subscribed to the primacy of the economic and older American conservatives hankered after a primacy of culture (a quasi-aristocratic, Southern culture in particular), the neocons thoroughly believed in the ‘primacy of the political’.²⁴ As Kristol himself put it, ‘neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the “American grain”. It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general

23 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, *Commentary* (November 1979), 44.

24 Adam Wolfson, ‘Conservatives and Neoconservatives’, in Irwin Stelzer (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic, 2004), 215–31.

tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic.’²⁵ This meant endorsing modern life, broadly speaking, including technology and at least certain aspects of modern culture (but decidedly not any aspect of the counter-culture).

To be sure, it wasn’t all optimism. Allan Bloom – who was not a neo-conservative in the narrow sense, but managed to write a surprise bestseller which resonated with conservatives of all stripes – saw the United States becoming the victim of dangerous relativism in the form of postmodernism and other insidious European imports. American intellectual life, it seemed increasingly, was split between a left wing in thrall to cutting-edge European thought (or what they interpreted as cutting-edge European thought) and a right wing that sought to instil pride in the young and boost US nationalism. Bloom’s concluding paragraph to his *Closing of the American Mind* read:

This is the American moment in world history, the one for which we shall forever be judged. Just as in politics the responsibility for the fate of freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime, so the fate of philosophy in the world has devolved upon our universities, and the two are related as they have never been before. The gravity of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.²⁶

Was neoconservatism an exclusively American phenomenon, as has often been claimed? In one sense, yes: it was part of a profound re-shaping of intellectual life, as think tanks and foundations – well-organised conservative ones in particular – came to play a more influential role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy in the United States. But in another sense it was not: other countries witnessed the phenomenon of the disillusioned social democrat who strongly objected to the New Left and the ‘adversary culture’. In West Germany, for instance, there was Hermann Lübbe, a philosophy professor who had served in social democratic governments. Lübbe sought to defend ‘common-sense morality’ and traditional notions of culture against what he thought were the wildly utopian hopes of the ‘68 generation. In France, some of the thinkers around *Commentaire* took a similar stance, like Lübbe and his allies defending *bürgerliche* values, although they did not embrace outright Victorian virtues in the way Gertrude Himmelfarb would in the United States. In a sense, it was only in Britain that the particular phenomenon of social democratic intellectuals turning right did not really exist – the emergence of Roy Jenkins’s Social Democratic Party notwithstanding.

²⁵ Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, *Weekly Standard*, 25 August 2003.

²⁶ Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 382.

The end of the social democratic consensus

It was then, above all, old-style social democracy that was under threat in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The most conservative politician at the time – in the sense of not wanting change – was ‘the right-wing social democrat’, according to Ralf Dahrendorf.²⁷ More precisely, threats came from two sides: on the one hand, there was the New Left and the social movements it had spawned, including the peace movement which was growing rapidly in opposition to the ‘Euromissiles’. On the other hand, there was what observers alternatively construed as a revival of classical nineteenth-century liberalism or as an entirely novel form of ideology best summed up as libertarianism or ‘neoliberalism’ (to which I will turn in the next section). But quite apart from these two threats, there was postmodernism – not a political movement, to be sure, but certainly a political mood characterised by a distrust of ‘grand narratives’ of human progress and the rational collective self-transformations of societies.

The lasting legacies of the New Left were feminism and environmentalism – the former, in particular, could at least partially be integrated into parties which had previously understood themselves more or less without saying as ‘productivist’ and male-centred.²⁸ Environmentalism, however, was often institutionalised separately (in green parties – which initially had been conceived as ‘anti-party parties’). But, eventually, it was at least partly adopted by all parties.

Both feminism and environmentalism were intimately tied to the peace movement: opposition to nuclear war became closely aligned with efforts to end patriarchy and male violence, as well as what the British historian Edward Thompson referred to as the general ‘exterminism’ of the industrial system.²⁹ Ecological concerns (or even eco-centrism and what the Norwegian Arne Næss had theorised as ‘deep ecology’) could only be sharpened by the apparent threat of a ‘nuclear holocaust’. A founder of the German Green Party, Petra Kelly, for instance, called the anti-nuclear movement ‘an absolute twin of the peace movement’, while the East German dissident Rudolf Bahro insisted that ‘militarism is a natural consequence of the dependence on raw materials

27 Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus? Zur Frage der Legitimität der politischen Macht in der Gegenwart’, in Dahrendorf, *Lebenschancen: Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979), 147–66.

28 Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

29 E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Press, 1981).

of our over-worked production system'.³⁰ Thus 'eco-pacifism' mandated nothing less than what thinkers such as Bahro referred to as 'industrial disarmament' – even if it remained unclear what an industrially disarmed society might look like. However, Bahro and others claimed that 'it is in general wrong to believe that social change can only be achieved if people have first been given a scientific explanation of what precisely can be done'.³¹

Social movements, then, were thriving throughout the 1980s, but their visions were, for the most part, negative, if not outright apocalyptic. As Bahro announced in 1982:

the plagues of ancient Egypt are upon us, the horsemen of the apocalypse can be heard, the seven deadly sins are visible all around us in the cities of today, where Babel is multiplied a thousand fold. In 1968 the promised Canaan of general emancipation appeared on the horizon, and this time at last for women as well. But almost all of those who believe in this have tacitly come to realise that first of all will come the years in the wilderness. All that is lacking now is the pillar of fire to show us the route of our exodus.³²

Very much in the spirit of the times, Habermas announced – under the title *The New Obscurity* (*Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit*) – the 'exhaustion of utopian energies' in 1985, claiming that the utopias centred on labour and human productivity had conclusively lost their appeal. Meanwhile, Dahrendorf had already declared a few years earlier the end of the 'social democratic century' and postmodern thinkers announced the 'end of metanarratives' – and stories of human progress in particular.³³ A thinker such as Habermas saw rational efforts to transform societies – a conception he identified with the Enlightenment – as coming under attack from neoconservatives, who apparently believed in a kind of 'foreshortened' or 'arrested' Enlightenment. In their view, capitalism was here to stay for good, and traditional values and culture were to compensate for any damage capitalism might be inflicting on individuals and the 'lifeworld' – a kind of consolation through aesthetics. In any event, in the eyes of the neocons (as construed by Habermas), the traditional family and the nation-state were institutions that simply could not

30 Rudolf Bahro, *From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review*, trans. by Gus Fagan and Richard Hurst (London: Verso, 1984), 138.

31 *Ibid.*, 146.

32 Rudolf Bahro, 'Who Can Stop the Apocalypse? Or the Task, Substance and Strategy of the Social Movements', *Praxis International*, 2, 3 (1982), 255.

33 Jürgen Habermas, 'Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien', in Habermas, *Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), 141–63; Dahrendorf, 'Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus?'.

be further transformed, let alone transcended altogether – they were, in a sense, where the Enlightenment met its institutional limits.

The descent from Mont Pèlerin

The real threat to social democracy was neither neoconservatism – which was not in principle hostile to the welfare state – nor postmodernism. The real threat emerged from ‘classical liberalism’, which to the surprise of contemporaries generated ‘utopian energies’ and was reconceived to celebrate both the unrestricted market and the strong state. The rise of libertarianism, ‘neo-liberalism’, or what sometimes was also called ‘the New Right’ had begun in the mid-1970s. It would arguably not have happened without Margaret Thatcher and a determined set of policy intellectuals around Ronald Reagan. But it also would not have happened without the work of a number of economists and social philosophers earlier in the century. Ludwig von Mises had argued as early as the 1920s that ‘only ideas can overcome ideas and it is only *ideas* of Capitalism and of Liberalism that can overcome Socialism’.³⁴ Friedrich von Hayek had started his contribution to these efforts with direct attacks on Keynes in specialised journals in the 1930s, but then had branched out into popular political pamphleteering with his 1944 bestseller *Road to Serfdom* (which had been adapted for an American audience by *Reader’s Digest*). In 1947, he had founded the Mont Pèlerin Society, named after the Swiss mountain village where it was first convened – a self-described ‘non-organisation of individuals’,³⁵ but de facto an elite advance troop in the war of ideas. Hayek claimed that ‘we must raise and train an army of fighters for freedom’. The clarion call for libertarian ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’ had been heard both in the United States and in Britain. Think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs in London were established and eventually gained influence on major politicians such as Sir Keith Joseph. Moreover, by the early 1970s, Hayek himself was no longer seen as a kind of intellectual crank, as had been the case during the heyday of Keynesianism. He received the Nobel prize (though it was suspected he was mostly chosen to ‘balance’ the socialist Gunnar Myrdal), and became a major influence in Latin America.³⁶

34 Quoted in Alan O. Ebenstein, *Friedrich von Hayek: A Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 40.

35 R. M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995), xiii.

36 Ebenstein, *Hayek*, 143.

Hayek's master idea was that a centrally directed economy could not make use of the tacit and socially dispersed knowledge of individuals, while a market economy could. Economic planning, he claimed in *The Road to Serfdom*, would bequeath totalitarian domination as an unintended consequence. Any central plan would necessarily have to be based on value judgments and a conception of what constituted a good life. These decisions would have to be made by bureaucrats and imposed on individuals who might have quite different values. Consequently, even the most well-meaning socialists would end up constructing a totalitarian state. While Hayek, in 1944, was still rather gloomy about the future of the West, he later argued that socialism had probably peaked with the British Labour government during the years 1945–51.

Hayek saw himself as rehabilitating a classical nineteenth-century conception of liberalism. He lauded the rule of law and argued that the limits, rather than the source, of political rule were normatively decisive. A staunch methodological individualist, he inspired Margaret Thatcher's famous saying that there was no such thing as society. In an interview with a journalist from *Woman's Own* in 1987, she said 'There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.'³⁷

But Hayek also turned out to be an advocate of the strong state, especially a state that was able to resist the demands emanating from society – in other words, special interest groups. He even argued for a new constitutional settlement ensuring that only universal laws (that is, not ones serving special interests) would be enacted and individual liberty maximised. In particular, he had in mind the creation of an upper house with a small membership – 'an assembly of men and women elected at a relatively mature age for fairly long periods, such as fifteen years, so that they would not be concerned about being re-elected'.³⁸

Hayek's thought proved popular because it so clearly appeared to offer a solution to the 'governability crisis' of the 1970s. But, importantly, it also proved influential among dissidents east of the Iron Curtain. 'Liberalism' came to be identified with Hayek much more than with the liberal theorist John Rawls, for instance. In fact, Hayek was elevated to the status of an iconic figure for intellectuals like Václav Klaus, the Czech economist who later served as his country's prime minister and president.

37 Margaret Thatcher, 'Interview for *Woman's Own* ("no such thing as society")', at Margaret Thatcher Foundation, www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689

38 Friedrich von Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 113.

In the end, libertarianism turned out to be vastly more influential in the United States than in Europe, even if some of the most important theorists in the United States – Mises and Hayek, for example – had of course been European. Libertarianism fitted a political culture that always placed a high premium on the ideals of rugged individualism. But, interestingly, the American version of libertarianism was also at the same time more popular (or perhaps populist) *and* more philosophically grounded. Only in the United States was there a ten-part television series, 'Free to Choose', by Milton Friedman; only in the United States did libertarian novels like those of Ayn Rand become bestsellers; and only in the United States could there be a viable trade in Mises T-shirts. But libertarianism was also more systematically developed philosophically there. Robert Nozick's 1974 *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* was a libertarian answer to John Rawls's social democratic *Theory of Justice*, and it had no equivalent in Europe.

In Europe, Hayekian liberalism was often still cloaked in the language of the social democratic consensus. In 1975, for instance, Keith Joseph claimed that 'the objective for our lifetime, as I have come to see it, is embourgeoisement'. He then went on to explain that 'our idea of the good life, the end product, and of embourgeoisement – in the sense of life-style, behaviour pattern and value-structure – has much in common with that traditionally held by Social Democrats, however we may differ about the kind of social economic structure best capable of bringing about and sustaining the state of affairs we desire'.³⁹ In continental Europe, there was even more of a sense that the achievements of the social democratic consensus had to be preserved. Dahrendorf was not the only intellectual who felt that 'the consensus is in a certain sense the most in terms of progress that history has ever seen'.⁴⁰ Even nominally conservative politicians agreed that things should change only in such a way that everything could essentially stay the same.

The politics of anti-politics under post-totalitarianism

The question of whether intellectuals still mattered politically continued to be widely debated in the West during the last decades of the twentieth century. It could hardly be doubted, though, that they mattered in Central and Eastern

39 Keith Joseph, *Reversing the Trend: A Critical Re appraisal of Conservative Economic and Social Policies – Seven Speeches by the Rt. Hon. Sir Keith Joseph Bt. MP* (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1975), 55 and 56.

40 Dahrendorf, 'Am Ende des sozialdemokratischen Konsensus?', 150.

Europe. Their dissident strategy from the mid-1970s onwards was based on what appeared to be an idea both of breathtaking simplicity and sheer genius: they wanted to take their regimes at their word, especially after socialist governments had signed the Helsinki Accords of 1975.⁴¹ For instance, Charter 77, a motley group of reform Communists, Trotskyists, Catholic conservatives, and assorted philosophical anti-modernists, sought to subscribe to a strict legal positivism and merely 'help' the Czechoslovak state to implement the accords. As Václav Benda, a leading Czech dissident, put it, 'this tactic of taking the authorities at their word is, in itself, a shrewd ploy'.⁴² Rights talk reminded everyone about their very absence; but this was less to engage the regimes than to 'talk past them'.⁴³

Of course, the establishment of political organisations outside the various Communist and socialist parties and their offshoots was strictly forbidden. So, almost by definition, any groups or associations being formed had to present themselves as 'apolitical' or perhaps even 'anti-political'. This also made conceptual sense, as the regimes were uniformly described by the dissidents as 'totalitarian' – that is, trying to monopolise the political. Although some observers felt that it was 'supremely ironic that just at the moment when the concept of "totalitarianism" was losing its plausibility in the West, it was helping to fuel democratic activism in the East', this was not strictly true. Anti-totalitarianism became central for French left-wing intellectuals in the mid-1970s. It also made a comeback with older liberal anti-totalitarian thinkers such as Jean-François Revel in France and Karl Dietrich Bracher in Germany. They strenuously opposed the peace movement in Western Europe because of its alleged blindness to the threats emanating from a totalitarian Soviet Union.⁴⁴

In fact, the dissidents in Eastern Europe shared more concerns with intellectuals in the West than is usually acknowledged. One was the idea that a 'lifeworld' of undamaged interpersonal relations (such as family and friendships) could be recovered or protected even under totalitarianism. This

⁴¹ It is worth remembering that dissidents did not call themselves dissidents, for the most part.

⁴² Václav Benda, 'The Parallel "Polis"', in H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson (eds.), *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 35.

⁴³ Judt, *Postwar*, 567.

⁴⁴ Jeffrey C. Isaac, 'Critics of Totalitarianism', in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 196. See Jean-François Revel, *La tentation totalitaire* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1976), and Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Das Zeitalter der Ideologien* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1982).

intuition was particularly important in the thought of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Patočka had emerged from the phenomenological school and had studied with both Husserl and Heidegger. Rather than going along with Heidegger's general suspicion of humanism, however, Patočka attempted to 'humanise' Heidegger and use his ideas in the service of a vision of individual dignity. Patočka appeared to present phenomenology as holding the promise of personal transformation, even of a kind of philosophical salvation in the face of terrible political circumstances. Central was the notion of 'care for the soul', which Patočka viewed as a distinctive European idea going back to Plato, and which meant both a resistance to a kind of self-forgetting in everyday life and a refusal of violent attempts to transcend everydayness, such as in war.⁴⁵ He also formulated the ideal of a 'community of the shaken' in the face of totalitarianism. He insisted on the specifically moral – again, as opposed to political – character of dissidence, claiming that morality 'does not exist to allow society to function, but simply to allow human beings to be human'.⁴⁶ As one of the first spokesmen for Chapter 77, he was arrested by the Czech secret police and died after a number of severe interrogations. Infamously, the authorities tried to disrupt his funeral with a motocross-race right next to the cemetery and a helicopter hovering above.

But the dissidents' voices could no longer be drowned out or silenced. Havel, who described himself as 'a philosophically inclined literary man', carried forward Patočka's legacy. He drew on Heidegger to formulate a comprehensive critique of modernity and of human beings' dependence on technology – a critique that was supposed to be applicable to the West as much as the East.⁴⁷ Like Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, Havel opposed 'rationalist humanism', 'the proclaimed and practised autonomy of man from any higher force above him', or simply 'anthropocentricity'.⁴⁸ In the end, Havel saw state socialism as just a more extreme or uglier expression of modernity. In the same vein, Solzhenitsyn claimed that 'this is the essence of the crisis: the split in the world is less terrifying than the similarity of the disease afflicting its main societies'.⁴⁹

45 Jan Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, trans. by Peter Lom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

46 Quoted in Martin Palouš, 'International Law and the Construction Liberation, and Final Deconstruction of Czechoslovakia', in Cecelia Lynch and Michael Loriaux (eds.), *Law and Moral Action in World Politics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 245.

47 Aviezer Tucker, *Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 135.

48 Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, 16. 49 *Ibid.*, 19.

There was also another sense of 'anti-politics' – in the form of opposition to power politics in East and West – and especially power politics with nuclear weapons. As György Konrád put it:

Antipolitics strives to put politics in its place and make sure it stays there, never overstepping its proper office of defending and refining the rules of the game of civil society. Antipolitics is the ethos of civil society, and civil society is the antithesis of military society. There are more or less militarized societies – societies under the sway of nation-states whose officials consider total war one of the possible moves in the game. Thus military society is the reality, civil society is a utopia.⁵⁰

More important than any more or less wholesale condemnation of modernity, however, was Havel's famous argument in 'The Power of the Powerless' that even under the conditions of what he now described as 'post-totalitarianism' individuals could start 'living in truth', if they stopped going through the ideological motions that the regime prescribed.⁵¹ Havel's greengrocer who puts out a sign saying 'Workers of the world, unite!' without any real conviction became one of the most powerful symbols for the hollowness of the regimes – and the cynical complicity of their subjects. By the same token, however, Havel had shown that despite the apparent 'auto-totality' of the system, the regimes were in fact extremely fragile.

In one important sense, Havel was to take anti-politics to an extreme which alienated more traditional liberal democrats. In his view, restoration of parliamentary democracy was only a first step that had to be followed by an existential revolution and the 'restoration of the order of being'. Rather than copying existing models in the West, the goal was a 'post-democracy', characterised, above all, by the absence of political parties.

Yet it would be wrong to think that all 'anti-politics' was anti-institutional per se. One of the most influential ideas among the dissidents was to create what Benda had termed 'the parallel polis', or what Adam Michnik had theorised as a 'New Evolutionism'. Institutions with very concrete purposes parallel to the state were created within fledgling civil societies: workers' defence committees, most prominently with the Komitet Obrony Robotników (KOR)

⁵⁰ György Konrád, *Antipolitics: An Essay*, trans. Richard E. Allen (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984), 92.

⁵¹ Václav Havel, 'The Power of the Powerless', in Havel, *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central Eastern Europe*, ed. by John Keane (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 23–96.

in Poland, underground trade unions, ‘flying universities’, and organisations such as Hungary’s Szegényeket Támogató Alap (Foundation to Support the Poor). These were provocations, of course, in socialist countries where poverty was supposed to have been eliminated, but they were also genuine counter-cultural groups and social movements dealing, for instance, with the horrendous environmental consequences of state socialism.

Demands for ‘truth-telling’ and ‘truth-living’ against a background of high European philosophy were thus complemented by much more concrete action and limited, practical goals pursued by an ever proliferating number of civic groups and associations.⁵² As Michnik had put it, the point was to ‘give directives to the people on how to behave, not to the powers on how to reform themselves’.⁵³ Benda, in turn, summarised the strategy by saying that ‘we join forces in creating, slowly but surely, parallel structures that are capable, to a limited degree at least, of supplementing the generally beneficial and necessary functions that are missing in the existing structures, and where possible, to use those structures, to humanize them’.⁵⁴

Opposition could also take playful forms and was, at any rate, animated by a whole range of different political ideas: some outrightly nationalist, some religious, some purely focused on a kind of human rights universalism. Opposition movements often reflected long-standing splits and cleavages in different countries’ intellectual scenes and political cultures more broadly. Hungary, for instance, saw the emergence of an opposition divided between ‘democrat-urbanists’ and ‘populist-nationalists’.⁵⁵ In such circumstances, it was all the more important that intellectual figures could be found whose ideas were capable of integrating or at least appealing to different groups. In the Hungarian case, István Bibó – or rather, the memory of István Bibó – performed such a role. Bibó had identified distinctive Central European traditions which at the same time could be construed as liberal and as democratic. Nationalism and liberalism might therefore come together in a demand for popular sovereignty and territorial independence from the Warsaw Pact.

52 This seems to me more accurate than to say that the generation of ‘truth-tellers’ had been superseded altogether. See Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 12.

53 Quoted in Noel O’Sullivan, *European Political Thought since 1945* (London: Palgrave, 2004), 167–68.

54 Benda, ‘The Parallel “Polis”’, 36.

55 Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, trans. by Tim Wilkinson (Budapest: Corvina, 1999), 415.

A late liberal triumph?

At first glance, it seems that the 1980s were, above all, a decade of renewed confidence and optimism leading right up to Fukuyama's 1989 thesis about the end of history. It was not just morning in America, as Ronald Reagan's campaign motto had asserted; it was a new dawn for the West as a whole. Yet, it is easily forgotten that self-doubt kept shadowing much of the decade. In 1988, anxieties about the erosion of US strength and the decline of the West made Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* into a major bestseller. The consumerism and hedonism (and, yes, cynicism) of the 1980s inspired diagnoses of decadence – after all, under Reagan the United States had become the world's largest debtor. And the fears of 'nuclear holocaust' only slowly subsided in the West after Gorbachev had committed to winding down the Cold War.

Nor was Fukuyama's 'End of History' the naïve, liberal triumphalism it has so often been made out to be. Fukuyama, after all, did not predict the end of all conflict and violence; rather, he asserted that there was, in the long run, no attractive alternative way of life or way of organising human collectives that could rival liberal democracy.⁵⁶ He predicted that the world was going to go the way of post-Hitler – that is, 'post-ideological' and therefore 'post-historical' – Western Europe, and that there would in all likelihood be a "Common-Marketization" of international relations'.⁵⁷

Fukuyama was not afraid of asserting what both postmodernism and the methodological individualism of Hayek and other libertarians had allegedly discredited: a 'grand narrative'. Moreover, his interpretation was suffused with the very cultural pessimism that had animated Alan Bloom, his teacher. Were liberal democracies to be populated by Nietzschean 'last men', that is, docile, self-satisfied, mediocre, utterly un-heroic bourgeois philistines? Fukuyama's answer was not a happy one. The 'end of history', he wrote, 'will be a very sad time . . . In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.'

Thus, liberal triumphalism was not nearly as triumphalist as commentators later tended to assume. The anxieties and the cultural pessimism of the 1970s, in fact, persisted beyond the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it was at least questionable whether liberal democracy actually reigned triumphant outside

⁵⁶ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

the immediate context of the US–Soviet confrontation. The year 1989 was an *annus mirabilis* for Europe, but it was also the year of Tiananmen. It was, furthermore, the year of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. And it was the year of an altogether different peaceful transition against the odds: that of the Iranian regime, after the death of its charismatic leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Were these genuine challenges to liberal democracy, or could one confidently assert with Fukuyama that ‘our task is not to answer exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world, but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which are therefore part of world history’?⁵⁸

In one sense, 1989 obviously *was* an ending: that of major ideological divisions marked by the Iron Curtain. And, yet, as this chapter has suggested, within Europe, as well as between Western Europe and the United States, there was much more of a *common* intellectual history than is often assumed. At the same time, it is clear in retrospect that many heated debates of the period – especially in Western Europe – were profoundly inward-looking, if not provincial. Paradoxically, a Europe at the mercy of the superpowers also had the privilege of withdrawing from the world at large. Among so many other things, 1989 also meant the end of that privilege.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

The world economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990

GIOVANNI ARRIGHI

The 1970s began with the collapse of the gold-dollar exchange standard and the defeat of the United States in Vietnam – two events that jointly precipitated a ten-year-long crisis of US hegemony. The 1980s, in contrast, ended with the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies, US “victory” in the Cold War, and a resurgence of US wealth and power to seemingly unprecedented heights. The key turning point in this reversal of fortunes was the neoliberal (counter)revolution of the early 1980s orchestrated by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the relationship between this turning point and the preceding crisis of US hegemony on the one side and the subsequent collapse of the USSR on the other.

The crisis of US hegemony and the onset of global turbulence

US hegemony in the Cold War era was based on institutional arrangements that originated in the widespread belief among US government officials during World War II that “a new world order was the only guarantee against chaos followed by revolution” and that “security for the world had to be based on American power exercised through international systems.”¹ Equally widespread was the belief that the lessons of the New Deal were relevant to the international sphere: “Just as the New Deal government increasingly took active responsibility for the welfare of the nation, US foreign-policy planners took increasing responsibility for the welfare of the

¹ Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 44, 68.

world.” To take responsibility, of course, “meant government intervention on a grand scale.”²

In Franklin D. Roosevelt’s original vision, the New Deal would be “globalized” through the United Nations, and the USSR would be included among the poor nations of the world to be incorporated into the evolving Pax Americana, for the benefit and security of all. In the shoddier but more realistic political project that materialized under Harry S. Truman, in contrast, the containment of Soviet power became the main organizing principle of US hegemony, and US control over world money and military power became the primary means of that containment.³ This more realistic model was not so much a negation of the original notion of creating a global welfare state as its transformation into a project of creating a “warfare–welfare state” on a world scale, in competition with and in opposition to the Soviet system of Communist states.⁴

Neither the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s nor the subsequent long downturn can be understood except with reference to the successes and failures of this project. The boom was launched and sustained through the joint operation of both military and social Keynesianism on a world scale. Military Keynesianism – that is, massive expenditures on the rearmament of the United States and its allies and the deployment of a farflung network of quasi-permanent military bases – was undoubtedly the most dynamic and conspicuous element of the combination. But the US-sponsored spread of social Keynesianism – that is, the governmental pursuit of full employment and high mass consumption in the First World and of “development” in the Third World – was also an essential factor.⁵

2 Ann-Marie Burley, “Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State,” in J. G. Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 125–26, 129–32.

3 Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994), 276–80, 295–97.

4 The expression “warfare–welfare state” is borrowed from James O’Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973).

5 On the critical role of military Keynesianism in launching the expansion, see, among others, Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of the United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 103–04, and Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 77–78, 98. On the First World and Third World variants of social Keynesianism, see Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 202–11, and Beverly J. Silver, *Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 149–61.

The reconstruction and upgrading of the German and Japanese economies were integral aspects of the internationalization of the US warfare–welfare state. As Bruce Cumings notes, “George Kennan’s policy of containment was always limited and parsimonious, based on the idea that four or five industrial structures existed in the world: the Soviets had one and the United States had four, and things should be kept this way.” The upshot in East Asia was US sponsorship of Japanese reindustrialization. The Korean War became “‘Japan’s Marshall Plan’ . . . War procurement propelled Japan along its war-beating industrial path.”⁶ US promotion of the reconstruction and upgrading of the German industrial apparatus occurred through different but equally effective channels. Germany was, of course, among the main beneficiaries of the Marshall Plan and US military expenditures abroad. But the most important contribution was US sponsorship of West European economic union. As future secretary of state John Foster Dulles declared in 1948, “a healthy Europe” could not be “divided into small compartments.” It had to be organized into a market “big enough to justify modern methods of cheap production for mass consumption.” A reindustrialized Germany was an essential component of this new Europe.⁷

The “catching-up” of latecomers with the technological and organizational achievements of the leading capitalist state – “uneven development,” in Robert Brenner’s characterization of the process – was thus consciously and actively encouraged by the leader itself, rather than merely the result of the latecomers’ actions, as it had been in the nineteenth century. This peculiarity accounts not just for the speed and extent of the post-World War II boom, but also for its transformation into the relative stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s. The capacity of Japan, Germany, and other West European countries to combine the high-productivity technologies pioneered by the United States with the large, low-wage, and elastic labor supplies employed in their comparatively backward rural and small business sectors pushed up their rate of investment and economic growth. Through the early 1960s, this tendency benefited the United States as well because the rapid economic expansion of Western Europe and Japan created profitable outlets for US multinationals

6 Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences,” in F. C. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 60; and Cumings, “The Political Economy of the Pacific Rim,” in R. A. Palat (ed.), *Pacific-Asia and the Future of the World-System* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 31; see also Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan’s Postwar Economy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1958), 85–91.

7 Quoted in McCormick, *America’s Half Century*, 79–80.

and banks, new export opportunities for domestically based US firms, and ideological resources for the US government in the Cold War. "Uneven development" was thus a positive-sum game that buttressed "a symbiosis, if a highly conflictual and unstable one, of leader and followers, of early and later developers, and of hegemon and hegemonized."⁸

By the mid-1960s, however, Germany and Japan had not just caught up with but had forged ahead of the United States in one industry after another – textiles, steel, automobiles, machine tools, consumer electronics. More important, the newer, lower-cost producers based in these and other follower countries began invading markets hitherto dominated by US producers. As a result of this influx of lower-priced goods into the United States and world markets, between 1965 and 1973 US manufacturers experienced a decline of over 40 percent in the rate of return on their capital stock. Their response to this intensification of competition included pricing products below full cost, repressing the growth of wage costs, and updating their plant and equipment. But, in Brenner's view, the most effective US weapon in the incipient competitive struggle was the devaluation of the US dollar against the German mark (by a total of 50 percent between 1969 and 1973) and the Japanese yen (by a total of 28.2 percent between 1971 and 1973). Thanks to this massive devaluation, profitability, investment growth, and labor productivity in US manufacturing staged a comeback, restoring the US trade balance to a surplus, while the competitiveness of German and Japanese manufacturers was sharply curtailed. The global crisis of profitability was not overcome, but its burden was distributed more evenly among the main capitalist countries.⁹

The intensification of intercapitalist competition that ensued from the US-sponsored reconstruction and upgrading of the West European and Japanese economies was not the only cause of the crisis of profitability. Equally important was US support for full-employment policies and the spread of high mass consumption both at home and throughout the First World. While consolidating the hegemony of liberal capitalism, this variant of social Keynesianism strengthened the capacity of workers to seek a greater share of the social product. This empowerment of labor culminated in what E.H. Phelps Brown aptly called the "pay explosion" of 1968–73. Coming in the wake of twenty years of rising real wages in the core regions of the global economy, the pay explosion supplemented the intensification

8 Robert Brenner, "The Economics of Global Turbulence: A Special Report on the World Economy, 1950–1998," *New Left Review*, 1, 229 (1998), 91–92; and Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy* (London: Verso, 2002), 14–15.

9 Brenner, "The Economics of Global Turbulence," 17–24, 41, 93, 105–08, 124, 137.

of intercapitalist competition in exercising a system-wide downward pressure on profitability.¹⁰

Washington's Cold War policies thus put a double squeeze on profits: through the intensification of intercapitalist competition, which US actions encouraged by creating conditions favorable to the upgrading and expansion of the Japanese and West European productive apparatuses; and through the social empowerment of labor, which Washington promoted through the pursuit of near full employment and high mass consumption throughout the Western world. This double squeeze was bound to produce a system-wide crisis of profitability, but was not in itself a sufficient reason for the crisis of US hegemony which became the dominant event of the 1970s. What turned the crisis of profitability into a broader hegemonic crisis was the failure of the US warfare–welfare state to attain its social and political objectives in the Third World.

Socially, the “Fair Deal” that Truman promised to the poor countries of the world in his 1949 inaugural address never materialized in an actual narrowing of the income gap that separated them from the wealthy countries of the West. As Third World countries stepped up their industrialization efforts (industrialization being the generally prescribed means to “development”), there was indeed industrial convergence with First World countries; but there was virtually no income convergence. Third World countries were thus bearing the costs without reaping the expected benefits of industrialization (see Table 1).¹¹

Far more conspicuous was the political failure of the US warfare–welfare state. Its epicenter was the war in Vietnam, where the United States was unable to prevail, despite the deployment of military hardware and firepower on a scale without precedent for a conflict of this kind. As a result, the United States lost much of its political credibility as global policeman, thereby emboldening the nationalist and social revolutionary forces that Cold War policies were meant to contain.

Along with much of the political credibility of its military apparatus, the United States also lost control of the world monetary system. The escalation of

10 E. H. Phelps Brown, “A Non-Monetarist View of the Pay Explosion,” *Three Banks Review*, 105 (1975), 3–24; Makoto Itoh, *The World Economic Crisis and Japanese Capitalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 50–53; Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, *Capitalism since World War II: The Making and Breakup of the Great Boom* (London: Fontana, 1984), 269–76.

11 Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly J. Silver, and Benjamin D. Brewer, “Industrial Convergence and the Persistence of the North–South Divide,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38 (2003), 3–31.

Table 1. *Third World GNP per capita as a percentage of the First World's GNP per capita*

Region	1970	1980	1985	1990
Sub-Saharan Africa (with South Africa)	4.7	3.9	3.1	2.7
Latin America	16.4	17.6	14.4	12.3
West Asia and North Africa	7.8	8.7	7.9	7.4
South Asia (without India)	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4
East Asia (without China and Japan)	6.1	8.0	8.6	11.0
China	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3
India	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.2
Third World	4.0	4.3	4.1	4.1
Third World (without China)	5.7	6.1	5.5	5.3
Third World (without China and India)	8.1	8.8	7.7	7.5
North America	105.0	100.7	101.6	98.2
Western Europe	104.6	104.6	101.5	100.5
Southern Europe	58.2	60.0	57.6	58.6
Australia and New Zealand	83.5	74.7	73.3	66.4
Japan	126.4	134.4	140.8	149.8
First World	100	100	100	100
Eastern Europe	—	—	—	11.1
Former USSR with Russian Federation	—	—	—	10.7
Russian Federation	—	—	—	14.1
Former USSR without Russian Federation	—	—	—	7.1
Eastern Europe and former USSR	—	—	—	10.8

Note: GNP in constant 1995 US dollars. Countries included in the Third World: Africa (except Angola, Libya, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Swaziland), Latin America (except Cuba), West Asia (except Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey), South Asia (except Afghanistan and Bhutan), and East Asia (except Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, North Korea, and Japan).

Source: Calculations based on World Bank World Development Indicators 2001, 2006.

public expenditures to sustain the military effort in Vietnam and to overcome opposition to the war at home – through the Great Society program – strengthened inflationary pressures, deepened the fiscal crisis of the US state, and eventually led to the collapse of the US-centered Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates. Crucial in this respect was the explosive growth of the eurodollar and other extraterritorial financial markets.

Established in the 1950s to hold dollar balances of Communist countries unwilling to risk depositing them in the United States, the eurodollar market grew primarily through the deposits of US multinationals and the offshore activities of New York banks. Having expanded steadily through the 1950s and

early 1960s, it started growing exponentially in the mid- and late 1960s – eurocurrency assets more than quadrupling between 1967 and 1970.¹² Hard as it is to know exactly what lay behind this explosion, it is plausible to suppose that it was triggered by the crisis of profitability of those years. Declining rates of profit under the impact of intensifying competition and growing labor demands must have boosted the liquidity preference of US multinational corporations operating in Europe. Since conditions for the profitable reinvestment of cash flows were even less favorable in the United States than in Europe, it made good business sense for the multinationals to “park” their growing liquid assets in eurocurrency and other offshore money markets rather than repatriate them.

The explosive growth of eurocurrency markets provided currency speculators – including US banks and corporations – with a huge *mass de manoeuvre* with which to bet against, and thereby undermine, the stability of the US-controlled system of fixed exchange rates. And once that system actually collapsed, fluctuations in exchange rates became a major determinant of variations in corporate cash-flow positions, sales, profits, and assets in different countries and currencies. In hedging against these variations, or in trying to profit from them, multinationals tended to increase the monetary resources deployed in financial speculation in extraterritorial money markets where freedom of action was greatest and specialized services were most readily available.¹³

It follows that the massive devaluation of the US currency of the early 1970s was not just, or even primarily, the result of a conscious US policy aimed at shifting the burden of the crisis of profitability from US to foreign business. It was also and especially the unintended consequence of lax US monetary policies aimed at sustaining the military effort in Vietnam on the one side, and of the actions of US multinationals and financial speculators aimed at profiting from the fiscal crisis of the US warfare–welfare state on the other. Combined with the loss of credibility of US military power, the massive devaluation of the dollar in turn prompted Third World governments to adopt a more aggressive stance in negotiating the prices of their exports of industrial raw materials – oil in particular. Intensifying intercapitalist competition and the stepping up of low- and middle-income countries’ industrialization efforts

12 Eugène L. Versluysen, *The Political Economy of International Finance* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 16–22; Marcello de Cecco, “Inflation and Structural Change in the Euro-dollar Market,” *EUI Working Papers*, 23 (Florence: European University Institute, 1982), 11; Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 182.

13 See, among others, Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 11–13.

had already led to significant increases in raw-material prices before 1973. In 1973, however, the virtual acknowledgment of defeat by the US government in Vietnam, followed immediately by the shattering of the myth of Israeli invincibility during the Yom Kippur War, energized the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) into protecting its members more effectively from the depreciation of the dollar through a fourfold increase in the price of crude oil in a few months. Coming as it did at the tail end of the pay explosion, this so-called oil shock deepened the crisis of profitability and strengthened inflationary tendencies in core capitalist countries. At the same time, it generated an \$80 billion surplus of dollars in the hands of oil-exporting countries (so-called petrodollars), a good part of which was parked or invested in the eurocurrency and other offshore money markets. The mass of privately controlled liquidity that could be mobilized for financial speculation and new credit creation outside publicly controlled channels thereby received a powerful additional stimulus.¹⁴

The tremendous expansion in the supply of world money and credit, engendered by the combination of extremely lax US monetary policies and the explosive growth of privately controlled liquidity in offshore money markets, was not matched by demand conditions capable of preventing the devaluation of money capital. To be sure, there was plenty of demand for liquidity, not only on the part of multinational corporations – to hedge against or speculate on exchange-rate fluctuations – but also on the part of low- and middle-income countries to sustain their developmental efforts in an increasingly competitive and volatile environment. For the most part, however, this demand added more to inflationary pressures than it did to the expansion of solvent indebtedness:

Formerly, countries other than the United States had to keep their balance of payments in some sort of equilibrium. They had to “earn” the money they wished to spend abroad. Now . . . [c]ountries in deficit could borrow indefinitely from the magic liquidity machine . . . Not surprisingly, world inflation continued accelerating throughout the decade, and fears of collapse in the private banking system grew increasingly vivid. More and more debts were “rescheduled,” and a number of poor countries grew flagrantly insolvent.¹⁵

In short, the interaction between the crisis of profitability and the crisis of hegemony, in combination with lax US monetary policies, resulted in increasing

14 Itoh, *The World Economic Crisis*, 53–54, 60–68, 116; de Cecco, “Inflation and Structural Change,” 12; Strange, *Casino Capitalism*, 18.

15 David Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 137–38.

world monetary disorder, escalating inflation, and steady deterioration in the capacity of the US dollar to function as the world's means of payment, reserve currency, and unit of account. From 1973 to 1978, the abandonment of the gold-dollar exchange standard appeared to have resulted in the establishment of a de facto pure dollar standard that enabled the United States to tap the resources of the rest of the world virtually without restriction, simply by issuing its own currency.¹⁶ By 1978, however, the threat of an imminent demise of the US dollar as world money had become quite real. When on October 6, 1979, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, began taking forceful measures to restrict the supply of dollars and to bid up interest rates in world financial markets, he was responding to a crisis of confidence that threatened to deteriorate into a collapse of the dollar, perhaps leading to a financial crisis and pressure to remonetize gold, against which the United States had fought doggedly for over a decade. And when a few months later the flight of hot Arab money into gold in the wake of the Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed the price of gold to a high of \$875, Volcker took even harsher measures to stop the growth of the US and global money supply.¹⁷

The neoliberal (counter)revolution and the end of the Cold War

Volcker's switch from highly permissive to highly restrictive monetary policies in the last year of the administration of Jimmy Carter was the harbinger of the abandonment under Reagan of the ideology and practice of the New Deal, nationally and internationally. Drawing ideological inspiration from Thatcher's slogan "There Is No Alternative" (TINA), the Reagan administration declared all variants of social Keynesianism obsolete and proceeded to liquidate them through a revival of early twentieth-century beliefs in the "magic" of allegedly self-regulating markets.¹⁸ The liquidation began with a

16 Benjamin J. Cohen, *Organizing the World's Money* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Riccardo Parboni, *The Dollar and Its Rivals* (London: Verso, 1981).

17 Michael Moffitt, *The World's Money: International Banking from Bretton Woods to the Brink of Insolvency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

18 On the rise and demise of such beliefs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Karl Polanyi's classic work *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For a comparison of the late twentieth-century neoliberal turn and its late nineteenth-century antecedent, see Beverly J. Silver and Giovanni Arrighi, "Polanyi's 'Double Movement': The *Belles Époques* of British and US Hegemony Compared," *Politics and Society*, 31 (2003), 325–55.

drastic contraction in money supply and an equally drastic increase in interest rates, followed by major reductions in corporate taxation and the elimination of controls on capital. The immediate result was a deep recession in the United States and in the world at large and a simultaneous escalation of interstate competition for capital worldwide.

TINA was thereby turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whatever alternative to cutthroat competition for increasingly mobile capital might have existed before 1980, it became moot once the world's largest and wealthiest economy led the world down the road of ever more extravagant concessions to capital. This was especially the case for Second and Third World countries which, as a result of the change in US policies, experienced a sharp contraction both in the demand for their natural resources and in the availability of credit and investment on favorable terms. It was in this context that the liquidation of the legacy of the welfare state in the United States and other First World countries was supplemented by a sudden switch of US policies toward the Third World. The focus shifted from the promotion of the "development project" launched in the late 1940s and early 1950s to the promulgation of the neoliberal agenda of the so-called Washington Consensus. Directly or through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the US government withdrew its support from the "statist" and "inward-looking" strategies (such as import-substitution industrialization) that most theories of national development had advocated in the 1950s and 1960s and began instead to promote capital-friendly and outward-looking strategies, most notably macrostability, privatization, and the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements.¹⁹

The change has been referred to as a "counterrevolution" in economic thought and political ideology.²⁰ This characterization of the neoliberal turn contrasts with its promoters' preference for the term "revolution." In reality, as the expression "neoliberal (counter)revolution" is meant to convey, the phenomenon was counterrevolutionary in the intended consequences but revolutionary in the unintended ones. To focus for now on intended consequences,

19 Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000); John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). As Hans Singer has noted, the description of development thinking in the postwar era as statist and inward-looking is correct, but neither characterization had the derogatory implications they acquired in the 1980s: "The Golden Age of the Keynesian Consensus: The Pendulum Swings Back," *World Development*, 25 (1997), 283–95.

20 See, among others, Toye, *Dilemmas of Development*, and Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 83–84, 227–30.

the counterrevolutionary thrust of the neoliberal turn was evident not only on issues of economic development in the Third World, but also in its attempt to reverse the empowerment of labor that had occurred in First World countries in the 1950s and 1960s.

The slowdown of economic growth and escalating inflation of the 1970s had already eroded the capacity of workers in the United States and other core countries to resist encroachments upon their working and living conditions. But their leverage collapsed only with the Reagan administration's liquidation of the New Deal. Beginning with the deep recession of 1979–82, pressure on profits emanating from workers' demands in core countries subsided. As Thatcher's adviser Alan Budd admitted in retrospect, "What was engineered in Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism which re-created a reserve army of labor, and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since."²¹ The maneuver was especially successful in the United States, as Volcker's successor at the helm of the US Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, pointed out when he attributed the higher profits and greater increases in productivity of US companies to Japan's and Europe's "relatively inflexible and, hence, more costly labor markets." "Because our costs of dismissing workers are lower," he explained, "the potential costs of hiring and the risks associated with expanding employment are less."²²

The success of the neoliberal (counter)revolution in disempowering labor did contribute to the revival of US profitability in the 1990s, but it was not the key factor that pulled the US economy out of the deep recession of the early 1980s and propelled it towards renewed expansion in the 1990s. Far more decisive was what Brenner calls the "fortuitous" return of Keynesianism. Reagan's "monumental programme of military spending and tax reduction for the rich . . . partly offset the ravages of monetarist tight credit and kept the economy ticking over." This socially regressive Keynesianism brought back budget, trade, and current account deficits with a vengeance. In contrast to the 1970s, however, instead of precipitating a run on the dollar and increasing monetary disorder, even larger US deficits in the 1980s led to a sharp appreciation of the US currency and to the establishment of a long-lasting pure dollar standard.²³

This different outcome of Reaganite Keynesianism can be traced in part to the taming of labor. On the whole, however, it reflected the fact that the

21 Quoted in David Harvey, *Spaces of Hope* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 7.

22 "For Greenspan, Flexibility Key to US Gains," *International Herald Tribune*, July 12, 2000. See also Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble*, 60–61.


23 Brenner, *The Boom and the Bubble*, 36, 54–55.

neoliberal turn promoted a major reorientation of the US economy to take full advantage of the ongoing financial expansion of capital at home and abroad. As previously noted, in the 1970s a growing competition between lax US monetary policies and mechanisms of private interbank money creation set an increasingly large group of countries free from balance-of-payments constraints, thereby undermining Washington's seigniorage privileges while feeding offshore money markets with more liquidity than private capital could possibly invest safely and profitably. Unfolding in conjunction with the deepening crisis of US hegemony, this mutually destructive competition between US private and public money culminated in the devastating run on the dollar of 1979–80. Whatever the actual motivations and ostensible rationale of the sudden reversal in US monetary policies that followed the run, its true long-term significance – and the main reason why it eventually revived US fortunes beyond anyone's expectations – is that it brought this mutually destructive competition to an abrupt end. Not only did the US government stop feeding the system with liquidity; more importantly, it started competing aggressively for capital worldwide – through record high interest rates, tax breaks, increasing freedom of action for capitalist producers and speculators, and, as the benefits of the new policies materialized, an appreciating dollar – prompting a massive rerouting of global capital flows toward the United States.

The extent of the rerouting can be gauged from the change in the current account of the US balance of payments. In the five-year period 1965–69, the account had a surplus of \$12 billion, which constituted almost half (46 percent) of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1970–74, the surplus contracted to \$4.1 billion and to 21 percent of the total surplus of G7 countries. In 1975–79, the surplus turned into a deficit of \$7.4 billion. After that, the deficit escalated to the previously unimaginable levels of \$146.5 billion in 1980–84 and \$660.6 billion in 1985–89 (see graph 1).²⁴

This massive redirection of capital flows toward the United States had devastating effects on the Third and Second World countries that in the 1970s had been lured, to paraphrase David Calleo, the economic historian, into borrowing “indefinitely from the magic liquidity machine.” When the United States reversed its monetary policies and started to compete aggressively in world financial markets, the “flood” of capital of the 1970s turned into the “drought” of the 1980s. Suffice it to say that the success of the

24 Calculated from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, various years). Leaving aside “errors and omissions,” current account surpluses are indicative of net outflows of capital, and current account deficits are indicative of net inflows.



Graph 1. Current account balances, China, Germany, Japan, and the United States (in billions of 2006 US dollars)

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.

United States in attracting capital turned the \$46.8 billion *outflow* of capital from G7 countries of the 1970s (as measured by their consolidated current account surpluses for the period 1970–79) into an *inflow* of \$347.4 billion in 1980–89.²⁵ First signaled by the Mexican default of 1982, the drought created a propitious environment for the counterrevolution in development thought and practice that the neoliberal Washington Consensus began advocating at about the same time. Taking advantage of the financial straits of many low- and middle-income countries, the agencies of the consensus foisted on them measures of “structural adjustment” that did nothing to improve their position in the global hierarchy of wealth but greatly facilitated the redirection of capital flows toward sustaining the revival of US wealth and power.²⁶

²⁵ Calculated from International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*.

²⁶ Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer, “Industrial Convergence and the Persistence of the North–South Divide”; Toye, *Dilemmas of Development*; McMichael, *Development and Social Change*; Sarah Bracking, “Structural Adjustment: Why It Wasn’t Necessary and Why It Did Work,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 80 (1999), 207–27; Manfred Bienefeld, “Structural Adjustment: Debt Collection Devise or Development Policy?,” *Review* (Fernand Braudel Center), 23 (2000), 533–82.

The impact of the neoliberal (counter)revolution on the Third World was far from uniform. Some regions (most notably East Asia) succeeded in taking advantage of the increase in US demand for cheap industrial products that ensued from US trade liberalization and the escalating US trade deficit. As a result, their balance of payments improved, their need to compete with the United States in world financial markets lessened, and indeed East Asian countries became major lenders to the United States. Other regions (most notably Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa), in contrast, did not manage to compete successfully for a share of the North American demand. These regions tended to run into balance-of-payments difficulties, which put them in the hopeless position of having to compete directly with the United States in world financial markets. The overall result was that between 1980 and 1990 the income per capita of East Asia (including China and Southeast Asia but excluding Japan) relative to that of the First World increased by almost 40 percent, while that of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America decreased by about 30 percent.²⁷

I shall later discuss the conditions that enabled East Asian countries to turn the neoliberal (counter)revolution to their advantage. For now, however, it is important to emphasize that the change in the conjuncture of the global political economy precipitated by the neoliberal turn contributed decisively to the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies. Standard accounts of the crisis focus on the internal dynamic of these economies, emphasizing their tendency to privilege quantity over quality in economic production and social provision. As long as massive inputs of labor and natural resources could be channeled toward the building of a heavy-industry economy, central planning generated rates of economic growth among the highest in the world.²⁸ But once labor and natural resources became more fully utilized, and further growth more dependent on growing productivity, central planning became increasingly anachronistic. Worse still, attempts to spur productivity by stepping up investments in human capital further

27 The G7 is the group of seven major industrialized countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The exact percentages are +38.5 for China, +38.7 for the rest of East Asia (excluding Japan), -30.6 for sub-Saharan Africa, and -30.1 for Latin America. Less extreme were the changes for West Asia and North Africa (-14.9) and for South Asia (+8.3). All percentages have been calculated from data provided in World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001). For details on the countries included in each region, see Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalization and Uneven Development," in I. Rossi (ed.), *Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches* (New York: Springer, 2007), table 2, 191.

28 See Richard N. Cooper's and Wilfried Loth's chapters in volume II.

undermined the political legitimacy of a system that was more and more incapable of delivering on its promises of a quality of life superior to the Western one.²⁹

Arguments of this kind are useful in highlighting factors that undoubtedly contributed to the terminal crisis of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies. They nonetheless obscure the fact that, despite its superpower status and the success of its modernization efforts, throughout the Cold War era the USSR occupied a position in the global hierarchy of wealth very similar to that of Latin American countries. Lack of data makes comparisons difficult for the period under consideration, but a fairly reliable source for an earlier period put the GNP per capita of the USSR at 25.2 percent of that of the wealthier countries of the West in 1938 and at 18.3 percent in 1948. These figures were almost exactly the same as those for Latin America (23.8 percent in 1938 and 16.2 percent in 1948) and for Hungary and Poland combined (26.7 percent in 1938 and 18.4 percent in 1948). Half a century later, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet system, the situation had apparently not changed except for a further widening of the income gap vis-à-vis the wealthy countries of the West. Although there are no comparable figures for the USSR itself, the corresponding figure for Hungary and Poland combined in 1988 was 11.1 percent and for Latin America 10.6 percent.³⁰

Assuming that the economic performance of the USSR between 1948 and 1988 was not very different from that of Poland and Hungary, the above

29 For good summaries of these accounts, see Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), 230–37, and Manuel Castells, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. III, *End of Millennium* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 5–37. For a recent reassessment of the contradictions of Soviet planning, see Vladimir Popov, “Life Cycle of the Centrally Planned Economy: Why Soviet Growth Rates Peaked in the 1950s,” available at www.nes.ru/nvpopov/documents/SovietGrowth-Boston.pdf.

30 Figures for 1938 and 1948 have been calculated from data provided in W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), and figures for 1988 from World Bank, *World Development Report* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990). The figures are percentages of the weighted average per capita income of Australia, Austria, Canada, France, (West) Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Benelux and Scandinavian countries. The Latin American aggregate includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The figures are based on current exchange rates (FX) calculations. If they had been based on purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations, the percentages would have been higher. The choice of FX-based data is justified by their greater validity than PPP based data as indicators of relative command over world economic resources. For a discussion of the criteria used in the choice of the aggregates and of the data, see Giovanni Arrighi, “World Income Inequalities and the Future of Socialism,” *New Left Review*, 1, 189 (1991), 39–65.

figures suggest that the economic position and trajectory of the Soviet system of centrally planned economies in the Cold War era was strikingly similar to those of a Third World region like Latin America. Despite their radically different political and economic regimes, not only did they occupy the same position in the global hierarchy of wealth, but they also lost about the same ground with respect to the upper echelons of the hierarchy. There was, of course, a fundamental difference in the status and power of the two regions in the Cold War era: Latin America was a politically subordinate and militarily insignificant domain of US hegemony, while the Soviet system of states had sufficient political and military power to limit and constrain the global reach of that hegemony. Over time, however, the capacity of the Soviet system to keep up politically and militarily with the US system was bound to be seriously restricted by the increasing income gap that separated the two systems.

The problem was not so much that, following Kennan's advice, the United States had succeeded in retaining within its domains four of the world's five main industrial core areas. As previously noted, in the Cold War era there had been considerable industrial convergence between lower- and higher-income countries. The problem was that industrial convergence with the high-income countries of the First World was not accompanied by income convergence, so that Second World countries, no less than Third World countries, had to bear the costs without reaping the expected benefits of industrialization. The nature of the predicament was nowhere more evident than in the armaments race on which much of the credibility of Soviet prestige and power had come to rest.

There is in this regard a close, if little noticed, parallel between the armaments race in the Cold War era and that between Britain and France in the nineteenth century. As William McNeill has pointed out, from the mid-1840s through the 1860s, most technological breakthroughs in the design of warships were pioneered by France. And, yet, each French breakthrough called forth naval appropriations in Britain that France could not match, so that it was "relatively easy for the Royal Navy to catch up technically and surpass numerically each time the French changed the basis of the competition."³¹

This pattern of the nineteenth-century armaments race shows that control over the world's financial resources can provide a more decisive competitive advantage than leadership in technological innovation. This possibility was confirmed in the Cold War competition between the United States and the

³¹ William McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 227–28.

USSR. The key technological innovation in this competition was the launching of the Soviet Sputnik in October 1957. Although the power and prestige of the USSR were greatly enhanced by the innovation, soon they were completely overshadowed by the achievements of the space program that the United States launched in 1961 with financial resources entirely beyond the reach of the USSR. What is more, in the decade following the launching of Sputnik, the installation of hundreds of long-range missiles empowered the United States and the USSR to destroy each other's cities in a matter of minutes. The signing of a five-year Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972 consolidated the balance of terror between the two superpowers, but did not halt the armaments race. It simply shifted it "to other kinds of weapons not mentioned in the treaty for the good reason that they did not yet exist."³²

In the scientific discovery of new weapons systems – even more than in earlier forms of the armaments race – the superpower with greater command over global financial resources could turn the balance of terror to its own advantage by stepping up, or by threatening to step up, its research efforts to levels that the other superpower simply could not afford. This, of course, is what the Reagan administration did in the 1980s primarily, though not exclusively, through the Strategic Defense Initiative. It is not clear to what extent the need to rescue the US economy from the deep recession of 1979–82 through a powerful dose of military Keynesianism influenced the strategic considerations that led to this final escalation of the Cold War armaments race.³³ But whatever the US rationale, Soviet miscalculations played a crucial role in determining the eventual outcome.

Two such miscalculations were especially crucial. One was the decision to join other middle-income countries in borrowing heavily from Western banks in the 1970s. The true extent of Soviet borrowing is not known, but we do know that East European countries assumed financial obligations that were among the heaviest in the world.³⁴ A second and greater miscalculation was the invasion of Afghanistan. As previously noted, this event, in conjunction with the Iranian crisis, precipitated the run on the dollar that in 1980 led Volcker to tighten further the US money supply and take other measures that turned the flood of capital available to Second and Third World countries in the 1970s into the drought of the 1980s, and simultaneously produced a

32 *Ibid.*, 360, 368, 372–73; for the US–Soviet arms race, see William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

33 For Reagan's policies, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

34 Iliana Zloch Christy, *Debt Problems of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

collapse in the price of gold, oil, and other raw materials, which had become the main source of foreign exchange for the USSR. These changes hurt the USSR as they did other middle-income countries that had gone into debt in the 1970s.³⁵ But in the case of the Soviet Union, a deteriorating financial position was aggravated by the capacity of the United States to borrow massively from abroad, mostly from Japan, so as to escalate the armaments race well beyond what the USSR could afford. Combined with generous US support to Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation, the escalation forced the Soviet Union into an unwinnable double confrontation: in Afghanistan, where its high-tech military apparatus found itself in the same difficulties that had led to the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and in the arms race, where the United States could mobilize financial resources wholly beyond the Kremlin's capabilities.

This double confrontation did not in itself cause the collapse of the USSR.³⁶ But it was certainly one of the most crucial elements in the combination of circumstances that did. Above all, it had unintended consequences that had a lasting impact on things to come.

The legacy of the neoliberal (counter)revolution

Who actually won the Cold War, if anyone did, remains a controversial issue.³⁷ Assessments of the global power of the United States in the wake of the demise of its Soviet rival vary widely.

"Now is the unipolar moment," a triumphalist commentator crows; "[t]here is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it." But a senior US foreign-policy official demurs: "We simply do not have the leverage, we don't have the influence, the inclination to use military force. We don't have the money to bring the kind of pressure that will produce positive results any time soon."³⁸

These contrasting assessments of US power reflected the peculiar dynamic that had brought the Cold War to an end. The triumphalist assessment reflected the unanticipated ease with which US policies had thrown the Soviet colossus off balance and "won" the Cold War without firing a shot. The cautionary

35 Castells, *End of Millennium*, 21.

36 For the collapse of the USSR, see Alex Pravda's chapter in this volume.

37 Robert Gilpin, "The Prospects for a Stable International Political Order," paper presented at the conference "Plotting Our Future. Technology, Environment, Economy and Society: A World Outlook," Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, Italy, October 1996.

38 John G. Ruggie, "Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 109 (1994), 553.

assessment, in contrast, reflected the fact that the defeat of the Soviet Union had not eliminated the deeper causes of the crisis of US hegemony of the 1970s. To the extent that the Soviet collapse was caused by US power, it was due not to US military might but to a superior command over the world's financial resources. And to the extent that it had military origins, it confirmed rather than reversed the verdict of the Vietnam War: it showed that, in Afghanistan no less than in Vietnam, the high-tech military apparatuses controlled by the Cold War superpowers, whatever their use in reproducing the balance of terror, were of little use in policing the Third World on the ground.

Worse still, the mobilization of the world's financial resources to rescue the US economy from the deep recession of the early 1980s, and simultaneously to escalate the armaments race with the USSR, transformed the United States into the greatest debtor nation in world history, increasingly dependent on cheap East Asian credit, labor, and commodities for the reproduction of its wealth and power. This shift of the center of world-scale processes of capital accumulation from North America to East Asia may well turn out to be the most significant legacy of the Cold War. But whether it will or not, the shift provides key insights into the evolving relationship between the Cold War and the world economy.

The most immediate impact of the Cold War on the East Asian region was to reduce most of its states to a condition of vassalage vis-à-vis one or other of the two contending superpowers. Soon, however, the Korean War demonstrated the precariousness of this condition and induced the United States to establish in the region a trade and aid regime extremely favorable to its vassal states, especially Japan. This "magnanimous" early postwar regime set in motion a "snowballing" process of connected economic "miracles" which started in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, rolled on in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and some ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980s, and eventually encompassed China and Vietnam as well.³⁹

In spite of US "magnanimity," the faultlines between the US and Soviet spheres of influence in the region started breaking down soon after they were established, first by the Chinese rebellion against Soviet domination in the late 1950s, and then by the US failure to split the Vietnamese nation along the Cold

39 Terutomo Ozawa, "Foreign Direct Investment and Structural Transformation: Japan as a Recycler of Market and Industry," *Business and the Contemporary World*, 5 (1993), 130–31, and Ozawa, "Pax Americana-Led Macro-Clustering and Flying Geese Style Catch-Up in East Asia: Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous Growth." *Journal of Asian Economics*, 13 (2003).

War divide.⁴⁰ In this respect, the Vietnam War was a crucial turning point. While the Korean War had resulted in the formation of a US-centric East Asian regime based on the exclusion of China from normal commercial and diplomatic intercourse with the non-Communist part of the region, defeat in Vietnam induced the United States to allow China to resume such contacts. The scope of the region's economic integration and expansion was thereby broadened considerably, but only at the expense of US capacity to control its dynamic politically.⁴¹

Japan's spectacular economic ascent from the 1950s through the 1980s gradually transformed the previous relationship of Japanese political and economic vassalage vis-à-vis the United States into a relationship of mutual dependence: Japan remained dependent on US military protection, but the reproduction of US power came to depend on Japanese finance and industry. This transformation has been widely attributed to policies that made Japan the prototype of the "developmental state."⁴² Equally important, however, were two other factors.

One was the strong growth in the United States and in the USSR of capital- and resource-intensive industries (such as the steel, aircraft, military, space, and petrochemical industries), which created profitable opportunities for specialization in labor-intensive industries and resource-saving activities. As economic historian Kaoru Sugihara has underscored, Japan seized these opportunities by developing interlinked industries and firms with different degrees of labor and capital intensity, but retained an overall bias toward the East Asian tradition of privileging the utilization of human over nonhuman resources. At the same time, a surge of nationalism under the Cold War regime generated fierce competition across the East Asian region between relatively low-wage industrializers and higher-income countries. "As soon as wages in one country rose even fractionally," that country "had to seek a new industry which would produce a higher quality commodity," thereby "creating an effect similar to the 'flying geese pattern of economic development.'"

40 For an analysis of the Sino-Soviet split, see Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

41 Bruce Cumings, "Japan and Northeast Asia into the Twenty-First Century," in P.J. Katzenstein and T. Shiraishi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 154–55; Mark Selden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945–1995," in Katzenstein and Shiraishi (eds.), *Network Power*, 306–40.

42 The characterization of Japan as a "developmental state" was originally proposed by Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). The notion was later applied to other states in the East Asian region. See, for example, Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*.

And the more low-wage countries joined the process, the longer the chain of “flying geese.”⁴³

The other factor that contributed decisively to the Japanese economic ascent and the diffusion of Japanese economic power throughout the East Asian region was the crisis of vertically integrated business organizations. As the number and variety of vertically integrated, multinational corporations increased worldwide, their mutual competition intensified, inducing them to subcontract to small businesses activities previously carried out within their own organizations. The tendency toward the bureaucratization of business through vertical integration, which had made the fortunes of US corporate business since the 1870s, thus began to be superseded by a tendency toward informal networking and the revitalization of small business.⁴⁴

This trend has been in evidence everywhere, but nowhere more so than in East Asia. Without the assistance of multiple layers of formally independent subcontractors, noted Japan’s External Trade Organization, “Japanese big business would flounder and sink.”⁴⁵ Starting in the early 1970s, the scale and scope of this multilayered subcontracting system increased rapidly through a spillover into a growing number and variety of East Asian states. Although Japanese business was its leading agency, the spillover relied heavily on the business networks of the overseas Chinese diaspora, which were from the start the main intermediaries between Japanese and local businesses in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and most Southeast Asian countries. The region-wide expansion of the Japanese multilayered subcontracting system was thus supported not only by US political patronage “from above,” but also by Chinese commercial and financial patronage “from below.”⁴⁶

43 Kaoru Sugihara, “The East Asian Path of Economic Development: A Long-Term Perspective,” in G. Arrighi, T. Hamashita, and M. Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2003), 105–10, 112–14. The flying-geese pattern of economic development to which Sugihara refers is the leading-sector model of spatial diffusion of industrial innovations which was originally proposed by Kaname Akamatsu, “A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy,” *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 86 (1961), 196–217. Ozawa’s notion of a snowballing process of connected East Asian economic miracles is a later version of this model.

44 Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, “World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy,” in A. Portes, M. Castells, and L. A. Benton (eds.), *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 29–30; Bennett Harrison, *Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 244–45.

45 Daniel I. Okimoto and Thomas P. Rohlen, *Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society and Political Economy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 83–88.

46 Giovanni Arrighi, Po-keung Hui, Ho-Fung Hung, and Mark Selden, “Historical Capitalism, East and West,” in Arrighi, Hamashita, and Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia*, 312–13.

Over time, however, patronage from above and below began to constrain rather than support the capacity of Japanese business to lead the process of regional economic integration and expansion. As long as the “magnanimous” postwar US trade and aid regime was in place, Japan’s dependence on US military protection was not a problem. But, by the 1980s, that regime had given way to US extortions, such as the massive revaluation of the yen imposed on Japan by the Plaza conference of 1985 and the so-called Voluntary Export Restraints imposed on Japanese imports into the United States, which considerably undermined Japan’s capacity to profit from US patronage.⁴⁷ To make things worse for Japan, US corporations began restructuring themselves to compete more effectively with Japanese businesses in the exploitation of East Asia’s rich endowment of labor and entrepreneurial resources, not just through direct investment, but also through all kinds of subcontracting arrangements. The more intense this competition became, the more the overseas Chinese emerged as one of the most powerful capitalist networks in the region, in many ways overshadowing the networks of US and Japanese multinationals.⁴⁸

This development encouraged Deng Xiaoping to seek the assistance of the overseas Chinese in upgrading the Chinese economy and in pursuing national unification in accordance with the “One Nation, Two Systems” model. The result was the close political alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and overseas Chinese business. Together, they greatly facilitated the reincorporation of mainland China into regional and global markets and resurrected a state whose demographic size, abundance of entrepreneurial and labor resources, and growth potential surpassed by a good margin those of all other states operating in the region, the United States included. The progressive realization of that potential in the 1990s and 2000s would create for US hegemony a new challenge in key respects more complex and difficult to contain than the Soviet challenge of the Cold War era.

47 Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*, 118–19, 132, 230–32; Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007), ch. 6.

48 Arrighi, Hui, Hung, and Selden, “Historical Capitalism,” 315–16.

The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

SILVIO PONS

After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the leading West European Communist Parties – the Italian and the French – expressed their disapproval of the repression of the Prague Spring and of its ideological justification, known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Such dissent marked a historic turn of events, given that both parties had unconditionally approved the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. For a brief moment, the creation of a Western Communist pole was conceived of as a possibility in Italy and France, and perceived as a danger in Moscow. However, in a few months, the scenario of a *coup de théâtre* – a new heresy in the Communist world – came undone. Under pressure from the USSR, Western Communism's united front fell apart. The French Communists (Parti communiste français, or PCF) backtracked, happily accepting the authoritarian "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. The Italian Communists (Partito comunista italiano, or PCI), on the other hand, maintained their dissent, but were careful not to break with the Soviets, retaining the idea of "unity in diversity" inherited from Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI from 1927 to 1964.¹

Nevertheless, such a prospect was kept alive by the Italian Communists, the most important Communist force in the West. They obstinately refused to brush the Prague Spring aside as a negligible episode and gradually increased their electoral strength in the country. During the early 1970s, the PCI under Enrico Berlinguer's leadership developed into a party that promoted an Italian road to socialism within the framework of a parliamentary democracy. Although they constantly appealed to their own national tradition – especially to Antonio Gramsci's ideas about the complexity of revolution in the West and to the tradition of a mass party, the so-called *partito nuovo*, established by Togliatti after World War II – the Italian Communists tried to increase their

¹ See Maud Bracke, *Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007).

legitimacy by forging an international alliance with their French and Spanish partners, based on independence from the USSR, detachment from the Soviet model, and the idea of Western socialism founded upon democratic principles. The partnership of the three Western Communist parties gave rise to what was called *Eurocommunism*.

The birth of Eurocommunism in the second half of the decade garnered attention in international public opinion for two reasons: first, because of its goal of modernizing European Communism; and, second, because it appeared to modify the Cold War landscape. By declaring orthodox Communist political culture obsolete, the Eurocommunists proposed a “third way” between social democracy and Soviet socialism. By viewing détente as a new international environment, they asserted themselves as one of the movements that advocated the gradual end of the Cold War divide in Europe. Therefore, Eurocommunism raised curiosity and concern, hope and hostility. In Western Europe, it was viewed with interest by some social democrats, mainly in Germany and Sweden, but opposed by others, as in France, and discarded by “new left” movements. In Eastern Europe, it was perceived with moderate empathy in Belgrade and in Budapest, and elsewhere in informal circles, while being rejected as a destabilizing factor by most representatives of the Communist establishments. Dissidents in socialist countries were inspired by the Eurocommunists’ declarations of intellectual and political freedom, but also frustrated by their diplomatic prudence and political unpredictability. Both in Moscow and in Washington, Eurocommunism triggered apprehension and anxiety.

Thus Eurocommunism was a factor for change and a source of conflict in European politics. Eventually it collected more enemies than friends. The Soviet reaction prevented East European Communists from joining and thereby weakening bloc cohesion. The US opposition to any participation of Communist Parties in Western European coalition governments was maintained, and damaged the PCI. Most of the Western Communist Parties remained small sectarian entities under Moscow’s influence. Furthermore, contradictions and divisions between Eurocommunists came to the surface, weakening their capacity to challenge Moscow and influence East European Communism. Crucial disagreements between the two main partners, the Italian and the French Communists, were never overcome. The Italian Communists’ ambition to generate a new political culture failed and became simply a national peculiarity. As détente declined, Eurocommunism did not become an authentic political movement on the European scene and failed in its aim of representing a new model of reform Communism.

The Italian origins of Eurocommunism

At the time of the Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia, Berlinguer had stood out as one of the PCI leaders who was staunchest in defending the right of other parties to disagree with the USSR. Since leading the Italian delegation at the Moscow conference of the Communist Parties in 1969, he had appeared to the Soviets to be an independent personality, barely reliable from their point of view.² When Berlinguer became general secretary of the PCI in 1972, he again proposed the idea of aggregating the Western Communists, a project now made more feasible by the progress of the international détente. The Italian Communists, not unlike the Soviet ones, supported détente and viewed West Germany's *Ostpolitik* favorably. But they developed their own particular point of view. Their propensity for a "dynamic," not static, détente overturned one of the Soviets' fundamental assumptions: while in Moscow bipolar détente and the authoritarian "normalization" of Eastern Europe were axiomatically linked, the PCI made a connection between European détente and the promotion of change under the banner of "socialism with a human face." At the same time, the Italian Communists had reexamined the negative opinion of the European Economic Community (EEC) that held sway in Moscow. The concept of Europe adopted by the PCI increasingly overlapped with that of the main social democratic parties, while remaining distinct from that of the other Communist Parties.³

Berlinguer set himself the goal of exporting the PCI's vision of détente and Europe to other Western Communist Parties. This appeared possible especially after the PCF softened its own anti-Europeanism and decided to emulate the PCI, sending a delegation to the European Parliament in 1973.⁴ The Italians wanted to call a conference of the Western Communist Parties

2 A. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 271. At the time, Cherniaev worked under Boris Ponomarev, chief of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet union. After 1985, he was to become one of Mikhail Gorbachev's closest collaborators on international issues.

3 Donald Sassoon, "La sinistra, l'Europa, il PCI," in Roberto Gualtieri (ed.), *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991* (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 223-49. See also the documents collected in Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari (eds.), *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimonianze e documenti 1945-1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).

4 Gérard Streiff, *Jean Kanapa 1921-1978: une singulière histoire du PCF*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), vol. I, 553. Kanapa was head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCF from 1973 to 1978. Among Europe's Communist Parties, the PCI was the first to send its own delegation to the Strasbourg parliament in 1969.

aimed at identifying the specific nature of the problems they were grappling with. Georges Marchais, the general secretary of the PCF from 1972,⁵ agreed to assist Berlinguer with the conference, which took place in Brussels in January 1974. Berlinguer's intervention in Brussels centered on Europe's autonomous role in world politics. For the PCI, the initiative of aggregating the Western Communist Parties made sense only if it were linked to the idea of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American."⁶ The French seemed in tune with the Italians. But the majority of the Western Communist Parties – clearly influenced by Moscow and the East European regimes – did not change even slightly their extremely negative view of the EEC and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Consequently, the conference showed more conflict than consensus.⁷

Nevertheless, convergence between the Italian and the French parties – respectively gathering more than one-fourth and more than one-fifth of the national electorate – looked encouraging. After all, the other Western Communist Parties represented almost negligible political forces. In Northern Europe, the traditional weakness of the Communists showed no sign of change. The British, the Belgian, and the Norwegian Communist Parties – the three minor parties that had expressed dissent against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia – saw their support from the working class decline and performed poorly in elections. All of the other northern parties were invariably pro-Soviet. Only the Communist Party of Finland was successful in terms of electoral percentages, but its interest in European issues was small. The Communist Party of West Germany – a fierce opponent of the PCI in Brussels – had no representation in the Bundestag and was strongly influenced by the ruling East German Communist Party. In Southern Europe, the prospects for change were more promising. But the Greek Communists were deeply split between pro-Soviet and reform factions, while the Portuguese

5 For a biographical profile of Marchais, see Thomas Hofnung, *Georges Marchais: l'inconnu du Parti communiste français* (Paris: L'Archipel, 2001).

6 Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Roma, Archivio del Partito Comunista Italiano (hereafter: FIG APC), Fondo Berlinguer, serie Movimento Operaio Internazionale (MOI), fasc. 114; FIG APC, Scritti e discorsi di Berlinguer, 26 January 1974, mf 073, 389–99. The archives of the Italian Communist Party, including Berlinguer's personal papers, are extremely rich on international issues for the whole of the 1970s. This chapter is based on those archives. At the time of writing, the archives of the PCF and the Spanish Communist Party were not readily available for the second half of the 1970s, at least as far as international issues are concerned.

7 See the memoirs of Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Napoleone, 1994), 34. During the 1970s, Rubbi was a leading official of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCI. He became head of the department in 1979.

held orthodox positions. Only the Spanish Communist Party (Partido comunista de España, or PCE) supported change.⁸

After the meeting in Brussels, Berlinguer aimed gradually to define a set of distinctive principles and policies for Western Communism. His key idea was to put an end to the sectarian minority traditions and behavior of the Western Communists that had resulted from the Cold War, thus contributing to the prospect of Communism being able to compete with social democracy for hegemony on the Left. Berlinguer's West European Communist strategy also had a national aspect. It was conceived in parallel with the launching of the "historic compromise" between Communists and Catholics in Italian politics, proposed by Berlinguer in September/October 1973.⁹ He intended to avoid a repetition in Italy of what had happened in Chile – a cruel conflict between the Left and the moderate forces, and a military *coup d'état* made possible by a hostile international environment. In his view, as a consequence of European détente, American hegemony could be contained, liquidating the anti-Communist veto imposed over Italian politics from the outside. A sufficiently "dynamic" view of détente would bring a Communist party to power in a Western country, if the party were able to build national and international coalitions and to modernize its own political culture.

Despite the failure of the Brussels conference, the Soviets were unhappy. After having tolerated the initiative, they let the PCI know that they were not keen on the formula of Europe as "neither anti-Soviet nor anti-American," and that they were concerned about the possible creation of a Western Communist center.¹⁰ As Cherniaev noted in his journal, it was clear in Moscow that some Western Communists avoided "identifying in any way with Soviet and Eastern European Communism," especially after the latest repressive measures against world-famous dissident intellectuals such as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.¹¹ But the Soviets' discontent should not be interpreted solely in the light of their hardened ideological control. A political paradox was taking shape: more than in Western Communism, the PCI's policy encountered a certain degree of positive attention in the East – where it was essentially perceived as supporting European détente and national autonomy in

8 See Aldo Agosti, *Bandiere rosse: un profilo storico dei comunismi europei* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1999), 264–87.

9 See Enrico Berlinguer, *La "questione comunista," 1969–1975*, ed. by Antonio Tatò (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1975), 609–39.

10 Information note, Foreign Policy Department, February 18, 1974, FIG APC, Estero, 1974, mf 074, 414.

11 A. Cherniaev, 'Na Staroi ploshchadi: iz dnevnikovykh zapisei. 1973 god', *Novaya i noveishaya istoriia*, 6 (2004), 115.

the Soviet bloc. The PCI's points of view came to influence the Communist Parties in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia, although for differing reasons and with different emphases.¹²

The Italian Communists' policy sounded a discordant note, just at the moment when the Soviets wanted to take advantage of the Western world's weakness caused by the oil crisis after the 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East. Given the internal political and social crisis in Italy and the rise of terrorism, that country appeared to be the weak link in the Atlantic alliance. Moscow would have preferred the PCI to exert influence in Italy by maintaining a traditional model of class politics. But the Italian Communists wanted to modify the bipolar architecture and develop an innovative example of reform Communism in Western Europe.

In this context, Berlinguer's personality assumed international significance. His strategy was by no means simply geared to obtaining national legitimization, even if his political discourse constantly evoked the particular intellectual and national heritage of Italian Communism. In Berlinguer's thinking, there was a link between the idea of a new paradigm of Western socialism – to be built by embracing pluralist democracy and by rejecting a consumerist society – and the idea of Europe as a “third actor” in world politics, emerging through the process of détente and the birth of a political architecture of European integration. This vision had universal appeal as well as theoretical limitations: his analysis of international relations was still essentially based on the old Communist axiom of the “general crisis of capitalism.” Nevertheless, Berlinguer put new issues on the agenda, believing in the possibility of pragmatic change in Communist political culture. His ideal of humanistic socialism was not intended to embrace social democracy: it was aimed at preserving and modernizing the revolutionary tradition inherited from the history of Communism.¹³

Eurocommunism: birth and contradictions

However, cultural change and alliance-building between Western Communists proved to be difficult, as evidenced by disagreements in the aftermath of

12 Information by Sergio Segre on his trip to Bucharest and Belgrade, FIG APC, Estero, 1974, mf 074, 250.

13 See, in particular, Enrico Berlinguer, *La proposta comunista: relazione al Comitato centrale e alla Commissione centrale di controllo del Partito comunista italiano in preparazione del XIV Congresso* (Turin: Einaudi, 1975). On Eurocommunism as a project of the Italian Communists, see Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006).

Portugal's "carnation revolution" in April 1974. Views on the Portuguese revolution soon became a testing ground for the principles embraced by the West European Communists. The Italian and Spanish Communists publicly criticized the conduct of the Portuguese Communists, headed by Alvaro Cunhal. In Berlinguer's two subsequent meetings with Manuel Azcarate, the head of the PCE's foreign department, and with Santiago Carrillo, the general secretary of the PCE, held in June and July 1975, there was agreement on the concern that the model followed by Cunhal in his struggle with the socialists resembled that of the "popular democracies" in Eastern Europe and that he sought to achieve a monopoly of power for the Communists.¹⁴ The French Communists, in contrast, supported their Portuguese comrades.¹⁵ In the meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais held in Paris on September 29, 1975, the two sides agreed that their respective evaluations of the Portuguese question were different. The Italians understood that the French supported Eurocommunism essentially for domestic political reasons, but for those same reasons they could change their tactics at any time.¹⁶ Berlinguer told his Italian colleagues that working out an understanding with the French was even more difficult than with the Soviets.¹⁷ Consequently, while the public meeting held between Berlinguer and Carrillo in Rome in July 1975 was intended to convey a sense of harmony between Italian and Spanish Communists, nothing came out of the November 1975 meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais in Rome except symbolic declarations of good intentions.¹⁸ The alliance between the three parties had no clear political content.

The PCF's positions on Portugal largely reflected those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In private, the Soviets criticized Berlinguer and accused the United States of preparing a coup in Portugal similar to what had happened in Chile.¹⁹ The Soviets' own objectives during the Portuguese crisis were probably more restrained than revolutionary. A confidential note written by Vadim Zagladin, one of the main officials of the CPSU's International Department headed by Boris Ponomarev, after a trip to Portugal in

¹⁴ FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 122 and fasc. 125.

¹⁵ FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204, 216–19.

¹⁶ FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 129. The notes taken by Kanapa at the time also confirm the divergence between the PCI and the PCF on the Portuguese question: see Streiff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, p. 30.

¹⁷ FIG APC, Direzione, Verbal, September 26, 1975, mf 0208, 176–78.

¹⁸ FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 129.

¹⁹ Record of the meeting between A. Kirilenko, V. Zagladin, E. Berlinguer, A. Cossutta, G. Napolitano, G. Pajetta, and S. Segre, March 24, 1975, FIG APC, Estero, 1975, mf 204, 593–94.

early September 1975, shows that the Soviets sought contacts with a number of political forces, starting with the Socialists, and that they wanted to convince Cunhal to contain the extremist tendencies working in his party and in the army. The Soviets worried that a Portuguese Communist Party grab for power could result both in the party getting crushed and in Moscow losing its influence on politics in a strategically important country.²⁰ However, Moscow believed Cunhal's conduct served as an example for other Western Communist Parties – in terms of both loyalty to the USSR and aversion to US leadership – and constituted an alternative to Berlinguer's policy.

On Western Communism, paradoxically, Soviet and American interests converged. For different reasons, both Moscow and Washington feared the PCI's reform Communism. In 1974–75, Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, outlined a position on the "Communist question" that matched his geopolitical thinking and his bipolar vision of the European theatre. The Portuguese revolution led him to fear a "domino effect" that would threaten the system of American alliances in Southern Europe, notwithstanding the political and ideological differences between the various Communist Parties. He worried that the United States would have a weakened capacity to control Western Europe.²¹ Even when the Italian Communists abandoned their anti-NATO position in December 1974, Kissinger's views did not change.²² At a meeting with his staff in January 1975, he rejected the argument that the United States could find a Communist Party "acceptable" if it were independent of Moscow, observing that "[Josip Broz] Tito is not under Moscow's control, yet his influence is felt all over the world." Should the Communists come to power in any West European country, the map of the post-World War II world would be "totally redefined."²³

The Soviets avoided formulating so clear a position. But they probably approved Kissinger's veto of the PCI. They were afraid that the model of an independent Communist Party might help create an independent West European center for Communism, which in turn could influence the parties of

20 Fond Gorbacheva, Archives, Moscow, fond 3, opis' 1, kartochka 13678.

21 See Mario Del Pero, *Henry Kissinger e l'ascesa dei neoconservatori: alle origini della politica estera americana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 88–94. See also Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 400.

22 On December 10, 1974, in his report to the Central Committee of the PCI, Berlinguer declared that the party was no longer requesting Italy to break with NATO; see Berlinguer, *La proposta comunista*, 60–64.

23 Kissinger's staff meeting, January 12, 1975, United States National Archives, Washington DC (NARA), RG 59, 78D443, 6. See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 627, 631.

Eastern Europe.²⁴ Even more than the Italian Communists' reversal of their anti-NATO positions, what worried Moscow was their idea that Europe should play a new role in world affairs.²⁵ Rather than seeking to capitalize on the possibility of the PCI's entrance into an Italian governing coalition, Moscow feared that its example might undermine both Soviet leadership of European Communism and the European détente, which was based on bipolar stability.

Despite Washington's alarm and Moscow's suspicion, Western Communism's role on the European scene did not generate an authentic political movement. There were unbreachable divergences between the Italian and the French Communists, and not only over the Portuguese revolution. The PCI and the PCF held different positions on Europe, since the latter was against any weakening of national sovereignty in favor of political integration. Moreover, the individual parties' prospects differed considerably: while the PCI had achieved remarkably increased support at the administrative elections of June 1975 and was in the running to govern Italy as the dominant force on the Left, the PCF was suffering from a stagnant voter base and competition from the Socialists, and the PCE was reemerging from illegality in the transition after Francisco Franco's long dictatorship. Nevertheless, although its actual position remained fragile and uncertain, Eurocommunism was perceived by the public to be one of the portents of change triggered by détente.

By the end of 1975, the term Eurocommunism had entered the political lexicon. The Western Communists now distinguished themselves by criticizing Moscow on human rights in light of the Helsinki agreements. The 25th Congress of the CPSU recorded unprecedented events: Marchais did not attend, and Berlinguer made a speech focusing on the issue of "pluralism" and political democracy.²⁶ The symbolic effect of this distancing from the Soviet model was quite considerable.²⁷ At his confidential meeting with Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the CPSU, on March 1, Berlinguer emphasized the "new possibilities" arising for the "democratic and socialist forces" in a situation marked, in his opinion, by the decline of the United States after its defeat in Vietnam and by the crisis of capitalism in Western Europe.

24 On the convergence between Moscow and Washington against Eurocommunism, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 388.

25 FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1975, mf 201, 779–83.

26 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 136.

27 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 102.



1. Leader of the Italian Communist Party Enrico Berlinguer (left) and French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais during a meeting in 1976. Berlinguer took his party in a radical anti-Stalinist direction that Marchais found difficult to follow.

Brezhnev adhered to Berlinguer's thesis, but denied that the USSR's actions were conditioned by a "siege mentality," as the Italian leader had maintained.²⁸ Subsequently, in a joint meeting with Marchais in Paris on June 3, 1976, Berlinguer used the term *Eurocommunism* in public for the first time.²⁹

The main test came in late June, when a European conference of Communist parties convened in Berlin. Even just a few days before proceedings began, despite pressure from the Soviets and their allies, the attendance of the Italian and French Communists was not taken for granted. There was no agreement on a common document. For more than a year, preparatory talks had been in a stalemate, generating tension.³⁰ The real point of the conference concerned the relationship of the Communist movement to détente. The Soviets and their closer allies aimed at containing the most dangerous messages of Helsinki – the protection of human rights and the abandonment of a concept of international relations based on class struggle – by stressing the ideological ties that bound European Communists together. Therefore, Moscow wanted

28 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 136.

29 FIG APC, Estero, 1976, mf 0228, 565–67; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 139.

30 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 339ff. See also Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 91ff.

the Italians to attend the conference, which otherwise would have lost much of its meaning.³¹ On the other side, the Italians decided to participate because they hoped to focus on détente and establish it as a principle shared by all European Communist Parties.

The Italian Communists were at a crucial point in their own national policy. Although it did not become the major political party at the national elections of June 1976, the PCI gained more than 34 percent of the vote. No Western Communist Party had ever received the vote of one-third of the whole electorate, a level that was comparable to that of Europe's major social democratic parties. On the eve of the elections, Berlinguer had made another move to legitimize the PCI as a governing force. In an interview with *Corriere della sera* on June 9, 1976, that was to become famous, he stated that the Italian Communists' "road toward socialism" was more likely to be found within the Western alliance than within the Soviet bloc. He also defined the North Atlantic Treaty as a "shield useful for constructing socialism in freedom."³² The Soviets were not happy, but Brezhnev wanted to avoid a rift with Berlinguer.³³ Nor did Berlinguer seek a confrontation with Moscow.³⁴ He was probably hoping that once the Helsinki Accords had been secured, Moscow might be open to a more advanced and flexible notion of détente, one that would allow for change in the European order of the Cold War.

When Berlinguer had introduced the term *Eurocommunism* in Berlin, Marchais and the PCF had refused to follow him, preferring to adopt the traditional concept of the autonomy of the parties.³⁵ Tito and Nicolae Ceaușescu also emphasized their autonomy. Thus, the PCI appeared to be the main feature in a new landscape of European Communism, marked by the end of Soviet predominance.³⁶ Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov, the head of ideology in the Soviet Politburo, were not inclined to initiate divisive ideological and political debates with the Western Communists.³⁷ They were clearly satisfied with binding the PCI to a pattern of formal unity within the Communist movement. Moscow would recognize Eurocommunism in order to contain it.

31 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 339.

32 See Enrico Berlinguer, *La politica internazionale dei comunisti italiani* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976), 159–60.

33 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 343. Brezhnev sent a letter of invitation to Berlinguer on June 17, 1976, asking for his participation at the Berlin conference: FIG APC, Estero, 1976, mf 0240, 382–87.

34 On June 19, 1976, Berlinguer, remarked that "[a] PCI–CPSU agreement [is] important for the Communist movement in and out of Europe": *ibid.*, 388.

35 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 140.

36 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 93ff.

37 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 345; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 140.

Eurocommunism as a source of conflict

Between late 1976 and early 1977, the development of Eurocommunism was identified largely with the role and initiative of the PCI, the leading Western Communist Party and the only one that could boast growing electoral success. Furthermore, the PCI influenced the “national solidarity” government formed by the Christian Democrat leader Giulio Andreotti in August 1976, which included no Communist ministers, but rested upon the Communists’ abstention in the parliament. The Italian Communists asked for full membership in the government and the abandonment of the US veto against them.

The administration of Jimmy Carter did not immediately indicate whether it looked favorably on the Italian Communists’ participation in a governing coalition. Carter and his advisers oscillated between an open-minded consideration of this unprecedented scenario and a traditional vision of Eurocommunism as a threat to NATO.³⁸ In his memoirs, Richard Gardner – the US ambassador to Rome from 1977 to 1981 and a personal friend of Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski – acknowledges this ambivalence in American policy. Gardner observes that there was a predisposition to express “a position different from those of Ford and Kissinger, who had barred the door to any contact” with the PCI. However, Carter and his advisers also believed that the PCI’s political evolution was still “far from justifying the abandonment of American objections to its governing role.”³⁹

The problem was not limited to Italy. A memorandum on foreign-policy priorities written for President Carter immediately after his election, on November 3, 1976, by Brzezinski, Gardner, and Henry Owen, stated that there was “a very subtle but important link” between the question of left-wing oppositions in Western Europe and “United States’ policy towards Eastern Europe.” They believed that the “moderate promotion of greater diversity in Eastern Europe [could] be strengthened by efforts to foster gradual ‘liberalization’ and ‘assimilation’ of the Western European Communist parties into the democratic process.”⁴⁰ By the end of 1976, American policy toward Eurocommunism was not confined to “non-interference,” but was part of a

38 Irvin Wall, “L’amministrazione Carter e l’eurocomunismo,” *Ricerche di Storia politica*, 2 (2006), 181–96.

39 Richard N. Gardner, *Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall’ambasciatore americano a Roma 1977–1981* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), 31.

40 Memorandum on Foreign Policy Priorities for the First Six Months, November 3, 1976, Cyrus Vance and Grace Sloan Vance Papers, box 9, f. 19, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

strategy linking the democratic evolution of Western Communism to developments in the Soviet bloc. This approach contrasted with Kissinger's because it envisioned Eurocommunism as a phenomenon that might enhance US interests, given its potential consequences for Eastern Europe and the challenge it posed to the USSR's leadership of the Communist movement.

The launching of Eurocommunism in the Berlin conference, the start of a new political arrangement in Italy, and the development of an alliance of the Left in France were significant political events in the West and had repercussions throughout the continent. Soviet and East European leaders would have preferred to ignore these developments, but they could not. The Hungarians confessed to the Italians that Eurocommunism was creating "big problems" in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constituting a "point of reference for a variety of forces sustaining the need for deep-seated changes."⁴¹ The Poles held positions similar to the Hungarians.⁴² Western Communists – and the Italians in particular – were aware of the impact Eurocommunism was having. According to the PCI's foreign-policy chief Sergio Segre, it was "feeding forces of renewal" and undercutting prevailing forms of political and cultural life in Eastern Europe.⁴³

The ideas associated with Eurocommunism ignited conflict with Moscow. The Soviets were now ready to confront Eurocommunism. Their intolerance grew considerably in the aftermath of the Berlin conference. In the Politburo, Suslov and Iurii Andropov, head of the KGB, the Soviet security and intelligence agency, wanted to fight Eurocommunism as a dangerous form of revisionism.⁴⁴ At a Warsaw Pact meeting held in late 1976, Brezhnev denounced an attempt by Western "reactionary circles" to separate Western Europe's Communist Parties from the socialist countries.⁴⁵ Moscow was especially worried that the PCI would soon participate in the ruling coalition of Italy, and its role was not being formally rejected by the administration in Washington; the PCI, in fact, was no longer the tool of USSR's influence in Italy. The PCF seemed more eager to maintain an alliance with the Socialists, who were in a position to lead the French Left to victory in the upcoming

41 FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1976, mf 0280, 382–85.

42 Information from Poland, February 1–4, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0288, 317.

43 See Sergio Segre, "Lineamenti per una storia dell'eurocomunismo," in Segre, *A chi fa paura l'eurocomunismo?* (Rimini Florence: Guaraldi, 1977), 36. Segre was head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the PCI from 1970 to 1979.

44 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 349.

45 Record of the meeting between Ceaușescu and Berlinguer, January 19, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0288, 197.

elections, and the PCE was on the eve of its first test in national elections. The Kremlin, in short, had failed to thwart the birth of a Western Communist pole, which seemed to be solidifying.

As Eurocommunism loomed over the continent, the Soviets grew more and more worried that Kissinger's "guarantee" against upsetting the political chessboard in Europe was no longer operative. Worse yet, in their eyes the human rights campaign of the Carter presidency was not distinguishable from the public declarations of Eurocommunists in favor of freedom of thought in the East.⁴⁶ The Soviet leaders, therefore, decided to cast aside their former strategy of accepting and declawing Eurocommunism. In February 1977, they objected to a forthcoming meeting of the three Eurocommunist parties that was being planned for Madrid. In a letter to Berlinguer, they criticized the "so-called Eurocommunist platform" and warned of the "start of a new and extremely dangerous split in the Communist movement." They sent a similar letter to Marchais.⁴⁷

Thus, the meeting held in Madrid on March 3, 1977, between Berlinguer, Marchais, and Carrillo, seemed like a challenge to Moscow, even if it presented nothing new politically. The final document prepared by Segre, Azcarate, and Jean Kanapa, the head of the PCF's foreign department, was diluted by the latter's refusal to emphasize the role of Europe and support closer ties with European socialists.⁴⁸ Berlinguer still believed – as he maintained to the PCI's leadership shortly thereafter – that the meeting had been a "political success" because Marchais and Carrillo had for the first time "appropriated the word Eurocommunism in public and in private."⁴⁹ But the leaders at Madrid articulated different conceptions of Eurocommunism: for the French Communists, it was a tool to be used for the purposes of internal politics and was subject to redefinition depending on their competition with the Socialists, while no real change was implied in the domain of political culture; for the Spanish, Eurocommunism constituted a genuine alternative center of the international Communist movement confronting Moscow and its East European allies; for the Italians, it was a movement aimed at gradual reform, indicating a new model of socialism and a positive idea of Europe,

46 The Italian Communist press emphasized both the censure of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the arrest of the dissidents Iurii Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg in the USSR: see for example *l'Unità*, February 6, 1977.

47 FIG APC, Estero, 1977, mf 0297, 1494–95; Strcifff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, 78.

48 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 69.

49 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, March 5, 1977, mf 0296, 798, 204; FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 146. See also Luciano Barca, *Cronache dall'interno del vertice del PCI*, 3 vols. (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2005), vol. II, 677.

possessing the potential to influence East European parties and even the Soviets. The ideas professed by the Eurocommunists revealed a differentiated scenario, combining common statements of principle on the values of democracy with irreconcilable positions on major political issues.

However, Kremlin leaders feared the centrifugal, pluralistic, and critical message conveyed by Eurocommunists. After the Madrid meeting, the tension between Moscow and the three Western parties, including the PCF, peaked.⁵⁰ The KGB tried to discredit Berlinguer.⁵¹ The *casus belli* was supplied by the publication of a pamphlet by Carrillo on Eurocommunism.⁵² The Soviets reacted against the criticisms of “real socialism” leveled by the Spanish leader.⁵³ Berlinguer publicly declared that Eurocommunism was not an ephemeral phenomenon, and that all states and political parties had to come to terms with it.⁵⁴ When a PCI delegation visited Moscow in July, it faced harsh criticism from Suslov and Ponomarev.⁵⁵ And, some months later, in November 1977, when Berlinguer went to Moscow for the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution and gave a speech saying democracy was a “historically universal value upon which to base an original socialist society,” he was chided by Brezhnev. The Soviet leader attacked the PCI, ridiculed it for not “unmasking” NATO’s “aggressive” nature, and implied that the Italian masses did not support the PCI’s policy.⁵⁶ For the first time, the Soviets forced Berlinguer to choose between the PCI’s new national and international positions on the one hand, and its membership in the Communist movement on the other.

Upon his return from Moscow, Berlinguer met with Carrillo to examine the possibility of relaunching Eurocommunism, thus demonstrating his determination not to back down in the face of Soviet intimidation.⁵⁷ In a joint interview with the Spanish leader, Berlinguer stated that Eurocommunism was “not just a large movement of ideas, but a movement that advances based on certain fundamental political choices.”⁵⁸ However, he was well aware that

50 Streiff, *Jean Kanapa*, vol. II, 87–88.

51 Christopher Andrew with Vasilii Mitrokhin, *L'archivio Mitrokhin: le attività segrete del KGB in occidente* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000), 372.

52 See Santiago Carrillo, *L'eurocomunismo e lo Stato* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1977).

53 Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 350. 54 *L'Unità*, June 20, 1977.

55 Notes by E. Macaluso on M. Suslov's and B. Ponomarev's interventions during the meeting with the PCI's delegation, no date, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0299, 235–48.

56 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 151.

57 Record of the meeting between E. Berlinguer and S. Carrillo, November 10, 1977, FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0309, 264–70.

58 *L'Unità*, November 11, 1977.

political harmony with the PCF was weak and doubtful. Eurocommunism could scarcely be defined as having a shared message, let alone as a political movement. To make such an argument was, at best, a case of wishful thinking. Moreover, Berlinguer and Carrillo seemed to assume that Eurocommunism and détente would continue to develop simultaneously, while instead the international political climate was deteriorating. The Soviet reaction against Eurocommunism was not ephemeral. It was a clear sign that the stalemate of détente in the Cold War system would leave only a narrow political space for unorthodox movements, especially in the Communist camp.

The demise of Eurocommunism

The Madrid meeting of March 1977 marked the apex of Eurocommunism, but also the start of its decline. The French Communists sundered the alliance of the Left and embarked on a regression into orthodoxy. The Spanish Communists garnered very modest results in their first electoral test (less than 10% compared to almost 30% for the Socialists), and they began to succumb to internal division. The Italian Communists suffered from sharing in governing responsibility without actually taking part in government. Within the respective countries, the Communist Parties' relations with social democrats were not harmonious. Only the PCI could boast strong relations with many of the large non-Communist parties of the European Left and especially with German Social Democrats. However, deep bonds had not yet been developed, although Berlinguer was aware that relations with European social democratic parties were crucial to Eurocommunism in its search for Western legitimacy. The PCI's main counterparts were still in the East, particularly Tito and János Kádár; both empathized with Eurocommunist political discourse, but remained cool about pluralist democracy and open only to limited forms of compromise.⁵⁹ Berlinguer's policy, therefore, still faced serious difficulties in coalition-building, in spite of its international ambitions.

At the same time, the PCI was vulnerable domestically, given the gravity of the Italian crisis. On January 12, 1978, the US State Department issued a statement confirming that the United States opposed Communist Parties' participation in West European governments. This declaration had been encouraged by Ambassador Gardner, and the decision to adopt it was

59 FIG APC, Fondo Berlinguer, serie MOI, fasc. 149, record of the meetings between E. Berlinguer and J. Kádár (October 1–3 1977); FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0304, 480–95, record of the meetings between E. Berlinguer and J. Tito (October 4, 1977); FIG APC, Note alla Segreteria, 1977, mf 0304, 502–20.

provoked by the PCI's request in December 1977 to form a new coalition government that included the Communists.⁶⁰ In fact, the State Department merely repeated what was already known regarding the United States' official position; there was no radical revision of the Carter administration's policy.⁶¹ Nonetheless, the declaration meant that the intent to put Eurocommunism to the test, initially formulated by Brzezinski and his collaborators, was never tested in practice. The Carter administration had come to view the PCI and its policies as a part of its European problems. Officials in Washington made no serious attempt to detach the leading Western Communist Party from Moscow, although they might have capitalized on growing tensions between Berlinguer and Brezhnev. Instead, the Carter administration's strategy in Italy was to work with the Christian Democrats to weaken the PCI.⁶²

A few months later, in the spring of 1978, the crisis of the Italian republic reached its climax when the Red Brigades kidnapped and murdered Aldo Moro, the moderate president of the Christian Democrats, the party most open to collaboration with the Communists.⁶³ The Communists promised parliamentary support to the government, but received no real concessions in return. By that time, the French Left, beset by divisions between Communists and Socialists, had lost the national elections. For different reasons, the national chances of both the major Western Communist parties suddenly worsened.

Furthermore, the crisis of détente that became apparent in US–Soviet relations by mid-1978, especially on the issue of Soviet intervention in Africa, increasingly menaced all ideas and hopes of changing the bipolar architecture of Europe.⁶⁴ West European Communists responded in very different ways to the hardening of the Cold War. While the French took sides with the Soviet bloc, the Italians tried to maintain their independence. With the two major Western Communist Parties facing domestic crisis and following opposing perspectives internationally, the collapse of Eurocommunism had begun.

60 Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 2, 1977, Brzezinski donated material, box 41, Jimmy Carter Library; Gardner, *Mission: Italy*, 190ff.; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 312.

61 Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," 194.

62 See Olav Njølstad, "Come tenere i comunisti fuori dal governo senza ingerenze: l'amministrazione Carter e l'Italia (1977–78)," *Passato e Presente*, 16 (1998), 57–84.

63 See Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il caso Moro: una tragedia repubblicana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005).

64 On the Soviet view of the crisis of détente in 1978, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). See also the chapters by Zubok and Olav Njølstad in this volume.

In October 1978, a PCI delegation led by Berlinguer visited Paris, Moscow, and Belgrade. The trip was a political pilgrimage aimed at exploring what could be done to halt the crisis of détente, preserving Europe from super-power tensions. The meeting between Berlinguer and Marchais demonstrated that basic differences between the two parties, regarding Europe's political integration and the degree of collaboration with the socialists, persisted.⁶⁵ The PCF had actually given up its previous hopes of building an alliance with the PCI, showing that its embrace of Eurocommunism had just been a matter of expediency.⁶⁶ Consequently, Berlinguer acted in his mission to the East as the leader of the PCI, not as a partner in a Western Communist movement.

During Berlinguer's October 1978 mission to Moscow relations between the Italian Communists and the Soviets worsened dramatically.⁶⁷ In his first meeting with Suslov and Ponomarev, Berlinguer established a clear connection between the "hard blow" that Communist ideals had suffered because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the difficulties Communists faced as a result of "the limits to freedom" in the USSR. He requested respect for a "plurality of opinions," and remarked that dissidents "are said to be violating the law, but it is the very nature of these laws that raises serious doubts with us." Suslov responded angrily, saying that respecting pluralism would mean restoring "a society divided into classes" and permitting "spying activities." He aggressively invited the Italian Communists to abandon "the terms [pluralism and Eurocommunism] that have been created by our adversaries." Ponomarev then said that Eurocommunism "serves only to set the Communist Parties of the West against those in the socialist countries. Our adversaries are not without praise for this." Berlinguer replied that "we do not receive praise from our adversaries," to which Suslov retorted, "So we hope."⁶⁸ In a subsequent meeting, Brezhnev revealed that he was entirely under the influence of Suslov.⁶⁹ He rebuffed Berlinguer's attempt to defend the principles of the PCI's policy, and stated that the "national solidarity" experience had bound Italy closely "to the American military machine and to NATO."⁷⁰ Berlinguer realized that he would get nowhere with Brezhnev. He concluded

65 FIG APC, Direzione, Allegati, October 19, 1978, mf 7812, 58–66.

66 See Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, *Histoire du Parti communiste français* (Paris: PUF, 1995), 368.

67 FIG APC, Estero, 1978, mf 7812, 57–150. See also Silvio Pons, "Meetings between the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rome, 1978–1980," *Cold War History*, 3 (2002), 157–66.

68 FIG APC, Estero, 1978, mf 7812. 69 Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 141–57.

70 Note by A. Rubbi on the meeting with L. Brezhnev of October 9, 1978, FIG APC, Direzione, mf 7812, 78–82.

that both Moscow and Washington would attempt to undermine the PCI's policy of working within the parliamentary system.⁷¹

In early 1979, the Italian Communists, for domestic political reasons, decided to put an end to their participation in the "national solidarity" majority. Their retreat into opposition, and their subsequent electoral defeat in June 1979, marked the end of their rise in the domestic arena. Although the PCI continued to receive almost 30 percent of the vote, it would never again take part in a government majority. Soon thereafter, the Euromissile crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan provoked the final collapse of the international relaxation of tensions that had been conducive to nurturing political change in Europe during the 1970s. The Eurocommunist strategy ended without any lasting political achievement. The French Communists returned to orthodoxy and realigned with Moscow, even to the point of justifying the invasion of Afghanistan. The Spanish Communists fragmented, with a considerable component swearing allegiance to the Kremlin. In large measure, the Soviet campaign against Eurocommunism was successful. As international relations worsened, centripetal trends prevailed in European Communism, both among the parties in the Soviet bloc and among the Western parties. The Italian Communists, meanwhile, continued their criticism of Soviet foreign policy. They condemned the invasion of Afghanistan and then denounced General Wojciech Jaruzelski's *coup d'état* in Poland. The PCI evolved as a force increasingly separated from the Communist world, but without any major success in linking up with the broader Western European Left.⁷²

Eurocommunism and the Cold War

Eurocommunism challenged the persistence of the Cold War system during the 1970s. It tried to erode the clear demarcation of Europe's geopolitical boundaries and subverted the unity of the Communist movement. The Eurocommunists adopted a vision of *détente* as a source of political change

⁷¹ Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, 142.

⁷² Strong emphasis on the PCI's difference from social democracy was one leitmotiv of the political memoranda sent to Berlinguer by his assistant, Antonio Tatò: see *Caro Berlinguer: note e appunti riservati di Antonio Tatò a Enrico Berlinguer 1969–1984* (Turin: Einaudi, 2003). For retrospective criticism, see the memoirs of Giorgio Napolitano, at the time one of leading personalities of the moderate wing of the PCI: Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal PCI al socialismo europeo: un'autobiografia politica* (Rome Bari: Laterza, 2005).

that clashed with the conservative notions prevailing in Washington and in Moscow. They underlined the role of Europe as a global player, thus contesting bipolarity as an outdated international order and calling attention to multipolarity as an emerging reality in world affairs. By emphasizing the virtues of pluralism and reform, they helped destroy discipline in the Communist camp and presented the Soviets with a political message that threatened to destabilize their dominion over Central and Eastern Europe. The leading Eurocommunist party, the PCI, increased its national strength to the point of becoming a plausible party of government in Italy. All of this made Eurocommunism a significant international phenomenon in the second half of the decade.

However, the Eurocommunists overestimated the potential for change in the Cold War system and for reform in the Communist world. They maintained that reform and détente would go hand in hand. This assumption was central to the rise of Eurocommunism, but it eventually proved deceptive. For some time after the crisis of détente had begun, Eurocommunist ideas resonated because of their critique of bloc thinking and the Cold War system. But, as a political phenomenon, Eurocommunism was never consistent and successful. It was not based on a political platform genuinely shared by the two major parties, the Italian and the French. It could not depend on a substantial following among European Communist Parties or within overall European public opinion. The Eurocommunists' relationship with the main social democratic forces of the European Left remained limited and conflictual. Their relations with Moscow were at the same time tense and hesitant, and were maintained in spite of Soviet hostility. Even their rejection of Soviet myths was inconsistent; in particular, the image of the basically peaceful character of the USSR, as a counterbalance to US power politics, was never completely abandoned. When détente began to collapse, the rifts in the alliance between the three main West European Communist Parties became apparent, and their cooperation broke down.

Before the decade was out, Eurocommunism had ceased to be a significant international force. Although its appearance had weakened bloc cohesion, it could not overcome the established policies of the two blocs. Its demise was a clear sign of the limits of feasible change in international politics and in European Communism. Outside Italy, Eurocommunism rapidly faded from the European scene. Berlinguer's desire to remove the Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, to precipitate reform of Communism in Eastern Europe, and to forge a new socialist model in the West proved to be unachievable. The search for a "third way" between social democracy

and Soviet socialism remained a dream of the Italian Communists alone. Eurocommunist ideas would later become a significant asset for the reformers who gathered around Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.⁷³ But, in the early 1980s, the promise of Eurocommunism was apparently extinguished. In fact, at the time of Berlinguer's death in 1984, the term *Eurocommunism* itself had fallen into disuse.

⁷³ See the chapter by Archie Brown in this volume.

The Cold War and Jimmy Carter

NANCY MITCHELL

April 25th, 1980. President Jimmy Carter was under siege at home and abroad. Inflation had risen to almost 20 percent, and unemployment was more than 7 percent. Americans sat in lines at gas pumps. Pummeled from the Left by Senator Edward Kennedy and from the Right by Ronald Reagan, Carter saw his quest for a second term foundering. The shah of Iran had been overthrown, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan, the Sandinistas had seized power in Nicaragua, and fifty-two Americans sat captive in Tehran. It was, as Walter Cronkite told his viewers, “Day 175 of America held hostage.”

At seven o'clock that morning, the president addressed the nation. “Late yesterday,” he explained, looking exhausted and grim, “I cancelled a carefully planned operation which was underway in Iran to . . . rescue . . . American hostages, who have been held captive there since November 4.”¹ The photographs of the crumpled hulks of US helicopters in the Iranian desert seared deep into the American psyche. They seemed to illustrate the absolute collapse of US power and prowess.

The photographs resonated – a helicopter framed the disgraced Richard M. Nixon as he waved farewell on the White House lawn in August 1974; helicopters lifted the last, defeated Americans from the roof of the US Embassy in Saigon in April 1975; and the insistent rhythm of chopper blades suffused the memory of the war in Vietnam, constructed by movies like *Apocalypse Now*. Nine days after that film won the Oscar for sound, the world awoke to images of American helicopters lying in shambles in the Iranian desert.

Despite the disco music, the garish polyester, the drugs, and the sexual revolution of the 1970s, the global politics of the decade were, for Americans, somber. They grappled with failure in Vietnam and strategic parity with the Soviet Union; they faced the Arab oil embargo and growing economic

¹ J. Carter, “Address to the Nation,” April 25, 1980, *American Presidency Project*, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ (hereafter APP).

competition from the European Community and Japan. They suffered through Watergate, the congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and stagflation. There seemed to be weekly reminders that the United States was losing power and influence.

This not only stung: it also mattered. The Cold War was a contest that consisted of shadow-boxing in areas of marginal significance because real war in places that really counted – Berlin, Washington, and Moscow – was unwinnable. In an age of deterrence, perception was reality.

The striking feature of the widespread perception of American weakness in 1980 is how wrong it was. It is not simply hindsight – the knowledge that nine years later the Berlin Wall would crumble – that highlights the startling misperceptions of 1980. The facts were available then for anyone who read the *New York Times* and certainly for government insiders to see that the United States was winning the Cold War.

These facts, however, were overlooked. Americans focused on their inability to stop the Communists in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, and they neglected facts that were more salient for gauging the progress of the Cold War: during the Carter presidency, the United States normalized diplomatic relations with China, excluded the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace process, and saw a grave challenge to Soviet control over Poland. Yes, there were setbacks in the Third World, but there were huge gains in Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Moreover, in reports leaked to the press, the CIA had detailed the dire economic straits of the Soviet Union. “The Central Intelligence Agency is bearish on the Soviet economy,” a *New York Times* editorial noted in August 1977. “Moscow, says the CIA, will feel increasing strain in the years ahead; sharply reduced rates of economic growth will pose excruciating choices for the Kremlin leaders.”²

Why was this not apparent in 1980? During the 1970s, Americans confronted failure. The war in Vietnam sucked the oxygen out of talk of US defense and security, triggered inflation, and constrained, long after it was over, the president’s ability to use – or threaten to use – force. Given the belief that the Cold War was a zero-sum game, the intensely painful and unfamiliar sense of weakness caused by the US loss in Vietnam led Americans to exaggerate Soviet strength. Moreover, as the Nixon administration’s policy of détente took shape, the essence of the Cold War seemed to shift in confusing ways. If

2. *New York Times*, August 22, 1977, 22.

the Cold War was an ideological struggle, why was Washington flirting with Communist China? And if it was, instead, a great power struggle, how could the United States defend itself and its allies in an era of strategic parity? In August 1945, Washington had stood supreme in military might; predictably, the Soviet Union had played catch-up, until in 1969 the National Security Council believed that Moscow had achieved “virtual parity” with Washington.³ No one could be sure, in a nuclear age, what this meant for the security of the United States or its allies. By the mid-1970s, therefore, it was not clear exactly who or what the United States was fighting or how serious was the threat. Voices on the Right, emboldened by warnings of growing Soviet strength from an alternative intelligence assessment group (Team B), hammered home warnings of US vulnerability in the face of the “clear and present danger” of Soviet expansionism, while proponents of détente emphasized the need to negotiate with the Kremlin. In the late 1970s, the Cold War was out of focus: there was no consensus on what it was about, or how important it was in US priorities, or how to gauge who was winning it.

The Carter administration drowned in these uncertainties. Stripped of the protective edifice of détente, unwilling to embrace the simple-minded anti-Communism of the Committee on the Present Danger, and pummeled by one crisis after another, the administration never persuaded the American public that it had a clear grasp of the US role in the world. The press personalized this into an entertaining battle between the patrician and dovish secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, and the Polish-born and hawkish national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Fueled by real disagreements and bruising infighting, stories of the growing schism between them became the principal way to explain the alleged contradictions of Carter’s foreign policy. Coupled with its missteps, compounded by poor intelligence, and bedeviled by leaks, the administration took a beating in the press. “Carter should have fired Vance,” Brzezinski opined thirty years later. “Or he should have fired me. Or I should have shut up. I didn’t know how much it was hurting the presidency.”⁴

Tales of the disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski not only undermined the administration, they also skewed popular perception of it: they wrote Carter out of the story, which was a mistake. On several occasions, Carter did waver between the advice of Vance and Brzezinski – dealing with the shah

3 H. Kissinger to R. Nixon, October 20, 1969, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, I*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), document no. 41.

4 Author interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington, DC, March 20, 2007.



2. President Jimmy Carter talks with top foreign-policy aides National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski (center) and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (right), outside the Oval Office, September 11, 1979. The two advisers were rivals for the president's attention.

is the most important example – but, overall, he was a decisive president, as seen in the resolute and often unpopular stances he took toward Panama, Rhodesia, the Middle East, and China. The real problem was not that Carter was torn between Vance and Brzezinski, but the opposite: he held both their viewpoints simultaneously. That is, he believed in patient diplomacy *and* in the dramatic gesture; he saw beyond the Cold War *and* he was a firm Cold Warrior.

Carter's attitude reflected the complicated situation of the United States in the world of the late 1970s – years stretched perilously between the twin certitudes of détente and Evil Empire. Carter had a vision, that the United States' foreign policy should reflect its values, but it did not help him set priorities. And, in practice, it was inevitably compromised, time and time again. This led, occasionally, to incoherence – not just to debates between two advisers, but to something much deeper.

These confusions are seen by looking at the administration's policies toward arms control, human rights, the Middle East, Iran, China, and, particularly, the Horn of Africa. The sands of the Ogaden, the Ethiopian desert that Somalia tried to annex, might have buried détente, as Brzezinski famously proclaimed, but these same sands exposed the complexities of the Cold War in the Carter years.

On Christmas Day, 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Carter foreswore complexity and embraced old-fashioned dualism. But his inability to free the hostages in Iran made it impossible for him to free himself from the aura of weakness that had come to define him. Paradoxically, 1980 – that *annus horribilis* when the administration seemed unable to do anything right – was, in Cold War terms, a very good year for the United States: the Soviets were sucked into the quagmire of Afghanistan and defied by the success of Solidarity in Poland. But in 1980, Americans – struggling at home with stagflation and humiliated abroad by an Iranian rabble – were not able to penetrate the fog of war: the administration joined its domestic rivals in decrying the rising threat posed by the resurgent Soviet Union and set in motion the largest increase in defense spending since the Korean War.

Weapons systems encapsulated the dilemmas of the Cold War in the late 1970s. Technicians developed an enhanced radiation weapon, the neutron bomb, as an antitank device, but its opponents in Europe and in the United States seized on the fact that it would kill people while leaving buildings intact, enabling the victorious US army to march through depopulated streets of liberated – presumably European – cities. The Pentagon valued the neutron bomb because it was a more usable weapon than a traditional nuclear bomb and therefore helped restore the credibility of deterrence, but this usability fueled the antinuclear movement in Europe and the United States. Likewise, to defend new MX missiles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that carried bombs delivering 250 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb – technicians suggested placing them in perpetual motion on trains running along multiple rail tracks in Utah and Nevada. Again, this was logical: silo-based weapons were vulnerable to increasingly accurate Soviet missiles.

But there was insanity to the logic. Bumper stickers began appearing: "MX – May the Farce Be With Us."⁵ The technicians, and the politicians who embraced their schemes, had fallen prey to the roadrunner syndrome. They were like the cartoon figure Wile E. Coyote who, in hot pursuit of the Roadrunner, kept running on thin air. This is the image of the Cold War during the Carter years: Wile E. Coyote, legs a whirling blur, about to fall.

Righteousness

Carter ran a smart campaign in 1976. Focusing on the early primaries, he carried a simple message across the United States: "You are a good people; I am a good man; vote for me." After Watergate, Vietnam, and Angola, many Americans were hungry to hear this simple affirmation of their goodness, and Carter's inexperience in Washington – the Jimmywho factor – was an asset. When Carter mentioned human rights during an early stump speech, the small crowd cheered. He mentioned it again and again. It became a Rorschach test of the electorate: liberals assumed Carter was signaling that he would distance the United States from right-wing dictators in the Third World; conservatives thought he would apply pressure on the Soviet Union. The candidate did not elucidate.

Carter did not initiate the discussion of human rights; he rode a wave that had been growing since the end of World War II and that had gained momentum in 1975 when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the countries of Europe, East and West, signed the Helsinki Accords. Many in the United States, including Carter, had denounced Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Gerald R. Ford for signing an agreement that seemed to legitimate Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.⁶ They failed to grasp the significance of the fact that the agreement committed all signatories to respect the human rights of their citizens. This was the Greek army in the Trojan horse; invisible at first, it penetrated the heart of the Soviet empire and destroyed it.

Carter inherited an extremely contradictory policy toward the Soviet Union. *Détente* was more a description than a prescription. It described a slight slackening in the tension between two adversaries, like in a tug-of-war at a country fair when both teams of burly men, their feet dug deep into the earth and their faces frighteningly red and blotchy, pause for a second,

⁵ *New York Times*, December 23, 1980, 10.

⁶ *US News & World Report*, September 13, 1976, 19.

to regroup and take stock. For Washington, the pause was needed to reduce the cost of the arms race, restore a credible deterrent, end the war in Vietnam, and tame West Germany's *Ostpolitik*. For Moscow, the pause punctuated the world's acknowledgment that it was finally an equal in the great power struggle, allowed it to gain technology and credits from the West, and gave it time to focus on China. Nothing fundamental changed during détente: the Cold War remained the paradigm and, for the United States, containment remained the strategy. Détente, however, did introduce an element of confusion: it made it difficult to maintain a sharp focus on the conflict. Was the Soviet Union a mortal enemy, as the US defense budget continued to indicate, or was it, as the rhetoric of détente claimed, a partner in creating a "stable structure of peace"?⁷

It was against this backdrop that the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola acquired such significance: the arrival of 36,000 Cuban soldiers in Luanda by early 1976 punctured the overblown promises of détente. Months later, the Republican Party airbrushed the French word from its vocabulary, so toxic was the spill from the fiasco in Angola. During the campaign, Carter promised to maintain détente, but by 1976 no one was sure what that meant.

Intensifying the confusion was the increasing salience of human rights, signaled not only by the Helsinki Accords but also by the 1974 Jackson–Vanik amendment that tied US trade liberalization with the USSR to Moscow's treatment of its Jewish citizens. If détente meant that the United States accepted Moscow as a status quo power, the assault on Soviet abuses on human rights implied the opposite: that the West did not accept the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.

This contradiction had been blurred in the Kissinger years: in his basso voice, with overtones of humor and condescension, the national security adviser and/or secretary of state would explain that the bluster about human rights was a congressional sideshow. President Ford refused even to receive Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in the White House. But when Carter strolled down Pennsylvania Avenue on that cold January 1977 day, he carried the concern about human rights squarely into the Oval Office. Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet dissident, had already sent the president a letter asking him to "raise your voice" on behalf of the oppressed citizens of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁸ The contradictions of US policy toward the Soviet Union were about to be laid bare.

7 R. Nixon, "Third Annual Report to the Congress," February 9, 1972, APP.

8 *New York Times*, January 29, 1977, 2.

"The problem with Jimmy Carter," explained Andrew Young, the minister and civil rights activist who served as US ambassador to the United Nations from 1977 to 1979, "is that he is so *righteous*. He makes everybody else feel guilty."⁹ Carter, a born-again Baptist who still teaches Sunday school in his hometown of Plains, Georgia, a dusty crossroads 130 miles south of Atlanta, would be the first to admit that he is a sinner, and his life – a dramatic journey that he is pursuing full tilt in his eighties – suggests he is not an inflexible person. But on the standards he expects of himself and others he is uncompromising. These are his sheathed claws: disappointment, disapproval, and repudiation.

Carter was very cautious about deploying military force, but he was a flamethrower of soft power. He believed that he should be able to point out the faults of the Soviet Union and, at the same time, negotiate arms-control treaties that were in both countries' interests.

Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had just celebrated his seventieth birthday, but he was an old man: in poor health, obdurate, and running out of time. He had been leading the Soviet Union since 1964, and his rule had been troubled – the Prague Spring, border clashes with China, and a deteriorating economy. He considered the first treaty that arose from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which he and Nixon had signed in 1972, to be one of his great achievements, and he was eager to settle the details of the SALT II accord, which he had agreed upon in outline at the 1974 summit with Ford in Vladivostok. The Soviet leader had grown accustomed to the Republicans; he was leery of the upstart from Georgia.

Brezhnev's anxieties mounted in the weeks following Carter's inauguration. On January 26, the new administration voiced support for the Czech dissident movement known as Charter 77; on February 7, it conveyed "concern" about the Soviet treatment of dissident Aleksandr Ginzburg; and, on February 16, Carter sent an open letter to Sakharov assuring him that "Human rights is a central concern of my Administration." The Soviet government expressed "displeasure" at Washington's meddling, to no avail. On March 1, Carter met with prominent dissident Vladimir Bukovskii in the White House, asserting that he did not intend "to be timid" in his support of human rights.¹⁰

Nor did the new president intend to be timid in his pursuit of deep cuts in nuclear weapons. The SALT I talks, which had stretched from 1969 to 1972,

⁹ Author interview with Andrew Young, Atlanta, GA, July 16, 2002.

¹⁰ *New York Times*: February 18, 1977, 3; February 19, 1977, 1; March 2, 1977, 1.

were deemed successful because they generated a treaty. But this treaty allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to retain more than 1,700 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles each; and the SALT II accord that had been outlined in Vladivostok “limited” the number of each side’s launchers to 2,400.

Carter was not interested in arms control as therapy. He wanted deep cuts. When Vance traveled to Moscow in March 1977, he carried the administration’s revised SALT II proposals, which had been devised precipitously and secretly. Vance sought dramatic cuts in existing weapons systems and a ban on the testing and deployment of several future systems. Carter considered the proposals an impressive step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. That was not, however, how the Soviets viewed them: besides reneging on promises the Kremlin believed had been made at Vladivostok, Carter’s cuts eviscerated the heart of their nuclear force, their large ICBMs, while leaving the US force, more reliant on bombers, largely in place. Brezhnev was appalled.

Shifting sands

Four days after Vance left Moscow empty-handed, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was in Washington meeting Carter for the first time. Carter, despite the broad smile and the “Jimmy,” is not a gregarious man. He is hard to know and even harder to befriend. Sadat broke through Carter’s reserve. A rapport was established almost immediately. “Of almost a hundred heads of state with whom I met while president,” Carter explained, “he was my favorite and my closest personal friend.”¹¹

Sadat affected Carter’s perception not only of the Arab–Israeli conflict but also of Soviet policy in Africa. He and the Saudi royal family were deeply concerned about growing Soviet influence on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa. On the second day of Sadat’s visit – April 5, 1977 – Carter wrote a message to Vance: “Find ways to improve relations with . . . Somalia.”¹²

Although the struggle between the superpowers had begun in Europe, it had soon moved to safer terrain. Fourteen years before Carter took office, John F. Kennedy had declared, “Berlin is secure, and Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world.”¹³ All

11 Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 89.

12 “Chronology of Events: Somali–US Relations 1976–77,” undated [c. April 1978], Freedom of Information Act request.

13 Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 872.

subsequent administrations had followed suit: the Cold War was cold in Europe and hot in the periphery – Africa, Central America, the Middle East. It became difficult for Europe – East or West – to grab Washington's sustained attention. The Carter administration doused the fire of Eurocommunism in Italy and had testy relations with both Paris and Bonn. It waged the Cold War not in Europe but in the periphery. Even the controversy over the placement of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe to counter the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20s was more about a rift in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than it was about US–Soviet relations. Therefore, to understand the constraints and complexities of the Cold War during the Carter years, one must look to the periphery and particularly to the bizarre superpower dance in the Horn.

Ethiopia, long a US ally, had been rocked by revolution in 1974 and had veered in an increasingly anti-American direction. The new Ethiopian leaders had approached Moscow for aid, but the Kremlin had hesitated, in part because the Soviet Union's most important ally in sub-Saharan Africa, Somalia, was Ethiopia's sworn enemy. Somalia claimed almost a third of Ethiopia's territory – the Ogaden desert, inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The Soviet Union had poured more than \$400 million into Somalia, a barren, sparsely populated, strategically located, and desperately irredentist land. In return, the Somali president, Mohamed Siad Barre, had given the Soviets access to the port of Berbera, where they constructed an airfield, a communications center, and a missile maintenance facility. But now Moscow was being wooed by Ethiopia, a country with a glorious history and large population, a US ally whose ruthless leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was suddenly swearing allegiance to Vladimir Lenin.

During the spring of 1977, the Soviets began sending arms to Ethiopia. On April 23, Mengistu expelled almost all US diplomats and military personnel from Ethiopia. Meanwhile, despite Soviet blandishments and threats, Siad Barre refused to renounce his country's claim to the Ogaden.

Carter was on the horns of a dilemma. How, in the complex and out-of-focus 1970s, did policymakers define US national interest in the Horn? In that era of extraordinary constraints on the use of force, the usual frame of hawk versus dove is less useful than the distinction between globalists and regionalists, but it, too, is inadequate. It obscures the reality that both groups were fighting the Cold War – they just disagreed about the most effective way to do it.

From the beginning to the end of his presidency, Carter was simultaneously both a globalist and a regionalist. He was a conservative Cold Warrior who

wanted to deny the Soviet Union any advance, but he was also convinced that the key lesson of the US defeat in Vietnam was that Washington's over-emphasis on the threat of Communism had caused it to fight the Cold War ineffectively. When Carter announced in May 1977 that the United States was "now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear," his stress was on "inordinate."¹⁴ Carter did not mean that he had transcended anti-Communism or the Cold War. Far from it: the Cold War permeated Carter's foreign policy.

This was not obvious at the time. After Kissinger's singular focus on superpower diplomacy, Carter's decision to pay serious attention to festering problems on the periphery – especially the Panama Canal negotiations and the insurgency against the white minority government in Rhodesia – made it appear that he was turning away from the Cold War, whereas he was in fact waging a more complex, preemptive, and diffuse Cold War. Moreover, the logic of his policy was counterintuitive: he would fight Communism more effectively by not being so obsessed with fighting Communism. The apparent contradictions of this approach left Carter vulnerable to the persistent and effective ridicule of the rising Right, particularly Ronald Reagan, whose weekly radio broadcasts helped shape an image of Carter as naïve, weak, and incompetent.

Part of the problem was that Carter had such an overcrowded agenda in his first year that he did not convey a clear sense of his priorities. With so much legislation crowding Congress's agenda, some failure was inevitable. This gave his critics fodder. Carter himself reflected on this in an interview during Reagan's first term. Almost wistfully, he contrasted his cluttered agenda in 1977 with what "Reagan did, I think wisely, in 1981 with a major premise and deliberately excluding other conflicting or confusing issues. It . . . gave the image . . . of strong leadership and an ultimate achievement. We didn't do that."¹⁵

One item on that crowded agenda in the late spring of 1977 was the Horn of Africa. Abdullahi Addou, the urbane and indefatigable Somali ambassador to the United States, had been pressing his case for months: his government was upset that the Soviet Union was drawing closer to Ethiopia; it wanted to turn toward the United States and was seeking military and economic assistance. Addou saw the assistant secretary for Africa in March; he saw Vance on May 3;

14 J. Carter, "Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977, APP.

15 "Interview with Jimmy Carter," November 29, 1982, Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 23.

on May 11, he saw Vice President Walter Mondale; finally, on June 16, he was ushered into the Oval Office.

The pressures on Carter were complex. Since the Soviets had befriended Ethiopia, it was tempting to pry Somalia from their camp: tit for tat. Moreover, it would signal to Sadat and the conservative Arabs, whose help Carter required to move the Middle East peace process forward, that the administration took their concerns seriously. Depriving the Soviets of Berbera would enhance the security of Western trade, particularly oil, and tilt the balance of power in the Indian Ocean toward the United States. However, Somali troops were supporting Ogadeni guerrillas fighting against Ethiopian troops, and the administration was loath to back an aggressor because it would undermine its successful efforts to improve relations with the rest of the African continent. Also, Carter had pledged during the campaign to reduce arms transfers: sending arms to Somalia would directly contradict this. Finally, the situation in the Horn was unpredictable. In Ethiopia, Mengistu's henchmen had embarked on the "red terror," slaughtering thousands of citizens, and his regime was challenged by insurgencies in almost every province. Somalia, despite Addou's professions of friendship for the United States, had neither broken ties with Moscow nor expelled its 4,000 Soviet military and technical advisers.

On June 16, Carter told Addou that "it was difficult for us to give [Somalia] military assistance, but we were working with our allies to see that Somalia had adequate defense capabilities without relying on the Soviet Union."¹⁶ Carter and his advisers may have hoped that this careful phrasing would buy them time. If so, they underestimated the power of the Cold War rules: by saying that Somalia no longer had to rely on the Soviet Union, Carter seemed to be promising that Somalia could depend on the United States. The fine print was irrelevant.

On July 23, regular Somali troops began a well-planned assault on the Ogaden. Washington drew back, sending no weapons but secretly encouraging third parties – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France – to help Somalia. By September, the Somalis controlled almost all the Ogaden, but they could not conquer two key towns, and the war stalemated. Moscow stepped up the pressure: between March 1977 and May 1978, it sent Ethiopia \$1 billion of military equipment as well as advisers. On November 13, 1977, in a desperate gamble for US arms, Siad Barre ejected virtually all the Soviet advisers and diplomats, withdrew Moscow's access to Berbera, and broke relations with

¹⁶ State 152186, June 16, 1977, Freedom of Information Act request.



Map 1. Horn of Africa

Cuba. On November 25, Fidel Castro decided to send Cuban troops to Ethiopia.¹⁷ They started to arrive a week later, aboard the largest Soviet airlift since the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. By the middle of December, there were 1,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia. By late January, there were 5,000; by the end of March, there would be 12,000.

Temperatures rose in Washington. The administration was widely blamed for giving Somalia a green light and failing to stop the Soviet/Cuban assault. The internal debate grew more bitter and the rhetoric more strident. At a January 12 news conference, Carter expressed “concern about the Soviet

¹⁷ “Respuesta de Fidel a Senén, 14–15.00 hrs – 25.11.77 – via telf. secreto,” Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana, Cuba (kindness of Piero Gleijeses).

Union's unwarranted involvement in Africa."¹⁸ As Cuban and Ethiopian troops turned the tide of the war, the United States was in a box: if it did not vehemently protest the Cuban presence it would look shockingly passive, but the louder it protested the more impotent it would look. Checkmate.

The administration grappled for the least bad response. The State Department spearheaded efforts to seek a diplomatic settlement, but these forays foundered. Brzezinski proposed a show of military might – sending a carrier group offshore – but this was shot down as a dangerously empty threat. The president, Vance, and Brzezinski exerted public and private pressure on the Soviets and the Cubans to withdraw, but the United States had inadequate leverage. The Carter administration – wanting to end the unproductive impasse in US–Cuban relations – had offered Havana the possibility of normalization, which would have meant lifting the crippling embargo, but Castro's soldiers kept pouring into Ethiopia. As Carter explained, many years later, "Castro had to make a decision between normal relations with the United States of America, which was an attractive prize, and his heartfelt obligations to struggling people in Africa."¹⁹

The White House failed to arouse international disapproval because the Soviets and Cubans had been invited by the Ethiopian government and they were fighting a blatant aggressor: their actions were thus legal. Carter's only option was to threaten the Soviets that their behavior in Ethiopia would hurt détente and, in particular, SALT II. Vance, however, vigorously opposed withdrawing from the SALT talks; he believed that it would be both disproportionate and ineffective. Moreover, all members of the administration agreed that the SALT treaty was in the US national interest.

A strategic dilemma underlies this impasse. As the arsenals of both superpowers grew more lethal, and as war in Europe became more unthinkable, the fronts of the Cold War were squeezed out to the periphery where the stakes were lower. But, precisely because the stakes were lower, the massive firepower of the superpowers and their serious coercive threats were inappropriate. Kissinger had promised that détente would square this circle, but Angola proved him wrong.

Brzezinski was right: doing nothing in the Horn made the United States look and feel weak. But Vance was also right: supporting Somalia – a country of some 3 million people that had no political, economic, cultural, or historical

¹⁸ "The President's News Conference of January 12th, 1978," APP.

¹⁹ Author interview with Jimmy Carter, Atlanta, GA, May 23, 2002. See also Piero Gleijeses's chapter in volume II.

ties to the United States and that had launched a war of aggression – was not worth derailing SALT.

Moreover, in “losing” Ethiopia, what did the United States forfeit? Washington had no significant strategic interests left in the land racked by Mengistu’s brutal revolution. And what did the Soviets gain? They lost access to Berbera and failed to secure a comparable base in Ethiopia. Instead, they added millions of needy Ethiopians and an unstable regime to their roster of allies. In his memoirs, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, delivered a succinct verdict on Soviet policy in the Horn. Ethiopia, he wrote, “was a serious mistake.”²⁰

At the time, however, Americans believed that the United States had lost something of great value in the Horn: prestige. Their country had looked weak, and looking weak during the Cold War was tantamount to being weak. Perception not only trumped reality; it created it.

The China card

“Which side were the barbarians on?’ asked Brzezinski, looking significantly northward [across the Great Wall] toward the Soviet Union. He took off his sweater and began to climb. ‘If we get to the top first, you go in and oppose the Russians in Ethiopia,’ he wise-cracked to the Chinese. ‘If you get there first, we go in.’” *Newsweek* accompanied this article about Brzezinski’s June 1978 trip to China with a photograph of the national security adviser on the Great Wall. The caption read, “Vance grimaced.”²¹

If Vance did indeed grimace when he read about Brzezinski’s antics in China, the reason was that he knew that the national security adviser was doing exactly what the president wanted. In August 1977, Vance had been the first senior member of the administration to travel to Beijing, when neither side was ready for normalization. Carter was shepherding the Panama Canal treaties through congress, while Deng Xiaoping coped with internal divisions in the Chinese leadership. Progress on US–Chinese relations stalled. By March 1978, however, Carter was in a hurry to cut through the red tape, finesse the Taiwan issue, and bypass Congress: he wanted full normalization by the end of the year – after the midterm elections and before SALT II was to be debated

20 Sergei Akhromeev and Georgii Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: Vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR’s Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 14.

21 “Polar Bear Tamer,” *Newsweek*, June 5, 1978, 61.

by the Senate. And Brzezinski, impatient, eager, and unencumbered by the bureaucracy of the Department of State, was the man to get it done.

Carter wanted normalization for two reasons: first, he considered it counterproductive to sever ties with any nation; second, he hoped that opening diplomatic relations with Beijing would give US negotiators leverage to wrest the best possible SALT II treaty from Moscow. Brzezinski embraced the second motivation with gusto. Both he and his Chinese hosts skillfully used their shared anti-Sovietism to break the ice and forge bonds. Carter understood that this would be the consequence of his decision to dispatch Brzezinski to Beijing. "I could see some of Zbig's prejudices," he explained to me in 2002. "Zbig, to some extent like Kissinger, was very concerned with the Soviet Union . . . Normalizing relations with China drove the Soviets up the wall." President Carter leaned toward me, "Brzezinski was my treasure."²²

Peace and revolution

Sadat could not get the Soviets out of the Horn, but in one bold move he swept them from the Middle East peace negotiations. Jump-starting the Middle East peace process was a high priority for the Carter team: more turmoil in the region would threaten global stability and the price of oil. Carter wanted to return to the promise of comprehensive peace held out by the Geneva conference that had foundered in December 1973. Therefore, on October 1, 1977, Vance and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, released a joint declaration calling for a revived conference. The statement mentioned the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."²³

The outcry was immediate and angry. Members of Congress, labor officials, and leaders of the US Jewish community lambasted the statement's "pro-Arab bias." The Israeli government rejected it "with both hands." A Geneva conference was dead in the water.²⁴

As the Carter administration ruminated over what to do next, Sadat, who needed peace and the substantial US aid that would follow, seized the initiative. On November 19, 1977, he traveled to Jerusalem; the next day, he addressed the Knesset. It was dazzling, and it changed the dynamic. Carter decided to invite Sadat and the prime minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, to

²² Author interview with Carter, Atlanta, GA, May 23, 2002.

²³ *New York Times*, October 2, 1977, 16. ²⁴ *Ibid.*, October 3, 1977, 6.

Camp David where he would personally mediate between them. The gamble, while less dramatic than Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, was bold: the president of the United States was negotiating without a safety net. And he was also negotiating without the Soviet Union.

The two treaties that emerged from this high-wire act – one that forged peace between Egypt and Israel, and one that articulated the rights of the Palestinians – marginalized the Soviets in two ways. First, the United States alone was the honest broker. Second, by removing the Egyptian army from the equation, the Camp David Accords gutted the ability of the Kremlin's Arab allies – Syria and Iraq – to threaten Israel. This dealt a devastating blow to Moscow's standing in the region.

While Carter was at Camp David literally giving his all to the peace process, things were falling apart in Iran. Carter had scarcely mentioned Iran during the campaign, and throughout 1977 he had sought to reassure Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi that he would continue business as usual despite his rhetoric about human rights and reducing arms sales. To this end, in May 1977, he deployed Vance to Tehran. While the restive Iranian opposition assumed that Carter's emissary would lecture the shah on his regime's human rights abuses, Vance did not mention the subject. And, later in 1977, Carter spent much political capital pushing through a skeptical Congress the \$1.2 billion sale of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) surveillance planes to Iran. At year's end, the president himself traveled to Iran and delivered the now infamous toast: "Iran," Carter announced, lifting his glass to the shah, "is an island of stability."²⁵ In fact, the country was imploding.

On September 8, 1978 – a day Iranians would come to know as Black Friday – Carter was immersed in his third day of increasingly choleric negotiations at Camp David. Before he joined Begin to celebrate the Jewish sabbath, he was briefed by his aides: the shah had declared martial law; thousands of protesters had gathered in central Tehran, and soldiers had shot into the crowds, killing at least eighty-six. The next day, from Camp David, Carter called the shah to convey his firm support.

It was not until November 9 that the Carter administration realized that a revolution was underway. In a telegram entitled "Thinking the Unthinkable," the US ambassador in Tehran informed a stunned Washington that the shah might not be able to hold onto power.²⁶ Indeed, on January 16, 1979, the shah fled into exile – the most significant loss of an ally in US history. The

²⁵ "Tehran, Iran Toasts of the President and the Shah," December 31, 1977, APP.

²⁶ Tehran 11039, November 9, 1978, Digital National Security Archive.

shock was compounded on November 4, 1979 when, after a turbulent year of revolution, Iranian militants stormed the US Embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six Americans hostage. The 444-day hostage crisis humiliated the United States, a mighty superpower rendered impotent by a shadowy mob.

The Iranian revolution cracked one of the pillars of the Cold War – that it was a zero-sum game. While the Kremlin did not lose an ally and its embassy was not besieged, the rise of an Islamist state on its border threatened Soviet security in much more immediate ways than it imperiled the United States. The revolution was, in Cold War terms, a lose–lose situation. The militants who seized the US Embassy contemplated storming the Soviet Embassy as well. A world that had heretofore been defined in Manichean terms suddenly and unexpectedly had a third way, an Islamist way. Washington, however, blinkered by its Cold War mindset and reeling from its loss, failed to understand this.

Delusion

“If we introduce troops and beat down the Afghan people,” Konstantin Chernenko warned his fellow Soviet Politburo members on March 19, 1979, “then we will be accused of aggression for sure. There’s no getting around it.”²⁷ Ten weeks after the shah fled Tehran, the Politburo met on three successive days to discuss a deepening crisis in Afghanistan, its fractious neighbor to the south. The previous April, the Communist Party had seized power in Kabul and drawn closer to Moscow. But the regime had alienated Afghans and been jolted by the revolutionary fervor radiating from Iran. On March 10, 1979, insurrection in the western city of Herat resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Soviet advisers and their families. The Politburo met in emergency session to decide what to do.

These meetings show clearly that the Politburo was loath to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. While its members were in agreement that, as Foreign Minister Gromyko said, “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan,” a country that had tilted toward the Soviet Union for sixty years, they were also fully cognizant of the perils of intervention. Iurii Andropov stated, “We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.” Gromyko added, “We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, [and] the SALT II negotiations would fly

²⁷ “Excerpt from Politburo Meeting,” March 18, 1979, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Virtual Archive.

by the wayside.”²⁸ The Soviets, therefore, decided to buy time, sending more aid and exhorting the Afghan leaders to shape up.

Washington, too, was hedging its bets. Before the Politburo met to discuss the chaos in Herat, the CIA had developed a plan to funnel covert aid through Pakistan to Afghan rebels opposed to the rising Soviet presence. This program was underway by July 1979.²⁹

By December 1979, three factors changed the Kremlin’s calculus: increasing fears of chaos in Iran, rising anxiety about the Afghan regime’s tilt toward the United States, and the realization that the US Senate was not going to ratify the SALT II treaty. On Christmas Eve, Soviet troops crossed the border. By January, 85,000 Soviets were fighting the mujahedin. It was the only intervention of Soviet troops outside Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

“My opinion of the Russians,” Carter announced days after the invasion, “has changed most drastically in the last week [more] than even in the previous two and a half years before that.”³⁰ Carter’s reaction was reminiscent of President Harry S. Truman’s response to the invasion of South Korea. The ambiguities, complexities, ironies, and unknowns of the Cold War fell from his eyes, and he suddenly saw – or believed he saw – Soviet intentions face to face. Carter’s view of the Soviets had always been hardline. “I’ve never doubted the long-range policy or the long-range ambitions of the Soviet Union,” he told *Meet the Press* days after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.³¹ His courting of Soviet dissidents and his refusal to accept the Vladivostok draft of SALT II had signaled this early in his presidency, and his China policy had continued the trend. But he had not imagined that Brezhnev would betray him. And, as Mondale explained, “Carter had been worn down by all these constant challenges and political bruises. He needed to show strength.”³²

In a cold frenzy, Carter pulled out all the stops, halting grain and high-technology exports, canceling fishery agreements, scrapping cultural exchanges, recalling the US ambassador, boycotting the Moscow Olympics, jump-starting the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, increasing aid to Pakistan and the mujahedin, appealing to the United Nations, NATO, and the international community, and stopping SALT II in its tracks.

28 “Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan,” March 17–19, 1979, CWIHP Virtual Archive.

29 Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 143–47; *Le Nouvel Observateur*, January 15, 1998, 76.

30 *Time*, January 14, 1980. 31 *Meet the Press*, January 20, 1980.

32 Author interview with Walter Mondale, Minneapolis, MN, March 29, 2007.

The illusions of détente had lifted, only to be replaced by the delusion that the invasion of Afghanistan proved that the Soviet Union was executing a grand strategy to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and encircle Western oil supplies. In fact, the Kremlin sent troops to Afghanistan with a sense of deep foreboding to shore up a most shaky ally on its increasingly treacherous border with Iran. The Soviets were propelled by weakness, not adventurism. That is not, however, how the Americans saw it.

Through a glass darkly

"Four, three, two . . ." The countdown was almost over. "Do you believe in miracles?", Al Michaels, the ABC sportscaster screamed. The whole country roared, "Yes!" For that intense moment on February 22, 1980, when the young US Olympic hockey team upset the seasoned, favored Soviet team, Americans broke through the decade-long slough of impotence and declared, as the *New York Times* wrote, "We're No. 1 now."³³

This was the way Americans wanted the Cold War: two sides, clear rules, US victory. And it was the way, after Afghanistan, that Carter framed it. Perhaps it was inevitable. Ambiguity and complexity clogged up the US political system: bills stalled in Congress, funding was obstructed, and the president was overwhelmed.

The regionalists' argument that policymakers should pay attention to local conditions made sense intellectually, and Carter was in sympathy with it. But it did not help him prioritize his overly busy days. Waging a complex, regionalist Cold War put unmanageable burdens on the president. It was triage without a clear protocol. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan whipped the US government back to a more comfortable, simpler bipolar world, one with a treacherous and formidable villain.

It did not, however, change reality, which continued to be almost unbearably and unimaginably complex. In 1980, as the hostages languished and Reagan flourished, revolution spread through Central America. The Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua in July 1979 was followed by a growing insurgency in El Salvador. In 1980 alone, more than 8,000 Salvadorans – in a country of only 4.5 million people – were slaughtered or disappeared in the military's bloody campaign against leftists. The archbishop of San Salvador, Óscar Romero, wrote to Carter: "Since you are a Christian and have said you want to defend human rights . . . I ask you . . . do not authorize military aid to the Salvadoran

³³ *New York Times*, February 23, 1980, 16.

government.”³⁴ A month later, on March 24, 1980, as the archbishop raised the chalice, he was shot through the heart by a sniper from a right-wing death squad. Carter decried the murder and all the other massacres and abuses, but he did not stop the flow of US military supplies because he considered the insurgents Communists, and Communists had to be stopped. Human rights would wait. The Cold War in 1980 was decidedly dualistic, despite the profound challenge to that worldview posed by the Iranian revolution.

It is understandable that Carter did not focus on the disturbances in a shipyard in Poland on August 14, 1980; he was celebrating his victory over Edward Kennedy after an acrid and humiliating fight for the Democratic nomination. But on that day, in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the whimper that would end the Cold War became audible. Lech Wałęsa, a man who took very seriously the idea that he and his fellow workers had human rights, began to lead a strike. The union that would emerge, Solidarity, roared through Polish factories and farms and cities and towns. It gathered power, and it demanded freedom. It challenged the very foundation of Soviet authority.

The Carter administration, consumed in those waning months with the hostages and the losing battle against Reagan, was surprised that the Polish government bowed to Solidarity’s demands for the right to organize, to strike, and to have a free press, and it expected the Soviets to respond as they had in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moscow’s allowing these concessions to stand would be unprecedented, and tolerating them in Poland, its most populous and largest satellite, was unimaginable.

The Carter administration warned Moscow not to invade Poland, and it worried about its limited options should Soviet tanks cross another border. But it failed to appreciate the formidable power of the doctrine – human rights – that Carter himself had proclaimed with such passion a mere three years before, and it failed to grasp the impotence of the Kremlin, for it was the Soviets, not the Americans, who did not defend themselves. The future – that the Kremlin would watch as its empire collapsed – was inconceivable.

Why was it so difficult to see clearly? During the first years of the Carter administration, the Cold War had been clouded by complexity. Opposed to Communism and to the inordinate fear of Communism, Carter failed to set clear priorities, confused the public, and invited the withering assaults of the rising conservative movement. The war in the Horn is the extreme example of

34 Ó. Romero to J. Carter, February 17, 1980, US Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Nomination of Robert E. White*, 96th Congr., 2nd sess, Executive Rept. 96–31, 39–40.

the Cold War during this period: there, in a godforsaken desert, the Cold War pulled the Soviets into a bitter battle against their own ally while the Carter administration anguished and argued, unable to determine US interests in the struggle. While the Soviets lost something useful – access to a base in the Indian Ocean – and the Americans lost nothing of value, that was not the scorecard that mattered: at that moment, when the Cold War was at its most abstract, Washington lost simply because it was perceived to have lost.

By December 1979, when Soviet troops poured across the Afghan border, Carter had been worn down by three years of trying to steer the country – in his intensely hands-on style – through dire economic straits and diplomatic challenges. The Iranian hostage crisis haunted him. He felt betrayed by Brezhnev, who, he believed, had promised him personally that his troops would not invade Afghanistan. Moreover, he was being challenged within his own party for the presidential nomination. It was time to show strength.

In its final year, the Carter administration overcorrected, falling back to a simplistic Manichean view of the contest with the Soviet Union. This exaggerated Soviet control of events and understated US advantages. Americans, including many in the Carter administration, wrongly attributed setbacks to US interests, such as the rise of the Sandinistas, to the Kremlin's masterful machinations. They were so preoccupied by signs of American weakness that they failed to see clearly what was right in front of them: the Soviet Union was facing its two worst nightmares – in Afghanistan, its army was bogged down by Afghans supported by the United States and China working together; and in Eastern Europe, the Polish government had capitulated to Solidarity, posing the gravest challenge to its authority the Kremlin had faced during the Cold War.

Carter governed in the dark shadows of the war in Vietnam. It was obvious that the US defeat in that war made Americans reluctant to project their military power; what was less apparent was that it also caused Americans to exaggerate their weakness. The attempts of the regionalists – led at times by Carter – to craft a foreign policy that transcended simple Cold War paradigms foundered because Soviet advances anywhere, no matter how pyrrhic (as in Ethiopia), could not be dismissed: they stung like another humiliation of the United States. That sense of vulnerability, compounded by stagflation, setbacks in the Horn of Africa, Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and hammered day after day by “America held hostage,” created an ineluctable narrative of American impotence. And, in a zero-sum game, if the United States was weak, then the Soviet Union must be strong. This conviction, plus the bewildering complexity of international affairs in the late 1970s, caused

even well-informed and wise commentators to underestimate the perils the Soviet Union faced. It led Carter, in his final year as president, to adopt the muscular rhetoric of Cold War and to put into motion an exploding defense budget. This policy, which Reagan would embrace, appealed to the American public. It made them feel strong again. The irony is that, in the Cold War during the Carter years, Americans were much stronger than they, or their president, knew.

Soviet foreign policy from détente to Gorbachev, 1975–1985

VLADISLAV M. ZUBOK

Soviet international behavior in the decade before Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* is still an understudied and highly controversial topic. Some authors have long argued that the Soviet Union was greatly interested in détente in Europe,¹ while neoconservative critics claimed that the USSR masterfully used détente in its quest for inexorable expansion and military superiority.² At the time, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and most Soviet dissidents energetically supported the latter view.³

Critics of détente made some excellent points. Soviet power reached its pinnacle in the late 1970s. Military expenditures, after rapid increases in the previous decades, stabilized at a high level. Three-fourths of all the research and development (R&D) potential of the country was located within the military-industrial complex. There were forty-seven "closed cities" with 1.5 million inhabitants, where military R&D labs and nuclear reactors were located, under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Ministry and the Ministry of Defense.⁴ The Politburo and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself rarely argued with the decisions and programs of the Military-Industrial Commission. In April 1976, after the death of Andrei Grechko, the former head of this commission, Dmitrii Ustinov, became the minister of defense. In 1976, the Soviet military began to

1 See Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution press, 1994), 1133–65.

2 Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 125–29.

3 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Ugodilo zernyshko promezh dvukh zhemovov: ocherki izgnania. Chast pervaya (1974–1978)" [The Little Grain Managed to Fall between Two Millstones: Sketches of Exile. Part I (1974–1978)], *Novyi Mir* [New World], 9 (1998), 56.

4 I. V. Byistrova, "Voienno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920-e–1980-e gg.: ekonomicheskie aspekty razvitiia" [The USSR Military-Industrial Complex from the 1920s to the 1980s: Economic Aspects of Its Development], in L. I. Borodkin and Yu. A. Petrov (eds.), *Ekonomicheskaiia istoriia: ezhegodnik* [Economic History: A Yearbook] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), 246.

deploy the Pioneer – which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) called the SS-20 – the new mobile, accurate, medium-range missile system carrying three warheads. Some experts had asserted that by the end of the 1970s the Soviet military would begin to surpass the United States in numbers of both missiles and nuclear warheads.⁵ The Soviet navy began to build a global infrastructure for the first time in its history. In addition to their base in the Horn of Africa, they acquired a base in Vietnam on the South China Sea.

Still, the neoconservatives, as well as Soviet dissidents, misjudged Soviet intentions. In retrospect, one has to recognize that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the Soviet Union lost its dynamism and sense of purpose. Soviet imperial expansion led to costly overextension. By 1985, the Soviet empire was more vulnerable than at any other time in its history. In one scholar's perceptive summary, the United States recovered from its time of troubles, "while the Soviet Union looked increasingly isolated and backward."⁶

This chapter begins with an explanation of the causes of this remarkable downturn. Soviet political leadership weakened, and there was stagnation in the ideological, economic, and social spheres. It then discusses how all these factors contributed to the unfocused imperial and military expansion that had neither strategic nor tactical goals, and that culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan. The chapter also dwells on the reaction to the Polish revolution – the pivotal moment in the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, when all the limitations of Soviet power came to light, and when the Kremlin began to explore the possibilities of retrenchment and retreat.

Leonid Brezhnev and stagnation

In the period 1970–74, Brezhnev himself was the main architect of détente on the Soviet side. Through a combination of enormous institutional power, tactical skill, and alliances (with the Foreign Ministry, the "enlightened" segments of the central party apparatus, the foreign-oriented sections of the security and intelligence agency, the KGB, the managers in the economy, industry, technology, and science, and even the majority of party secretaries), he managed to neutralize, split, and defeat the domestic critics of détente. Soviet foreign-policy achievements in that period became personalized as the achievements of Brezhnev's statesmanship, the results of his policy of peace.

5 Steven J. Zaloga, *The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 171, 176.

6 Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 4.

After 1975, however, Brezhnev's illness and dependence on medication led to prolonged absences from the Politburo and to the disruption of the decisionmaking process. Soviet foreign policy stalled, while Soviet armament policy continued without discussion, propelled by the colossal lobbying power of the military-industrial complex. In the absence of a dynamic leader, foreign and security policy were in the hands of the "troika" of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the KGB's Yuri Andropov, and Minister of Defense Ustinov. Yet, this troika did not act as a dynamic team. Instead, it was an uneasy alliance of aging functionaries, involved in mutual logrolling and back-scratching. They all owed their prominence to Brezhnev; at the same time (as the fall of Nikita Khrushchev had demonstrated), together they represented a political threat to the general secretary. Even the hint of a partnership among them could make them suspect in the eyes of Brezhnev and spell an end to their careers. For that reason, the troika took great care to see each other only in formal settings, at Politburo meetings. They were also extremely reluctant to challenge each other's bureaucratic territory.⁷ All three members of the troika had an interest in perpetuating the status quo, which was the increasingly fictitious leadership of Brezhnev. The general secretary remained the only authority that validated the troika's predominance over other Politburo members.

There were no other forces within the Soviet political system that could revise outmoded policies, draw new lessons, and correct missteps in foreign policy. And the broad support for Brezhnev's détente inside the Soviet political and bureaucratic classes was conditional on the continuation of policies and budgetary priorities that preceded détente and conflicted with it. There were powerful bureaucratic forces – above all the military-industrial complex, the more xenophobic elements of party elites, and the majority in the army and the KGB – who did not see immediate benefits from détente or who continued to regard the negotiations and agreements with the West as a risky, potentially dangerous, and ideologically questionable development.

As a result of weak political leadership, there were no conceptual debates in the Kremlin on foreign-policy strategy and tactics. The early achievements of détente – agreements on strategic arms, anti-ballistic missiles, Germany, and security and cooperation in Europe – became the official canon that had to be followed, but not discussed and reappraised. From the Kremlin's perspective,

7 G. Kornienko in *US–Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s: transcript from a Workshop at Lysebu, October 1–3, 1994*, transcribed by Gail Adams Kvam, ed. by Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1995), 78.



3. Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, who took over as general secretary of the Communist Party after Iurii Andropov's death in 1984, here flanked by Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov (left) and Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (right). Andropov had died after fifteen months in office. His successor succumbed after only thirteen months.

détente had given the Soviet Union its most advantageous international position since 1945. West European countries had embraced détente and had invested in it economically and politically. The painful Soviet setbacks in the Middle East, above all the defection of Anwar Sadat's Egypt, seemed to be compensated by the "carnation revolution" in Portugal in April 1974 and the opening of southern Africa to Soviet influence. The fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 had crowned the humiliating defeat of the United States in Southeast Asia. China remained hostile, yet the danger of a Sino-Soviet war had subsided after Mao Zedong, the Kremlin's arch-rival, died in 1976.

The crises of détente (the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Angolan war in 1975, and the war in the Horn of Africa in 1977) did not make Soviet leaders question their policies. Officials in the Kremlin assumed that the Soviet Union could reinforce European détente and the partnership with the United States while at the same time expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. The compartmentalization of policy responsibility for different regions of the world made Soviet behavior even less cohesive and consistent than it had been in the 1960s. Gromyko, the chief

interpreter and implementer of Soviet foreign policy, was interested only in great power politics. He left sub-Saharan African and Latin American affairs (including relations with Cuba) to the foreign-policy apparatchiks of the Central Committee's international departments and to the foreign divisions of the KGB.⁸ Neither these bureaucratic players nor Gromyko felt a responsibility to present their foreign-policy recommendations in a broader conceptual context.

The Moscow-based think tanks, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs, the Institute of the United States and Canada, the Institute of Oriental Studies, and the Institute of Africa (all part of the Academy of Sciences), are often described by scholars as having been oases of free thinking. Yet, during the détente years, the experts of these think tanks (known as *institutchiki*) played only a marginal role in Soviet foreign policymaking. Their occasional access to Brezhnev – often as speechwriters – did not significantly affect the content of specific Soviet policies. There were no conceptual thinkers among them. And even had any existed, they lacked the political channels for translating new ideas into policies.

The decade after 1975 became known in Soviet history as the time of stagnation (*zastoi*). Above all, it was a time of drift and inertia, bereft of ideological, economic, and social vitality. By the 1980s, the Soviet model had exhausted its innovative potential and had lost its international credibility (except in parts of the Third World). Above all, the model began to lose its appeal within Soviet society, even among the bureaucrats, educated elites, and skilled professionals, who since the 1950s had formed the growing Soviet “middle class.”

As official ideology, Marxism-Leninism became an increasingly ritualistic public language, with the sole purpose of legitimizing the existing political regime. Yet, for party elites, bureaucrats, and the professional middle class, the official political theory became almost completely detached from their more specific beliefs, values, and interests. The idealism of earlier decades was replaced by pervasive cynicism. Younger Soviet intellectuals of the 1960s generation, who had believed in “Communism with a human face,” lost their faith in any form of ideology. According to one astute observer, Marxism-Leninism “died a quiet death sometime during the reign of Brezhnev.” In

8 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 206.

Moscow, genuine Marxists became a vanishing breed.⁹ Duplicity, double-think, and cynicism became social and cultural norms.

Ideas and concepts originating from various strands of Russian nationalism, both pre- and postrevolutionary, spread through the ranks of Soviet bureaucracies and won numerous supporters in the party, military, and KGB hierarchies. These nationalist thinkers, among them established writers, journalists, and party ideologues, rejected the internationalist and revolutionary elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology and openly proclaimed “traditional Russian” ideas and values, associated with anti-Westernism, anti-Semitism, and anti-intellectualism. They viewed Communism as a transitional phase toward the triumph of Russia as a world power. At some point, Russian nationalists believed, the Communist shell would be tossed off and “Great Russia” would reemerge in the world.¹⁰ One could imagine how, under a more dynamic and intellectually vigorous Soviet leadership, the earlier achievements of détente could have led to the reformation of the rationale underlying Soviet international behavior. This rationale was still based on the imperial-revolutionary paradigm, rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Stalinist imperial mentality (with a great deal of Russian chauvinism).

This official ideological façade and chauvinism made it difficult for Soviet foreign policy to move toward any kind of great power *Realpolitik*. Unfortunately for Brezhnev’s détente, momentum in the United States was dissipating quickly after the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in 1974. With the White House weakened throughout the 1970s, and the critics of détente in the United States closing ranks, the Kremlin no longer had a pragmatic and reliable partner in Washington. The détente process, always a mixture of cooperation and confrontation, began, in the absence of breakthrough agreements, to tilt to the latter at the expense of the former. The Chinese Communist leadership could abandon a highly ideological foreign policy in favor of a Chinese version of *Realpolitik* in 1971–72 because Mao was

9 Dmitry Furman, “Perestroika glazami moskovskogo gumanitariia” [Perestroika through the Eyes of a Moscow Humanitarian] in Boris Kuvaldin (ed.), *Proriv k svobode: perestroike dvadtsat let spustia (kriticheskii analiz)* [Breakthrough to Freedom: On Twenty Years of Perestroika (A Critical Analysis)] (Moscow: Alpina Business Books, 2005), 316–19.

10 Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 59–60, 127–29; Nikolai Mitrokhin, *Russkaia partiia: dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR 1953–1985* [The Russian Party: Movements of Russian Nationalists in the USSR 1953–1985] (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003), 548–49.

still in power, and because the United States was interested in building a Washington–Beijing axis to counterbalance Moscow. There was no room for such a revolutionary development in the Kremlin. Americans predictably rejected all Brezhnev's attempts to offer the White House a version of the "two-policemen" model of the world. Instead, in 1978 they played the "China card" against the Soviet Union. And, of course, Brezhnev was too timid politically and ideologically to act as boldly as had Mao or later Deng Xiaopeng.

In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union was a curiosity. Its economy began to open up to the outside world, but it operated by its own autarchical rules, and its ruble was not convertible into other world currencies. Soviet imports of goods and technology continued to grow during the second half of the 1970s, fueled to a considerable degree by the influx of "petro-dollars" (revenues from the sales of Soviet oil and gas) after the spike in global oil prices after 1973. Although the USSR became more involved in international trade, it could not fully benefit from it. While Soviet industry, science, and technology depended on the import of foreign machinery and knowhow, it was only raw materials, primarily oil and gas, that the country could sell on international markets. Moreover, since 1963 the USSR had relied on the import of grain and meat to maintain the meager living standards of the Soviet population, and this dependence increased the vulnerability of the Soviet economy.

Military expenditures remained extremely high but, contrary to widespread assumptions in the West, they were not the biggest item in the Soviet budget. "Soviet entitlements" were actually a larger portion of the budget and grew more quickly, including subsidies to Soviet peasants. There were subsidies for food, housing, and "affirmative-action" social programs in the less-developed Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia. The former head of the Soviet planning agency (Gosplan), Nikolai Baibakov, recalled that "what we got for oil and gas" was \$15 billion in 1976–80 and \$35 billion in 1981–85. Of this money, the Soviets spent, respectively, \$14 billion and \$26.3 billion to buy grain, both to feed the cattle on collective farms and to put bread on the tables of Soviet citizens.¹¹ The Soviet "welfare state" actually became dependent on external trade and on détente, even while the military buildup endangered that same détente.

¹¹ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* (London: Longman, 2003), 140–41, 163; Nikolai Baibakov, "Mneniie" [Opinions] (interview), *Segodnia* [Today], November 20, 1998, 10.

In the social sphere, the corruption of the top echelons of the Soviet political class continued to expand. The hierarchical system provided privileged elites with special access to imported consumer goods from the West. The economic and consumerist perks the elites had enjoyed during the Stalinist period, which had isolated them from the “masses,” but which had declined under Khrushchev, were revived: the special apartments, the gated *dacha* (country house) communities, special stores, and restaurants with symbolic prices.¹² Wholesale and retail trade became part of the “grey-” and “black-market” segments of the economy; consumer goods were sold at their “real” price or traded for important services. The bulk of Soviet society, especially the urbanized population, but also increasing segments of the collectivized peasantry, participated in these practices. Yet people’s well-being did not increase. Any comparison between Soviet society and that of other countries (including some developing countries of Asia) produced shock and a sense of inferiority among elites and regular citizens.

Détente became a substitute for domestic economic, financial, and political reforms. Soviet consumers and the Soviet state became more dependent on the capitalist world than at any other time in its history (with the exception of the war against the Nazis).¹³ Détente exposed the Soviet people to alternative ways of life, eroded the myth of Soviet exceptionality, and weakened the messianic spirit that had nourished the revolutionary-imperial paradigm. Jobs and careers that involved trips abroad became socially prestigious and enormously profitable. Soviet diplomats, trade representatives, “advisers” in Third World client-countries, and interpreters received salaries in special “foreign-currency checks”; the purchasing value of these salaries was 15–20 times higher than an average Soviet salary at the time. After a few years of working abroad, a Soviet citizen could buy an apartment in Moscow, cars, a *dacha*, and Western-made consumer goods. Their own material interest encouraged Soviet bureaucrats and the military to lobby for “international assistance” to various African regimes with an allegedly “socialist orientation.”¹⁴

In the Soviet bloc, détente brought international recognition of the postwar borders. By signing the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, Western countries

12 Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, rev. ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 30–43.

13 Jeremi Suri, “The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism’: The Soviet ‘Thaw’ and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964–1972,” *Contemporary European History*, 15, 2 (2006), 133–58.

14 See James R. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” *Slavic Review*, 4 (Winter 1985), 694–706; Georgy Derluguian, “A Tale of Two Cities,” *New Left Review*, 3 (May/June 2000), 47–48.

seemed to acknowledge the legitimacy of Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe. For almost a decade, this region remained politically calm and socially stable. The Kremlin celebrated these achievements, but the price for them turned out to be steep. The Final Act made it more difficult for repressive measures to be used against “dissidents” in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union itself. Even more importantly, détente helped to undermine traditional Soviet/Russian fears of aggression from the West, which had been “a powerful . . . bond ‘linking’ the regime and its peoples and . . . the various sectors of the Soviet elite.”¹⁵ During the 1970s, this bond began to weaken. The Kremlin, in a relaxed mood, had fewer incentives to reform relations with its satellites and to develop a common strategy for political, social, and ideological reform.

Meanwhile, the political stability in Central and Eastern Europe was deceptive and tenuous. Fear of Soviet intervention (after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) temporarily discouraged national liberation movements. Yet the East European regimes’ desperate need to prop up their legitimacy pushed them inexorably toward asserting their “national” character as distinct from the Soviet model. Kremlin leaders closed their eyes to these developments. The absence of dynamic leadership in the Kremlin contributed to the potentially dangerous drift. Brezhnev might grumble that Romania had “betrayed” the Soviet camp, but he did nothing to alter Nicolae Ceaușescu’s behavior. Likewise, Erich Honecker in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Edward Gierek in Poland, and János Kádár in Hungary had considerable domestic autonomy as long as their policies preserved the semblance of stability.

Economically, the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe was foundering. There were growing imbalances in economic and trade relations among members of the Warsaw Pact. Attempts to build economic and financial ties had produced a bureaucratic monster in which barter and political deals took the place of mutually profitable trade. The Comecon was an ongoing failure; its members became individually dependent on Western Europe. The Kremlin had granted the East European regimes considerable autonomy in making economic deals. For Brezhnev and his aides, it was the only realistic solution. The Soviet Union could not risk a reduction of living standards in the region and at the same time could not afford to continue subsidizing East European societies by offering cheaper Soviet oil

¹⁵ Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73.

and other resources. One by one, leaders in Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia, Bucharest, and East Berlin began looking to the West in their desperate search for investments, new technology, and consumer goods.

In Poland, this led to an explosive situation after Gierek unwisely created false expectations among his people. The regime counted on Western technology, trade, and credits. Yet Polish economic policies were disastrous. Between 1975 and 1980, Poland's hard-currency debt to the West tripled, from \$7.4 billion to over \$21 billion. Poland's credit rating collapsed, as the purchase of Western technologies did not heighten productivity or engender an economic miracle. Sobered, the authorities backtracked, precipitating widespread anger among Polish workers. This prepared the ground for the Solidarity movement in 1980.¹⁶

African gambles and the worsening of US–Soviet relations

The most striking example of haphazard, fragmented decisionmaking can be found in Soviet expansion in Africa. South of the Sahara, the revolutionary-imperial paradigm showed its worst features.¹⁷ In European affairs and in relations with the United States, this paradigm encouraged pragmatism, profitable economic interaction, arms agreements, and mutual respect for spheres of influence. In Africa, however, the same paradigm promoted the expansion of Soviet "socialism" or an "empire of justice," attuned to the anticolonial and anti-imperialist movements of the twentieth century.¹⁸ In the 1970s, the loss of Egypt and, above all, the de facto alliance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the United States showed that the Soviet model of development was losing its appeal. Soviet investments in the Third World produced not an "inexorable march of socialism," but costly imperial commitments. These new circumstances, however, never initiated a policy debate in the Kremlin. Rather than reassess the overall strategy, Soviet bureaucrats and military leaders were tempted to recoup their losses when new areas in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa became "open" for Soviet involvement and influence.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1196–97. See also the chapter by Jacques Lévesque in this volume.

¹⁷ For the definition and applications of this paradigm, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

¹⁸ I have borrowed this term from Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War*.

KGB director Andropov later acknowledged that Soviet leaders “were dragged into Africa” against their best interests.¹⁹ Local revolutionary forces, as well as the dynamic and resolute policies of Cuba, played a large role in developments. In 1975, the Politburo failed to halt the Kremlin’s growing military and economic assistance to Angola, Mozambique, and other countries of southern Africa. In 1977, Ethiopia joined this group in receiving aid. These expansionist policies stemmed in part from erroneous conclusions about the global correlation of forces produced by the collapse of the United States in Vietnam as well as from the mishandling of local circumstances in African and other Third World countries.²⁰

Once the political commitments were made, sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn became locales for the Soviet military to employ its new power-projection capabilities and test its weaponry. In these areas, KGB operatives also tried to outwit and defeat their American rivals. And the apparatchiks of the Central Committee in charge of Third World “progressive movements” sought to compensate in these places for the moribund status of the Communist movement in the developed capitalist world. The military, the KGB, and the party apparatchiks, with their patrons in the Politburo and the Secretariat, all contributed to the expansion of the Soviet Union in Africa.²¹

In 1977, Soviet policymakers lost their ability to deal effectively with the United States. They failed to understand the profound changes that Watergate and the Vietnam War had produced in American politics. In particular, they failed to recognize that these changes had undercut the “backchannel” secretive diplomacy that had been instrumental in producing détente when practiced by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. Everybody in Moscow was surprised at the victory of the little-known governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, in the presidential elections of 1976. Carter ended the secretive interactions with Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin.²² He also broadened his advisory circle and included critics of US–Soviet détente. Some Soviet experts came to believe that the new president could fall under

19 For Oleg Troyanovsky on Andropov’s reaction, see *Global Competition and the Deterioration of US–Soviet Relations, 1977–1980: Harbor Beach Resort, Fort Lauderdale, FL, March 23–26, 1995* transcript edited by David Welch and Svetlana Savranskaya (Providence, RI: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1995) (hereafter *Fort Lauderdale*), 12.

20 Karen Brutents, *Tritsats let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), 298.

21 Karen Brutents, *Fort Lauderdale*, 22, 23.

22 David Geyer and Douglas Selva (eds.), *Soviet–American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969–1972* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2007).

the influence of anti-détente forces. The appointment of Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, known for his anti-Communism, raised immediate concerns in Moscow.²³

Carter's emphasis on human rights agitated Kremlin leaders. It appeared likely that the new US foreign policy would include insistence that the Soviets live up to the promises made in Helsinki. In early 1977, the KGB cracked down on Helsinki Watch groups, created by dissidents, and arrested their activists, including Iurii Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Anatolii Sharanskii. On February 18, Dobrynin was instructed to tell Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that the new American policy violated the Basic Principles that Brezhnev and Nixon had agreed upon in 1972. The warning did not change Carter's attitudes. Ten days later, he invited dissident Vladimir Bukovskii to the White House.²⁴

Brezhnev sought to return US-Soviet relations to a positive track by focusing on the old agenda. Speaking in Tula on January 18, 1977, he presented Soviet security doctrine in defensive terms. Brezhnev expected that his speech would neutralize growing American fears about a Soviet military threat.²⁵ Instead, Carter sent Vance to Moscow with a new proposal that discarded the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) so painfully negotiated by Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford in Vladivostok. Vance offered "deep cuts" in some strategic systems, especially those valued by the Soviet Union, in exchange for much smaller US concessions.²⁶ Brezhnev was dismayed, believing he had already made significant concessions and had fought at length with his own military advisers to get them to accept the Vladivostok agreement. He and Gromyko sent the US delegation back home empty-handed, rubbing salt in the wounds of the new administration.²⁷

This bad start undermined relations between top Soviet and American officials, many of whom had previously supported détente. In February 1977, Brezhnev, on Gromyko's advice, wrote to Carter that he would meet

23 Anatolii Dobrynin, *Sugubo doveritebno: posol v Vashingtone pri shesti prezidentakh SShA (1962–1986 gg.)* (Moscow: Avtor, 1997), 409.

24 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 288–89.

25 Georgii Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina: svidetel'stvo ee uchastnika* [The Cold War: An Account from a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 170–72; the diary of Anatolii Cherniaev, January 9 and 15, 1977, on file at the National Security Archive.

26 Olav Njølstad, *Peacekeeper and Trouble Maker: The Containment Policy of Jimmy Carter, 1977–1978* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 1995).

27 Cyrus Vance in *Salt II and the Growth of Mistrust: Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, May 6–9, 1994*, ed. by David Welch with Svetlana Savranskaya (Providence, RI: Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, 1994), 62; diary of Cherniaev, April 1, 1977, National Security Archive.



4. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev kissing President Jimmy Carter at the Vienna summit, June 1979. The Vienna embrace could not eradicate distrust.

him only when the SALT treaty was ready for signing. As a result, the next Soviet–American summit did not take place until June 1979 in Vienna, when Brezhnev was in poor physical health.

In the absence of conspicuous advances in US–Soviet relations, numerous conflicts of interest between the two superpowers became urgent. The Soviets felt, with justification, that the United States sought to push them out of the Middle East and to negotiate a separate truce between Israel and Egypt.²⁸ Brezhnev lamented “Sadat’s betrayal” and grew even angrier when the Carter administration began to use the “China card” to increase pressure on the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the Soviets tried to recoup their position by increasing their assistance to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other radical regimes in the Arab world. Soviet military “assistance” to the Third World jumped dramatically around the mid-1970s. In 1966–75, the Soviet Union supplied \$9.2 billion worth of armaments and military technology to “developing countries.” In 1978–82, this amount jumped to \$35.4 billion.²⁹ In Asia, the

²⁸ Brutents, *Tridtsat let*, 380–82. See also Nancy Mitchell’s chapter in this volume.

²⁹ L. N. Nezhtinskii (ed.), *Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika v godi “kholodnoi voini” (1945–1985): novoe prochenie* [Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War (1945–1985): A New Reading] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1995), 408; Bystrova, “*Voienno promyshlennnyi kompleks SSSR*,” 395.

Kremlin continued to build military forces in the Soviet Far East and Mongolia and developed strategic relations with India and Vietnam.

Although the Vienna summit in June 1979 showed that under better circumstances Brezhnev and Carter might have become partners, they were unable to stop the erosion of the US–Soviet détente. The backlash against détente in the United States grew.³⁰ In September 1979, US–Soviet relations soured further as a result of trumped-up American charges about the presence of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba (it was a training unit that had been there since 1962). And then, several months later, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

The invasion of Afghanistan

The background to and reasons for this invasion provide the most dramatic evidence of the Soviet inability to reassess the changing global situation and foresee the consequences of imperial overextension. There were two fundamental causes for Soviet miscalculations in Afghanistan and in the Middle East. First, the Kremlin was fixated on the bipolar geopolitical competition as a “natural” extension of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm. For Soviet leaders, “Islamic revolutions” had no part in this vision. Second, the decisionmaking process was paralyzed because of problems with the all-important agent at the top of the Soviet institutional hierarchy: Brezhnev was in a poor state of health.

Ironically, there was no lack of expertise and experience in the Soviet Union in dealing with Muslim countries and Islam. In fact, Soviet–Russian expertise in this regard stretched back to the eighteenth century and was considerably greater than that in the United States. There were many professional “Orientalists” working in the International Department of the Central Committee, the KGB, Soviet military intelligence, the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, and various institutions in the republics of Soviet Central Asia. Their advice, however, did not reach the decisionmaking level at crucial times.

In the end, Soviet policies in Afghanistan were caused by faulty and weak leadership and by spasmodic, ponderous reactions to the geopolitical changes in South Asia and the Middle East. For decades, Moscow had considered Afghanistan to be within the Soviet sphere of influence. Afghanistan was the only Soviet neighbor, aside from Finland, that had maintained a non-aligned status alleviating Soviet security concerns in the potentially unstable area of

30 See Nancy Mitchell’s and Olav Njølstad’s chapters in this volume.

Central Asia. “Losing” Afghanistan, neutral or allied, was unacceptable,³¹ and the US–Chinese rapprochement in 1978 made the country even more valuable. In this context, the military-revolutionary coup that brought a pro-Soviet Marxist movement to power in Kabul in April 1978 was an unexpected but pleasant surprise for Moscow. Soviet–Afghan contacts quickly mushroomed via the Defense and Foreign Ministries and the KGB. The channels of “fraternal assistance” broadened, and Soviet officials dealing with economy, trade, construction, and education flocked to Kabul. Among them were party delegations and many advisers from Central Asian Soviet republics eager to share their experience in “constructing a socialist society.” Costly commitments, including Brezhnev’s own, were made to the Afghan junta.³²

Meanwhile, the secular revolutionary regime antagonized the Islamic population and caused a massive exodus of refugees to Iran and Pakistan. In March 1979, a rebellion against the Kabul regime erupted in Herat. Noor Mohammad Taraki, the head of the revolutionary Afghan government, asked for Soviet military intervention. Initially, the troika of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko voiced their support for the military invasion. At the time, however, geopolitical considerations in the Kremlin still favored the diplomacy of détente. Brezhnev, who was still interested in a summit with Carter, restrained the interventionism of his lieutenants. In October 1979, however, Taraki’s assassination by his lieutenant Hafizullah Amin tipped the balance in the Kremlin in favor of intervention. Other international developments contributed to this fateful step. As a result of the controversy over the Soviet brigade in Cuba, US–Soviet détente was clearly moribund. And, on December 6, West Germany supported NATO’s double-track decision, opening the way to deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. This prompted Andropov to alert Brezhnev to the “dangers on the southern borders of the Soviet Union and a possibility of American short-range missiles being deployed in Afghanistan and aimed at strategic sites in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.”³³ Although reservations were voiced by the General Staff,

31 Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War*, 285; Aleksandr Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana* [The Afghan Conflagration] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 11–46.

32 Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina*, 190; Oleg Kalugin with Fen Montaigne, *The First Directorate* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 230–33; Vasilii Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan*, Working Paper no. 40 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2002).

33 Anatolii Dobrynin in *The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente: Transcript of the 1995 Nobel Symposium, Lysebu, September 17–20, 1995*, ed. by David Welch and Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: Det Norske Nobelinstitutt, 1996) (hereafter *Lysebu 2*), 91–93; the “last straw” argument is in Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana*, 123.

Ustinov quickly dismissed them. On December 12, the same day that NATO decided to deploy missiles in Western Europe, Brezhnev and the Politburo approved the Ustinov–Andropov plan to “save” Afghanistan and remove Amin from power. The KGB failed to do it “quietly”: a bloody invasion led to the murder of Amin as well as his family and guards.³⁴

Fierce American and international reaction caused the entire edifice of superpower détente to crumble. Brezhnev and his advisers were taken by surprise. Experts in the Central Committee apparatus, Foreign Ministry, and academic think tanks were shocked and dismayed.³⁵ In June 1980, Georgii Arbatov and a few other “enlightened” apparatchiks sought to convince Brezhnev and Andropov to withdraw from Afghanistan. Yet there was no political will in the Kremlin to do so. Immediate withdrawal in the face of military resistance inside Afghanistan and in view of US support of the mujahedin would have looked like a defeat.

European security and the Polish crisis

Frustrated with Carter and his policies, Brezhnev concentrated his waning energy between 1977 and 1979 on preserving European détente. France and West Germany became the focus of his personal diplomacy. Brezhnev’s relations with President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt remained good. They brought increasing economic benefits to the Soviet Union and buttressed Brezhnev’s reputation as a peacemaker among Soviet elites and the population.³⁶

European détente, however, also suffered from the rigidity and militarism of Soviet policies. During Schmidt’s visit to Moscow in May 1978, he asked Brezhnev to reconsider the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles R-16 (SS-20s) that presented a security threat to Western Europe. Brezhnev, however, refused to do so. He was under pressure from the military, who believed that the deployment would “finally lift the threat of surrounding NATO bases to the Soviet Union.”³⁷ As a result, Schmidt became convinced of the necessity of a “double-track” policy, one that combined negotiations with a commitment

34 Liakhovskii, *Plamia Afgana*, 121; General Valentin I. Varennikov in *Lysebu* 2, 85–86.

35 The diary of Cherniaev, December 30, 1979, National Security Archive.

36 Aleksandr M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: vospominaniia* [From Kollontai to Gorbachev: Memories] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), 178, 182, 193; May 5, 1978, entry, N. P. Kamanin, *Skrytii kosmos* [Secret Universe], 4th book (Moscow, In for tekst, 2001), 374.

37 Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, 194–95.

to deploy a new generation of American missiles in Western Europe. This decision taken by NATO countries contributed, in turn, to the Kremlin's decision to invade Afghanistan.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders desperately sought to salvage the remnants of European détente and convince West European countries (as well as a wary Third World) of its "peaceful" intentions. The biggest Soviet international undertaking in this regard was the lavishly conducted Olympic Games in Moscow during the summer of 1980. The games took place despite a US-led boycott. Earlier, Brezhnev had considered the games too expensive.³⁸ In contrast, after January 1980, no expense was spared. When most West European countries decided to send athletes to the games, Politburo members were convinced that, just as after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, European members of NATO did not want to antagonize the Soviet Union.

The games had barely ended when a severe political crisis in Poland called into question Soviet gains from European détente. The popularity of Solidarity threatened to destroy the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe. Soviet experts suspected a "hidden hand," perhaps a well-trained "underground" funded from abroad. Kremlin analysts regarded (not without justification) Pope John Paul II (Polish-born Karol Józef Wojtyła), Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the US Polish community as part of an anti-Communist conspiracy aimed at rolling back the Soviet empire.

The turmoil in Poland had political and psychological repercussions in the borderlands of the Soviet Union. In 1981, the KGB reported that mass strikes at some plants and factories in the Baltic republics were under the influence of the Polish workers' movement. The same was reportedly true in western Ukraine and Belarus.³⁹ Soviet authorities shut the borders with Poland and ended tourism, student programs, and cultural exchange with their "fraternal" neighbor. Subscriptions to Polish periodicals were suspended, and Polish radio broadcasts were jammed.⁴⁰

38 Note from L. Brezhnev to K. Chernenko, December 25, 1975, in *Vestnik Arkhiva Prezidenta: spetsial'noe izdanie. Generalnii sekretar L. I. Brezhnev: 1964–1982* [Bulletin of the Presidential Archives: special edition. General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, 1964–1982], 2006, 180.

39 Vladimir I. Voronkov, "Sobitiia 1980–1981 v Polshe: vzgliad so Staroi ploschadi" [Meetings in Poland 1980–1981: A View from Staraia Ploshchad] *Voprosi Istorii*, 10 (1995), 109.

40 Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations during the Polish Crisis, 1980–1981*, Special Working Paper no. 1 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1999), 24–34, 100–01.

Poland was much more important than Afghanistan; it was a crucial link between the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Soviet Union. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organization advocated “saving” Poland at any cost.⁴¹ The Kremlin used the threat of invasion to convince the leader of the Polish Communist Party, Stanisław Kania, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski to crack down on Solidarity. Kania equivocated, and Jaruzelski agreed to crush Solidarity, but believed it would be too risky to do so without Soviet military support. In December 1980, Warsaw Pact forces and the KGB began a full-scale campaign of intimidation of Poland, including large-scale military exercises that lasted three weeks.⁴² Only after the end of the Cold War did it become known that Brezhnev, Andropov, and even Ustinov were firmly against military intervention.⁴³

Aside from the prospective political and military costs of another invasion, there were the anticipated economic costs. If Warsaw Pact forces invaded Poland, the USSR would have to pick up the tab. But Soviet finances were already strained. In November 1980, Brezhnev informed the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria that the Soviet Union would have to cut supplies of oil to these countries “with a view of selling this oil on the capitalist market and transferring the hard currency gained” to help the Polish regime.⁴⁴

In November 1981, Moscow managed to convince General Jaruzelski to introduce martial law in Poland to suppress Solidarity. Jaruzelski’s action on December 13 removed the immediate political challenge to the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, however, the Polish crisis accelerated the financial crisis within the Soviet bloc. Soviet assistance to Jaruzelski remained at a high level, including \$1.5 billion worth of economic aid in 1981, and total emergency assistance equaled about 4 billion “convertible” rubles (or about \$5 billion) in 1980–81.⁴⁵ Western sanctions against Jaruzelski’s regime turned Poland into a permanent financial “black hole” for the Soviet Union. This “fraternal

41 Kulikov, “Poland, 1980–1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” at the international conference in Jachranka, Poland, November 8–10, 1997.

42 Cited in Voronkov, “Sobitiia 1980–1981 v Polshe,” 107.

43 Nikolai S. Leonov, *Likholetie* [Cursed Years] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), 212.

44 L. Brezhnev’s conversations in the Crimea, from the diary of Cherniaev, August 10, 1981; L. Brezhnev’s letter to E. Honecker, November 4, 1980, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien-und Massen-organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, J IY 2/202, Akt 550.

45 Aleksandr Shubin, *Istoki Perestroiki 1978–1984* [The Origins of Perestroika, 1978–1984], 2 vols., (Moscow: n.p., 1997), vol. I, 9; Egor Gaidar, *Gibel imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), 188.

assistance” to the Polish regime aggravated the consumer crisis in Soviet society; the butter and meat that went to Poland were sorely missed in Soviet cities and towns.

Reform or empire?

When Jaruzelski asked for Soviet troops as a backup, the Politburo refused. Andropov said: “We must be concerned above all with our own country and the strengthening of the Soviet Union.” The KGB chief knew about food shortages and long lines in major Soviet cities, and feared labor unrest in the USSR. Andropov’s comrades in the Kremlin agreed.⁴⁶ For the first time, Kremlin leaders viewed the maintenance of domestic stability and the preservation of external empire as mutually conflicting priorities. Soviet society in the early 1980s was already predominantly urban, with many million intellectuals, white-collar employees, and workers in secure jobs, receiving benefits such as free health care and education. The Soviet leaders feared that any drop in living standards could trigger labor unrest and a political crisis inside the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, as gold reserves declined, oil revenues decreased, and government expenditures mounted, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe faced a real economic crisis. Yet, characteristically, Brezhnev failed to act. There was no emergency session of the Comecon, no panels of experts, and, of course, no discussion in the press. Problems were swept under the carpet.

Against this backdrop, imperial overcommitments began to bite. Soviet subsidies and other forms of assistance went to sixty-nine clients and allies in the Third World. The Kremlin became the number one weapons seller in the world, but made very little profit from such sales.⁴⁷ The similar “zero-sum game” between Soviet domestic priorities and these imperial commitments could no longer be ignored. Soviet leaders realized that they could not continue to treat Soviet society as infinitely docile and quiescent.

Soviet responses to Reagan’s “crusade”

Ronald Reagan ended the US–Soviet détente, the process begun under the Carter administration. He also launched a worldwide anti-Soviet, anti-Communist “crusade” and initiated the largest defense buildup since the

⁴⁶ Minutes of Soviet Politburo, December 10, 1981, in Leonov, *Likholetie*, 212.

⁴⁷ Bystrova, “Voienno-promyshlennii kompleks SSSR,” 346–47.

Korean War. Suddenly, aging Soviet leaders saw that the global balance of forces could be reversed. They were profoundly dismayed.

Martial law in Poland exacerbated relations between Moscow and Washington. Reagan (who had earlier lifted the grain embargo on the USSR) resolved to squeeze the Soviets economically whenever he could. After December 1981, he pressured West European countries to cease construction of the transcontinental gas pipeline, a project pivotal for increasing Soviet revenues in the future. Gradually, this action and sinking world oil prices depleted Soviet hard-currency reserves and endangered the financial stability of the Soviet Union.

Above all, the actions of the Reagan administration aroused old fears in the Kremlin of a surprise nuclear attack.⁴⁸ In May 1981, Andropov, with Brezhnev's consent, launched a new strategic early-warning system.⁴⁹ Simultaneously, the Kremlin fomented the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe and the United States. Moscow also said it would never resort to nuclear weapons first, and hoped the United States would embrace the same declaratory policy.

Soviet leaders also worried about military collusion between the United States and China. Before Reagan came to power, Sino-Soviet relations had remained openly hostile. Experts on China in the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, the Central Committee, and the military establishment treated the PRC as a strategic enemy and even resisted revival of economic relations with the country.⁵⁰ Yet, the problems in Afghanistan and Poland, as well as the perceived aggression of the Reagan administration, convinced Brezhnev and a number of his advisers to reconsider their anti-Chinese inclinations. In March 1982, speaking in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Brezhnev expressed his desire to improve relations with China. In his view, the main Soviet enemy was the United States, and everything should be done to avoid pushing the Chinese into the US embrace. Afterwards, Sino-Soviet relations began to thaw, under the pressure of Soviet geostrategic fears. At the same time, the PRC also began to reconsider its global priorities, downgrading the Soviet threat. As a result of this mutual reappraisal, Sino-Soviet relations began to improve slowly.

48 Ben Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, September 1997), 9–10.

49 Sergei F. Akhromeev and Georgii M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskiĭ vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 14; Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 522.

50 Aleksandrov Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva*, 171–72.

On November 10, 1982, Leonid Brezhnev died. The 68-year-old Andropov became leader, and “enlightened” apparatchiks hoped that he would embark on a new course. They expected him to withdraw from Afghanistan, liberalize the Soviet regime, heal relations with East European countries, remove the SS-20s from Europe, and rein in the Soviet military-industrial complex.⁵¹ Andropov, however, was not ready for radical change. He was intensely suspicious of the United States and believed liberalization might undercut the Soviet regime. Knowing that he was dying of kidney disease, he had a dark, pessimistic streak that dominated his worldview.

A series of events in 1983 aggravated his fears. On March 8, 1983, the US president spoke of the Soviet Union as “an evil empire”; fifteen days later, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with the goal of making all nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Although a panel of Soviet experts concluded that SDI did not require immediate countermeasures, others were alarmed. And their worries grew after September 1, 1983, when a Soviet jet fighter shot down a Korean civilian airliner and US officials condemned the Kremlin for an “act of unprecedented barbarism.”⁵² While Andropov was already incensed, the US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 made him even more wary of renewed American imperialism.⁵³ He ordered Soviet negotiators to walk out of the Geneva arms-control talks.⁵⁴ In 1983, for the first time since 1962, nuclear fears began to percolate down to the Soviet public.⁵⁵

Andropov died in February 1984, replaced by another septuagenarian, Konstantin Chernenko. The remaining “duo” of Ustinov and Gromyko retained a virtual monopoly in military and foreign affairs. They dismissed Reagan’s personal overtures and continued to believe that his administration wanted to beat the Soviet Union into the ground. Not since early 1953, the time of Stalin’s death, had Soviet leaders reacted so narrowly and so fearfully.

⁵¹ The diary of Cherniaev, November 11, 1982, National Security Archive.

⁵² Pikhoia, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoriia vlasti* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 2000), 438–41; Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, 44–45, 49–50. For the American side of the story of KAL-007, see David E. Pearson, *KAL-007: The Cover-up* (New York: Summit Books, 1987).

⁵³ Information from the Soviet Central Committee to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact, a copy sent to the general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party Erich Honecker, probably December 1 or 2, 1983, a copy on file at the National Security Archive.

⁵⁴ Akhromeev and Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata*, 51.

⁵⁵ The author’s personal observations during his lecturing tours around the Soviet Union in 1984–86; also Gorbachev, “Otkrovennyi dialog o perestroike” [Open Dialogue about Perestroika] *Izvestiia*, April 29, 1990, cited in Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 189.

Yet, they could not come up with any new policies in response to the perceived dangers. They had scant financial resources. Total defense-related expenses, including indirect costs, as Brezhnev admitted in 1976, were around 40 percent of the budget. This figure was higher than in 1940, when the Soviet Union was preparing for World War II. Any additional rise in defense expenditures would lead to a drastic cut in living standards. Neither the aged Kremlin leadership nor the elites and the rest of Soviet society were prepared for this.⁵⁶ Talk of increased military expenditures was quickly squashed.

What remained of Andropov's programs to enforce discipline and promote a work ethic among blue-collar laborers and white-collar bureaucrats quickly degenerated into a farce. The huge human resources Stalin had mobilized – those millions of peasants, young urban workers, and enthusiastic party cadres – were no longer available. There was little idealism among elite, educated youth; frustrated consumerism, cynicism, and pleasure-seeking had taken its place. Even the Politburo leaders were not the same as forty years earlier; because of their old age, most of them thought more about their health, their work load, and their retirement perks than about the preservation of Soviet power.

Tacitly, in 1980–84, the Kremlin's "old guard" recognized the limits of Soviet power and wanted only to preserve the status quo. And it was their final act. Ustinov died on December 20, 1984, and on March 10, 1985, it was Chernenko's turn. While the latter's funeral was being prepared, there was a flurry of behind-the-scenes bargaining. The last survivor of the ruling troika, Andrei Gromyko, cast his decisive vote for Mikhail Gorbachev, the youngest Politburo member. In return for his support, Gromyko soon became the head of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, an elevated position of a largely ceremonial nature.⁵⁷ The complete deadlock in domestic and foreign policies, the growing fears of war, and the humiliating picture of the old guard clinging to power convinced elites in the party, the KGB, and the military that they needed a young, energetic, resolute leader. Gorbachev, a protégé of Andropov, fulfilled these requirements. After the failure of détente, Soviet elites looked to him as a "one-man solution" to numerous problems. Nobody could foresee at that time that this handsome, smiling party apparatchik would become in just a few years the gravedigger of the Soviet Union.

56 Robert D. English, "Sources, Methods, and Competing Perspectives on the End of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 23, 2 (Spring 1997), 286. The figure of 40 percent appeared in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms] (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), I, 334.

57 Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, I, 264.

This chapter demonstrates that the collapse of détente cannot be interpreted and understood through the prism of international affairs alone. Soviet foreign policy was shaped by profound internal decay. In a highly centralized political system, as the Soviet state was, the absence of dynamic leadership was especially problematic. Bureaucratic “log-rolling” dominated decisionmaking, and was driven by hidden economic motives. At the same time, Soviet policies were hostage to the ideological predilections and strategic anxieties of aging Politburo politicians. With Brezhnev incapacitated, Soviet foreign policy failed to respond to new challenges in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as well as to heightened concerns stemming from declining oil revenues and growing support for human rights. Ultimately, Soviet foreign policy lost its momentum and became reactive, driven by preexisting commitments, the paranoia of elderly leaders, and the venal impulses of bureaucratic and military elites.

American pressure on the USSR brought all these problems into focus. But it would be wrong to exaggerate the impact of this pressure. It perpetuated the Soviet confrontational stance and, among Soviet citizens, revived the image of the United States as the enemy. It was Reagan’s luck that his presidency coincided with generational change in the Kremlin, that is, with the exit of the old guard and the rise of the Westernized “enlightened” apparatchiks around Mikhail Gorbachev.

This period of Soviet torpor made party and professional elites realize that the war in Afghanistan and the Polish crisis had strained Soviet resources and endangered living standards in the Soviet Union. If conditions worsened, they perceived that a social explosion might occur not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet homeland itself. Many hoped Gorbachev would be able to solve the conundrum: reinvigorating the Soviet system without eroding the Soviet empire. They would be proven wrong on both counts.

Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

AMIN SAIKAL

The Cold War profoundly affected the fate of many states; Iran and Afghanistan were two which particularly felt its effects. Their domestic and foreign-policy settings were influenced by the onset of the Cold War in ways that produced contrasting outcomes for the two countries, helping eventually to open space for the rise of radical Islamism in their politics, with impacts well beyond their boundaries. The Iranian revolution of 1978/79 resulted in the overthrow of the US-backed regime of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi and its replacement with the anti-US Islamic government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In contrast, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 followed the seizure of power in Kabul by a cluster of pro-Soviet Communists twenty months earlier. However, both events were considerably grounded in the US–Soviet Cold War rivalry. Similarly, political Islam, or Islamism, which had a major effect on the Muslim world and its relations with the United States and its allies in the wake of the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, arose in interaction with the dynamics of the Cold War, although it was also embedded in older schools of thinking amongst Muslim scholars. Arguably, if it had not been for the US policy of containment of the Soviet Union and the Soviet responses to it, Iran might not have moved so clearly into the American orbit and Afghanistan might not have fallen under Soviet influence. By the same token, the grounds might not have emerged in the late 1970s for the radical forces of political Islam to become increasingly assertive in their quest to redefine Muslim politics, with an anti-US posture.

Background

When George F. Kennan on 22 February 1946 dispatched his ‘long telegram’ from Moscow to Washington (which formed the basis of the US strategy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War), few people could have

expected Iran and Afghanistan to be affected by the US–Soviet rivalry to such an extent that it would transform them into critical sources of tension and conflict in world politics over the next four decades. At the time, Iran and Afghanistan were two independent neighbouring Muslim states, enjoying varying degrees of strategic importance and experiencing different stages of national development. Although both were ruled by traditional monarchies, Iran could count on its oil riches and outlets to international waters to claim not only wider interaction with the outside world and greater strategic assets, but also a higher level of development than the resource-poor and landlocked Afghanistan. Iran was a relatively homogeneous state, dominated by Persian stock and the Shi'ite sect of Islam, whose clergy had historically forged a shaky alliance with the temporal power, forming the basis of the modern Iranian state. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a heterogeneous country, where a weak state functioned in dynamic relationships with strong micro-societies largely under the influence of the Sunni sect of Islam. However, the two countries had a great deal in common as well, especially in terms of language, culture, and historical experiences; in addition, each had long borders and extensive cross-border ethnic ties with the Soviet Union. They had both been subjected to pressures arising from Anglo-Russian rivalry in the past, with effects on their domestic and foreign policies. All this meant that their regimes had to be constantly conscious of performing a balancing act between religious and secular change on the domestic front, and between Western powers and the Soviet Union in the foreign-policy arena.

As a result, by the onset of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries promoted nationalist ideologies that emphasised the sanctity of religion and traditions, although without denying the need for secular national politics and development. Both states also assumed foreign-policy postures that upheld their neutrality in world politics as the best way of avoiding complications with the Soviet Union. On this basis, while seeking good relations with the United States as a distant power and source of aid, Tehran and Kabul could not afford to become too entangled in the Cold War.

However, in 1953, three separate but simultaneous events changed their circumstances. In one of its most successful operations of the Cold War, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped overthrow an elected, reformist government in Iran. In Kabul, a moderate and passive government was replaced by a more impatient and centralist set of modernisers. And in Moscow Iosif Stalin died, leaving power in the hands of new leaders who stressed peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of others as part of a new diplomatic offensive to shape

the dynamics of Soviet–American rivalry. These developments laid the groundwork for Iran to drift into the American orbit and for Afghanistan to become vulnerable to Soviet influence, opening the space for radical political Islam to rise in the region and beyond.

Iran

The Iranian crisis materialised against the backdrop of Iran's experiencing nationalist political turbulence and the United States and the Soviet Union eyeing the country as an important strategic prize. Moscow regarded Iran as vital for the Soviet Union's security in the south, and Washington saw it as significant to the US policy of containment and geopolitical dominance in the oil-rich Middle East.

At the heart of the Iranian turbulence was a bitter power struggle between the pro-Western Iranian monarch Mohammad Reza Shah, who had succeeded his father in 1941 in the wake of the joint Anglo-Soviet wartime occupation of Iran, and the veteran Iranian nationalist reformist politician, Mohammad Mossadeq. The latter wanted a revolutionary process of change to transform Iran into a constitutional monarchy; to maximise Iran's control over and income from its oil resources, which had been monopolised by the British since early in the century; and to implement long-overdue social and economic reforms. The shah was opposed to Mossadeq's approach, especially when it affected his traditional powers. However, when the Majlis (National Assembly) elected Mossadeq as prime minister on 30 April 1951, constitutionally the shah had no choice but to consent. Mossadeq's first act in office was the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on 1 May. The British rejection of the nationalisation – the first of its kind in the Middle East – and imposition of an economic blockade on Iran precipitated a crisis in Anglo-Iranian relations.

Mossadeq refused to back down on the grounds that he was politically and morally right, and that he had the support of the Iranian people and the international community. London, somewhat belatedly, underpinned its policy by claiming that the pro-Soviet Iranian Communist party, Tudeh, was benefiting from Mossadeq's government. Although initially Washington had sided with Iran in the dispute partly because it feared the British attitude was driving the country into Soviet arms, it now accepted the British anti-Communist argument for fear of the West losing access to Iran's oil. In late August 1953, the CIA, assisted by British intelligence, engineered a *coup d'état*. The shah, who had been forced by Mossadeq to leave the country for Switzerland a week earlier, was initially reluctant to support the CIA's machinations, but he

ultimately relented. The CIA brought him back and re-installed him on his throne not to reign but to rule Iran at the behest of the United States.

The CIA's intervention was widely resented inside Iran and in the region. The shah imposed a military dictatorship and made extensive use of a secret police force (SAVAK), set up for him by the CIA and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Many Iranians despised this development, but could not openly express their opposition. Elsewhere in the region, radical Arab nationalists (headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt) perceived the CIA's imposition as a threat to their quest for regional unity against the forces of 'colonialism', 'imperialism', and 'Zionism'. At the same time, the Soviets condemned the development as a Western imperialist offensive against independent post-colonial regimes.¹

The United States provided massive financial, economic, and military assistance, and signed various bilateral agreements with Iran to shore up the shah's government. From 1954 on, Washington put in place an international consortium to run the Iranian oil industry. The new corporation was controlled in equal parts by British Petroleum and five American oil companies, while remaining under the nominal tutelage of the Iranian National Oil Company, which Mossadeq had established. Further, Iran joined the US-backed regional alliance of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and its successor, the Central Treaty Organisation, two years later – part of a US strategy to put an international ring of containment around the Soviet Union. Iran lost its traditional neutrality in world politics. Its position in the US camp as a frontline bulwark against Soviet Communism was confirmed.

The shah pursued two contradictory goals: one was to make himself pivotal to the operation of Iranian politics; another was to find a pro-capitalist form of national development and foreign-policy behaviour that would complement his special relationship with the United States. However, to be successful, the former required centralisation, and the latter decentralisation, of politics. The shah formally ended martial law in 1959 and subsequently, under pressure from the administration of John F. Kennedy, set out to secure a wider base of popular legitimacy. In 1961, he embraced a land reform initiated by Prime Minister Ali Amini, a close friend of the Kennedys who had been imposed by Washington. However, by 1962, the shah prompted Amini to resign and he himself not only took over the administration of the land reform, but also

¹ S. M. Aliev (ed.), *Sovremennyi Iran* [Contemporary Iran] (Moscow: Rossiskaia akademiia nauk, 1993), 82–83; see also the chapter by Douglas Little in volume II.

initiated a number of other social and economic reforms, which he called the White Revolution or 'the revolution of the shah and the people'.

Yet, whatever steps he took from that point, he could not expunge the indignity of having been put on the throne by the CIA, nor bridge the contradiction in his goals, nor transform his relationship with the United States into one of interdependence in order to elevate his rule in the eyes of most Iranians and the countries of the region. He continued to reign using suppression, co-optation, patronage, and divide-and-rule politics. SAVAK was operated as such a pervasive force that the majority of the Iranian people thought that most of their compatriots were either members or informants of the organisation. This perception reached the point where 'people could not trust people'.²

There were four major sources of opposition brewing from the 1960s. The first consisted of the ideological and political opponents of the shah's rule. They included not only the remnants of Mossadeq's centre-left National Front, but also Marxist-Leninist groups such as Tudeh and Fadaïyan-e Khalq (People's Devotees) as well as the radical Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Warriors), which preached a mixture of Marxist and Islamic messages.

The second comprised the opponents of the shah's regime from the professional stratum of Iranian society. They included public servants, lawyers, journalists, academics, and university students. In general, they had no consolidated political agenda beyond seeking a democratic reformation of the political system.

The third was the Bazaaris or petit bourgeois, composed mainly of owners of small businesses and merchants, many of whom had traditionally constituted a fairly coherent middle-class stratum in close interaction with the Shi'ite religious establishment. Although some of the Bazaaris benefited from the shah's policies, there were also many who resented their change in status from independent merchants to participants in the shah's modernisation drive. They did not approve of increased taxes and regulations, nor did they appreciate the growing cost of living and of operating a business.

The fourth was the Shi'ite religious establishment. The Pahlavi dynasty had embraced Shi'ite Islam as a state religion, but would not allow it to set the framework for how the Iranian state and society operated. The shah, even more than his father, found it imperative to promote secular politics, partly in order to prevent any religious centre of power from challenging his position. His constant attempts to erode the power base of the Shi'ite establishment

2 Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 13.

caused widespread disquiet among the clerics. Many of their leading figures, especially in the city of Qom – a traditional Shi'ite seat of learning and political power that had counter-balanced temporal authority since the early sixteenth century – did not approve of the shah's regime or his pro-Western secular modernisation drive.

From the early 1960s on, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a leading Islamist and political critic of the shah's rule. After the death of his mentor, Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Borojerdi, in March 1962, Khomeini openly opposed the shah and his special relationship with the United States. To silence him, SAVAK first detained him in 1963 for a year and then forced him into exile, which took him to southern Iraq – the spiritual seat of Shi'ite power in the Muslim world. Khomeini received protection from Iraq's leftist-nationalist Baathist regime as leverage in Baghdad's political, ideological, and territorial disputes with Tehran. His opposition activities, with increased contacts with fellow dissident clerics in Iran, eventually led his followers to establish the Jame'eh Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez (Society of Assertive Clerics, SAC) in 1977, with the aim of overthrowing the shah's regime. Most of Iran's subsequent Islamist leaders belonged to this society.

While public grievances gathered pace in different levels of society, two related factors coalesced to trigger widespread active popular opposition to the shah's rule by the late 1970s. The first was the dramatic increase in Iran's oil revenue; this allowed the shah to entertain ambitious plans, including transforming Iran into what he called the world's fifth-largest economic and military power by the mid-1980s. The second concerned Washington's unqualified complicity in the shah's quest for grandeur. Under the Nixon Doctrine, which was formulated in the wake of the United States' debacle in Vietnam, the shah's regime was entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the interests not only of Iran but also of the United States in the region. The shah was given *carte blanche* to purchase any conventional weapon system he desired.

Iran's oil revenues were increasing sharply, and the shah had grand plans for social and economic reform and for military modernisation. These schemes soon proved to be poorly conceived and badly implemented, as well as irrelevant to Iran's real needs. More than 70 per cent of Iranians could not read and write, an equal number suffered from curable diseases and poor sanitary conditions, and unemployment hovered around 30 per cent, especially among Iranian youth, yet the shah continued to spend too much on economic modernisation and military build-up and too little on social development. This produced serious social and economic dislocation and imbalances

that caused much confusion and uncertainty among Iranians. A majority were no longer assured of the direction that their identity, lives, and society were taking. Those who did not benefit from the shah's policies (and they constituted a majority of the Iranians from both urban and rural backgrounds) could not identify with what the shah was trying to achieve.

Meanwhile, the shah's policies caused alarm in the region. Although the Soviets appeared to have come to terms with Iran's transformation into a firm US ally and were happy to settle for good working relations with Tehran in return for an Iran that was not openly hostile to them, they could not but view the shah's military build-up with trepidation. Moscow was horrified by the idea of the shah as the regional policeman. Nor could it remain indifferent to his projection of power against what he called foreign-backed subversive forces, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, which was also backed by several Soviet friends in the region – the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria, and Iraq – and his offer of support to Pakistan to crush the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, backed by another Soviet friend, Afghanistan. Beyond this, Moscow had reason to be mindful of Tehran's intelligence and economic co-operation with Israel. Such collaboration might have an impact on the regional balance of power as well as on Soviet support for the Palestinian/ Arab cause, on which Moscow had rested its Cold War competition with the United States in the wider Middle East since the mid-1950s.

By the same token, both radical and conservative Arab states found the shah's vision of an all-powerful Iran disturbing. The radicals had long been critical of the shah's regime. But their ranks were now swelled by conservatives, led by Saudi Arabia, given the historical, sectarian, and cultural differences between the Arabs and Iranians. The Saudis countered the development not only by engaging in a process of economic and military modernisation of their own, but also by using their position as the largest producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to keep oil prices steady, thus preventing the shah from receiving increased oil revenue. By 1975, this caused a serious shortfall in Tehran's income, forcing the shah to raise a \$500 million loan from Europe in order to meet the costs of his planned projects. Meanwhile, he had to call on Iranians to dampen the expectations that he had initially elevated. This could only draw the ire of many Iranians, who now questioned the shah's approach to their country's transformation.

In the context of this uncertainty, the change of American administrations, in 1977, from Republican to Democratic under President Jimmy Carter also had a profound effect on the shah's regime. Carter made human rights a foreign-policy

priority. Although his prime target was the Soviet Union, this move also pressured the shah to engage in a degree of limited liberalisation. Despite declaring off-limits any criticism of the monarchy, the constitution, and the armed forces, once he had engaged in even limited liberalisation, he was unable to stop its forward momentum.

The aggregate effect was widespread Iranian alienation from the shah's rule. Carter re-affirmed US support for the shah in November 1977 when he praised him as a 'strong leader', with a declaration that 'we look upon Iran as a very stabilising force in the world at large'.³ But it came too late. Iranian students studying in the United States had already begun a wave of protests which were picked up by Tehran University students and which snowballed into a nationwide uprising and popular revolution within months. The participants came to include a wide range of social strata. Since the shah had suppressed all forms of organised political opposition, the protesters had no shared platform: all they initially wanted was a democratic reformation of the shah's regime and the withdrawal of US support for that regime.

However, one opposition group that had remained fairly cohesive was the Shi'ite establishment: for fear of committing sacrilegious acts, SAVAK could not infiltrate the establishment's network of mosques and seminaries in order to uproot it. As a prominent Shi'ite leader (though not as senior in the Shi'ite religious hierarchy as, for example, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari), Khomeini found a wide audience when he portrayed the situation in religious terms. He dichotomised the world between the realm of *mostakbarin* (the oppressors) and *mosta'zafin* (the downtrodden) and called for empowerment of the latter. He electrified young clerics by calling on them to assume the task of governing instead of merely supervising the state. In comparison to the criticisms disseminated by the shah's political opponents, Khomeini's Islamist message was simple and easily discernable by a majority of Iranians, who had been imbued with the religion of Islam over the centuries.

Khomeini's preaching – spread by illegal pamphlets and tapes – helped his *Rowhaniyat* supporters seize the leadership in opposition by the second half of 1978. Khomeini provided guidance from Iraq, and then, when Saddam Hussein expelled him (under pressure from the shah), from Paris. Once the shah and SAVAK were exposed as vulnerable in their inability to suppress the cleric and his followers, the dam burst. Neither the shah's military heavy-handedness nor his concessions to the opposition could produce an outcome

³ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 November 1977.



5. Demonstrators in Iran carry posters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, February 1979. By the late spring of 1979, Khomeini's supporters were in full control of the country.

that was satisfactory to him. By November 1978, Khomeini would settle for nothing less than the shah's removal from power, which also became the goal of the opposition as a whole. The shah was finally forced to hand over power to a prominent figure of the suppressed National Front, Shapour Bakhtiar, and leave Tehran on 16 January 1979 for a 'temporary stay' abroad. Khomeini received a tumultuous welcome by millions of Iranians two weeks later when he returned to Tehran. The shah's temporary departure became a permanent exile, ending with his death eighteen months later in Cairo at a point when even the United States was no longer prepared to be closely identified with him.

Khomeini had always envisioned Iran as a Shi'ite Islamic state. He could now implement this ideal by first transforming the Iranian revolution into an Islamic one and then, after holding a referendum on 31 March 1979, by declaring Iran an Islamic republic, with an Islamic government, also known as *velayat-e faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent), with Khomeini assuming the all-powerful position of the Guardian.⁴ He scrapped the shah's pro-Western

4 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1979).

secular approach and replaced it with an Islamic paradigm in order to build a new Islamic Iran.

Just as it had remained oblivious to the possible consequences of its support for the shah, Washington now appeared overwhelmed by Iranian developments. Khomeini implicated the United States in the shah's 'reign of terror', and found it morally justifiable and politically expedient to denounce the country as the 'Great Satan', depriving Washington of a major strategic foothold in the region. He endorsed the action of a group of his militant student followers to over-run the US Embassy in Tehran and take fifty-two of its staff hostage, holding them from 4 November 1979 to 20 January 1981. The main purpose of the ensuing hostage crisis was to humiliate the United States and to keep the public mobilised behind his leadership. The hostage crisis revealed the limits of US power, and Moscow was pleased to see the United States ensnared while the USSR was seeking to deflect international opposition to its December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

Khomeini declared the new republic's foreign policy as neither pro-Western nor pro-Eastern, but pro-Islamic, and therefore totally independent. He inaugurated a *jihadi* (combative) phase in the revolution aimed at forceful Islamisation of politics and society according to his political Islamist version of the religion. This phase dominated the first few years of the revolution at the cost of thousands of lives. Yet, since he also wanted to build a powerful and modern Shi'ite Islamic state, he followed his *jihadi* phase with an *ijtihadi* (reformist/reconstruction) phase, during which he constructed a polity that had a pluralist Islamic system of governance and a foreign-policy posture capable of situating an Islamic republic in the prevailing world order, while keeping the United States as an 'evil power' at bay.⁵ He did not have much time for Soviet Communism either, condemning the USSR as 'the other Great Satan'.⁶ He later invited the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to convert to Islam.

Afghanistan

From 1953, as Iran drifted into the US camp, Afghanistan incrementally took the opposite path in the politics of the Cold War. Up to this point, King Zahir, who had acceded to the throne in 1933, had formally served as head of state,

⁵ Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* (London: Palgrave, 2003), 69–88.

⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 298.

but Afghanistan was really governed by his two uncles, Mohammed Hashem Khan and Shah Mahmoud Khan, who served as Zahir's prime ministers from 1933 to 1946 and 1946 to 1953 respectively. However, as post-Second World War pressures for modernisation built up and Afghanistan became enmeshed in a border dispute with the newly created Islamic state of Pakistan, the king agreed with his cousin, Mohammed Daoud, that the time had come for the younger generation of the royal family to lead Afghanistan. They struck a deal under which the king would be empowered to exercise his constitutional powers and Daoud would become prime minister, pursuing an accelerated process of state-building and modernisation.

Yet Zahir and Daoud came from two rival branches of the royal family. Once Daoud assumed power, he reneged on his promise to the king and immediately established himself as the *de facto* ruler, with several objectives. He wanted to centralise power in order to pursue accelerated modernisation driven by the state. He also wanted to renegotiate the Afghan–Pakistan border, or what had historically become known as the Durand Line (determined in 1893 by the British without Afghanistan's participation). Further, he supported a concept of nationalism centred on the ethnic Pashtuns. However, he needed massive foreign economic and military assistance for achieving his goals.

Daoud had no interest in Marxism-Leninism *per se* and he seemed aware both of the incompatibility of Soviet Communism with Islam and of the inappropriateness of a leftist/socialist revolution in Afghanistan. Equally, he appeared informed of the need to maintain balanced foreign relations. While upholding Afghanistan's traditional foreign policy of neutrality, Daoud approached Washington in 1953–54 for economic and military aid and mediation in the Afghan–Pakistan border dispute. Washington turned him down, especially on his request for military aid, on the grounds that Afghanistan was not as strategically important as two of its neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, and that 'no amount of military aid' could make Afghanistan 'secure against a determined Soviet attack'.⁷ Daoud and his brother, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, found the US rejection deeply offensive and regarded it as a clear sign of Washington's support for Pakistan in the conflict. Neither did they feel comfortable with the US penetration of Iran, given a simmering border dispute that Afghanistan had

7 Shaheen F. Dil, 'The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan', *American Political Science Review*, 71 (1977), 468.

with that country and the fact that Afghanistan had supported Mossadeq's oil nationalisation.

Daoud consequently turned to the USSR for purely pragmatic reasons. The post-Stalin Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev welcomed Daoud's request and embarked upon a generous programme of military and economic assistance to Afghanistan, which between 1955 and 1978 amounted to about \$2.5 billion. By 1956, Moscow also supported Afghanistan in its quarrel with Pakistan. The Soviet motives were clear: to counter the US policy of containment, to prevent Afghanistan from becoming an anti-Soviet American base like Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, to set a good example for promoting the new Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, and to hope to turn Afghanistan into a focus for expanding Soviet reach in the region. Moscow's new policies laid the foundation for growing military and economic influence. Within a decade, the Afghan armed forces became almost entirely Soviet-trained and -equipped, with Soviets also acting as advisers in civilian administration and economic development. Hundreds of young Afghans were sent to the USSR to receive both military and civilian training, with some becoming impressed by Soviet 'progress' and recruited by the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the KGB, for pro-Soviet activities upon their return to Afghanistan. At the same time, hundreds of Soviet advisers were stationed at different military and civilian levels in Afghanistan. When Afghan-Pakistan relations deteriorated, from 1959, and when Washington once again turned down an Afghan request in 1961 for mediation, Moscow stepped up its support for Afghanistan. After Pakistan denied Afghanistan access to its ports in 1961, the Kremlin opened an alternate transit route.

From the late 1950s, Washington augmented its economic assistance to Kabul to counter rising Soviet influence, something Daoud was keen to exploit. But American aid, which amounted to about \$520 million over the entire period of Soviet assistance, could not compensate for the fact that, in a country such as Afghanistan, the only effective agent of change was the armed forces, which received most of their support from the Soviets. US aid proved to be too little and too late, and declined with the deepening American involvement in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, as Afghan-Pakistan relations resulted in border skirmishes and closure of the Afghan transit route at a high economic cost for Afghanistan, Daoud found himself with little choice but to resign in March 1963. Taking advantage of this, the king inaugurated an 'experiment with democracy' as a way of strengthening his own hold on power and preventing Daoud from returning to government. Yet the so-called democratic phase soon turned out

to be a sham. It produced three non-partisan and unruly parliaments, with little influence on the executive branch. The phase nonetheless opened the way for a number of opposition clusters to become informally operational inside and outside the parliamentary arenas. Three of these proved to be highly consequential.

The first, the Communist cluster, included most prominently two rival pro-Soviet factions: Parcham (Banner) and Khalq (Masses), which originated in the mid-1960s. Parcham was made up mostly of Kabul-based urbanised Dari-speaking Afghans, many of whom had been educated in the Soviet Union. It was led by Babrak Karmal, who subsequently became the third Soviet-installed Communist president of Afghanistan. The Parchamis wanted to see the Afghan monarchy reformed in a bourgeois revolution; they believed the conditions in Afghanistan were not ready for the overthrow of the system and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although Karmal had developed an underground relationship with Moscow from the late 1950s, he had also attracted the patronage of Daoud, who used him as part of a strategy to build good relations with the USSR and to pressure his rival branch in the royal family. Khalq, in contrast, was composed mostly of Pashto-speaking Soviet-trained Afghans, many of whom had a rural background. It was led by a self-styled revolutionary, Noor Mohammad Taraki, and a US-educated Marxist-Leninist, Hafizullah Amin, who served as Taraki's powerful deputy. Subsequently, Taraki and Amin became the first and the second Soviet-backed Communist presidents of Afghanistan. The Khalqis styled themselves very much after the Bolsheviks, calling for a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of the system.

In 1966, the two factions forged an alliance within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). But this alliance soon proved to be short-lived: Khalq rejected Parcham for being part of the Afghan establishment, mainly because of Karmal's relations with Daoud. Neither faction ever attracted more than a few hundred core members. Due to this small size and to the fact that the Afghan monarchy continued to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, the successive governments of the democratic phase never perceived either of the factions as a threat.

Islamists formed the second cluster. By the early 1960s, a number of Afghans who had been educated at Cairo's traditional centre of Islamic learning, Al-Azhar University – which had become a hotbed of the radical Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood – returned to Kabul. They found the growing Communist influence and the monarchy's tolerance of it alarming. While most of their support was concentrated at the Faculty of

Theology at Kabul University, they wanted an Islamist transformation of Afghanistan. By the mid-1960s, they formed the Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), whose founding members included leaders of the future Islamic resistance to the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan such as Burhannuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik who became the head of Jamiat, and Abdurrasul Sayyaf, an ethnic Pashtun, who led the Ittihad-i Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Unity of Afghanistan). An Afghan Islamic Youth Movement was formed about the same time in alliance with the Jamiat-i Islami. Its founding members included Ahmad Shah Massoud, who subsequently emerged as a celebrated Islamic resistance commander against the Soviets. Another original member of the movement was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who later split from Jamiat-i Islami and formed his own mujahedin (Islamic resistance) group, the Hezb-i Islami, under the patronage of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).

The third cluster was the Daoudist network, which was decentralised, with Daoud acting as its discreet head. It was politically opportunist, operated and directed by a number of Daoud's agents within and outside the parliament. The network's function was to act in alliance with whoever was in the legislature and executive to cause political instability and undermine the position of the king – who, since turning his back on Daoud, had become the object of Daoud's intense fury – and thus facilitate the former prime minister's return to power.

Of these clusters, the Daoudists finally succeeded in seizing power and putting Afghanistan on a turbulent course of political development. In July 1973, in a secret alliance with the Parcham, which had some members and supporters within the armed forces, and while the king was on a visit to Rome, Daoud successfully enacted a bloodless coup, toppling his cousin's monarchy and declaring Afghanistan a republic. In his first policy statement, he condemned the preceding "democratic phase" as fraudulent and pledged to bring genuine democracy to Afghanistan. He affirmed a policy of non-alignment and praised Afghanistan's friendly relations with its 'great northern neighbour', the Soviet Union. At the same time, he singled out Pakistan as the only country with which Afghanistan had a major political dispute and stressed his country's support for the right to self-determination of the people of 'Pashตูนistan'.⁸ The constitution was suspended and all political activities

8 Text of Mohammad Daoud's declaration of the republic speech, in Abdul Aziz Danishyar (ed.), *The Afghanistan Republic Annual – 1974* (Kabul: Kabul Times Publishing Agency, 1974), 1–4.

were banned. Meanwhile, hundreds of Parchami supporters joined the bureaucracy, with 160 of their most energetic comrades-in-arms being dispatched to the provinces, where they could promote 'enlightenment and progress'.

Despite claims to the contrary, Daoud was basically an autocratic nationalist moderniser, somewhat similar to the shah. He had already labelled the Islamists 'reactionaries' and launched a violent campaign against them with the help of the Parchamis. After consolidating power, from 1975 he also moved to reduce his dependence on the Parchamis and the Soviet Union. To achieve his goal, he sought to normalise relations with Pakistan by playing down his initial stand on Pashtunistan; he also worked towards closer ties with the shah's regime in the hope that it could provide Afghanistan with substantial financial aid. Likewise, he attempted to expand relations with Saudi Arabia and Libya as additional sources of finance. He further sought to cultivate bonds with Egypt under Anwar Sadat, who had emerged as one of the strongest critics of the Soviet Union as he pursued peace with Israel and friendship with the United States. Daoud reasoned that such measures would also endear him to Washington, whose ambassador to Afghanistan, Theodore Eliot, confirmed Daoud's move in 1975 to tilt away 'from pro-Soviet leftists and their patron power'.⁹ In June 1976, Daoud dispatched Mohammad Naim as his special emissary to the United States to seek support for his domestic and foreign-policy changes.

However, while the shah promised \$2 billion in aid, he delivered only \$10 million of it before he was toppled, and the oil-rich Arab states made only modest contributions. Furthermore, Washington did not seem to realise the seriousness of the risk that Daoud was taking in his relations with Moscow by seeking to change Afghanistan's foreign-policy orientation; once again it rebuffed Daoud's approach. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was the main architect of the Nixon Doctrine, had so much confidence in the shah's regime and its ability to fulfil its role as a loyal US ally in the region that he advised Naim to turn to the shah as the main regional bulwark against Communism. Kissinger could not discern that the shah's regime was built on sand and that it did not have the capability of looking after US interests in Afghanistan.

Bewildered by the American response, Daoud nonetheless pressed on with his changes, much to Soviet annoyance. In April 1977, Soviet leader Leonid

9 Cited in Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 37.

Brezhnev invited Daoud to Moscow for talks. He asked Daoud to dismiss all non-Soviet specialists and advisers in Afghanistan, therefore arresting Afghanistan's shift away from the USSR. Brezhnev's intimidating approach backfired, for Daoud gave him 'a formidable dressing down . . . in front of his peers and most of his close associates'.¹⁰

That also appeared to seal Daoud's fate. Moscow urged the Parchamis and Khalqis to reunite within the PDPA in order to counter Daoud. When the PDPA staged demonstrations a year later, Daoud arrested most of its leaders. The PDPA's supporters in the armed forces launched a successful and bloody coup on 27 April 1978, eliminating Daoud and most members of his family. They declared Afghanistan a democratic republic with fraternal ties with the Soviet Union. While the Soviet leadership may have had prior knowledge of the coup, it is now established that it had no direct hand in it.¹¹

In the new PDPA government, Taraki took over the post of president, Karmal the position of vice president and second deputy prime minister, and Amin the position of first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. Moscow promptly recognised the new regime and declared full support for it. It urgently concluded a series of bilateral agreements and dispatched economic and military assistance. The number of Soviet military and non-military advisers was dramatically increased, reaching some 4,000 by the end of 1978; they guided the PDPA's administrative, political, economic, and security operations at all levels.

As might have been expected, the PDPA was not equipped to govern Afghanistan. It lacked a popular base of support, historical precedent, political legitimacy, and administrative experience; it was ideologically alien to Afghan society and suffered from intense factional rivalry. It became totally dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival. As PDPA leaders requested increased Soviet aid and Moscow obliged, the United States and Afghanistan's other neighbours, especially Iran and Pakistan, remained highly suspicious of the turn of events. However, for various reasons, most could do little. The Carter administration wanted to see the continuation of its policy of détente towards the USSR. The shah's regime was facing popular unrest and was incapable of fulfilling its proposed role under the Nixon Doctrine. The Pakistani military regime of General Zia ul-Haq, which was pursuing a policy of re-Islamisation and was a pariah in world politics, was the only actor keen to help those

10 Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), 180.

11 Vasily Mitrokhin, *The KGB in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre, 2002), 25–26.

Afghan Islamists who wanted to take up arms against the PDPA. The ISI cultivated Hekmatyar, now leader of the radical Islamist group Hezb-i Islami, for this purpose.

The PDPA quickly tore itself apart. Within two months of coming to power, the Khalqis outmanoeuvred the Parchamis, at first dispatching Karmal and some of his top lieutenants abroad as ambassadors and then dismissing them on charges of embezzling embassy funds. This, together with the Khalqis' ill-conceived Stalinist policies, outraged a majority of the Afghan people, prompting them to launch Islamist uprisings in different parts of the country. The PDPA requested increased Soviet assistance, including combat troops. While willing to continue its economic, military, and advisory assistance, the Kremlin was prudently reluctant to commit combat troops lest it antagonise the Afghan people further and entangle the Soviet Union in an unwinnable war.

However, the situation rapidly changed for Moscow when the ambitious Amin arrested (and later killed) Taraki and took over power in September 1979. Moscow could no longer trust Amin, who became aware that he was in a vulnerable position. As a consequence, to protect himself from the Soviets, he sought a ceasefire with Hekmatyar along with a normalization of relations with Washington. The Kremlin was faced with two stark choices. One was to invade and save the PDPA, thus protecting the massive Soviet investment in Afghanistan since the mid-1950s. Another was to let the PDPA regime collapse, at the risk of Afghanistan falling under Islamist rule, which, together with similar regimes in Pakistan and Iran, posed a perceived Islamist threat to the Soviet Central Asian Muslim republics. Brezhnev and a few of his colleagues in the Politburo decided on the invasion option.

In late December 1979, Soviet forces occupied Kabul and all other major cities, as well as the strategic points and main lines of communications and border entries. Their advanced special units promptly eliminated Amin and some of his colleagues. Karmal, whom Moscow had kept on tap for such an eventuality, was returned to Kabul to head a new PDPA government, dominated this time by the Parchamis. Moscow justified its invasion by claiming that it had dispatched a 'limited contingent' of Soviet troops at the invitation of the PDPA leadership to save Afghanistan from being overrun by imperialist-backed counter-revolutionary forces. The Kremlin expected the Soviet forces to stabilise the PDPA and Afghanistan within six to twelve months and then to return home en masse, leaving behind only small numbers of troops, as they had done in Eastern Europe. However, the invasion invited growing opposition not only from the Afghan people but also from most of the international

community. The only regional state that openly sided with the Soviets was India, largely because of its rivalry with Pakistan.

The invasion marked an unparalleled development in Soviet international behaviour outside the Warsaw Pact since the Second World War. All those foreign leaders who had traditionally believed Soviet foreign policy to be inherently expansionist now judged their suspicions to be well founded. The invasion shocked the West, especially the United States, which felt that it had been deceived despite its sustained efforts to maintain a policy of *détente*. It also caused alarm in the Muslim world about the long-term intentions of the Soviet Union. It frightened China, especially in the light of the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia a year earlier. Beijing viewed the invasion as part of a Soviet strategy to encircle China.

The invasion snuffed out *détente*. President Carter denounced it as a serious threat to the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and to world peace. However, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the US national security adviser, who had been warning the president about a 'creeping Soviet invasion' for months, now also saw a unique opportunity for the United States to turn Afghanistan into a 'Soviet Vietnam'.¹² On this basis, Washington formulated its counter-intervention strategy in connection with the overall American policy of containment.

The US counter-intervention strategy

The US strategy had four main elements. First, under the Carter Doctrine, it warned the Soviet Union against any expansion beyond Afghanistan, especially in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and promised to repel any such move by all means (including nuclear weapons). Secondly, it launched a diplomatic and propaganda campaign to prevent the Soviets from attaining international support for their invasion. Thirdly, since allying with Iran under Khomeini was not an option, it renewed the American alliance with Pakistan to strengthen that country's position as a front-line state and to enable it to act as a conduit for outside assistance to the Afghans who were fighting the invasion. Washington dropped its sanctions against Pakistan and embraced General Zia ul-Haq's dictatorship as an essential ally, despite the public US commitment to human rights and democracy. Fourthly, it backed the use of

¹² Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Les révélations d'un ancien conseiller de Carter: 'Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ...'", *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 14 January 1998.

Islam by the Afghans and their Muslim supporters as an ideology of resistance to wage a *jihad* (holy war) against the Soviet occupation. The CIA was authorised to organise a network of material and human support for the Afghan Islamist resistance.

Although Zia ul-Haq scorned the Carter administration's initial offer of \$400 million in economic and military assistance, he did not have to wait long for a larger amount of American aid. After winning the 1980 US presidential election, Ronald Reagan, the Republican candidate, assumed the presidency. Holding strong anti-Soviet convictions, he believed the United States had to pursue the Cold War vigorously against the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration increased US aid to Pakistan to \$3.2 billion over six years. The CIA forged very close ties with the ISI, which Zia ul-Haq put in charge of Pakistan's Afghanistan and Kashmir policies. From the early 1980s, the ISI tried to orchestrate Afghan resistance.

Seven main Afghan mujahedin groups rapidly became operative, with their political leaders and headquarters based mainly in Pakistan's border city of Peshawar, from where the resistance was largely directed and assisted. Although the Afghan Shi'ite minority also formed several mujahedin units with bases in Iran, the Pakistan-based groups claimed to represent the 80 per cent of the population of Afghanistan that was Sunni. Although proving to be divided along personal, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, and political lines, they all embraced Islam as an ideology of resistance and professed unity of purpose and action on this basis, with some being more radical than others in their ideological disposition. While three small groups supported the restoration of the monarchy of Zahir Shah, who remained in Rome, and stood mostly aloof from the resistance, the others opposed the monarchy and fought for a free and independent Islamic Afghanistan. Two rival groups emerged in dominant positions: Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami, which was primarily Pashtun-based, and Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, which was composed largely of non-Pashtuns. Jamiat's key commander, Massoud, turned his native Panjshir valley (sixty miles north of Kabul) into an enduring fortress of resistance. Whereas Hekmatyar was a self-styled radical Islamist and an ISI instrument, Massoud proved to be an independent-minded moderate Islamist and nationalist. He possessed a vision and a strategy that enabled him to be far more successful than Hekmatyar in subsequent years.

The CIA acted as the overall supplier and co-ordinator of outside aid to the mujahedin, but the ISI distributed most such outside assistance. The lion's share went to Hekmatyar, even though he was highly critical of the United States and at times tried to break the unity of the resistance for his own

political purposes. The ISI and the CIA jointly managed a network of volunteers from the Muslim world in support of the Afghan resistance. The young Saudi son of a billionaire, Osama bin Laden, was one such volunteer. The ISI also worked hard to develop networks of Pakistani Islamist activists whom it trained, armed, and funded not only to infiltrate and control the Afghan resistance, but also to fight in Kashmir. For this purpose, with most funding coming from Saudi Arabia and the United States, the ISI nurtured a range of Islamic *madrasas* (schools) whose students were recruited from amongst the Pakistanis and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These students were mostly schooled in a form of *jihadi* Islamism so they would be ready to defend their religion when they were called upon.

Ultimately, three factors helped the mujahedin and their international supporters to achieve victory, thereby contributing to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. First, the Soviets persistently failed to win the support of the Afghan people and the international community, while the United States and its allies remained determined to do whatever possible, short of risking a direct confrontation with the USSR, to turn Afghanistan into a theatre of conflict where Soviet Communism could eventually be buried. The biggest advantage that the Soviets initially had was their air superiority. Washington and London addressed this problem in the mid-1980s by providing the mujahedin with shoulder-fired Stinger and Blowpipe missiles, significantly degrading the Soviet capacity to provide air cover for ground operations. This increased the cost of the war for the Soviets, alerting them to the fact that they were involved in a lost cause.

Secondly, at no point did the Soviets manage to secure effective mechanisms of control on the ground in Afghanistan. All their efforts at creating a united governing PDPA proved futile. In 1986, they replaced the ideologically dogmatic and administratively incompetent Karmal with the politically pragmatic head of the KGB-run Afghan secret police (KHAD), Mohammed Najibullah. But this brought about few improvements. Najibullah's promotion of party solidarity and a policy of 'national reconciliation' did little either to stop the power struggle within the PDPA or to entice any major mujahedin group to join the government.

The third factor was the generational leadership change in the USSR. The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 proved critical in the process. Gorbachev rapidly learned that he had inherited not only a politically and economically stagnant USSR, with growing internal nationality problems and foreign-policy isolation, but also a draining Afghan conflict. On 25 February 1986, he described the Afghan crisis as a 'bleeding wound', and conveyed a



6. Afghan mujahedin standing on a downed Soviet helicopter, January 1980. The invasion of Afghanistan turned out to be costly for the Soviet Union.

readiness to work towards a political resolution.¹³ He signalled an even stronger desire for a settlement to President Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986. At that time, however, Reagan wanted nothing short of Soviet defeat, although he found the Soviet leader to be likable, and a potential partner.

In 1987, Gorbachev intensified his peace-making efforts as a prelude to a Soviet troop withdrawal. He launched a three-pronged approach. One focused on opening dialogue with the mujahedin and their regional backers in Islamabad, Tehran, and Riyadh in order to facilitate some kind of power-sharing arrangement between the Islamists and the PDPA. Another was to let the UN peace mediation, which had commenced shortly after the Soviet invasion but had been frustrated by Soviet intransigence, become more effective. The third was to strengthen the PDPA regime's defences in order to pave the way for a Soviet withdrawal and to empower Afghan forces to replace them. The first prong did not work. But UN mediation resulted in the Afghan Geneva Peace Accords, signed on 14 April 1988, between the PDPA government and that of Pakistan and co-guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the accords did not provide for a ceasefire, let

¹³ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 86.

alone peace, they helped the Soviets to withdraw their forces within a year. Nonetheless, Moscow and Washington retained the right to continue to supply arms to their respective clients. Washington claimed victory and scaled down its involvement in Afghanistan, but Islamabad revelled in the opportunities to expand its influence in Afghanistan and the broader region as a dividend for its investment in the Afghan resistance.

After the Soviet withdrawal, the PDPA regime survived for three years, largely because of growing divisions and in-fighting among the mujahedin, who began to lose any semblance of unity after the Soviet pull-out. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in December 1991, finally deprived the regime of its lifeline. By late April 1992, Najibullah's government collapsed. Massoud's forces took over Kabul and the mujahedin declared the establishment of an Islamic government. With this, the United States also turned its back on Afghanistan. Washington had achieved its prime goal of delivering a mortal blow to Soviet Communism and was no longer interested in the post-Communist transition and management of war-torn Afghanistan. It left the country to the mercy of its predatory neighbours, especially Pakistan, which was now close to its goal of securing a subservient government in Kabul.

At first, Islamabad backed Hekmatyar to prevent Massoud and the leader of his political group, Rabbani, from consolidating power. But when Hekmatyar proved ineffective, the ISI raised a fresh new Pashtun-dominated militia, the Taliban (religious students), to achieve its objectives. The Taliban were a Sunni extremist Islamist force, who claimed religious superiority over all other Islamist forces in Afghanistan. They appeared on the Afghan scene in 1994 and by September 1996 were able to take over Kabul. Massoud and his forces retreated to the Panjshir valley and northern Afghanistan, where they re-grouped and formed an alliance against the Taliban and Pakistan's 'creeping invasion' of Afghanistan. In the meantime, while Afghanistan's other neighbours opposed the Taliban regime and closed their borders with the country, the ISI allowed Osama bin Laden to return shortly after the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Bin Laden was joined in 1997 by the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bringing new Arab money and volunteers. The Taliban, in alliance with bin Laden's Al Qaeda, pursued a reign of terror in Afghanistan and turned the country into a hub for international terrorism, poppy growing, and drug trafficking, all in the name of Islam.¹⁴ It was from

¹⁴ G. Farrell and J. Thorne, 'Where Have All the Flowers Gone? Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown against Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan', *International Journal of Drug Policy*, 16, 2 (2005), 81–91.

Afghanistan that Al Qaeda masterminded the attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington. The United States countered and launched a military campaign in Afghanistan as part of a wider 'war on terror', toppling the Taliban and helping to establish the internationally backed government of President Hamid Karzai in December 2001. Yet the Taliban and Al Qaeda survived to continue the fight, and the structures supporting them in Pakistan remained intact.

The Cold War, as the world knew it, ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, radical Islamism, with an anti-US posture, flourished in the post-Cold War period. Having germinated from both sides of the Shi'ite (Iran) and Sunni (Afghanistan and Pakistan) divide, it challenged the United States and its allies in the region and beyond. The Al Qaeda attacks on the United States confirmed the enormity of the danger that radical forces of political Islam could pose to the country and its allies. As such, radical Islamism became a substitute for the Soviet threat, and once again Washington was able to claim a global enemy on which it could blame its foreign-policy mistakes.

The collapse of superpower détente, 1975–1980

OLAV NJØLSTAD

In October 1974, Henry A. Kissinger, the US secretary of state, met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow to discuss unresolved arms-control matters before the upcoming US–Soviet summit in Vladivostok. They made progress but still noted that détente – the finely calibrated reduction of US–Soviet tensions that their two governments had presided over in the previous few years – was in fact “hanging by a thread.”¹ Both men knew only too well what the alternative would be. As the recently resigned US president, Richard M. Nixon, had warned Brezhnev a few months earlier: “if détente unravels in America, the hawks will take over, not the doves.”²

Eventually they did. By the end of 1980, US–Soviet relations were freezing, with few economic transactions, daily exchanges of hostile words, and growing concerns among American and Soviet citizens about their countries’ military competition. Since détente was motivated by a desire to stabilize the nuclear arms race, enhance bilateral cooperation, and decrease the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers, its fate was increasingly apparent.

The collapse of superpower détente did not happen overnight. Nor was it caused by a single, overwhelming destructive force, like an earthquake or tsunami. Rather, it was a slow, eroding process, in which multiple events and forces added strength to one another and gradually tore apart the delicate fabric of lofty ideas, pragmatic assumptions, and half-sincere obligations associated with détente.

In order to explain the process, at least three questions have to be considered. Did détente fail because of contradictions in the policy itself, what

1 Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 269. For the origins of détente, see Robert D. Schulzinger’s, Jussi Hanhimäki’s, Marc Trachtenberg’s, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman’s chapters in volume II.

2 Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), 1031.

scholars have referred to as “flaws in design and execution”?³ Or was the collapse brought about because one of the parties, or both, deliberately pursued other goals that were incompatible with the rules and spirit of détente? For instance, neoconservative critics at the time claimed that détente was ruined by the restless expansionism and military ambitions of the Soviet Communist regime.⁴ In contrast, scholars of liberal or leftist leanings claimed that détente fell victim to the rise of conservatism in the United States, accompanied by a drive for strategic superiority fueled by the US military-industrial complex.⁵ Finally, it has been argued that superpower détente was torn apart by more fundamental forces, bipolarity being the obvious realist choice, whereas others stress the ideological, socioeconomic, and military contradictions that they claim drove the Cold War from the very beginning.⁶

I will argue in this chapter that détente collapsed in four successive stages, each one having a distinct dynamic of its own, and that the process may be analyzed fruitfully from two different time perspectives: short- and long-term. Depending on which one we apply, different, but compatible, causal patterns come to the fore.

Détente loses momentum (1975–1976)

In August 1974, Gerald R. Ford inherited détente together with the presidency. He quickly decided to stay the course. As late as July 1975, Ford told Brezhnev that he remained a strong believer in détente and wanted to push forward to reach an early agreement in the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process.⁷ At this point, however, détente was already subject to increasing criticism, first and foremost in the United States but to some extent even within the ruling circles of the Soviet Union. In order to explain why, it is necessary to look at what the two governments were hoping to achieve by détente.

3 Stanley Hoffmann, “Détente,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), 231–63.

4 Richard Pipes, *US–Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981).

5 Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983).

6 Samuel P. Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” in Nye (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy*, 265–89; Phil Williams, “The Limits of American Power: From Nixon to Reagan,” *International Affairs*, 63 (1989), 575–87; Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?,” *Cold War Studies*, 3 (2001), 36–60; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8–72.

7 Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 438, 468.

As introduced by Nixon and Kissinger in 1971–72, the US policy of détente emerged from a gloomy assessment of American military, economic, and political power, all of which had been strained by the Vietnam War.⁸ Adding to their concern, the Soviet Union was about to obtain parity with the United States in strategic weapons, and might be tempted to use its military might to challenge US interests abroad. At the same time, the American architects of détente believed that the present Soviet leadership should be looked upon less as Communist true believers and more as skillful, if sometimes ruthless, practitioners of *Realpolitik*. It followed from this assumption that the United States might be able to moderate Soviet behavior through the well-orchestrated use of positive incentives and negative sanctions.

From a US perspective, then, détente was essentially a realist strategy to cope with the challenge of Soviet power in an era of American relative decline. Under its auspices, US policy toward the Soviet Union changed in three important ways. First, arms control supplemented arms buildups as an instrument for maintaining a favorable strategic balance. Thus, from the outset, SALT became the backbone of détente. Second, détente saw a shift in emphasis away from US containment of Soviet expansionism to what has been described as Soviet “self-containment.”⁹ Instead of using the threat of US countermeasures to compel Soviet restraint, Nixon and Kissinger tried to encourage Moscow to commit itself to preserving the status quo in international affairs. The key instrument was the Basic Principles Agreement of May 1972. Last but not least, they tried to engage the Soviet Union in economic, technological, and cultural transactions. The hope was that such cooperation would make the Soviets more dependent upon the West, and thus less inclined to pursue policies hostile to US interests. Accordingly, Nixon and Ford struck generous deals to sell grain to Moscow as well as advanced machine tools and oil-drilling and coal-mining equipment. They also promised to initiate new legislation that within a few years could be expected to grant financial credits and most favored nation (MFN) trade privileges to the Soviet Union.

Apparently, Brezhnev and his colleagues shared the goals of stabilizing the nuclear arms race, avoiding dangerous disputes over regional conflicts, and expanding economic contacts between East and West, but they did so for different reasons. It had been costly to catch up with the United States in

⁸ See Robert Schulzinger’s chapter in volume II.

⁹ Stanley Hoffman, *Dead End* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1983), 90; Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1988), 54–55.

strategic weapons. Knowing the potential capabilities of the American weapons industry, Moscow felt that it would be well served by a nuclear arms-control regime that helped to fix a rough strategic balance with the United States. As for economic and cultural cooperation, Moscow's main hope was that increased access to Western goods, credits, and technologies would help to fill immediate gaps in Soviet production, thereby satisfying growing consumer demand in the USSR and improving Soviet industrial performance in the longer haul.

In addition, each government had a particular reason of its own for wanting to improve bilateral relations. Nixon and Kissinger also saw détente as a means to enlist Soviet assistance to end the Vietnam War. The Soviet leadership saw it as a vehicle for obtaining US recognition of the USSR as an equal superpower.¹⁰

For both sides, détente suffered a blow when Nixon resigned in 1974. Brezhnev lost a partner whom he felt he understood and could do business with.¹¹ As Nixon told him in their last meeting: "I am in a unique position of being able to bring the American public along in support of détente. I can handle our so-called hawks."¹² Nixon's downfall left vacant his position as the leading conservative spokesman in international affairs. The man who aspired to fill this void was Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Unlike Nixon and Ford, Jackson wanted to use détente to squeeze concessions from the Kremlin in the field of human rights. Together with other legislators, he refused to support the granting of MFN status and financial credits unless Moscow allowed 60,000 Jewish citizens to emigrate annually. Brezhnev rejected the move as illegitimate meddling into internal Soviet affairs. When the Senate, in December 1974, adopted legislation in support of Jackson's position, Moscow made it clear that it no longer had any interest in securing MFN status.¹³

These developments basically killed the cooperative aspects of détente. This meant that its future would become even more dependent upon what happened in the fields of strategic arms control, regional conflicts, and – somewhat unexpectedly – human rights. The latter issue was not included

10 John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 289–316.

11 Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 261.

12 Nixon, *Memoirs*, 1029.

13 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 453–63; Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 210.



7. US senator Henry Jackson (second from left) embraced Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Soviet novelist and dissident (third from left), and challenged the détente policies of Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter.

in the original concept of superpower détente but was introduced later by Jackson and other domestic critics of Kissinger's diplomacy.

As the 1976 presidential nomination campaign began in earnest, both liberal and conservative candidates turned their attention to human rights. Whereas liberals primarily opposed Kissinger's readiness to support right-wing authoritarian regimes in the Third World, and to some extent even felt détente was too important to be put at risk because of Soviet human rights abuses, conservatives saw it differently. In their view, superpower détente was pointless, if not immoral, unless it helped produce better human rights conditions for the Soviet and East European peoples.¹⁴

The rise of conservatism in American politics in the mid-1970s had complex causes. All things considered, it should be seen first of all as a sociopolitical response to the widespread perception of American decline. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the conservative drive was to a large extent nurtured by the same concern as détente itself – only the recommended cure was different.

¹⁴ Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 2.

Basically, the neoconservatives were calling not for equilibrium with the USSR, but for restoration of American global power. That could happen, they insisted, only if the United States addressed the increasing military threat of the USSR, stood up against the specter of Communism, and did more to protect American interests and values abroad.¹⁵

Nothing better reveals Ford's vulnerable position on détente than his gradual retreat from the SALT process. In Vladivostok, both the United States and the Soviet Union made important concessions. Ford had particular reason to be satisfied. For more than two years, Jackson and other conservatives had complained that SALT I was allowing the USSR to keep a larger number of missile launchers. They insisted that the next SALT agreement had to be based on the principle of equality in aggregate numbers. Taking into account the additional nuclear forces of the United States' allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the considerable US lead in MIRV (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle) technology and cruise missile development, numerical equality was advantageous to the United States – which is probably why Brezhnev, in the words of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “had to spill blood” in order to win approval for it from the Soviet High Command and Ministry of Defense.¹⁶

Even so, the Vladivostok accords did not satisfy Ford's domestic opponents. Liberals felt the aggregate ceilings were too high; conservatives argued, inter alia, that the United States should never have allowed the Soviet Union to keep 308 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In January 1976, Kissinger went to Moscow in an attempt to renegotiate the agreement, but he returned empty-handed. Having overruled his military advisers once, Brezhnev simply had nothing to offer, even more so since the wisdom of his “peace program” had already been questioned by orthodox Marxists within the Communist Party.¹⁷ Thereupon, Ford decided to postpone further negotiations until after the upcoming election. At this point, he was facing a tough race for the Republican nomination against the former governor of California, Ronald Reagan, who was running on a strong anti-détente platform. Ford won the nomination, but found himself leading a presidential ticket that called for “peace through strength” and hardly mentioned détente at all.¹⁸

15 Charles Tyroler, II (ed.), *Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 1–5.

16 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 336–38.

17 Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 172.

18 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 546–53.

The main reason for this aboutface was the increasing dissatisfaction within American society about the state of world affairs. Among conservatives, the fall of South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 had been hard to swallow. Soon, they accused Ford of letting Cuban troops, supported by Soviet military advisers, decide the outcome of the postcolonial civil war in Angola to the advantage of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).¹⁹ Upset by these conservative attacks, Ford and Kissinger tried to convince Soviet leaders that it would be in their own best interest to reduce their involvement in Angola, but in vain: Brezhnev and his colleagues saw it as both necessary and legitimate to support the MPLA. Moreover, they wanted to “show the flag” in Angola in order to encourage what they believed to be an emerging revolutionary tide in the Third World.²⁰ Another reason why the Soviet leadership rejected the complaints from Washington was that, in their eyes, the United States was applying a double standard on the issue of restraint in regional conflicts. What about Chile and Egypt, they asked.²¹

What really turned détente into a liability for Ford was not Angola, however, but his inability to convince the American people that the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was not primarily serving to legitimize the Stalinist division of Europe.

Despite the critics’ views, the Helsinki Conference was in hindsight the most important achievement of East–West diplomacy during the 1970s.²² Nevertheless, Ford’s involvement in the process contributed to his loss in the presidential election to Jimmy Carter, the former Democratic governor of Georgia. In a televised debate on foreign policy, Ford indicated that those criticizing the Helsinki Accords were way off the mark, since the peoples of Eastern Europe did not “feel oppressed.” Carter, who in the preceding weeks had accused his opponent of having “put a lid on the hopes and aspirations for the Eastern European people,” scored an easy point.²³

In Moscow, the fact had *not* been missed that, by signing the Helsinki Accords, the Soviet government was making an unprecedented commitment in favor of human rights. To be sure, not everyone in the Kremlin had wanted

19 For developments in Angola and southern Africa, see Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow’s chapter in this volume.

20 For Soviet actions, see Vladislav M. Zubok’s chapter in this volume.

21 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 365–67.

22 Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); see also Jussi Hahnimäki’s chapter in volume II.

23 *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, vol. I, Carter (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), 711, 835.

the Soviet Union to participate in the Helsinki Conference. What swung the Politburo over to Brezhnev's side was the prospect of increased economic cooperation with the West. Brezhnev was helped also by Gromyko's assurance that it would be up to Moscow to decide how to comply with the humanitarian commitments of Basket III. "We are masters in our own house," he said.²⁴

Gromyko's pledge reflected growing self-confidence among Soviet leaders. By the mid-1970s, Moscow was deeply satisfied with the way "the correlation of forces" in the world was evolving. More than anything, this applied to the overall distribution of military power. Thanks to strategic parity, the United States had finally recognized the Soviet Union as a superpower of equal status and legitimacy.²⁵ Believing as they did that the "objective historical forces" were now firmly on their side, Soviet leaders were confident that the next administration in Washington would have to be supportive of détente, no matter who won the upcoming presidential election.

That was a fateful miscalculation. By the fall of 1976, American voters across the political spectrum were expressing a growing dissatisfaction with the direction of US–Soviet relations. In spite of détente, they felt that US interests were being challenged by the Soviet Union and its proxies in a number of trouble spots around the world. This added to their growing concerns about the military balance and Moscow's disrespect for human rights. On all these issues, powerful interest groups – mostly with a conservative agenda – knew how to foment and exploit popular discontent for their own political, institutional, or even economic purposes. *Their* expectation about the future of US–Soviet relations was strikingly different from that of the Soviet leadership: whoever became the next American president, he would have to stand up to Moscow.

The flaws of détente (January–June 1977)

The emergence of Jimmy Carter as the thirty-ninth US president marked a turning point in US–Soviet relations. Despite his strong criticism of how Ford had managed détente, Carter did not want US–Soviet relations to deteriorate. Rather, he hoped to change the character of that relationship and to move beyond the Cold War framework of international politics.

²⁴ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 351.

²⁵ William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 188–98.

To achieve this goal, Carter launched a series of initiatives on so-called global issues. He called also for “a new and genuine détente,” a phrase borrowed from Senator Jackson after the latter quit the race for the Democratic nomination. To Jackson, this meant a détente “that reflects our own values and our own security interests.”²⁶ Carter’s definition was less blunt. First, détente had to be comprehensive, not selective, which meant that controversial issues should not be left out simply because Moscow did not want to discuss them. Moreover, Carter felt that détente had become a one-way street in which the US government had been “giving up too much and asking for too little.” To reverse this trend, he insisted on reciprocity in all US–Soviet matters and promised to be “a much tougher negotiator” than Nixon and Ford.²⁷

One of the reasons why Carter became so unpopular in Moscow almost from his first day in office was that he set out to do exactly the things that the Soviet leaders had told him in advance could only harm their relationship. In a secret message, conveyed to Carter shortly after his election, Brezhnev assured the new president that he wanted to work with the United States on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation. However, he could not fail to notice that some of Carter’s public statements were “not consistent” with this goal.²⁸

After Carter took office, Brezhnev repeated the message in their personal communications. On the crucial issue of arms control, he flatly rejected Carter’s suggestion to include in SALT II some deep cuts in the level of forces. Ambitions of this sort would have to wait until the next agreement, Brezhnev explained, adding that the Soviet leadership could not help asking what was “the real purpose of putting forward such proposals, which may be superficially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact is directed at gaining unilateral advantages.” He called upon the American side to demonstrate a more “constructive and realistic approach” when Secretary of State Cyrus Vance came to Moscow at the end of March.²⁹

Since Carter decided to ignore these warnings, the Vance mission was doomed to fail. What motivated Carter to put forward the famous “deep cuts” proposal of March 1977 has been subject to much scrutiny. Apparently, the

26 Interview with Senator H. Jackson, December 1974, “Foreign Policy – Soviet–US Relations,” University of Washington Libraries, H. M. Jackson papers, Box 309, Folder 25.

27 *The Presidential Campaign*, 246, 116, 547.

28 Memo, A. R. Seith to W. A. Harriman, “Soviet Message to President-Elect Carter,” December 3, 1976, US Library of Congress, W. A. Harriman Papers, Box 597.

29 L. Brezhnev to J. Carter, February 25, 1977, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 181–87.

decision reflected a mix of moral obligation, military logic, and political tactics. Carter saw nuclear weapons as the number one threat to world peace, and had promised to move quickly toward “the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from this earth.”³⁰ This may have inspired him to put aside the cautious formula inherited from Vladivostok in favor of a bold step that, if successful, would have gone down in history as the first example of genuine nuclear disarmament. According to the deep-cuts proposal, both sides would reduce their aggregate force levels by some 20–25 percent. However, the Soviets were supposed to scrap more than half of their heavy missiles, thereby considerably reducing the potential first-strike capability of their strategic forces. No wonder the proposal received full backing from both Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and the Pentagon.³¹

For the same reason, deep cuts were very much to the liking of Senator Jackson. In 1976, Jackson and his assistant, Richard Perle, had joined forces with the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a very conservative interest group, to warn the American public that Soviet heavy missiles posed an unprecedented threat to US security.³² Carter may have feared that, if he failed to address the so-called window-of-vulnerability problem right away, Jackson would fight whatever SALT II Treaty he came up with.³³

Carter’s blunt criticism of human rights in the Soviet Union reflected a similar mix of motives. With his strong religious beliefs, Carter felt morally obliged to put human rights at the top of his foreign-policy agenda.³⁴ In addition, his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had convinced him that human rights represented an important asset that could be used to put Moscow ideologically on the defensive and encourage political opposition within Soviet society itself.³⁵

Carter no doubt understood that by openly supporting prominent dissidents, such as Andrei Sakharov and Vladimir Bukovskii, he would infuriate the Soviet leadership. Such interference in Soviet internal affairs, Brezhnev

30 *The Presidential Campaign*, 249; *Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, 1977*, book 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), (here after PPP: Carter) 2–4.

31 Harold Brown, “Position Paper on SALT,” May 16, 1976, National Security Archive; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983) 160–62.

32 Henry M. Jackson, “Memorandum for the President on SALT,” February 15, 1977, UWL, Jackson papers, Box 315, Folder 37.

33 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 160–62; Olav Njølstad, “Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Détente,” in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 35–40.

34 *The Presidential Campaign*, 547, 711–12, 742, 874, 1021, 1043.

35 PD-18, “US National Strategy,” August 24, 1977, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA, Presidential Directives Collection.

had warned him, would never be tolerated, “whatever pseudo-humanitarian pretence is used for the purpose.”³⁶ Three days later, on March 1, 1977, Carter welcomed Bukovskii into the White House.

Incredible as it may seem, Carter believed that he could condemn the lack of personal freedom in the USSR without at the same time hurting US–Soviet relations. The reasoning behind this rather naïve expectation was that, as long as his administration denied that there was any linkage between Soviet human rights abuses and other policy matters, no damage would occur. Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin’s memoirs reveal the extent of Carter’s misjudgment. As he reports, Soviet leaders regarded the human rights campaign “as a direct challenge to their internal political authority and even as an attempt to change their regime.”³⁷

In the weeks prior to Carter’s inauguration, there had been much speculation in the Western media about whether Moscow would put the new US president to some kind of “test.” What happened in the winter and spring of 1977, however, was quite the opposite: Carter tested the willingness of Brezhnev to go along with his call for a new and genuine détente. When it became evident that Moscow would hold on to its old positions, Carter reluctantly switched to a policy that at first glance appeared to have much in common with that of his Republican predecessors.

Carter’s well-intended but poorly executed effort to inject new life and meaning into détente had at least one indisputable consequence: it made it harder for anyone to believe that genuine progress could be made in US–Soviet relations, at least within the foreseeable future. On the American side, supporters of détente could only regret that valuable time had been lost and mutual distrust had been allowed to deepen, whereas critics felt they had been proved right in their suspicion that détente was a one-way street that would only deliver results suiting Moscow. On the Soviet side, something quite similar did happen: Carter’s bold initiatives made it more difficult for Brezhnev to convince skeptics within the party apparatus and the military establishment that détente was not some kind of trap that the US government would use to undermine the military power and international standing of the Soviet Union. Since Brezhnev and his colleagues felt personally insulted by Carter, their reflex was to cling even harder to their already inflexible positions.

³⁶ L. Brezhnev to J. Carter, February 25, 1977, in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 181–87.

³⁷ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 395.

Détente as the least common denominator

In the next two-and-a-half years, détente was in flux, oscillating between cooperation and competition. Both governments increasingly demonstrated a willingness to take advantage of strategic opportunities that they believed would help improve their own competitiveness or weaken that of their opponent. Intentionally or not, these actions raised the level of bilateral tension.

In June 1977, at the time that Carter relinquished his quest for a new détente, he declared that he wanted the United States “to aggressively challenge, in a peaceful way, of course, the Soviet Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are crucial to us now or potentially crucial 15 or 20 years from now.”³⁸ Gradually, Brzezinski was able to convince him that the sandy soil of the Ogaden desert in the Horn of Africa might in fact be such an area. The story of how the two superpowers, after switching clients, got involved on opposite sides in the Ethiopian–Somali struggle over the Ogaden is told elsewhere in this volume.³⁹ Here, suffice it to say that the initiative mostly stayed with the local actors, and that, initially, the United States had strong reservations about becoming associated with the expansionist schemes of its new client, Somalia’s ruthless dictator Siad Barre.⁴⁰

Gradually, however, Brzezinski was able to convince Carter that the struggle in the Horn should be seen as an integral part of the US–Soviet global competition. Likewise, the leaders of Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia warned Carter about Soviet expansionist schemes in the Red Sea–Persian Gulf region. In the winter and spring of 1978, Brzezinski, too, began to argue that it would be irresponsible to dismiss the possibility of a Soviet grand design. With Soviet and Cuban influence growing in Ethiopia and South Yemen, US access to the Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil fields might one day become endangered. The United States could not ignore the looming threat.⁴¹

By then, US intelligence had detected that a Soviet general was operating in Ethiopia. Armed with this critical piece of information, Carter met Gromyko in the White House on May 27, 1978, for a broad discussion of US–Soviet affairs. When the US president said that he believed there were high-ranking Soviet

38 Carter interview, June 10, 1977, PPP: Carter, 1088, 1091.

39 See Nancy Mitchell’s and Vladislav M. Zubok’s chapters in this volume.

40 Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 70–73; NSC-21, “The Horn of Africa,” March 17, 1977, National Security Archive, Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton, Record no. 1557.

41 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 180–81; Olav Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” *Cold War History*, 4 (2004), 23.

military personnel, including a Red Army general, on duty in Ethiopia, Gromyko rejected the allegations, stating that there was “no Soviet Napoleon in Africa.”⁴²

For Carter and his senior advisers, this was a crucial moment. The president was shocked to see how easily Gromyko was lying to him, “because the truth to him was what the Kremlin decided.”⁴³ In fact, Gromyko was probably not fully aware of the situation in Ethiopia – he had ordered his staff not to bother him with African affairs. Moreover, the leadership in Moscow had lulled itself into believing that the independence struggle in Africa was driven by “objective” historical forces that had very little to do with the day-to-day relations between the United States and the USSR.⁴⁴

Mainly because of Moscow’s insensitivity to US complaints about the increasing Soviet–Cuban involvement in the Horn, the Carter administration modified its initial rejection of linkage as a policy instrument. In March 1978, both Carter and Brzezinski issued statements to the effect that there existed at least an indirect linkage between Soviet–Cuban adventurism in Africa and the prospect for progress on other issues.⁴⁵ In the next months, Carter repeatedly warned that Soviet military operations abroad could harm the future of US–Soviet relations. In June 1978, he publicly challenged Moscow to choose “either confrontation or cooperation.”⁴⁶

The deteriorating relationship with Moscow prompted Carter to embrace China. Initially, Carter and Vance had agreed to treat the question of normalizing relations with China separately from their conduct of US–Soviet affairs. They wanted to be evenhanded. When it turned out that Beijing rejected normalization on such terms, Brzezinski tried to convince Carter to meet Chinese demands. Brzezinski’s aim was to set up “a tacit security relationship” with Beijing, thereby enlisting Chinese support in the United States’ global competition with Moscow. He noted in his diary, “Perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more about our policy toward China, we will have less cause to worry about our relations with the Soviets.”⁴⁷

42 Memorandum of conversation, Carter and Gromyko talk, May 27, 1978, in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 203–05.

43 Carter interviewed by the author, October 20, 1993, Atlanta, GA.

44 Dobrynin, in *Confidence*, 413; Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance*, 204–05.

45 Brzezinski news conference, March 1, 1978, cited in Roger P. Labrie (ed.), *SALT Hand Book: Key Documents and Issues, 1972–1979* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 543–48; Carter news conference, March 2, 1978, *PPP: Carter*, 442; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 185–86.

46 Carter’s Annapolis speech, June 7, 1978, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977–1980* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1983), 565–68.

47 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 200. For a similar motive behind Nixon and Kissinger’s China diplomacy, see Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in vol. II.

After the Islamic revolution broke out in Iran in the fall of 1978, the temptation to play the China card became even harder to resist. Should Iran disintegrate and fall into Soviet hands, it would represent a tremendous setback to US strategic, economic, and military intelligence interests. As Brzezinski warned Carter at the beginning of December, there was an “arc of crisis” in the making that, if unchecked, could lead to the establishment of a vast Soviet sphere of influence, running from Aden to Islamabad and Chittagong.⁴⁸

The announcement two weeks later, on December 15, 1978, that the United States and China had established diplomatic relations, infuriated the men in the Kremlin. After Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent state visit to Washington, Soviet leaders grew more angry when it became obvious that the Chinese vice premier had informed Carter about China’s intention to invade Vietnam. In Soviet eyes, consultation implicated Carter in the illegal border-crossing.

In view of these developments, the long-awaited Carter–Brezhnev summit, which took place on neutral ground in Vienna in June 1979, did not bring about the upswing in US–Soviet relations that the two principals had hoped for. The high point was, of course, the signing of the SALT II Treaty. Completed after years of negotiations, the agreement was a major accomplishment, even though it did not move the arms-control process very much beyond the Vladivostok accords. Apart from SALT, little progress was being made.⁴⁹

As it turned out, the kisses that Carter and Brezhnev exchanged at the end of the SALT II signing ceremony had barely dried on their cheeks before a bilateral crisis broke out that promptly disclosed the limits of the summit thaw. In September 1979, a US senator revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had discovered a secret Soviet “combat brigade” in Cuba. After weeks of conflicting information it was finally confirmed by US authorities that the Soviet forces in question had in fact been acknowledged by President John F. Kennedy in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. According to Vance, the bizarre dispute was caused by a mistake by the US intelligence community.⁵⁰

In Moscow, as elsewhere, the misplaced hysteria over the combat brigade was seen as a political ploy by American “militarists” to destroy détente and sabotage the SALT II Treaty ratification process in the US Senate. Many lawmakers already doubted whether it would be in their country’s best interest to ratify the treaty. For undecided senators concerned about their 1980 reelection campaigns, it was tempting to side with the CPD, which

48 Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities,” 23. 49 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 430.

50 *Ibid.*, 434; Vance, *Hard Choices*, 362–63.

claimed that the United States would be safer with no treaty at all.⁵¹ According to Paul Nitze, a leading CPD spokesperson at the time, SALT II was a bad bargain for the United States and might even “increase the risk of war.”⁵² The propaganda worked. Public support for the treaty dropped dramatically.⁵³

From a Soviet perspective, waning congressional support for SALT II was only the flip side of an even more worrisome development: the rapidly growing dissatisfaction in American society with the very idea of strategic parity and political reconciliation with the USSR. In 1977–78, opinion polls showed that, for the first time since 1960, a clear majority of American voters believed that the US was falling behind the USSR in power and influence, and wanted the United States to get tougher with the Soviets as well as increase the level of spending for defense.⁵⁴ These sentiments were no doubt fueled in part by the alarmist warnings of the CPD that Moscow was seeking military superiority and might be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the West.⁵⁵

Already by mid-1978 Carter had become so frustrated by Moscow’s unwillingness to reduce the numbers of heavy missiles and to suspend deployment of their much-feared SS-20s in Europe that he was beginning to take steps to rectify the strategic balance. He moved ahead with new weapons programs inherited from his Republican predecessors and initiated new programs of his own, such as the Stealth bomber (B-2). He convinced his NATO allies to increase their military spending by 3 percent annually and to modernize the alliance’s theater nuclear forces by deploying 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles. Although Brezhnev warned against adopting the plan, saying it would undermine military stability in Europe, NATO felt that the Warsaw Pact already had upset the balance. On December 12, 1979, NATO made its famous “dual-track” decision: to deploy and to negotiate.⁵⁶

51 Dan Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 181–90.

52 Paul H. Nitze, “Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?,” May 16, 1979, in Tyroler (ed.), *Alerting America*, 159–65.

53 Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control*, 82–88.

54 Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” and William Schneider, “Public Opinion,” in Nye (ed.), *The Making of America’s Soviet Policy*, 265–89, 11–35.

55 Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” *Commentary* (August 1977); Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Policies of Containment* (Boston: South End Press, 1983); Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 132–43.

56 Olav Njølstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War,” in Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 198–99; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 310.

Afghanistan and a return to the Cold War

The fourth stage in the collapse of détente was set off by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, and by the overthrow and killing of Hafizullah Amin in Kabul.⁵⁷ The decision to invade was made by a small group within the Politburo, including Foreign Minister Gromyko, Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov, and Iurii Andropov, director of the state security and intelligence agency, the KGB. They feared that Amin was collaborating with the United States and might betray the Kremlin, as had Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat. They also felt an ideological obligation to sustain the Marxist-Leninist regime in Kabul. They dreaded the prospect of Afghanistan falling into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. That would endanger the security of the Soviet Union's southern border, and make it difficult to curb the upsurge of religious sentiments among the rapidly growing Muslim population within the Soviet Union itself.⁵⁸

No evidence suggests that they were driven by expansionist impulses. Rather, they were acting defensively to a local crisis across the Soviet border, and self-confidently believed that they could accomplish their goal of restoring order and bolstering their new minion, Babrak Karmal, within three or four weeks.

Soviet leaders also grossly miscalculated the reaction to their invasion in the West, particularly in the United States.⁵⁹ The invasion catalyzed a major revision of US policy towards the Soviet Union. Describing it as the most serious threat to world peace since World War II, Carter abandoned détente. His harsh words were backed by action. He aimed to isolate the Soviet Union, inflict harm on its economy, and deter it from undertaking any additional expansionist adventures.

Carter was shocked by the magnitude of the Soviet operation and deeply concerned about its strategic and political implications. The invasion complicated his task of rescuing the Americans held hostage in Iran and intensified his worries about US strategic and economic interests in the Persian Gulf. He feared that the Kremlin might be tempted to challenge US influence in the region, a concern that went back to the early days of the administration.⁶⁰ In August 1977, in fact, Carter had recommended the establishment of a Rapid

57 For more on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Amin Saikal's and Vladislav M. Zubok's chapters in this volume.

58 Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy in Afghanistan 1978–1979," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 132–36; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 446–47.

59 Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 444. 60 Njølstad, "Shifting Priorities", 26, 51 n. 19.

Deployment Force (RDF) to deal with military contingencies outside Europe, primarily in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. Nothing much was done until the Islamic revolution in Iran made it clear that the RDF needed to be transformed into a viable military force. Even then, things went slowly, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the building of military airfields and storage sites, the negotiation of transit and overflight routes, and the construction of better training facilities throughout the region.⁶¹

Thus, when Carter declared in January 1980 that it would be the policy of the United States to regard any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region as an assault on its vital interests,⁶² he was articulating a shift in strategic priorities that was already underway. However, other US countermeasures had *not* been contemplated before the invasion. These included the grain embargo, the boycott of the upcoming Summer Olympics in Moscow, the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the United Nations, and, more importantly, Carter's decision to ask the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty as long as Soviet military forces remained in Afghanistan. Although Senate ratification was already in doubt, Carter had remained optimistic until the first Soviet troops crossed the Afghan border. By then, it was obvious that the treaty would be defeated on the Senate floor. That humiliation Carter could not afford if he wished to prevail in the upcoming 1980 presidential election – especially as more than fifty US diplomats were still held hostage by Islamist students in Tehran.

For the rest of Carter's presidency, détente was put on the back burner. The ideological competition with Moscow was stepped up, with particular attention given to oppressed national and Muslim minorities within the Soviet Union. Secret assistance was channeled to Solidarity in Poland and the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Western and regional allies were encouraged to supply Somalia with weapons.⁶³ In the strategic field, Carter set out to bolster the US nuclear deterrent not only by continuing the buildup of US forces, but also by signing a presidential directive, PD-59, that seemed to indicate that he wanted the United States to acquire the capabilities to prevail in a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

As far as superpower détente was concerned, Reagan's landslide victory in the 1980 presidential election did not make much of a difference. For all practical purposes, the process had been dead for more than ten months already. It received the fatal blow with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. By then,

61 *Ibid.*, 21–55. For more on Carter, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

62 Carter, State of the Union address, January 23, 1980, *American Foreign Policy*, 55.

63 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy." 64 Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 789–90.

however, both parties had already moved so far away from its original concept – in action, spirit, and planning – that it is highly questionable whether it would have survived for long even without the invasion, or a similar crisis, taking place.

The collapse of détente

What caused the collapse of superpower détente can be analyzed from several different angles and time perspectives. If we focus strictly on the development of US–Soviet relations in the 1970s, the collapse of détente is to a large extent explainable in terms of flaws in design; political backlash from inflated popular expectations; and unforeseen action–reaction processes triggered by opposition groups at home or uncontrollable allies abroad. Both governments were also careless about violating the rules of détente and were insufficiently sensitive to how the other would regard its actions. In each of the first three stages outlined above, there were numerous chances to avoid undermining détente, at least temporarily. Nixon and Kissinger could have refrained from overselling the new “structure of peace” in the first place. Moscow could have acted more pragmatically on the question of Jewish emigration. Carter could have delayed his quest for deep cuts until a Vladivostok-type SALT II agreement was in place. The Soviets could have kept their military advisers out of the Horn, and so forth. But the fact that détente could have been executed more smoothly and consistently does not explain *why* it collapsed.

To answer that question, détente has to be placed in a wider context, as an evolutionary stage in the protracted Cold War conflict. Seen in this perspective, the fall of superpower détente calls for an explanation that relates it to the geopolitically embedded, ideologically driven, and technologically sustained zero-sum game that characterized that conflict almost from beginning to end.

More specifically, détente collapsed because of at least five fundamental factors. First, détente suffered from lack of mutual trust. Between the world’s leading capitalist and Communist powers, cooperation and stability were impossible unless their elites trusted each other. After the resignation of Nixon, however, it became clear that at the highest level of government, statesmen were suspicious about each others’ motives and intentions. No summit pledges could help Soviet and US leaders escape the distrust which, for multiple historical reasons, was so deeply embedded in their Cold War mindsets.⁶⁵

65 Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: US–Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 21–30, 184–89, 237–39; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 242–72, 334–37.

Second, détente crumbled from within because of the absence of common values and visions. The mutual interest in stability and arms control could not conceal the fact that the two superpowers possessed different political ideals and nurtured different hopes for the future direction of world affairs. The Cold War was more than anything else a clash of social systems and ideologies.⁶⁶ These aspects of the relationship were intentionally minimized by the US architects of détente, but fueled the dissatisfaction of influential conservative interest groups in Washington and, eventually, American voters as well. In Moscow, the guardians of Communist orthodoxy also saw to it that Brezhnev did not make any ideological or political concessions toward the West that would encourage more opposition at home. However, with Carter's entry into the White House, questions of human rights, democracy, and justice were once again put on top of the US–Soviet agenda. Officials in Moscow protested, but actually had little reason for complaint, as their idea of “peaceful coexistence” had always implied that the ideological competition between the two opposing systems would continue as before. It did indeed. By 1980, when workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, Poland, began to challenge the power monopoly of the Polish Communist Party, Soviet leaders may have realized that Carter's claim that US support of human rights made it “part of an international tide, growing in force,” was more than an empty slogan.⁶⁷

Third, détente failed because there was no real economic interdependence between the Soviet Union and the West, a factor that made the cooperative dimension of détente unrealistic from the outset. The increasingly sluggish Soviet command economy had very little to offer Western capitalism. The United States did not need to trade with the Soviet Union, a fact that made it both easy and tempting for American policymakers to use their economic and technological assets as sticks rather than carrots. There were few business groups with a vested interest in détente; moreover, the Carter administration's links to the farm bloc – which did have such an interest – were not close.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, there were many well-organized groups with a residual hostility against helping the Soviet economy unless Moscow came up with some substantial political concessions in return: Jews, Lithuanians, Poles, the neoconservatives, and the Christian right, to mention only a few.

66 See Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 396–407.

67 Carter's Annapolis speech, June 7, 1978, *American Foreign Policy*, 565–68.

68 Huntington, “Renewed Hostility,” 281.

Fourth, the unraveling of détente was caused by a mutual lack of restraint that stemmed from the zero-sum logic of Cold War geopolitics. Both super-powers were guilty of seeking unilateral geopolitical advantage at the other's expense, especially in the Middle East, Angola, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf region. The United States also tried to improve its strategic position by playing the China card; by supporting opposition groups and governments in Eastern Europe seeking independence from Moscow; and, after the invasion of Afghanistan, by trying to turn Moscow's involvement there into a "Soviet Vietnam."⁶⁹

Finally, détente fell victim to the dynamics of the arms race – or, rather, to the intellectual, institutional, and economic pressures stemming from groups, companies, and bureaucracies with a vested interest in the arms race. Without embracing technological determinism, there is little doubt that developments in military technology and hardware in the 1970s both deepened the security dilemma and weakened the case for quantitative arms control. Prospects for possible technological breakthroughs engendered fears as well as temptations on both sides, making it difficult for leaders to resist requests from the military-industrial complexes for more resources for military research and development programs.⁷⁰

Moreover, by the mid-1970s, the military balance had become so complex that it became almost impossible to assess objectively.⁷¹ Nothing illustrates this better than when the director of the CIA tasked two different groups of experts, Team A and Team B, to analyze the same set of intelligence data, and they came up with markedly different conclusions with respect to Soviet strategic intentions and military capabilities. Competing threat assessments prompted rival strategies for how to deal with the perceived Soviet menace. Instead of a modest buildup of US forces combined with quantitative strategic arms control, as preferred by Nixon, Ford, and Carter (that is, after Moscow rejected deep cuts), the neoconservatives called for a radical strengthening of American military might in order to deter Soviet aggression and, eventually, resume "serious" disarmament negotiations from a position of strength. By the time of the 1980 presidential election, not only Reagan but even key members of

69 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy," 203–12.

70 Alex Roland, "The Military-Industrial Complex," in Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), *The Long War: A New History of US National Security Policy since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 359; Irina Bystrova, *Soviet Military Industrial Complex: Problems of Creation and Development, 1930s–1980s* (Moscow: Institute of Russian History, 2006).

71 For the arms race, see William Burn and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

Carter's national security apparatus supported this line of reasoning.⁷² On the Soviet side, economic constraints now started to squeeze the military sector. As spending for strategic weapons systems leveled out, leaders in Moscow were even less inclined to consider new ideas and proposals, such as "deep cuts" and "the zero option," placing their bets instead on a fixed nuclear stalemate.⁷³

What happened in the years 1975–80, therefore, was that the structure of peace and cooperation which détente was meant to bring about proved elusive. For a short while, détente helped change the climate of US–Soviet relations, but not much else.⁷⁴ Fundamentally, the root causes and basic dynamics of the Cold War remained the same.⁷⁵ Superpower détente was a well-intended political ambition that failed to materialize; moreover, it became increasingly irrelevant to what was happening in the rapidly changing world of the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁷⁶

72 Njølstad, "The Carter Legacy," 202.

73 Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 165, 172–73.

74 This is in line with Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 486–91.

75 Jervis, "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?," 60; Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 452.

76 As John W. Young points out in his chapter in this volume, détente continued as a European project even in the 1980s.

Japan and the Cold War, 1960–1991

MICHAEL SCHALLER

Japan, along with Germany, played a central role in the Cold War. Both countries fought against the United States and its allies during World War II, and both emerged as key objectives and participants in the contest between the Soviet- and American-led blocs. As early as 1947, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that Western security required the restoration of these “two great workshops” of Europe and Asia.¹ Yet, in spite of Japan’s dual role as prize and player, it differed in several ways from its European counterpart. Unlike Germany’s Social Democrats, the opposition Socialist Party in Japan rejected the legitimacy of a military alliance with the United States. Also, the insulation provided by its island status made Japanese less fearful than West Germans of a direct military threat from the Soviet Union.

During the early Cold War as well as its later stages, Japan occupied a distinct role vis-à-vis its Western allies and Communist enemies. Always more of an economic than a security partner, Japan formed both a pivot of US-led containment in East Asia and an occasional rival. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served both to protect West Germany and control it, the United States’ so-called Pacific alliance with Japan similarly embodied a form of “double containment.” US forces in and around Japan shielded it from external threats while also tethering Japan, lest it slip from Washington’s orbit and gravitate toward neutralism or something worse. In February 1972, President Richard M. Nixon made this point to Chinese Communist leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Responding to longstanding Chinese criticism of the US–Japan security treaty, Nixon asserted that what had begun as an anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese alliance now served Beijing’s interests nearly as much as Washington’s. US bases in Japan not only deterred Soviet adventurism but

¹ Dean Acheson, “The Requirements of Reconstruction,” *Department of State Bulletin*, 16, 411 (May 18, 1947), 991–94.

also “kept Japan from pursuing the path of militaristic nationalism” that could threaten China and other Asian nations.²

During most of the 1950s and 1960s, American officials typically worried that Japan’s need for raw materials and markets might provide Communist powers with leverage to pull Tokyo into their orbit. American strategists considered it vital to keep Japan’s industrial base out of Soviet or Chinese hands while utilizing Japan as a staging area for air, sea, and land power in East Asia. Neither the war in Korea nor the one in Vietnam could have been fought without Japanese bases, and probably would not have been fought but for the fact American leaders considered Japan the ultimate target of aggression in both cases. To compensate – or placate – Japan, presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower through George H. W. Bush provided generous access to markets on which Japanese prosperity depended.

Throughout most of the Cold War, US policymakers criticized Japan’s reluctance to play a more active military role in Asia even as it prospered as a result of access to American consumers as well as from the security umbrella the United States provided over much of the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, Japanese of nearly every political stripe chafed at US pressure to limit Japan’s trade and other contacts with the Soviet Union and, especially, China (before 1972). They also resented constant prodding from Washington for Tokyo to boost its military posture. Japan’s pivotal postwar prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, set a pattern by opposing any rush to rearm or to become the United States’ “enforcer” in Asia. Rearmament, he insisted, would come some day “naturally if our livelihood recovers.” Until then, it was best to “let the Americans handle” Japan’s security. It was Japan’s “god-given luck,” the tart-tongued politician opined, that the American-written constitution “bans arms.” This provided Japan “adequate cover” to deflect calls for building up a large military establishment or deploying its own forces in Asia. Yoshida ridiculed as “oafs” his compatriots who wanted to amend the constitution.³

2 Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 560–67; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 1061–63. For Nixon’s and Kissinger’s talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1971–74, see William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1999); memoranda of conversations, R. Nixon, H. Kissinger, Zhou Enlai, et al., February 22, 23, 24, 1972, originals in United States National Archives, Washington, DC, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Special Files (WHSF), President’s office Files, box 87. Full transcripts are online at the web site of the National Security Archive.

3 Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4.

With few exceptions, all of Yoshida's successors through 1991 shared his outlook.⁴

As Takeshita Noboru, who served as prime minister during the last years of the Cold War, observed, the long-dominant conservative "Liberal Democrats had used the possibility of criticism by the Socialists to avoid unpleasant demands by the United States, such as taking a more active role internationally" or in regional conflicts, from the Korean War through the struggle in Vietnam. The parties of the Left and Right engaged in implicit "burden sharing," Takeshita admitted, an approach that he characterized as "cunning diplomacy."⁵

Before 1969, the hard edges of the Cold War in Asia, and Japan's perceived economic weakness, led the United States to tolerate its ally's reluctance to confront its Communist neighbors more forcefully. After 1969, Japan's growing economic strength and Washington's softer approach to the Soviet Union and China cast Tokyo's recalcitrant behavior in a harsher light.

As a member of the Nixon Cabinet in 1971 complained, "the Japanese are still fighting the [Second World] war," with the "immediate intention . . . to try to dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world."⁶ That year's "opening" to the People's Republic of China (PRC) by President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger not only signified their intention to enlist the PRC as an anti-Soviet barrier in Asia, but also reflected their resentment over Japan's economic policies. For much of the next twenty years, especially after the 1973 American exit from Vietnam, the East Asian Cold War lost its focus and intensity. The United States remained the dominant military power in Asia, but containment of Soviet influence in the region depended increasingly on Washington's strategic cooperation with China and Japan's exercise of financial muscle. A more traditional balance-of-power diplomacy replaced ideology.

The 1960 security treaty crisis: danger and opportunity

During 1960, the Pacific alliance nearly came apart. Early that year, after prolonged negotiations, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (a prewar Cabinet member and one-time accused war criminal) reached agreement with

4 For more information on US-Japanese relations after World War II, see Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu's chapter in volume I.

5 Schaller, *Altered States*, 4. 6 *Ibid.*, 232; *Time*, May 10, 1971.

American diplomats to revise the unpopular, one-sided security treaty imposed on Japan as the price of ending the postwar occupation in 1952. The new defense pact recognized Japan's equality as an American partner.

Kishi's rise to power coincided with the arrival in Tokyo of US ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, the general's nephew and a career diplomat close to Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. MacArthur agreed with a National Security Council (NSC) assessment that unless Washington revised the unpopular security treaty in the direction of "greater equality," Japan would "drift away" toward neutrality or might even collaborate with the Sino-Soviet bloc. As Kishi put it, the United States had reached a "turning point" with Japan and, unless it accommodated demands for change, the alliance would erode "in an atmosphere of acrimony and mounting hostility." In five years or less, MacArthur warned Eisenhower, Japan might become neutral in the Cold War or "even turn to work with the Communists."⁷

MacArthur persuaded Eisenhower and Dulles to renegotiate the unpopular security pact. In January 1960, the new treaty, which eliminated grating clauses that gave US forces nearly unlimited rights in Japan, was ready for ratification. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro described the achievement as marking the "end of the postwar period as far as Japan's diplomacy was concerned."⁸ Kishi flew to Washington where he and Eisenhower celebrated the document as the symbol of a new partnership as well as a spur to increased trade.

In spite of these bright prospects, Kishi's effort to ram the treaty through the Diet provoked a bitter response in that chamber and on the streets of Tokyo. Many Japanese believed that *any* military pact violated the no-war constitution. Others charged that the presence of US troops and bases made Japan a likely target in case of war with the Soviet Union and increased Japan's chances of being pulled into Asian conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, or Taiwan. Along these lines, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko warned Japan that "in conditions of a modern rocket-nuclear war all Japan with her small and thickly

7 "Progress Report on US Policy Toward Japan" (NSC 5516/1), February 6, 1957, Operations Coordinating Board, box 15, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS; transcript of a recorded interview with Douglas MacArthur, II, December 16, 1966, J. F. Dulles Oral History Project, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton University Princeton, NJ; D. MacArthur to Department of State, February 25, 26, March 14, April 17, 1957, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, XXIII (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991–93) 270–79 (hereafter FRUS with year and volume number); Schaller, *Altered States*, 130–35.

8 Fujiyama quoted in *Japan Times*, January 1, 1960.



8. The US military presence was controversial in Japan. Here, hundreds of thousands demonstrate against the alliance in Tokyo in 1969.

populated territory, dotted . . . with foreign war bases, risks sharing the tragic fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the first few minutes of hostilities.”⁹

In an attempt to foment additional opposition to the new security pact, the Soviet Union withdrew its earlier promise to return to Japan a pair of small islands (the “northern territories”) when Moscow and Tokyo signed a formal agreement ending World War II. The terms of the pact with the United States, the Soviets indicated, made a deal with them unlikely. To make a point about Japan’s military as well as political vulnerability, the Soviets test-fired a missile over Japan en route to a mid-Pacific touchdown. China simultaneously denounced the deal by lambasting the “Kishi clique of war criminals” who risked involving Japan in the United States’ imperialist adventures.

A grassroots movement that included trade unionists, peace activists, intellectuals, and Marxist students coalesced under the banner of the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty or AMPO, as the treaty was termed in Japanese. Some opposed the new treaty as a threat to peace; others saw their opposition as a way to mobilize an anti-Kishi

⁹ *FRUS, 1958–1960*, XVIII, 283; Tetsuya Kataoka, *Price of a Constitution* (New York, C. Russak, 1991), 203; George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 184–86.

movement, to improve ties with China, or to oppose “US imperialism.” A small band of radical students, known as *Zengakuren*, fantasized that the antitreaty movement could spark a social revolution in Japan. A large number of those opposed to the treaty were actually more hostile to Kishi’s domestic policies and to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in general than to the actual provisions of the revised security pact with the United States.

In May 1960, when Kishi took advantage of a Socialist boycott to push the treaty through the Diet, outraged opponents launched a cycle of mass demonstrations in Tokyo. Ambassador MacArthur staked his reputation on the treaty and his friendship with Kishi. He urged Eisenhower to visit Japan despite the massive protests, even proposing to mobilize a security force composed largely of Japanese gangsters to protect the president. Abandoning Kishi and postponing the visit, MacArthur warned, would be a “mortal blow” to pro-American forces in Japan and would represent a victory for “pro-communist and anti-American forces” behind the disorder.¹⁰ In spite of these pleas, Eisenhower had the good sense to cancel his visit – which would have been the first of any sitting president.

As James Reston, veteran diplomatic reporter of the *New York Times*, commented, “at best the United States has lost face. At worst it has lost Japan.” Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson charged that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “political ju-jitsu” might force Americans to abandon Japan.¹¹ Despite loose talk about the “Kremlin triumph,” the feared debacle never happened. By the end of June, the revised treaty came into effect and Kishi resigned. Americans encouraged senior LDP faction leaders to select the moderate conservative Ikeda Hayato as his successor. Ikeda, in turn, worked with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to bring moderate Socialists back into the Diet in part by assuring them of secret US financial support. The CIA also expanded its subsidies of the Japanese press, buying, in effect, more favorable coverage.¹²

Ikeda shifted attention away from contentious foreign-policy issues and concentrated instead on bread-and-butter economic concerns. This helped restore political and social calm. Ikeda also pledged to “promote parliamentary government through mutual cooperation with the opposition.” When asked by an aide how he would restore public trust, Ikeda answered, “[I]sn’t it

10 See MacArthur’s messages for the secretary of state and President, D. MacArthur to C. Herter, May 25, 26, 27, 1960, *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVIII, 303–09.

11 Public Opinion Study, June 21, 1960, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (DOS), RG 59, US National Archives (USNA), College Park, MD.

12 See *FRUS 1958–1960*, XVIII, 385–88 and 398–401; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, 308–26.

all a matter of economic policy?" On taking office, he announced the goal of "income doubling" within a decade.¹³

Since 1955, Japan's gross national product (GNP) had grown an average of 10 percent annually, much of this the result of exports to the United States. In spite of this surge, business power and labor weakness resulted in little improvement in the standard of living for the average worker. Ikeda recognized this gap as a factor that enraged workers and intellectuals and encouraged them to blame the United States for their unfulfilled expectations. To undermine his opponents, Ikeda declared that so long as GNP increased at an annual rate of 7.2% (it actually rose an average of more than 10% during the 1960s), the LDP would ensure that the real income of most workers would double by the end of the decade. This pledge swung opinion in his direction and by August 1960, 51 percent of the public voiced strong support for Ikeda's policies. With Kishi removed from power, the antitreaty coalition in Japan quickly splintered. In an election held in November 1960, the LDP managed to increase its Diet majority by thirteen members. The Socialists gained as well, taking seats from the Democratic Socialists who found little favor despite an infusion of US financial support.

Amidst the treaty crisis, the NSC drafted the Eisenhower administration's final assessment of US policy toward Japan. Policymakers continued to view Japan through a Cold War lens. Japan remained one of the world's four major industrial complexes and the only highly industrialized nation in the Asia-Africa sphere. If its inherent strength were "harnessed to Communist Bloc power," the NSC warned, "the world balance of power would be significantly altered." It went on to say that US access to logistic facilities in Japan was "indispensable to an economical and effective defense of the Far East."¹⁴

But, according to the NSC, the critical determinant of Japan's future alignment would come from US trade policy. Japan had little control over the terms of international trade and access to raw materials, the NSC noted. Japan's stability and friendship rested "upon the United States not only as its most important source of industrial raw materials and largest single market but also for leadership fostering liberal trade policies throughout the free world and particularly among the industrialized nations of Western Europe." Any deterioration in the terms of trade, the NSC cautioned, could push Japan's

13 Yutaka Kosai, *The Era of High Speed Growth: Notes on the Postwar Japanese Economy* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986), 130.

14 "United States Policy Towards Japan" (NSC 6008/1), June 11, 1960, *FRUS 1958-1960*, XVIII, 335-49; NSC meeting of July 1, 1960, Whitman File, NSC Series, box 11, Eisenhower Papers.

otherwise conservative political and business leaders to “consider a shift toward reliance on the Communist Bloc.”¹⁵

The new frontier in the Pacific

To everyone’s surprise, the three years that followed the near-meltdown in US–Japan relations in 1960 proved among the most amicable of the post-World War II period. President John F. Kennedy, like Ikeda, shifted the focus of bilateral relations away from contentious issues such as military posture and back toward trade, a subject about which the two leaders perceived common interest. Kennedy believed that economic interdependence would link Japan more firmly than a paper treaty to the Western alliance, while Ikeda recognized that only the United States could absorb the exports upon which Japanese economic growth and conservative political hegemony relied. In addition, the appointment of an exceptionally able ambassador, Harvard professor Edwin O. Reischauer, so improved the tone of bilateral relations that even serious disagreements over China policy, the occupation of Okinawa, and Japan’s export surge did not endanger the alliance.

In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* just before Kennedy’s election, Reischauer criticized the Eisenhower administration for seeing Japan as primarily a military ally and for mistaking Japanese anger at Kishi and the security treaty as a Communist plot. In fact, he asserted, most of Japan’s moderate intellectuals and students voiced frustration with, not hate for, the United States. Skillful diplomacy, Reischauer argued, could restore this “broken dialogue.”¹⁶

Despite having nearly been killed by the Japanese navy in the South Pacific, Kennedy voiced strong, public admiration for Japan’s postwar accomplishments. In an interview with Japanese journalists just after his inauguration, JFK predicted Japan was “destined to rule” the economy of Asia and spoke of the “great benefits” increased trade (currently running a \$1 billion surplus in favor of the United States) held for both nations.¹⁷ Kennedy personally intervened to kill a legislative proposal creating a federal holiday to “observe December 7 each year as the day that will live in infamy.”¹⁸ In spite of some misgivings, the new president accepted a CIA recommendation to continue the modest American subsidy to LDP candidates.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Edwin O. Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (October 1960), 13.

¹⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, 164.

¹⁸ Lawrence F. O’Brien to Rep. Leo W. O’Brien, May 4, 1961, White House Central File (WHCF), CO 141 Japan, box 62, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.

Ambassador Reischauer added to the positive trajectory of US–Japanese relations. Born in Japan of missionary parents, fluent in Japanese, and married to a prominent Japanese journalist, Reischauer was the antithesis of his imperious predecessor. In formal speeches and informal gatherings with students, intellectuals, and opposition politicians, he argued that the US military presence in, and nuclear umbrella over, Japan stabilized the region and restrained right-wing nationalists whose call for rearmament would alienate many of Japan's neighbors. Coining the phrase “equal partnership,” the mainstream Japanese press spoke admiringly of a Kennedy–Reischauer “charm” offensive. Meanwhile, an irate Communist newspaper, *Akahata*, condemned the ambassador as a threat to all revolutionaries.

During 1961–62, negotiators agreed to settle Japan's \$2 billion occupation-era debt for about \$500 million, with a portion of the funds going to Southeast Asian development and cultural exchanges. Progress on this and other issues prompted Kennedy's advisers, including Reischauer, Walt Rostow, and career diplomat Richard Sneider, to inform the president that the best way to assure amity was to “tie Japan's economy [even] more fully with that of the West.” The more trade increased, the more Japan's “sense of partnership” with the United States would grow. This would soften tensions over China policy, the occupation of Okinawa, and Japan's unease over nuclear testing. If necessary, Rostow added, Kennedy might permit Japan to have token trade with China, so long as Tokyo agreed that trade “not involve political concessions by Japan” or a willingness to see China admitted to the United Nations.¹⁹

In June 1961, when Ikeda visited Washington, Kennedy stressed his desire to “maintain a liberal trade policy” and battle protectionist demands from the US textile industry. In their meetings, Ikeda told Kennedy that expanded bilateral trade and recognition in Washington that Japan's importance to the United States was “considerably stronger than a military alliance” would reassure ordinary Japanese. It would also justify the LDP's going along with American initiatives to refuse to grant diplomatic recognition to the PRC and to “keep the Chinese Communists out of the UN.”²⁰

19 Robert H. Johnson to W. Rostow, “Prime Minister Ikeda's Visit,” June 19, 1961, President's Official File, Japan, box 120, Kennedy Library; W. Rostow to J. Kennedy, June 19, 1961, *ibid*.

20 Memorandum of conversation, June 21, 1961, *FRUS*, 1961–1963, IX, 468–69; joint communiqué issued by the president and Prime Minister Ikeda, June 22, 1961, President's Official File, box 120, Kennedy Library; R. Sneider to M. Bundy, “Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda,” June 23, 1961, WHCF, box 62, *ibid*.

Although Kennedy occasionally hinted at reassessing the nonrecognition policy toward China, he did not budge on the subject. China's development of nuclear weapons, its border war with India in 1962, and its support for Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia affirmed Kennedy's belief that the PRC threatened regional peace and American interests. An aide to Reischauer recalled that during nearly three years of service in Tokyo under Kennedy, the ambassador received only one serious rebuke: when he told a Japanese audience that decisions to open diplomatic ties with China were completely up to them, Secretary of State Rusk shot back a three-word cable, "No, they aren't."²¹

According to Asakai Koichiro, Japan's ambassador in Washington, Americans tended to like Russians but hate Chinese Communists, while "in Japan the situation is exactly reversed." Many Japanese sympathized with nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, saw India – not China – as a bully, and shared Ikeda's sentiment, expressed to Kennedy, that "Japan historically and traditionally has had special relations with the Chinese."²²

Administration officials urged Ikeda and his Cabinet to reject Chinese trade proposals. Kennedy told a Japanese Cabinet delegation in December 1962 that "the major question facing us today is how to contain Communist expansion in Asia." Was Japan prepared to help the United States "prevent Communist domination of Asia?" Yet, Foreign Minister Ohira told a flustered Dean Rusk that the United States "should leave Communist China alone." Rusk replied that the United States would "leave the Chinese Communists alone when the Chinese Communists leave others alone."²³

During 1963, when Japan approved indirect credits for the construction of a Chinese textile plant, American officials considered retaliating against Japanese textile exports to the United States. Ikeda argued that trade credits might moderate Chinese behavior and asked if there was not a "racist motive" to Washington's relative sympathy toward trading with the Soviets as compared to the Chinese. This dispute might have grown into a more significant fissure between Tokyo and Washington had China not soon entered a more radical phase and had the Vietnam War not escalated. Both developments strained Sino-Japanese relations, and Vietnam War orders provided a dynamic

²¹ Ernest Young, aide to E. Reischauer in 1963, recounted this episode to the author.

²² J. Emmerson to D. Rusk, December 5, 1962, 611.94/12–562, DOS, RG 59, USNA; meeting between D. Rusk and Ohira M., et al., December 4, 1962, 794.5/12–462, *ibid.*

²³ Meeting between D. Rusk and Ohira M. et al., December 4, 1962, 794.5/12–462, *ibid.*

boost to the Japanese economy that surpassed any short-term advantage of trade with China.

The continued occupation of Okinawa represented another contentious issue between the Pacific allies. In 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff vetoed the return of the island to Japan, although the chiefs acknowledged that Japan retained “residual sovereignty.” In 1961, Okinawa, with a million mostly poor farmers, remained an economic backwater whose disgruntled population chafed under continued American military rule. Nearly all Japanese on the home islands resented this continued loss of sovereignty over Okinawa. Although the Pentagon insisted on retaining control over the extensive military base network there, Kennedy aides such as George Ball and Reischauer thought it “preposterous” that, with Japan a major ally, “we should still be treating [Okinawa] as our colony.”²⁴ They compared the situation to the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Kennedy appointed a special task force that recommended greater home rule and development aid to Okinawa. This eased tension. Escalation of the Vietnam War, however, and Okinawa’s pivotal role in that conflict blocked movement to return the island.

Shortly before his assassination, Kennedy had decided to visit Japan as part of an Asian tour. Roger Hillsman, an East Asian adviser, had proposed the trip’s theme: promoting a new “Pacific partnership that joins the developed countries of the Pacific,” such as Japan, Australia, and the United States, with the “less developed countries in a coordinated program of nation building.” This initiative would link the “two major components” of US policy in Asia – “deterrence of Communist aggression” and “nation building, [with] the construction of a viable system of free-world societies through economic and technical assistance.” Japan, he asserted, could play a special role of “consultation and collaboration” in the “development of free Asian societies.”²⁵ Kennedy’s death, three weeks later, and the war in Vietnam dashed these hopes.

The Vietnam trauma

Between the 1950s and the early 1970s, the Vietnam War badly strained US–Japan relations. Officials such as Vice President Johnson insisted that opposing

²⁴ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), 196.

²⁵ R. Hillsman to D. Rusk, October 31, 1963, “A Presidential Trip to the Far East in Early 1964,” box 5, Presidential Far Eastern Trip Plans, Roger Hillsman Papers, Kennedy Library.

wars of “national liberation” would reassure key allies. He made this point in a May 1961 report to Kennedy after visiting Saigon. If Chinese-supported guerrillas overran Southeast Asia, Johnson wrote, the “island outposts – Philippines, Japan, Taiwan – have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.”²⁶ Yet escalation of the war after 1964 strained the very alliances it sought to bolster. Both Johnson and Nixon resented Japan’s refusal to provide direct military support to the Vietnam crusade even as Japan became that war’s main economic beneficiary.

The divergence over Vietnam became clear early in 1964 when Secretary of State Rusk visited Tokyo in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. When he heard Foreign Minister Ohira suggest that, given French recognition of the PRC and China’s development of an atomic bomb, the time had come to drop efforts to isolate Beijing, Rusk exploded. China’s “militancy, both in doctrine and action,” he asserted, made negotiations pointless. Even the Soviets, Rusk argued, feared the prospect of “800 million Chinese armed with nuclear weapons.” If Moscow was worried, Japan should be terrified.²⁷

When Ohira dismissed this warning as “rather stiff” and shopworn, Rusk responded that while the United States could “pull out of [Southeast Asia today] and . . . survive . . . Asian countries will not survive.” He urged Japan to substantially boost its purchase of American military equipment to offset Tokyo’s emerging trade surplus and to expand its own military establishment. Prime Minister Ikeda replied that any additional defense items would be purchased from domestic manufacturers and attributed Japan’s postwar success to the fact that “it no longer had a great army.” Expanding the Self-Defense Force, a constant US demand, would jeopardize Japan’s security, not enhance it. Instead, Japan would “perform a mission in the economic field” to stabilize Southeast Asia.²⁸

Over the next four years, Ikeda and his successor, Sato Eisaku, adhered to this line. When pressed by Washington, they voiced general support for US military actions in Vietnam, while also suggesting that political and economic alternatives to the war should be explored. Citing the no-war constitution and widespread domestic opposition to the fighting in Vietnam, Japan’s

26 L. Johnson to J. Kennedy, “Mission to Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan,” May 23, 1961, *The Pentagon Papers (New York Times Edition)*, (New York: New York Times Books, 1971), 127–30.

27 Memorandum of conversation, D. Rusk, Ohira M., et al., January 26, 1964, NSC File, Country File, Japan, box 250, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

28 *Ibid.*; memorandum of conversation between D. Rusk and Ohira M., January 18, 1964, *ibid.*; memorandum for the president, January 28, 1964, *ibid.*; memorandum of conversation between D. Rusk and Ohira M., January 29, 1964, *ibid.*

conservative leaders would neither field military forces nor finance the United States' battle.

In January 1965, these tensions dominated talks Johnson held with Sato in Washington. The president asked Sato to help hold the line against Chinese admission to the United Nations and to sign a long-delayed peace settlement with South Korea that included Tokyo picking up an estimated \$1 billion aid package for Seoul. When Sato expressed tepid approval for US escalation in Vietnam, LBJ asked why Japan, like the United States' other friends, was "under the bridge or hiding in caves" when he asked for help. Where were Britain, Germany, and Japan? Giving medical aid to Saigon was fine, Johnson smirked, but the time had come for Japan "to show the flag." If Japan "got in trouble," the president added, "we would send our planes and bombs to defend her." Now the United States was "in trouble in Vietnam" and the question was "[H]ow can Japan help us?" To make matters worse, Johnson noted, he had "50 senators after him" complaining about Japanese textile and electronic exports.²⁹ Shortly afterward, Japan donated 11,000 radios to South Vietnam. Johnson sneered that, while bandages and radios were fine, "what I am interested in is bodies."³⁰ Blaming Japan's lukewarm support partly on the attitude of the antiwar Reischauer, Johnson and Rusk recalled him in mid-1966 in favor of the hawkish career diplomat, U. Alexis Johnson.

Japanese of varied political outlooks saw the Vietnam War, much like the Korean conflict, as largely a proxy struggle between the United States and the PRC. Opinion surveys revealed that a broad spectrum of ordinary Japanese sympathized with Vietnamese nationalists and saw the United States, like Japanese militarists in the 1940s, as bullies in Vietnam. The American air assault in Vietnam also evoked painful memories of how Japanese civilians had suffered during the US air campaign in World War II.

Japan's sustained interest in improving trade, cultural, and diplomatic ties with China clashed with US priorities. However, after 1966, two factors moderated the strain. Japan's export surge, fueled in large part by substantial American spending in Southeast Asia and Japan, rendered potential sales to China less important. At the same time, Mao's launch of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 put China on a chaotic course that impeded the expansion of trade or diplomatic ties.

29 Memorandum of Johnson-Sato conversation, January 12, 1965, box 253, *ibid*.

30 National Security File, Meeting Notes File, box 2F: meeting with foreign policy advisers, November 4, 1967, Johnson Library.

US military escalation in Vietnam, the Japanese government's tacit approval, and concern among ordinary Japanese that these actions might provoke a war with China nurtured an antiwar movement among students and intellectuals. Beheiren (Citizens' Federation for Peace in Vietnam) opposed the war both on pacifist grounds and out of concern that Japan might be dragged into the conflict through its ties to the United States. Ideologically distinct from either the Socialist or Communist Parties, Beheiren protestors led almost daily demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Tokyo from late 1965 onward. By 1968, pollsters reported that two-thirds of Japanese favored modifying or terminating the security treaty with the United States when it came up for renewal in 1970.

Although the Johnson administration doubted that Japan would provide military assistance in Vietnam, Japan played a critical logistic role in the war. The repair, communication, ammunition, oil storage, and recreational facilities the United States had access to in Japan and Okinawa were vital to the war. Between 1965 and 1973, 1 million military transport and combat flights to Vietnam originated in Okinawa, while nearly three-fourths of the 400,000 tons of supplies required each month by the American military in Vietnam passed through the island. Small wonder that in 1965, the US Department of Defense began referring to Okinawa as the "Keystone of the Pacific," even placing the logo on license plates. Admiral US Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, stated in December 1965 that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue fighting the Vietnam War."³¹

Neither American nor Japanese policymakers anticipated that Vietnam's greatest impact on Japan would be economic. Japanese industries, especially those supplying petrochemicals, textiles, electronics, and automotive parts, expanded rapidly as the Pentagon procured supplies close to the war zone. The expenditure of billions of additional dollars throughout Southeast Asia, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, created great demand for Japanese products among previously dollar-poor nations. By 1970, about 20 percent of Japan's exports went to Asia. Products such as Japanese motorcycles became so abundant that in the late 1960s the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, routinely referred to Saigon as "Honda-ville." From the 1970s on, Japan became a major consumer of Southeast Asian raw materials and a major supplier of finished goods to the region.

³¹ Thomas Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 85–88.

Estimates of the value of Vietnam-fueled sales by Japanese industry between 1965 and 1972 run to at least \$7 billion. Japanese industry also benefited by finding export niches in the American market, as US manufacturers worked at full capacity producing military goods. Japanese exports to the United States totaled \$2.5 billion in 1965. By 1969, they doubled and, by 1972, quadrupled to over \$9 billion. In the same period, the US trade deficit with Japan grew from −\$334 million to −\$4.1 billion.

Even as the 1968 Tet offensive revealed the unwinnable nature of the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration complained that the alliance with Japan had become one-sided and unbalanced – only this time in Japan's favor. While the United States spent lives and treasure in Vietnam, Japan accumulated huge trade surpluses and demanded the return of Okinawa. Secretary of State Rusk complained of Japan's "intolerable attitude" and constant "whining about Okinawa while we are losing several hundred killed each month in behalf of our common security in the Pacific."³²

Both the Tet offensive and Johnson's decision not to seek reelection stunned Japanese officials. They wondered if Washington's call for negotiations with North Vietnam might signal interest in a deal with China, "leaving the Japanese government out on a limb." Ambassador Johnson assured Prime Minister Sato that no one in Washington "favored détente with Peking," nor would a future president "take such a radical step without including our most important Asian ally."³³

By June 1968, after the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy as well as major urban riots, Rusk felt compelled to tell Japanese Ambassador Ushiba Nobuhiko that the United States "was not a sick society." Rather, it had been compelled to carry "more of the psychological and political burden than we should." Americans could no longer "accept the role of unilateral policeman" in Asia. The question remained, "[W]ho else would share these responsibilities?"³⁴

In spite of Japan's growing wealth and economic influence, neither the LDP nor their left-wing opponents had any inclination to salvage the failing US military adventure in Vietnam or ratchet up efforts to contain China. In a

32 D. Rusk to L. Johnson, quoted in Mark Gallicchio, "Occupation, Domination, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy," in Akira Iriye and Robert Wompler (eds.), *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951–2001* (New York: Kodansha International, 2001), 130.

33 U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 499–501.

34 Memorandum of conversation, D. Rusk and Ushiba N., June 6, 1968, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 251, Johnson Library.

plaintive message to Prime Minister Sato, Lyndon Johnson could do little but complain that the United States had paid a heavy price in Vietnam. It had kept “an arm around the Japanese and held an umbrella over them for a long time.” Did the Japanese government realize that their time was long overdue to “contribute to Asian security?”³⁵ Tokyo made no real reply.

The Nixon shocks

Asakai Koichiro, Tokyo’s ambassador in Washington in the late 1950s and early 1960s, spoke of a recurring dream in which he awoke to discover that the United States had recognized China without informing Japan. This scenario, dismissed as paranoia by US officials, became known in diplomatic circles as “Asakai’s nightmare.”³⁶

The so-called Nixon Shocks, or *shokku*, as the Japanese termed the president’s decisions during the summer of 1971 to reach out to China, sever the dollar’s link to gold, and impose stiff import tariffs, revealed a dramatic change in Washington’s view of Japan and China. The stalemate in Vietnam, growing Soviet strategic strength, the weakening dollar and loss of gold reserves, the outbreak of major Sino-Soviet border fighting in 1969, and American frustration with Japan’s ballooning trade imbalance caused a major revision of US policies in East Asia. The Nixon administration moved closer to China and away from its alliance with Japan. The fact that US security and economic ties with Japan weathered this period and lasted until the Cold War ended was testament to how intertwined the Pacific allies had become.

Since Japan added little military power to the Pacific Alliance, Nixon and Kissinger disparaged its importance in global affairs. Kissinger complained that Japanese strategists were “not conceptual” and mocked them as “little Sony salesmen.”³⁷ Nixon, too, criticized Tokyo’s focus on trade even while he complained about Japan’s growing influence throughout Asia. The Japanese, he told British prime minister Edward Heath, were “all over Asia, like a bunch of lice.”³⁸

Complaints by US manufacturers and their political allies forced Nixon to confront trade issues. In part to win economic concessions from Japan, Nixon

35 W. Rostow memorandum for the president, June 12, 1968, box 252, *ibid.*; memorandum for W. Rostow, “Amb. Johnson’s Call on the President,” June 14, 1968, *ibid.*

36 Schaller, *Altered States*, 225, 228. 37 *Ibid.*, 212.

38 Memorandum by H. Kissinger for R. Nixon, “The President’s Private Meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath,” December 20, 1971, Nixon papers, Freedom of Information Act request.

agreed in 1969 to return Okinawa, effective in 1972 by which time, he presumed, the Vietnam War would have ended. At the same 1969 meeting with Prime Minister Sato, Nixon thought he had secured a promise that Japan would reduce textile sales to the United States, an issue of special concern to Republicans seeking to expand their political base in the American South.

Sato's repeated failure to deliver a textile deal as well as Tokyo's refusal to increase the value of the yen in relation to the dollar embittered Nixon and Kissinger. This resentment influenced their decisions in 1971 not to inform Japan about the new China policy nor of subsequent actions to impose tariffs and to sever the dollar's link to gold. As Nixon reportedly said, the "shocks" were calculated to "stick it to Japan."³⁹

Although utilizing China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in Asia was the main goal of Nixon's approach to the PRC, hostility toward Japan was an additional factor. Gyohten Toyoo, a Finance Ministry official in the early 1970s, reported that he and his colleagues believed that the "Nixon administration was thinking about the possibility of using Communist China as a counterweight to Japan in post-Vietnam Asia." The approach to China, along with Nixon's so-called New Economic Policy (the decisions in the fall of 1971 ending dollar-gold convertibility and imposing a tariff that fell especially hard on Japanese imports), he asserted, seemed to be "playing a kind of China card to Japan."⁴⁰ In fact, Nixon and Kissinger frequently bracketed their discussion of "triangular" diplomacy among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States with hostile references to Japan.⁴¹

In July 1971, shortly before informing the American people and the Japanese government that Kissinger had traveled to Beijing and had arranged for a presidential visit, Nixon confided his thoughts to his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman. In politics, Nixon explained, "everything turns around." The Chinese were eager to "deal with us" due to their "concern regarding the Soviets," their former ally. He (Nixon) had "fought the battle for Chiang" on Taiwan since the 1950s and had always "taken the line that we stand by the South Koreans, the South Vietnamese, etc." How "ironic" that a conservative like himself was the "one to move in the other direction."⁴²

39 Nixon cited in Joan Hoff Wilson, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 140.

40 Paul A. Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, *Changing Fortunes* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 96.

41 On détente, see Robert D. Schulzinger's and Marc Trachtenberg's chapters in volume II.

42 H. R. Haldeman notes of July 13, 14, 15, 19, 1971, WHSF, box 44, Nixon project, now Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.

Cooperation between the United States and the PRC, Nixon predicted, would “shatter old alignments.” The “pressure on Japan” might even “push it into an alliance with the Soviets.” Moscow would likely try to redress the balance of power in Asia by “moving to Japan and India.” To forestall this, Nixon would “reassure” the Pacific allies that he was not selling out friends “behind their backs.” But, he added, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States’ Cold War allies must understand that, while for twenty years there had been “validity in playing the free nations of Asia against China,” the United States could now “play a more effective role with China than without.” In response to these changes, Nixon surmised, Japan might “either go with the Soviets or re-arm,” two bad alternatives from China’s perspective. With a little hand-holding, Nixon predicted, he could get the Chinese leadership to agree that a continued US military role in Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia was “China’s [best] hope for Jap restraint.”⁴³

Nixon refused to give Japan advance notice of his July 15 announcement about the China initiative. Sato received word of the breakthrough three minutes before Nixon spoke on television, leading Japan’s ambassador in Washington to exclaim, “[T]he Asakai nightmare has happened!” Although most Japanese agreed with the goal of an opening to China, all recognized the explicit insult in how the policy change was communicated. As a tearful Sato put it to a visitor, “I have done everything” the Americans have asked, but they had “let him down.”⁴⁴

In the months preceding Nixon’s February 1972 visit to the PRC, Chinese officials played up the theme that, aside from the Soviet threat, nothing was more worrisome than “Japanese expansionism.” Beijing accused Tokyo of planning to take advantage of the American retreat from Vietnam by asserting economic hegemony over Southeast Asia. At the same time, in what may have been an effort to keep the Chinese on edge, Nixon pressed Sato to expand Japanese military forces and even to “reconsider” Japan’s refusal to develop nuclear weapons.⁴⁵

During Nixon’s February 1972 visit to China, he discussed Japan in depth with Mao and Zhou. When the Chinese protested the US military presence in Japan, Nixon and Kissinger asked Zhou and Mao to ponder the alternative of a Japan uncoupled from the United States. Should the United States, they asked, tell the “second most prosperous nation to go it alone, or do we provide a shield?” Was not a “US–Japan policy with a US veto” less dangerous than a

43 *Ibid.*; see also Haldeman diary CD ROM version, entries of July 13–19, 1971.

44 Schaller, *Altered States*, 228–29. 45 *Ibid.*, 229–32.

"Japan-only policy?" When Zhou asked if the Americans could restrain the "wild horse of Japan," Nixon answered that without the security treaty and US bases the "wild horse of Japan could not be controlled." Kissinger added that the security pact restrained the Japanese from developing their own nuclear weapons (despite Nixon's recent suggestion that Japan "go nuclear") or from "reaching out into Korea or Taiwan or China." The US alliance provided "leverage over Japan" without which, Nixon said, our "remonstrations would be like an empty cannon" and the "wild horse would not be tamed."⁴⁶

Rhetorically, Nixon had reversed the rationale for the US–Japan alliance that had prevailed since the Korean War. Instead of American bases in and around Japan deterring China, they were now justified as blocking "Japan from pursuing the path of militaristic nationalism." Maintaining US forces in the Asia-Pacific region, Nixon and Kissinger stressed to Zhou, was "in your interest, not against it."⁴⁷

Early in 1973, following Nixon's reelection and the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, Kissinger returned to Beijing. In talks focused on countering Soviet pressure in Asia, Kissinger was struck by the "major turnabout" in his hosts' attitude toward Japan and the United States since 1971. Now that Japan, under Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, had established diplomatic and trade ties with the PRC, complaints about Japanese militarism vanished. Zhou now spoke of Japan helping to contain the Soviet Union and its ally, India. Chinese leaders even expressed concern over US–Japan trade tensions. Zhou cautioned Kissinger against pushing Japan into a "situation where the Soviet Union became its ally instead of the United States." Mao urged Kissinger to spend more time soothing the Japanese and to "make sure that trade and other frictions with Tokyo . . . would not mar our fundamental cooperation." Sounding much like former secretary of state Dulles, Mao urged that Japan help anchor an anti-Soviet barrier stretching from Western Europe to Northeast Asia. Like Dulles, Mao complained that Tokyo's conservative leaders were dragging their feet in joining a crusade against Moscow.

Startled by their tone, Kissinger felt a need to caution Zhou and Mao against entering a bidding war with Washington "to compete for Tokyo's allegiance." This, he warned, might encourage "resurgent" and possibly anti-American "Japanese nationalism." As he departed Beijing, Kissinger confided in a

46 See memoranda of conversations, Nixon, Kissinger, Zhou, et al., February 22, 23, 24, 1972, WHSF, box 87, President's Office Files, Nixon Presidential Materials project.

47 The most accessible set of transcripts of Kissinger's meetings with Chinese leaders can be found in Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts*. See also the online collection of the National Security Archive web site, which adds additional material as it becomes available.

message to Nixon that the United States was now in the “extraordinary position” that among all nations, with the possible exception of Britain, “the PRC might well be the closest to us in its global perceptions.” In “plain words,” the United States and China had become “tacit allies.”⁴⁸

These political developments stunned both the LDP and the Socialists. Having played on the “China threat” and the importance of close ties to the United States to assure both security and prosperity, the LDP felt whipsawed and betrayed by Nixon. The Socialists were also in an awkward position. As Washington adopted many of the policies long advocated by the Left, they no longer had an LDP–Washington axis to denounce. While reaching out to China economically, Japan remained largely a bit player in the long twilight of the Cold War in Asia.

Japan, the United States and the “long end” of the Cold War

Nixon’s opening to China and the departure of American troops from Vietnam effectively ended the “classic” Cold War in Asia. For the next decade, both China and the United States worried about Vietnam’s meddling in Cambodia, the outpouring of Southeast Asian refugees, and Soviet designs in the region. But aside from China’s brief border war with Vietnam in 1979, intended to punish the pro-Soviet leadership in Hanoi for deposing the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, the major powers avoided direct confrontations in East and Southeast Asia. The “special relationship” between the United States and Japan formally continued. The security treaty was quietly renewed in 1970 and periodically thereafter, but economic tensions continued to strain the alliance. After 1973, ideology played a diminishing role in the policies pursued by the United States, China, and Japan, while issues including access to oil and responses to regional conflicts, such as those in the Middle East, increasingly divided the Pacific allies.

Nixon’s speculation that Japan might gravitate toward the Soviet Union proved baseless. In 1971, and periodically over the next decade, Soviet envoys visited Tokyo to suggest that Japan join the USSR in a united front against Washington and Beijing. But Moscow had little to offer. Japanese public opinion continued to blame the Soviet Union for past mistreatment of

48 “Meeting Between Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou,” February 17, 1973, National Security Archive; Kissinger, “Discussion of International Issues and China – US Relations with Mao,” February 17, 1973, *ibid.*; Kissinger, “My Meeting with Chairman Mao,” February 24, 1973, *ibid.*; “My Asian Trip,” February 27, 1973, *ibid.*

prisoners of war seized in 1945 (some of whom were held for a decade) and resented the Kremlin's refusal even to discuss return of the so-called Northern Territories, the small islands near the Kuriles occupied since the end of World War II. The Soviets dangled promises of Siberian resources (if Japan built the infrastructure to extract them), but the country was a dismal market for Japan's consumer-export-driven economy.

Instead, after 1972, Japan turned its economic and political focus toward China and Southeast Asia. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan gradually replaced the United States as the biggest foreign investor and aid provider to both regions. To bolster its economic leverage, by the mid-1970s, Japan cooperated closely with ASEAN, the anti-Communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations. To gain entry into the fabled, if still future, "China market," Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing shortly after Nixon. He apologized for wartime crimes, cut formal diplomatic ties (but not trade links) to Taiwan, and joined Zhou in a statement condemning "hegemony" in Asia, a euphemism for Soviet domination. In 1978, the two nations signed formal treaties of peace and commerce. By the mid-1980s, China had become Japan's second-largest trading partner, behind the United States, while Japan was China's leading trading partner.

After Tanaka's fall in a bribery scandal in December 1974, four weak prime ministers led Japan in rapid succession. Only in 1982, when Nakasone Yasuhiro became prime minister and closely allied his government to the administration of Ronald Reagan – at least rhetorically – did Japan ratchet up its anti-Soviet rhetoric. But after Nakasone retired in 1987, another half-dozen weak LDP prime ministers held sway before the Cold War ended and the long-dominant party fractured in the early 1990s.

Soviet–American tensions and Japanese–American trade disputes largely defined Japan's role in the last decade and a half of the Cold War. Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, and a restive Congress, complained frequently about Japan's expanding trade surplus with the United States, but had no solution to offer. In 1978, responding to budget pressures and complaints by domestic steel, textile, and automotive manufacturers, Congress adopted the first of several resolutions criticizing Tokyo for spending too little on its own defense, impeding American exports to Japan, and dumping goods on the United States. But the deterioration of détente after 1978 made the Carter administration reluctant to implement trade retaliation against Japan since it wanted Tokyo's cooperation against Moscow.

When Reagan became president in 1981, he pledged to enhance US military power, challenge Soviet influence in the Third World, and prod American

allies into shouldering a greater defense burden.⁴⁹ Reagan called upon Japan to assume responsibility for protecting its sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 miles, alleviating the burden on the US Navy. Between 1982 and 1987, one or both houses of Congress passed several resolutions demanding that Japan either expand its military capacity and take on a larger regional security role or else pay the United States for the cost of defending Japan's global interests. These measures spoke to American frustration with Japan's "free-riding" on security issues and bitterness over what was seen as Japan's undermining of key US industries such as automobile manufacturing.

These strains were partially mitigated by the strong personal bonds that Reagan forged with Prime Minister Nakasone, who took office in 1982. An assertive nationalist who echoed many of Reagan's anti-Soviet themes, Nakasone applauded the US arms buildup and the policy of challenging Soviet influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Calling Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" (MacArthur's description of Taiwan and Japan on the eve of the Korean War), the prime minister pledged to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Asia.⁵⁰

Nakasone's enthusiasm for a defense buildup troubled many Southeast Asian nations, which worried about their inclusion in Japan's proposed 1,000-mile security cordon. But Nakasone's rhetoric exceeded his delivery. The Japanese government increased its cooperation with the United States in areas such as intelligence sharing and contingency planning, and accepted the principle of a forward defense of its sea lanes. Nakasone also approved a small increase in defense spending, so that by 1987 the arms budget exceeded the longstanding informal cap of 1 percent of GNP. Reagan spoke appreciatively of these acts, but most members of Congress dismissed them as mere tokens. In 1985 and 1987, Congress passed resolutions demanding that Japan commit to a more aggressive defense posture in Asia and the Pacific, and increase defense spending to 3 percent of GNP or pay Washington an equivalent amount.

US grumbling reflected the ballooning trade gap with Japan – approaching \$60 billion annually by 1987 – and anger over revelations that for some time the giant Toshiba Corporation had violated agreements with the United States by selling sensitive computer software and machine tools to the Soviet Union that were useful in building stealthier submarines. In 1987, Congress imposed selective import restrictions on Japanese electronics and, in particular, Toshiba products. On the steps of the Capitol building, several members of Congress held an "execution" of a Toshiba radio which they smashed with sledgehammers.

⁴⁹ For Reagan and the end of the Cold War, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

⁵⁰ Schaller, *Altered States*, 254.



9. Baltimore, Maryland: imported Toyotas arrive at port. By the 1970s, many Americans had started to worry about Japan's industrial might.

Detroit autoworkers protested Japan's growing share of the US car market, already 20 percent, by bludgeoning an imported Toyota.

Neither Reagan, Congress, nor irate automobile workers had much leverage over Japan. In the mid-1980s, Tokyo bowed to US pressure to upwardly value the yen and limit the export of some automobiles and other products. But these actions barely affected the overall trade balance. With the budget deficit at record levels under Reagan and then George H. W. Bush, the US Treasury relied on the Japanese government and private investors to purchase

over a third of new US debt. By 1989, Japanese held about 20 percent of all US government debt. In effect, these “loans” financed the Reagan- and Bush-era deficits incurred by tax cuts and increased arms spending. By 1985 the United States went from being the world’s biggest creditor to the largest debtor.⁵¹ Conversely, Japan became the biggest creditor nation.

The improvement in Soviet–American relations in the late 1980s, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, highlighted tensions in the US–Japan relationship. Public opinion surveys taken between 1989 and 1991 revealed that a majority of Americans considered Japan’s economic power a major threat to national security. So many mass-market books criticizing Japan, or even prophesying war, appeared that some book stores created a “Japan-bashing” section. Tensions between the Pacific allies might have grown worse had not Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1993, kicking off a prolonged recession that weakened Tokyo’s clout. Meanwhile, US economic growth accelerated for the remainder of the 1990s, reducing trade tensions.

In January 1992, a month after the Soviet Union collapsed, President Bush – who almost fifty years before, as the youngest carrier pilot in the navy, had been shot down by the Japanese – led a delegation to Tokyo. He hoped to persuade government and corporate leaders to increase their purchase of American goods to alleviate the trade gap. During a state dinner, a fatigued president succumbed to acute stomach flu, slumped over Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi, vomited into his host’s lap, and fainted. Although Bush soon recovered, the televised incident tainted the ill-starred visit and prompted a nasty exchange.

After Bush departed, Miyazawa told Diet members that Americans “lacked a work ethic,” produced shoddy goods, and had no one but themselves to blame for their economic problems. American journalists and politicians responded in kind. South Carolina’s Democratic senator, Ernest Hollings, told a group of factory workers they should “draw a mushroom cloud and put underneath it: made in America by lazy and illiterate Americans and tested in Japan.”⁵²

This exchange symbolized the economic and political malaise that afflicted US–Japan relations as the Cold War receded. Observing this, Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson quipped (in a phrase popularized in 1992 by several presidential hopefuls) that, “while the good news is that the Cold War is over, the bad news is Japan and Germany won.”⁵³

51 See Giovanni Arrighi’s chapter in this volume. 52 Schaller, *Altered States*, 258.

53 Chalmers Johnson to author.

As the Cold War ended, the roles played by the United States and Japan had partly reversed. Japan now provided much of the capital, credits, technology, and consumer goods purchased by the United States and the developing world, especially in East and Southeast Asia. Although Japan remained a military midget, the post-Cold War environment amplified, more than ever, its status as an economic superpower. Whether or not Japan played much of a role in ending the Cold War depends partly on the assessment of Tokyo's financial contribution to the Reagan-era arms buildup. Japan recycled its trade surplus in the form of loans that financed the new arms race, but historians disagree about how important a factor this was in changing Soviet behavior.

China and the Cold War after Mao

CHEN JIAN

On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist leader who had ruled the country for twenty-seven years, died. Almost immediately, the development of China's domestic and international policies reached a critical juncture. In the last years of the Chinese chairman's life, he endeavored to keep China on course in his continuous revolution. Meanwhile, in view of a growing security threat from the Soviet Union and a persistent legitimacy crisis – one that was characterized by his revolution's inability to meet the expectations of the Chinese people's lived experience – Mao led China to a rapprochement with the United States. He also introduced a set of ideas about China's place in the world that were development-oriented rather than revolution-driven. These changes in China's international policies had a significant and long-lasting impact on the global Cold War.

After Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's paramount leader. In order to modernize China, Deng initiated the "reform and opening" policies in the late 1970s. China then experienced a profound derevolutionization process, gradually changing from an "outsider" in the existing international system – dominated by the United States and the capitalist West – to an "insider." All of this, while altering further the structure of the Cold War, buried the last hope of international Communism being an alternative to liberal capitalism as the mainstream path toward modernity. Consequently, China played a crucial – indeed, at times even central – role in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Mao's last revolution and China's double crisis

At the center of China's political chronology in the last decade of Mao's life was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Mao had two goals in mind. First, he hoped that it would allow him to discover new means to promote the transformation of China's state

and society, as well as its international outlook. Second, he wanted to use the Cultural Revolution to enhance his much weakened power and reputation in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward. For the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), these two goals were interrelated: he believed that his strengthened leadership role would best guarantee the success of his revolution.

Mao easily achieved the second goal in the Cultural Revolution, but he failed to reach the much more complicated first one. Although the mass movement launched by the Cultural Revolution destroyed both Mao's opponents and the "old" party-state control system, it was unable to create the new form of state power that Mao desired for building a new social order in China. Despite this failure, however, Mao was ready to halt the revolution in 1968–69. In July 1968, when Mao dispatched the "Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team" to various Beijing universities to reestablish the party-control system, the Red Guards at Qinghua University opened fire on them. Mao then decided to dismantle the Red Guards movement.¹ For two decades, "mobilizing the masses" had been the key for Mao to maintain the momentum of his "revolution after revolution." At the moment that he openly stood in opposition to the "revolutionary masses" in order to reestablish the Communist state's control over society, his transformative agenda collapsed.

Meanwhile, Beijing faced a grave international security situation. The propaganda prevailing during the Cultural Revolution created new enemies for Beijing and drove China into deeper isolation. American involvement in the Vietnam War and Beijing's support for Hanoi occasionally brought China and the United States to the verge of a direct military confrontation. At the same time, Beijing's provocative challenges to "Soviet revisionism" destroyed any hope that China and the Soviet Union might regard each other as comrades-in-arms.²

The hostility between China and the Soviet Union culminated in March 1969 in two bloody clashes between Chinese and Soviet border garrisons on Zhenbao island on the Ussuri River.³ For a few months, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of a general war. Reportedly, Soviet leaders even

1 *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic], 13 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987–93), XII, 516–17; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 250–51.

2 See Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

3 Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (August 2000), 25–31.

considered conducting a preemptive nuclear strike against their former Communist ally.⁴ Beijing's leaders responded in ways that created the worst war scare in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC).⁵

The extraordinary perception of threat from the Soviet Union, combined with the fading of Mao's continuous revolution, spurred Beijing to improve relations with the United States.⁶ On the American side, President Richard M. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw improving relations with China as beneficial to the United States. In the short run, this would help get the United States out of the Vietnam War and, in the long term, would enhance its strategic position in a global confrontation with the Soviet Union.⁷ All of this paved the way for the coming of "the week that changed the world" in February 1972, when Nixon made his historic trip to China and met with Mao and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing.

The Sino-American rapprochement as a turning point

In retrospect, the Chinese–American rapprochement reshaped a world that had been profoundly divided by the global Cold War. It ended the total confrontation between the United States and China that had lasted for almost a quarter-century, opening a new chapter in the relations between the world's most powerful country and its most populous nation. It also dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two conflicting superpowers. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to devote more American resources and strategic attention to dealing with the Soviet Union, Moscow's leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, faced the prospect of overextension.

In a deeper sense, Beijing's cooperation with Washington and confrontation with Moscow changed the essence of the Cold War. Ever since its beginning in the mid- and late 1940s, the Cold War had been characterized

4 US State Department memorandum of conversation, "US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR Nuclear Capability," August 18, 1969, SN 67–69, Def 12. Chicom, United States National Archives, Washington, DC; see also Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (New York: Little, Brown, 1978), 183.

5 Yang, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969," 35–37.

6 For more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 7–10, 241–42.

7 Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 57–61; Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 183–84, 234–35; see also Robert Schulzinger's chapter in volume II.

by a fundamental confrontation between Communism and liberal capitalism.⁸ The Chinese–American rapprochement obscured the distinctions between socialist and capitalist paths toward modernity. The Sino-Soviet split buried the shared consciousness among Communists that government planning and command economies were a viable path to modernization.

Taking the Soviet threat as a shared concern, Beijing and Washington gradually moved toward a tacit strategic partnership. Although the two countries did not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1979, leaders from the two sides often consulted on political and even military issues throughout the 1970s.

In this evolving international environment, Mao introduced his “Three Worlds” theory. As early as the late 1940s, Mao had laid out a unique Intermediate Zone thesis. He argued that in postwar international politics there existed a vast intermediate zone that was not directly controlled by either of the two superpowers, yet was the main target of competition by both. He believed that China belonged to this zone, a position that he continued to hold even after the PRC entered a political and strategic alliance with the Soviet Union.⁹

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the mending of Sino-American relations provided Mao with the opportunity to develop a new theoretical framework that would not only make sense of the PRC’s changed international policies but also provide crucial legitimacy to the Chinese chairman’s fading notions of “continuous revolution” at home. In a series of talks with foreign visitors in 1973–74, Mao argued that the world had been divided into three. He told Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, on February 22, 1974: “The [United States] and the Soviet Union belong to the First World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe, Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the Third World ... The [United States] and the Soviet Union have a lot of atomic bombs, and they are richer. Europe, Japan, Australia and Canada, of the Second World, do not possess so many atomic bombs and are not so rich as the First World, but richer than the Third World ... All Asian countries, except Japan, and all of Africa and also Latin America belong to the Third World.”¹⁰ On April 10, 1974, Deng Xiaoping, head of the Chinese delegation attending the UN General Assembly, publicly presented Mao’s “Three Worlds” notion, emphasizing that the Third World

8 See David Engerman’s chapter in volume I.

9 *Mao Zedong xuanji* [Selected Works of Mao Zedong], 5 vols. (Beijing: Renmin, 1965), IV, 1191–92; *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1998), 122–25.

10 *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, 454.

was formed by the vast majority of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹¹

Both Mao's Intermediate Zone thesis and his Three Worlds theory challenged the existing world order. But the latter was not a simple repetition of the former. The Intermediate Zone thesis hinged on the discourse of "international class struggle." In comparison, economic development formed the primary concern of the Three Worlds theory. In presenting it, Mao still embraced the language of "class struggle." But as far as the theory's basic *problématique* was concerned, he already highlighted "development" as a question of fundamental importance for China and other Third World countries.

It may seem odd that Mao, who had championed a revolutionary agenda for so many years, put forward the development-oriented Three Worlds theory toward the end of his life. But this made sense given the profound desire on the part of the chairman and his generation of revolutionaries to make China strong and to revive its central position in the world. Ever since he had proclaimed atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace at the time of the PRC's formation that "we the Chinese people have stood up," Mao had legitimated his "revolution after revolution" by repeatedly emphasizing how his programs would change China into a country of "wealth and power." Thus, alongside his discourse on class struggle were campaigns like the Great Leap Forward that proclaimed the possibility and necessity of dramatically increasing China's speed of development. Even the Cultural Revolution adopted the slogan of "grasping revolution, promoting production." When the Chinese Communist regime was encountering an ever-deepening legitimacy crisis as the result of the economic stagnation and political repression that Mao's revolution had wrought, the chairman introduced the development-oriented Three Worlds theory to emphasize – first and foremost to the Chinese people – that China, as a key Third World country, would continue to play a central role in transforming the world. By doing so, however, Mao opened a door that he did not mean to open: although he never introduced a grand strategy of "reform and opening," when he assigned so much emphasis to "development" in the Three Worlds theory, he created the opportunity for his successors to adopt a new grand strategy that would take "development," rather than "revolution," as its central mission.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the Chinese–American rapprochement, Beijing gradually moved away from its previous support of revolutions in

¹¹ *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], April 11, 1974.

other countries. During the last stage of the American–Vietnamese talks in Paris for ending the Vietnam War, Beijing’s leaders urged their comrades in Hanoi to strike a deal with the Americans. Almost immediately after the signing of the Paris Accords, Beijing significantly reduced its military and other aid to Hanoi.¹² In April 1975, against the background of impending Communist victories in Indochina, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung visited Beijing to try to gain China’s backing for his renewed aspirations to unify Korea through a “revolutionary war.” Beijing’s leaders demonstrated little interest in, let alone support of, Kim’s plans.¹³

In the meantime, rapprochement with the United States facilitated changes in China’s development policies. In 1972–73, Beijing approved twenty-six projects that called for the import of new equipment and technologies from Western countries and Japan, amounting to \$4.3 billion.¹⁴ Implementation of these projects represented a first major step toward bringing China into the world market dominated by Western capitalist countries. Although Mao never totally relinquished his hope of transforming China and the world in revolutionary ways, this notion eroded in the last years of his life. His decision to improve relations with the United States in the early 1970s made it politically feasible for his successors to pursue a course of opening to the outside world.

Deng’s rise and the reform and opening of China

Mao’s death in September 1976 immediately triggered the most dramatic power struggle in the history of the People’s Republic. Less than a month later, Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor and China’s new leader, joined forces with several top CCP leaders to direct a coup that destroyed the “Gang of Four,” the Cultural Revolution radicals headed by Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow.¹⁵

Deng Xiaoping, however, quickly replaced Hua and became China’s paramount leader. Mao had, in the last months of his life, ordered that Deng be

12 Chen Jian, “China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1973,” in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.), *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979* (London: Routledge, 2006), 53–59.

13 Mao’s talks with Kim, April 18, 1975, and Deng’s talks with Kim, April 20, 1975, CCP Central Archive, Beijing; see also Leng Rong and Wang Zuoling, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu* [A Chronological Record of Deng Xiaoping], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2004), I, 36–37.

14 Chen Jinghua, *Guoshi yishu* [Recollections and Accounts of State Affairs] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi, 2005), ch. 1.

15 MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution*, 443–49.

purged from the party leadership for the second time in the Cultural Revolution. Despite Hua's resistance, Deng – with the support of the army as well as the great majority of party officials – managed to reemerge in Beijing's decisionmaking inner circle by late 1977. The most influential event in Deng's ascendance happened in the ideological and theoretical field. After Mao's death, for the purpose of consolidating his position as China's top leader, Hua and some of his close associates proclaimed that "whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever policy Chairman Mao opposed, we shall resolutely oppose." On May 11, 1978, *Guangming Daily*, a party ideological organ, published an essay, "Practice Is the Sole Criteria by which to Judge Truth." The essay argued that whether a theory represented the truth must be tested by practice. As the essay presented a serious challenge to the two "whatevers" notion, Hua and his associates tried to suppress this debate. However, it soon became clear that Deng was behind those who favored a new pragmatism based on empirical experience. He supported this new approach because it sundered the assumptions and practices that Mao and his continuous revolution had imposed upon China. By late 1978, it was clear that Deng and his supporters had won the debate.

Deng's victory paved the way for him to introduce the "reform and opening" policies at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP's Eleventh Central Committee, held in Beijing on December 18–22, 1978. Deng redefined the party's central mission by abandoning Maoist slogans such as "class struggle" and "continuous revolution." Following his pragmatic "cat theory" – "black cat or white cat, so long as it catches mice, it is a good cat" – Deng emphasized the primacy of economics over politics. What was unleashed was a process that would transform China's state and society, as well as its path toward modernity.

The "reform and opening" were first and foremost a derevolutionization process. While Mao's revolutions were being abandoned at home, Beijing's leaders decided to dramatically reduce and then completely stop China's material support to Communist insurgencies abroad. Since the early 1950s, and especially during the Cultural Revolution, China had provided military and other support to Communist rebels in countries such as Burma, Malaya (Malaysia), and Thailand. The trend began to change after Nixon's China visit. With the inauguration of the "reform and opening" policies, Beijing's leaders decided that it was time for China to go further. In 1980, Beijing informed the Burmese Communists that China would terminate its aid over five years.¹⁶ In

16 Yang Meihong, *Yingsu huagong: wo zai miangong shiwu nian* [Red Poppy: My Fifteen Years with the Burmese Communist Party] (Hong Kong: Tiandi, 2001), 263–64.

December 1980, Deng told Chin Peng, the secretary general of the Malayan Communist Party, to stop the operation of the party's radio station (which had been broadcasting from Chinese territory since the early 1970s).¹⁷

In Maoist discourse, revolutions were always closely associated with wars. When Beijing's leaders abandoned revolution, they gradually changed their estimate of the danger of a new world war. Since the 1960s, Beijing had persistently claimed that, because of the existence of imperialism, a new world war could only be delayed, not averted. With the introduction of modernization programs, Deng concluded that "it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that there is hope of maintaining world peace."¹⁸

These developments changed China's position in the world. Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic had been a revolutionary country on the international scene. China constantly challenged the legitimacy of the existing international order, which Mao and his comrades believed to be the result of Western domination and thus inimical to revolutionary China. The logic of the "reform and opening" process meant that China would no longer behave as a revolutionary country internationally. This change, in turn, symbolized the beginning of a critical transition in China's evolution from an outsider to an insider in the existing international system.

Not surprisingly, at the center of China's "opening policies" was Beijing's embrace of a more open approach toward the capitalist world market. Until the last years of the Maoist era, China maintained only limited exchanges with other countries. The twenty-six import projects adopted in the wake of Sino-American rapprochement opened China's door to Western technology, yet they did not expose China to the world market. In particular, little change occurred in China's Soviet-style planning economy.

The reform and opening policies of the late 1970s were much broader and deeper. They transformed China's domestic economic structure and its international connections. Throughout the Maoist era, Chinese leaders saw markets and profits as alien to genuine socialism. Deng, by initiating the reform process in China, emphasized that everything should be done to promote productivity. "To get rich is glorious," he said. Meanwhile, he and his colleagues significantly broadened the scope of China's international connections. They sent Chinese students to study in Western countries and Japan,

17 Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 457–58.

18 Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, 3 vols. (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), III, 132.

promoted China's international trade with Western countries, and welcomed investments from abroad.¹⁹ When Deng and his fellow Chinese leaders were designing China's path toward modernity, they looked to the West for models to formulate China's development strategy. They repudiated their own experience with building socialism in the 1950s and 1960s, when they had wholeheartedly embraced a Soviet model – characterized by a rigid state-controlled planning system.

Alliance with Washington, war with Hanoi

In the context of Beijing's market-oriented modernization drive, the strategic relationship between China and the United States developed continuously in the late 1970s. Nixon's visit to China ended the total confrontation between the two countries. But they still did not have formal diplomatic relations. The Chinese leaders were told that Nixon would deal with this issue during his second term. However, the Watergate scandal made it impossible for Nixon to concentrate on improving relations. Still, in May 1973, China and the United States each established a liaison office in the other's capital. During the presidency of Gerald R. Ford, issues such as the end of the Vietnam War, the lingering crisis in the Middle East, and the United States' strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union attracted Washington's main attention. Ford was also reluctant to try to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing because he was not ready to modify, sunder, or repudiate US ties with Taiwan.²⁰

Deng's reforms happened at the same time that President Jimmy Carter was reassessing US relations with the PRC. While China's new "opening" approach served as an important pulling force for Washington to improve relations with Beijing, the difficulties the Carter administration was having in concluding the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) with the Soviet Union created a strong push for US policymakers to turn their strategic attention to

19 Bruce Cumings, "The Political Economy of China's Turn Outward," and William R. Feeney, "Chinese Policy toward Multilateral Economic Institutions," in Samuel Kim (ed.), *China and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), chs. 9 and 10.

20 In November 1974, Deng specified three conditions as prerequisites for diplomatic relations between China and the United States: that the Americans must cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abolish the US-Taiwan treaty of mutual defense, and withdraw all military forces from Taiwan. See Xue Mouhong, *et al.*, *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1988), 226.

China. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, played a crucial role in shaping Washington's policy. Carter shared Brzezinski's vision. China was a core component of his global policy. "The United States and China," he said, "share certain common interests and ... have parallel, long-term strategic concerns." Carter thus emphasized that improving relations with China was, "an interest that is both fundamental and enduring."²¹

On the Chinese side, Deng regarded cooperation with the United States as highly compatible with both China's international strategic interests and his modernization drive. From the beginning, Deng treated diplomatic relations with the United States as a top priority. As expected, the course of the negotiations was difficult – especially because of the complexities surrounding the Taiwan issue. In December 1978, the two sides reached agreement on most questions. The only matter that remained unsolved was whether Beijing would agree that, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the United States would pause for one year – rather than discontinue permanently – "restrained sale of selective defensive arms" to Taiwan. On December 13, on the eve of an important CCP Central Committee meeting, Deng made the crucial decision that Beijing would concede to the United States on this last issue. This concession paved the way for the two sides to announce on December 15 that formal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic and the United States would be established on January 1, 1979.²²

On December 15, Beijing and Washington also announced that Deng Xiaoping would visit the United States in early 1979. This would be the first time in the history of the People's Republic that a top Chinese leader visited the United States. Deng was determined to make sure that the visit, which occurred on January 29–February 4, 1979, would be a success. Deng talked to Carter about global and regional strategic issues. A crucial topic was Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Deng emphasized that Vietnam was behaving like a "regional hegemon," and asked for Carter's advice on – in fact for his support for – Beijing's plans to use military force "to teach the Vietnamese a lesson." In a handwritten letter, Carter told Deng that Beijing should not use military means to deal with Hanoi.²³ However, Washington's

21 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 550; for the larger context in which Carter made the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with China, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

22 Xue, et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, 229–30.

23 Letter, President J. Carter to Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, January 30, 1979, Brzezinski File, Box 9: China, Folder: China President's Meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.



10. Simonton, Texas, February 1979: Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping tries on a cowboy hat presented to him at a rodeo. Deng sought improved ties and adeptly appealed to American sensibilities.

actions pointed in another direction: it shared with Beijing strategically important intelligence information on the deployment of Soviet military forces along the Soviet–Chinese border, as well as on Vietnam’s military operations in Cambodia and on its border with China.²⁴ During Deng’s visit, the Chinese and American leaders also discussed cooperation between the two countries in new areas, including strategic affairs. They concluded their talks with the signing of agreements regarding science, technology, and cultural exchanges between China and the United States.²⁵

The establishment of Chinese–American diplomatic relations served the interests of both governments. For Deng, the pursuit of cooperation with the United States was an integral part of his “reform and opening” policies. Deng understood that, so long as China wanted access to the US-dominated world market, it would have to pursue a strategic partnership with the United States. For Carter, China was a potential strategic partner in containing the growing Soviet threat. Policymakers in Washington felt that, in Southeast Asia, Angola,

24 Interview with a senior Chinese diplomat who served as a messenger between Beijing and Washington in 1979, Washington, DC, February 2006.

25 Tian Zengpei, et al., *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao* [Chinese Diplomacy since Reforming and Opening to the Outside World] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1993), 393–94.

Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, Moscow and its allies – such as Cuba and Vietnam – were on the offensive, putting greater pressure on vital US strategic interests. By tilting toward Beijing in the Sino-Soviet rift, Brzezinski contended, the United States would serve its own interests.²⁶

In the context of China's modernization drive and its strengthened strategic partnership with the United States, China's relations with Japan also experienced major improvements. In 1972, only months after Nixon's visit to Beijing, China and Japan established formal diplomatic relations. In 1978, Beijing and Tokyo signed a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation, in which both countries agreed to work together to prevent the emergence of a dominant hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region. In the late 1970s, Japan was the first among all major industrial/capitalist countries to provide China with substantial technological and financial support.²⁷

While the collaboration between China and the United States and other capitalist countries was being strengthened, China's confrontation with the Soviet Union continued. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and China's punitive war against Vietnam combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to bring Sino-Soviet relations to their lowest point since 1969. Moreover, the Chinese–Vietnamese conflict and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan became the two most difficult issues blocking the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations until the late 1980s, when the global Cold War was already approaching its end.

In a general sense, China's road away from revolution greatly reduced the degree of outside threat to China's international security interests as perceived by Beijing's leaders. Therefore, China's modernization drive should also have served as a powerful reason for Beijing to improve its relations with Moscow. In the late 1970s, China started improving its relationship with several countries of the Soviet bloc, including Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.²⁸ What made the improvement of Chinese–Soviet relations much more difficult was the deteriorating relationship between China and the unified Vietnam. Chinese and Vietnamese Communists were close allies during the First Indochina War and most of the Second Indochina War.

²⁶ Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 419.

²⁷ Zhang Tuosheng, "China's Relations with Japan," in Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko (eds.), *The Global Age of the US-China Japan Triangle, 1972–1989* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 193, 242–43; Wang Taiping, et al., *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiao shi, 1970–1978* [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China, 1970–1978] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1999), 19–33.

²⁸ China already had good relations with Romania and Yugoslavia in the 1970s.

Beginning in the late 1960s, however, relations between the two Communist allies had begun to deteriorate. After the Vietnamese Communists unified the whole country in 1975, hostility quickly developed between Beijing and Hanoi, eventually leading to a major border war in early 1979. On February 17, 1979, Chinese troops started a large-scale invasion of Vietnam to “teach the Vietnamese a lesson.” After hard fighting and heavy casualties, the Chinese troops seized Lang Son and Cai Bang, two strategically important border towns. Instead of pushing forward, Beijing announced that Chinese troops would begin to return to China. The confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese troops, however, did not stop with the withdrawal of the former. Throughout the 1980s, the borders between the two countries constituted areas of protracted warfare.

Several factors underlay the prolonged confrontation between Beijing and Hanoi: historically, relations between China and Vietnam had been conflictual; geopolitically, Hanoi’s deep involvement in Laos and Cambodia caused Beijing to suspect that the Vietnamese intended to establish their own regional hegemony in Indochina; politically, Hanoi’s discrimination against ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam fueled the enmity; and, strategically, Beijing resented Hanoi’s alignment with the Kremlin on China’s southern periphery, and Hanoi disliked Beijing’s rapprochement with Washington.

In an even deeper sense, the reasons for Beijing’s continued confrontation with Hanoi – and, in the background, with the Soviet Union – were not international, but profoundly domestic. Deng made the decision to “teach the Vietnamese a lesson” during the Third Plenary Session, the same session that approved Deng’s reform programs. From his perspective, the decision to go to war provided him with a highly valuable opportunity to consolidate his control of China’s military and political power and to crush any possible opposition to his position as China’s paramount leader. The confrontation with Vietnam enabled Deng to capitalize on the patriotism of the Chinese people. Throughout the 1980s, popular literature, movies, and music extolled the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s struggle against the ungrateful Vietnamese and inspired a campaign of domestic mobilization to foster “love of the socialist motherland.” At a time when the reform and opening policies were creating profound economic inequality within Chinese society and stirring unrest, the confrontation with Vietnam – and Beijing’s representation of it to the Chinese people – served to mobilize the support of ordinary Chinese for the regime in Beijing.

In late December 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, signifying a major turning point in the development of the Cold War. The invasion

shattered US–Soviet détente and increased the Kremlin’s strategic overextension. It also greatly deepened the suspicion and hostility between Beijing and Moscow, and offered a new reason for Beijing and Washington to establish closer relations.

Immediately after Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan, Beijing’s leaders denounced the invasion and prepared to deal with its consequences. Deng stated that the Soviet invasion demonstrated Moscow’s desire to achieve “worldwide hegemony” and created threats of the most serious nature for the peace and security of Asia as well as for the whole world.²⁹ On January 10, 1980, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a new barrier to improved relations between Beijing and Moscow.³⁰ Then, having just reestablished its membership in the International Olympic Committee, the Chinese government decided that Beijing would join a group of countries – mostly Western and capitalist – in boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow scheduled for the summer of 1980.

Thus, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China’s rift with the Soviet Union continued. Throughout the 1980s, Beijing provided substantial military and other support to Pakistan and, largely through Pakistan, to the resistance forces in Afghanistan. In March 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced that he did not intend to threaten China; in fact, he hoped to improve relations. Deng did not oppose Soviet overtures, but he also believed that Moscow needed to prove its good intentions. For Sino-Soviet relations to improve, Deng said, Moscow had to reduce its military forces on the Soviet–Chinese and Mongolian–Chinese borders, withdraw from Afghanistan, and encourage Vietnamese troops to leave Cambodia.³¹

In the meantime, shared interests in containing Soviet expansion in Afghanistan allowed Beijing and Washington to develop a cooperative relationship (although on a limited scale) in the military and security spheres. In January 1980, right after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US secretary of defense Harold Brown visited China. In May 1980, Chinese defense minister Geng Biao visited the United States. Several months later, Washington had approved “export licenses for some 400 items in the area of advanced technology in military support equipment.”³²

The depth of the new Chinese–American strategic cooperation was tested after Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980. As a

29 Leng and Wang, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu*, I, 589.

30 Tian, *et al.*, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao*, 291.

31 *Ibid.*, 291–92. 32 Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 424.

conservative politician who had long voiced a strong commitment to Taiwan, Reagan claimed during his presidential campaign that if elected he would restore the United States' "official diplomatic relationship" with Taiwan. But when he became president, Reagan took a conciliatory approach toward China. While calling the Soviet Union an "evil empire," he viewed the PRC as a useful partner in the American mission to contain the expansion of Soviet power. On August 17, 1982, China and the United States signed a joint communiqué, in which the United States confirmed that it would "reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."³³

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was a superpower in decline, and China contributed in crucial ways to Moscow's problems. In a strategic sense, Beijing's partnership with Washington and its continued confrontation with Moscow completely altered the balance of power between the two superpowers. More importantly, China's market-oriented reforms destroyed Moscow's claims that Communism remained a viable alternative to capitalism. Beijing's repudiation of the Soviet model discouraged other Third World countries from thinking that Communism could serve as an exemplary model for achieving modernity. Since the Cold War from its inception had been a global struggle between two contrasting ideological and social systems, the new course embraced by China obscured the distinctions between the two sides and favored the capitalist world. The Soviet Union and its allies found it increasingly more difficult to sustain the course of the Cold War.

The Tiananmen tragedy of 1989 and the end of the Cold War

Throughout the 1980s, China's reform and opening process developed continuously. In September 1980, after an experimental period, CCP leaders adopted a "family-based responsibility system" in the Chinese countryside, thereby undermining the People's Communes that had existed in China since the late 1950s. The peasants were given greater freedom to produce and sell agricultural products. At about the same time, four special economic development zones were established in coastal cities, where policies to attract international investment were implemented. Reform measures were also introduced in state-owned enterprises, removing the tight controls on the state planning system and making productivity and profits the central goals of production.

³³ Xue, *et al.*, *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, appendix I, 431.

In addition, the Chinese government allowed privately owned businesses and Chinese–foreign jointly owned ventures to coexist with state-owned enterprises. In 1982, the party's Twelfth Congress pointed out that multiple forms of ownership should be allowed “for the promotion of socialist economic reconstruction.”³⁴ In 1987, the party's Thirteenth Congress further emphasized that cooperative businesses, individual businesses, and privately owned businesses should all be encouraged to develop. China also carried out several price reforms in the 1980s, mainly for the purpose of removing state subsidies on commodities, so that the market rather than state plans would determine prices.³⁵

The new policies generated rapid growth in the Chinese economy and resulted in profound changes in Chinese society. But the legacies of China's age of revolution were deep and influential. The CCP's one-party reign did not change. Indeed, the reform and opening were highly unbalanced from the beginning: emphasis had been almost exclusively placed on economic initiatives, leaving aside politics and ideology. Despite China's abandoning of Maoist discourses, since the late 1970s the CCP leadership had repeatedly called on the party to fight against “bourgeois liberalization,” warning ordinary Chinese that they should boycott the “spiritual pollution” of Western influence.

But Chinese society was changing. The mid-1980s witnessed a new tide of “cultural fever” in China's intellectual life. Like the Chinese intellectuals of the early twentieth century, many educated Chinese in the mid- and late 1980s became increasingly frustrated with the reality that China's reform and opening were restricted to technology and the economy. Many intellectuals, using cultural criticism as a weapon, wanted to reform the sphere of politics and political culture. The political agenda of the “cultural fever” was epitomized in a television series, *Heshang* (River Elegy). Tracing the origins of China's backwardness in modern times to the early development of Chinese civilization, *Heshang*'s writers emphasized the importance of transforming China's authoritarian political culture.³⁶

34 Hu Yaobang's speech at the Party's Twelfth Congress, September 1, 1982, *Shier da yilai: Zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [Since the Twelfth Party Congress: A Selection of Important Documents] (Beijing: Renmin, 1982), 14–25.

35 Su Xing, *Xin zhongguo jingji shi* [An Economic History of the New China] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1999), 735–49.

36 Chen Fongching and Jin Guantao, *From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1997).

In a political sense, *Heshang* identified the huge gap between the stagnation in China's political system and the rapid changes in China's economy and society. This highly imbalanced trajectory was one of the most important causes of the tragedy of 1989. In the meantime, increasing numbers of Chinese people traveled abroad to study and to do business. In July 1987, Taiwan's aged leader, Jiang Jingguo, lifted the martial law that had been imposed for thirty-eight years, opening a new era of political democratization in the island. Pressure mounted on Beijing's leaders for political reforms on the mainland.

In 1989, China's economy and society were facing a potentially explosive situation. A direct source was the price reforms that the CCP leadership initiated in August 1988: over the next five years price controls and subsidies for most commodities were scheduled to be eliminated; thereafter, prices would be set by the market. Although price reforms were to be accompanied by salary reforms so that most workers' standard of living would not be lowered,³⁷ when the Chinese people learned of the price-reform decision, they immediately interpreted it as the prelude to another – unprecedented – round of price increases. Panic-buying ensued. China's total sum of commodity sales in August 1988 increased 38.6 percent compared with August 1987, while the country's savings decreased by 2.6 billion yuan.³⁸

What made the situation difficult for leaders in Beijing was the Chinese people's mixed feelings toward the reform and opening process. In a general sense, the majority of the population supported the new policies. But the widening gap between the rich and the poor, the high inflation rate, the widespread corruption among party and government officials, and a huge sense of uncertainty concerning what the reforms would lead to created fear.

Students at universities and colleges all over China – especially in central cities such as Beijing and Shanghai – had the most profound sense of crisis. This was a generation who had grown up in the last years of the Cultural Revolution and the first years of the reforms, a generation who could still be easily inspired by the idealistic vision of transforming China. Viewing the stagnation in China's political life and the increasingly rampant corruption among officials, the students believed it was their responsibility to make China not only stronger and richer but also better for its people. At the end of 1986, students at several major cities in China held demonstrations for political reforms and against corruption. When the protests abated, Hu Yaobang, the CCP secretary general who had been widely regarded as an advocate of comprehensive reforms, was forced to resign. But the students' consciousness

37 *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily], August 19, 1988. 38 Su, *Xin zhongguo jingji shi*, 781–82.

of political participation did not vanish. Entering 1989, they grew more deeply concerned about the future of China.

Although China's domestic situation was heading toward a crisis, its international status was better than it had been since the PRC's establishment. Chinese–American relations developed smoothly in the second half of the 1980s. Beijing's leaders welcomed George H. W. Bush's election as president of the United States. Many of them had known Bush since his time as the director of the US liaison office in Beijing in the mid-1970s. Bush did not disappoint his old friends in Beijing. In February 1989, shortly after he became president, he visited China. Deng proposed to Bush that, in addition to their relationship in the strategic field, China and the United States should “mutually trust and mutually support” each other in additional areas.³⁹ China's relations with Japan and with many other Western countries also improved in the 1980s, especially as China's market reforms presented these countries with bright prospects for investing in and doing business with China.

Even China's relationship with the Soviet Union showed signs of improvement. Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, wanted to restructure and nurture progressive change in the Soviet Union. He sought better relations with Western countries and with China. Seeing that Moscow had substantially reduced its military deployment along its border with China and that Soviet leaders were seeking to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, Deng deemphasized these two matters as preconditions for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. On October 9, 1985, Deng asked the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu to convey a message to Gorbachev: “If the Soviet Union reach[ed] agreement with us on Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia and [took] due action,” he would be willing to meet with Gorbachev to discuss how to improve relations between China and the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

From 1986 to 1989, Beijing and Moscow conducted a series of political negotiations to resolve problems and pave the way for a Chinese–Soviet rapprochement. In January 1989, Hanoi announced that all Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia by September. On February 6, 1989, the Chinese and Soviet governments issued a nine-point statement, emphasizing that the two sides would strive for a just and reasonable resolution of the Cambodia issue, and that withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia would form an important part of the solution.⁴¹ Against this background, Beijing and Moscow agreed that Gorbachev would visit China on May 15–18

39 Leng and Wang, *et al.*, *Deng Xiaoping nianpu*, II, 1267. 40 *Ibid.*, 1085–86.

41 Tian, *et al.*, *Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao*, 296–97.



11. A Chinese protester confronts tanks near Tiananmen Square, June 1989. Chinese students and workers tested the limits of China's political reform in the spring of 1989 and were beaten back.

for a summit with Deng and other Chinese leaders. After more than two decades of confrontation, the two largest Communist countries in the world were beginning to cooperate in international affairs.

But time was not on the side of international Communism. Gorbachev faced great challenges in domestic affairs, and so did Deng. In March 1989, after a series of protests in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the city was placed under martial law. On April 15, Hu Yaobang, the reform-minded party leader who had been ousted after the 1986 student movement, suddenly passed away. Students in Beijing quickly turned the mourning of Hu into a public expression of their frustration and anger over widespread corruption and political stagnation. When the party's propaganda machine, with Deng's approval, accused the students of being incited by provocateurs, the students responded with more protests. Beginning on May 13, students from universities all over Beijing and many other parts of the country started a hunger strike at Tiananmen Square, which later evolved into a mass occupation of this space in the center of the capital. On May 20, martial law was declared in Beijing. However, the students at the square and the people in Beijing angrily defied the authorities, leading to a standoff. Deng

and other party elders decided to use troops to crack down. On June 3–4, PLA soldiers fought their way into the square, attacked the students, and killed an unknown number of them as well as other Beijing residents.⁴² The tragedy of Tiananmen stunned the entire world.

Ironically, the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow ensured that the tragedy of Tiananmen would be widely covered by the international media. Gorbachev's official visit to Beijing had attracted extensive media attention. In addition to reporting on the Sino-Soviet summit, however, several hundred reporters covered the standoff between the students and the government, as well as the bloody crackdown on June 3–4. When millions of viewers in different parts of the world saw on television a young Chinese man standing in front of a moving tank to stop its advance, they were shocked. This was a defining moment for the fall of international Communism.

In China, the Tiananmen tragedy did not put an end to the reform and opening process. After a short period of stagnation, the reform process regained momentum in 1992, when Deng used a dramatic tour of southern China to revive his reform ideas and practices. But the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc did not survive. In December 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had existed as the real and symbolic dividing line between East and West for almost three decades, was destroyed. The same month, Romania's Communist dictator Ceaușescu and his wife were executed after they tried but failed to use military force to suppress mass protests in Bucharest. Two years later, on August 19, 1991, a military coup staged by a group of hardline Communist leaders occurred in Moscow. However, the coup was quickly defeated. The coup leaders hesitated to repress the resistance because the "jarring effect" of the Tiananmen tragedy lingered in their minds.⁴³ This, then, became another defining moment in twentieth-century history, a moment that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Communist bloc in Eastern Europe in a few short months. As a consequence, the global Cold War ended. Although the conflict started and finished in Europe, the great transformations that China experienced from the late 1960s to the early 1990s formed a unique and integral part of the Cold War's final denouement.

42 The Chinese government announced that thirty-six people died on June 3–4. The unofficial death toll provided by survivors and international observers, however, is several hundred or more.

43 For an excellent account of the "abhorrent" memory of the Tiananmen tragedy by the Soviet leaders and its "jarring effect" upon developments in the Soviet Union and East European countries, see Mark Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (2003), 189–90; 6, 4 (2004), 33–35; and 7, 1 (2005), 66.

The Cold War in Central America, 1975–1991

JOHN H. COATSWORTH

The strategic stalemate that prevented a direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union displaced violent superpower competition to areas of the Third World where the two blocs could invest in local and regional wars without risking direct confrontation. The Soviet Union tended to approach such conflicts cautiously even when they involved other Communist states.¹ The United States, by contrast, adapted its security policies to a containment doctrine that defined the political complexion of every non-Communist government in the world as a matter of potential strategic interest. Local opposition to foreign rule in the US and European colonial empires, and social movements aiming to displace traditional elites elsewhere, confronted a strong US preference for reliably anti-Communist (and thus conservative to right-wing) regimes. Even moderate to conservative regimes that sought to advance national interests by constraining US influence came under assault from Washington. Governments that collaborated closely with the United States often had to ignore or suppress local interests opposed to US policies.

In its prosecution of the Cold War in the Third World, the United States enjoyed formidable advantages over its Soviet rival. Economic strength gave US leaders a decided financial and material advantage over the Soviets. Military bases projected US power into regions bordering on Communist states throughout the world. US ideological and cultural assets also helped. Alliances with local elites eager to reduce domestic challenges proved especially helpful. The United States deployed all of these resources in response to perceived affronts to its regime and policy preferences wherever they occurred. The Soviet Union and its allies worked assiduously to overcome

1 The Soviets calibrated their support for allies and “proxies” in the Third World to avoid costly and unproductive commitments. In Latin America, for example, the Soviets declined to support guerrilla movements in the 1960s and criticized the Cubans for doing so. See Jorge Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch. 3.

US advantages by supporting anti-US political movements and regimes, though their successes were fewer and frequently reversible. The US–Soviet rivalry produced an era of escalating violence throughout the Third World that did not stop until the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990–91.²

In Latin America, unlike most other regions, the Cold War projection of US power was based on its existing strategic and economic predominance. By World War I, the United States had succeeded either in controlling or in securing the overthrow of governments deemed unfriendly throughout Central America and the Caribbean. In the 1920s, US economic and geopolitical interests extended to most of South America as well. In the 1930s, faced with growing resentment against its interventions in the Caribbean, which made it difficult to secure Latin American cooperation in efforts to revive trade after the collapse of 1929–33, the United States announced a “Good Neighbor” policy, according to which it would henceforth refrain from direct military interventions anywhere in the hemisphere.³

The Cold War provided a convenient rationale for enlarging and institutionalizing preexisting US efforts to impose its ideological and policy preferences on other states. As the United States insisted on greater conformity, however, opposition to its influence often intensified. An early crisis point occurred in 1959–62 when a newly installed Cuban government opted to defect to the Soviet camp rather than adjust its policies to US requirements.⁴ The Cuban government then supported movements opposed to pro-US elites and regimes throughout the hemisphere. The United States reacted forcefully between 1962 and 1973 by intervening to secure the removal of governments it deemed unsuitable or unreliable. When the left-wing nationalist Sandinista movement (the Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN) friendly to Cuba seized power in Nicaragua in 1979 and armed opposition movements gained support in El Salvador and Guatemala, the United States again reacted harshly.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had no significant strategic or economic interests in the western hemisphere. Soviet leaders refused pleas for military aid to avert the US attack on Guatemala in 1953–54.⁵ Though it

2 See Human Security Center, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Part I.

3 On the Good Neighbor Policy, the classic work is Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Norton, 1967).

4 See James G. Hershberg’s chapter in volume II.

5 On Soviet bloc rejection of Guatemalan aid requests, see Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), ch. 9.

provided military and economic aid to Cuba from 1961, the USSR opposed Cuba's support of guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the Soviets pushed the Cubans to abandon support for such movements in Latin America, offered only modest assistance to the elected socialist government of Chile (1970–73), and sought normal diplomatic and trade relations with the some of region's most repressive military regimes.⁶ The Soviet Union and some East European Communist states provided aid to Nicaragua after the victory of the Sandinista insurgency, but in small amounts reflecting Soviet economic decline and political uncertainty.

Latin American governments, political movements, and interest groups often challenged US predominance from within the region. Though circumstances and capacities varied, nearly every Latin American government attempted at one time or another to mitigate or evade compliance with US interests by turning to other great powers, such as Britain, France, and both imperial and Nazi Germany. The Cuban appeal to the Soviet Union in the 1960s thus followed a long tradition. At various times, Latin American governments, unsuccessfully for the most part, requested regional or international support through the Pan American Union or its successor, the Organization of American States (OAS), or the United Nations. Some sought to deflect or resist US pressure by mobilizing popular support, but such mobilizations raised popular expectations, alienated elites, and often drove the United States to intervene.

Had the United States limited its Cold War objectives to defense against threats to its security, it would have had little reason to exert itself in Latin America. In addition to its unchallenged economic and political predominance, the United States emerged from World War II with nuclear weapons and a military establishment immensely superior to any regional power, indeed more than sufficient to deter any potential threat from Latin America without compromising other strategic missions. US political leaders, however, tended to accord great symbolic importance to deviations from US policy preferences in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean basin. They worried about the demonstration or "domino" effect of any defections from the US camp on neighboring and even distant countries, but their greatest concern focused

6 On Soviet policy in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, see Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, chs. 3–4; Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983); and Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959–1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

on the domestic political consequences should additional territory “fall” to “Communism.”

The institutional foundations for prosecuting the Cold War in Latin America developed in the late 1940s with the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the creation of the OAS in 1948. In addition to pushing for new inter-American institutions, the US government also abruptly shifted its diplomatic and intelligence agencies from combating Axis influence in Latin America to fighting Communism. In the Caribbean and Central America, where the United States could overturn and replace governments with ease, US officials expected a particularly high degree of conformity to US policy preferences.

The Cuban revolution of 1959 marked a watershed in the Cold War strategy of the United States in Latin America. After defeating an invasion force of US-sponsored counterrevolutionaries at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, the Castro government received Soviet military aid to bolster its defenses against what both Cuban and Soviet authorities perceived as the threat of an imminent invasion by the armed forces of the United States. The Soviets secretly placed intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba in September–October 1962 and succeeded in extracting from the administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–63) a pledge not to invade Cuba in exchange for their withdrawal.⁷ The survival of the Cuban revolution and the country’s transformation into a Communist state allied politically and diplomatically to the Soviet Union induced major shifts in US policy toward Latin America during the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–69) administrations.⁸ On the one hand, the Kennedy administration created an “Alliance for Progress,” an aid program with the goal of demonstrating that non-Communist, democratic regimes could match the social progress achieved by Communist Cuba. On the other, it developed a new strategic doctrine to guide military aid that emphasized the role of Latin America’s armed forces in suppressing internal threats to the established order rather than defending the hemisphere against external invasion. These threats included not only Cuban-backed guerrilla movements, which erupted in the mid-1960s, but also elected governments that drifted leftward or otherwise failed to conform to US requirements.

7 See James G. Hershberg’s chapter in volume II.

8 Despite Cuba’s repeated expressions of interest, the USSR never entered into a formal military alliance with Cuba nor did it ever formally agree to defend Cuba militarily. Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact.

The Carter administration and human rights in Central America

When Jimmy Carter assumed the US presidency in January 1977, only Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia in Latin America had governments voted into office in open, competitive elections. The new US administration, spurred by public, congressional, and international criticisms of the policies of Richard M. Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald R. Ford (1974–77) in Latin America, made human rights the centerpiece of its Latin American policy. To the consternation of the region's military regimes, the US government suddenly became critical of the measures they saw as necessary to eliminate Communist and left-wing influence. President Carter endorsed the conventional view, often at odds with official US actions in the 1960s and 1970s, that the lack of democracy threatened the stability of the region in the long run. He saw dictatorships as inherently unstable and worried that the opposition movements they provoked would follow the path of the Cuban revolution toward radicalization and eventual alliance with the USSR. Some Carter officials thus began pressuring the generals to cede power to elected governments and cease abusing citizens during the transition. However, others in the Carter administration worried that abruptly withdrawing support from military regimes would create the very instability that Carter claimed he wanted to avoid.⁹

The Carter administration began in 1977 to implement its human rights policies in Central America, though it gave initial priority to renegotiating the Panama Canal Treaty. Only Costa Rica, of the five Central American republics, held regular elections, respected the civic and human rights of its citizens, and provided public goods and services (education, health, infrastructure) with reasonable efficiency and transparency. In Honduras, the Carter administration succeeded in improving human rights by supporting democratically inclined military officers who eventually engineered the country's return to civilian rule with elections to a constituent assembly in 1980. It failed in Guatemala and El Salvador, however, where human rights abuses were escalating and neither government showed the slightest interest in negotiating with the United States. Carter cut off military aid to both these countries in 1977. In response, these governments ended military ties to the United States

⁹ For a useful and insightful review of Jimmy Carter's human rights policies and their implementation in Latin America as a whole, see Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 6.

and denounced the Carter policy as intrusive meddling in their internal affairs. The US government continued economic aid to avoid punishing innocent beneficiaries, and sought quietly to develop contacts and leverage within the two military establishments. This backdoor military diplomacy succeeded briefly in El Salvador in 1979, but failed in Guatemala.

Carter focused most of his attention on Nicaragua, in part because the regime of Anastasio Somoza seemed most likely to bend to US pressure. In 1978, Somoza's rivals began to pose a threat to the government, making it potentially more dependent on US help. When the country exploded in mass protests and insurrection in September, Carter was already pressuring President Somoza to cede power to a new government that would organize elections. If managed adroitly, Somoza's government could then be replaced by one dominated by one or another of the country's traditionally moderate political parties, grateful to the United States for having paved its way to power. The alternative, which Carter and his advisers sought to avoid, was a polarization of Nicaragua into warring camps, with the initiative passing to the armed guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Somoza, on the other hand, was determined to retain power and convinced that, if the United States were forced to choose between him and the FSLN "Communists," it would have to choose him and back off from its efforts to push him out.¹⁰

Events moved more rapidly than either Carter or Somoza anticipated. Somoza maneuvered to elude demands for "free elections" and began eliminating plausible alternatives. On January 10, 1978, the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the wealthy publisher of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* and a possible successor, touched off a general strike. FSLN guerrillas gained adherents throughout the country. Urban attacks and even large-scale uprisings against the National Guard multiplied. The FSLN managed to seize the national Congress building in Managua in August. The following month, the FSLN briefly seized the northern town of Estelí, buoyed by a mass insurrection against the regime. In December, Somoza rejected a last effort by the Carter team to negotiate a peaceful departure.

Between January and June 1979, the Carter administration watched as the FSLN and Somoza's National Guard fought one another. US military and economic aid to the Somoza government was formally cut off in February,

10 Robert A. Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), chs. 4–6; Thomas Walker, *Nicaragua, the Land of Sandino* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981); William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States and Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1998), 10–32.



12. Jubilant Sandinista rebels in the main square of Managua, June, 1979. The Sandinistas seized Managua with huge popular support.

and Carter officials hoped Somoza would step down. In late June, after the OAS rejected a US plan to send “peacekeepers” to Nicaragua because their main effect would have been to save the National Guard from defeat, US officials opened negotiations with the FSLN, insisting that the Sandinista leaders agree to appoint “moderates” to a majority of Cabinet posts in the new government and promise to hold free elections. The FSLN agreed after some hard bargaining. Somoza then fled Nicaragua on July 17; two days later, the Sandinistas entered Managua amid tumultuous celebrations.¹¹

As the Carter administration worked to salvage the wreckage of its anti-Sandinista policies in Nicaragua, it moved simultaneously to avert “another Nicaragua” in neighboring El Salvador. It did so by inspiring key officers in the Salvadoran armed forces to overthrow the highly repressive government of General Humberto Romero on October 15, 1979. The new government created a five-person *junta* or council to exercise presidential powers until reforms could be implemented and elections called. Two members of the *junta* represented the armed forces; three were civilians. The government

¹¹ Pastor, *Not Condemned*, chs. 4–6; Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

announced an end to repression, full restoration of civic and human rights, and a commitment to agrarian reform and other progressive social policies. For the next three months, El Salvador exploded into renewed political activity and social activism. Political parties, labor unions, community and civic organizations, church groups, and publications of all kinds suddenly emerged from hiding or developed spontaneously. Tragically, the *junta* never managed to exert control over the Salvadoran military and its repressive apparatus and was not supported by the United States when it sought to do so. The Salvadoran military and police units remained intact and crushed their foes. On January 3 and 4, 1980, the three civilian members of the Salvadoran *junta* and all the civilian members of the Cabinet resigned in protest. In the months that followed, the Salvadoran civil war began in earnest. The Carter administration wanted democracy in El Salvador, but it gave priority to preserving the integrity of the Salvadoran military and its command structure to avoid repeating a collapse similar to that of Somoza's National Guard.¹²

The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 hastened the collapse of Carter's efforts. In El Salvador, Reagan's campaign speeches criticizing Carter's human rights policies had helped persuade the Salvadoran military to launch an orgy of repression. In December 1980, after the rape and murder of four US nuns, Carter briefly suspended military aid, but this decision had no impact on the Salvadoran military because its leaders correctly expected Reagan to reverse it.

In Nicaragua, Reagan's campaign rhetoric, which portrayed the Sandinistas in Nicaragua as "Communists" and included pledges to remove them from power, convinced the movement's leaders that there was little point in placating the United States any longer. US-backed politicians in the Sandinista Cabinet lost what leverage they had earlier acquired. More significantly, FSLN leaders decided to extend military and financial aid to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) fighting against the Salvadoran military. The FMLN had the support of nearly all the opposition parties and organizations in El Salvador, except for a minority faction of the Christian Democrats, whose leaders had agreed to form a new government with US support. The Sandinistas hoped that the FMLN would be able to take power in a "final offensive" scheduled for January 1981, just prior to Reagan's inauguration. They hoped that two revolutionary governments in

12 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 33–51; Pastor, *Not Condemned*, ch. 11; James Dunkerley, *Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America* (New York: Verso, 1988), ch. 8.



13. Funeral of Archbishop Óscar Romero of El Salvador, who was killed by right-wingers in March 1980 as he was saying mass. A bombing at the funeral left thirty-eight people dead, and the civil war intensified.

Central America would be able to withstand the hostility of the new US administration better than one. When the FMLN's final offensive failed, the Sandinistas stopped the flow of weapons and support, but this did not impress Reagan and his aides.¹³

¹³ See LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*; Americas Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union, *Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, January 1982* (Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Union, 1982); Cynthia Arnson, *El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1982).

The Reagan revolution versus the Sandinista revolution

In its first weeks in office, the new administration made clear that it intended to reverse a “dangerous decline” in US power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies. The Reagan team charged that timid policies had caused the “loss” of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Iran, Mozambique, and Nicaragua to hostile regimes. They wanted to support allies and punish foes. Central America’s proximity and weakness made it an ideal test case for their bold plans. Democracy and human rights would continue to be important goals in the rhetoric of US officials, but quickly became secondary concerns in practice. The new administration set about repairing relations with abusive but pro-US regimes throughout the hemisphere, including the Argentine military *junta* whose members were later prosecuted, and the military government of Guatemala, then in the process of razing hundreds of indigenous villages and exterminating their inhabitants.¹⁴

The administration’s chief policy goals in Central America included the destruction of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and victory over insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. It expected Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama to help achieve these objectives and exerted unremitting pressure on their governments whenever their enthusiasm for US efforts flagged.

President Reagan made Nicaragua a key symbol of his administration’s aggressively anti-Communist foreign policy. Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, the president stated, had become a “Communist,” “totalitarian” state similar to Cuba. Between January 1981 and December 1983, the administration orchestrated a step-by-step escalation of tensions with Nicaragua, seeking to build public support for an eventual US military intervention. The 1984 US presidential campaign forced the administration to reverse course to avoid political setbacks, but after the president’s reelection in November, Reagan and his advisers expected to resume and consummate its campaign to rid the hemisphere of the Sandinista regime.

The Reagan administration’s hostility toward the Nicaraguan government stemmed from inaccurate premises. The Sandinistas were not turning Nicaragua into a “totalitarian dungeon,” as Reagan described it. They did not impose a one-party state, nationalize the country’s productive property, or suspend

¹⁴ Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala, Memory of Silence (Tz’inil na’tab’al): Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification*, 2nd ed. (Guatemala: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1998).

civic and human rights. They did adopt a new constitution that called for open and competitive elections in 1985, which they moved to 1984 in response to US demands. Nor did the Sandinista regime pose the slightest military or strategic threat to the United States. The Sandinistas announced that their country would remain in the OAS and continue to fulfill its obligations under the Rio Treaty. They stated repeatedly that they would never permit foreign (i.e., Cuban or Soviet) military bases on their territory and offered to sign a treaty, with stringent inspection provisions, to that effect, though they did accept substantial economic and military aid from both.

Throughout the 1980s, both Cuba and the Soviet Union pressured the Sandinistas to seek an accommodation with the United States and made it clear that they were not in a position to offer either military protection or sufficient economic aid to subsidize the Nicaraguan economy in the event that the Sandinistas wished to impose a socialist model. Soviet military aid totaled a mere \$12 million from 1979 through 1980, rising to \$45 million in 1981 after the United States began funding exile groups, eventually called the Contras, that were seeking to create a military force to carry out attacks against the Sandinista armed forces from bases in neighboring Honduras. Military aid from all the Soviet bloc countries peaked at approximately \$250 million in 1984. Economic aid from the Soviet bloc rose to a high of \$253 million in 1982 and declined thereafter.¹⁵ The Sandinista government received more aid from Western Europe and other Latin American countries than from the Communist bloc, virtually all of it conditional on respect for private property and civil liberties.¹⁶

To President Reagan, however, the Sandinistas were implacable enemies of the United States and had to be overthrown. In March 1981, after less than two months in office, he authorized the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to support the Contras. By December, the president had authorized the CIA to provide them with funds, training, equipment, and logistical support. The

15 On Soviet aid, see "Latin Focus: Despite Fears of US, Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Appears to Be Limited – White House Will Push To Aid Contras to Lessen Risk of Region Revolution – Managua Shuns Puppet Role," *Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 1985, 1; Stephen Kinzer, "For Nicaragua, Soviet Frugality Starts to Pinch," *New York Times*, August 20, 1987; W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America: New Opportunities and Old Constraints," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 26,2 (May 1984), 163–98.

16 On the Sandinista regime, see Thomas Walker, *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), and Stephen Kinzer, *Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1991). On Soviet policies and attitudes, see Kiva Maidanik, "On Real Soviet Policy Toward Central America," in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *The Russians Aren't Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 89–96.

Honduran government essentially ceded control of its border with Nicaragua to the CIA and its Nicaraguan recruits (initially drawn from the ranks of the former Somocista National Guard). The Argentine military regime managed to spare enough officers from its domestic campaign of terror to provide appropriate training for the new Contra forces in 1981 and 1982. The Honduran military also provided logistical support and training. The initial Contra force of 500 grew to an army of 15,000 at its maximum strength in the late 1980s.¹⁷

The first major Contra attack on Nicaraguan territory occurred on March 14, 1982. For Reagan, the beginning of the Contra war brought two benefits. First, it demonstrated the president's resolve. This helped to reduce squabbling within the administration, weakened those who preferred diplomacy, and gave notice to other countries in the region (including those supporting the Sandinistas, such as Mexico and Venezuela) that efforts to negotiate a solution to the US–Nicaraguan conflict were likely to be futile. Second, the Contra attacks had a predictably galvanizing effect on the Sandinistas themselves. In response, the regime declared a state of siege, imposed restrictions on the press and on civil liberties, and instituted universal military conscription. These measures gave the Reagan administration the evidence needed to back its claims about the Sandinistas' totalitarian proclivities. Reagan did not want to tame the Sandinistas; he wanted them ousted from power.

Though he succeeded, temporarily as it turned out, in creating the monster he wanted to slay, Reagan faced a skeptical public and Congress. Initially, his administration had funded the Contras with money already appropriated for the CIA and the Defense Department. When these funds ran out, it had asked Congress for additional money. Wary legislators had approved \$19 million for Contra aid in 1983–84, but had prohibited the administration from using any funds for overthrowing the government of Nicaragua, activities that might be defined as state-sponsored terrorism under international law. In late 1983, as polls had showed that public disapproval of the administration's Central American policies could affect the president's reelection effort, administration officials had begun speaking in encouraging terms about prospects for a peaceful resolution of differences with the Sandinistas.¹⁸

During the 1984 presidential campaign, Reagan's Nicaragua policy collapsed into incoherence. Some of the president's advisers used the pause in rhetorical

17 Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 13.

18 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 14.

hostilities to push for a negotiated settlement. In June, Secretary of State George Shultz, who had kept himself aloof (or had been excluded) from dealing with Central American issues, spent two and a half hours at the Managua airport talking with Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. Some military leaders in the Pentagon worried that an invasion of Nicaragua might lead to a protracted intervention, with the population supporting Sandinista guerrillas, much as had happened in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975. But the hawks in the CIA and the White House sought to evade the growing restrictions on aid to the Contras. They tried to secure funds from private donors and from several countries closely allied to the United States, such as Israel and Taiwan. They also approved the mining of Nicaraguan harbors (a flagrant violation of US law and treaty obligations as well as international law) and supported other acts of terrorism against civilian targets in Nicaragua, just as press reports began linking the Contras to human rights abuses, corruption, and drug-smuggling. Angered, Congress then voted to cut off all aid to the Contras.¹⁹ But some White House aides again secretly ignored the new restrictions and intensified their campaign to raise funds for the Contras, an effort led by National Security Council staff officer Colonel Oliver North.²⁰

The most serious threat to the hawks in the administration came from the Sandinistas themselves, who adopted a democratic Constitution, moved national elections to coincide with the US elections in November 1984, lifted restrictions on the press and on civil liberties, and agreed to permit all opposition parties, even those supporting the Contras, to run candidates and campaign freely. The Sandinistas also agreed to sign a “Central American Peace Treaty,” drafted to meet US requirements and brokered by Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (the Contadora Group). The treaty provided for internal democracy, a pledge not to support the Salvadoran guerrillas, the withdrawal of all Soviet bloc and Cuban advisers, a promise never to permit foreign military bases on Nicaraguan territory, limits on the size of its military establishment, and an independent and intrusive inspection system to ensure compliance. Thereafter, the Sandinistas kept their pledge not to aid the FMLN in El Salvador and expelled some of its leaders from Nicaragua. The Sandinistas also asked most of their Cuban and Soviet bloc military advisers to leave. Although these were exactly the steps urged upon the Nicaraguan leaders by Secretary of State Shultz,

19 On the congressional debates and restrictions, see Cynthia Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1993).

20 The illegal White House activities erupted into public view in 1986 in what came to be known as the Irangate or Iran–Contra scandal (see n. 23).

the hawks in the Reagan administration – North, CIA deputy director Robert Gates, and others – maneuvered to get Honduras to reject the treaty and to persuade the Costa Rican and Salvadoran governments to express reservations.²¹

After the reelection of President Reagan, the campaign to overturn the Sandinista regime resumed immediately.²² Momentarily cowed by the magnitude of the Reagan electoral triumph, Congress appropriated \$27 million in “non-lethal” aid for the Contras in 1985–86 and then appropriated \$100 million (\$30 million for weapons) for 1986–87. Despite their new weapons, however, the Contras did not become an effective military force. More at home in their well-stocked Honduran base camps than in combat, they suffered a series of defeats in engagements with the Sandinista army in 1984–85 and subsequently reverted to terrorist attacks on civilian targets, such as sugar mills, farm cooperatives, rural schools, and health clinics, most of which were defended, if at all, by lightly armed civilian militias.

The Reagan administration’s illegal activities in supplying arms to the Contras came to light in a series of incidents that culminated in October and November 1986. In October, the Nicaraguans shot down a CIA resupply plane and captured a surviving crewmember, who confessed fully; the Sandinistas eventually released him. In November, news began leaking from the Middle East of a secret deal with Iran, in which, among other things, the administration agreed to sell arms to Iran and use the “profits” to acquire black-market arms for the Contras.²³

In addition to breaking domestic laws, the Reagan administration found itself accused of violating international law by the Nicaraguan government before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Since the violations, which included the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors, could not be denied, the US government asserted that for reasons of national security it would no longer accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in matters relating to Central America. When the court rejected this argument and rendered a verdict requiring the United States to pay reparations to Nicaragua for the damages it had inflicted, the United States ignored the court’s ruling.²⁴

21 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, chs. 15–16; for a contrary view, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, “Demystifying Contadora,” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1985), 74–95.

22 See, for example, Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945–1993* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 200–01.

23 On the Irangate or Iran–Contra scandal, see Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), *The Iran–Contra Scandal: The Declassified History* (New York: New Press, 1993).

24 Smith, *The Last Years*, 197–99.

When Republicans lost control of the US Senate in the November 1986 elections and the Iran–Contra scandal erupted two weeks later, public support for the administration's Nicaragua policy disappeared. The administration held on to its goal of overthrowing the Sandinistas throughout the fall of 1986 and the spring of 1987 because it still had the funds to do so. When it became clear in the summer of 1987 that Congress would not allow the Contra war to continue into the next fiscal year, the administration's Nicaragua policy disintegrated. In August, the president proposed a plan to House speaker James Wright that specified the conditions under which the US government would be willing to end its confrontation with the Sandinista regime. Wright agreed with much fanfare, but then adroitly announced that Reagan's conditions coincided with terms already negotiated among the Central American countries in talks initiated and led by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias. Called the "Esquipulas II" agreement, named for the Guatemalan town where the treaty was negotiated (an Esquipulas I agreement had not prospered), the treaty accomplished what the Reagan team had sought to avoid: it provided a mechanism for ending the Contra war without the disappearance of the Sandinista government. Reagan objected and bitterly opposed the Esquipulas II agreement, but the disarray in his administration due to the Iran/Contra scandal, together with congressional and public opposition to his Central American policies, left him little room to maneuver.²⁵

In fact, the Esquipulas II agreement embodied virtually all US demands except for the overthrow of the Sandinista government. It required the Sandinistas to place Nicaragua's internal politics under international supervision, to hold new elections (already scheduled) but without restrictions on foreign financing of electoral campaigns, and to negotiate separately with the Contras. The Sandinistas agreed to these terms, despite their risks, because the Contra war had devastated the Nicaraguan economy, forced the government to abandon most of the social programs it had begun to implement, and cost the lives of 30,000 Nicaraguans, mostly civilian supporters of the Sandinista revolution. Though the Reagan administration had failed to overthrow the Sandinistas and found itself forced to accept a peace process it had bitterly opposed, the Contra War and the election of Reagan's vice president,

25 On negotiating with the crippled Reagan team, see Jim Wright, *Worth It All: My War for Peace* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993). On the peace agreement, for which Oscar Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987, see Martha Honey, *Hostile Acts: US Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1994), ch. 14; LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, ch. 21; John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Viking, 1989).

George H. W. Bush, to the presidency in 1988 persuaded most Nicaraguans that their country had no choice but to install leaders that Washington would approve. The Sandinistas lost the election of 1990 to a US-organized and -financed coalition of anti-Sandinista parties.²⁶

Counterinsurgency in Guatemala and El Salvador

In Guatemala and El Salvador, the Reagan administration supported the counterinsurgency campaigns of the local militaries. The Guatemalan guerrilla movement had revived in the mid-1970s, attracting widespread support in the indigenous communities of the highland provinces. Afflicted by economic change, increasing inequality, and generational conflicts, and nurtured by the growing presence of outsiders (Catholic Action, evangelical missionaries, and Peace Corps volunteers), many indigenous communities sought new ways to resolve tensions. National governments, which had once kept the peace by maintaining clientelistic relations with indigenous leaders, were not so good at managing these relationships when they were controlled by military leaders. Pervasive neglect punctuated by episodes of repression replaced the old system.²⁷ The guerrillas recruited the young, the energetic, and people seeking democracy or social justice, but also developed ties to traditional community leaders who had lost faith in the government. By 1981, 17,000 soldiers of the Guatemalan army faced 6,000 insurgents organized into seven fronts nominally covering two-thirds of the nation's territory; the guerrillas occupied one provincial capital and dozens of highland villages.²⁸

The Reagan administration sought to renew military aid to Guatemala, but failed to persuade Democrats to go along. Massive human rights abuses, which the administration denied, troubled even some Republicans in Congress. Although the Guatemalan army circumvented the cutoff by purchasing weapons from other countries, the Reagan administration still fretted about the regional implications of guerrilla successes in Guatemala and looked for an opportunity to help reverse them. When dissident military commanders overthrew Guatemalan president Lucas García and installed former general

26 John H. Coatsworth, *Central America and the United States: The Clients and the Colossus* (New York: Twayne, 1994), 166.

27 See Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 220–33.

28 Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, "The Hidden War: Guatemala's Counterinsurgency Campaign," in Nora Hamilton, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Linda Fuller, and Manuel Pastor, Jr., *Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and US Policy in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 153–82.

Efraín Ríos Montt, a recent convert to evangelical Protestantism, Reagan renewed economic aid. In December 1982, he visited Guatemala City, praised the new government's commitment to defending Guatemala from the threat of Communism, and promised to renew US military aid.

The Ríos Montt government acted decisively. In 1982 and 1983, it destroyed an estimated 686 indigenous villages and hamlets, killing between 50,000 and 75,000 people. It forced 800,000 peasants into "civil patrols," sparing their communities only if they provided evidence of their success in uncovering and killing insurgents. In a population of fewer than 9 million, the regime created a million refugees (150,000 of whom fled into Mexico).²⁹

Ríos Montt was toppled by a new coup in August 1983. The new government, headed by General Oscar Mejía Victores, consolidated the gains achieved against the insurgents. He ended Ríos Montt's quixotic but popular campaign against corruption, rescinded tax increases to which the nation's economic elite had objected strenuously, and promised to return the country to civilian rule. The Reagan team welcomed the government's pledge to hold new elections because it provided evidence of the regime's commitment to democracy at a time when credible reports of atrocities were flooding Congress and the media. On the other hand, the new regime refused to be drawn into US efforts to contain Communism in the rest of Central America. Mejía Victores declared that "the countries of the isthmus could coexist with a Communist Nicaragua."³⁰ His civilian successors encouraged negotiations and compromise.

Crushing the insurgency in El Salvador proved to be the Reagan administration's most difficult challenge in Central America. The Salvadoran guerrillas had widespread support and proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of relentless attacks. The brutality of the Salvadoran military and its associated "death squads" matched that of the Guatemalans but, unlike their Guatemalan counterpart, the Salvadoran military faced almost certain defeat and disintegration without massive US aid. But the military's human rights abuses outraged some members of the US Congress whose votes were needed to get military aid approved.

29 On the Guatemalan counterinsurgency efforts and their human cost, see Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala, Memory of Silence*. For a moving first-hand account of the atrocities, based on the experience of the late Fr. Ronald W. Hennessey, a Maryknoll priest from Iowa, see Thomas R. Melville, *Through a Glass Darkly: The US Holocaust in Central America* (n.p.: Xlibris, 2005), part VI. On Reagan administration policy, see Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 158–69.

30 Floria Castro, "La política exterior de Guatemala, 1982–1986," *Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos*, 43 (January–April 1987), 65.

The Reagan administration thus faced two important but contradictory tasks. The first was to prevent the collapse of the Salvadoran military. This required an effort to promote competence, reduce corruption, and minimize high-visibility human rights abuses. The second task was to cobble together a civilian government credible enough to ensure that Congress would provide military aid despite continuing evidence of the military's abuses.

Reagan's advisers found a solution in José Napoleón Duarte, leader of the conservative wing of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Duarte had credibility with Democrats in Congress because of his past relationships with Carter and because the Salvadoran military despised him. Reagan insisted that the Salvadoran military accept Duarte's election. Though the PDC soon collapsed and disappeared from Salvadoran politics, it did use its temporary power to open political space just as the Salvadoran military's dependence on US aid was forcing it to become more discriminating in its brutality. Duarte even succeeded in removing a number of abusive senior commanders with US help, though the death toll and human rights abuses remained at high levels throughout his administration.³¹ Between October 1979 and early 1984, nearly 40,000 people, most of whom were unarmed noncombatants, were murdered by the armed forces, and over 500,000 refugees fled the country.³²

The Reagan administration devoted more time, effort, and resources to Central America than any other administration in the history of the United States. It failed, however, to achieve its main objectives. It did not overturn the government of Nicaragua or thwart a peace agreement that defined conditions for peaceful coexistence. The Guatemalan insurgents were driven from the indigenous highlands at a vast cost in life and property, but this victory damaged US credibility on human rights, yet failed to attract Guatemalan support for US policies elsewhere in Central America. The administration did transform the Salvadoran army into a large, well-equipped, and more effective fighting force, but did not defeat the FMLN. Though some political space opened under the PDC regime, the Reagan team blocked the civilian government's efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war.

31 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, chs. 6–12; Amson, *Crossroads*, 139–54; Terry Karl, "Exporting Democracy: The Unanticipated Effects of US Electoral Policy in El Salvador" in Hamilton, Frieden, Fuller, and Pastor (eds.), *Crisis in Central America*, 173–92. Total US aid to El Salvador in the 1980s amounted to \$4.7 billion, roughly \$1,044 per inhabitant.

32 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 169–74; Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: US Policy and El Salvador* (New York: New York Times Books, 1984); United Nations, *From Madness to Hope: The Twelve Year War in El Salvador*, Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (UN Doc S/25500, April 1, 1993).

The end of the Cold War in Central America

The end of the global Cold War during the presidency of George H. W. Bush pushed the new administration to alter course in Central America. Instead of seeking to overthrow the Sandinistas and win the war in El Salvador, the administration adopted new policies designed mainly to remove Central America from the US political agenda and drastically reduce the time and resources devoted to the region.

First, however, Bush and his advisers decided to get rid of the Panamanian government dominated by the once-cooperative General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega was tolerated despite evidence of his links to drug-smuggling and money-laundering so long as he supported US policies in Nicaragua and El Salvador. When he balked at providing direct aid to the Contras, news accounts exposed his alleged criminal connections. Noriega was indicted for drug-smuggling and other crimes by federal grand juries in Florida in February 1988. The United States invaded Panama in December 1989, kidnapped Noriega, and brought him to the United States to be tried on drug charges.³³ Nearly all of the Latin American nations opposed the US action, and the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the OAS, condemned the invasion.³⁴

With Noriega out of the way, the Bush administration swiftly turned its attention away from Central America. As the Cold War ended, the region lost both its strategic significance, arguable at best, as well as its symbolic role as a battleground in a larger global conflict. Elites in Central America, along with the region's military establishments and right-wing political forces, came to realize that they could no longer count on massive US aid. The collapse of Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe pushed opposition parties and guerrilla movements to reassess their options, even though the help they received had been modest at best. In short, the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union produced a stalemate in which the only plausible outcome for all of the local contenders was a negotiated peace in the context of US hegemony.

In Nicaragua, with money running out, the Contras reached a belated ceasefire agreement with the Sandinista government. Although the Contras did not surrender their arms, the Sandinistas complied scrupulously with the treaty and scheduled elections for February 25, 1990. The US government

33 See Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110, 4 (Winter, 1995), 539–62.

34 See Robert Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), 95–98.

persuaded the fractious anti-Sandinista opposition to unite around a single candidate, Violeta Chamorro, and poured money into her campaign. The invasion of Panama and the refusal of the Contras to disarm and accept an amnesty helped to convince Nicaraguan voters that peace could not be achieved and the economy restored without appeasing the United States. Chamorro won a narrow victory.³⁵

In El Salvador, the United States also changed course and backed UN-brokered talks between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. The defeat of the corrupt and discredited PDC at the hands of the right-wing ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) party, which had close ties to the military and its death squads, reassured the military high command that its interests would be protected. Late support and some arm-twisting by the Bush administration produced a document signed at the United Nations in New York on December 31, 1991.³⁶

Negotiations to end the civil war in Guatemala were more protracted. Civilian presidents did not challenge the armed forces, but elections did open political space for dissent and opposition. With help from the William J. Clinton administration (1993–2001), a peace settlement was signed in December 1996, but not before an internal investigation by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board concluded that the CIA had been deeply involved in human rights abuses in that country.³⁷

Between the onset of the global Cold War in 1948 and its conclusion in 1990, the US government secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four governments in Latin America, four by direct use of US military forces, three by means of CIA-managed revolts or assassination, and seventeen by encouraging local military and political forces to intervene without direct US participation, usually through military *coups d'état*. These actions enhanced the capacity of US leaders to shape events throughout the region by making intervention a credible threat, even in countries where it had not yet occurred. As a consequence, for over forty years, Latin Americans were ruled by governments more conservative (and thus reliably anti-Communist) than Latin American voters were inclined to elect or than US citizens themselves would have been inclined to tolerate.

35 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 553–64; Coatsworth, *Central America*, ch. 7.

36 LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard*, 564–78.

37 Cited in Richard Nuccio, "The CIA and the Guatemalan Peace Process," foreword to the 1999 edition of Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, exp. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), xxiv–xxvi.

The human cost of this effort was immense. Between 1960, by which time the Soviets had dismantled Stalin's gulags, and the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of nonviolent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many individual Latin American countries.³⁸

The hot Cold War in Central America produced an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. Between 1975 and 1991, the death toll alone stood at nearly 300,000 in a population of less than 30 million. More than 1 million refugees fled from the region – most to the United States. The economic costs have never been calculated, but were huge. In the 1980s, these costs did not affect US policy because the burden on the United States was negligible. Indeed, there were benefits. Calling attention to threats emanating from a region so close to the United States helped the Reagan administration gain credibility and build support for its other priorities, including major increases in defense spending. Decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union had created a domestic political culture that rewarded aggressive behavior when the costs could be passed on to others.

Since many of the concerns the Reagan administration expressed about Central America were empirically false or historically implausible, many historians and political scientists have tended to conclude that US policy in Central America during the Cold War cannot be explained as the result of rational calculation. Policymakers, they claim, suffered from a kind of anti-Communist cultural malaise or imperial hubris.³⁹ Jorge Domínguez has argued, for example, that the Cuban revolution so traumatized US policymakers that, at crucial moments in the succeeding decades, US policy became "illogical."⁴⁰ But for Central Americans, it made little difference whether the Cold War policies of the United States arose from rationally calculated malevolence or merely undisciplined atavism. Many question whether this sad history came to a definitive end when the Cold War ended.

38 This observation is based on the author's examination of published CIA and State Department reports and on the reports of Freedom House, a private nonprofit organization hostile to Communist regimes.

39 See, for example, Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1982); Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope*, 361, 366.

40 Jorge Domínguez, "US–Latin American Relations During the Cold War and Its Aftermath," in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 33.

The Cold War and southern Africa, 1976–1990

CHRIS SAUNDERS AND SUE ONSLOW

Although southern Africa remained marginal to the Soviet–American relationship in the Cold War era, much of the history of the region in these years was shaped by the ideological confrontation between the superpowers.¹ This theme has attracted little detailed attention in the relevant scholarly literature, perhaps because the connections are often difficult to draw and local actors did not see the struggle between Moscow and Washington as all-important. In southern Africa, the primary process underway in these years was decolonisation, and the residual strength of white settler regimes gave anti-colonial struggles a particular intensity. These struggles pre-dated the onset of the Cold War, but the superpower conflict moulded them in new ways, and played a key role in the transition from colonial and white minority control to black majority rule.

In the decade before the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union supported liberation movements that embarked on armed struggles, while the United States, despite its anti-colonial origins and rhetorical commitment to freedom, remained an ally of the colonial powers and of apartheid South Africa, with which it retained close economic and strategic ties. From the mid-1970s, the United States accepted the need for evolutionary change towards black majority rule. The debate in Washington was then over the pace, and means, of such change. Under Gerald R. Ford and, in particular, Ronald Reagan, the United States sought to prevent regimes allied to the Soviet Union from achieving power or retaining control. The administration of President Jimmy Carter worked more actively through multilateral diplomacy to secure transitions to

1 On the period to 1976, see Michael E. Latham's and Piero Gleijeses's chapters in volume II. We define 'southern Africa' as including Angola but not Tanzania (which received more aid from China than any other African country) or Zaire (where Cold War intervention in the early 1960s had resulted in the installation of the US-backed regime of Mobutu Sese Seko) (see Sean Kelly, *America's Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu of Zaire* (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1993)).



Map 2. Southern Africa

black majority rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa (SWA)/Namibia; Carter was convinced that racial justice and independence were the best recipe to forestall Communist influence and domination. For their part, the white governments of South Africa and Rhodesia continued to use the perceived threat of Communism to demonise the liberation movements, to legitimate actions against them, and to divert domestic and international attention from the real causes of opposition to racist rule.

The Cold War did not merely mean rivalry between the United States and the USSR in the struggle to gain influence in southern Africa. The Soviet Union's aspirations to be the leading supporter of African liberation movements in the 'anti-imperialist' struggle were challenged, after the Sino-Soviet split, by China and by Cuba's activism. Washington's policy towards southern Africa was not always in tune with London's approach. While some Western policy advisers argued that radical African nationalism was first and foremost an indigenous phenomenon, others emphasised foreign influences and links. And the 'anti-imperialist' struggle in southern Africa was not confined to that between the Soviet bloc, China, and their European/American capitalist antagonists, for the South African and Rhodesian white regimes also regarded themselves as anti-imperialist. Afrikaner antipathy to British imperialism had deep roots, while in Rhodesia Ian Smith's government had broken with Britain in 1965.²

The dynamics of the Cold War in southern Africa were, therefore, complex. The regional liberation movements themselves did not form a monolithic bloc. Often bitter rivals, both before and after independence, these movements tried to exploit the preoccupations of the external powers for their own benefit and to achieve a greater degree of independence in the global system. While socialism appeared to many to offer an alternative path to modernity, and a way to re-align the asymmetrical economic and power-political arrangements of the pre-independence era, none wished to exchange one form of foreign domination for another – although this was not widely recognised at the time. The overwhelming provision of assistance for the liberation struggle from the USSR, its East European allies, and Cuba took the form of military instruction, logistical support, and weaponry, rather than substantial injections of economic aid. However, a significant part of the Second World's support of the African 'global South' was also the provision of tertiary education and collaboration through international youth and women's groups. This provided an important sense of solidarity that helped to sustain the determination of African nationalists. While the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee joined the socialist countries in supporting the armed struggles of liberation movements, most independent African countries tried to distance themselves from superpower competition through participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, hoping thereby to enhance their moral legitimacy and freedom to manoeuvre.

The Cold War in the region, then, constituted a highly complex clash of systems and ideas, in which the propaganda battle on the home front often

2 See D. Lowry, 'The Roots of Anti Communism and the Cold War in White Rhodesian Culture, ca. 1920s–1980', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 169–94.

played as important a part as military conflict. Three distinct phases can be identified in the period between the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1975 and the final disintegration of the Soviet bloc in 1990. In each period, domestic developments and events were affected by the international dimension, and local actors drew upon external support as it suited their own particular agendas. In each phase, the attitude and activities of the regional hegemon, South Africa, are particularly important to an understanding of the shifting dynamics of power, perception, and political control.

1975–1980

The Cold War appeared to have arrived in Africa with a vengeance as a direct consequence of the failure of the Ford administration, aided by the South African government, to prevent a Marxist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA), from coming to power in Angola in 1975–76. This resounding setback for American and South African policy had far-reaching implications for the regional ideological and racial balance of power. The MPLA victory was achieved thanks to the support of a substantial Cuban military force. On the other side of the continent, newly independent Mozambique followed Angola in signing a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, and the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) formally declared itself Marxist-Leninist. To the South African government, which had long claimed itself to be a bastion of anti-Communism and asserted its affinity with Western strategic and economic interests, these developments brought the Cold War to its doorstep and raised the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow. The apartheid regime viewed the Cubans in Angola as a Soviet proxy, and feared that the USSR had a grand design to bring all southern Africa within its sphere of influence, and therefore would increase their aid to liberation movements. The South African government was in the process of developing nuclear weapons as the ultimate defensive measure to deter international threats and forestall possible regional armed intervention.³ Yet the failure of the South African invasion of Angola and the triumph of radical

³ Though South African diplomats continued to deny that Pretoria had nuclear weapons, by the early 1980s South African scientists had begun to construct atomic bombs. The United States may have given clandestine support for South Africa's nuclear weapons programme: Marta van Wyk, 'Ally or Critic? The United States' Response to South African Nuclear Development', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 195–222.



14. Soldiers of the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola). The MPLA came to power with Soviet assistance and with the help of Cuban troops.



15. Black students protesting against apartheid in Soweto, South Africa, June 1976.

movements in Luanda and Maputo emboldened black South Africans, and the uprising that began in Soweto in June 1976 strengthened the South African government's belief in a Communist-led 'total onslaught' on the white minority regime, and the need for a 'total strategy' to defeat it.⁴

Cold War perceptions had also long been important in framing the outlook and behaviour of the members of the Rhodesian Front (RF) government, representing the interests of about 250,000 whites in a population of more than 4.5 million. These politicians, like those of South Africa, had persuaded themselves of the existence of an international Communist threat and elaborated a self-serving propaganda to convince the white electorate, as well as elements within the African community, that Rhodesia represented the front line in the Cold War in the region.⁵ Events in Angola merely served to convince politicians in the Rhodesian capital, Salisbury, of the validity of this view. As the RF's leader, Ian Smith, told B. J. Vorster, the South African prime minister, 'the West should realise Rhodesia was trying to avoid a revolution; premature majority rule would ensure that Rhodesia would be lost to the free world'.⁶ Smith's refusal to accelerate domestic political and economic reform, while attempting to find black leaders prepared to collaborate with his agenda, prompted the rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements to approach Cuba, the Soviet bloc, and China for military hardware and training. This ability to appeal to a variety of external patrons intensified power struggles within the nationalist groups themselves. Furthermore, the presence of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) guerrilla training camps in Zambia and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) military bases in Mozambique meant that those countries were targeted for retaliatory action by the Rhodesian security forces. As a result, the Zambian and Mozambican economies suffered increasingly from disruption of trade and communications links. Support for the liberation struggle in neighbouring countries thus came at a high price for these newly independent states. To the political leadership in Lusaka, Maputo, and Luanda, however, the failure

4 See, e.g., M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force* (Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2006), esp. ch. 11. The term 'total onslaught' was not new at this time, but was now given new significance: N. Stultz, 'South Africa in Angola and Namibia', in T. G. Weiss and J. G. Blight (eds.), *The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 86.

5 J. Frederikse, *None but Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1982); C. A. Ford, 'South African Foreign Policy since 1965: The Cases of Rhodesia and Namibia', DPhil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1991; Lowry, 'The Roots of Anti-Communism'.

6 J. Gaylard, record of meeting, 9 June 1976, Smith Papers: 4/002 (M), Cory Library, Rhodes University, South Africa.

of their Rhodesian/Zimbabwean comrades to achieve comparable independence represented a compromised victory for their own liberation struggles.⁷

Relationships within the socialist bloc were not as straightforward as its opponents often believed. Contrary to Pretoria's and Salisbury's perceptions, the Cubans had not acted at Moscow's behest in the Angolan conflict, although the Soviets had provided much of the transport, weaponry, and equipment by which the Cubans asserted their authority. With the triumph of the MPLA, the Kremlin was optimistic that Soviet influence in the region would grow as sponsor of the 'anti-imperialist struggle' and that more pro-Soviet regimes would come to power. The Communist Party of South Africa had had close relations with Moscow from its inception, and from the early 1960s the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) had forged new ties with the underground and exiled African National Congress (ANC). During the 1970s, the Soviets stepped up their military and logistical support for liberation in the region. From 1979, Moscow sent military advisers to Angola, who helped train the Angolan armed forces and the ANC's army, called Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), as well as those from Namibian liberation movements. By the mid-1980s, there were approximately 2,000 Soviet instructors in the Angolan theatre.⁸ The Cuban commitment remained much larger: although Castro had originally intended to withdraw gradually all Cuban forces over a three-year period, the continuing regional conflict, and especially South African aggression in southern Angola, prompted increased Cuban provision of military advisers and training, in addition to the growing number of troops.

By contrast, the influence of Moscow's ideological rival for leadership of agrarian revolutionary nationalism, the People's Republic of China (PRC), waned in relative terms. This was in part because of the political convulsions in China following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, but it was also

7 Though Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia sought to distance his country from both Washington and Moscow, he had tried to persuade the American government to share nuclear technology. See A. DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia and the USA 1964–1968', *Cold War History* 7, 2 (2007), 227–50. The Zambians were very unhappy when the Americans then sold high-grade enriched uranium to South Africa, and the Byrd Amendment permitted American purchases of Rhodesian chrome in defiance of UN-mandated economic sanctions.

8 V. Shubin, 'Moscow and ANC: Three Decades of Co-operation and Beyond', paper presented at Conference on International Anti-Apartheid Movements in South Africa's Freedom Struggle: Lessons for Today, Durban, 10–13 October 2004; V. Shubin, 'Unsung Heroes', *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007), 251–62. The South African government cited the capture of a Soviet soldier in Angola in 1981 as evidence of the threat from the USSR. See also Piero Gleijeses's chapter in volume II.

because Beijing often backed less successful nationalist movements. Driven by the Sino-Soviet split in its selection of regional clients, the PRC supported the relatively ineffectual Pan-Africanist Congress in the South African liberation struggle, the marginalised South West African National Union in SWA/Namibia, and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA), one of the losing parties in the Angolan civil war. Although China stepped up aid to independent Zambia and Mozambique and to ZANU's guerrilla forces, Beijing's influence was more rhetorical than substantive, and far less than that of the Soviet Union and Cuba.⁹

For its part, the Ford administration continued to view southern African developments primarily through Cold War lenses. Washington realised that the failure of its covert activity in Angola had accentuated perceptions of US weakness, but both Henry Kissinger, who still regarded South Africa as the 'key policeman' in the region, and the South Africans were determined to try to prevent the USSR from embarking on further adventures. Their greatest fear, as Kissinger put it, was a 'total victory in Africa' for the Soviets.¹⁰ To this end, the US secretary of state launched a diplomatic offensive in 1976 to achieve negotiated settlements to end the Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts. The United States and Britain hoped that, because of its diplomatic isolation following the Angolan debacle, South Africa would be susceptible to a joint approach on Rhodesia and vulnerable to discreet diplomatic pressure.

This was by no means certain, for the South African government felt betrayed, as Kissinger and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had encouraged South African intervention in Angola. The failure there had enormous implications for Pretoria's control over neighbouring SWA/Namibia. Prime Minister Vorster was seeking Western endorsement for his Turnhalle conference approach, which excluded the most important party, Sam Nujoma's South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). As the MPLA consolidated its victory, SWAPO was able to establish its military bases in southern Angola, immediately north of Ovamboland, from which it drew most of its support. Its war against South African occupation of Namibia, which had begun in 1966, now began to escalate.¹¹

9 This was in part influenced by events elsewhere, such as Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. See S. F. Jackson, 'China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1993', *China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), 388–422; I. Taylor, 'The Ambiguous Commitment: The People's Republic of China and the Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18, 1 (2000), 91–106.

10 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 237–38.

11 CAB 1/1/6, 7 September 1976, South African National Archives, Pretoria.

At the same time, with the triumph of the pro-Marxist FRELIMO forces in Mozambique, the liberation war in neighbouring Rhodesia/Zimbabwe grew more intense. For Kissinger and the South Africans, resolving the crisis there became even more important than bringing about a Namibian settlement. From Pretoria's perspective, if radical nationalists came to power north of the Limpopo River, South Africa would lose a vital buffer state on its perimeter. Now isolated in the international community, and under considerable pressure at the United Nations over its presence in Namibia, the South African government sought to use a settlement of the Rhodesian issue as its path to international respectability. Despite the government's sense of betrayal, in Kissinger it appeared to have found a Western leader with whom it could work. In a major speech in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1976, Kissinger promised that the United States 'would communicate to the Smith regime its view that a settlement leading to majority rule must be negotiated rapidly'. Like the South African government, he hoped that 'moderate' blacks could be found to take over in Rhodesia and Namibia. This, Kissinger believed, would meet international and internal pressure for majority rule and isolate the radical leadership of the liberation movements, with links to the USSR or the PRC. He was especially concerned to ensure that the Cubans did not intervene in the full-blown guerrilla war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Were they to intervene there, he told the American president, 'Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.'¹²

The continued presence of Cuban forces in Angola added to the shared sense of threat felt by the white minority regimes, but each had a different approach to resolving the challenge from radical African nationalism. Despite the appearance of white solidarity and their shared loathing of Communism, there was little love lost between South Africa's Afrikaner nationalist government and the Smith regime.¹³ Vorster pressed Salisbury to compromise before Carter's anticipated election victory, as this might close a vital window of opportunity to achieve a settlement with preferred nationalist elements. South Africa's resolve to settle the Rhodesian issue meant that when Kissinger met Vorster in Europe in June 1976, the US secretary of state had little difficulty

12 National Security Council minutes, 7 April 1976, www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nscmin/760407.pdf, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.

13 Ford, 'South African Foreign Policy', 114, 119–20, 124. See also S. Onslow, 'South Africa and the Owen–Vance Plan', *South African Historical Journal*, 51 (2004), 130–58. To the South African government, the Rhodesian white community seemed tainted by its past close association with British imperialism, the historic foe of Afrikaner nationalism, and Rhodesian racial policies seemed fundamentally flawed.

in persuading the South African premier to withhold military supplies and crucial ammunition from Rhodesia. Kissinger and Vorster then pressured Smith into conceding a transition to majority rule within two years.¹⁴ While hard-liners in the South African Cabinet remained profoundly concerned about the security implications for the republic of majority rule in Rhodesia, it was recognised that South Africa could not afford to continue to provide massive injections of aid and arms to the RF regime.¹⁵

The advent of President Carter saw a shift in US policy towards southern Africa. Driven by his particular moral agenda, Carter immediately terminated nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and his administration was to devote an inordinate amount of time and energy to the settlement of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean and SWA/Namibian issues. Departing from Kissinger's free-wheeling style, Washington now worked closely with Britain to promote a Rhodesian/Zimbabwean all-party settlement from September 1977. South Africa, meanwhile, encouraged the RF government to pursue an internal settlement, meaning a 'home-grown' form of majority rule that would allow for continued white political and economic direction of the country and would exclude what was seen to be the Marxist-oriented Patriotic Front (PF) of ZAPU and ZANU. Smith's obduracy strengthened the determination of the nationalists to challenge him militarily, and they received increasingly active backing from their external patrons. By 1979, the Rhodesian security forces had lost control of most of the rural hinterland, and the Soviet Union was providing sophisticated weaponry to ZAPU guerrillas based in Zambia, while Cuban military instructors were training ZAPU recruits at Luso Boma in Angola. By 1979, the camp there contained 125 Cuban instructors, training approximately 6,000 ZAPU guerrillas at a time; more ZAPU fighters were based in refugee transit camps in Botswana. It was, however, ZANU's combatants, operating from neighbouring Mozambique and using Maoist techniques of infiltration and indoctrination, who proved much more successful than ZAPU's fighters in penetrating Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Carter also tried to use multilateral diplomacy to resolve the Namibian issue, but there, too, failure to secure a swift transition to majority rule resulted in an escalation of violence. SWAPO relied on the Soviet bloc for its arms, and from 1976 Cuban instructors helped train its military wing in Angola. SWAPO's

14 See S. Onslow, "We Must Gain Time": South Africa, Rhodesia and the Kissinger Initiative of 1976', *South African Historical Journal*, 56 (2006), 123–53.

15 For some in the South African security forces, the Rhodesian conflict was a useful theatre in which to refine counter-insurgency techniques and even to test chemical and biological weapons.

Lusaka congress that year adopted a political programme that spoke of the goal of 'scientific socialism', and the organisation began planning to move its headquarters from Zambia to Marxist Angola.¹⁶ The Carter administration took the lead in forming a Western Contact Group, comprising representatives of the five Western countries then members of the Security Council, to discuss with the South African government and SWAPO how to reach a settlement to end the conflict. The Contact Group told Vorster to abandon his Turnhalle scheme because it did not include SWAPO, and subsequently produced a compromise plan for a transition to independence in Namibia. This called for an election supervised by the UN and a continued South African administration until independence.

Although the military/intelligence establishment in Pretoria, which was increasingly dominating South African foreign policy, disliked the idea of a UN-supervised election that might bring SWAPO to power, the South African Cabinet accepted the compromise plan in April 1978.¹⁷ Despite the South African Defence Force (SADF) raid on the SWAPO camp at Cassinga in southern Angola on 4 May 1978, in which over 600 people were killed, pressure from the front-line states – Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana – induced the reluctant SWAPO leadership to agree to the plan in July. It was then embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of September 1978, which the USSR did not veto because the proposed settlement had African support.

Hopes that the Western powers had successfully arranged a Namibian transition to democracy were, however, soon dashed. As soon as details emerged of how the UN intended to implement the plan, the South African government began the stalling tactics that would delay Namibian independence for another decade. As in the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case, the South Africans were not prepared to see their preferred successor competing against its arch-opponents through the ballot box. Pretoria would not accept that Nujoma was in the mould of Samora Machel of Mozambique – a pragmatic nationalist who wanted independence above all and who was no Soviet puppet.

Cold War fixations became increasingly entrenched in South Africa in the latter half of the 1970s. The major Soviet/Cuban intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–78 was misinterpreted as a possible precedent for intervention in the

16 For SWAPO's ideology, see especially L. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia* (Basel: Schlettwein Publishing, 1998). The headquarters moved in 1979.

17 See Westad, *Global Cold War*, 283–84.

south of the continent.¹⁸ Although Moscow was growing somewhat disenchanted with intervention in the Third World, the South African government, lacking access to accurate intelligence, continued to believe in a total onslaught orchestrated from the Kremlin.¹⁹ In this distorted world-view, South Africa was a prime target of Soviet designs – a misperception strengthened by the fact that the ANC, in exile, strongly influenced by the SACP, was committed to armed struggle to overthrow the South African state.

In an attempt to counter the seemingly all-encompassing Soviet threat, Vorster's successor as prime minister, P. W. Botha, held out a vision of a neutral 'constellation' of anti-Communist states in southern Africa. This was explicitly designed to set South Africa apart from both East and West. South Africa also continued to explore the idea of collaboration with authoritarian, anti-Communist states in Latin America, while at the same time presenting itself as the last redoubt of Western capitalism in southern Africa against the advancing tide of Communist-inspired radical African nationalism.

Despite fears that the Rhodesian imbroglio would deepen, the decade ended with a surprisingly swift Rhodesian settlement. After both the British Labour government and the Carter administration had refused to accept the internal settlement of 1978 which excluded the Patriotic Front, the new British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, was persuaded by her foreign secretary, Peter Carrington, of the vital necessity to include the PF in negotiations. Carrington then brought the all-party negotiations at Lancaster House to a successful conclusion in December 1979. Machel exerted crucial pressure on ZANU leader Robert Mugabe both to attend the conference and to accept the outcome. It now seems likely that the United States and Sir 'Sonny' Ramphal, secretary general to the Commonwealth, helped behind the scenes on the land issue.²⁰ Thatcher herself was persuaded that the white-led Rhodesian security forces would retain ultimate authority and that a moderate black government would be elected, a conviction shared in Pretoria. In April 1980, Zimbabwe attained internationally recognised independence after an election supervised by Britain and the Commonwealth. Despite the South African and British governments' sense of shock when Mugabe swept to victory at the polls,

¹⁸ See *ibid.*

¹⁹ Under Reagan, close ties were to develop between South African military intelligence and the CIA. Much of the story of intelligence co-operation remains unclear, but see J. Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006).

²⁰ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1983), and private information.

Mugabe's conciliatory rhetoric on assuming power, his apparent willingness to co-operate with the white-dominated business community, and the effective postponement of radical land reform all seemed to suggest that Zimbabwe could become a successful multi-racial, pluralistic capitalist state.²¹ At the start, it was hoped that a stable and prosperous Zimbabwe would encourage gradual change in South Africa. In the view of Richard Moose, the US assistant secretary for African affairs, the fact that Zimbabwe's transition to independence was the product of a negotiated settlement brokered by Britain, and not a military victory, was 'the greatest reverse the Russians have suffered in Africa for years'.²² Much of this was, in reality, the West being purblind in the context of the Cold War, for Mugabe continued to use violence to achieve political goals in independent Zimbabwe.

1980–1985

Although the prospects of peace in southern Africa initially appeared brighter at the start of the 1980s, thanks to the Zimbabwe settlement, much of this period was a time of growing militancy, violence, and repression of dissent in the region. The South African government remained fixated by the perceived threat from the USSR and its regional proxies. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, although conceived in Moscow as a defensive measure, had seemed to the increasingly embattled white minority regime in South Africa to be the 'ultimate proof of [Soviet] aggressive intent'.²³ Pretoria's world-view was to find strong support from the Reagan administration as well as from Thatcher, in the context of renewed international tension between East and West. This effectively gave South Africa an international protective shield.²⁴

Although Mugabe's declaration of political support for the South African liberation movements stopped short of permitting the establishment of ANC forward bases inside Zimbabwe, the South African government remained

21 David Blair, *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (London: Continuum, 2003); Stephen Chan, *Robert Mugabe: A Political Life* (London: IB Tauris, 2002). Washington provided a three-year aid package of \$225 million, and in 1981 Zimbabwe was pledged a further \$665 million by the international community.

22 *Christian Science Monitor* (weekly edition), 28 April 1980, cited in Adrian Guelke, 'Southern Africa and the Superpowers', *International Affairs*, 56, 4 (Autumn 1980), 648. The new Zimbabwean state did not permit the USSR to establish an embassy in Harare until 1981.

23 Westad, *Global Cold War*, 322.

24 Roger Pfister, *Apartheid South Africa and African States 1961–1994* (London: IB Tauris, 2005), 105–06.

profoundly suspicious of his ideological agenda.²⁵ Furthermore, Mugabe's victory had undermined the South African government's hopes to create a constellation of client states on its perimeter. Now intent on ensuring a weak and fractured Zimbabwe which would be in no position to foment further unrest within South Africa, Pretoria began to recruit former Rhodesian military personnel and created a network of informants within the Zimbabwe police, armed forces, and intelligence community. A campaign of sabotage and assassination was initiated, targeting Zimbabwean and exiled ANC officials, as part of an anti-Communist counter-insurgency strategy. South Africa also assumed responsibility for the military and financial support of the Mozambique National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, RENAMO), a dissident militia originally created and funded by Rhodesian intelligence in 1976 to destabilise the Marxist Mozambican government. Working through RENAMO, South Africa deliberately stoked the civil war inside Mozambique, which was to last until 1992. In southern Angola, the South African military gave massive support to build up the rebel and anti-SWAPO Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*, UNITA), in another effort to keep the black African radical challenge as far as possible from South Africa's own borders.

Zimbabwean independence inadvertently delayed Namibia's own attainment of majority rule. Mugabe's victory suggested to the Botha government that SWAPO would win a Namibian election, and South African determination to prevent this outcome helped to ensure there would be no such settlement in the early 1980s. The South African minister of foreign affairs told Chester Crocker, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, in 1981 that South Africa wanted the United States 'to stop Soviet gains ... SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day ... [the South African government]'s bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek'. The South African minister of defence was adamant that South Africa could not allow a SWAPO election victory or the presence of Soviet/Cuban troops at Walvis Bay.²⁶ SWAPO's political programme enabled Pretoria to present the conflict as one between a party intent on establishing a Communist dictatorship and an occupation regime wishing to bring Namibia to independence as a

25 There remained an undercurrent of tension between ZANU-PF (the name ZANU acquired as the PF broke up) and the ANC, for the ANC had been linked to ZAPU. In the Unity Accord of 1987, ZANU-PF formally merged with ZAPU.

26 The transcript of the meeting between C. Crocker, P. W. Botha and M. Malan, leaked by a State Department official, is in B. Wood (ed.), *Namibia, 1884–1984: Readings on Namibia's History and Society* (London: Namibia Support Committee, 1988), esp. 705.

liberal multi-party democracy.²⁷ But Crocker, who worked tirelessly to try to settle the Namibian issue, albeit on American terms, drew a clear distinction between the pragmatic Marxist regime in Mozambique and the Cuban-backed regime in Angola. He agreed with the South African government that 'Soviet domination [was] a danger', but added that he believed the 'best way to avoid that danger [was] to get Namibian issue behind us'.²⁸ He pointed out that any government of an independent Namibia would be so economically dependent on South Africa that it would not be able to support the armed struggle against the apartheid state.

For Reagan, the prime goal was to extricate the Cuban troops from neighbouring Angola. In 1982, the CIA predicted that, even if SWAPO and Angola were to accept Western plans for a Namibian settlement, 'the Soviets [will] seek to fuel tensions and suspicions to ensure that the final accord is reached in an atmosphere of antagonism and distrust . . . The Soviets would hope that, in such an environment, the Namibian Government would turn to the USSR for support.'²⁹ But the USSR did not interfere when the Western Contact Group in 1982 formulated a set of constitutional principles for Namibia and secured SWAPO's acceptance of them. The Contact Group hoped to re-assure the South Africans that an independent Namibia would be a pluralistic and liberal-democratic state. The Soviets did not expect this to succeed, especially in the light of the continued South African raids into southern Angola on SWAPO bases. The Reagan administration refused to support resolutions at the UN condemning South Africa's raids, on the grounds that SWAPO was engaged in violence against the occupation regime. When one of these raids in early 1983 led to fierce clashes between the SADF and the Angolan army, the Soviet Union told the South African government bluntly that it would not allow the MPLA regime to collapse.

Superpower rivalry continued to influence the course of the liberation struggle in South Africa itself. Despite the continued existence of the main

27 I. Scholtz, 'The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of the South African Strategy', *Scientia Militaria*, 44, 1 (2006), 34. SWAPO remained pragmatic in its search for an end to the South African occupation. A leading UN official commented that if Nujoma had met Marx in the street, he would not have recognised him: B. Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), 198.

28 Wood (ed.), *Namibia, 1884–1984*, 706. See C. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

29 National Intelligence Estimate, 'The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests', 11 April 1982; see also 'Moscow and the Namibia Peace Process', Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 7 April 1982, both at www.foia.uci.gov.

pillars of apartheid, South Africa was viewed by the Reagan administration as a valuable ally which, for example, provided access to information on Soviet shipping movements around the Cape. A great deal of propaganda was generated about southern Africa as a source of essential strategic minerals for the West. It was widely believed that if the ANC came to power in South Africa, it would introduce a pro-Soviet socialist system. For its part, the Soviet Union believed that in giving the ANC and SWAPO military support it was on the right side of history, for these liberation movements were destined to come to power. The Soviets had no illusions, however, that once in power such organisations would be firmly controlled by Moscow, despite the influence of members of the SACP in the ANC in exile.

Soviet policy elsewhere in the region was far from an unmitigated success. Angola and Mozambique were economic disasters, and in both countries the Soviets had found themselves sucked into civil wars. In 1981, the Soviet bloc's economic community refused entry to Mozambique because it could not afford the aid that entry would entail, and the pragmatic Machel then began a slow process of reconciliation with the United States, hoping to attract Western aid instead. American pressure helped produce the Nkomati Accord, signed between Machel and Botha in March 1984, and named after the border town where the signing took place. In the accord, South Africa agreed to sever support for RENAMO's destabilisation of Mozambique, and Mozambique promised that it would not allow the ANC to operate against South Africa from its territory. This followed the US-brokered Lusaka Accord the previous month between Angola and South Africa, which provided for a withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola. In return, the Angolans promised to prevent SWAPO moving into the area vacated by the South Africans.

While these agreements showed the strict limits of Soviet influence, a series of events in 1985 seemed to signal that Cold War-related conflict in the region was set to continue. The Lusaka Accord fell apart when the Angolans failed to prevent SWAPO operating from southern Angola, and the SADF did not honour the Nkomati Accord. The Cabinda incident of May 1985, in which a South African reconnaissance unit was discovered by the Angolans while it was preparing to blow up American-owned oil-storage facilities in northern Angola, demonstrated the continued determination of Pretoria to pursue a counter-insurgency strategy. As part of its agenda actively to assist counter-revolutionary groups after the repeal of the Clark Amendment (which expressly forbade such support) in July 1985, the US Department of Defense gave UNITA sophisticated weaponry, including Stinger anti-aircraft

missiles.³⁰ While the United States saw this as countering Soviet attempts to destabilise the region, American support for UNITA helped escalate the war in southern Angola. Though there were now growing doubts in Moscow about Soviet involvement in the region, American assistance to UNITA made it more difficult for the USSR to find a way to extricate itself. With little prospect of persuading the Cubans to leave Angola, given the continuing South African raids, there appeared to be no hope of Namibia becoming independent.

As South Africa itself became engulfed from 1984 in the Township Revolt – another internal uprising and the most serious challenge the apartheid regime had faced – it was difficult for the Reagan administration to argue that its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with the South African government had achieved anything significant in encouraging a peaceful transition to political reform.³¹ Yet, for all the apparent impasse in the region, and escalating conflict and brutality, the next five years saw an extraordinary series of developments. These would break the log-jam of entrenched animosity and confrontation and bring the story of Cold War intervention in the region to an end.

The winding down of the Cold War

The reverberative effect of the dramatic change in the climate of superpower relations that now took place was increasingly evident in southern Africa. As the intensification in the Cold War in the early 1980s had helped sustain apartheid, so the easing of international tensions played an equally important role in its eventual collapse. The new superpower rapprochement helped produce both Namibian independence and political transformation in South Africa itself.

These developments were due in large part to the ‘new political thinking’ in the USSR. The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, realised that liberation forces sought national independence as much, if not more, than socialism, and that South Africa and the United States remained extremely powerful in the region. He and his Politburo allies believed that misconceived policies in

30 UNITA received more than \$250 million in aid from the United States between 1986 and 1990: Westad, *Global Cold War*, 391. In building up UNITA, South Africa sought to tie down both SWAPO and the ANC in Angola.

31 Crocker and others pointed to the new constitution of 1984 as an important departure from apartheid, but its introduction coincided with the outbreak of the Township Revolt. The abolition of the pass laws, another reform cited by the proponents of constructive engagement as evidence of the success of the policy, was forced on the government by the breakdown of the system of enforcing those laws.

the Third World had been responsible for Soviet failures.³² While not initially prepared to cut and run, the Soviet leadership wished to resolve conflicts so that the USSR could withdraw without loss of prestige, reduce the substantial burden of financial and military support, and concentrate on domestic problems. In discussions with Reagan at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev disavowed any Soviet ambitions in southern Africa.³³ Just as the intervention in Afghanistan now seemed to the Soviets to have been a mistake, so too did continuation of the massive support that had been given to Angola. At a meeting of the Central Committee in December 1986, Gorbachev announced both Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the reduction of support for Angola. He informed his colleagues that he was prepared to make compromises in the Third World to improve relations with the United States and that he wanted to use Soviet leverage to resolve conflicts by peaceful means.³⁴ However, this did not translate into an immediate reduction in Soviet assistance to Angola: in 1987, the USSR supplied another \$1 billion of arms in response to the US weaponry sent to UNITA. On Soviet advice, and backed by Soviet weaponry, the MPLA government launched a major offensive against UNITA.

The Soviets' reassessment of their policy in southern Africa was matched by a growing realisation by the Reagan administration – now reverting to Carter's interpretation – that the ANC and SWAPO were first and foremost nationalist movements, influenced by, but not under the control of, left-wing forces. The United States now began to accept that there was no Soviet master plan to control all of southern Africa, and that the Soviets wanted to find ways to reduce their assistance to liberation movements. Like others in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the KGB, began to explore the idea of a negotiated

32 This shift in Soviet thinking away from fostering the armed liberation struggle was reflected in the appointment of the career diplomat and long-serving Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatolii Dobrynin, as head of the International Department.

33 See Westad, 372, and G. Evans, 'The Great Simplifier: The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1948–1994', in A. Dodson (ed.), *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 139.

34 A. Adamishin, *Beloe solntse Angoly* [White Sun of Angola] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001). See V. Shubin and A. Tokarev, 'War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension', *Review of African Political Economy*, 90 (2001), 607–18. To say, as Gennadii Gerasimov did, that all Angola and Afghanistan had in common was the letter 'A' was wrong: V. Shubin, *ANC: The View from Moscow* (Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1999), 325. Gerasimov said this in the context of the rejection of an offer by the South African minister of defence in March 1988 of a bilateral agreement with the USSR over Angola. That offer reflected a new South African attitude towards the USSR, even if the 'bear' was not yet seen to be a 'teddy' (A. Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa* (London: Ballantine, 1990), 363).

settlement in South Africa,³⁵ Secretary of State George Shultz met Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader, against the background of rumours that the jailed Nelson Mandela was talking to officials of the South African government.

These international developments were mirrored by important developments within the ANC itself. In September 1985, the exiled ANC leadership first held talks in Zambia with leading South African businessmen, and these and subsequent discussions helped shift the ANC's attitude to the role of the market. With Moscow's change of stance from support for armed struggle to negotiated settlements, and in the light of the reality of the minimal impact of its armed struggle on the resolve and military capabilities of the apartheid state, the ANC began to play down its rhetorical emphasis on the role of armed struggle.

As the Cold War started to wind down, both superpowers began to seek compromise positions. It was, however, a second large-scale Cuban intervention that tipped the balance towards accelerated change in Namibia and South Africa itself. The major offensive launched by the Angolan army against UNITA in September 1987 was routed by a South African counter-attack. In response, Castro sent 15,000 of his best troops to Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. The successful defence of the town and the subsequent rapid advance of a Cuban force of approximately 13,000 men to the Namibian border fundamentally altered the military balance of power in southern Angola/northern Namibia. The Cuban-led offensive in Angola was a calculated risk, given the open secret of South Africa's nuclear arsenal. As had been the case in 1975, the Cubans had not consulted Moscow in advance. The United States played its part in bringing South Africa to the conference table by threatening to withhold satellite information on Cuban troop movements in Angola.³⁶ As the military setback at Cuito Cuanavale greatly weakened the influence of the 'securocrats' in Pretoria, and raised the possibility that the Cubans might not stop their advance southwards at the Namibian border, the South Africans agreed to negotiate in May 1988. Through Crocker's mediation, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa held a series of meetings in a variety of different cities. For their part, the Soviets gave cautious encouragement to Cuba and Angola to negotiate an agreement.³⁷ These

35 Other elements in the Soviet bureaucracy remained committed to helping the ANC gain power by any means possible: Chris Saunders interview with Irina Filatova, Soviet specialist, Cape Town, July 2006.

36 Chris Saunders interview with Robert Frasure, assistant to Chester Crocker, Washington, DC, May 1990.

37 E.g., *Cape Times*, 26 June 1988; Chris Saunders interview with Vladilen Vasev, Africa specialist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow, June 1996.

discussions culminated in the Angola/Namibia Accords signed in New York in December 1988 which initiated the process leading to the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. In the aftermath of the signing of the accords, the United States and the Soviet Union were to work closely together as members of a joint commission to oversee the implementation of the accords.

Although the accords did not specify that the ANC bases inside Angola had to be dismantled, this was part of the agreement. The loss of these bases further weakened the residual hard-line stance of the ANC. With the disintegration of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe later in 1989, and the disappearance of its patrons there, the ANC's shift to accept a mixed economy, property rights, and a liberal democratic multi-party system accelerated.³⁸ Without the Angola/Namibia agreement, the subsequent relatively peaceful election campaign, and the knowledge that Namibia would become independent with a liberal-democratic constitution, President F. W. de Klerk would not have been able to announce, at the opening of the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990, that the ANC, the SACP, and other organisations were to be legalised, and that negotiations with Mandela and the ANC would begin.

De Klerk himself stressed the importance of the events in Eastern Europe in his historic speech.³⁹ To many South Africans, the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to symbolise the very collapse of Communism itself, and the fear of Communism triumphing in southern Africa rapidly evaporated. Though apartheid ended chiefly because of growing internal resistance, which gave substance to the notion that the country was becoming ungovernable, the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid were inextricably linked.⁴⁰

The Cold War and black liberation

The Cold War played a crucial role in the transition in the region from colonial and white minority rule to black majority rule. While the Cold

38 Douglas Anglin, 'Southern African Responses to East European Developments', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 3 (1990), 431–55. Although the ANC had traditionally looked to Moscow for guidance and support, China's gradual transformation under Deng Xiaoping towards a managed market economy added credence to the model of modified socialism.

39 See F. W. de Klerk, *The Last Trek – A New Beginning. The Autobiography* (London: Macmillan, 1988), A. Guelke, 'The Impact of the End of the Cold War on the South African Transition', and J. Daniel, 'A Response to Guelke: The Cold War Factor in the South African Transition', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 14, 1 (1996), 101–04.

40 The connection between the ending of the Cold War and the end of apartheid was 'secondary and tactical rather than primary and strategic': Evans, 'Great Simplifier', 148–49.

War brought stability in Europe, it made for instability and an increasingly 'hot' war in southern Africa, including the threat of a more serious confrontation, which had it eventuated, say between the Cubans and the South Africans in 1988, might have sucked in the superpowers. The white regimes exploited the clash between the two great power ideological rivals to preserve power and to justify their actions against the liberation movements. Then, the easing of international tensions encouraged Pretoria to negotiate settlements in which, through a bargaining process, it hoped to win major concessions ensuring protection of property rights and continued political influence. Although the Soviets, like successive American administrations, acted opportunistically and largely reactively, it was strongly believed in Washington, Pretoria, and Salisbury that Moscow aimed to take over the region, a belief that buttressed the white minority regimes. While, with hindsight, it is evident that such perceptions bore little relation to reality, at the time they profoundly shaped policies and actions. While the differing racial policies of South Africa and Rhodesia were condemned by the West, both countries remained closely integrated in the West's intelligence network, and the economies of both remained assimilated in the international economy, despite boycotts and sanctions, in large part because of their strategic minerals.

In particular, the Cold War stimulated and shaped the armed struggles in the region. A prime example of this was the way in which the United States armed UNITA as an opponent of the Cuban- and Soviet-backed MPLA. Without the massive amounts of arms and material provided by the USSR, both to the new black governments and to the liberation forces, the armed struggles would have been much smaller in scale and less successful. Cuba's contribution to the battle against colonialism and apartheid was particularly important in terms of military personnel. While Cuba was perceived in Washington to be acting as Moscow's stooge, the Castro regime was motivated by its own highly developed sense of historic, cultural, and ideological solidarity with its African nationalist anti-imperialist comrades. By the time the last Cuban troops left Angola in 1991, 380,000 Cuban combatants and 70,000 civilian aid workers had gone to southern Africa, the great bulk to Angola.⁴¹

In addition to the cycle of superpower intervention and reaction, a wide range of actors and institutions played secondary but still important roles. These included the Non-Aligned Movement, which supported liberation struggles while distancing itself from superpower rivalries expressly to

⁴¹ Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 268.

underpin national independence, and the Organisation of African Unity. UN bodies also frequently reflected regional Cold War tensions. Most importantly, the Cold War helped shape the behaviour of the Security Council, where superpower vetoes circumscribed action.⁴² Organisations, such as the Commonwealth, were similarly affected by Cold War concerns. So too were the actions of individual European governments that sought to stand apart from the ideological conflict. Scandinavian governments went out of their way to emphasise their neutralist credentials when aiding liberation in southern Africa through education and political support for transition to black majority rule.

The Cold War also had broad and enduring societal consequences for the region. It profoundly influenced the provision and consumption of information via television and radio. The ideological struggle also had an insidious corrupting impact upon the role of opposition in political debate. Government repression of dissent was legitimated, and progress towards majority rule delayed. The militarisation of the liberation struggles meant resistance was organised on hierarchical lines, which deeply affected social and gender relationships. The conflict mentality engendered lasted into the post-independence era. Once nationalist movements achieved formal independence, they were often highly suspicious of domestic political criticism. Namibia and South Africa gained remarkably liberal constitutions in the early 1990s, but the Cold War environment left compromised post-independence transitions to democracy in the southern African region.⁴³ The assertion of 'victors' history' by particular successful liberation movements has tended to distort understanding of how and why majority rule was achieved. It has also eroded political debate, a vital element of a tolerant democratic society. In such ways, the Cold War has left lasting legacies in the region.

42 On the Non-Aligned Movement, see, for example, A. W. Singham and S. Hine, *Namibian Independence: A Global Responsibility* (Westport, CT: L. Hill, 1985); on the UN, see, for example, United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948–1994* (New York: United Nations, c. 1994).

43 See Henning Melber, 'Liberation and Democracy: Cases from Southern Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21, 2 (2003), 149–53.

The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War

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'The Gorbachev revolution' was of decisive importance in relation to the end of the Cold War. The wording itself, though, requires some elaboration. The profound changes that occurred in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s were not, it goes without saying, simply the work of one man. However, reform from below, not to speak of revolution in a more conventional sense of the term, was infeasible. Not only was the system rigidly hierarchical, but it also embodied a sophisticated array of rewards for conformist behaviour and calibrated punishments for political deviance. The Communist Party was, moreover, able to devote vast resources to propagating its version of reality, especially successfully in the realm of foreign policy. Average Soviet citizens did not have the kind of personal experience which would have enabled them to call into question the story of the Soviet Union's struggle for peace in the face of provocative acts by hostile imperialist forces.

The term 'Gorbachev revolution' is apt inasmuch as changes of revolutionary dimensions – especially pluralisation of the political system – occurred under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership and with the full weight of his authority and the power of the office of Communist Party leader behind them. The notion of revolution from above is also, though, paradoxical, for Gorbachev was by temperament a reformer rather than a revolutionary. The resolution of the paradox is to be found in Gorbachev's pursuit of revolutionary goals by evolutionary means, phraseology he frequently used himself. Indeed, his realisation that means were no less important in politics than ends marked one of his sharpest breaks with the Bolshevik legacy and decades of Communist practice. Within his first five years in power, Gorbachev evolved from Communist reformer to democratic socialist of a social democratic type. He found himself very much on the same wavelength as former German chancellor (and president of the Socialist International) Willy Brandt and Spanish prime minister Felipe González, the latter his favourite interlocutor

among all the foreign heads of government whom he met.¹ Although Gorbachev could hardly announce publicly that he had become a social democrat while he was still general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), he told his aide, Georgii Shakhnazarov, as early as 1989 that he felt close to social democracy.² His public pronouncements and policies increasingly reflected that personal political evolution. The programmatic statement presented to, and adopted by, the XXVIIIth Congress of the CPSU, 'Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism' in the summer of 1990 was essentially a social democratic document.³ This was even more true of the draft party programme compiled the following year.⁴

The early development of Gorbachev's new thinking

However, the Cold War was over by then – over, indeed, by the end of 1989, by which time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had become independent and non-Communist. Thus, it is Gorbachev's outlook and the change in Soviet policy up to 1989 that is the major focus of this chapter. Although Gorbachev's views both on the scale of the transformation needed by the Soviet system and on international policy became more radical over time – with 1988 the year in which he moved from being a reformer of the Soviet system to a systemic transformer – the month of December 1984, three months before he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as Soviet leader, deserves more attention than it has received. It was then that Gorbachev began to provide solid evidence that fresh thinking might be about to emerge at the top of the Soviet system. His speech of 10 December to a conference on ideology in Moscow was a mixture of the old and the new.⁵ It was, however, sufficiently innovative, as well as scathing, in its attack on hidebound Soviet thinking that

1 See Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 74; and Mikhail Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Remembering Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2006), 103.

2 As Shakhnazarov revealed in an article in *Izvestiia*, 18 November 1991, 4.

3 See *Pravda*, 15 July 1990; and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/0821 C2/1–C2/8.

4 *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 23 July 1991; and BBC SWB, 27 July 91, C/1–C/9, esp. C/1 and C1/5–C1/6.

5 M. S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannnye rechi i stat'i* [Collected Speeches and Articles], 5 vols. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), vol. II, 75–198. For an early discussion of this speech, see Archie Brown, 'Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin', *Problems of Communism*, 34, 3 (May–June 1985), 1–23.

Chernenko – on the prompting of his aides and of the editor of the Communist Party's principal theoretical journal (*Kommunist*), Richard Kosolapov, who had read with disapproval the text circulated to them in advance – telephoned Gorbachev late in the afternoon on the day before the conference was to take place, urging him to postpone the event or at least to change his speech.⁶ Gorbachev demonstrated his growing boldness as the second secretary of the party by flatly rejecting both requests.⁷

Just over a week later, Gorbachev made another speech, this time to British parliamentarians, the significance of which is clear in retrospect. It was delivered on 18 December, towards the end of his first visit to Britain, during which he famously made a good impression on Margaret Thatcher. The speech itself received far less attention than the difference in style of Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, as compared with any previous high-ranking Soviet visitors. British ministers commented favourably on Gorbachev's willingness to engage in real argument, rather than simply repeat Soviet dogma, and on his pleasant manner, while observing that this was not accompanied by actual policy change. Indeed, so long as Chernenko was general secretary and, still more important, Andrei Gromyko remained foreign minister, Gorbachev was not in a position to make new foreign-policy proposals. His speech, however, was devoted to the imperative necessity of ending the Cold War, and it embodied a freshness of language and of tone.

It had become evident, Gorbachev said, that 'Cold War' was not a normal condition of international relations, since it constantly carried within itself a military threat. While calling for a return to 'détente, productive discussions and co-operation', he added: 'For that not only words are needed (although in politics they are also important).'⁸ It was insufficient, he said, to regard war as a great misfortune. What needed to be realised was that it now threatened to destroy the human race. The most acute and urgent contemporary problem, 'now worrying all people on earth', Gorbachev said, 'is the prevention of nuclear war'. The nuclear age, he observed, 'inescapably dictates new political thinking [*novoe politicheskoe myshlenie*]'.⁹ Among the phrases Gorbachev introduced in that speech, which were to acquire greater resonance over time, were not only 'new political thinking', but also Europe as 'our common

6 Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. I, 254; Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Sumerki* [Twilight] (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 369; and Vadim Medvedev, *V kommande Gorbacheva: vzgliad iznutri* [In Gorbachev's Team: An Inside Look] (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 22–23.

7 Iakovlev, *Sumerki*, 369; and Medvedev, *V Kommande Gorbacheva*, 22–23.

8 Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, II, III. 9 *Ibid.*, II.



16. Future Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev meets British prime minister Margaret Thatcher outside London in December 1984, less than three months before he became the leader of the Soviet Union. Thatcher commented that this was a man with whom she could do business.

home'.¹⁰ He argued that 'the foreign policy of every state is inseparable from its internal life' and 'the basic goal' is 'to raise the material and spiritual level of the life of our people'. For that to be achieved, the Soviet Union needed peace. This, he added, 'is our principled line, not dependent on political conjuncture'.¹¹

Gorbachev became general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 11 March 1985, one day after the death of Chernenko. He was elected unanimously by the Politburo and the Central Committee, whose members had no notion of how radical a shift in Soviet policy they were inaugurating. Neither, for that matter, had Gorbachev. He knew he was much more of a reformer and 'new thinker' on foreign policy than were the Politburo members who had chosen him, but events were to move in unexpected directions and some of his actions and

¹⁰ 'Europe', said Gorbachev, 'is our common home. A home, and not a "theatre of military operations"' (*ibid.*, 114).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 115.

inactions (such as eschewing the use of force in Eastern Europe) had major unintended as well as intended consequences. The greatest unintended outcome of all was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, by 1988, had consciously set about dismantling the Soviet *system*. At no time did he wish to see the disappearance of the Soviet *state*. Among the many factors that contributed to the latter's collapse was the achievement of independence, with Soviet acquiescence, by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. That raised the expectations of the most disaffected nationalities within the USSR.

Institutional factors in policy innovation

There should be no doubt that one of Gorbachev's principal aims from the outset of his leadership was to end the Cold War. Economic reform – to raise the standard of living of citizens and to renew the dynamism of the Soviet economy – was also a major initial goal. The Soviet Union had experienced a long-term decline in the rate of economic growth from the 1950s to the early 1980s, and the need to improve economic performance was one of the main stimuli to perestroika. There were, however, institutional reasons why it was easier to alter foreign than economic policy. The number of key office holders who needed to be replaced in order to effect a major shift in foreign policy was no more than half a dozen, whereas there were scores of ministers with economic responsibilities. Half of the twenty or so departments of the Central Committee were overseeing the economy (only two were concerned with foreign policy), and there were tens of thousands of party officials and factory managers throughout the country with stakes in the existing system. Their institutional inertia could be relied upon to make the task of economic reform difficult, even if Gorbachev had begun with a clear blueprint of what was required.¹² Moreover, the person in day-to-day charge of economic management within the Soviet-style dual executive was the chairman of the Council of Ministers rather than the party general secretary. From the autumn of 1985, that person was a Gorbachev appointee, Nikolai Ryzhkov, but it soon became plain that the scope of his reformism was essentially technocratic and nothing like as wide-ranging as was Gorbachev's.

12 He lacked that, but he encouraged debate on economic reform and he was attracted both to measures of decentralisation of the Soviet economy and to making concessions to market forces.

In sharp contrast with the gargantuan task of replacing those responsible for the management of the economy, it took less than a year from the time he became Soviet leader for Gorbachev to change the entire top foreign policy-making team. This had profound consequences for the content of policy. The most important foreign policy-maker in the Soviet Union had traditionally been the general secretary, and so the fact that Gorbachev himself was playing that role was of prime significance. However, in day-to-day policy terms, Gromyko, who had been foreign minister since 1957, had gained vast authority, enhanced after he acquired Politburo membership in 1973, and still further augmented by the health problems of three successive general secretaries – Leonid Brezhnev in his later years as well as Iurii Andropov and Chernenko. Thus, Gorbachev's replacement of Gromyko by Eduard Shevardnadze in the summer of 1985 was a momentous appointment. Gromyko had been content to move to the honorific post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet – the formal headship of the Soviet state, which meant that he would retain his position as a senior member of the Politburo. He had assumed, however, that he would be succeeded by one of 'his' people in the Foreign Ministry. His reaction when Gorbachev first mooted the name of Eduard Shevardnadze as his successor 'was close to shock'.¹³ Gorbachev had selected someone who owed nothing to Gromyko and who had no foreign-policy experience. Compared with Shevardnadze, Gorbachev – with his visits as the head of Soviet delegations to Canada in 1983 and Italy (for Enrico Berlinguer's funeral) and Britain in 1984 – was almost an experienced internationalist. Shevardnadze was, moreover, someone Gorbachev knew well and whom he had good reason to regard as a like-minded ally. Thus, for five years they were able to work constructively in tandem, although Gorbachev was always the senior partner.

The two other foreign-policy institutions whose heads were changed were the International Department and the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee. The International Department had been led by Boris Ponomarev for even longer than Gromyko had been foreign minister. He was replaced in March 1986 by Anatolii Dobrynin who had spent twenty-four years as Soviet ambassador to Washington. Dobrynin was a foreign-policy professional with none of Ponomarev's pretension to play the role of Marxist-Leninist theoretician and little or no interest in non-ruling Communist Parties or in supporting revolutionaries in the Third World, traditional preoccupations of the International Department. At the same time, Gorbachev replaced the

¹³ Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, I, 288.

Brezhnevite head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee, Konstantin Rusakov, with an ally, Vadim Medvedev. Of lesser formal rank but even more important in terms of everyday access and influence on foreign policy than Dobrynin and Medvedev was Gorbachev's new foreign-policy aide, Anatolii Cherniaev. It was in February 1986 that the open-minded and enlightened Cherniaev was appointed by Gorbachev to be his principal foreign-policy *pomoshchnik*, in succession to Aleksei Aleksandrov-Agentov who had performed that role for Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. Cherniaev epitomised new thinking in foreign policy and was to play a significant part in the drafting of Gorbachev's speeches and books. The relationship between these two men – Cherniaev, who had fought through the Second World War, the older of them by a decade – was a close one. Gorbachev on one occasion introduced Cherniaev to Felipe González as his 'alter ego'.¹⁴

Over and above these changes, Gorbachev gave spectacularly quick promotion to Aleksandr Iakovlev. At Iakovlev's request, Gorbachev had interceded with Andropov to end his ten-year spell as Soviet ambassador to Canada, enabling him to return to Moscow as director of the major international relations institute, IMEMO. Gorbachev and Iakovlev had established a close rapport during Gorbachev's 1983 visit to Canada and had spoken frankly about what they thought had gone wrong in the Soviet Union. In the two years Iakovlev held the IMEMO directorship, 1983–85, he was an informal adviser of Gorbachev (drawing, naturally, on the expertise of his institute) and was a member of the group that accompanied him to Britain in 1984. Although Iakovlev was not even a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1985 – and thus, in formal terms barely in the top five hundred people in the Soviet pecking order – by the summer of 1987, he was one of the five most powerful Soviet politicians, a full member of the Politburo, and a secretary of the Central Committee. That accelerated promotion he owed entirely to Gorbachev. In the earliest years of perestroika, Iakovlev's main responsibility was not for foreign policy, but he was a staunch 'new thinker'. From 1988, his foreign-policy role was institutionalised; he became the secretary of the Central Committee overseeing international affairs.

Gorbachev also made changes at the top of the Ministry of Defence which strengthened his role, and that of Shevardnadze, in arms-control negotiations. When a young West German, Matthias Rust, succeeded in breaching Soviet air defences by flying his light aircraft into Moscow and landing just off Red

¹⁴ Grachev, *Final Days*, 185.



17. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev with two of his closest colleagues, Politburo member Aleksandr Iakovlev, the key ideological defender of reform (left), and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (right). Gorbachev made effective use of his power of appointment in the foreign-policy sphere.

Square, Gorbachev used the opportunity to berate the military leadership and to dismiss, among others, Minister of Defence Sergei Sokolov. He appointed in his place General Dmitrii Iazov, who, eventually, at the time of the August 1991 coup, turned against Gorbachev, but until then was relatively deferential. As Dobrynin noted: 'Gorbachev made perfect use of the military's state of confusion and its badly damaged prestige . . . Yazov was far more obedient to Gorbachev than Sokolov, and thus Gorbachev accomplished a quiet coup. The new defense minister knew little about disarmament talks, and had nothing to do with them. With Yazov as defense minister, Shevardnadze felt much more at ease during the talks. Opposition by the military became more moderate.'¹⁵

Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War

There were good reasons for change in Soviet foreign policy by the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union had seriously strained relations with the United States,

¹⁵ Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York: Random House, 1995), 625–26.

China, and Western Europe. Its relations with Japan continued to be icy-cool, and though East European party leaderships and governments were generally friendly and obedient, goodwill towards the Soviet Union was conspicuously lacking among the populations of several of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, most notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition, on the eve of perestroika, slow economic growth meant that Soviet living standards had virtually ceased to improve. Yet the country was remarkably stable in 1985. The dissident movement, which had never amounted to a tide of discontent, had been reduced to a trickle. There were no riots, large-scale strikes, or other manifestations of popular discontent. Nor was there any hint of disagreement within the Politburo (not even from Gorbachev, who had no desire to fall from the ladder he had climbed to the penultimate rung) when Gromyko and Minister of Defence Dmitrii Ustinov responded to what they perceived as a heightened Western threat in traditional ways. These included advocacy of greater ideological vigilance, still more military spending, and a 'peace offensive' aimed at winning sympathy in the West without making any significant change in Soviet policy. At a Politburo meeting on 31 May 1983 – not long after President Ronald Reagan's launch of his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and his use of the phrase 'evil empire' with reference to the Soviet bloc – the only additional responses which the Soviet leadership could add to the usual list were to propose holding a joint meeting with the Soviet Union's East European allies to co-ordinate their response to greater American bellicosity, to seek further rapprochement with China, and to engage Japan in joint economic development, possibly including a new flexibility on the issue of the disputed Kurile islands.¹⁶ Little progress was, in fact, made at that time with either of the Asian countries, especially the latter. Minister of Defence Ustinov, at the same meeting, said that everything should continue as before in the Soviet defence field and that all the missiles that had been planned should be delivered. It was agreed that the Soviet Union should intensify its propaganda both internationally and domestically to counter 'anti-Soviet fabrications' emanating from the Reagan administration.¹⁷

Prior to Gorbachev's general secretaryship, Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe had remained unquestioned, as had the wisdom of the Soviet military

¹⁶ 'Zasedanie Politbiuro TsK KPSS, 31 maia 1983 goda', Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), fond 89, Reel 1.1003, *opis'* 42, File 53, esp. 3–4 and 6. Japan and the Soviet Union disputed the sovereignty of the southernmost Kurile Islands, islands Soviet forces had occupied at the end of the Second World War.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. That Gorbachev's attitude on both these questions was different emerged from the moment he succeeded Chernenko. He was less interested in Eastern than in Western Europe, and was determined that there should be no more Soviet invasions – as of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 – which, among other undesirable consequences, would sully his efforts to secure a qualitative improvement in East–West relations. As early as his meetings with the East European Communist leaders at Chernenko's funeral, Gorbachev told them that in the future their relations should be based on equality and that, in effect the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was at an end.¹⁸ The leaders of the other European Communist states, Gorbachev observes, 'did not understand this very well and even did not believe it'.¹⁹ Some of them, apart from doubting Gorbachev's sincerity, had no interest in giving credence to his assurance, for Soviet armed might was the ultimate guarantee of their retaining power. In particular, they did not wish to sow any doubts in the minds of their own citizenry regarding Soviet willingness, as a last resort, to intervene to defend 'socialism'. It was, after all, the belief that limited sovereignty was a fact of life, as had been amply demonstrated to the Hungarians and Czechs, which moderated the political aspirations of citizens in Central and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, however, followed up his informal remarks to his East European counterparts in March 1985 with a memorandum to the Politburo in June 1986 and statements at a meeting with the leaders of other European Communist states a few months later which more formally established the need for the relationships among 'socialist' countries to be voluntary and based on equality.²⁰

Three years after he came to power, Gorbachev appeared to go further on the issue of Soviet hegemony over other states. In his major speech to the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU in the summer of 1988, he emphasised each country's right to choose its political and economic system. That point attracted somewhat more attention when he repeated it in his UN speech in December of the same year. Even then, as US secretary of state George Shultz

¹⁸ For a detailed analysis of the subsequent dramatic change in Eastern Europe, see Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

¹⁹ Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku*, 70. 'In essence', said Gorbachev in a 1999 interview, what he told the East European leaders on 12 March 1985 was 'the establishment of the end of the "Brezhnev doctrine"'. See Hoover Institution and Gorbachev Foundation Interview Project on Cold War, interview of 22 March 1999 with Mikhail Gorbachev.

²⁰ For Gorbachev's memorandum to the Politburo, see 'O nekotorykh aktual'nykh voprosakh sotrudnichestva s sotstranami, 26 iunia 1986 g.', Volkogonov Collection, National Security Archive (NSA), R10049. The meeting of leaders of the member states of Comecon was held in Moscow on 10–11 November 1986.

later observed, the press was captivated by the 'hard news' of the Soviet armed forces being cut by half a million men, including substantial troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. The media, he noted, largely missed the 'philosophical' content of Gorbachev's speech, 'and if anybody declared the end of the Cold War, he did in that speech'.²¹ Interestingly, Gorbachev had endorsed many of these points of principle, including 'the right of every state to political and economic independence', as long ago as the Delhi Declaration which he had co-signed with Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (a like-minded leader, with whom he enjoyed cordial relations and frank discussions) in December 1986.²² That, however, came at a time when there was still Western scepticism about the correlation between Gorbachev's words and deeds, and the document had nothing like as much impact in North America, Western Europe, or, most pertinently, Eastern Europe as had his December 1988 UN speech. Within the twelve months that followed the latter, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe put this statement of principle to the test and found that Soviet actions or, more precisely, inaction – restraint and eschewal of coercive action in response to demands for independence – corresponded with Gorbachev's words.

Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War

While Gorbachev's report to the Nineteenth Party Conference reflected the further development of his views and those of his allies in the Soviet leadership, he showed willingness from the outset to break with previous Soviet foreign policy, even though some of the changes were revealed only to the Soviet leadership and not, initially, to the outside world. In addition to the changing relationship with Eastern Europe, it is worth noting that as early as 1985 Gorbachev was determined to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan.²³ Accompanied by Gromyko, Gorbachev met the general secretary of the ruling party and president of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, who was in Moscow for Chernenko's funeral, just three days after

21 George Shultz, speaking at a Princeton University conference in February 1993, quoted by Pavel Palachenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997), 370.

22 See Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy*, II, 107–16.

23 In his 1999 interview for the Hoover Institution/Gorbachev Foundation Interview Project on the Cold War, Gorbachev said: 'Already in the first days [of his general secretaryship] there was recognition of the necessity of ending the war in Afghanistan.' See also Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1991), 26.

he became general secretary. Gorbachev began the Kremlin meeting by thanking Karmal for the respect the Afghan leadership had shown for the memory of Chernenko, and went on to say that 'in the future the Afghan comrades may fully count on our support and solidarity'.²⁴ Scarcely any sooner, however, than Karmal had expressed his thanks for that assurance, Gorbachev went on: 'You remember, of course, Lenin's idea that the criterion of the vitality of any revolution is its ability to defend itself. You, Comrade Karmal, naturally, understand . . . that Soviet forces are not able to remain in Afghanistan for ever.'²⁵

Gorbachev took only half a year before going beyond the *not* 'for ever' to putting a provisional timetable for Soviet withdrawal to Karmal, telling him that the Afghans had better learn how to defend themselves by the following summer (that of 1986). Persisting with a theme he had broached in March, Gorbachev also advised the Afghan leadership to lean on the 'traditional authorities' and to broaden the base of the regime. Karmal, Gorbachev told the Soviet Politburo, had been 'dumbfounded' to learn that the end of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was imminent. However, Gorbachev concluded this October 1985 Politburo discussion by saying: 'With or without Karmal we will follow this line firmly, which must in a minimally short amount of time lead to our withdrawal from Afghanistan.'²⁶

Getting Soviet troops out of Afghanistan took substantially longer than Gorbachev wanted. There were a number of reasons for that. The Soviet military were reluctant to give the appearance of having lost the war, with a concomitant loss of face. Shevardnadze at times also dragged his feet, being reluctant to abandon the Soviet Union's Afghan allies, whereas Gorbachev was more concerned with the death toll among Soviet conscripts and with removing the obstacle which Afghanistan represented to better East–West relations. Another reason why it was as late as February 1989 when the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan is that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze found the United States nowhere near as accommodating as they wished when they tried to secure American help in establishing a regime in Kabul which would not be dominated by Islamist extremists. Additionally, the Soviet withdrawal

24 'Zapis' besedy tov. Gorbacheva M.S.s General'nym sekretarem TsK NDPA, Predsedatelem Revoliutsionnogo soveta DRA B. Karmalem, Kreml' 14 marta 1985 g.', Russian and East European Archives Documents Database (READD) Collection, NSA, R10066, 1.

25 *Ibid.*, 2.

26 Anatoly S. Chernyaev Diary 1985, NSA website, www.gwu.edu/~nsarhiv, entry for 17 October 1985.

from Afghanistan took longer than it should have done, Cherniaev has suggested, because the issue was 'still seen primarily in terms of "global confrontation" and only secondarily in light of the "new thinking"'.²⁷ There was also the problem which afflicts all leaders who embark on an unwinnable war of explaining why so many deaths had been caused to no avail. Gorbachev, having played no part in the decision to invade Afghanistan and having been privately opposed to it, could have used that as an escape route. However, addressing the Politburo in early 1987, and acknowledging that it would be possible to 'get out of Afghanistan fast' and blame everything on 'the former leadership', he went on:

We have to think about our country's authority, about all the people who've fought in this war. How could we justify ourselves before our people if, after we leave, there followed a real slaughter and then the establishment of a base hostile to the Soviet Union? They'd say you forgot about those who suffered for this cause, about the state's authority! We'd only embitter everyone by abandoning our duty after losing so many people.²⁸

It is not surprising, then, that Gorbachev was seeking an international settlement, one which would neither convey the impression of an unseemly Soviet retreat nor produce an outcome that would leave Afghanistan in the hands of people far more hostile to the Soviet Union than the country had been before its traditional rulers were overthrown.

The 'new thinking' and common security

A notable milestone in the development of new thinking on security issues was an international conference, held in Moscow in February 1987, called 'The Forum for a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Humankind'. Although Andrei Sakharov, the prominent dissident and physicist, described the event as 'staged primarily for propaganda purposes', the forum marked his return to public life – indeed, his entry into it more fully than in the past.²⁹ Following a telephone call from Gorbachev in December 1986 to tell him he was now free to return from his exile in Gorkii (Nizhniy Novgorod), Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, had arrived back in Moscow later that month. Notwithstanding his scepticism about the motivation for holding the conference, Sakharov

27 Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, transl. and ed. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 90.

28 *Ibid.*, 106.

29 Andrei Sakharov, *Moscow and Beyond 1986 to 1989* (New York: Knopf, 1991), 15.

welcomed his invitation as a participant, since 'after many years of isolation', this was his 'first opportunity to present [his] views before a large audience'.³⁰

The conference was more important than Sakharov surmised. He openly dissociated himself from the position which the Soviet leadership had adopted at the Reykjavik conference whereby insistence that the United States stop its attempt to develop a defensive missile system – Reagan's SDI – was made part of a package. Without concessions from Reagan on SDI, the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals on which both Gorbachev and Reagan had agreed at Reykjavik had not taken place. Other Soviet speakers at the forum stuck to the official line, but Sakharov, addressing the forum, said that any anti-ballistic missile system, including SDI, was doomed to failure. It would be 'expensive and ineffective'.³¹ As Sakharov notes: 'Two weeks after the Forum, the USSR renounced the package principle for intermediate range missiles, and soon thereafter proposed the elimination of shorter-range missiles.'³² That is not to say that Sakharov's opinion and this decision were an example of cause and effect. Cherniaev, even before the Reykjavik summit, had urged Gorbachev not to make deep reductions in nuclear weapons 'conditional on a space agreement'.³³ However, Sakharov's dismissive view of the viability of a defensive missile system, given his eminence as a physicist and his role in the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, could only be helpful to those of Gorbachev's advisers who thought that the linkage with SDI should be dropped.

In Gorbachev's own speech to the forum on 16 February 1987, there was much more than met the eye of most observers. An exception was Joel Hellman, the unnamed principal author of an insightful analysis of Gorbachev's speech and of some of the roots of his 'new thinking' more generally.³⁴ Distinguishing Gorbachev's reflections and pronouncements from those of previous Soviet leaders, Hellman noted that Gorbachev used 'apocalyptic terms more characteristic of the language of the anti-nuclear movement than of traditional Soviet perceptions of nuclear arms'.³⁵ In contrast with 'Brezhnev's and Chernenko's unabashed pride in the achievement of nuclear parity', Gorbachev spoke of 'nuclear suicide', 'the point-of-no-return',

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 18. ³¹ *Ibid.*, 22. ³² *Ibid.*, 23.

³³ Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, 82.

³⁴ 'Textual Analysis of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech to the Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind", Moscow, February 16, 1987', prepared by the Staff of the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations (manuscript).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

and the real danger that 'life itself on Earth [might] perish'.³⁶ He also endorsed a trend in international relations (which no previous Soviet leader had discerned or supported) 'away from competition and rivalry towards "interdependence" and "unity"'.³⁷

A minority of Soviet scholars, and a still smaller minority of enlightened officials, had since the 1970s been developing ideas on foreign policy which deviated from Soviet orthodoxy and emphasised global interdependence. These discussions were little noticed outside the USSR and, even when they were, usually deemed a matter of purely 'academic' interest, rather than of potential consequence. Nothing could have been further from the truth. Within strict limits, the advice of specialists such as the directors of two major international relations institutes, Nikolai Inozemtsev of IMEMO and Georgii Arbatov of the Institute of the United States and Canada, modified Soviet policy even in the Brezhnev years in a more pro-détente direction. The real breakthrough, however, occurred in 1985 when, as Robert English puts it, the 'new thinking' came to power.³⁸

Many of the premature Soviet 'new thinkers', who were able to develop still more radical ideas when a political leader receptive to innovative thought suddenly appeared in the Kremlin, had been influenced by their reading of Western writings – including the literature of the peace movement, of 'Eurocommunists', and of social democrats – and by their travels abroad. Precisely because they had privileged access to Western political and social scientific analysis and some direct contact with their foreign counterparts, it was the *institutchiki* and *mezhdunarodniki* (specialists in research institutes and international relations specialists – two overlapping categories) who contributed substantially more to the new thinking which came to power with the accession of Gorbachev than the dissidents. Sakharov was a partial exception to that generalisation, but in the absence of civil society in the Soviet Union before perestroika, heterodox thinking in official institutions, including the International Department of the Central Committee and a number of research institutes (especially IMEMO, the Institute of the United States and Canada, and Oleg Bogomolov's Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System), was much more influential than the *samizdat* and *tamizdat* writing of dissidents.

36 *Ibid.* The quotations are from Gorbachev's 16 February 1987 speech, the full text of which is published in Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, IV, 376–92.

37 'Textual Analysis', 2.

38 'The New Thinking Comes to Power' is the title of the penultimate chapter of English's excellent study of the development of fresh thinking within the Soviet Union. See Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 193–228.

Matthew Evangelista has notably drawn attention to the significance of certain transnational organisations, such as the Pugwash movement, which brought scientists from East and West together.³⁹ The former head of the Soviet Space Research Institute, Roald Sagdeev, noted in his memoirs: 'Throughout the most difficult periods of confrontation – the ups and downs of the Cold War – the Pugwash meetings remained the only reliable channel for important arms control discussions between the Soviet and American blocs.'⁴⁰ Evangelista points out that the very expression 'new thinking' appeared in the founding document of the Pugwash movement, 'drafted by Bertrand Russell and endorsed by Albert Einstein in 1955'.⁴¹ (Shevardnadze refers to this document in his 1991 memoirs.⁴²) Both Evangelista and English note the significance also of the Palme Commission – the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, headed by Olof Palme, the former Swedish prime minister – which included among its members the German social democrat Egon Bahr and Cyrus Vance, the former US secretary of state.⁴³ The Soviet representative on the Palme Commission, Georgii Arbatov, has written that it 'became an important aspect of my life and exerted a great influence on my understanding of politics and international relations'.⁴⁴ He found himself having to argue and find common ground with 'people who were unusually perceptive and original thinkers'. The most significant of the notions they came up with, Arbatov concludes, was 'the idea of "common security", the essence of which was that we cannot guarantee our own security at the expense of someone else's, but only on the basis of mutual interests'.⁴⁵ That was to become one of the tenets of the new thinking on foreign policy of the Gorbachev era.

Informal transnational influences

Many of the transnational influences that contributed to the fundamental ideational change in the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s

39 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

40 Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars* (New York: Wiley, 1994), 64–65.

41 Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, 3. 42 Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, 46.

43 See Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, esp. 160–62 and 185–86; and English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, esp. 168–69.

44 Georgii Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 311.

45 *Ibid.*

occurred outside formal organisations. At one level, there were the trips abroad of specialists in the research institutes and, at a still more significant level, those of senior officials in the International and Socialist Countries Departments of the Central Committee, among them two future influential advisers of Gorbachev – Cherniaev, who from 1970 until 1986 was a deputy head of the former, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, who from 1972 until 1988 was a deputy head of the latter. For both of them, seeing Western countries for themselves and interacting with foreign politicians and social scientists were important. Both also were members of the ‘Prague group’, people who had worked on the *World Marxist Review* (*Problemy mira i sotsializma* in its Russian version) and had interacted with West European and Latin American as well as East European Communist intellectuals while producing that journal of the international Communist movement. All these experiences played a part in the evolution of their political thinking.

Especially important was the unusually wide experience of the Western world of Aleksandr Iakovlev, whose speedy promotion by Gorbachev was noted earlier. Iakovlev had spent a year in New York at the end of the 1950s as a graduate exchange student at Columbia University without being at all won over to the American way of life. His ten years in Canada, however – from 1973 to 1983 – were a period in which he was able to compare at leisure the vastly greater economic efficiency and political liberty of the country to which he was ambassador with the economy and polity of Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. The standard of comparison he now had with which to judge the Soviet system made him much more critical of it, although, like Gorbachev, in 1985, he still believed that it was reformable.

The most important examples of transnational influences for the conceptual revolution and policy transformation that occurred in the Soviet Union during perestroika were those on Gorbachev. That follows from the strictly hierarchical nature of the system and the power and authority that accrued to the general secretaryship. Gorbachev had made short visits to the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, France, and Italy during the 1970s. Holidays in France and Italy were especially important in leading him to question the discrepancy between Soviet propaganda concerning the capitalist world and West European realities. Gorbachev wrote in his memoirs that, after seeing the functioning of civil society and of the political system in these countries, his ‘a priori faith in the advantages of socialist over bourgeois democracy was shaken’.⁴⁶ He was led to ask himself: ‘Why do we live worse than in other developed

⁴⁶ Gorbachev, *Zhizn’ i reformy*, I, 169.

countries?’⁴⁷ More important still were the visits he made, which have already been touched on, when he was a Politburo member but not yet general secretary, to Canada in 1983, to Italy in June 1984, and to Britain in December of the same year. The Italian visit as head of the Soviet delegation for the funeral of Enrico Berlinguer made a strong impression on Gorbachev. He found it remarkable that the Italian president, Alessandro Pertini, was present at the funeral and bowed his head before the coffin of the leader of the Italian Communist Party. ‘All this’, Gorbachev wrote, ‘was a manifestation of a way of thinking not characteristic for us and of a different political culture.’⁴⁸

‘The Gorbachev revolution’ had roots both in Soviet society, most significantly within a critically thinking part of the political elite who found themselves empowered when Gorbachev was elevated to the general secretaryship, and in a broad range of transnational influences. The latter were a consequence of the new possibilities in the post-Stalin period for learning about the outside world and about ways of thinking other than those which had received the imprimatur of the Soviet censorship. In that connection, it is worth adding that for senior members of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, such as Central Committee members (whose ranks Gorbachev joined in 1971), there was the possibility of ordering Russian translations of foreign political literature, printed in minuscule editions and available only to the politically privileged. A majority of regional party secretaries had no interest in taking advantage of this, but both Gorbachev and his wife were voracious readers and a steady stream of such literature made its way from Moscow to Stavropol in the period before he moved to the capital as a secretary of the Central Committee in 1978. His reading included the works of Eurocommunists (among them the three-volume history of the USSR by the Italian, Giuseppe Boffa) as well as the writings of leading social democratic politicians such as Willy Brandt and François Mitterrand.⁴⁹

Changing Soviet–US relations

Much policy was made, of course, in interaction with foreign partners during the perestroika period, especially with the United States (and with the Federal Republic of Germany over German unification). But to reduce international influences on the Soviet leadership to the policies of the Reagan

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 49–50.

administration, or even to see them as the main determinant of Moscow's foreign policy during this period, would be grossly misleading. The views of Gorbachev, together with those of key allies whom he promoted speedily to influential positions, had already undergone an important evolution in the direction of what Gorbachev as early as 1984 was calling 'new political thinking'. There was a logical connection between Gorbachev's desire to end the Cold War, an important element in his thinking from the moment he became general secretary, and the subsequent dramatic decision of the Soviet leadership to allow the countries of Eastern Europe to acquire their independence and discard their Communist regimes in the course of 1989. This brought the Cold War, in the sense of military rivalry between two blocs, to an end. The Cold War, as a clash of systems, also ended in 1989, for the changes within the Soviet political system by then – the development of political pluralism, freedom of speech, and contested elections – meant that it was no longer meaningful to call even the Soviet Union Communist. The leading role of the Communist Party was in the process of being dismantled and 'democratic centralism' had been thrown to the winds, with party members, adhering to radically different political agendas, competing against one another in elections for the new legislature.

The Soviet leadership was responding to the positions Reagan had staked out, just as Washington was having to respond to Gorbachev's diplomatic initiatives.⁵⁰ At the first summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva in 1985, no breakthroughs occurred. At the second – in Reykjavik in 1986 – when both leaders came close to agreeing to ban nuclear weapons, a spectacular change of policy on both sides was thwarted by the stumbling block of SDI. When the Politburo agreed at a meeting on 28 February 1987 to decouple SDI from the issue of removing intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe,⁵¹ it was possible for Reagan and Gorbachev to sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 8 December of that year, the second day of their Washington summit. Reagan had particular reason to regard this as a success, because it incorporated his 'zero option' of the early 1980s, dismissed out of hand by the Soviet leadership then, involving the removal of Soviet missiles already deployed as well as the non-deployment or removal of Pershing and cruise missiles. The treaty infuriated many in the

⁵⁰ See Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

⁵¹ A. Cherniaev (ed.), *V Politbiuro TsK KPSS ... Po zapisiam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)* [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), 151–52.

Soviet military because, as Jack Matlock (the US ambassador to Moscow at the time) observed, the Soviet Union not only 'agreed to eliminate many more weapons than the United States did', but also included 'the SS-23 (called the "Oka" in Russian) among the missiles to be eliminated'.⁵² The Soviet military held that the Oka had a range of only 400 kilometres and should not, therefore, be covered by the treaty. For the sake of getting an agreement, however, Gorbachev was willing to accept the American view that its range could be 500 kilometres or more.⁵³

The treaty was, however, not so much a victory for the United States as a victory for those on both sides of the Cold War divide who wished to lower tension and move from mere arms control to significant steps of disarmament. It had its hard-line opponents in Washington as well as in Moscow. Those in the United States were more publicly vocal, for in 1987 (as distinct from 1990–91) open opposition within the Soviet Union to the general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was still ruled out. Paradoxically, old institutional norms protected the new thinking from old thinkers. In the United States, two former secretaries of state – Alexander Haig and Henry Kissinger – as well as Senators Bob Dole, Dan Quayle, and Jesse Helms were among the prominent conservative opponents of the INF Treaty.⁵⁴ Some of the original supporters of the zero option had endorsed it because they were confident that the Soviet Union would never admit that the deployment of SS-20 missiles had been a mistake. For these spurious advocates of the elimination of intermediate-range missiles from European soil, the zero option, as Matlock puts it, 'was useful only so long as the Soviet Union rejected it'.⁵⁵

The final summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan was in Moscow from 29 May to 2 June 1988. Although stronger on symbolism than substance, it provided evidence for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that a qualitative change for the better had taken place in the relations between the two major Cold War rivals. For Soviet citizens, this was an especially salient issue, since they had experienced a devastating war in their homeland, and their fear of war in the decades since then had been profound. Reagan's recognition of how much had changed in the Soviet Union was highly significant. When he was asked by a reporter in Moscow whether he still believed that the Soviet Union

52 Jack F. Matlock, Jr, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 274.

53 *Ibid.*

54 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 1007–08; and Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 275.

55 Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, 275.

was an 'evil empire', he responded, 'No, I was talking about another time, another era.' This answer reverberated around the world.⁵⁶

In contrast, President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft showed an excess of caution about how much the Soviet Union had altered. Bush's initial ambivalence stemmed, in part, no doubt, from his lack of credibility among conservatives, whose support Reagan had cultivated for decades. Nevertheless, when Bush and Gorbachev finally had their first summit in Malta in late 1989, Bush decided they shared 'a lot of common ground'.⁵⁷ For the first time in the history of such meetings, the general secretary of the CPSU and the president of the United States ended a summit with a joint press conference. It followed talks which Bush characterised as having 'shown a friendly openness between us and a genuine willingness to listen to each other's proposals'.⁵⁸ The dexterous press spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gennadii Gerasimov, was able to announce: 'We buried the Cold War at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea.'⁵⁹

The Gorbachev revolution in perspective

The funeral of the Cold War was a victory for the West in the sense that democratic political systems had proved more attractive to the citizens of Communist Europe than their own political regimes, and market economies had turned out to be more efficient than Soviet-style command economies. That is not at all the same thing as endorsing the popular oversimplification that it was the pressure of the Reagan administration or American military superiority that left the Soviet leadership with no option but to concede defeat. The policy that Gorbachev pursued was, in fact, one that aroused vast misgivings, and later scathing criticism, from a majority of officials within the Soviet party-state, not to speak of representatives of the military-industrial complex. The Soviet Union had held on to what it saw as its legitimate gains from the Second World War (in Central and Eastern Europe) during decades in which the preponderance of military power favoured the United States much more than it did by the 1980s. It was, after all, only in the early 1970s that the Soviet Union reached a rough parity with the United States in military strength.

56 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (London: Little, Brown, 1993), 9.

57 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 173.

58 *Ibid.* 59 Beschloss and Talbott, *At the Highest Levels*, 165.

While Gorbachev eventually enjoyed good personal relations with both Reagan and Bush, he was ideationally more comfortable with European social democratic statesmen, such as Brandt (although by the perestroika period he was no longer German chancellor) and González. George Shultz's recollections are the best foreign-policy memoirs by a major American political actor of the 1980s, but they exaggerate the extent to which Gorbachev was responding to US tutelage. The sources of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' were diverse, with American official circles but a part, and by no means the major part, of them. That both Reagan and Gorbachev shared a horror of nuclear weapons brought them close to far-reaching agreements in Reykjavik in 1986 and to the successful signing of the INF Treaty in 1987. Their otherwise extremely different world-views intersected in a desire to rid the world of the nuclear threat, but they had reached those positions entirely independently and under very different influences.

The changes that made up 'the Gorbachev revolution' had many sources, but what made them possible to implement was an interdependent mixture of ideas, leadership, and institutional power. For Gorbachev, and for a number of those he chose to be his advisers and close associates, seeing the outside world for himself (and they for themselves) was very important. That also, however, is a point about *their* mindsets, their intellectual and political dispositions. Travel is said to broaden the mind, but over many years Andrei Gromyko was a living refutation of the notion that this automatically occurs. While it would be naïve to portray the United States as a non-ideological, purely pragmatic international actor and the Soviet Union as the one ideological superpower, there is no doubt that the USSR had the more systematically ideocratic regime. It possessed a body of doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, which, while not unchanging, seemed impregnable to fundamental challenge until Gorbachev undermined it from within. He rejected the essentials of Leninism while continuing to express his respect for Lenin.⁶⁰ Given the extent to which Lenin had been deified in the Soviet Union, that may have been the only way to end the ideological hegemony of Leninism, although Gorbachev, projecting much of his own reformism on to Lenin, continued to cite him not only for prudential reasons. If, though, we are to speak of the evolution of Gorbachev's views stopping at a particular destination, that destination would be social democracy, a merging of the liberal and socialist traditions.

60 Archie Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), and Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. 284–94 on 'Gorbachev, Lenin, and Leninism'.

Ideas were crucially important in the transformation of the Soviet system and of Soviet foreign policy, but ideas on their own were not enough. Throughout the post-Stalin period there were people in the USSR with radically unorthodox ideas, but until the second half of the 1980s that did not get them very far (unless 'far' includes the labour camps of Siberia). In a Communist system, to a much greater extent than under conditions of political pluralism, ideas needed institutional bearers. In this strictly hierarchical society, more power resided in the general secretaryship of the Central Committee than anywhere else. The Cold War ended when it did because of the confluence of events that brought a leader with a mindset different from that of every other member of Brezhnev's, Andropov's, and Chernenko's Politburo to the locus of greatest institutional power within the system. Having reached that position, and drawing upon ideas which were not necessarily novel in a universal sense, but which were path-breakingly new in the Soviet context, Gorbachev was able to inaugurate a conceptual revolution as well as systemic change, both domestically and internationally.

US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush

BETH A. FISCHER

What role did President Ronald Reagan and President George H. W. Bush play in ending the Cold War? Three distinct schools of thought have arisen in response to this question. The first school maintains that the United States triumphed in the Cold War by destroying its nemesis, the USSR. These "triumphalists" focus primarily on the Reagan years and contend that the administration brought about the end of the Cold War by hastening (even causing) the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹ In this view, the Reagan administration was keenly aware of the fragile state of the USSR. Thus, it adopted a hardline policy to push its enemy toward collapse. This policy included an unprecedented military buildup, the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and tough rhetoric. Ultimately, the Reagan administration proved victorious: the Soviets could not keep pace with the administration's military expenditures, nor could they match US technological advances. Consequently, the Kremlin was forced to surrender. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, had no option other than to become more conciliatory toward Washington. The ultimate triumph came in 1991, however, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

A second school of thought turns this logic on its head. In this view, the Reagan administration's hardline policies were an impediment to ending the Cold War. The president's virulent anti-Communism, his belligerent rhetoric, SDI, and the military buildup combined to make it more difficult for Gorbachev to pursue improved relations with the West. These observers point out that Gorbachev faced a conservative faction within the Politburo

¹ See Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Cold War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994); Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (January/February 1995), 154–61; Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990); and Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

that saw the United States as an imperialist enemy. These conservatives were wedded to traditional Soviet policy toward the United States and opposed Gorbachev's "new thinking," which entailed a more conciliatory posture toward the West, and unilateral gestures intended to end the arms race. These Soviet hardliners believed Washington would perceive Gorbachev's policies as a sign of weakness and attempt to gain advantage. The more belligerently Reagan acted, the more they were convinced that Gorbachev was on the wrong course. Thus, they pressured him to abandon his reforms. "Reagan's tough policy . . . made . . . life for [Soviet] reformers, for all who yearned for democratic changes in their life, much more difficult," Georgii Arbatov, the director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, has explained. "In such tense international situations the conservatives and reactionaries were given predominant influence [in the USSR]. That is why . . . Reagan made it practically impossible to start reforms after Brezhnev's death (Andropov had such plans) and made things more difficult for Gorbachev to cut military expenditures."²

From this perspective, then, Reagan's "get tough" posture had the unintended effect of supporting Soviet leaders who favored a more antagonistic approach toward Washington. If Reagan had not been so belligerent, Gorbachev would have had more domestic support for his foreign-policy reforms, and the Cold War would have ended earlier.

A third school takes a broader approach: in this view, President Reagan and President Bush were both largely irrelevant to the ending of the Cold War. From this perspective, Gorbachev terminated the Cold War practically single-handedly. "In just less than seven years, Mikhail Gorbachev transformed the world," historian Robert C. Kaiser has written in an example of this view. "He turned his own country upside down . . . He tossed away the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe with no more than a fare-thee-well. He ended the Cold War that had dominated world politics and consumed the wealth of nations for nearly half a century."³ Soviet expert Strobe Talbott expressed a similar belief when asked during a talk show why the Cold War ended. "The Soviet Union collapsed," he exclaimed. "The Cold War ended almost overwhelmingly because of internal contradictions or pressures within the Soviet Union and the Soviet system itself. And even if Jimmy Carter had been reelected

2 G. Arbatov memorandum to Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 1991, as quoted in Kegley, "How Did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38 (1994), 14–15.

3 Robert G. Kaiser, *Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumph, His Failure, and His Fall* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), II, 13.

and been followed by Walter Mondale, something like what we have now seen probably would have happened.”⁴ During the 1992 presidential election William J. Clinton voiced a similar view. Governor Clinton derided President Bush’s claim to have seized the opportunity to end the Cold War, quipping, “That’s like a rooster taking credit for the dawn!”⁵

This view focuses almost exclusively on Gorbachev’s desire to end the arms race in order to divert resources from military expenditures to domestic restructuring. From this perspective, Gorbachev’s desire for domestic reform brought about the end of the Cold War. President Reagan and President Bush just happened to be occupying the White House at the time that the Soviet Union was going through this revolutionary period.

To a certain extent, each of these three perspectives rests upon the assumption that the Reagan administration pursued a hardline policy toward the Soviet Union for the bulk of its two terms in office. For example, the triumphalists assert that it was precisely this confrontational policy that forced the Soviet Union to its knees and brought victory for the West. Those who assert that the Reagan administration was an impediment to improving relations also suggest that Reagan’s hard line made life difficult for Soviet reformers into the late 1980s. Those who think the American presidents were irrelevant to the ending of the Cold War focus primarily upon what was happening within the USSR and, consequently, gloss over the intricacies of US foreign policy. However, the implication is that Washington continued to plod along the same well-worn path of hostility while Gorbachev revolutionized world affairs.

The hardline years

These assumptions about the Reagan administration’s policy are mistaken. President Reagan did indeed have a confrontational policy toward the USSR through 1983, but the following years were characterized by a concerted effort to improve superpower relations.

Between 1981 and 1983, the Reagan administration adopted a hawkish posture toward the Soviet Union. This approach included tough rhetoric, a military buildup, and confrontational policies on arms control and regional conflicts. During these early years, the president repeatedly denounced the Soviet Union. “The West won’t contain communism, it will transcend

4 S. Talbott, “Inside Washington,” as quoted in Schweizer, *Victory*, xii.

5 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993), 468.

communism,” Reagan vowed in 1981. “It will dismiss [communism] as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.”⁶ Others within the administration echoed these sentiments. “The Soviets [are] not only our rival, but the rival of a humane world order,” Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger declared in February 1983. “[N]o one man – indeed no group of men – can affect, except at the very margins, the fundamentally competitive nature of our relationship.”⁷ As Reagan famously declared in 1983, the USSR was the “evil empire.”⁸

Reagan charged that the Soviet Union had been engaging in “the greatest military buildup in the history of man” and that it was “plainly . . . offensive in nature.”⁹ At the same time, he argued, the United States had allowed its military capabilities to deteriorate. The consequence was that the Soviets had military superiority – a questionable charge that the Kremlin repeatedly rejected. In response, the White House initiated the largest peacetime military buildup in US history, with defense expenditures consuming more than 30 percent of the federal budget between 1981 and 1985. In 1983, President Reagan also introduced SDI. This research program envisioned a space-based system of lasers that would intercept and destroy Soviet nuclear missiles headed toward the United States. President Reagan hoped that it would lead to a defensive system that could protect the American people from a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack. However, while the president viewed SDI as a defensive system, others perceived it to be part of his policy of confrontation. Critics pointed out that SDI had offensive implications: if feasible, it could protect the United States from a retaliatory strike, thus freeing the country to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR. The Soviets also charged that SDI would precipitate a new arms race in space.

The Reagan administration also appeared uninterested in arms control. It rejected the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), claiming that it bolstered the military imbalance.¹⁰ Instead, the White House proposed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The intent was to reduce the

6 Ronald Reagan, Commencement Address at Notre Dame, May 17, 1981, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* [hereafter WCPD], 17, 532.

7 Lawrence Eagleburger, “Review of US Relations with the Soviet Union,” February 1, 1983, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1983* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1984), 499–500, 504.

8 Ronald Reagan, remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, FL, 8 March 1983, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1983*, Book 1 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), 364.

9 Ronald Reagan, Remarks at Rancho del Cielo, 13 August 1981, WCPD, 17, 874.

10 However, it did ultimately agree to abide by its terms.

overall number of strategic weapons in the superpowers' arsenals. However, it meant a cap on land-based warheads that would have required the Soviets to destroy more than half of their arsenal, while allowing the United States to increase its numbers. Given the administration's hawkish rhetoric and military buildup, this proposal was widely viewed as insincere. The Soviets dismissed it as nothing more than a public-relations gimmick.

In addition, in 1981, the Reagan administration announced it would honor the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1979 decision to deploy US intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe to counter Soviet SS-20s that were aimed at the region. Reagan's announcement prompted public protests throughout Europe and generated a peace movement. In response to this pressure, the administration put forward the so-called zero option, in which the United States would forego the deployment of its intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe if the Soviets would agree to dismantle their SS-20s. Many observers within the United States and abroad perceived this proposal to be a farce, as it required the Soviets to dismantle existing weapons while requiring virtually nothing of the United States. Some of Reagan's less hawkish advisers even opposed the plan. "The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was not negotiable," Secretary of State Alexander Haig fumed in his memoirs. "It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at a cost of billions of rubles in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe." Haig worried that the proposal was a "frivolous propaganda exercise . . . that would needlessly weaken the President's credibility."¹¹ The Kremlin immediately rejected the zero option, and stormed out of ongoing arms control talks in protest when the US Pershing II missiles began arriving in West Germany in 1983.¹²

The Reagan administration's approach to regional disputes was also confrontational. The White House wanted to check the influence of the Soviets throughout the globe and to place "maximum pressure" on them throughout the Third World. It desired to ensure that Soviet costs would remain high in these regions, and thus sought to assist those fighting them "to the maximum

11 Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 229. Ultimately, Gorbachev did agree to a version of this plan.

12 "Reagan's Arms Cut Proposal Assailed," November 20, 1981, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 33:47, 7. See also George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), 123.

degree possible.”¹³ In Afghanistan, the Reagan administration beefed up US support to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets, while demanding that the Soviets withdraw.

By the fall of 1983, superpower relations were more hostile than at any period since the Cuban missile crisis. In September, the Soviets shot down a civilian airliner, KAL 007, killing all 269 people on board, including 61 Americans. The Soviets initially denied that it had happened, but then changed course and insisted that it was not a civilian plane. They refused to take responsibility or express remorse. The president was enraged and asserted that the tragedy was yet another “act of [Soviet] barbarism.”¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, General Secretary Yuri Andropov issued an unusually bitter statement declaring, in effect, that he could no longer do business with the Reagan administration.

Seeking cooperation

Despite this public acrimony, Reagan and several key advisers were, in fact, working behind the scenes on a plan to improve superpower relations. By late November 1983, the president had established an advisory group whose purpose was to chart a course toward “constructive cooperation” with the Kremlin. The president unveiled this new approach on January 16, 1984, with a major speech on superpower relations. The aim of the address was to launch a policy of “realistic reengagement” based on mutual “cooperation and understanding.”

Reagan began the speech by noting that the tense status quo between the superpowers was no longer acceptable. “Our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be,” he explained. “[W]e want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.” The tone of the address was reasoned and cooperative. Rather than issuing demands for changes in Soviet behavior and engaging in name-calling, as had been common in the past, the president spoke of the need to address common problems jointly. “Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies,” he explained. “But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms.” In a marked change, the president sought to reassure Moscow of Washington’s

13 For example, see National Security Decision Directives 75 (January 1983) and 100 (July 1983), www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/.

14 Ronald Reagan, “US Measures in Response to the Soviets’ ‘Korean Airline Massacre,’” September 5, 1983, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1983, 545.

benign intentions. "Our challenge is peaceful. We do not threaten the Soviet Union . . . Our countries have never fought each other; there is no reason why we ever should."

The president sought to improve relations in three key areas. The first task would be to "find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world . . . [R]educing the risk of war – and especially nuclear war – is priority number one." Indeed, in a radical departure from the accepted wisdom about international security, Reagan called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. "[M]y dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth," the president declared. Second, Reagan sought to "establish a better working relationship" with the Kremlin, "one marked by greater cooperation and understanding." In order to further mutual understanding, he proposed the institutionalization of superpower dialogue. The aim of this dialogue would be to clarify intentions, minimize uncertainty, and, ultimately, to avoid conflict. Finally, the president invited collaboration in resolving regional conflicts, such as Afghanistan, southern Africa, and Central America. Rather than denouncing the Soviets' "expansionist" activities, as was customary in the past, Reagan stated that the superpowers "should jointly examine concrete actions that we can both take to reduce US–Soviet confrontation" throughout the world.¹⁵

Why the shift?

Why this shift in policy?¹⁶ Several factors came into play. On a fundamental level, the change may have been more apparent than real. Reagan had long spoken of his desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, although this idea was rarely taken seriously, even by his own aides. "The concern about nuclear war and the challenge to diminish that war was always foremost in [Reagan's] mind," the president's adviser and long-term friend, Martin Anderson, has explained. "It was not something he talked about a lot in public. But he had strong feelings and strong convictions about what could and should be done."¹⁷

15 Ronald Reagan, "The US–Soviet Relationship," *Department of State Bulletin* 84 (January 16, 1984), 1–4; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 463–67.

16 For more, see Beth A. Fischer, *Triumph? The Reagan Legacy and American Foreign Policy Today* (forthcoming).

17 Martin Anderson, *Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 72. For more, see Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005).

In addition, some administration officials maintain that Reagan had always intended to seek cooperation and nuclear disarmament once the United States had regained its strength. By 1984, the United States was in a much stronger position than it had been in years, as the president noted at the outset of his January 16th address.¹⁸ The military buildup was taking hold, US nuclear missiles had been deployed to Europe, the American economy was recovering, and the Western alliance appeared to be unified.

Despite the president's longstanding antipathy to nuclear weapons and his desire for constructive cooperation with the Soviet Union, movement toward this end had been erratic, owing to ideological disputes within the administration, bureaucratic infighting, personnel turnover, and competing priorities. The president's inability to make a decisive commitment to engagement also played a role. Disorganization in the policymaking process was an additional hurdle.¹⁹ In short, the administration had a hard time getting its act together.

But other factors played a role. European allies had become anxious about the state of superpower relations and had been quietly appealing for the administration to be "less shrill."²⁰ Such messages found a receptive audience within some quarters of the administration. The president's domestic advisers, such as Michael Deaver and James Baker, had an eye on the 1984 presidential election and believed a less confrontational approach would score points with voters. Nancy Reagan also urged the president to pursue the path toward peace. Mindful of her husband's legacy, the First Lady encouraged him to leave behind something more enduring than simply a military buildup.²¹

The mounting tension throughout the fall of 1983 was also critical in precipitating the shift. In November, NATO conducted a large-scale military exercise in Europe which simulated a nuclear attack on the USSR. The Soviets appeared to believe that the exercise was the beginning of a real war, and began to prepare to respond in kind. Reagan had long been concerned about the possibility of an accidental nuclear Armageddon, and the KAL 007 tragedy

18 At times, however, the president rejected the notion that the United States had reached a position of strength. For example, see Reagan's remarks to Gorbachev during the second plenary meeting on November 19, 1985, Geneva, Switzerland, available in Jack F. Matlock papers, Geneva Memcons, Box 92137, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

19 In his memoirs, Shultz paints a picture of a president who allowed himself to be routinely undermined by the hawks within his own administration.

20 Author interview with Robert McFarlane, Washington, DC, July 7, 1995.

21 Author interview with Caspar Weinberger, Washington, DC, July 31, 1995. McFarlane offered this view as well.

and the war scare surrounding the NATO exercise heightened these anxieties. According to Robert McFarlane, his national security adviser, the president was “genuinely anxious” about the war scare, and it had a “big influence” on his subsequent approach to the Soviets.²²

The Reagan administration’s reorientation was initially discounted or ignored both in the United States and in the USSR. Some derided it as insincere, noting that the White House remained wedded to the controversial SDI as well as its confrontational approach to regional disputes in Central America and Afghanistan. It was also apparent that some members of the administration did not support the new outlook, most notably Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and William Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Others considered the new approach to be a cheap ploy to win the upcoming election. In many instances, it simply fell upon deaf ears.

Moreover, the new approach yielded little fruit for several years. The Kremlin was going through a period of unprecedented turmoil with the death of three leaders in less than two and a half years. It simply was not in a position to engage on major policy initiatives, even if it were so inclined, which it was not. Consequently, superpower relations remained icy until the November 1985 Geneva summit. It was only after the 1986 meeting in Reykjavik that relations began to thaw considerably.

In essence, the suggestion that the Reagan administration pursued a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union throughout its two terms in office is not historically accurate. The White House had jettisoned its confrontational approach by 1984. Between 1984 and 1988, the goal was to improve superpower relations. As McFarlane explained to reporters in a background briefing before Reagan’s January 16th speech, “The fundamental purpose of the president’s address will be to present in a clear and comprehensive manner his objective, which is to solve problems with the Soviet Union and to improve the state of this crucial relationship.”²³ Jack Matlock, the director of Soviet affairs on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, concurs that the aim was to begin to build a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Matlock, who wrote the bulk of the January 16th address, has

22 Author interview with McFarlane, July 7, 1995. On the war scare, see Benjamin B. Fischer, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare* (Washington, DC: Study for the Center of Intelligence, 1997), and Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 102–43.

23 R. McFarlane briefing, January 1984, White House Office of Records Management subject file SP 833 (Soviet/US Relations, WH 1/16/84) 168687–194999.

recollected that the administration thought an improvement in superpower relations might be years in the making:

At the time [January 1984] I said "I don't see any way the present Soviet leadership is going to be able to respond, but we need to be on the record." At least when there are changes [in Soviet leadership] and they are prepared to engage, we should have a policy that is ready and which is directed at not doing them in . . . Now, did we think they would say, "Hoorah, that's right, we're gonna do it?" Of course not. We were very aware of all of the suspicions and of the real problems. My own estimate at the time was that nothing would happen for a year or even two, but if we could keep steadily reiterating our [new policy] we would eventually engage the Soviets on it.²⁴

The Reagan administration never sought to "vanquish" the Soviet Union, as the triumphalists assert. Reagan officials recall that they recognized Moscow's economic difficulties and sought to place pressure on these weaknesses. However, they reject the notion that the administration was consciously seeking to bankrupt the Soviet Union. "We imposed costs [on the Soviet Union], and put pressure on them through the USIA [US Information Agency] and so forth," McFarlane explained in 1995. "But 80–90 percent of what happened to the USSR was because Marxism was a dumb idea. At most the Reagan administration accelerated its decline by 5–15 years."²⁵ Matlock agrees that the White House did not aim to vanquish the Soviet Union. "I think we recognized the difficulties with the Soviet economy," Matlock recalled in 1998:

[But] I would say that none of the key players [in foreign policymaking] were operating from the assumption that we were going to do the Soviet Union in, or that the purpose of the pressure was to bring them down . . . [T]hat's all thinking after the fact. Our goal was always to give the Soviets incentives to bring the Cold War to an end.²⁶

Furthermore, the Reagan administration did not pursue SDI for the purpose of bankrupting the Soviet Union, as some have charged. "I was present at many, if not most, of the discussions on [SDI]," Lieutenant General Edward

24 Jack F. Matlock's remarks, in Nina Tannenwald (ed.), "Understanding the End of the Cold War, 1980–1987," transcripts from Oral History Conference, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI (hereafter Brown Conference transcripts), 89.

25 Author interview with McFarlane, July 7, 1995.

26 Matlock's remarks, Brown Conference transcripts, 86, 88. Archival material overwhelmingly supports these recollections. For example, see George P. Shultz, "US–Soviet Relations," January 19, 1983, memo to President Reagan, documents from Oral History Conference, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, RI (hereafter Brown Conference documents), number 2.

L. Rowny explained in 1998. "As the archives are opened, I would be greatly surprised if you find any serious talk about [spending the Soviets into the ground] at all. I think it did come up once or twice in passing, but by and large, throughout the period, President Reagan's idea was 'Let's defend the people of the United States.'"²⁷

Another point is crucial: Reagan's hardline approach of 1981–83 led to a period of nearly unprecedented hostility between the superpowers. There were few, if any, gains from such an approach. Superpower relations began to improve only after the president changed course and Gorbachev introduced important changes to Soviet foreign policy.

It is equally important to note that Reagan began seeking a rapprochement with the USSR before Gorbachev came to power. Thus, Washington was not simply responding to Gorbachev's revolutionary policies. The White House was not simply "along for the ride," as some imply. Reagan and his key advisers actively sought to improve relations even before the Soviet Union began to reform.

Shared dreams in a nuclear world

The three perspectives discussed at the outset not only overstate the antagonistic nature of the Reagan administration's policies, they also overlook the degree to which the Reagan and Bush administrations shared many fundamental goals with Gorbachev and his reformers. While there were important disagreements between the two capitals, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers shared a sense of purpose with the White House on the most fundamental issues. Chief among these shared goals was Reagan's and Gorbachev's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. It was this common dream that initially led the two men to realize they could work together, thus opening the door to further collaboration.

Both Reagan and Gorbachev rejected the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which contended that there would be stability and peace as long as the two sides had enough nuclear weapons to withstand a nuclear attack and to retaliate in kind. Reagan abhorred this doctrine and considered it immoral: "To rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat . . . [is] a sad commentary on the human condition," he lamented in 1983.²⁸ He repeated these sentiments during his first meeting with Soviet foreign minister Eduard

²⁷ Ed Rowny, Brown Conference transcripts, 63.

²⁸ Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983, *WCPD*, 19, 447.

Shevardnadze in September 1985. "Today it is uncivilized to say we can only maintain peace by threatening innocent people," Reagan reasoned.²⁹

By the time Gorbachev was admitted to the Politburo he, too, had become opposed to the conventional nuclear doctrine. "When I saw the monster that we and the United States had created as a result of the arms race, with all its mistakes and accidents with nuclear weapons and nuclear power, when I saw the terrible amount of force that had been amassed, I finally understood what the consequences, including global winter, would be," Gorbachev has reflected.³⁰

Reagan and Gorbachev both feared the possibility of an accidental nuclear exchange. The president repeatedly spoke to his advisers about his concerns regarding an unintended nuclear Armageddon, and believed that the presence of vast stockpiles of nuclear arms raised the probability of an accident. The KAL 007 tragedy and the war scare of November 1983 played on Reagan's concerns about such an accidental nuclear exchange. As McFarlane has recalled, President Reagan "was genuinely alarmed that the world could get out of control . . . [H]e genuinely understood that systems can fail, and he saw a responsibility to think beyond established doctrine."³¹

Gorbachev shared these concerns. "I was quite sure . . . that the people in the White House were not idiots [and would not intentionally launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union]," he has recalled. "More likely, I thought, was that nuclear weapons might be used without the political leadership actually wanting this, or deciding on it, owing to some failure in the command and control systems. They say that if there is a gun, some day it will shoot. That fear motivated me to seek an end to the arms race."³² Soviet concerns about an accidental nuclear exchange grew after the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear-power plant.

Consequently, both the president and the general secretary sought to eliminate nuclear weapons. "I believe there can only be one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age: a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought," Reagan declared to the Japanese Diet on November 11, 1983. "I know I speak for people everywhere when I say our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from

29 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Random House, 2004), 142.

30 Gorbachev, as quoted in Jonathan Schell, "The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons," *The Nation* (2–9 February 1998), www.gci.ch/GreenCrossFamily/gorby/newspieces/interviews/thenation.html.

31 McFarlane, Brown Conference transcripts, 144.

32 Gorbachev, as quoted in Schell, "The Gift of Time."

the earth.”³³ Gorbachev shared this dream and sought to make it reality. In January 1986, the Soviet leader proposed a plan for abolishing nuclear weapons worldwide by 2000.

Although both leaders had repeatedly called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, it was only during the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting that they came to understand the depth of each other's conviction on the matter. To the consternation of most of his advisers, President Reagan revealed at Reykjavik that he was prepared to accept Gorbachev's plan to eliminate all strategic nuclear arms within ten years. Although such an agreement never materialized because of disagreements over SDI, the meeting was crucial in that it proved to Gorbachev that, despite Reagan's sometimes antagonistic rhetoric, the president sincerely sought to eliminate nuclear weapons. "It was a real watershed," Gorbachev has explained.³⁴ Such understanding gave the Soviet leader more confidence to pursue his reforms at home. "After Reykjavik, it was perfectly clear to Gorbachev that there was not going to be a war, and that neither side was going to attack the other," Gorbachev's foreign-affairs adviser, Anatolii Cherniaev, has explained. "He became less concerned about this. I remember multiple discussions of military and budgetary issues, and whenever [the military] mentioned any kind of figures with requests for military spending, Gorbachev always bristled and said, 'Are you planning on going to war? I'm not going to war. So all of your suggestions are unacceptable.'"³⁵

Both the Kremlin and the White House also believed that a genuine improvement in relations would not be possible without a modicum of trust. "The problem of the Cold War was a problem of trust, and of differences in how we understood each other's efforts in the area of security and defense," Cherniaev observed in 1998. "It was this absence of understanding, or incorrect understanding, or lack of desire to understand that was the root of the problem."³⁶ Gorbachev and his colleagues sought to build trust through a series of unilateral arms reductions and moratoria intended to prove that the Soviet Union sincerely sought to end the arms race.

In Reagan's view, the Cold War was built upon a foundation of mistrust. If the mistrust could be resolved, other policy disputes would dissipate as well. This was especially true regarding arms control. "We don't mistrust each other because we're armed," Reagan was fond of saying; "we're armed

33 Lou Cannon, "President Hails Japan as Partner," *Washington Post*, November 11, 1983.

34 Gorbachev, as quoted in Schell, "The Gift of Time."

35 Anatolii Cherniaev, Brown Conference transcripts, 44–45. 36 Cherniaev, *ibid.*, 64.

because we mistrust each other.” The president was not terribly engaged in the minutiae of the arms-control process – indeed, he found such details boring. But this was because he believed the weapons were a symptom of underlying suspicions, rather than the heart of the problem. If the mistrust between the superpowers could be resolved, the arms race would take care of itself. Consequently, the Reagan administration took a different approach toward building trust than did Gorbachev and his aides: it sought to shift the focus of superpower relations away from arms control and to aim instead to make progress in other areas, such as human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations.³⁷ It was hoped these discussions would improve mutual understanding. McFarlane has explained that, “By broadening the agenda to include not just arms control but other issues we hoped to relieve some of [the Soviet] leaders’ fears that we would attack.”³⁸

The Reagan administration’s decision to emphasize topics other than arms reductions frustrated Gorbachev and his aides, however. They continued to regard arms control as the defining feature of superpower relations.³⁹ Moreover, the Soviets were seeking to reduce the financial burden of the arms race and they suspected that the Reagan administration’s focus on other issues was a ploy to slow down – or avoid – such a process.

Gorbachev and Reagan shared another important goal: each believed that superpower dialogue was imperative, owing to the nuclear threat. During his January 1984 address, Reagan stated that he sought a more cooperative superpower relationship and declared that Washington “must and will” enter into talks with the Kremlin. “The fact that neither side likes the other’s system is no reason not to talk,” he reasoned. “Living in the nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.”⁴⁰ Gorbachev used strikingly similar language during a July 1986 conversation with French president François Mitterrand. “The nuclear era requires new thinking from everybody,” the general secretary explained. “We all depend upon each other. That is why it is very important to understand each other better. In essence, we have no alternative other than to learn to live in the real world.”⁴¹

37 For example, see Robert C. McFarlane, Memorandum for the president, “Checklist of US–Soviet Issues: Status and Prospects,” February 18, 1984, available in Jack F. Matlock papers, US–USSR Relations, January–April 1984, Box 23, Reagan Library.

38 McFarlane, Brown Conference transcripts, 67.

39 See Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996), esp. 453.

40 Reagan, “The US–Soviet Relationship.”

41 Transcript of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand, July 7, 1986, archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Brown Conference documents, number 25.



18. Vice President George Bush, President Ronald Reagan, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the Statue of Liberty, New York, December 1988, at the end of Gorbachev's visit to the United States. Reagan and Bush labored to support Gorbachev's unprecedented reforms.

Reagan and Bush also shared Gorbachev's assessment that the Soviet system was in need of reform. Reagan had been calling for market reform and democratization in the USSR since the 1970s.⁴² Although Bush and his advisers were initially skeptical about the viability of Gorbachev's policies,

42. See Reagan's radio addresses during the 1970s in Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, *Reagan: In His Own Hand* (New York: Free Press, 2001).

they repeatedly stressed both in public and in private that they wanted the reforms to succeed. During their December 1989 summit meeting in Malta, President Bush explained to Gorbachev, "You're dealing with an administration that wants to see the success of what you are doing. The world will be a better place if *perestroika* succeeds."⁴³

Moreover, both the Bush administration and Gorbachev and his aides sought stable, managed change. Whether by nature or by political philosophy, President Bush disliked the idea of revolution. Instead, the president and his advisers hoped *perestroika* would lead to a gradual democratization of the Eastern bloc. Gorbachev and his reformers sought the same, in the belief that they could retain greater control over an evolutionary process than a revolutionary one. Both leaders and their aides were therefore unsettled by the rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe, particularly regarding the reunification of Germany.

The Bush administration believed that stable, managed change could occur only if the USSR remained united and Gorbachev's position remained strong. Therefore, Bush and his advisers did not want the Soviet Union to dissolve. In particular, they feared what would happen to the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal should the center collapse.

Accomplishing more by saying less

Not only did the White House share many fundamental goals with Soviet reformers, the US presidents refrained from exploiting the changes taking place in the USSR to the degree they could have. For the most part, they were careful not to exult over a Cold War "victory." For example, while there were important policy differences among Bush's advisers, they all agreed that the White House should not exacerbate Gorbachev's difficult situation. These efforts to avoid embarrassing Gorbachev largely took place behind the scenes. "We can accomplish more by saying less," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft reasoned.⁴⁴ Consequently, Bush and his aides opted for a policy of "prudence." This approach was characterized by deliberately bland statements about the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For instance, while preparing for a July 1989 visit to Poland and Hungary, Bush advised his speechwriters, "*Whatever* this trip is, it's *not* a victory tour with me running

⁴³ Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 154.

⁴⁴ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1998), 135.

around over there pounding my chest . . . I don't want [my speeches] to sound inflammatory or provocative. I don't want what I do to complicate the lives of Gorbachev and the others . . . I don't want to put a stick in Gorbachev's eye." During the trip, Bush emphasized his desire for strong superpower relations and advised the reformers in Poland and Hungary that they needed perestroika to be successful in order for their own reforms to proceed. Likewise, as Lithuanians began their drive for independence in December 1989, White House press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told the media, "We don't want to take any positions that are not helpful to either side."⁴⁵ This statement was striking not only for its aloofness, but because of the longstanding American claim that the Baltic countries were not legally a part of the USSR. One could easily imagine an American president seizing upon these uprisings and making them the centerpiece of renewed condemnation of Soviet imperialism.

In the same spirit, in January 1990, the president tried to blunt international criticism of Gorbachev for sending Soviet troops into Azerbaijan to quell anti-Armenian riots there. Bush told *Newsweek* that it would have been preferable if the troops had not been sent, "but here you have a situation where the Soviet Union is trying to put down ethnic conflict, internal conflict." The president characterized Gorbachev's position as "extraordinarily difficult" and added that the problems "would not be made easier by a lot of pontificating from leaders in other countries."⁴⁶ Here again, it is not difficult to imagine a different president loudly condemning the Kremlin for employing troops against its own people.

As the uprisings in the Baltic republics continued throughout 1990 and 1991, the Bush administration came under increasing pressure at home to make a bold statement of support for the people of these regions and to condemn the Soviet threat of the use of force. The administration was in a difficult spot: on the one hand, it sought the democratization of these territories; on the other hand, it preferred managed reform under Gorbachev's leadership. A public declaration of support for the peoples of the Baltic republics might play well among the American public, but it would undermine Gorbachev. Moreover, Bush and his advisers anticipated that public pressure within the United States would prevent them from carrying through with a planned superpower summit in February 1991. However, canceling the summit as punishment for Soviet actions in the Baltic region would undercut Gorbachev. Ultimately, a compromise was found: the two countries issued a joint statement in which the summit was "postponed," ostensibly owing to the Persian Gulf War and

45 Beschloss and Talbott, *Highest Levels*, 86, 175. 46 *Ibid.*, 176.

obstacles regarding arms control. The uprising in the Baltic area was never mentioned.

As Gorbachev's authority became increasingly tenuous toward the end of 1990, he sought to strengthen his position by adopting more hardline policies and consolidating his power. These moves prompted strong condemnation from Boris Yeltsin, as well as the resignation of Gorbachev's reform-minded foreign minister, Shevardnadze. Both men warned of a coming dictatorship. The Bush administration's response was muted, however. Baker told reporters that the United States would be "foolish" not to take Shevardnadze's warning seriously, but did not elaborate. Bush explained to the press, "Any time you move from a totalitarian, totally controlled state to an open state . . . you're bound to have problems . . . Far be it from me to try to fine-tune the difficulties that they're having there."⁴⁷ Once again, it is easy to imagine an alternative response in which Washington seized upon these warnings of dictatorship and reiterated its condemnation of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union.

Some contend that the Bush administration was far too cautious and could have done more to support reformers in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In particular, they criticize the administration for dragging its feet when it came to office in January 1989, rather than seizing the initiative for change. Indeed, upon taking office the administration engaged in a review of US policy toward the Soviet Union which dragged on for months, placing superpower relations on hold. The outcome of the review was little more than pap and was rejected by Bush and his most senior advisers. Throughout most of 1989, the Bush administration appeared flat-footed, unable to grasp the momentous changes taking place in the Soviet sphere, much less fashion a vision for a post-Cold War world.

The Bush administration was laboring under serious constraints, however, the most important of which was uncertainty. The White House was aware that Gorbachev's position was becoming increasingly precarious. While Bush wanted to encourage reforms through making concessions of his own, he had to consider the growing possibility that Gorbachev would be ousted. In such a case, the reform movement could be jettisoned and the Cold War resumed. Washington needed to ensure that it would not find itself in a vulnerable position should such a scenario come to pass.

The Bush administration was also constrained by economic realities, both at home and within the Soviet Union. Although Gorbachev and his advisers

47 *Ibid.*, 296–97.

began increasing pressure for Western financial aid in July 1990, the Soviet economy had yet to be reformed. While Bush wanted to “reward” Gorbachev for his reforms – and to bolster the Soviet leader’s position at home – he was painfully aware that any aid would have been largely ineffectual. The administration’s ability to provide financial support was further constrained by the budget deficits caused by the Reagan-era military buildup. These budgetary constraints were a source of concern and embarrassment for the president and his advisers.⁴⁸

In short, the Bush White House had to tread a very fine line: it sought to support and encourage Gorbachev’s reform program, yet it also needed to protect US security interests should perestroika be abandoned.

Thorns in superpower relations

Although the Reagan and Bush administrations shared important goals with Soviet reformers and sought to support them, there is no doubt that some of Washington’s policies made life very difficult for Soviet reformers. For example, the main thorn in superpower relations between 1983 and 1987 was the Strategic Defense Initiative. If anything was an impediment to improving superpower relations, it was SDI.⁴⁹ Although the Soviets privately doubted the feasibility of SDI, in public they adamantly opposed the project through October 1986 for a variety of reasons. Gorbachev initially opposed SDI because his primary aim was to end the arms race. It would be more difficult for him to pursue arms reductions if some of his Soviet colleagues believed the United States to be launching a new arms race in space. Additionally, some Soviet military experts were advising that one of the most effective ways to respond to SDI was to overwhelm the system; that is, if SDI could defend against 1,000 missiles, then the Soviets should produce 1,500 missiles. Such advice made it even more difficult to pursue arms reductions.

Despite the Soviets’ vociferous and continual objections to SDI, President Reagan would not budge on his pet project. He repeatedly refused Soviet attempts to keep SDI in the laboratory. The president offered to share SDI technology with the Soviets on several occasions, but the Kremlin found these arguments unconvincing and increasingly irritating.

The impasse over SDI ended in late 1986, after Gorbachev decided to shift emphasis away from the program. By this time Soviet studies had concluded

⁴⁸ See Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 49, 52, 113, 126, 276–77.

⁴⁹ For more, see Fischer, *Triumph?* For an alternate view on SDI, see Lettow, *Quest*.

that SDI simply was not feasible, and some suspected it was a hoax intended to goad the Soviets into massive military outlays.⁵⁰ More importantly, after the Reykjavik summit, Gorbachev became convinced that the United States posed no threat to Soviet security. This understanding blunted most of the Soviet criticisms of SDI. By 1987, the Politburo's concerns about SDI had dissipated to the extent that it sought to shift the focus of arms talks away from the defense project and toward the conclusion of a treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles. This shift paved the way for significant progress in arms control, and the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987.

Regional disputes were another source of tension. Although Washington sought to improve bilateral relations with Moscow, it continued a policy of confrontation in Central America and Afghanistan through the early 1990s.⁵¹ For example, Washington continued to funnel untold amounts of weapons and approximately \$3.2 billion to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In 1986, it began providing the mujahedin with shoulder-fired Stinger missiles.⁵² These anti-aircraft missiles effectively ended the Soviets' dominance of the air, thus turning the tide in the war. Moreover, the Americans did nothing to help the Soviets extract themselves from Afghanistan even after Gorbachev made it clear that this was his goal. In fact, the Reagan administration repeatedly resisted negotiations to end the conflict. As Gorbachev complained to Shultz in 1987, the Soviet Union wanted to leave Afghanistan, but the United States kept "putting sticks in our spokes."⁵³

Reagan, Bush, and the Cold War

What role did the Reagan and Bush administrations play in ending the Cold War? The three perspectives discussed at the outset are all extreme: Washington did not vanquish the USSR, nor was Washington irrelevant. These perspectives overstate the degree to which the White House was antagonistic toward the Kremlin and overlook the degree to which the two

50 The Soviets conducted two studies, both of which concluded SDI was unrealizable: Major General Vladimir I. Slipchenko, Brown Conference transcripts, 51–52.

51 See John H. Coatsworth's and Amin Saikal's chapters in this volume.

52 Much of the impetus for this assistance – although not all – came from Congress. See Odd Arne Westad, "Reagan's Anti-Revolutionary Offensive in the Third World," in Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 241–62, and Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret Wars of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

53 Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 895.

governments possessed shared objectives. As early as January 1984, the Reagan administration was publicly calling for dialogue, cooperation, and the elimination of nuclear weapons. This was important because these policies created an environment that was receptive to the revolutionary changes that were eventually introduced in Soviet policy.

President Reagan played a critical role in bringing the Cold War to its conclusion, but not because of his military buildup or confrontational posture, as triumphalists maintain. Rather, it was Reagan's desire to eliminate nuclear weapons that proved pivotal. "Reagan's anomalous anti-nuclearism provided the crucial signal to Gorbachev that bold initiatives would be reciprocated rather than exploited," Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have rightly observed. "Reagan's anti-nuclearism was more important than his administration's military build up in catalyzing the end of the Cold War."⁵⁴ Former Soviet officials agree: "[Gorbachev and Reagan] were very idealistic . . .," Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh reflected in 1993. "[T]his is what they immediately sensed in each other and this is why they made great partners . . . And if it were not for Reagan, I don't think we would have been able to reach the agreements in arms control that we later reached: because of Reagan, because of his idealism, because he really thought that we should do away with nuclear weapons. Gorbachev believed in that. Reagan believed in that. The experts didn't believe, but they did."⁵⁵

While Reagan's aspiration to eliminate nuclear weapons placed the superpowers on the path to ending the Cold War, Bush's desire to support Gorbachev kept them on the trail. Both President Reagan and President Bush sought to midwife Soviet reforms, not to stymie them. This support made it easier for Gorbachev to cope with domestic critics, and to continue his programs.

How far could Gorbachev have gone with his reforms had the White House chosen to exploit the changes within the Soviet bloc? If Reagan had publicly exulted that he had forced the Soviets to their knees through his arms buildup, would arms-reductions negotiations have proceeded? If the Bush administration had seized upon the reunification of Germany and its inclusion in NATO as a great victory for the West and the capitulation of the "evil empire," would the reform process have continued? We may never know the

54 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Who Won the Cold War?," in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 628.

55 Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's remarks, in William C. Wohlforth, *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 125–27, 160.

answers to these questions for certain. But evidence suggests that the peaceful resolution of the Cold War depended upon the active collaboration of both Moscow and Washington, indeed of East and West.

Thus, the US presidents played a critical role in bringing about the ending of the Cold War. This role, however, was clearly secondary. Reagan became more conciliatory, but Gorbachev revolutionized his country's foreign policy. Bush supported Gorbachev, but his propensity for prudence paled in comparison to Gorbachev's bold initiatives. The changes in Soviet foreign policy were of a much greater magnitude – and more painful – than were the changes in US policy. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, relinquished their grip on Eastern Europe, reached out to a “common home” in Western Europe, and allowed the emancipation of the Soviet republics. Moreover, Kremlin officials made disproportionate concessions in their quest to end the arms race. For example, during the Reykjavik summit, US negotiators were stunned as Gorbachev introduced concession after concession, accepting most of the administration's earlier “zero–zero” proposal. “We came [to Reykjavik] with nothing to offer and had offered nothing,” US arms negotiator Kenneth Adelman later recalled, “[We] sat there while they unwrapped their gifts.”⁵⁶ Such gestures were in striking contrast to the president's inflexibility on SDI. While President Reagan and President Bush sought to improve superpower relations, they certainly did not meet Gorbachev halfway.

⁵⁶ As quoted in Frances FitzGerald, *Way out there in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 360.

Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989

JOHN W. YOUNG

This chapter argues that Western Europe contributed significantly to the way the Cold War ended. With its large, well-educated population, with its industrial output and technology, and with strategic access to the North Atlantic, the region always remained the greatest potential prize in the global contest between the superpowers. The West European desire to continue détente in the wake of the Afghanistan crisis acted as a brake on US policy during the ‘new’ Cold War and encouraged the improvement in relations afterwards.¹ Perhaps more important, at the same time, West Europeans rescued their economies from the doldrums and continued to build the most successful customs union in the world in the European Community. They also strengthened democracy in Southern Europe, and remained determined, even amid the euphoria of ‘Gorbymania’, to maintain a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), complete with an effective nuclear defence. This combination of strength and a willingness to talk to the other side allowed West European governments to remain popular at home, to maintain security abroad, and to pursue a dynamic policy in the Cold War, one that did much to secure a resolution on Western terms.

If the breakdown of the Soviet system is seen as the result of a long-term failure of Communism in the face of liberal capitalism, then the success of West Europeans in creating a stable, thriving democratic system – mixing economic success with social justice – was an important component of the West’s victory in the Cold War. In a real sense, NATO’s agenda in the Helsinki process was fulfilled. The Soviets may have won recognition of the postwar territorial settlement in 1975, but only at the cost of allowing

¹ For a discussion of Afghanistan, see Amin Saikal’s chapter in this volume; for a discussion of the evolution of détente and its breakdown, see especially Jussi Hanhimäki’s chapter in volume II and Vladislav M. Zubok’s and Olav Njølstad’s chapters in this volume.

Western goods and ideas into an increasingly decrepit Marxist system. For the satellite states of Eastern Europe, the freedom and wealth of their Western neighbours acted as a magnet, drawing them away from Moscow and undermining the foundation of the system that disintegrated so spectacularly in late 1989, when it became obvious that Red Army bayonets would no longer prop it up. Thus, the end of the Cold War on Western terms can be seen as the result not only of American strength or of Mikhail Gorbachev's policies, but also of the creation of a thriving liberal democratic bastion on the very doorstep of the Warsaw Pact. This bastion was formed of countries whose social democratic political systems, voluntary association in the European Community, and willingness to differ with Washington on some issues made them an attractive model for East Europeans.

Reactions to Afghanistan

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, triggering the 'new' Cold War, Western Europe was beset by uncertainty. For a decade the region had been troubled by high inflation, unemployment, monetary instability, strikes, and social unrest. In the late 1960s, the healthy economic growth that had characterised the Western world since the Korean War drew to an end. A postwar generation had grown up who questioned materialism and sought new moral and artistic values. Riots in France in May 1968 and the 'hot autumn' in Italy in 1969 were early signs of what could happen when rising expectations were threatened by poor job prospects and reduced purchasing power. Those threatened with more limited opportunities were ready to operate outside traditional political institutions, hence rising trades union membership, student agitation, the emergence of feminism, and environmentalism. At the extreme, urban terrorists – such as Italy's Red Brigades and West Germany's Baader–Meinhof gang – became active, while in the Basque country of Spain and in Northern Ireland more sustained campaigns of violence were fuelled by regional problems.

The uncertainty only worsened when rising oil prices after the 1973 Middle East war pushed up inflation, followed by government expenditure cuts and recession. Even in West Germany, the healthiest European economy, unemployment reached nearly 5 per cent in 1975. In Britain, inflation passed the 20 per cent mark in 1975; in Italy, it was not much lower. Economies had barely recovered from the first 'oil shock' when, thanks to the Iranian revolution of early 1979, there was a second energy crisis, pushing the West into depression. By 1981, unemployment was over 2 million in West

Germany, over 3 million in Britain. The years of ‘stagflation’ and discontent helped to create the impression that Soviet Communism, as an economic and social system, was as successful as Western capitalism. The Soviet economy may have been stagnant from the mid-1970s but so too, at that point, were the United States and Western Europe. It was against this unpromising background that Western Europe’s 1980s resurgence must be traced.

The early years of the new decade were a time of continuing concern, and Europeans did not relish a return to the Cold War during the last year of the presidency of Jimmy Carter.² In Western Europe, *détente* had always meant something different than it did for the superpowers. The Soviets had exploited the process to try to freeze their nuclear parity with Washington, secure technology transfers, and legitimise their hold over Eastern Europe. The United States had used *détente* to manage relations with Moscow during a difficult period in the 1970s, when containment was called into question by the impact of the war in Vietnam. But, since the 1950s, European leaders had seen the reduction of East–West tension as a life-or-death issue, perched as they were on the military divide between the two sides. *Détente* not only reduced the risks of nuclear obliteration on the continent; it also allowed trade and personal contacts to open with Eastern Europe, giving both sides a stake in a more stable relationship. Even West Germany, sceptical about *détente* in the 1950s, had, through the development of *Ostpolitik*, become keen to develop links to East Germany. Furthermore, given the depressed state of their own economies, West Europeans were eager to exploit markets in the East. None of this meant there was any sympathy at official levels for Soviet policy. Far from being an alternative to Cold War, *détente* was a more subtle way of pursuing the destruction of the Soviet bloc by breeding within it an awareness of the benefits of openness, market economics, and democracy.

The differences between the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies over East–West relations were based, then, on questions of tactics rather than fundamental values. Yet, sometimes the differences could seem serious. West European governments joined in the chorus of condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan at the UN. But, given that NATO had learned to live with the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it was difficult for most Europeans to see why this new intrusion should spark a return to Cold War. After all, Afghanistan had been a Marxist state since early 1978, and the Soviets had perhaps acted defensively to prop it up. Meeting in Paris within weeks of the invasion, the German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and the French

² See Nancy Mitchell’s chapter in this volume.



19. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt meet in Bonn. Even as the US–USSR détente faltered, European statesmen kept up relations with Kremlin leaders.

president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were concerned to balance condemnation of Moscow's invasion with the preservation of contacts, issuing the lukewarm threat that 'détente would probably not be able to withstand another shock of the same type'.³ Afghanistan seemed a long way off and Europeans, having recently retreated from their colonial empires, did not share the superpowers' obsession with a 'zero-sum' contest in the Third World.

To the United States, the situation appeared more serious. Doubts had been growing about the value of détente for years, and now there were exaggerated fears that the Kremlin was driving towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Carter began to expand defence spending and took sanctions against Moscow without consulting his West European allies. Some of them made their discontent clear, fuelling US suspicions that, thanks to détente, Western Europe was becoming too dependent on the Soviet bloc. In particular, there was no European support for a trade embargo against the USSR. During the spring of 1980, Giscard and Schmidt both held summits with Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader. The president and the chancellor were friends, and both had elections looming. They believed it essential to maintain a dialogue with Moscow and were critical of Carter for past inconsistencies. Neither of them

3 Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 1089.

felt that the panicky measures he took in 1980 would persuade the Kremlin to leave Afghanistan. Then, again, neither of them had any sympathy with Communist aims. When, in April, the US Olympic Committee voted to boycott the Moscow games, West Germany was one of only three NATO members, alongside Norway and Turkey, to follow suit. Other governments, including the British, were sympathetic to a boycott but would not force their Olympic Committees to participate. The United States and its European allies, however, were able to preserve a common position at the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) that opened in 1980 as a follow up to Helsinki. At Madrid, West European countries, Canada, and the United States firmly resisted the Eastern bloc's attempts to play down the importance of human rights.

Reagan's first term

After Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, trans-Atlantic difficulties continued. British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who shared Reagan's faith in free-market economics, soon became a trusted ally and even Schmidt praised Reagan for his uncomplicated personality and consistency. But the chancellor also complained that Reagan 'was no more considerate of the interests of his allies ... than Carter before him'.⁴ The new president's determined anti-Communism included a warning in a speech of 2 September 1981 that the United States was ready to pursue a nuclear-arms race and a statement on 2 November that nuclear war in Europe need not lead to a strategic exchange. Nothing could be better calculated to rekindle European fears that their own security took second place in the eyes of the superpowers. Differences also emerged over Poland at the end of the year when the new Communist leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, introduced martial law and banned the independent trades union, Solidarity.⁵ This setback for hopes of liberalisation led Reagan to introduce sanctions against the USSR and Poland. But, as with Carter's reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan, West European governments disliked being faced with a US *fait accompli*. Although the European Community (EC) and NATO both warned Moscow that events in Poland had put détente at risk, West European governments saw no point in encouraging Poles to believe that anything could be done to free them from Communist rule. After all, nothing had been done to help Hungary in 1956 or

⁴ Helmut Schmidt, *Men and Powers* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), 251.

⁵ See Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

Czechoslovakia in 1968 when they were invaded. Since Soviet forces had not invaded Poland, the EC would not move beyond a limited set of trade restrictions against the USSR.

Reagan was not to be deterred.⁶ He exerted considerable pressure on West European countries to suspend their plans for an oil–gas pipeline from Siberia, and banned American companies and their European subsidiaries from helping to build it. US officials argued that they wanted to reduce West European dependency on the Eastern bloc, deny the Soviets billions of dollars, and give them an incentive to ‘behave’ in the future. Even Alexander Haig, who resigned as Reagan’s first secretary of state in June 1982, noted the irony that, ‘when the hammer of American economic power finally smashed down, it did not strike the Russians ... but instead battered our friends and allies’.⁷

Europeans were not convinced that such steps would alter Soviet policy and, in any case, the Reagan administration seemed hypocritical, since it was currently selling vast amounts of grain to the Soviet Union at very low prices. The pipeline was not only a major investment project, but was also designed to help Western Europe meet its energy needs following the recent ‘oil shocks’. US pressure was resisted by all EC members, even Thatcher. Schmidt and the recently elected François Mitterrand in France were deeply opposed to Reagan’s behaviour, especially since he did not seem to comprehend their interests. Speaking in Washington in July, Schmidt tried to make Americans understand Germany’s dilemma: ‘Our country lies within the range of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. It is no bigger than the state of Oregon, but six thousand nuclear weapons are deployed there which are not under our control.’⁸ His days as chancellor were already numbered, however: soon afterwards, a parliamentary vote brought the Christian Democrats into office under Helmut Kohl, a leader more sceptical about trying to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Aside from their differences over Poland, Europeans and Americans had an uneven record of co-operation during Reagan’s first term. The October 1983 US invasion of Grenada upset even Reagan’s principal European ally, Margaret Thatcher. The Caribbean island was a former British colony and London would have expected to be consulted over such military action. The ‘special relationship’ was restored soon enough and in mid-April 1986, when US aircraft bombed Libya, the British were the only European power to

6 See Beth A. Fischer’s chapter in this volume.

7 Alexander Haig, *Caveat* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), 241.

8 Quoted in Jonathan Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), 178.

provide active support. Others refused even to grant the United States over-flight rights for the operation. Meanwhile, American officials in the mid-1980s felt increasingly threatened by European Community protectionism, while Europeans were critical of US policy towards Nicaragua and of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as ‘Star Wars’, announced by Reagan in March 1983. His European allies questioned the feasibility of such an anti-ballistic missile programme. They worried that merely pursuing such a chimera would induce the Soviets to take counter-measures and upset the nuclear balance. But the impact of such differences should not be exaggerated. Even taken together, such troubles in the Western alliance hardly matched those provoked by the collapse of the European Defence Community in 1954 or French withdrawal from NATO in 1966. And there were important examples of allied unity. For example, in 1982, France, Italy, and Britain joined the United States in sending a force to Lebanon. On 23 October 1983, 58 French troops as well as 241 Americans were killed in bomb attacks in Beirut, a tragedy that led to the international force being withdrawn. Only weeks before the Beirut bombings, on 1 September 1983, in one of the most serious crises of the decade, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner. Moscow’s unrepentant response to the incident encouraged West Europeans to join the United States in denying landing rights to the Soviet state airline, Aeroflot.

NATO’s cruise–Pershing deployment

The most significant signs of the continuing health of the US–European alliance, the basic unity of their aims, and their common determination to maintain a strong defence against the USSR were reflected in NATO deliberations between 1979 and 1983. In December 1979, NATO ministers decided to deploy 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe while hoping that progress on arms-control agreements with Moscow could make such action unnecessary. At the time such a deal did not seem unlikely. In the late 1970s, European leaders, especially Schmidt, had been deeply concerned that the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range SS-20s in Eastern Europe could undermine the ‘chain of deterrence’ that was essential to NATO strategy.⁹ Although Brezhnev hinted at a deal – the Soviet Union would reduce its medium-range weapons in Europe if NATO avoided the deployment of new systems – the invasion of Afghanistan made it most unlikely that one could be achieved. In February 1980, as part of the gulf opening between the two sides,

⁹ Schmidt, *Men and Powers*, 71.

Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko announced that the USSR would continue with arms-control talks only if NATO abandoned its decision to modernise its nuclear arsenal.

The war of nerves between East and West continued under Reagan, each side trying to score propaganda points off the other. Gromyko told the UN in September that the USSR hoped both superpowers would promise not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a war in Europe. Since the Warsaw Pact had a clear superiority in conventional arms, the 'no-first-use' proposal was seen as a non-starter by NATO. Reagan recognised the wisdom of launching a dramatic, positive-sounding proposal of his own, hence his statement on 18 November 1981 that both sides should destroy all their intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) weapons. But, since the USSR was already deploying SS-20s, while NATO had yet to receive the cruise and Pershing missiles, this 'zero option' was seen by the Soviets as one-sided. INF talks began in Geneva on 30 November, but they did not make much progress. Britain and France refused to consider the Soviet demand that their nuclear arsenals should be included in the talks.

It was probably not likely that an INF deal could be struck before NATO put cruise-Pershing missiles into Western Europe. Until that was done, Moscow could hope that popular opposition to the missiles would stop the plans for deployment. But the atmosphere was made even more disturbing by Reagan's rhetorical attack on the USSR as an 'evil empire' on 9 March, and by the threat from the Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, that a successful cruise-Pershing deployment would spell the end of the INF talks. In late October, there were anti-nuclear protests in all the countries due to receive missiles. In Britain, media attention focused on the 'women's peace camp' outside the Greenham Common airbase, where the first cruise missiles were scheduled to arrive. In Germany, there was a week of demonstrations. In Italy, half a million people marched in Rome on 22 October, while 300,000 gathered in Brussels on the 23rd. But the United States' allies proved determined to go ahead with the 1979 decision. On 15 November, 'Tomahawk' cruise missiles arrived on schedule at Greenham Common. A week later, the West German Bundestag voted, by 286 to 226, to deploy Pershing IIs. The following day, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva INF talks, beginning a depressing year on the arms-control front.

The extent of the suspicion between the two sides in Europe was highlighted by a NATO military exercise, codenamed Able Archer, carried out on 2–11 November. The Soviets feared this might be a 'cover' for a surprise attack. With disarmament talks ended, Reagan preoccupied with re-election, and



20. A protester is arrested by police during a demonstration against the installation of American Pershing missiles in Ramstein, West Germany. NATO leaders overcame protests and successfully deployed the missiles.

another conservative geriatric, Konstantin Chernenko, taking power in Moscow in February, East–West relations in Europe seemed as frozen as they had been under Harry S. Truman and Iosif Stalin. Only in January 1985, after the Kremlin realised that the popular upsurge against the missile deployments in Western Europe had ebbed and after Reagan was re-elected as president, did the Kremlin agree to re-open INF and strategic arms talks.

European democracy resurgent

Moscow had failed to intimidate West European governments on the military-security front, and its inability to exploit popular discontent in the region exposed the diminished appeal of its system. Compared to earlier phases of the Cold War, there was now little support for Communist Parties in Western Europe. Nor was there much social dissatisfaction for Moscow to exploit. A decade before, the situation had appeared very different. In Greece, when the military regime collapsed in 1974, Constantine Karamanlis, the new prime minister, had legalised the Communist Party and had taken his country out of NATO. In Portugal, when decades of dictatorship had ended in April 1974, the

new government included Communist ministers. In neighbouring Spain, the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975 had been followed by steps towards democracy that included the legalisation of the Communist Party. And in the 1976 elections in Italy the Communists had won more than a third of the vote.

But the Communist advance in Western Europe was not sustained: liberal democracy proved a resilient force and, if anything, NATO emerged stronger than ever. The social discontent of the late 1960s and 1970s rarely converted into sympathy for Marxist-Leninism partly because, after Czechoslovakia, Soviet Communism was seen as being an oppressive system, no better than capitalism. The 'new Left' was influenced by Trotskyite and anarchist views, and quickly became fractured. Those who opposed the INF deployment in 1983 were mainly middle-class liberals, genuinely concerned about the dangers of nuclear war, rather than apologists for Communism. In the rural, conservative societies of Southern Europe, the weakness of the Communists was quickly exposed. In Greece, Karamanlis was actually a conservative, who distanced himself from the United States mainly because he was offended by its failure to prevent the partition of Cyprus. The Portuguese Communists were humiliated in the April 1975 elections, winning only 12.5 per cent of votes, while the Spanish Communists won less than a tenth of votes in June 1977. Greece rejoined NATO in 1980, while Spain entered in 1982.

Only in Italy and France was support for Communism deep-seated. But that support, too, slowly dissipated.¹⁰ Collectivist values faded in the face of individualism, as did the strength of trades unions in the wake of the reduced importance of traditional heavy industries, such as coal, steel, and ship-building. Meanwhile, centrist governments delivered social reforms, and social mobility increased. In the June 1979 general election in Italy, the Communist share of the vote dropped to 30 per cent, removing the danger that the Communist Party of Italy could take control of the government. Although Socialist candidate François Mitterrand included four Communists in his Cabinet when he won the French presidency in 1981, the Communists were disappointed with Mitterrand's waning radicalism and quit in 1984. After that, the Communists in France rapidly became marginalised, taking only 10 per cent of the vote in 1986.

There was evidence, too, of greater political stability in the key states of Western Europe. In Britain, Thatcher's Conservative Party, having come into office in May 1979 in the wake of the so-called winter of discontent, won the elections of 1983 and 1987. In France, Mitterrand, the first Socialist president

¹⁰ See Silvio Pons's chapter in this volume.

under the Fifth Republic, was forced to share power with a Gaullist prime minister (Jacques Chirac) after the 1986 elections, but he was nevertheless re-elected in 1988. In West Germany, Kohl led the Christian Democrats to victory in the general elections of 1983 and 1987. Indeed, between October 1982 and November 1990, the three principal West European democracies – Britain, France, and West Germany – had an unprecedented period of eight years in which the heads of government remained the same. The existence of such strong and popular leaders in the West contrasted starkly with the party stalwarts in the Kremlin: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were all ageing, sick, and incapable of dynamic action.¹¹

The improved stability of the West European governments and the decline of the Left were linked to the region's reviving economic fortunes. Whereas in the first half of the decade Western European growth rates averaged 1.7%, in the second half the average was 3.2%. Recovery from the 'stagflation' of the 1970s was the result of a number of factors, some having little to do with Europeans themselves. The growth of the US economy, stimulated by Reagan's tax cuts and defence expenditures, fuelled European exports to the United States. The decline of oil prices also eased one of the most significant inflationary pressures in Western Europe, a region heavily dependent on imported oil. High interest rates also drove inflation down, placing the economies of Western Europe in a good position to exploit the communications revolution that now gathered pace (see Table 2).¹²

There was also a general recognition by the early 1980s that the Keynesian approach to economics, popular in the postwar period, had failed to deliver consistent, inflation-free growth. Keynesianism was supposed to maintain full employment through increased state spending, financed by higher taxation, when demand in the economy sagged. But changes in demand were difficult to predict and governments were reluctant to cut back on spending even when full employment was achieved, especially when strong trades unions backed higher social expenditures. The result in the 1970s had been an 'overheating' of West European economies, too much demand leading to inflation, which oil price increases compounded. In Britain, Thatcher's Conservatives cut taxes, placed limits on trades union rights, restricted strikes, returned nationalised industries to private ownership, promoted entrepreneurship, and reduced inflation. Thatcher's policies took time to be widely accepted, but

11 John Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 124.

12 See also the chapters by David Reynolds and Giovanni Arrighi in this volume.

Table 2. *Economic growth rates of leading West European states, 1980–1989*

	France	Germany	Italy	Spain	UK	USA
1980	1.5	0.9	3.6	1.4	-2.3	-2.0
1981	0.4	-0.9	0.0	-1.2	-1.3	1.6
1982	2.7	-1.1	0.4	0.7	1.5	-2.9
1983	0.8	2.3	0.9	1.2	3.7	3.9
1984	0.8	2.4	2.9	1.3	2.4	6.9
1985	1.6	1.6	3.0	2.0	3.3	3.0
1986	2.4	2.6	2.5	3.0	3.9	2.3
1987	1.9	1.2	3.0	5.3	4.5	2.3
1988	4.1	3.3	3.9	4.9	5.6	3.0
1989	3.4	3.2	2.9	4.6	2.1	3.2

Measured by percentage growth of gross domestic product with comparative figures for the United States.

Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table 6.2* (Center for International Comparisons of Production, Incomes and Prices, University of Pennsylvania, September 2006).

their success contrasted with Mitterrand's initial actions in France. Upon taking office in 1981, the Socialist president pursued a Keynesian programme to boost growth and curb unemployment. Salaries were increased, social security payments became more generous, and state ownership was expanded to more than a third of industry. Within two years, these initiatives had led to much higher taxes, a large trade deficit, and a fall in the value of the currency. Economic growth was sluggish and unemployment numbers rose, forcing the Socialists to shift direction. In 1983–84, Mitterrand introduced a set of austerity measures. He cut state expenditure and reversed his nationalisation programme. His failed experiment sounded the death knell of old-style state intervention as a cure-all for the woes of free-market economies and confirmed that the future lay with rolling back state expenditures, limiting taxation, and encouraging private enterprise, as in Reagan's United States and Thatcher's Britain, even if the short-term cost was higher unemployment.

By the mid-1980s, there was a desire even by left-wing governments to adopt the new free-enterprise consensus. In Italy, Socialist premier Bettino Craxi (1983–87), heading a coalition government, stood up to the trades unions and ended the indexation of wages against inflation. In Spain, where the

Socialist Party won power in 1982, Premier Felipe González cut state expenditures and warned voters that there was no alternative to high unemployment if Spain were to become competitive in world markets. It should be remembered that in Italy and Spain policies of state intervention were identified with the Right rather than the Left: the Mussolini and Franco dictatorships had embraced nationalisation in the 1930s and 1940s. It should also be recognised, however, that despite tax cuts and privatisation, West European levels of state spending were still historically high. Social security payments, free education, and public health systems remained intact. Governments did not forget the importance of providing adequate welfare systems as a 'safety net' for those endangered by poverty, even while trades unions were brought under control and unemployment climbed. The free-market approach, combined with welfare policies and democratic politics, stood in stark contrast to what was happening in the Eastern bloc. Communist governments persisted with a cumbersome and inefficient process of central planning, producing poor-quality goods, and making little provision for those in poverty.

The European Community

For West Europeans, these years were important for the revived fortunes of the European Community (EC), which itself contributed to the economic resurgence. In the 1970s, the hopes raised by the first enlargement of the EC, bringing in Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, had been followed by a series of disappointments. Against a background of rising oil prices, stagnant growth, and labour unrest, the Community had failed in its efforts to create an economic and monetary union, as proposed in the 1970 Werner Report, or a fuller political union, to which leaders had committed themselves at the Paris summit of 1972. The situation began to look more hopeful in 1979 when the first direct elections to the European Parliament in Strasbourg were held and most members joined in an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The ERM 'pegged' members' currencies within a certain percentage of each other and helped foster a stable trading environment. Also, in a two-stage 'Southern enlargement', Greece entered the Community in January 1981, with Spain and Portugal following in 1986. In all three cases, membership helped to stabilise the new democracies that had emerged in the mid-1970s. A similar process would occur after 1989, when East European countries sought Community membership after decades of Communist rule; EC enlargement again became the means to anchor countries in a voluntary organisation based on liberal democracy and free enterprise.

Much of the EC's energy in the early 1980s was absorbed by the so-called British budgetary dispute in which Margaret Thatcher tried to secure a rebate on payments to the EC. Only in 1984 did she gain satisfaction on this point and only then, against an improving economic background, did the process of EC integration properly revive. It was driven along by a revival of enthusiasm for the European integration project, particularly from Mitterrand and Kohl. The falling value of the franc in the early 1980s, as a result of Socialist economic policies, had called France's role in the ERM into question, but now Mitterrand reinvigorated the commitment to deeper European integration as the best way for France to achieve growth. After 1984, the ERM proved much more successful at guaranteeing currency stability to its members, helping increase the volume of trade still further. European fears of US and Japanese technological competition also encouraged ideas of a joint Community approach. A committee was set up under an Irish politician, James Dooge, to recommend EC reform.

The result of the Dooge committee and a subsequent inter-governmental conference was the 1987 Single European Act. Members of the EC agreed to create a 'single market', hoping that the free movement of capital, goods, and people would deliver future economic expansion. To offset some of the anticipated negative fallout from a more open and competitive marketplace, most members also signed a 'Social Charter' that guaranteed a minimum level of welfare. Here, again, was evidence that governments recognised the importance of combining free enterprise with social welfare if greater competitiveness were not to lead to popular discontent. Among other provisions, the 1989 Social Charter included maximum working hours, a minimum working age, the right to join trades unions, gender equality, and protection for people with disabilities. The significant point in a Cold War context was that West Europeans not only pressed forward with creating a large, thriving economic unit that the Soviet bloc could not hope to emulate. They also developed a policy on social justice that gave fair treatment to individuals and social groups by guaranteeing basic rights such as those enshrined in the Social Charter.

There was room for debate about how 'social justice' was best defined and protected. The Left was more inclined to take state action to provide a minimum wage, keep prices in check, and ensure a fair share of the tax burden; the Right was eager to reduce government intervention, provide only a basic social welfare system, and emphasise the need for law and order. Thatcher refused to sign the Social Charter, describing it as a 'socialist charter'. But, despite such differences of emphasis, the contrast to the Soviet bloc by the

mid-1980s was stark. Instead of an integrated economic community at the cutting edge of new technologies, East European countries were heavily in debt, inefficient in their use of resources, unable to compete in world markets, and a burden on the Soviet economy, which supplied them with oil and raw materials. For them, there was no recovery from the stagnation of the 1970s. In the field of social justice, although they could claim to have full employment and some basic welfare provisions, the East Europeans had no free trades unions and little respect for rights such as freedom of religion, of movement, or of the press. Hospitals and schools were of poor quality, environmental protection was almost non-existent, and law and order were enforced only as part of a police state. One stark result of the failure of Communism to deliver better conditions to its people was the lower life expectancy in Eastern Europe: between 1970 and 1991, for example, male life expectancy increased only 1.1 years for East Germans compared to 5.2 years for West Germans. And East Germany performed better than most Soviet bloc states.¹³ Between 1980 and 1985, life expectancy in the bloc was about four years below that of West Europe's NATO members.¹⁴

Uncertain détente, 1985–1988

The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 did not of itself prove a dramatic turning point for international relations. For one thing, the greatest point of tension in the 'new' Cold War had passed in 1983, with the fears of a surprise attack surrounding NATO military exercise Able Archer, the invasion of Grenada, the downing of a Korean civil airliner, and the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles. In 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz had told Congress that, despite the 'sharply divergent goals and philosophies' of the superpowers, it was vital that they 'work towards a relationship ... that [could] lead to a safer world for all mankind'. It was an approach endorsed on the other side of the Atlantic by, among others, British foreign secretary Geoffrey

¹³ William Cockerham, 'The Social Determinants of the Decline of Life Expectancy in Russia and Eastern Europe', *Journal of Health and Social Behaviour*, 38 (June 1997), 126.

¹⁴ Leaving the two Germanies aside, life expectancy in Soviet bloc states for both sexes combined in 1980–85 ranged from 69 in Hungary, through 70 for Romania, to 71 for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, whereas even in Portugal, the worst-performing NATO state in Western Europe, life expectancy was 72. The figure was 73 for Luxembourg, 74 for Belgium and the UK, 75 for France, Italy, and Greece, 76 for the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, and 77 for Iceland. See United Nations, *World Population Prospects: 2006 Revision*, esa.un.org.

Howe. He hoped to use personal contacts to expose the Soviets to Western thinking and encourage moves towards political and economic pluralism in the Eastern bloc. Significantly, Thatcher's first visit behind the Iron Curtain was to Hungary in February 1984. Even on the other side of the curtain there were voices calling for moderation: thus Erich Honecker, the East German leader, spoke of 'limiting the damage' caused by the breakdown of the INF talks.¹⁵

It is easy to forget that the Kremlin agreed to resume negotiations on both INF and strategic missiles before Chernenko died in early 1984. Talks resumed in Geneva on 12 March 1985, just one day after Gorbachev was elected general secretary. This is not to say that his triumph did not signify some change. Thatcher had called him 'a man with whom I can do business', when he had visited London the previous December.¹⁶ At home, he soon developed a greater 'openness' (glasnost) about Soviet problems, with a readiness to seek a 'restructuring' (perestroika) of society, which suggested major changes to the centrally planned economy. On foreign affairs, he inaugurated 'new thinking', characterised by an acceptance of the multi-polar global system, a readiness to co-operate with the West, and a retreat from Third World involvement. Nonetheless, although Gorbachev was ultimately associated with the breakup of the Soviet system, this does not mean that he initially intended massive changes at home along liberal lines.¹⁷

In Europe, the first events of the Gorbachev era suggested that the Cold War would persist, albeit at a lower level of tension than in the early 1980s. A US soldier was killed while visiting East Germany in March; the Warsaw Pact was renewed for twenty years in April; and the INF talks stagnated. Espionage controversies, those vivid reminders of East–West suspicion, continued to flare in Western Europe. In September 1985, the British expelled more than thirty Soviet agents, only to have Moscow respond, in the time-honoured way, by throwing out an equal number of Britons. Thereafter, the British sent eleven more Soviet diplomats home in May 1989. France was involved in similar 'tit-for-tat' expulsions in 1983 (when forty-seven diplomats were ordered to leave), 1986 (involving four Soviets), and 1987 (another three).

East–West differences continued. In 1987, at the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city of Berlin, Mitterrand, Reagan, and Queen Elizabeth II visited West Berlin. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact held a summit in East

15 Quoted in *New York Times*, 21 December 1983; cited in Robert English, 'Eastern Europe's Doves', *Foreign Policy*, 56 (Fall 1984), 51.

16 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 459–63.

17 See Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

Berlin, but neither Erich Honecker nor Eberhard Diepgen, the mayor of West Berlin, attended ceremonies on the other's side of the Wall. Nor were relations between Moscow and Bonn especially cordial. Helmut Kohl likened Gorbachev's mastery of the media in his early months to that of Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda chief who had committed suicide at the end of the war; and, before the 1987 elections in West Germany, Gorbachev openly sympathised with the Social Democrats, twice meeting Johannes Rau, their candidate for chancellor. The first summit between Gorbachev and Kohl, in fact, did not take place until October 1988, after it became clear that Kohl would be in power for another term. By that time, Reagan and Gorbachev had met four times.

Indeed, in 1986–87, it seemed that West Europeans were less willing than Reagan to rush into agreements with the Kremlin. The European approach was more consistently one of seeking détente while keeping NATO defences intact, so that the region did not become vulnerable to Soviet intimidation. Both sides of this equation – the pursuit of détente from a position of strength – were important. Signs that Reagan and Gorbachev might be able to work together came with their first summit, at Geneva in November 1985, followed two months later by Gorbachev's acceptance of the 'zero option'.¹⁸ Differences over SDI helped to wreck their second summit, at Reykjavik in October 1986. Afterwards, however, West European governments realised that Gorbachev's and Reagan's common desire to ban nuclear weapons might harm NATO's defence strategy. When Mitterrand and Thatcher met, they declared that nuclear deterrence was still essential to West European defence because Warsaw Pact nations still held a clear superiority in conventional forces. The British and French governments were concerned not so much at the failure of the Reykjavik summit to achieve a breakthrough, but at the danger that Reagan's readiness to disarm could undermine mutual deterrence. According to the British foreign secretary, 'The real anxiety sprang from the fact that a US President had come so close, without any effective transatlantic consultation, to striking a deal of such far-reaching importance.'¹⁹

The fear that the superpowers might strike a deal over European heads of state was an old one, yet Europeans were also ready to end the INF imbroglio and move toward a resolution of political tensions in Europe. In May 1987, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed that there should be a deal based on the 'zero option', and this led to the INF treaty, signed by Reagan and

¹⁸ See Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 523–24.

Gorbachev in Washington in December. Even if the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces affected only about 6 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenals, it was a remarkable treaty that went beyond the mere arms control of the SALT era and eliminated an entire category of nuclear missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. Western concessions helped bring this about, especially Kohl's readiness to dismantle Germany's ageing medium-range missiles. Moreover, the process seemed likely to spread to other areas. 'The [INF] Treaty held political significance far beyond disarmament policy', said the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.²⁰ But when the Reagan administration ended, the INF Treaty remained the only major East–West agreement; the shape of the new Europe was still uncertain.

The unexpected revolution, 1989

There were few signs in the first half of 1989 that the European continent was on the brink of revolutionary change. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, governments still wrestled with the problem of how to match the reduction of tension with the preservation of security. In NATO, London and Bonn wrangled bitterly over the configuration of the alliance's nuclear arsenal. Thatcher was now beginning to look out of touch with some of the changes she had helped bring about. There was logic to her position: 'History teaches that dangers are never greater than when empires break up and so I favoured caution in our defence and security policy.'²¹ Initially, the United States was sympathetic to her argument that NATO should retain land-based tactical nuclear weapons rather than negotiate them away in talks with the Soviets. The INF Treaty had already threatened to undermine NATO's policy of 'graduated response' to a Soviet attack and, with the Warsaw Pact still holding conventional superiority in Central Europe, it seemed sensible to update the Lance missiles based in West Germany.

But such an approach led to differences with Kohl and Genscher. Having been sceptical about Gorbachev's intentions in 1985–87, the chancellor was now more inclined to try to break down the suspicions between East and West, a process that might reduce the prospects of a nuclear war taking place on German soil. He and his foreign minister were willing to negotiate away

²⁰ Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), 231.

²¹ Thatcher, *Downing Street Years*, 769.

the short-range nuclear weapons on both sides. Most Europeans, including Mitterrand, sided with the West German leaders. To Thatcher's annoyance, at the NATO summit in Brussels in May 1989, President George H. W. Bush shifted to a middle position. This fitted the new president's decision to treat Germany as the key American ally in Europe. Although NATO leaders proved more united on conventional weapons, German–British tensions simmered. Thatcher's doubts about deeper integration in the European Community, not least her dislike for the monetary union, positioned her against Mitterrand and Kohl.

While these differences divided the West European powers, Gorbachev struggled to design a comprehensive vision of Europe's future. In a speech in Prague on 10 April 1989, Gorbachev – who was about to visit a number of West European capitals – talked of a 'common home' in Europe, a 'cultural and historic entity rich in spiritual significance ... even if its states belong to different social systems'. This was reminiscent of the views of General Charles de Gaulle, president of France, in the 1960s, and it seemed that it would become part of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. But the 'common home' idea was not pursued systematically when the questions surrounding it were not addressed in a careful manner.²² Gorbachev also talked of strengthening the CSCE's role in a pan-European security structure, but in visits to London, Bonn, and Paris in mid-1989 he failed to develop his ideas into anything concrete. Only when addressing the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July 1989 did he speak of the need to recognise the continent's different social systems, respect national sovereignty, and end any resort to military force as ways of creating a 'common European home' in which the balance of power would give way to joint interests.

Although the key decision-makers were unsure of the way forward, events in Eastern Europe now moved rapidly, bringing about a situation leaders had not foreseen, but which they had done much to encourage. In the Vienna review conference of the CSCE, which ended in January 1989, Gorbachev accepted the Western agenda rather than push a distinct line of his own. He ended the jamming of Western media broadcasts to the Eastern bloc and released hundreds of political prisoners. He also allowed the monitoring of human rights in the USSR, tolerated a more independent line from Eastern bloc regimes, and agreed to open talks on the reduction of

²² Gorbachev had actually used the term two years earlier but did not make much of it until the Prague speech: Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (London: Collins, 1987), 208.

conventional forces in Europe. These policies fostered the possibility of change in the Eastern bloc.²³

The changes were welcomed by West European leaders. They encouraged Soviet 'new thinking' about openness, non-interference in Eastern Europe, and the non-use of force. They highlighted the benefits of co-operation through loans, trade, and cultural exchanges. After Kohl and Gorbachev held a successful summit in June 1989, the European Community established PHARE, an aid programme to Poland and Hungary, the two Warsaw Pact countries moving most smoothly towards a liberalised political system. Although Kohl, Mitterrand, and Thatcher – like officials in Washington – did not foresee the unravelling of the remaining Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in November and December 1989, they carefully avoided triumphalist language lest they trigger a backlash. Communist governments collapsed and the Warsaw Pact quickly disintegrated without a major conflagration, at least partly because of shared views that had evolved after 1985 between the two blocs on the need to reduce the risk of nuclear war, to develop economic co-operation across the Iron Curtain, and to respect human rights.

The attractions of Western Europe

In the early 1980s, differences over Afghanistan and Poland had suggested a rift between the United States and Western Europe which the Kremlin might exploit, not least by playing on popular fears of nuclear war. But this was not a simple case of a trans-Atlantic divide. For one thing, European countries had their own differences. The West Europeans should not be viewed as a single group with a common outlook in these years. France had gone furthest to assert its independence from Washington since the 1960s, and West Germany, under Schmidt, was most eager to maintain *détente* with the East; meanwhile, Britain had tried to maximise its influence by staying close to the United States and at the same time opposing the political integration of the European Community that Paris and Bonn both favoured. Generally, arguments within the Western alliance were not about core ideological values, but about the appropriate ways to deal with the Communist challenge, such as enforcing sanctions over issues concerning Afghanistan and Poland. But the significance of these debates should not be exaggerated. At times, West European leaders were willing to adopt sanctions while US officials were ready to sell grain to

23 See Jacques Lévesque's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in this volume.

the USSR; likewise, in the INF talks, Reagan was willing to run risks that raised European fears that their own security might be compromised. Overall, European governments were perhaps more consistent than US policy-makers across the decade, neither exaggerating the dangers posed by the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 nor rushing towards a nuclear deal in 1986–87.

What stands out above all in the mid- to late 1980s, however, is the health of the liberal democratic, capitalist system in the United States and Western Europe compared to the increasingly decrepit Soviet-dominated East. However difficult it was for Washington officials to dictate policy to its Western allies, the latter were not the economic drain that the (more politically quiescent) East European countries were on the USSR. Instead, by the early 1980s, East European governments were heavily in debt to banks in Western Europe. As Warsaw Pact nations, with their totalitarian governments and central planning, continued to stagnate, their Western neighbours elected stable governments under strong leaders, re-asserted free market values, and reinvigorated the EC. Moscow was unable to exploit popular discontent over the missile deployments in 1983. Instead, the demonstrations at that time proved the last gasp of the 'anti-establishment' protests that had burst on the West in 1968. Local Communist Parties had little impact outside France and Italy, and even in those countries they were in retreat.

In looking at the collapse of Soviet power, it should be recognised that, among other factors, Gorbachev was faced with a resurgent Western Europe. Liberal capitalism was being reinvigorated there, and it served as a magnetic attraction to East Europeans. The West European success was still heavily reliant on the United States: European economies would not have revived as strongly as they did after 1982 without 'Reaganomics',²⁴ and the security provided by the US nuclear umbrella was still essential to Western Europe's psychological well-being. But Western Europe remained the only region in the world, other than North America, where in the mid-1980s liberal democracy seemed to be resilient. Aside from Japan, India, and a few other isolated examples, stable democratic politics was still a rarity. Throughout much of Africa, Asia, and South America, dictatorships were the rule; changes of government were usually brought about by coups rather than free elections. But in Western Europe since the Second World War, democratic politics, social democracy, and free enterprise had thrived.

It was significant, too, that this resilient system was right on the Soviet doorstep. From here, West Europeans were able to extend credits to the

²⁴ See Giovanni Arrighi's chapter in this volume.

Eastern bloc, press for human rights to be respected, and exploit Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, as when Thatcher stepped from her limousine to shake hands with ordinary Russians in March 1987. The full appeal of Western wealth and freedom may have become clear only in late 1989 with the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe, but the peoples and governments of Western Europe had nurtured their institutions carefully over many years. Their decisive contribution to ending the Cold War on liberal terms was by demonstrating that the benefits of a market economy could be coupled with political democracy, welfare provision, and social justice. The success of the West European experience was evident after 1989, when East Europeans struggled to create their own social democratic political systems, embraced free enterprise, and requested membership in both NATO and the European Union. In other words, the new governments in Eastern Europe sought not an American model nor some reformed version of Communism; they looked instead to the societies forged in Western Europe during the Cold War.

The East European revolutions of 1989

JACQUES LÉVESQUE

Soviet acceptance of the collapse of East European Communist regimes in 1989 must be considered the single most significant event leading to the end of the Cold War. It provided the most compelling evidence of the magnitude of changes that were going on inside the USSR in 1989. Until then, the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms was doubted in many places. Soviet behavior in 1989 in Eastern Europe was the definitive reality check of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy.

Provocative as it may sound, it is not so much what happened in Eastern Europe itself in 1989 that was historically significant. The fragility of the Communist regimes there had been on the historical record for many years. It was Soviet tolerance for change that made the difference. Until Gorbachev's reforms, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe had been internalized both in the East and in the West as an inescapable fact until some indeterminate future time. That is why the complete emancipation of Eastern Europe in 1989, while Soviet power was still intact, came as a breathtaking surprise in the West, in Eastern Europe itself, and even in the Soviet Union. The central argument of this chapter is that, while each revolution had specific national characteristics, their pace and scale were largely shaped by the *gradual* discovery of the scope of Soviet tolerance.

Since the Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, Western Sovietologists and East European political actors alike had believed there were two clear thresholds that East European countries could not cross without triggering Soviet military action: ending the dictatorship of the Communist Party and its role as the only possible engine of socialist development, and/or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The pact was held to be the very core of the world socialist system. Alexander Dubček and the Czechoslovak leaders of 1968 had carefully tried to avoid these two pitfalls. But at that time Moscow was more intolerant than Dubček had expected about developments that merely approached these thresholds.

Amazing as it may appear in retrospect, as late as three years after Gorbachev's accession, these two limits of Soviet tolerance were still assumed to be in place. Given the reforms that Gorbachev had introduced in the USSR, it was clear that there was room for greater experimentation and tolerance than there had been earlier. But, of the two old thresholds, only the first – political reform – seemed open to even partial reconsideration.

A prelude to 1989: Solidarity in Poland

Poland made the first of the series of revolutionary breakthroughs in Eastern Europe in 1989. It had always been the most rebellious Warsaw Pact member, having experienced social upheavals in 1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980–81. The most far-reaching had been the last: for a year, the regime had teetered on the verge of complete collapse.

In July and August 1980, a wave of strikes involving 300,000 workers swept across Poland after the government announced food-price increases of close to 100 percent in some cases in order to slow the growth of Poland's imports and spiraling foreign debt. To end the unrest, the government was forced to make a major political concession. On August 31, in the Gdańsk shipyard, it officially accepted the first independent trade union in the Communist world: Solidarity. In exchange, its leader, Lech Wałęsa, formally acknowledged the leading role of the Communists, the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), in state affairs.

For a short period of time, many political actors, including leading party figures, believed that a new model of reformed socialism could emerge from the Gdańsk agreements. Wałęsa repeatedly stated that Solidarity was not and did not want to become a political organization. His and his chief advisers' aim was not "to conquer the state, but to reform its interaction with society."¹

But the social and economic situation in Poland was too revolutionary for reform to be workable, and Solidarity was too strong (and the party government too weak) for a real partnership to emerge. In a matter of months, Solidarity membership surged to 10 million in a total Polish population of 35 million. Spontaneous strikes broke out across the country and were temporarily settled with wage hikes. By December 1980, general wage increases had reached 13 percent while the total food supply had decreased by 2 percent. The

¹ Jack Bielasiak, "Solidarity and the State: Strategies of Social Reconstruction," in Bronislaw Misztal (ed.), *Poland after Solidarity: Social Movements versus the State* (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985), 28.

gap continued widening throughout most of 1981. In each major confrontation, the regime had to back down. Deliberately or not, Solidarity became a major political organization. While it never formally claimed state power, it portrayed itself as the representative of the whole Polish nation.

Needless to say, Soviet leaders were extremely hostile to Solidarity from the outset, and very openly so. Starting in late August 1980, they conducted a series of military maneuvers and troop movements on Poland's borders and inside the country, in an attempt to intimidate the union and pressure their Polish counterparts to restore order. On the eve of Solidarity's congress in September 1981, the largest military exercises in the history of the Warsaw Pact were held in the Baltic republics, Belorussia, and along the Polish coast. But when each of these moves failed to significantly affect events in Poland, it became clear that Soviet leaders were highly reluctant to resort to direct military action. Solidarity's leaders were emboldened. In the weeks before the crackdown in December 1981, the union's leading organs were calling for self-management not only in the workplace but also in local communities. There was talk of organizing a workers' militia, and the union called for a national referendum on confidence in the government to be held within months.

After some hesitation, the Soviet Politburo had by June 1981 made a secret decision not to intervene militarily in Poland under "any circumstances."² The Soviets expected serious armed resistance and even feared that segments of the Polish army might fight Soviet or Warsaw Pact troops. They also foresaw toughened international sanctions, in addition to those that had already been imposed on the USSR on account of its ongoing war in Afghanistan. According to evidence that became available after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow would have been prepared to live with the failure of the Polish regime rather than face the consequences of an intervention. This does not mean that the Soviet leaders were willing to abandon their strategic and military positions in Poland. On the contrary, in the event of a challenge from a new regime, they were ready to defend their bases and the Warsaw Pact's lines of communication, by force if necessary.³ It must be emphasized, however, that none of these contingency plans for action, or *inaction*, was ever tested in reality.

The Soviet leaders abandoned their idea of the best-case scenario, which was the reestablishment of order by their Polish counterparts. But they were

2 See Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 171–204.

3 *Ibid.*, 235.

very dissatisfied with the Polish government's equivocation. Officials in Warsaw, including General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the prime minister, reneged on many promises made to Moscow to introduce martial law. It was only after Jaruzelski became party leader, on September 6, that serious plans to impose martial law were made.

Solidarity's leaders never took the threat seriously. They were convinced that the Communists would never dare declare and enforce martial law. They were certain that most of the armed forces would defy orders and the regime would collapse. The union's leaders, therefore, were stunned by Jaruzelski's military coup of December 13, 1981. The general imposed order over a period of three days, arrested Solidarity's leaders and activists, and avoided a blood-bath. The success of the coup also came as a dismaying surprise for most Western observers and governments.

Eastern Europe between the repression of Solidarity and the advent of Gorbachev

The repression of Solidarity was greeted with enormous relief in Moscow and by the leaders of the other Warsaw Pact countries. At the height of its strength, Solidarity had launched a solemn "Appeal to the Peoples of Eastern Europe" to follow its lead. Its repression was seen everywhere as a reminder of Soviet thresholds of tolerance. If the suppression of the Prague Spring had been a clear warning to East European leaders, the clampdown on Solidarity was a warning to the opposition forces. The net result favored "stagnation," to use the term later chosen by Gorbachev to characterize the Soviet predicament. While stagnation manifested itself differently in each East European country, what all the regimes had to fear was social unrest rather than an assault on power by opposition forces.

Economic growth rates slowed in all the countries of the area, from an average of 4.2% in 1975, to 1.4% in 1980, and 1.0% in 1985. In 1987, it was 0.2%. The problem afflicted both conservative and reformist regimes. The prudent economic reforms that had been successful in Hungary for quite a few years had exhausted their potential. In some countries, the standard of living even declined. At the same time, their hard-currency debts to the West kept increasing, reaching enormous proportions in some cases. Again, the trend was unaffected by the degree of political orthodoxy of the regimes. For instance, East Germany was one of the most indebted countries and at the same time one of the most ideologically hostile to the West. All of Eastern Europe was increasingly linked to the West as a result of economic factors

notwithstanding the deep geopolitical divide of the continent. The same could be said about the penetration and influence of Western ideas and values.

Awareness of the severity of the overall situation varied widely among the Communist leaderships of the region. In Poland and Hungary, where for many years there had been a significant degree of tolerance for debate within society and within the party, the conviction that bolder changes were needed had permeated both. Many leading Communist intellectuals and politicians believed that the full benefits of the extension of market mechanisms could be realized only with accompanying social, though not political, pluralism. But Soviet intolerance was a stumbling block. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, earlier successes and an economic performance that was still better than that of all other socialist states convinced leaders that they could muddle through with only piecemeal adjustments. Ideological rigidity combined at times with a sense of weak legitimacy to prevent the introduction of reforms, as in the case of Czechoslovakia.

When Gorbachev took power in 1985 and began to deal with the USSR's own, much weaker "westward gravitation," Eastern Europe was already divided in two loose sub-blocs. In Poland and Hungary, the regimes were prepared to accept the challenges of new economic transformations and experiments in democratization. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, the regimes refused to embark on these uncharted waters. This divide deepened in 1988, with growing polarization in 1989. With the exception of developments in Bulgaria, the differences between these two sets of states remained in place throughout the revolutions of 1989, with events in the first group influencing what happened in the second. But the common thread in the revolutionary changes of 1989 was the gradual discovery of Soviet tolerance.

If that discovery was gradual, it was because Gorbachev's policies, consequential as they proved to be, were not devoid of ambiguity. The genuine democratization measures that he introduced in the USSR in 1987–88 were intended to legitimize the party's leading role. Together with economic reforms, they were meant to lead to a new model of democratic socialism, not a social democratic type of capitalism (even though they were pointing in that direction). Given past Soviet practices, Gorbachev's first deliberately ambiguous repudiations of the Brezhnev Doctrine were not taken at face value, within or outside the Warsaw Pact. His support of reforms in Poland and Hungary was clear. But his forbearance with the leaders of the second sub-bloc (with the noteworthy exception of Romania's leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu) was also a source of ambiguity.

Saving the party's leading role in Poland

In an apparent paradox, the crucial breakthrough that brought on the end of Communism in Poland in 1989 came in a much less revolutionary situation than 1980–81. As a matter of fact, it was a shared sense of their relative weakness that led the two antagonists of 1981 to reach a historic compromise in April 1989.

In order to achieve a degree of reconciliation with Polish citizens, Jaruzelski had decreed a general amnesty for all political prisoners in September 1986. The regime believed it had the upper hand in the deadlock with Solidarity, which continued to operate illegally. In 1988, even Wałęsa's main advisers estimated that public support for the union was around 20 percent, only slightly higher than support for the regime, and that the vast majority were indifferent. After its relegalization in the spring of 1989, Solidarity's membership reached 2 million, only one-fifth of the 1981 level. Therefore, Jaruzelski self-confidently entered into extensive roundtable negotiations with Solidarity in order to address the state of the economy and to limit negative public reaction to the expected consequences of economic reforms.

When roundtable negotiations began on February 6, 1989, all issues were on the table except foreign policy. Both sides tacitly admitted that relations



21. Demonstrators during the 1987 papal visit to Poland: no one could predict the limits of Soviet tolerance.

with the USSR were not negotiable, and Solidarity did not even raise them. While the party's leading role was not directly challenged, this point was in fact at the center of the talks. The real issue of the day was the reduction of the party's power. On April 7, 1989, the roundtable agreements were signed. Solidarity was recognized not only as a trade union, but also as a legitimate political opposition force. A crucial point for the government was Solidarity's agreement to participate in the elections, which were to be held under rules that essentially preserved the party's leading role.

Under the new system, it was agreed that the opposition would compete for 35% of the 460 seats in the Diet while the other 65% would be left unopposed to the PUWP and its satellite parties. A new body, a 100-seat Senate with far less power, was to be elected in free elections. However, to override a Senate veto, a two-thirds' majority would be required in the Diet. Consequently, the party might have to negotiate with the opposition on some of the government's major programs; this was one of the most politically significant elements of the accords. The two houses of parliament sitting in joint session would elect the president, who was to wield considerable powers. Given the far greater number of deputies in the Diet and the PUWP's official dominance of the body, the formula ensured General Jaruzelski's election to a six-year term.

The official Soviet reaction was enthusiastic. While Gorbachev was not prepared to accept a multiparty system for the USSR itself, the Polish agreements were a best-case scenario for Eastern Europe. They fit perfectly with the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign-policy goals. While the party's power had been constrained, it still remained hegemonic in the political arena. At the same time, the democratization process was genuine and credible enough that Western countries would feel obliged to encourage it with economic assistance. It was a significant step toward societal rapprochement between the two Europes, which Gorbachev saw as a necessary precondition for trust, further arms reductions, and cooperation. It was seen as a milestone in the construction of Gorbachev's ideal of a "common European home," which would gradually overcome the division of Europe.

However, barely two months after the roundtable agreements, the Polish scenario began to unravel. On June 4, in the first round of the elections, Solidarity's Civic Committee won 92 of the 100 seats in the Senate, far more than predicted. But the biggest surprise was the miserable performance of the PUWP and its allies in the competition for the Diet seats reserved for them. Solidarity won 160 of the 161 seats for which it could compete. By contrast, for the 299 seats reserved for the governing coalition, only five candidates

managed to garner the 50 percent of votes required to win. Voters had the right to choose between several candidates. Some people crossed out the names of all the Communists on their ballots; others crossed out the names of the most prominent ones. The PUWP's losses were a terrible blow for the government. In the second round of voting, the governing coalition won the remaining 294 seats it had been guaranteed. But voter turnout was a mere 25 percent. The government's delegitimization and Solidarity's victory were felt all the more keenly since they were unexpected on both sides.

The PUWP's satellite parties took advantage of the party's weakness to escape its domination. They refused to enter a new coalition government with the PUWP unless Solidarity was also included. Without its allies, the party did not have an absolute majority in the Diet. Solidarity refused to enter a PUWP-led coalition.

It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty that Gorbachev spoke to the Council of Europe on July 7 and made a most explicit repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. He was addressing a West European audience and seeking to increase the credibility of his foreign policy, without apparently realizing the impact his remarks would have in Poland, where they altered Solidarity's perception of its room to maneuver. On August 7, Wałęsa raised the stakes and called for a Solidarity-led government under a new slogan: "Your president, our prime minister." A more wide-ranging power-sharing agreement than had ever been contemplated before was now demanded.

On July 19, Jaruzelski had been elected president by the parliament, thanks to abstentions by several Solidarity deputies, who did not want to push their new political clout too far. On August 18, after tough negotiations and ambiguous low-level Soviet warnings, Wałęsa agreed to accept Communist ministers in a Solidarity-led government. Jaruzelski designated Wałęsa's nominee, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, to form a new government. Before giving a final blessing to Mazowiecki's government's composition, Mieczysław Rakowski, who had replaced Jaruzelski as PUWP general secretary, had a forty-minute telephone conversation with Gorbachev. The Soviet leader expressed no objections to the formation of the new government and deflected Rakowski's request to visit Moscow, saying it would be interpreted as a form of Soviet opposition or pressure.

As early as 1985, meeting with the Communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev had told them they had an entirely free hand in their internal affairs. This was not taken at face value, even after August 1989. Of course, Gorbachev did express preferences or concerns at various times. These were seen as warnings. At the time of the developments in Poland, Gorbachev was near the peak of his worldwide prestige and popularity. The Soviet Union's withdrawal

from Afghanistan, unilateral disarmament initiatives, and acceptance of important changes in Poland and Hungary were perceived in the West as tangible proof of Gorbachev's declared intention of ending the Cold War and building a new international order. He had good reason to be fully confident in what he could achieve with his mounting political capital. What he told Rakowski was typical of the way he was to approach adverse developments in Eastern Europe. By accepting them gracefully, he thought he could earn goodwill and respect for Soviet interests from "former" opponents. In the short run, this policy of appeasement did work to a significant extent in Poland. Both Wałęsa and Mazowiecki repeatedly vowed that Solidarity would fulfill Polish Warsaw Pact commitments. This respect for Soviet power and benevolence did also extend – to a much lesser degree – to domestic politics for some time.

The formation of the Mazowiecki government spelled the end of the PUWP's hegemony in Polish politics. But the Communists remained a major force to be reckoned with. Their four ministers headed the Ministries of Defense, the Interior (police forces), Transportation (closely linked to Warsaw Pact logistics), and Foreign Trade. The important Foreign Affairs Ministry was given to Krzysztof Skubiszewski, an independent who had previously been a member of Jaruzelski's Council. The extent of Communists' influence remained far greater than the number of ministries under their control would suggest. Above all, Jaruzelski continued to serve as commander-in-chief. He had the constitutional power to dismiss the government, dissolve the parliament, or declare a state of emergency. In the roundtable agreement, the office of president had been designed to be the chief instrument of the PUWP's power. All of the tools of repression remained in the hands of Communists.

Though a fundamental breakthrough had taken place in Poland in August 1989, Solidarity's leaders did not consider it in any way irreversible. It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall, soon afterwards, that Poland's real emancipation from the USSR took place.

Saving the party's leading role in Hungary: more promising beginnings

The democratic transformations initiated in 1989 by the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP, the Hungarian Communist party) were bolder than those in Poland. The Hungarian regime had been the most audacious in implementing reforms, even at times of considerable Soviet intolerance. It had gained more experience in testing the limits of Soviet tolerance than other countries' governments and was also more confident of its political strength.

Surprisingly, the HSWP's leader, János Kádár, had succeeded in redeeming himself after presiding over the brutal Soviet repression of the 1956 Hungarian insurrection. From the 1960s on, he had pursued a policy of inclusion and reconciliation, while introducing market mechanisms into the economy and allowing the development of a sizable private sector. For lengthy periods of time, in the 1970s and 1980s, there were no political prisoners in Hungary. Kádár became genuinely popular. He and his associates were convinced that they had gained a significant degree of legitimacy. In retrospect, it would be more accurate to say that they had earned wide acceptance, certainly more than any other Communist government in Eastern Europe.

Kádár's long tenure was destabilized by Gorbachev's rise to power in Moscow. Bolder reforms were needed and the Hungarian leader refused to heed mounting pressure within the HSWP. His associates rightly believed that Gorbachev's reforms had opened new horizons. In May 1988, they forced Kádár to resign the party leadership.

Prime Minister Karoly Grosz replaced Kádár as party leader. Grosz was known for his efficiency and was considered a committed reformer. But more radical reformers soon outmaneuvered him. At the beginning of 1989, the party leadership was very divided. Two of the main reformers, Imre Pozsgay, the most outspoken and most popular, and Rezso Nyers, who had been the architect of the "Hungarian model," openly courted support outside the party. Like Jaruzelski, all of the leading Hungarian reformers, including Grosz, agreed that the political system should be opened up to the opposition.

In January 1989, without the party's approval, Pozsgay released and endorsed the conclusions of a commission he chaired that had been charged with reexamining the 1956 insurrection. He declared that the uprising had not been a counterrevolution but a legitimate popular insurrection. Pozsgay thought this was a necessary step to reinforce the party's legitimacy, and thereby his own popularity and ability to face upcoming political challenges. His unilateral statement was not only a gamble with the party leadership (which he won), but also a somewhat risky test of Soviet tolerance. His declaration was an implicit denunciation of Soviet behavior on a major issue. When no official Soviet reaction was forthcoming, Pozsgay was highly relieved.⁴ He knew that a Soviet rebuff would have spelled the end of his rise within the HSWP leadership; the fact that none ever came emboldened him.

⁴ It was later revealed that Gorbachev had prevented the publication of a rebuttal prepared by the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Still, he could take nothing for granted. Hungarian reformers did not know the limits of Soviet tolerance. According to their own accounts, they knew that Gorbachev was pressing for reforms and that there was an ongoing struggle within the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, they had great difficulty in weighing not only the balance of power in Moscow at any given time but also in discerning Gorbachev's ultimate intentions.

In February, the party's Central Committee approved the outlines of a new constitution to be submitted to the National Assembly. The HSWP's leading role was not inscribed in the document. The omission did not mean that the party was prepared to relinquish power. It was confirming its commitment to keep its leading role through persuasion and the use of political instruments, not constitutional ones. At the same time, the draft constitution defined Hungary as a "socialist state," and of course the emerging new political parties were bound to act in accordance with the constitution. The rules of the game between the HSWP and other political parties were not yet defined.

When the results of the Polish roundtable were made public, the Hungarian opposition parties let it be known that, unlike Solidarity, they would accept nothing less than genuine competition and free elections. The HSWP's leader, Grosz, was opposed to free elections. But he was rapidly losing ground within the party leadership. On June 21, when Hungary formally opened its own national roundtable, it was already clear that the party leadership would agree that the 1990 elections would be free and fully competitive.

Party leaders' acceptance of free elections was based on the conviction that their commitment to fundamental reforms was paying off. Reliable polls were forecasting 35 to 40% support for the HSWP; its closest rival was under 20%. Under these conditions, the reforming HSWP could expect to remain the dominant political party and the arbiter of the political game for the next four years, even without an absolute majority. HSWP leaders wanted an electoral system that delivered a clear majority government, which was what Pozsgay was advocating. Moreover, Pozsgay was the party's designated candidate for the powerful presidency, to be created as a result of the roundtable negotiations. He was widely expected to win a free election. Building on these encouraging expectations, the HSWP decided to hold a party congress in the fall and formally transform itself into a Western-type socialist party.

In Moscow, in closed debates among reformers, Aleksandr Yakovlev, the most radical of Gorbachev's associates, saw these developments as a vindication of his claims that bold reforms could enable a Communist Party to gain new legitimacy and keep its leading role by political means. At that time, he was

advocating a formal split and competition between the reformist and conservative wings of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev was definitely not prepared to accept such a change, he viewed the Hungarian developments with cautious sympathy, which explains why most official Soviet newspapers, such as *Pravda*, commented on them favorably.

Gorbachev's hands-off attitude did not mean that the HSWP and the Hungarian opposition parties felt entirely free of Soviet constraints and demands. While the leading role of the party was clearly open to reconsideration, the socialist system itself could not be criticized. In a meeting with Grosz in Moscow in March 1989, Gorbachev told him that "the safekeeping of socialism" was the aim of reform.⁵ At that time, in the USSR itself, socialism was becoming an increasingly elastic concept. Gorbachev himself had no clear idea of the limits of "reformed socialism." However, it was a core belief and a powerful motivating force for his actions. Though his warning to Grosz was not formulated as a direct threat, it was taken very seriously in Hungary. The opposition accepted a compromise formula stipulating in the first lines of the constitution that in the Republic of Hungary "the values of bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism are equally realized." In deference to Soviet power, the opposition agreed to early presidential elections, which Pozsgay was expected to win.⁶

At the end of July, during the roundtable negotiations, Nyers, who was then president of the HSWP, declared that Gorbachev wanted "the HSWP to remain *one of the essential forces* in the renewal of society; and Hungary not to abandon its friendship with the Soviet Union in a *unilateral* movement toward the West."⁷ The last words are highly significant. The European reconciliation that Gorbachev contemplated was to be made through bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The new European order was to be organized around two largely demilitarized blocs. They were to be gradually superseded by a reconfigured and strengthened CSCE that could manage the pan-European process. Therefore, in order to win better terms for the USSR in Europe, Gorbachev needed a modicum of foreign-policy cohesion within the Warsaw

5 "Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and HSWP General Secretary Karoly Grosz," Moscow, March 23–24, 1989, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), 78.

6 See Renée De Nevers, *Comrades No More: The Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 151.

7 *Corriere della Sera*, September 9, 1989; emphasis added.

Pact, which, while in a different way from before, remained crucial.⁸ Hungary's membership in the pact was not up for negotiation at the Budapest roundtable, any more than it had been in Poland.

When the roundtable talks ended on September 18, the HSWP embraced democratic rules more fully than its Polish counterpart, but it had a firmer hold on power and considerably brighter prospects. Its opportunities, however, would soon be swept away by the earth-shattering events that took place in Germany with the fall of the Berlin Wall. What was happening in Hungary had a decisive effect on developments in East Germany. The first breach in the Berlin Wall happened on September 10 when Hungarian authorities opened their western borders to East German citizens.

The Berlin Wall as catalyst

The processes of change in Poland and Hungary in 1989 have been described as "negotiated revolutions." Though the terms are somewhat antinomic, the characterization is appropriate. These revolutions were initiated from above. A third revolution of this type occurred in Bulgaria on November 9, simultaneously with the fall of the Berlin Wall, but without any link to it. Subsequently, real revolutions from below occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, with a "negotiated capitulation" in the first two.

The dividing line between the two patterns of change was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Its consequences rapidly blurred the differences between the results of the two models. When the Soviet Union tacitly acquiesced to the fall of the Berlin Wall, people around the world saw it as a momentous event. It provided dramatic and incontrovertible confirmation of the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the two weeks that followed, as the East German regime began to crumble with not the slightest – even indirect – Soviet show of force, the magnitude of Gorbachev's incremental revolution became unmistakably clear. The German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, became convinced that the new Soviet course was irreversible and that German unification was possible. He therefore decided to seize the initiative and put German unification on the international agenda.

As it became evident that the USSR would not use force and was advising East European regimes against it, respect for Soviet power and its assumed thresholds of tolerance rapidly evaporated nearly everywhere, including

8 For a detailed examination of Gorbachev's approach to change in Eastern Europe as a way for the USSR to join Europe, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).

Washington. Ignoring Gorbachev's objections, US president George H. W. Bush and Kohl insisted that a united Germany must be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), notwithstanding the fact that this would mean the end of the Warsaw Pact. Earlier, in July, during an official visit to Poland and Hungary, Bush had met with opposition leaders and advised prudence and restraint. In Hungary, according to his advisers, he had been somewhat disturbed by their impatience. But now he was willing to challenge the most basic ingredient of the European balance of power.

The first signs of the crumbling of East Germany radically accelerated events throughout the region. The fragile political equilibria achieved in Poland and Hungary collapsed. All of Eastern Europe, it seemed, was intent on hurling itself through the open Berlin Wall. In the weeks that followed the fall of Erich Honecker, the East German leader, and the opening of the Wall, the PUWP disintegrated. In some places in Poland, party cells declared their own dissolution. In the summer of 1990, given the totally new domestic and international situation, Jaruzelski decided to renounce the presidency. In Hungary, on November 26, a referendum was held to postpone the presidential elections until after the parliamentary elections. The proposition passed by a slight margin, ending Pozsgay's political ambitions. When the parliamentary elections took place in May 1990, the Socialist Party, the successor to the HSWP, received 8 percent of the popular vote, losing all power.

In June 1990, when it appeared increasingly probable that Gorbachev would have to accept a united Germany in NATO, the new Hungarian prime minister declared that his country wanted to leave the Warsaw Pact, or see the pact dissolved. After receiving new German guarantees of its border, the Polish government reneged on its earlier commitments and followed suit. Gorbachev did little to reverse the trend of events; Soviet tolerance astonished contemporaries.

Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution

The crumbling of the Berlin Wall triggered changes in Czechoslovakia. The leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CzCP) was still controlled by those who had called for the military suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968. Unlike Kádár, they had never sought reconciliation with the people. They had expelled hundreds of thousands of supporters from the party and kept them out. At the beginning of 1989, no reformist wing existed within the party.

The active opposition was limited to tiny elitist groups such as Charter 77, set up to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords; its most prominent

member was Václav Havel. He and other activists were constantly harassed and arrested by the police. While Czechoslovakia's economy had the same structural problems as its neighbors, the people enjoyed the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe and the regime had a significant degree of acceptance within the working class.

Nonetheless, a genuine reformist Communist alternative existed in Czechoslovakia, one that could have enjoyed immediate legitimacy. Dubček and many veterans of the Prague Spring were still alive. Leaders of the Italian Communist Party, who had strongly supported the Czechoslovak experiment in 1968, asked Gorbachev to facilitate their return to political life. Although the Soviet leader had excellent relations with the Italian Communists, he refused. He said that he could not intervene and that change had to come from within the CzCP.⁹ His aloofness could be interpreted in different ways. But while mildly encouraging CzCP boss Milouš Jakeš to introduce reforms in April 1989, he also told him that he considered the Prague Spring "to have turned toward counterrevolution."¹⁰ This statement was made after he had accepted the HSWP's revision of the far more radical Hungarian insurrection of 1956. Given such inconsistencies, it is small wonder that many East European reformers were uncertain *at that time* about the limits of his tolerance. This was certainly the case with Czechoslovak prime minister Ladislav Adamec, a would-be reformer. Adamec sought and received encouragement from members of Gorbachev's entourage, but was told that he could not and would not get direct support from Gorbachev. As a result, Adamec remained a very timid proponent of reforms.

But the changes that took place in Poland and Hungary in the summer of 1989 affected events in Prague. In July, Adamec announced the forthcoming introduction of economic reforms, some of them similar to those of the Prague Spring, but without any accompanying political overtures. By August, the number of opposition groups had grown to more than thirty. On August 21, the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion, nearly 10,000 people took part in demonstrations, chanting slogans such as "Long live Poland and Hungary" and "Long live Dubček."

A week after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the situation changed dramatically. With authorization from the government, the official student organization

9 See Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990), ch. 5.

10 See the transcript of the conversation in Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformat-siia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reforms through His Aide's Eyes], (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993), 109.

called for a demonstration on the fiftieth anniversary of the death of a student killed during the Nazi occupation. The crowd swelled to 50,000 and turned into an unprecedented mass demonstration against the regime. Sections of the crowd were brutally assaulted by police forces and hundreds of people were injured. This sparked a series of events that brought the regime down in three weeks.

On November 19, on Havel's initiative, twelve opposition groups formed Civic Forum. Daily mass demonstrations and gatherings in Prague grew to gigantic proportions, from 200,000 people in the first days to 400,000, and then to as many as 750,000. Havel addressed the crowd in Wenceslas Square on November 21, as did student and opposition leaders, including Dubček. The party leadership was paralyzed. Contrary to what was feared and reported, the government never contemplated a crackdown, even though army leaders were prepared to act. Given events elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the expectation that they would face open disapproval from Moscow, the CzCP Politburo lost the will to resort to mass repression. While there were threats, there was no attempt to systematically arrest opposition leaders. The regime believed that it could remain in power if it were willing to accept reform.

On November 21, Prime Minister Adamec announced that he was prepared to open talks with Civic Forum, that he favored "a different concept of the leading role of the Party," and that he would open the government to non-Communists. In the following days, he met with members of Civic Forum, who demonstrated flexibility. Finally, on December 3, in what appears to have been a total misreading of the situation, he came out with a proposal for a new government in which non-Communists would receive five seats in a 21-member Cabinet. His concept of the leading role of the party still implied political hegemony, as in April in Poland. Obviously, at that point, the issue was not one of assumed Soviet limits of tolerance, but rather Adamec's own political convictions. His proposal was rejected. Immediately afterwards, he left for Moscow to attend the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders that followed the Bush–Gorbachev Malta summit of December 2 and 3. The CzCP being dramatically weakened, Adamec sought Gorbachev's open, explicit support for his efforts to form a new government. But the Soviet leader felt it was too late to get involved. Upon his return from Moscow, Adamec resumed negotiations with Civic Forum. Rather than agreeing to a government in which he would have been in the minority, he resigned on December 7. A few days later, his deputy and successor as prime minister, Marián Čalfa, formed a government in which non-Communists were in the majority. Čalfa himself quit the party shortly afterwards. The dismantling of the regime

was completed on December 29, when Parliament elected Havel as president. Dubček had accepted the lower position of chairman of the parliament the previous day.

Havel and Civic Forum gained the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. They initially accepted the country's international obligations under the Warsaw Pact, and even proposed a European security concept that was very close to Gorbachev's vision. They suggested the creation of a new pan-European security system based on the CSCE; NATO and the Warsaw Pact would continue until they were gradually replaced by the new structure. However, in July, when it became apparent that Gorbachev would feel compelled to accept a united Germany inside NATO, Czechoslovakia began to consider withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.¹¹ Later, together with Hungary and Poland, it did press for the dismantling of the pact.

Romania: a revolution from below, intercepted from above

In almost every respect, the Romanian revolution of December 1989 departed from patterns observed elsewhere. The Romanian revolution was both a popular insurrection and a *coup d'état*: both were bloody and caused hundreds of deaths. These peculiarities were, of course, related to the nature of Ceaușescu's regime, which made East Germany and Czechoslovakia look like modern, benign dictatorships, and the Polish and Hungarian regimes positively enlightened and benevolent. A manifesto published abroad in March 1989 by former Romanian Communist leaders described their country's grotesque regime as fundamentally "non-European."

Still, it was the Romanian people's awareness of what was going on elsewhere in Eastern Europe that energized them and ignited the revolts that spelled the end of the regime. It was not an accident that the first of these revolts occurred close to Hungary, in the largely ethnic Hungarian city of Timișoara, on December 16 and 17. Romanians joined the growing protests in spite of the ethnic tensions that Ceaușescu had fomented for years. The unrest was brutally repressed, causing sixty deaths.

Until the riots reached Bucharest, Ceaușescu exhibited confidence in his ability to withstand the earthquake rocking Eastern Europe. On December 18, he left Romania for a scheduled visit to Iran. On December 21, after his return,

¹¹ See Andrew Cottle, *East Central Europe after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 62–63.



22. December 1989: the Romanian revolution against the Communist regime turned violent. The other East European revolutions of 1989 were mostly peaceful.

a mass demonstration that had been called in his support turned into a riot, and he and his wife fled Bucharest. Until their speedy execution on December 25 after a grotesque “trial,” sporadic fighting continued in Bucharest. Meanwhile, astounding news poured in, much of which later proved to be disinformation. It was announced that terrorists from the notorious Securitate, supposedly assisted by Palestinian and Syrian fighters, had killed as many 63,000 people. Later, the number of deaths proved to be in the order of 600 and most of the “terrorists” arrested were released without trial.

There are many conflicting conspiracy theories about the events of that third week of December. Some go as far as to claim that the fighting and disinformation were orchestrated by the new leaders in order to keep the rebellious population off the streets while they divided power, and to demonize the Ceaușescu. After the Berlin Wall came down and the Czechoslovak regime collapsed, a large number of high-level officials in Romanian state organizations and the apparatus of repression were only waiting for the opportune moment to jump ship and turn against the despot they hated. The twisted web of intrigue reveals the confusion of maneuvers in a free-for-all fed by mutual distrust created by Ceaușescu’s dictatorship.

There are clear signs that the governing body that emerged in those dramatic days was largely a makeshift affair. One of its masterminds, Silviu Brucan, a former ambassador to the United States, was under house arrest when the regime fell. In 1984, he had been involved, along with General Nicolae Militaru and other military leaders, in planning a coup against Ceaușescu, which was ultimately called off. Ion Iliescu, who was to become the new leader, had once been considered a potential successor to Ceaușescu, but had been marginalized since 1971. The poor coordination of the “*coup d’état*” that piggybacked on the insurrection was obvious. After Ceaușescu fled Bucharest on December 22, General Militaru appeared on television and asked viewers to find Iliescu and tell him to come to the television station. Iliescu arrived shortly thereafter and asked other individuals to come to the headquarters of the Central Committee to help found a National Salvation Committee.

Soviet behavior was consistent with the general pattern observed elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Brucan recalled in 1992 that during a visit to the USSR in November 1988 he had met with Gorbachev and told him of his intent to work for the overthrow of Ceaușescu. The Soviet leader told him that the USSR could not take part. He reportedly expressed sympathy, however, with the idea of ousting the dictator, “on condition that it was conceived and carried out in such a way as to leave the Communist Party as the leading political force in Romania.”¹²

From his first public utterances, Iliescu declared himself in favor of renewed socialism, and the National Salvation Front (NSF) was later transformed into a new Socialist Party that managed to hold on to power. The outcome was in line with the USSR’s preferences, but was definitely not orchestrated in the Kremlin. Interestingly, a more active Soviet role in Romania or even direct intervention would have been welcomed in Washington. On December 24, with Bucharest engulfed in fighting and chaos, James A. Baker III, the US secretary of state, declared on American television that the United States would not object “if the Warsaw Pact judges it necessary to intervene” in Romania.¹³ While this was eloquent proof that the Cold War was over, it was met in Moscow with some degree of suspicion and irony. The United States had just sent troops into Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega.¹⁴ Soviet leaders saw Baker’s implicit invitation as a way of legitimizing the United

12 Silviu Brucan, *Generatia Irosită* [Wasted Generation], quoted by Dennis Deletant, *Ceaușescu and the Securitate* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 366.

13 James Baker interview, “Meet the Press,” December 24, 1989.

14 See John H. Coatsworth’s chapter in this volume.

States' behavior. Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze's deputy ministers remarked to the American ambassador in Moscow that it was somewhat paradoxical that, at a time when the USSR had abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine, the United States was embracing it.

After December 1989, the fortunes of Iliescu and the NSF can be seen as a successful variant of Gorbachev's best-case scenario for Eastern Europe. Iliescu won the presidential election of May 1990 with 85 percent of the popular vote, while the NSF won 236 of the 396 seats in the lower house of the new Romanian parliament. Romania remained a reliable member of the Warsaw Pact up to its end in 1991.

Bulgaria's quiet, successful transition

The other success story of Gorbachevism took place in Bulgaria. There is an element of continuity here: Bulgaria was the country that had always caused the fewest problems for its Soviet mentor, and it remained the most faithful ally of the USSR up to the Soviet collapse.

At the beginning of 1989, Bulgaria was still led by Todor Zhivkov, who had led the Bulgarian Communist Party for thirty-five years. An astute political survivor who was always attentive to Moscow, he was alert to the generational change in the Soviet leadership and the start of perestroika. In 1987, in a bid to emulate and even overtake perestroika, he launched a vast program of radical administrative and organizational changes that touched everything except the mechanisms of his personal power. As many as 30,000 officials were removed from their positions, engendering strong dissatisfaction among technocrats. At the same time, he was playing on Bulgarian nationalism. He had launched a campaign of "Bulgarianization" which, as of June 1989, had led to the forced emigration of over 200,000 Bulgarians of Turkish origin amid widespread international condemnation.

In this context, and with the changes going on in Poland and Hungary, many Bulgarian party and government leaders dreamed of overthrowing the dictator. But here, too, second-tier Communist officials were hesitant to act without cues from the Soviet Union. For them, as for Zhivkov, the key to the future lay in Moscow. They knew that Zhivkov was despised in Gorbachev's entourage, much more so than Honecker or Jakeš. But in all formal and informal meetings, the dictator seemed to have good, even warm, relations with Gorbachev. Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov had the opportunity to sound out Gorbachev personally during an informal gathering at the Warsaw Pact summit of July 1989. He whispered to Gorbachev: "We are determined to

carry out a change of direction in Bulgaria.” He got a very short answer: “eto vashoe delo [it’s your business].”¹⁵ This could be understood as a green light, but it was far from the explicit support that was sought. Mladenov took three months to act, delaying until he had mustered the support of Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov, the minister of defense, and the Central Committee secretary for international affairs, among others. They apparently received guarded support from the Soviet Embassy in Sofia, which was controlled by committed “Gorbachevites” (not the case everywhere in Eastern Europe). At a Politburo meeting held on November 9 (hours before the Berlin Wall’s opening), Zhivkov was forced to agree to hand in his resignation at the Central Committee meeting scheduled for the next day.

In the following weeks, Mladenov and his reformist team put forward a program of “reformed socialism,” and promised free elections and the removal of the reference to “the leading role” of the party from the constitution. Following the Hungarian model, the Bulgarian Communist Party transformed itself into a socialist party. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, it opened roundtable negotiations with opposition forces, which had appeared before Zhivkov’s fall. It won the free elections of June 1990 with an absolute majority of 52.75 percent.

The new Bulgarian party, like the Romanian successor party, the NSF, survived the debacle that swept away Communist reformers across Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was largely because civil society was not yet so developed in the two countries, nor were opposition forces so powerful. Historians have seen this as a manifestation of the faultline that divides the Balkan region from the rest of Europe, one rooted in long Ottoman domination. Whatever the merits of this view, these two faithful allies were of little help to Gorbachev in securing the new European international order that he contemplated. The events in the northern tier of the Warsaw Pact sealed the failure of his European goals.

The fall of the East European regimes

With the exception of Bulgaria, the actual collapse of all the East European regimes took place in less than two months, from mid-November to the end of 1989. Before that, the changes in Poland and Hungary can be seen as a testing of the limits of Soviet tolerance. After the Soviet acceptance of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had been the linchpin of the USSR’s hegemony in Eastern Europe, everything changed everywhere in a matter of weeks. It had become

15 Interview with Petar Mladenov, Sofia, November 12, 1994.

unmistakably clear that Gorbachev not only would not use force, but also would not condone its use by the Communist Parties to hold on to power. The East German party crumbled, the Czechoslovak and Romanian regimes were swept away, and the Polish and Hungarian political compromises were destroyed.

Gorbachev's highly idealistic expectation that Soviet acceptance would bring new forms of democratic socialism and salvage Soviet influence within a transformed alliance proved to be ill-founded. His long leniency with Honecker's and Jakeš's regimes did not help. Soviet domination had lasted too long, and its consequences were too deeply resented. A cathartic moment was needed.

The opposition forces of Eastern Europe showed restraint and respect for Soviet power until the extent of Soviet tolerance was put to a final test with the fall of the Berlin Wall. So did the United States. Until November 1989, Bush had urged greater prudence on the Polish and Hungarian opposition leaders and, with his NATO allies, he had favoured the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. Afterwards, Bush pressed for German unification inside NATO. As Gorbachev had feared, this proved fatal to the pact and to his all-European goals.

The East European revolutions occurred when Gorbachev's tolerance for reform surpassed anything that his contemporaries had imagined. As his tolerance became clear, the reformers were emboldened, as were Bush and Kohl. East European peoples had long yearned for change; Gorbachev made it possible.

The unification of Germany, 1985–1991

HELGA HAFTENDORN

The Cold War and the division of Germany were closely related; at the core of both was the question of which power was to dominate the center of Europe: the Soviet Union or the United States.¹ The Berlin Wall was its starkest symbol. Lurking in the background was the political and military presence of the four victorious powers of World War II in Berlin and Germany. No element of this structure could be overcome without changes in the others. The East–West conflict would only be ended if the Wall came down and Germany were reunified.

Given these strong linkages, two questions arise: how was it possible that in 1989 the Wall that for twenty-eight years had separated the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) crumbled visibly, and that unification took place with the consent of all four powers who also withdrew most of their troops from Europe?

The consolidation of the status quo

After the Helsinki Conference of 1975, the two superpowers as well as the two German states felt comfortable respecting the *modus vivendi* on the territorial status quo in Europe, which had been achieved through détente and German *Ostpolitik*.² When contacts grew after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR,³ East Berlin intensified its policy of demarcation: to emphasize its disparity with capitalist West Germany, the GDR defined itself as a “socialist workers’ and peasants’ state” whose alliance

1 See Hans-Peter Schwarz’s chapter in volume I.

2 See Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter in volume II.

3 Federal Republic of Germany, *Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (Bonn: Press and Information Office, 1973).

with the USSR was “irrevocable.”⁴ Neither at home nor abroad were better relations with West Germany to be interpreted as a prelude to reunification.

For West Germany, improving the living conditions of their fellows in the East was more important than restoring national unity, though the commitment to unification enshrined in the Federal Republic’s Basic Law (constitution) was retained. Bonn continued to follow Egon Bahr’s notion of “change through rapprochement.”⁵ Bahr was now undersecretary in the chancellor’s office; he had become the closest confidant to Chancellor Willy Brandt on issues of relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union. In spite of the GDR’s efforts to distinguish itself from the Federal Republic, a rising stream of visitors crossed the inter-German boundary, typically from the West, but also elderly people from the East. The GDR tried to throttle this flow by increasing costs, but failed. Increasingly, the GDR lived on the transfer funds that it received from the FRG for transit, postal fees, and other services.⁶ In the early 1980s, the fundamental weakness of the GDR economy resulted in acute balance-of-payments difficulties, which caused East Berlin to bargain for additional financial support. In return for two unrestricted loans of DM 1.95 billion, West Germany secured a number of humanitarian gestures.

Under the impact of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of December 1979 to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe,⁷ East–West relations deteriorated. Both German states, though, tried to insulate their dialogue from the repercussions of renewed superpower confrontation. In an ironic twist of history, the declaration of martial law in Poland coincided with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s visit to the GDR, a trip that had been postponed many times. In his conversations with the secretary of the East German Socialist

4 Erich Honecker in a speech commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the GDR on October 6, 1974, in *Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, ed. by German Institute for Contemporary History and Institute for International Relations, 33 vols. (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1954–88), XXII (1976), 87–91.

5 “Wandel durch Annäherung,” head of the Berlin Press and Information office, Egon Bahr, at Tutzing, July 15, 1963; *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by Federal Ministry for German Affairs (Frankfurt: Alfred Metzner, 1978), IV/11, 869–97.

6 To improve relations between the parts of Germany, Bonn had agreed to pay for the services East Berlin rendered. Their actual value is difficult to establish. In the 1980s, the annual transfers are estimated at DM 1,490 million and the overall transfers from 1971 to 1989 at DM 23,165 million. See Dieter Grosser, *Das Wagnis der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: Politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 50.

7 “Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers: The ‘Double Track’ Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces,” Brussels, December 12, 1979, in *NATO Handbook: Documentation* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), 202–05.

Unity Party (SED), Erich Honecker, he wanted to ascertain how relations could be enhanced. The results of this meeting illustrated how constrained were the parameters of intra-German relations as “neither of the states could remain unaffected by a general escalation of tension in world politics.”⁸ Reacting to the anxiety about superpower war, both leaders announced the concept of a “community of responsibility” between the two states and pledged that “war must never again emanate from German soil.”⁹

Honecker’s return visit to Bonn eventually took place in September 1987. It highlighted the GDR’s efforts to gain international recognition. His conversations with Schmidt’s successor, Helmut Kohl, though, did not change their differences of opinion. The GDR continued to demand the recognition of its sovereignty, which the FRG for constitutional reasons could not grant. But Kohl’s assurance that Bonn did not wish to destabilize the GDR was doubtless of significance to Honecker. Various agreements signed during the visit improved living conditions in divided Germany. For both leaders, respecting the *modus vivendi* on the territorial status quo and improving the quality of life of the German people were critically more important than restoring national unity. On a practical level, relations seemed well on the way to normalization. Thus, when, in 1987, US president Ronald Reagan stood at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and called on the Soviet leader, “Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” his demand was interpreted by many as a propaganda ploy.¹⁰

The disintegration of the status quo in Europe

It took a number of years for the “Gorbachev revolution”¹¹ and the changes it wrought in the Soviet Union to be recognized abroad, and even longer for them to have a lasting impact on the two German states. In an interview with *Newsweek* in October 1986, Kohl mused: “I don’t consider [Mikhail Gorbachev] to be a liberal. He is a modern communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels, who was one of those responsible for the crimes in the Hitler era, was an expert in public relations, too.”¹² The chancellor’s blunder,

⁸ Interview with E. Honecker, *Neues Deutschland*, November 16, 1981.

⁹ Joint communiqué on the meeting between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Secretary General Erich Honecker, December 13, 1981, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by Federal Ministry of German Affairs (Bonn: Ministry of German Affairs, 1982), II/8, 422.

¹⁰ John C. Kornblum, “Reagan’s Brandenburg Concerto,” *American Interest*, Summer (May/June) 2007, 25–32.

¹¹ See Archie Brown’s chapter in this volume. ¹² *Newsweek*, October 27, 1996, 29.

though not intended to irritate the Soviet general secretary, indicated that he believed that no fundamental political changes were taking place in Moscow. No wonder Gorbachev was deeply offended by this remark. German–Soviet relations were put on ice.

Western Europe played a subsidiary role in Gorbachev's policy toward the West. He concentrated on improving relations with the United States, as he felt that progress in East–West relations was conceivable only in cooperation with the recognized leader of the Western world. In particular, he wanted to end the increasingly costly nuclear-arms race and prevent its expansion into space. But Kohl's remark reinforced Gorbachev's cool attitude toward the FRG, which he held responsible for the NATO two-track decision and for the deployment of new nuclear missiles. Further, Gorbachev wished to dissuade Honecker from improving relations with Bonn. The Soviet leader worried about East Germany's increasing economic dependence on West German subsidies. Gorbachev, therefore, did little to conciliate Bonn.

Soviet relations with East Berlin also did not proceed smoothly. Moscow continued to value the GDR as a strategic ally, but realized that the country was no longer an economic and political asset. The most orthodox of all Communist Parties, the SED shunned reform. It publicly defied perestroika, viewing its ripple effects with great concern. GDR officials considered it a necessary expedient for the Soviet Union, which it need not emulate. One did not have to renovate one's apartment just because a neighbor was putting up new wallpaper, remarked Politbüro member Kurt Hager.¹³

After a visit to Moscow in 1987 from German president Richard von Weizsäcker, the icy relations between Bonn and Moscow began to thaw. His conversations with Gorbachev, although occasionally "pointed [and] harsh," were quite cordial.¹⁴ Gorbachev told his guest that the question of unification was closed, though history in a hundred years might decide otherwise. When Kohl visited Gorbachev in Moscow in October 1988, however, a new chapter was opened in German–Soviet relations. The two leaders found that they were more compatible than they had expected, and each had a surprisingly sensitive attitude to the other's outlook. Gorbachev was pleased that German banks extended a low-interest loan for the modernization of Soviet light industry. The Soviet leader's June 1989 trip to Bonn saw the evolution of a special bond of trust between the two men. Both leaders committed themselves to enforcing human rights and respecting international law. They

¹³ Interview with Kurt Hager, *Der Stern*, 16 (April 9, 1987), 140–44.

¹⁴ Hans Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 543.

acknowledged that all people should freely choose their political and economic system.¹⁵ With this statement Gorbachev rescinded the Brezhnev Doctrine on the limited sovereignty of socialist states. Honoring this commitment was of utmost importance to the peaceful revolution that was about to take place in Eastern Europe.

Upheaval in the German Democratic Republic

During the summer of 1989, important changes were occurring in much of Eastern Europe.¹⁶ In Poland, the first free elections unleashed a political landslide. The independent labor union Solidarity won an overwhelming victory and established a government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In Hungary, reform socialists under Miklós Németh tried to loosen ties to the Warsaw Pact and increase cooperation with the West. The GDR, however, shunned reform; it proved unresponsive to Gorbachev's counsel that "those [who are] late will be punished by history."¹⁷

Within the communist bloc, the GDR became increasingly isolated. In despair, large numbers of East Germans left their country. As they could not cross the border to the West directly, they sought refuge in the FRG's embassies in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. They had lost hope for economic improvements and political liberalization. Moreover, the image of a capitalist threat (*'Feindbild'*) had dissipated under the impact of streams of Western visitors and of television. On September 10, Hungary opened its border with Austria to these refugees, while thousands of GDR citizens still crowded in the West German Embassy in Prague. People's emotions were stirred when Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher spoke to them and announced that he had arranged their exit to the West in sealed trains through East Germany. At the Dresden train station, however, the police cracked down very harshly on the throngs of desperate people seeking to flee, along with their fellow citizens, to West Germany.

East Germans faced a dilemma. While the societies in neighboring East European countries opened up, the GDR regime tightened its grip. The Stasi, the GDR's secret service, actively spied on the discontented, and the jails

¹⁵ Joint German–Russian declaration, Bonn, June 13, 1989, *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Office*, 61 (June 15, 1989), 542–44.

¹⁶ See Jacques Lévesque's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷ Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews* (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1998), 412.

filled with those whose only crime was wanting to leave the country. While the GDR prepared for the celebration of its fortieth anniversary and awaited the visit of foreign dignitaries, police and army units clubbed protesters on the streets of Berlin. But not all people intended to flee; many deliberately wanted to stay and work for change within the GDR. In spite of repression, a wide spectrum of opposition groups, citizens' committees, and new political parties formed, meeting either in private or in the shelter of Protestant churches.

In many towns, people attended prayer services and marched through the streets peacefully. On October 9, after a service in Leipzig's Nikolai Cathedral, more than 100,000 people took to the streets, shouting "Wir sind das Volk! [We are the people!]" and "Keine Gewalt! [No force!]." A showdown was expected because riot police and paramilitary units were massed, and the hospitals had prepared for emergencies. Against all expectations, the authorities did not employ force although they had received orders to use their weapons, if necessary, to disperse the crowds. Soviet troops stationed in the GDR also did not intervene. Perhaps the massacre they had witnessed in Beijing's Tiananmen Square restrained them?¹⁸ Or perhaps it was the sheer number of protesters that convinced authorities they could not repress the crowds?¹⁹

Each Monday people marched in Leipzig and other cities while a fragile peace held. Party officials did not have the means to stop the popular upheaval. But the antipathy to reform exhibited by the aging and fractious SED leadership further frustrated East Germans and stifled their resistance. Amid the social ferment, productivity and economic growth dropped sharply. While the GDR in the early 1980s had been the most successful socialist economy in Eastern Europe – though its GNP and productivity were just 60 percent of that of West Germany – it now approached economic and financial collapse.²⁰ Dependent on energy supplies from the Soviet Union and credits from the West, the regime's command economy could not generate sufficient foreign exchange to meet its obligations. Shortages of basic commodities grew worse, and the stark realities of everyday life contrasted sharply with the propaganda that the regime circulated in the mass media; the legitimacy of the party and the state crumbled.

¹⁸ For more on developments in China, see Chen Jian's chapter in the volume.

¹⁹ Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), 111–17.

²⁰ See Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 59–78. For economic developments, see Wilfried Loth's chapter in volume II.

Popular protest and the dire economic situation kindled a conspiracy inside the Politbüro. Frustration with Honecker's authoritarian style had been mounting for some time, but a mixture of loyalty to the chief and distrust of one another kept the revolt in check. Approaches to Gorbachev invariably brought the response that any personnel changes had to be achieved by the East Germans themselves. Finally, a small group of Politbüro members led by Honecker's protégé, Egon Krenz, finessed a motion calling for the dismissal of Honecker. On October 18, 1989, Honecker agreed to be replaced by Krenz "for health reasons."

In his acceptance speech, the new leader promised a *Wende* (turn) in dealing with the concerns of the people. He announced steps to legalize new political parties and draft a more liberal travel law. Though both party and government still lacked a political plan, with great fanfare they announced further reform. They bet that they could "ride the tiger" if they satisfied some of the protesters' most salient requests. They might have succeeded had the reforms come a few weeks earlier, but by now all confidence in the political leadership had dissipated.

SED spokesman Günther Schabowski's incomplete announcement of the travel regulations that had been approved by the Politbüro on November 9, 1989, finally forced the Wall open. When he was asked by a journalist when the new rules would go into effect, Schabowski, who had received only fragmentary information during a hectic day, muttered, "sofort [right away]"; he did not mention that passports and visas were required. When people heard they could visit the West without any formality, they rushed to the transit points in Berlin and overwhelmed the guards. Thousands of ecstatic East Germans thronged the streets of West Berlin; they were welcomed by their fellow citizens with champagne and flowers. In disbelief, the world watched jubilant Germans standing on the Wall and chiseling it away.

These dramatic events took place on the doorstep of the Soviet Embassy located near the Brandenburg Gate. How would the Soviet leadership react? When news of the opening of the Wall reached Moscow, Gorbachev was highly agitated. But Krenz reassured Soviet ambassador Viacheslav Kochemasov that nothing dramatic had happened. He said the new travel regulations had gone into effect prematurely, but the government would soon be able to control events.²¹ Of course, this was not true; party and state structures were disintegrating. Symbolic were the raids on the Stasi headquarters in Berlin and Dresden by GDR citizens, who littered the streets with once-secret documents

²¹ Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer*, 265.



23. Thousands of Germans gather to celebrate the demise of Communism with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, November 1989.

and files. The greatest danger, though, was that, in a desperate effort to restore order, the East German military would intervene. In expectation of more demonstrations in Berlin, several mechanized units had been mobilized, and it was known that in case of an emergency the army had plans to occupy West Berlin. Nothing of this sort happened. Although on November 10, a state of alert had been increased, the political and military leaders were no longer able to give orders that were heeded.

Restoring the German question to the European agenda

The reaction of Germans, East and West, was joyful. But all through these critical days in November, people held their breath as developments unfolded. How would the four powers, which still possessed postwar rights, react to events in Germany as a whole and in Berlin in particular? At the suggestion of the Soviet government, on December 11, 1989, the Allied Control Council met in Berlin to discuss the ongoing developments. This meeting demonstrated the allies' role and served as a warning to those Germans who wanted to speed up events.

The day the Wall fell Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher were on a state visit to Poland. Once back in Bonn, they immediately tried to reassure Soviet leaders and Germany's Western allies that the FRG would not permit the situation to get out of hand.²² Kohl felt he could best control the situation by emphasizing the importance of West Germany's integration into NATO and the European Community (EC). He sensed that the collapse of the GDR was imminent, opening up the possibility for reunification. But aware of concerns from Germany's neighbors, Kohl stressed that under all circumstances European integration should continue: "German unity can be achieved only if the unification of the old continent proceeds. Policy on Germany and on Europe is but two sides of one coin."²³ He assured French president François Mitterrand that the FRG would adhere to the agreed schedule for deepening European integration.²⁴

In order to influence events, Bonn had to develop a political strategy for dealing with the German question. When Kohl announced his "Ten Points" in the Bundestag on November 28, they came like a bolt out of the blue.²⁵ He promised quick humanitarian and financial help to the GDR and sketched the path to an eventual all-German federation.²⁶ Kohl emphasized that any future "German architecture" should be embedded in a European order of peace and

22 Telephone conversations between H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, and M. Gorbachev, November 11, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Special Edition from the Archives of the Chancellor's Office 1989/90, ed. by Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998), 511–12, 515–17.

23 Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 985–96.

24 Fifty-fourth German–French Consultations in Bonn on November 2–3, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 470–76.

25 "10-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung," cited in Wolfgang Schäuble, *Der Vertrag: wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1991), 18.

26 See Horst Teltschik, 329 *Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 55–56.

follow the rules and norms of international law, including the right to self-determination. He expressed his hope for attaining “a situation in which the German people can regain their unity by exercising their free will, taking account of the interests of all concerned, and assuring peaceful cooperation in all of Europe.”²⁷

Except for the Greens, all German parties – including the Social Democratic opposition – applauded the chancellor for his audacious initiative. But among Germany’s allies, Kohl’s Ten Points caused much concern. NATO leaders had not been consulted in advance and had mixed feelings about German unification. Their attitudes illuminated a paradox. In the past, Western leaders had quite freely declared their support for reunification, believing that the issue would forever remain theoretical. Privately, they adhered to the view that European security interests were best served by the division of Germany. How could this contradiction be overcome?

The only foreign leader who immediately backed the German position was US president George H. W. Bush. He, like most Americans, felt that pursuing reunification was a natural course after the Wall had collapsed. In a speech in Berlin on December 11, Secretary of State James Baker outlined the American vision for a “new architecture for a new era in Europe.”²⁸ He wanted the division of Berlin and Germany to be overcome peacefully and in freedom. NATO, Baker said, should be transformed to include more nonmilitary aspects of security in its mission, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) made more effective, and the EC strengthened and its links with the United States expanded.

In keeping with the pattern set by General Charles de Gaulle, Mitterrand indicated that he considered the German desire for reunification absolutely legitimate, provided it took place peacefully and democratically. When the time was ripe, its realization depended on the will of the German people.²⁹ But in November 1989 Mitterrand did not think the time had yet come. He insisted that democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe should be undertaken first, and the ramifications of German unity dealt with subsequently. He emphasized that German reunification needed to be firmly anchored in the European Community. Strengthening the EC and intensifying Franco-German relations were deemed vital to reassure everyone that Germany would not again be able to dominate Europe.

27 Letter from H. Kohl to G. Bush, November 28, 1989, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 567–73.

28 Address by Secretary J. Baker, Berlin Press Club, December 11, 1989, US Information Service Press Release.

29 See Frédéric Bozo’s chapter in volume II.

Though officials in Paris and Bonn fully agreed on linking German unification to European integration, they differed on priorities and procedures. Mitterrand wanted to build a European monetary union, while Kohl's main aims were to restore German unity and construct a European political union. He saw the European and German projects proceeding in tandem.³⁰ But as Kohl did not want to risk losing French support for his agenda, he had to adjust his priorities accordingly, even if monetary union was not popular in Germany. The nexus between German unity and European integration remained very much at the center of the Franco-German discourse.

British prime minister Margaret Thatcher was haunted by the obsession of a "German Europe" dominating the continent. She candidly called for an Anglo-French initiative to restrain the "German juggernaut." When Kohl asked for support, she burst into a towering rage and declared that there were other important issues to consider, including the role of the four powers, the Helsinki Act, transformation in Eastern Europe, and the fate of Gorbachev's perestroika: "Any attempt to talk about either border changes or German reunification would undermine Mr. Gorbachev and also open up a Pandora's Box of border claims right through central Europe."³¹ It was no secret that she was still wedded to the status quo, as were most European leaders. But after considerable German prodding, on December 9, 1989, the twelve European heads of state gathered at a summit in Strasbourg. They committed themselves to seeking "the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain their unity through free self-determination."³²

Although Bush was fully supportive of German unity, he called on Kohl to slow down and handle his partners more carefully. While prodding other allies to accept reunification, Washington also conferred with the Soviets. In January 1990, Bush and Baker decided to accelerate these talks, believing that the Soviets might extract too many concessions in protracted negotiations. Kohl, too, believed that the window of opportunity might soon close, and he wanted to bring about unification as quickly as possible.

On February 24–25, 1990, President Bush, Secretary Baker, and Chancellor Kohl met at Camp David to exchange views and coordinate strategies on the rapidly unfolding situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The US and West

30 Conversation between H. Kohl and F. Mitterrand at Latché, January 4, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 683–90.

31 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 794–97; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 984.

32 "Conclusions of the Presidency on the Strasbourg European Council, 8 and 9 December 1989," at europa.eu/rapid/searchResultAction.do.

German governments agreed that the international aspects of German unification should be discussed with the two German states in a quadripartite forum, not in the CSCE. A unified Germany, moreover, must remain a full member of NATO. Bush reminded Kohl that “the concept of Germany being in NATO is absolutely crucial.” He opposed a special status for a reunified Germany like the one assigned to France, exclaiming: “One France in the alliance, with its special arrangements, is enough.”³³ Kohl and Bush agreed that the Soviet Union should be fully involved in this process without giving it an opportunity to block progress. But they agreed that Gorbachev would only come around in direct talks with the US president.

Moscow and the German question

The question of whether the plans for restoring German unity had any chance to succeed depended on attitudes in the Kremlin. The first German–Soviet encounters after the fall of the Wall were not very promising. When Genscher visited Moscow in early December, Gorbachev was still angry about Kohl’s ten-point plan, which he considered a *diktat*.³⁴ Aware of the growing problems in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union itself, Gorbachev resented Kohl’s bold initiative, which constrained his options. But when, in early 1990, the demise of the GDR seemed a matter of months rather than years, the Soviet leader knew that the only thing he could do was to try to influence the process in a way that conformed to Soviet interests as much as possible. Moscow reoriented its policy toward the Federal Republic without completely ignoring the GDR. Gorbachev insisted that the conditions of unification should be discussed by the Four Powers together with the two German states. Concerning Germany’s final status, he was thinking along the lines of military neutrality. Should the Western allies agree, he was prepared to withdraw Soviet forces from the GDR.

The FRG wanted neither a neutral Germany nor one with a special status. But Kohl knew that German unity could not be restored by recreating the Bismarckian Reich. He was, instead, thinking in terms of an all-European security system into which a united Germany could be integrated. This system would include Britain and France, as well as the United States with its superior military forces, and would build on cooperative relations with the

33 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Random House, 1999), 252.

34 Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 584–87.

Soviet Union. A united Germany, he believed, should be a fully sovereign state, entitled to decide its own security according to the principles of international law and the interests of its partners. In Kohl's view, it should remain a member of NATO, adhere to the CSCE process, renounce atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons, and support reform in Central and Eastern Europe.³⁵

US officials also rejected the idea of German neutrality; in their view, a united Germany must remain in NATO. To alleviate Soviet concerns, Baker built on ideas developed earlier by Genscher, acknowledging that NATO's jurisdiction should not be extended eastward. The US position was outlined in a paper that President Bush sent to Kohl before the chancellor's trip to Moscow.³⁶ When Baker met with the general secretary and his advisers, the secretary insisted that German unification was inevitable. To win his Soviet interlocutors' consent, Baker said that the rights of the four powers must be upheld while both German states were to be granted an equal voice in the process. The US State Department had developed a concept of 4+2 negotiations between the four powers and the two German states, later changing it to 2+4 to take account of German sensitivities.

The climate was favorable when Chancellor Kohl met the Soviet general secretary on February 10, 1990. After their talks, Gorbachev stated that they had no differences of opinion on the issue of unification and on the right of all people to strive for their national unity. He acknowledged that the East and West Germans had learned the lessons of history. But, he said, the path to unity should take cognizance of political realities and the Helsinki process. Gorbachev also discussed the inviolability of borders, the question of alliances, and prevailing economic relations between the USSR and the GDR. If Soviet concerns with these matters could be respected, he was willing to accept German reunification and promised not to encumber the process with additional political demands.³⁷ To most observers, his assurances came as a sensation. How was it possible that the Soviet Union would forsake its control of the GDR, the key to the cohesion of the Soviet bloc? Most probably, Gorbachev hoped that the FRG would help with the modernization of the Soviet economy. Given Moscow's financial problems and the weakness of the GDR, the Soviet leader saw no alternative.

35 Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 584–85; memo from H. Teltschik to H. Kohl, n.d., in *Deutsche Einheit*, 771–76.

36 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 179–85.

37 Teltschik, 329 *Tage*, 137–44.

International negotiations on German unity

The German government was determined to prevent the four powers from dictating the conditions and the time schedule for reunification no matter what the cost. But it agreed with Secretary Baker's proposal that the two German states should form an international framework together with the four powers for negotiating German unity. In February 1990, it was agreed that their representatives would meet in a 2+4 committee to discuss the international aspects of unification while the intra-German aspects were arranged by the two German states. The French and the British concurred that the four powers were not entitled to prevent unification, but insisted their rights had to be respected.³⁸

The 2+4 negotiations provided an international umbrella under which German unification could take place. In this process, the FRG received strong support from the US administration, which advocated rapid unification and unqualified membership of Germany in NATO. Initially, Bonn had been in favor of a somewhat slower approach because it had hoped to solve many inter-German problems first, but it soon saw the advantages of parallel processes and agreed that the agenda for the 2+4 talks should be confined to a few basic issues. The French and British also pushed for an early beginning, but did not expect a rapid conclusion. Although they did not question the right of the Germans to self-determination, they believed that unification must not endanger stability and security in Europe. For this reason, they felt strongly that Germany must recognize Poland's western border as soon as possible. For France, it was also important that the tempo of unification did not undermine European integration, while Britain emphasized the importance of a united Germany's membership in NATO.

In the Treaty of Warsaw, signed in 1970, the Federal Republic and Poland had confirmed the inviolability of their borders and had declared they had no claims to each others' territory. But Kohl feared that in the upcoming elections his governing coalition might lose the support of German voters who had been expelled from Poland after World War II, and hence his parliamentary majority might be shattered. Kohl, therefore, balked at the Polish request that Germany recognize Poland's western border as part of a final settlement, or that Poland and the two German states must first reach an agreement on regulating their common border. In the eyes of Polish officials, the unilateral declarations to this effect by the Bundestag and the Volkskammer did not

38 First meeting of the 2+4 foreign ministers, Bonn, May 5, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1090–94.

suffice. The Poles also demanded reparations for war damages inflicted on their country. Not even the prospect of a comprehensive treaty on cooperation and good neighborly relations with Germany could induce the Poles to give up these demands. But, under pressure from their allies, both governments compromised. With the Polish foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski present, the 2+4 foreign ministers agreed on a set of principles regarding the question of borders.³⁹ They specified that unified Germany would not assert any claim to the territory of any other state, and that Germany's external borders would be included in the final settlement. Additionally, Germany and Poland pledged to reaffirm their common borders in an internationally binding bilateral treaty.

The position of the GDR in the 2+4 talks changed after the elections in March. Previously, it had essentially supported the Soviet proposals; it now showed considerable interest in expediting the course of the negotiations. It placed a high priority on settlement of the border issue. Because the GDR saw itself as a mediator between East and West, it called for building a new security order in Europe. It agreed that for an interim period, until the dissolution of the alliances under a pan-European security system had been realized, Germany should be a member of a reformed NATO. To this end, the CSCE should be strengthened and progress made on a reduction of military forces.

Reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union was considerably more difficult. Although Gorbachev had accepted the right of the Germans to unify, the Soviets insisted that their own economic and security interests must be recognized. The sticking point was German membership in the Atlantic alliance. Moscow demanded Germany hold either a neutral status or concurrent membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Finally, it insisted that unification could take place only after the project of a "European home" had been realized and common institutions in the CSCE framework established. In the long term, both alliances should come together under the roof of the CSCE. Lastly, the Soviets demanded that all borders be guaranteed and the status of Germany as a whole codified in a peace treaty.

In May 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze added further conditions. He proposed that Germany receive full sovereignty only after a long transition that would serve as a kind of probation period. He also demanded a synchronization of the external aspects of unification with the CSCE process. If this were achieved, he said, the Soviets might be willing to

39 Paris text on border questions, July 17, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1369.

revisit the question of alliance membership, which under present conditions they rejected categorically. Concerned about accelerated German unification and the loss of the GDR, the diehards in the Politbüro reasserted their views. Given these new difficulties, the question was how the West could address Soviet concerns without compromising its own priorities.

Bilateral summits

The 2+4 negotiations were interwoven with a series of high-level talks between Bush, Kohl, and Gorbachev. It was in these meetings that the sticking points regarding German unity were resolved. The most difficult issue was German membership in NATO.

In order to prepare for Gorbachev's visit to the United States, Baker went to Moscow on May 18–19. He sought to demonstrate that the Americans were responsive to Soviet worries. He argued that the 2+4 talks gave the USSR a place at the table and allowed it to play an important role. He further offered a package of nine assurances to allay Gorbachev's security concerns: (1) limiting the Bundeswehr in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe; (2) accelerating the negotiations on limiting short-range nuclear forces; (3) ensuring that the Germans would not develop, possess, or acquire either nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; (4) keeping NATO forces out of the GDR for a transitional period; (5) developing a schedule for Soviet forces to leave the GDR; (6) adapting NATO politically and militarily; (7) getting an agreement on the Polish–German border; (8) institutionalizing and reforming the CSCE; and (9) developing economic relations with the Germans, while ensuring that GDR financial obligations to the USSR would be fulfilled.⁴⁰ Gorbachev, though showing some interest in these pledges, responded that a unified Germany in NATO was impossible. It would inflame his domestic foes and kill perestroika. But he also intimated that, according to international law, each nation had a right to choose its alignments. With this remark, Gorbachev hinted at a potential compromise formula.

All depended now on Gorbachev's visit to Washington and Camp David on May 31–June 4. Under what conditions would the Soviets accept united Germany's membership in NATO, and what could the West offer to help Gorbachev save face? Given his economic plight, a trade agreement was high on the Soviet leader's agenda. A formula was worked out under which the

⁴⁰ James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 250–51.

United States and the USSR would sign a grain and trade agreement, although the president would not send it to Congress for ratification until the Soviets had passed legislation on emigration – a condition that had been set forth publicly before. Another sweetener was a US commitment to expedite the ongoing arms-control negotiations, above all the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). On the German question, extensive confidential talks with Gorbachev as well as various personal gestures were necessary until the Soviet leader conceded, much to the dismay of his advisers, that the Helsinki Final Act meant that the Germans themselves had the right to decide their alliance membership.⁴¹

To further facilitate agreement, the US administration pushed for reform in NATO. A milestone was the London Declaration, in which NATO offered dialogue and cooperation to the members of the Warsaw Pact. It proposed that the two alliances declare that they no longer considered each other to be enemies and that aggression was unthinkable. NATO also announced a revision of its military strategy, a reduction in the operational readiness of its troops, a general reorganization of forces, and new arms-control initiatives. Nuclear weapons were to be regarded as “weapons of last resort.”⁴²

Chancellor Kohl built on these bargains when he saw Gorbachev in July in Moscow and in the Caucasus. Though he had been apprised by the White House about the results of the Bush–Gorbachev summit, he felt that the question of NATO membership still had not been settled. Kohl was fortunate that his meeting with Gorbachev occurred right after the Soviet leader’s position had been strengthened at the July congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev could now take a more accommodating position. Much to the surprise of the German delegation, Gorbachev acknowledged that united Germany was entitled to decide its alliance membership. He assured Kohl that *de jure* the matter was clear. *De facto*, however, he insisted that NATO’s reach after unification should not be extended to the territory of the GDR. He further suggested that a separate treaty should be negotiated on the presence of Soviet troops in former GDR territory during a transitional period. On the size of the Bundeswehr, the Soviets accepted Kohl’s target size of 370,000, halving the existing strength. Regarding Moscow’s wish that Germany renounce all ABC weapons, Kohl declared that Germany would continue to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gorbachev in turn agreed

41 Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 279–88.

42 “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, London, 5–6 July 1990,” *Survival*, 32, 5 (September/October 1990), 469–72.



24. West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left, at table), Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl with their advisers during Kohl's visit to the Caucasus in July 1990. The personal cooperation between the West German leaders and Gorbachev was a key to the peaceful unification of Germany.

that at the moment of unification the rights of the four powers were to be terminated and Germany would regain its full sovereignty.⁴³

To make these concessions easier for the Soviets, the chancellor offered to restructure German–Soviet relations and conclude a comprehensive treaty on cooperation and good neighborly relations. He also offered economic aid, but refused to shoulder the costs of stationing Soviet troops in eastern Germany until 1994 when they would be withdrawn. The problem was solved by modulating the financial impact on Soviet troops stemming from the introduction of the Deutschmark into East Germany. Bonn promised Moscow an overall sum of DM 12 billion and an interest-free loan of DM 3 billion. These agreements were codified in bilateral treaties between Germany and the Soviet Union.⁴⁴

43 Conversation between H. Kohl and M. Gorbachev, Moscow, July 15, 1990, in *Deutsche Einheit*, 1340–67.

44 For the German–Soviet treaties, see *Europa-Archiv*, 46, 3 (1991), D63–90; for the Treaty on Economic Cooperation, see *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 133 (November 15, 1990), 1382–87.

Parallel inter-German negotiations

Developments in East Germany accelerated the unification process. The waves of people moving to West Germany were swelling to more than 2,000 a day. This brought the GDR economy to the brink of collapse, particularly since the administration was slow in initiating economic reforms, hoping instead for aid from West Germany. Bonn, though neither interested in an economic breakdown of the GDR nor wanting to encourage further immigration, ruled out substantial financial aid because it did not consider the East German leadership capable of reforming the system along the lines of a market economy. Kohl instead suggested that the two sides consider forming a monetary union. In early February 1990, he announced his intention to open negotiations with the GDR to achieve this goal.

The offer of the Deutschmark was a courageous political step that injected momentum into the unification process. It was economically risky – even more so at the favorable 1:1 exchange rate – but it offered the East Germans a new perspective on their future. Experts warned that the gap in productivity between East and West would lead to economic distortions, undermine the profitability of the GDR economy, and eventually lead to its collapse. These experts recommended that the East German economy should gradually be brought up to Western standards before a common currency was introduced. But Kohl disregarded this essentially solid advice. The decision to offer the Deutschmark was made exclusively for political reasons. Kohl wished to strengthen those political forces that stood for speedy reunification.

The negotiations on monetary union began in April. The biggest impediments were the exchange rate for the East German currency and property rights. For both issues, solutions were found. The return of confiscated property was to have precedence over reparations. But Moscow demanded that there be no restitution of the land confiscated by the Soviets in 1945–49. To administer the GDR's assets and debts, and oversee the conversion of the nationalized industries into private ownership, a trust agency was created. In spite of annual transfers of more than DM 100 billion, jump-starting the East German economy was more difficult than expected. The old industrial sectors broke down before new ones could be created. As a result, the integration of the two states was slowed down considerably.

The monetary union could be realized only if backed by both Germanies' partners, who expected that their interests would not be harmed. Moscow's concerns that trade commitments within the Comecon, payments for the

Soviet troops in the GDR, and existing loans be honored were settled at the meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in July 1990. To get the EC's approval, Bonn had to dispel worries about German intentions while simultaneously retaining its freedom of action. Reluctantly, the European Community recognized Germany's right to self-determination, but insisted that it be fully embedded within the community. Aware of opposition to a redistribution of the EC's structural assistance funds, Kohl pledged not to request any additional money for alleviating the costs of unification. Instead, a national unity fund was established to provide for financial transfers from the old to the new *Länder*, thereby aiming to bring living standards in the East up to those in the West. In April 1990, the EC agreed that the GDR could be integrated into a "united Germany and hence into the Community."⁴⁵

The treaty on monetary union took effect on July 1, 1990, after it had been ratified by large majorities in both the Bundestag and the Volkskammer.⁴⁶ Now political unification was inevitable. Officials in Bonn had always felt that economic and monetary unity without political unification would involve incalculable financial risks. Hence, the treaty on monetary union also adumbrated political unification. Its preamble stated that economic union was a first step toward establishing state unity according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, which envisaged the law's extension to other parts acceding to the Federal Republic.

After East Berlin had committed itself to accession as clearly as had Bonn, the next question was whether a treaty was necessary or whether the GDR could simply declare its accession to the FRG. The freely elected GDR government under Lothar de Maizière wanted a formal treaty as only this would give East Germany a chance to pursue its interests forthrightly. De Maizière actually wanted the GDR to rebuild its society first and then accede to the FRG as an equal partner. This view was shared by many West Germans, especially among members of the opposition. Such a process would have been possible under the Basic Law's Article 146. To palliate East German feelings, the West German negotiators, who were in a position of strength, agreed that they should "work out a treaty that . . . could command a two-thirds' majority in the *Volkskammer*."⁴⁷ They were also aware that the treaty needed to be ratified

45 "Conclusions of the Chair at the European Council in Dublin, April 28, 1990," *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 51 (May 4, 1990), 401–04.

46 "German–German Treaty on Monetary, Economic, and Social Union," May 18, 1990, *ibid.*, 63 (May 18, 1990), 517–44.

47 Schäuble, *Der Vertrag*, 15.

by the Bundestag and approved by the *Länder* governments, where opposition to unification was mounting.

The negotiations on the unification treaty were not so much about “whether” and “when” as about “how.” They took place in an atmosphere of trust. Reconciling the legal systems was difficult. It was decided that West German federal law would extend to all of Germany, although in certain cases special transitional regulations were planned. They also forged compromise agreements on the touchy issues of handling Stasi files and dealing with Stasi agents. It was more difficult to agree on financial issues, such as allocating revenues between federal and state levels. While the GDR wanted preferential treatment for the new *Länder*, the old *Länder* flatly refused. They argued that by contributing to the Unity Fund they were doing their share in helping to rebuild the East. When the GDR governing coalition broke apart in August 1990, the East German government lost much of its negotiating clout and was forced to accede to Bonn’s position. The Treaty on German Unity was signed on August 31, 1990, after only eight weeks of negotiations.⁴⁸ There was a clear consensus that accession should take place as soon as possible. But before that could occur, the 2+4 negotiations had to be concluded and the results confirmed by the CSCE foreign ministers.

German unification

The final settlement regarding Germany was signed by the foreign ministers of the 2+4 nations on September 12, 1990. It went into effect after the CSCE foreign ministers heard the results of the 2+4 negotiations on October 1. Article 1 defined the territory and borders of the united German state and declared that in the future it would not raise any claims to the territory of other states and would guarantee this by altering its constitution accordingly. Article 2 reconfirmed the declarations of both German states renouncing the use of force. Article 3 reiterated the commitments to abjure ownership and use of ABC weapons, adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and reduce German forces to 370,000 troops. The conditions and terms for the presence of Soviet soldiers in East Germany were stipulated in Article 4. Article 5 dealt with the status of the GDR after the withdrawal of troops. Article 6 confirmed that united Germany could be a member of alliances with full rights and obligations. Article 7 terminated the rights and

⁴⁸ *Verträge zur Einheit Deutschlands*, ed. by the German Press and Information Service (Bonn: BPA, 1990), 43–71.

responsibilities of the four powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. United Germany was to "have full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs."⁴⁹ The treaty was ratified by the five participating states on March 15, 1991. The sixth state, the GDR, had disappeared in October when it acceded to the FRG.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement was supplemented by various protocol notes and a joint letter from Genscher and de Maizière to the foreign ministers of the four powers. In the letter, the two German states committed themselves to preserving a unified Germany that was free and democratic. They also confirmed an earlier statement regulating unresolved property issues resulting from expropriations by the USSR. In addition, the new Germany promised to maintain Soviet monuments and cemeteries and to care for them respectfully. And, furthermore, Germany reaffirmed that it would honor the legal obligations resulting from agreements previously concluded by the GDR.⁵⁰ Unification then took place at midnight on October 3, 1990. Effective on the day of unification, the four powers terminated their rights and responsibilities.

Germany's unity was achieved with the blessings of its neighbors and the help of the citizens of the GDR, who with their peaceful demonstrations had brought about the 'Wende'. According to the main West German negotiator, Wolfgang Schäuble, "unity was possible only because no blood was shed."⁵¹ Watching the Wall come down had made the Germans feel "like children under a Christmas tree." High emotions nonetheless gave way to a tedious process of negotiating various international treaties. A great drama of popular revolt, political ferment, and legal artistry changed the course of history.

Looking back, the "window of opportunity" had been open only for a limited time. It took an ambitious and courageous leader such as Gorbachev to release East Berlin from the bonds of the Soviet bloc and thereby risk its dissolution. It was fortunate that at the same time an American president resided in the White House who had a great understanding of Europe. When Bush remarked that he would not beat on his "chest and dance on the wall,"⁵² he was being prudent. While not wishing to antagonize Gorbachev, he did hope to make the collapse of the Wall permanent and wanted to work with his NATO allies toward that end. The diplomatic skills of other Western leaders, not least Chancellor Kohl, contributed to making unification acceptable to

49 "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany," *International Legal Materials*, 29 (1990), 1186–93.

50 "Agreed Memorandum," September 12, 1990, *Bulletin of the German Press and Information Service*, 109 (September 14, 1990), 1156–57.

51 Schäuble, *Der Vertrag*, 15. 52 Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified*, 105.

Germany's neighbors. Kohl was willing to make parallel progress on European integration, and this led to the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992. A new European structure was built, in which German unification could be embedded. Neither of the Cold War superpowers would dominate the new Europe. A major cause of the East–West conflict was gone, and the Cold War was ended.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991

ALEX PRAVDA

Just as the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution defined the start of the ‘short’ twentieth century, so the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR marked its completion. The two stories should not be conflated. The demise of the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly the result of domestic factors: in the liberal climate of perestroika, ethnic nationalist movements flourished and provided effective vehicles for republican elites who were looking to gain power at the expense of a Kremlin weakened by mounting economic troubles and deepening political divisions. In this predominantly domestic process, international factors associated with the ending of the Cold War played a significant if secondary role. This chapter will consider how they helped to accentuate two outstanding features of the process of collapse: its speed and its remarkably peaceful course.

The domestic story

Before examining how external factors came into play, let us consider briefly the domestic course and dynamics of the story they affected. The Soviet collapse involved two intertwined processes: the transformation of the Communist regime and the disintegration of the highly centralised Union. Regime change came from the top: the Kremlin drove a project of radical liberalisation (*perestroika*, or restructuring) which by 1990 had transcended the Communist system of rule. The union was undermined from below: nationalist publics and elites pressed for greater autonomy from the centre. In the first act of the drama of collapse, in 1989–90, the pressure in the main was for sovereignty and came from smaller union republics in the Baltic region and the Caucasus. In the second act, which ran from late 1990 through the end of 1991, the larger republics – Ukraine and, crucially, Russia – declared sovereignty (see Map 3). Russian leadership gave enormous impetus to the republican cause and progressively undermined the centre’s capacity to withstand



Map 3. Successor states of the USSR

the growing centrifugal tide. With the elected Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, championing the causes of both republican nationalism and radical political change, the fight to reduce Moscow's hold over the republics merged with the struggle for power at the centre. Economic crisis and political polarisation made it increasingly difficult for Mikhail Gorbachev to steer a centrist reform course. After the failed hard-line coup of August 1991, the Soviet leader found himself unable to salvage the reformed regime or to get agreement on a looser union. Yeltsin and the radical agenda won the day: in November the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned, and in December the USSR was superseded by the Commonwealth of Independent States.¹

There is no simple explanation for the Soviet collapse; 'essentialist' interpretations, which highlight the self-destructive nature of totalitarianism and the inevitability of imperial disintegration, fail to capture the complexity of the process.² To be sure, structural features of the system mattered a great deal. The multinational federalism of the USSR made it easier in terms of both

¹ For the detailed chronology of republican declarations, see Edward W. Walker, *Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 64, 83, 140.

² Alexander Dallin, 'Causes of the Collapse of the USSR', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 8, 4 (1992), 279–81, and Alexander Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 49–51, 67.

constitution and organisation to press for greater republican autonomy. The intertwined structures of Communist Party and state meant that moves to relax rigid centralism in the former destabilised the latter in ways the leadership failed to anticipate. But contingent factors were vitally important. It is unlikely that the process that ended in collapse would have started without the drive of an exceptional leader, Gorbachev, determined to reinvigorate the system through radical reform. And it would not have gone so fast and so far without the mobilising skills of local nationalists and the eagerness of opportunist republican elites to jump on to the nationalist bandwagon, and without the miscalculations of the Kremlin in dealing with both.³

The policy of glasnost (or openness) started the nationalist ball rolling in 1987–88. Kremlin reformers encouraged popular debate and agitation for change – even where this assumed nationalist forms – to help create a groundswell of support for perestroika. The new liberal climate encouraged ethnic groups to air long-standing grievances, whether against other groups, as in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, or whether against Moscow, as in the case of the Crimean Tatars' campaign for the right to return to their homeland. From mid-1988, ethnic protests became more frequent, larger, and better organised; 1989 saw the rise in Georgia and the Baltic states of powerful separatist movements. These waves of protest swelled tides of nationalism that swept over Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.⁴

The prominence in this upsurge of nationalism of the Baltic and Caucasian republics reflected the particular resilience in these regions of ethnic identity and national ambition. Both existed, if at lower levels of intensity, throughout the USSR. Their survival was due in part to the duality of a nationality policy that had long tried to create an overarching Soviet identity while providing an institutional and cultural framework for multinationalism, in the hope of avoiding any nationalist backlash. As long as the whole Soviet political system

3 Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), ch. 8; Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 206–10; and his chapter in this volume. See also Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 17, 47–48, 132, and Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4 Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 30–36, 64–66, 186–90, 296–99. From early 1988, the Armenian majority in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within Azerbaijan, pressed for unity with Armenia; their campaign sparked violent ethnic conflict and fuelled nationalist protest in both republics.

remained under tight control, as it did until perestroika, this dual strategy worked relatively well to contain serious centrifugal nationalism. Against this background, it is understandable that in the early years of perestroika Gorbachev did not regard nationality policy as an urgent problem. The trouble was that, as nationalist protest escalated, the Soviet leader continued to underestimate the strength of popular feeling involved. He tended to attribute the protests to economic discontent, inept local officials, and the agitation of a handful of opportunistic secessionists.⁵

The power play of local elites played a crucial role in the rapid rise of organised protest. Moscow failed to understand the extent to which opportunistic local elites helped mobilise nationalist discontent in order to strengthen their positions at home as well as enhance their role at union level. Nowhere did this drive for power matter more than in the emergence of the Russian Republic as the main challenger to federal authority. In an astute move, Yeltsin, who had broken openly with Gorbachev by mid-1990, became the champion of nationalist struggle throughout the country. Once the Russian heartland of the union threw its weight behind the campaign for greater republican powers – the Russian parliament declared sovereignty in June 1990 – the balance of the contest between centre and republics began to shift decisively in favour of the latter.

Yeltsin's adoption of the nationalist cause fused the struggle between Moscow and the republics with the fight over power at the centre. Political polarisation in Moscow and the increasingly fierce contest over the direction of change dominated and distinguished the second act of the drama of collapse. Gorbachev's efforts to hold a centrist line of reform came under ever more intense fire from both radicals and traditionalists. Yeltsin, his authority boosted by his election as Russian president in June 1991, led a coalition of nationalists and radical democrats which pressed the Kremlin to transform the regime and the federation. At the same time, Gorbachev found himself under growing pressure from conservative forces to retrench on both fronts. Beleaguered politically, the Soviet leader also found himself plagued by mounting economic problems.

Gorbachev responded to the growing economic and political crisis by veering first in a conservative direction, in the winter of 1990–91, and then back towards the radical reform course that remained close to his heart. On the republican front, a half-hearted attempt to take a tough line was followed by moves to deal

⁵ Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), ix, 107, 187–88, 394.



25. Protesters from the provinces near Red Square, Moscow, 1990. As the economic crisis intensified, the number of protests increased.

with the challenge by negotiating a looser federation through a new union treaty. The impending treaty sounded the final alarm for those conservatives who had long felt that the country was heading for disaster. In August 1991, hard-liners in the party, the military, and the Soviet security and intelligence agency, the KGB, mounted a coup to displace Gorbachev and use force to establish control over radical democrats and nationalists alike. The poorly organised coup collapsed in the face of determined resistance led by Yeltsin, who rallied radical democrat and nationalist forces and considerable popular support in Moscow. In the event, the putschists managed to strengthen the very forces they had intended to defeat, and in the process hastened the collapse of what remained of Communist Party and federal power.

In the final scene of the drama in the months following the putsch, Gorbachev accepted the independence of the Baltic states, yet still attempted, against overwhelming odds, to salvage some form of confederation. With the prize of becoming presidents of independent states almost within their grasp, republican leaders were unwilling to accept any compromise. Yeltsin and his allies in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan dealt Gorbachev and the USSR a fatal blow in December 1991 by establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States.

International factors

The Soviet collapse was shaped overwhelmingly by domestic factors. External developments had a largely indirect impact on changes within the USSR, through the cumulative effects of underlying shifts in the international landscape and as a result of strategic moves that opened the Soviet Union to outside influence. Both kinds of developments made a difference by affecting the conditions in which the domestic political game was played out. Only on occasion did external factors intervene in developments more directly by influencing the behaviour of key domestic actors. Through a combination of ‘conditioning’ and ‘intervening’ effects, the international developments associated with the ending of the Cold War made a significant contribution to the process of collapse, and in particular to the speed and relatively peaceful nature of its course.

There were two areas in which underlying developments and strategic moves relating to the international position of the Soviet Union had important conditioning effects on the process of its disintegration: pressures on the economy and greater opening up to the West.

Problems of external pressure and economic performance were connected with the process of collapse, though less centrally and directly than they appear from accounts that credit American containment strategies, especially as pursued by President Ronald Reagan, with a crucial role in bringing an end both to the Cold War and to the Soviet Union. To be sure, the arms race squeezed resources available for consumer production. And complaints about Moscow’s management of the economy formed part of nationalist platforms; but, typically, they served as adjuncts to the emotional and political case for independence. The sharp deterioration in the economic state of the country in 1990–91 certainly reduced the capacity of the centre to cope with political challenges at the periphery and in Moscow itself. The economic crisis was, however, connected less with international pressure than with the failings of the command economy and the flawed attempts at its reform.⁶

It could be argued that external material pressures, military and economic, had an impact on the domestic scene by way of the strains they imposed on Moscow’s imperial rule in Eastern Europe and beyond. But the growing costs of empire were a cause for concern rather than a major reason for the radical liberal turn in Moscow’s stance towards the region that came with Gorbachev’s accession. It was in Moscow’s Third World ventures that

⁶ Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (London: Longmans, 2003), chs. 7–9.

symptoms of the overextension often associated with imperial decline were more visible. Yet, even in the case of Afghanistan, the economic and military costs were far from crippling and formed part of a wider political reassessment which led to the decision to withdraw troops. For those seeking greater autonomy within the USSR, the withdrawal was significant less as a sign of general imperial erosion than as a strong signal of the new priority assigned to political rather than coercive means of managing challenges.

External material pressures exercised their most powerful influence by helping to spur the critical reassessment that produced Gorbachev's doctrinal revolution ('new thinking') and perestroika. The steady and growing lag of economic performance behind that of the developed capitalist states underscored the infirmity of the Soviet system and reinforced the case for a change in direction. The results of the re-appraisal were reforms to invigorate the system and to foster co-operation with the West, in part to ease the passage of domestic re-structuring.⁷

A key feature of the strategic changes associated with perestroika was a greater openness: freer debate at home and a freer dialogue with the West. Previous decades had seen some opening up to the outside, mainly through growing engagement with the West in areas of trade and arms control. The process of détente had made possible significant transnational flows of ideas between specialists, especially in the field of foreign and security policy.⁸ Eager to reap the benefits of agreements on arms, trade, and inviolability of borders, Moscow had signed up to the human rights provisions in Basket III of the Helsinki Act. In principle, this had increased the exposure to international norms of what had always been a closed fortress state.⁹ But Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Iurii Andropov had kept the fortress gates under lock and key. It was only under Gorbachev that they were opened and the revolutionary thesis propounded that some values and rights, including freedom of political choice, were universally valid. Such radical doctrinal change helped legitimate the efforts of those pressing for self-determination within the USSR. And with capitalist states no longer seen as inveterate adversaries, it was more difficult to treat nationalist challenges to Moscow as threats to national security. With understanding and co-operation as watchwords of the new foreign policy, there was little justification for the barriers that had traditionally insulated the Soviet Union against foreign influence: Gorbachev moved to ease restrictions on travel and to stop the jamming of Western broadcasts.

⁷ See Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

⁸ See Matthew Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

⁹ See Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

This opening up to the West had three kinds of effect on the process of Soviet collapse. First, the reduction of controls over channels of communication and contact gave nationalist activists freer access to diaspora groups, other non-governmental organisations, and foreign governments. Their political support and material aid encouraged nationalists to press their demands; the case they made for non-violent methods helped to make nationalist protest action remarkably peaceful.

Secondly, the greater openness of the Soviet leadership to Western counterparts gave foreign statesmen a chance to reinforce Gorbachev's predisposition to respond to nationalist challenges with political rather than coercive means. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev was prepared to discuss domestic problems with Westerners; and, as turmoil deepened, he paid more attention to their counsel of caution. The third and last way in which greater openness affected the process of collapse was through its impact on the polarisation of domestic politics which dominated the second act of the drama. Outrage at the concessions in arms agreements and the losses in Eastern Europe helped spur the conservative opposition to mount the August 1991 coup, the failure of which hastened the demise of the union it was designed to save.

If Gorbachev's foreign-policy revolution opened up domestic developments to influences from the 'far abroad' of the West, it was through the 'near abroad' of Eastern Europe that external factors arguably had their most extensive impact on the process of collapse. What happened in Eastern Europe had special significance for those within the USSR who saw Moscow exercising imperial rule over their republics. And the thick institutional connections linking East European party, state, and non-governmental networks with their Soviet counterparts ensured that developments were quickly transmitted in both directions. Awareness of the dangers of contagion had traditionally prompted the Kremlin to try and restrict contacts with Eastern Europe at times of turmoil in the outer empire. Under Gorbachev, tradition was turned on its head: the Kremlin hoped that Hungarian and Polish reformers might show what perestroika strategies could achieve and was happy to see glasnost spread the reformist message.

The demonstration effects of radical reform in neighbouring socialist states helped to nourish nationalist movements within the union, while the flow of information and advice from Eastern Europe helped inform their strategies.¹⁰

¹⁰ Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part I)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (Fall 2003), 204–05;

More importantly, activists pressing for greater republican independence of Moscow followed with great interest the Kremlin's response to developments in Eastern Europe as some indicator of its likely reaction to challenges at home. The fact that Moscow refrained from interfering in Poland and Hungary, even in 1989 when reforms went well beyond the perestroika agenda, gave nationalist leaders hope that Gorbachev's commitment to universal freedom of choice and the avoidance of force might constrain coercive action even within the USSR.

The Baltic struggle for independence

In any assessment of how East European influences and Western responses figured in the development of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union, the Baltic states occupy a special place. The Caucasus produced more violently disruptive nationalist protest. Strong ethnic nationalism in Azerbaijan and Georgia generated particularly forceful drives for independence which Moscow found difficult to contain. Both republics declared sovereignty in the autumn of 1989, and a year later the Georgians voted into power a radical nationalist and anti-Communist government. It was in the western republics, however, that the changes associated with the ending of the Cold War had their greatest impact on nationalist movements.

Of the western republics, the Baltic states stand out in terms of their susceptibility to external influence. They were, together with Moldova and the western regions of Ukraine, the most 'East European' of the union republics, in terms of historical and cultural affinity. And they retained a quasi-East European international status insofar as Western governments never formally recognised their incorporation into the USSR.

The most extensive impact of Eastern Europe on nationalist protest in the western republics came through demonstration effects. Activists in the Baltic region and Ukraine looked with admiration at the spectacular progress of radical popular movements in the outer empire and used their successes to mobilise support for the nationalist cause.¹¹ The impact of demonstration effects was reinforced by the diffusion of strategies and tactics from the 'outer' to the 'inner' empire: the revolutionary developments in Eastern

Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part II)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6, 4 (Fall 2004), 69–73; and Brown, *Seven Years*, ch. 8.

¹¹ Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization*, 194–95.

Europe helped shape the ‘repertoires of contention’ of nationalist movements in the western Soviet republics.¹²

Most actively engaged in direct diffusion activities were members of Solidarity, both before and after coming to power in Poland. In its trades union guise, Solidarity helped to inspire the organisation of independent labour unions by miners in the summer of 1989 which saw the radicalization of popular protest throughout western Ukraine. In the western regions of Galicia and Transcarpathia, Catholicism reinforced identity with the Poles and fed the groundswell of national feeling. More direct support for nationalist mobilization came from visits of Solidarity leaders who, much to the Kremlin’s consternation, toured nationalist ‘hot spots’ and made contacts with ‘anti-Soviet groups’.¹³

In Lithuania, smaller and more susceptible to external influence, Poland had a considerable impact. Sajudis, the organisation that set the tone for nationalist politics in Lithuania, actively sought contact with Solidarity. According to intelligence from the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, Solidarity officials used the meetings to promote their model as the most effective means of struggle and aspired to become the ‘co-ordinating centre’ of a new region-wide anti-Communist alliance. The actual advice Solidarity leaders offered was apparently sensible rather than militant, cautioning against haste or euphoria about self-liberation, and making the case for a cautious approach.¹⁴ A concern to encourage caution and moderation also coloured the Polish government’s public stance on Lithuanian developments. As the new post-Communist governments of Eastern Europe gained in confidence, their encouragement of Baltic and Ukrainian efforts to claim sovereignty became more open, yet remained tempered by recommendations to proceed prudently along the path to independence.¹⁵

12 Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part III)’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 1 (Winter 2005), 90–91, 94–95.

13 Gorbachev referred to such visits in these terms during his meeting with Polish Communist Party leader Mięczysław Rakowski on 11 October 1989, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation. See also Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism (Part I)’, 216–17, and Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 208, 229, 240–41.

14 ‘Informatsiia posol’sstva v Respublike Pol’sha v Mezhdunarodnyi otdel TsK KPSS, “O kontaktakh ‘Solidarnosti’ s ‘nezavisymi’ politicheskimi dvizheniyami vostochnoevropeiskikh stran”’, 15 February 1990, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, *fond* 89, reel 1.990, *opis*’ 8, file 63.

15 Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 306, 324.

A similar combination of strategic encouragement and tactical restraint emerges when one considers the pattern of influences from émigré organisations, publics, and governments in Western Europe and the United States. Émigré organisations were the strongest source of support for a radical nationalist agenda. Members of the Lithuanian diaspora were especially active in encouraging compatriots to set their sights firmly on nothing short of independence. Non-governmental organisations in the United States and Western Europe were also a source of support and publicity for the nationalist cause. For over a year after the Lithuanian declaration of independence, weekly demonstrations of solidarity held in Sweden provided a platform for Baltic nationalists to convey their message to a wider Western audience.¹⁶ The general growth in foreign coverage helped the nationalist campaign in three ways. First, the end of jamming of Western broadcasts meant it was easier for news of the Baltic struggle to reach the region and penetrate other republics, so adding to the mobilising effects of domestic glasnost. Secondly, foreign coverage had a re-assuring effect for nationalist leaders who saw it as a kind of security cushion against a military crackdown.¹⁷ And, lastly, the overwhelmingly positive nature of Western media comment increased domestic pressure on Western governments to support Baltic demands.

The bold strategies adopted by nationalist leaders owed a good deal to optimism about getting Western government support, especially from Washington. Sajudis cherished the hope that, if they managed to win political power and declare independence, they would receive US recognition. To their disappointment, the Americans made clear that recognition did not follow automatically from political declarations, but hinged on demonstrated control over state territory.¹⁸

This position formed part of a generally cautious Western response to the rapidly emerging nationalist tide. There was a basic duality in the stance of the West. Governments sympathised with calls for greater republican autonomy within a more genuinely federal structure. At the same time, they had a concern, which weighed more heavily and urgently, to minimise the kind of instability that might undermine Gorbachev and put in jeopardy his liberal and co-operative foreign policies. Western leaders were anxious to discourage

16 Kristian Gerner and Stefan Hedlund, *The Baltic States and the End of the Soviet Empire* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 149.

17 Bronislaw Kuzmickas, *Issivadavimas: uzseinio politikos epizoodai 1988–1991* [Liberation: Foreign Policy Episodes 1988–1991] (Vilnius: Apostrofa, 2006), 16.

18 Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 325–26, 227–32, 266–67.

Baltic and Ukrainian nationalist leaders from taking precipitate action lest it trigger a forceful response from Moscow. These fears lay behind the circum-spect tone of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's speech in Kiev in June 1990 and the still more careful stance President George H. W. Bush took on Ukraine's pursuit of independence when speaking there a year later.¹⁹

What impact did the Western line of cautious encouragement have on nationalist policies? The degree to which Western advice affected their strategies was limited, though under certain conditions it proved far from insignificant. Two episodes from the Lithuanian story are particularly telling. The first involved the timing of the declaration of independence in March 1990. Consulted by nationalist leaders, American officials advised caution and at the very least postponement of the declaration; their advice was ignored. What seems to explain the lack of influence in this case is the weak engagement on the American side and an excess of mistrustful defiance on the part of nationalist leaders.²⁰

In the event, the Lithuanians proceeded with their declaration, which triggered increased pressure from Moscow in the form of a partial economic blockade. This was the setting for the second episode, in which the West intervened far more effectively to help reduce tensions. Washington, Paris, and Bonn pressed Vilnius temporarily to suspend the declaration in order to open the way to a negotiated resolution to the confrontation. Soon afterwards, the Lithuanians announced a hundred-day moratorium on action to implement the declaration of independence; and Moscow lifted the blockade.²¹ Bilateral talks about talks got underway in October 1990. The explanation for the impact of external influence in this episode is the greater readiness in the West to become involved combined with the increased sway in Vilnius of more moderate politicians, such as Kazimiera Prunskiene, who were ready to listen to outside advice.²² By helping to moderate the Lithuanian stance, the

19 Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, 276–77; Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 565–67, 569–70. For a very good analysis of the West's role, see Kristina S. Readman, 'Between Political Rhetoric and Realpolitik Calculations: Western Diplomacy and the Baltic Independence Struggle in the Cold War Endgame', *Cold War History*, 6, 1 (2006), 1–42.

20 Confidence was reportedly buoyed by assurances from émigré sources that, if push came to shove, Washington would back Vilnius; see Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 235.

21 V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedatis, *Lithuania: The Rebel Nation* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 171–72; Alfred Erich Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), 103–14.

22 Kazimiera Prunskiene, *Gintarines ledi Ispazintis* [Confessions of the Amber Lady] (Vilnius: Politika, 1991), 45–48, and Vardys and Sedatis, *Lithuania*, 169–71.

West was able to contribute to a temporary reduction in tension between Vilnius and Moscow.

The West and Soviet policy in the Baltic region

The cautious approach taken by Western leaders probably increased their capacity to exercise some influence on Baltic developments through engagement with the Kremlin. While Gorbachev remained very uneasy about outside intervention in Baltic affairs and thought the Americans needed careful watching, he apparently did not think that they were out to destabilise the situation.²³ Still, Western influence on the Kremlin remained limited. On the general stance taken by Moscow towards nationalist challenges, the West's contribution was minimal. Arguments made by foreign leaders for a more liberal attitude to the rising tide of nationalism, in line with the principles of 'new thinking', fell on deaf ears. Suggestions that the Baltic republics were exceptional and might be given the freedom to decide on their own status were greeted with stony silence or outrage.²⁴

Behind Gorbachev's response lay a general wariness which persisted in this area to a greater extent than the remarkable growth in overall levels of trust in other arenas might have led one to expect. At the Malta summit, which for many marked the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leader remonstrated that the Americans failed to appreciate the sensitivity of the situation: this was an 'extraordinarily delicate' area where any outside encouragement of separatist trends could ruin the entire perestroika project.²⁵ If any republic were allowed to secede, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze warned in May 1990, civil war could follow; territorial integrity was of greater importance than good relations with Washington.²⁶ But it was clearly in the Kremlin's interests to avoid having to make a choice between the two. Keeping the West on board was vital to the successful neutralization of nationalist problems in the wake of the East European collapse. While warning Washington about the dangers of poking around in the 'ant-hill' of the multinational union, Soviet leaders were not averse on occasion to asking for Western help to temper the

23 See M. Gorbachev's comments to W. Jaruzelski in Moscow, 13 April 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

24 James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 248; M. Gorbachev meeting with M. Thatcher, 8 June 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

25 Malta summit, 3 December 1989, M. Gorbachev meeting with G. Bush; and plenary session, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

26 Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 379.

nationalist movements.²⁷ The possible usefulness of Western involvement opened up an avenue for the exercise of a modicum of influence.

The other way in which the West managed to exert some influence was through a combination of leverage and reassurance. In the spring and early summer of 1990, Washington tried to pressure Gorbachev to lift economic sanctions by linking a return to dialogue with the Balts with an agreement on trade which Moscow badly wanted. When this proved unsuccessful, a more effective, softer approach was taken, with looser linkages cushioned by assurances from both American and West European leaders about their commitment to perestroika, something by which a domestically beleaguered Gorbachev set increasing store.²⁸

The use of force

Such assurances also accompanied the tougher line taken by Western leaders on the issue at the core of their concerns: the use of force. Moscow's sparing use of coercion, and the low general incidence of violence, was perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Soviet collapse. In examining external influences on the Kremlin's attitude towards the use of force, we should distinguish between the considerable conditioning influence of developments in the East European arena on the one hand, and, on the other, the limited yet significant impact of direct efforts by Western leaders to buttress the case against coercion.

A powerful formative influence on the Gorbachev team's attitude to force was their highly critical assessment of the historical record of Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.²⁹ Gorbachev rejected force as an instrument of policy and adhered to this position in all his East European dealings. And, significantly, he saw the principled renunciation of coercion in foreign policy as strengthening the case against its use to deal with problems within the Soviet Union.³⁰ Consistency and international reputation were factors that

27 *Ibid.*, 322–24, 328–29; Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 240–42; M. Gorbachev meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy, 26 March 1990, Archives of the Gorbachev Foundation.

28 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 267–68; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 284–86, 289.

29 The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to have had a particularly powerful influence; see Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 264, 323.

30 M. Gorbachev's remarks to the Politburo on 11 May 1989; see Anatolii Cherniaev et al. (eds.), *V Politbiuro Ts KPSS: po zapisam Anatolii Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991)* [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), 480.

also helped consolidate Gorbachev's own position on this issue. There seems little doubt that he was personally convinced that force was morally objectionable and offered no solutions to political problems. He accepted its use only where, as in Baku in January 1990, there were no other ways of preventing bloodshed.³¹

If Gorbachev was in fact more firmly opposed to the use of force than many Western leaders assumed, there were still some grounds for concern. While averse to the use of force, Gorbachev seemed at times willing to contemplate various forms of coercive intimidation to prevent nationalists in the Baltic region and elsewhere pursuing what he saw as their unacceptable goal of secession. This kind of thinking exposed Gorbachev to the dangers of a slippery slope that could easily lead to sanctioning the use of force.³² The Soviet leadership teetered on the edge of such a slope in March 1990, when plans were approved for a forcible take-over in Vilnius. Western warnings against considering force, however much they irritated Gorbachev, echoed misgivings among his own advisers who worried that any slide towards the use of coercion could undermine perestroika.³³

In the event, military muscles were flexed throughout the Baltic region, and Lithuania found itself under a partial economic blockade rather than under the coercive emergency rule for which the hard-liners had pressed. With Gorbachev's political 'turn to the Right' in the autumn of 1990, disquiet grew once again about force being used to halt the onward march of Baltic nationalism. The attempt to do so came with the military crackdown in Vilnius in January 1991. The evidence suggests that the Soviet leader had no direct hand in the decision, but failed to take sufficient steps to prevent those who had long advocated a forceful solution from proceeding with their plans.³⁴

What bearing did relations with the West have on the Vilnius events and their aftermath? In the period leading up to January, American warnings apparently made little impact on a Soviet leader who assumed that his

31 Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 127–32. The evidence suggests that Gorbachev played no part in the decision to use force to quell nationalist protest in Tbilisi in April 1991; see Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism (Part II)', 28–31.

32 Gorbachev later acknowledged that he gave in to pressure and approved the temporary deployment of military patrols in Moscow in March 1991; see Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations*, 130.

33 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 264–65.

34 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 280–83; Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure*, 128; and Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 317–30.

unprecedented support for US policy in the Gulf would assure continued co-operation, even under difficult domestic circumstances.³⁵ The strength of Western reaction to the January events, and clear signals that further crack-downs could seriously undermine co-operation and jeopardise economic aid, probably strengthened Gorbachev's determination to guard against any recurrence of attempts by hard-liners to leverage him into a policy of coercion.³⁶ The Soviet leader finally dissociated himself from what had happened in Vilnius, and there were no subsequent attempts to use force on such a scale to stem the rising tide of nationalist separatism.

The second act: the KGB and military reaction

Frustrated by what they saw as Gorbachev's pusillanimity and his shift back to a course of liberalising reform, hard-liners in the party, the KGB, and the military began to use more drastic methods to pressure the Soviet leader. From the spring of 1991, Communist officials, including some from inner Kremlin circles, became ever more troubled by Gorbachev's moves to negotiate with the republics a treaty along genuinely federal lines. The desire to prevent the signature of the union treaty determined the timing of the August 1991 coup by which the putschists sought to reverse the tide of liberalisation and devolution.³⁷

Developments associated with the ending of the Cold War figured importantly in the events leading to the coup. The fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath turned what had begun as a trickle of public sniping at Gorbachev's foreign policy into a torrent of criticism from conservatives within the party, the KGB, and, especially, the military. The Gorbachev team came under repeated fire for having 'lost' Eastern Europe and undermining Soviet security.³⁸

35 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 280–83; Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure*, 128; and Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 450–52.

36 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 327–29, and Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire*, 68–73.

37 Gordon Hahn, *1985–2000: Russia's Revolution from Above: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), chs. 7–9. For the role of the KGB, see Amy Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (2003), 17–66.

38 Kramer provides a good review of military criticism; see 'The Collapse of East European Communism, (Part III)', 5–26. On the military in this period, see also Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233, 240; see also Brian D. Taylor, 'The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (Winter 2003), 17–66; William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT, and

The widespread anger and disaffection that international developments generated in conservative circles, and especially within the security establishment, flowed from a triple sense of loss. First, many found it difficult to abandon the traditional beliefs and assumptions that had underpinned Soviet security thinking. Accustomed to being guardians of the Soviet fortress, military and KGB officers found it hard to come to terms with a Kremlin that played down the Western threat. The military found it difficult to swallow new doctrine on mutual security and on 'reasonable sufficiency'.³⁹ KGB leaders were troubled by talk of universal human values and the new commitment to a Helsinki-plus line on human rights and freedom of information, all moves that exposed the country to what they saw as growing Western subversion.⁴⁰

Secondly, security professionals felt they had lost out to political amateurs in the making of policy. Many on the General Staff resented the way in which politicians, notably Shevardnadze, had run roughshod over the military in revising security doctrine and negotiating asymmetrical arms agreements. The KGB, to a far greater extent than the military, had ambitions to be a force in the making of both foreign and domestic policy.⁴¹ By 1989–90, KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov had become frustrated by the way in which the liberal approach, promoted by radical reformers such as Gorbachev's close colleague, Aleksandr Iakovlev, was taking domestic and foreign policy in directions that conflicted with KGB interests. As a major author of the 'new thinking' and the principal proponent of glasnost, Iakovlev was seen as having encouraged trends that had led to disasters in both the outer and the inner empire – the loss of Eastern Europe and the loss of control over the union republics.⁴² The 'capitulation' over East Germany was a turning point for

London: Yale University Press, 1998), 305–46; and Robert V. Baryl'ski, *The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), ch. 4.

39 Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnikia* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reformation through His Aide's Eyes] (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993), 89–92; Baryl'ski, *The Soldier in Russian Politics*, 52–53; and Sergei F. Akhromeev and Georgii M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskkii vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A critical view of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), 73, 93.

40 Vladimir Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo* [Personal File] (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), vol. II, 289.

41 Aleksandr Iakovlev, *Omut pamiat'* [Maelstrom of Memory] (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 317, 388, 447.

42 Kriuchkov charged Iakovlev with advancing American rather than Soviet interests: *Lichnoe delo*, I, 282–99.

Kriuchkov; he became increasingly critical of Gorbachev and tried to pressure him into taking a tougher stance on republican nationalism.⁴³ Here we have an instance of how resentment about loss of influence over the foreign policy process, together with hostility to its substance, fuelled determination to press for a tougher stance against domestic nationalist protest.

The third and final source of disaffection was resentment of the material losses associated with Gorbachev's mishandling of foreign and security matters. There was unease in the military about the withdrawal from Eastern Europe, on the grounds that it weakened defences. And there was outrage at the precipitate and chaotic nature of the withdrawal and the lack of proper provision made for returning troops. Grievances over Eastern Europe heightened military leaders' sensitivity to the disruption caused by the loss of central control over the republics and prompted many of them to refuse to allow their men to serve in other parts of the union.⁴⁴

Leading hard-liners tried to capitalise on these widespread concerns about the damage being done to national security at home and abroad. In June 1991, Kriuchkov described the country as being 'on the edge of catastrophe' and in danger of becoming a second-rank power, vulnerable to a predatory West.⁴⁵ The depth and extent of discontent within the security establishment helped encourage the putschists to think they could enlist sufficient numbers of the traditionally non-praetorian Soviet military to support drastic measures against the Gorbachev leadership. In this sense, international developments had an indirect hand in the making of the August coup. But they also contributed to its undoing. The putschists overestimated the degree to which patriotic clarion calls would rally the military behind a coup. In the event, there were enough officers who supported perestroika, or saw in Yeltsin the best hope for the restoration of order, to shift the balance of forces against the hard-liners.⁴⁶ The effect of the coup was to accelerate precisely those developments it had meant to avert: its failure opened the way for the victory of the radicals and for the final collapse of the USSR.

43 Kriuchkov interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, *Zavtra* [Tomorrow], No. 14, April 1994; Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, II, 24–25.

44 Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army*, 230, and Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, 277–79, 281–85, 292–304.

45 Kriuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, II, 387–92; and Knight, 'The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union', 77–78.

46 Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army*, 229; and John P. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 247–54.



26. The August 1991 coup against Mikhail Gorbachev failed, and Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president, was the hero of the hour. Here Yeltsin is defying the coup-makers from atop a tank in front of the parliament building.

Western benevolence without benefaction

In the atmosphere of growing crisis that marked the second act of the Soviet collapse, there was a qualitative shift in the nature of Western engagement.⁴⁷ Developments in the USSR became the focus of ever greater attention and activity in the capitals of the G7 major industrial powers. At the Moscow end, there was growing interest in dialogue and co-operation not only on international questions, but also on matters bearing directly on the domestic scene.

The most intensive dialogue and engagement developed around problems besetting the Soviet economy. From 1989, industrial production began to fall, shortages increased, rationing became widespread, and there was large-scale labour unrest in Russia and Ukraine. In the course of 1990, the economic crisis deepened and assumed growing importance in the struggle between Moscow and the republics: in October 1990, the Russian parliament laid claim to assets on its territory.⁴⁸

47 For an incisive analysis, see Celeste Wallander, 'Western Policy and the Demise of the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 4 (2003), 137–77.

48 Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy*, 228–31.

With the economic crisis making him ever more vulnerable to political attacks from conservatives and radicals, Gorbachev turned for help to his newfound Western friends. Bonn agreed to a package of around DM 15 billion as part of the overall settlement on unification, though relatively little of this was available to tackle urgent economic needs.⁴⁹ Moscow had long relied on substantial agricultural imports from the West, but no longer had sufficient energy export revenues with which to pay for these. Gorbachev had to contend with falling world prices and declining domestic production.⁵⁰ In the unfavourable international economic climate, Western banks became more risk-averse and reduced lending to Moscow. It was to the Americans, as leaders of the G7, that Gorbachev turned for substantial help to relieve the symptoms of the economic crisis; he asked for support in the order of \$15–\$20 billion.⁵¹

Bush firmly adhered to the policy that no large sums could be extended to the Soviet Union unless Moscow introduced serious market reform.⁵² Conditionality of this kind was unhelpful to Gorbachev, who was trying to steer a centrist economic and political course. In the fragile political situation, the risks of radical reform bringing more social disruption seemed excessive, especially to a leader who had fundamental doubts about moving rapidly to a liberal market economy. A nervous Gorbachev shifted uneasily between radical and conservative positions – the result was a series of hybrid reform plans that caused confusion at home and dismay among potential foreign donors.⁵³ Western leaders might have made a more helpful contribution had they pressed the Kremlin to phase in a less ambitious market reform programme, along the lines advocated by some West German bankers.⁵⁴

Gorbachev saw much of the talk about the need for market reform as reflecting American insensitivity and lack of real willingness to help.⁵⁵ The G7 leaders, including the more sympathetic West Europeans, were decidedly unimpressed by the Soviet anti-crisis programme presented at the July 1991

49 Angela E. Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 138–39.

50 Revenues from oil fell by around a third between 1984 and 1987; see Egor Gaidar, *Gibel' imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2006), 237; for production and prices, see 190–96, 234–35, 281–88.

51 Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 249–54.

52 Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 276.

53 Jerry F. Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 352–72.

54 Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 86.

55 Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London and New York: Doubleday, 1995), 612.

London summit.⁵⁶ Disappointed by the failure of his personal relations with Western leaders to yield returns, Gorbachev tried to make a more pragmatic case for major aid. As he told Bush in July 1991, if the United States was prepared to spend \$100 billion on regional problems (the Gulf), why was it not ready to expend similar sums to help sustain perestroika, which had yielded enormous foreign-policy dividends, including unprecedented Soviet support in the Middle East?⁵⁷ But such appeals fell on deaf ears. Not even the relatively modest \$30 billion package suggested by American and Soviet specialists – comparable to the scale of Western aid commitments to Eastern Europe – found political favour.⁵⁸

Frustrated by the West's unwillingness to reward foreign-policy favours, Gorbachev set increasing store by the basic common interest that bound them together: the need to avoid the disintegration of the USSR. His concern to retain Western support helped to reinforce a determination, even after the August putsch, to salvage some form of union.⁵⁹ He hoped that his commitment to keeping the country together would secure Western support in his struggle against Yeltsin and those who wanted to break up the USSR. He became increasingly anxious about the West shifting its support to his political arch-rival. At the same time, Gorbachev tried to use the Western card to strengthen his hand at home, arguing to the end that the disintegration of the union would be unacceptable to the international community.⁶⁰

Could the West have used its resources, material and political, more effectively to have exercised greater influence on the second act of the Soviet collapse? It is unlikely that even very large sums would have diverted the drama from its ultimate course. Still, substantial aid made available in early 1991 might have given Gorbachev some political respite and could conceivably have altered the way in which the drama played out.

If we consider the broad canvas of how the international dimension of the perestroika project figured in its domestic development, we see a mixed picture. In one sense, Gorbachev's initial plan worked: a liberal and concessionary foreign policy did create the kind of benign international environment

56 Rodric Braithwaite, *Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 298–300; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Understanding Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2006), 318–22.

57 Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, 356–57; and Yevgeny Primakov, *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 79–82.

58 Primakov, *Russian Crossroads*, 79–80.

59 Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, 303–04; Gorbachev, *Poniat' perestroiku*, 346–51.

60 Grachev, *Final Days*, 20, 74–75, 107; Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 666–68.

that made it easier to undertake radical and risky domestic reform. Bringing an end to Cold War confrontation and dismantling the traditional Soviet ‘fortress’ removed some of the obstacles to building the ‘temple’⁶¹ of the modern socialist system which Gorbachev envisaged. But another dynamic came into play which the authors of perestroika failed to anticipate. The unintended consequences in Eastern Europe of the liberal turn in foreign policy helped to catalyse centrifugal pressures within the USSR; and these in turn reduced the Kremlin’s capacity to manage the perestroika process. At the same time, East European as well as Western politicians exercised a calming influence on the struggle between the centre and the republics, by impressing on both sides the need to proceed cautiously and avoid the use of force. Taken together, these different international effects helped to make the Soviet collapse both a remarkably rapid and peaceful process.

61 For Gorbachev’s use of this term, see Grachev, *Final Days*, 64.

Science, technology, and the Cold War

DAVID REYNOLDS

History has seen many ferocious ideological conflicts, including the Crusades and the sixteenth-century Wars of Religion. What made the Cold War peculiarly dangerous and ubiquitous was the power of modern technology, most obviously nuclear weapons. But other new technologies were equally central: out of a vast range this chapter looks particularly at transistors, satellites, and computers. On both sides, the Cold War spawned massive military-industrial complexes, but the American version was much better integrated with the larger economy and society. The Soviet system, by contrast, suppressed the civilian economy and restricted the flow of information. In the short term, this enabled the Soviet Union to punch above its economic weight as a military power. By the 1980s, however, technology and information had become the Soviet Achilles heel.

The varieties of 'Big Science'

'When history looks at the twentieth century', wrote the American physicist Alvin Weinberg in 1961, 'she will see science and technology as its theme; she will find in the monuments of Big Science', such as huge rockets and particle accelerators, 'symbols of our time just as surely as she finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages.'¹

Weinberg helped popularise 'Big Science' as a catchphrase of the 1960s. Although hard to define precisely, the term signified a combination of big money, big equipment, and big teams, focused on a few key areas of activity and fusing pure science, technology, and engineering. Big Science was not an entirely postwar phenomenon – in the 1930s, some German and American companies already had large industrial research departments – but it took the

¹ Alvin M. Weinberg, 'Impact of Large Scale Science on the United States', *Science*, 134, 21 July 1961, 161.

Second World War and the Cold War to introduce the crucial element of big government. The state became the pre-eminent patron of scientific research largely because of the new imperatives of national security, and this was particularly true for the two superpowers. The locus of research varied: the Soviet Union, France, and West Germany favoured specialist institutes, whereas the United States and Britain kept it mostly within government laboratories and universities (thereby encouraging a symbiosis of teaching and research). In these varied forms, the governmental-industrial-academic complex was the motor of Big Science for most of the Cold War era.

This chapter centres on the United States and the Soviet Union. Before 1940, federal funding for research and development (R&D) was small, and mostly agricultural. All this changed with the Second World War, when the US government mobilised the nation's universities and R&D labs on a contract basis. The atomic bomb became the most celebrated project, but its price tag of some \$2 billion was two-thirds of that for radar (\$3 billion). The technological spin-offs from the latter were immense: as we shall see, the transistor had as big an effect on the Cold War as the bomb. Equally important, thousands of scientists had been moved by government from nuclear and particle physics – the 'sexy' subjects of the 1930s – into solid-state physics and related fields.

The US government's Office of Scientific Research and Development was wound up at the end of the war, but the valedictory report by its head, Vannevar Bush, left a marker for the future. Entitled *Science: The Endless Frontier*, it established the idea that 'basic research' was 'the pacemaker of technological progress', for which much of the future funding had to come from Uncle Sam.² The 'laboratories of America have now become our first line of defense', Secretary of War Robert Patterson declared in October 1945. Each service sponsored a plethora of big R&D projects in universities and industry, even before the Soviet atomic test and the Korean War in 1949–50 made the Cold War a paramount issue of national security. By 1956, defence projects constituted more than half of all spending on industrial R&D in the United States.³

The humiliation of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957 pushed American funding to new levels. Aeronautics and electronics were the prime beneficiaries,

2 Vannevar Bush, *Science: The Endless Frontier – A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research*, July 1945 (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation reprint, 1960), 19.

3 Paul Forman, 'Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940–1960', *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences*, 18 (1987), esp. 152–53 and 156.

but many areas of science were transformed, among them oceanography and materials science. Although direct military sponsorship of R&D became relatively less important after 1960, it remained at roughly the same level in real terms through the 1970s and 1980s. What was new was the emergence of other federal funders such as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and especially the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which accounted for about half of federal R&D by the 1970s. Most of their sponsorship was for national security and status in a broad sense, and it resulted in other vast programmes in the 1980s, such as the \$2 billion Hubble Space Telescope. Whereas federal spending had amounted to only 1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 1929, the proportion was nearly 17 per cent in 1953 – much of it defence-related.⁴

But although government funding shaped whole areas of scientific research in the United States, several qualifications must be made. First, scientists were not mere servants of the military. Shrewd scientist-politicians like Frederick Terman at Stanford and John Slater at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) were able to advance their own research goals by packaging them attractively for military-industrial sponsors. Secondly, there was extensive, if erratic, civilian spin-off from military-funded research. Co-operation between scientists and business on government projects spawned the Stanford Industrial Park (1951), the precursor of Silicon Valley, and the network of high-tech companies around MIT's labs along Route 128 around Boston. By the 1960s, the federal government was also spreading its funding more broadly to start-up companies as well as to established giants like Lockheed or International Business Machines (IBM). This highlights the third and most significant point: the United States had a thriving capitalist economy, geared predominantly to consumer markets at home and abroad. Defence industries became an important part of the domestic economy, often pioneering innovation, but they never dominated. By the mid-1950s, the United States, with only 6 per cent of the earth's population, was producing and consuming over one-third of its goods and services. GNP rose by half in real terms during the decade. Even in the rundown mining area of Harlan County, Kentucky – one of the United States' poorest areas – 67 per cent of homes had a television and 59 per cent had a car.⁵ This was a far cry from the Soviet Union, which boasted the world's most enormous yet narrowest military-industrial-academic complex.

4 William E. Leuchtenburg, *A Troubled Feast: American Society since 1945* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 47.

5 James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle against Poverty, 1900–1981* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 80.

State control of science was not invented by the Bolsheviks, who built on tsarist practice. Their structure of research institutes also drew on elitist German models. What was novel about Stalinist Big Science was the *extent* of state control and of elite isolation. The regime needed scientific innovation to enhance national wealth and security; yet such innovation depends on unfettered critical discussion of a sort that is potentially subversive in a closed society. This was Stalin's dilemma, and it helps explain why so many Soviet scientists and engineers were purged and imprisoned. It also dictated the deliberate physical segregation of Soviet scientists in research institutes and special closed cities of the 'white archipelago' of nuclear plants. In consequence, Soviet physics was 'an island of intellectual autonomy in the totalitarian state . . . the closest thing to civil society in the Stalinist regime' – from whose ranks dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov would eventually spring.⁶

Tight controls on civilian consumption enabled the Soviets to concentrate on military production. And centralised control of manpower and resources facilitated major projects such as aeronautics, space, nuclear weapons, and hydro-electric power. In these areas, the Soviet Union was able to match the United States. But there was a double price to be paid for segregating scientists. First, they were cut off from university teaching, with the result that Soviet science had to live off the intellectual capital of men educated in the era of relative international openness before the Bolshevik Revolution. Those scientists retired and died in the 1960s and 1970s, to be replaced by juniors formed in a Stalinist mould that excluded whole areas of science as bourgeois, cosmopolitan fallacies. Genetics was the most notorious example, but cybernetics and quantum physics were also under a cloud in the late Stalin years. Secondly, scientists were also isolated from ordinary industry. In 1982, only 3 per cent of Soviet research scientists with the *kandidat* degree (roughly equivalent to an American doctorate) were employed by industrial plants. Moreover, the lack of a thriving consumer economy full of opportunities for entrepreneurship reduced the scope for commercial development of military-funded innovations, particularly in the critical sectors of computers and information technology in general.⁷

6 David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 363.

7 Loren R. Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 180. More generally, see two related volumes of essays: Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davies (eds.), *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).

'The Cold War', writes science historian Nikolai Krementsov, 'gave defining meaning to two systems of Big Science, two mutually isolated but inter-dependent creatures, each almost unthinkable without the other.'⁸ In the McCarthyite 1950s, American Big Science had many similarities with Soviet practice: major government institutions like Los Alamos formed their own 'white archipelago'. But, overall, the United States was a far more complex economy and a much more open society. Civilian spin-off from military-funded research was frequent and extensive, and most new technologies gradually freed themselves from the handcuffs of Uncle Sam – the transistor and the computer being notable examples. In short, although both super-powers undertook Big Science on a massive scale, the technologies that shaped the late twentieth century were the products of capitalism, not Communism, and that proved enormously important for the outcome of the Cold War.

Transistors and the revolution in electronics

The computer revolution offers a good example of how a vital technology fuelled the Cold War, but also developed a trajectory and momentum of its own, particularly in the capitalist West.

Electronic computers were another spin-off from the Second World War. They were made possible by expertise and technology from the vast British and American radar projects; they were made necessary by the massive and speedy mathematical calculations required in technowar. By the end of 1943, the British government was using an electronic calculator, Colossus, to crack German ciphers at its Bletchley Park code-breaking centre. The first stored-programme computers were built and tested in England in 1948–49. These pioneering machines were essentially mathematical instruments, designed for complicated calculations. During the 1950s, however, their successors were developed as massive data-processors, to replace desk calculators or punched-card systems. They were produced in a big way in the United States by Remington Rand and especially International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) which, by 1964, accounted for 70 per cent of the worldwide inventory of computers, with a value totalling \$10 billion.⁹

8 Nikolai Krementsov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 290.

9 Emerson W. Pugh, *Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 296.

In part, IBM won out through superior customer support and heavy investment in R&D. But government contracts, particularly for the military, made a crucial contribution to establishing IBM as the industry's giant in the quarter-century after the Second World War. Over half of IBM's revenues from electronic data processing in the 1950s came from its analog guidance computer for the B-52 bomber and from the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defence system – at around \$8 billion, the largest and most expensive military project of the 1950s. In 1955, about 20 per cent of IBM's 39,000 American employees were working on it.¹⁰

Yet SAGE is a neglected Cold War story.¹¹ After the Soviet nuclear test in 1949, US Air Force (USAF) planners were alarmed at the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet air attack. To co-ordinate information from radar all over North America, a vast and very sophisticated computing system was needed – operating in real time, extremely reliable, and around the clock. The USAF turned first to MIT, establishing a special research programme there in 1951, which became the famous Lincoln Laboratory near Route 128. Once MIT had designed a feasible system and tested a prototype on Cape Cod, south of Boston, IBM won the contract to build and run the computers for the whole system. The first SAGE direction centre became operational in July 1958, but the whole system was not fully deployed until 1963 – involving twenty-four separate centres, each with two identical computers to permit servicing and prevent any system collapse. Each computer had 60,000 vacuum tubes and occupied an acre of floor space. Later, the vacuum tubes were replaced with magnetic cores, vastly enhancing speed and reliability. SAGE thereby pioneered the random-access core memory that within a few years was routine in all commercial computers. Apart from the financial benefits, SAGE also gave thousands of IBM engineers and programmers their basic training in the business. The experience gained was fully utilised when IBM was asked in 1957 to design a computerised reservations system for American Airlines. Little wonder that Thomas J. Watson, the company's head, claimed: 'It was the Cold War that helped IBM make itself the king of the computer business.'¹² Not until 1959 did IBM's revenues from commercial

10 Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 82–90.

11 On SAGE, see the special issue of *Annals of the History of Computing*, 5,4 (October, 1983), 319–403, and Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), ch. 3.

12 Thomas J. Watson, Jr., and Richard Petre, *Father and Son, & Co.: My Life at IBM and Beyond* (London: Bantam Press, 1990), 230–33.

electronic computers exceed those from SAGE and other military computing projects.¹³

In April 1964, IBM unveiled its System 360 'family' of computers and peripherals, all using the same software. By the end of the decade, it had captured three-quarters of the world market for mainframe computers. This great leap forward in technology was partly the result of refining the magnetic core memory developed for SAGE. But even more important was the revolution in electronics that made possible, first, the transistor and, then, integrated circuits. Again, the Cold War proved a critical catalyst.

The vacuum tubes used in early televisions and computers were large, fragile, and expensive. But a substitute emerged from wartime work on radar, where electronic tubes could not be used for microwave detection – hence the development of crystals such as germanium and silicon as semiconductors. After the war, Bell Laboratories – the research arm of the telecommunications giant AT&T – employed this wartime knowledge and many radar scientists in the search for a solid-state amplifier. At the end of June 1948, Bell unveiled a prototype called 'the Transistor', but the announcement was overshadowed by the start of the Berlin blockade. A brief story was relegated to the back of the *New York Times* under the heading 'News of Radio'.¹⁴

Although the first transistor radios were on sale by 1954, the new technology took time to catch on. The industry gradually moved from craft methods – rows of women workers using tweezers – to mass production and, in raw materials, from germanium to the more robust silicon. By 1960, the platform for a commercial industry had been built. But the industry would not have reached that point without military assistance. The transistor was hugely attractive to the armed forces because they needed reliable, lightweight guidance and communications systems in ships, planes, and guided missiles. By 1953, the US military was funding half of Bell Labs' R&D in transistors. Even more important, it provided large and secure markets. The proportion of US semiconductor production for military use rose from 35 per cent in 1955 to a peak of nearly 48 per cent in 1960. In 1963, transistor sales to the military were worth \$119 million, to industry \$92 million, and only \$41 million to the consumer.¹⁵

By the 1960s, the military was spreading its money more widely, to smaller, specialist firms such as Fairchild Semiconductor and Texas Instruments. These

13 Pugh, *Building IBM*, 326, Appendix D. 14 *New York Times*, 1 July 1948, 46.

15 Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 80.

companies were another sign of the porous nature of the military-industrial-academic complex in the United States (unlike the Soviet Union), and they were also the motor for the next phase in solid-state technology. Between them, Texas and Fairchild pioneered miniaturisation, replacing separate transistorised components linked in circuits with a single integrated circuit in one piece (or chip) of germanium. The first chips were marketed in 1961. By the end of the decade integrated circuits had become the norm in electronic components such as digital watches, which flooded the consumer market in the 1970s. But once again, Cold War funding and demand helped at the crucial start-up stage – until 1967 the US military was taking over 50 per cent of chip production, much of it for the new space race.¹⁶

Satellites and the revolution in communications

Despite more or less keeping up with the United States in testing nuclear weapons, the Soviets had lagged far behind in delivery systems. By the late 1950s, the USSR was threatened not only by the B-52 intercontinental bombers of the United States' Strategic Air Command, but also by aircraft and medium-range missiles located in Britain, Germany, and other allied countries. By contrast, the United States seemed immune from attack – that is, until Sputnik. On 4 October 1957, a Soviet R-7 missile from the Kazakh desert launched the world's first artificial earth satellite. Although only the size of a grapefruit, its eerie 'ping-ping' became familiar to radio listeners around the world. On 3 November, another satellite put a dog, Laika, into space for ten days. On the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, a few days after this second launch, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in per capita output within fifteen years.

Sputnik was a huge blow to American technological pride. In September 1958, the National Defense Education Act authorised \$1 billion over seven years in loans, fellowships, and grants to 'help develop as rapidly as possible those skills essential to the national defense'.¹⁷ The following month saw the start of operations for a lavishly funded civilian National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Initially, the United States floundered. Its highly

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁷ Barbara Barksdale Clowes, *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and National Defense Education Act of 1958* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 162.



27. A model of Sputnik in the Soviet pavilion at the Brussels World's Fair, 1958: briefly, the Soviet leaders could trumpet the superiority of their system.

publicised satellite launch on 6 December 1957 got a few feet off the ground from Florida's Cape Canaveral before the US Navy's giant Vanguard rocket sank back to earth in a ball of fire. Pictures of 'Flopnik' were beamed around the world. The Soviet programme, masterminded by Sergei P. Korolev, maintained its lead by launching the first satellite to orbit the moon on the second anniversary of Sputnik in October 1959. And, on 12 April 1961, Iurii Gagarin became the first man to orbit the earth. The handsome young cosmonaut, with his telegenic smile, became a national and international hero.

Soviet 'firsts' in space convinced many around the world that, just as Khrushchev boasted, the Soviet Union had eclipsed the United States technologically. But the reality was very different. The day after Gagarin was received in triumph at the Kremlin, Sir Frank Roberts, the British ambassador in Moscow, had to drive to Leningrad – seven hundred kilometres away. There were only two filling stations en route. At the one where Roberts stopped, the automatic pumps had failed. While the staff filled his Rolls Royce by hand, Roberts reflected on Gagarin's flight and savoured the irony.¹⁸ The story graphically illustrated the civilian price for Soviet Big Science: rockets beat the automobile hands down.

American humiliation in the space race in 1957 had more to do with rivalry between the army and navy than between the superpowers. Once resources and energies were focused in a single programme, the United States caught up. And the space race provided a massive new market for transistors and then chips. By January 1962, the United States had launched sixty-three payloads into space, the Soviet Union only fifteen.¹⁹ Although Soviet and American publicists concentrated on the human cargoes, what really mattered in the Cold War were the satellite launches. Although U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union came to an end in May 1960 after Gary Powers was shot down over the Urals, from August, the Discoverer satellite program started to provide even better intelligence. The first twenty-pound roll of film captured a million square miles of the Soviet Union. This, said one analyst from the US Central Intelligence Agency later, was 'more coverage in one capsule than the combined four years of U-2 coverage'.²⁰

The Soviets soon followed suit, however. Between 1957 and 1989, a total of 3,196 satellites and space vehicles were launched. Of these, 2,147 were Soviet and 773 American; Japan was in third place with a mere 38. About 60 per cent of the launches were military, and one-third were 'spy satellites' for photo reconnaissance.²¹ The superbly detailed intelligence thereby gained enabled each superpower to keep watch on the other, and provided essential re-assurance for their more stable relationship after the Cuban crisis of 1962.

18 Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War* (London: Bantam Press, 1998), 162.

19 Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 272.

20 Dino Brugioni, quoted in Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 250.

21 These and other figures for satellites from Desmond King Hele et al., (eds.), *The RAE Table of Earth Satellites 1958–1989*, 4th ed. (Farnborough, UK: Royal Aircraft Establishment, 1990), iv–vii.

In January 1967, they signed the Outer Space Treaty, which banned 'nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction' from space, the moon, and 'other celestial bodies'. Although both governments continued research into anti-satellite weapons as a safeguard, their consensus on the peaceful use of space was not breached during the Cold War.

Because space was not a battleground, satellite technology could also be used for civilian benefit. Again, the military pioneered the way. The US Army's Tiros series of weather satellites, first launched in 1960, transformed meteorological information and prediction. When Hurricane Camille hit Florida in August 1969, it caused \$1.5 billion in property damage, but only 260 lives were lost because of evacuation thanks to satellite early warning. The Soviets had their own meteorological system operating by the end of the 1960s. One of the biggest spin-offs from satellites was in navigation systems. These were pioneered in the 1960s for military use, and full development occurred only at the end of the Cold War. But, in December 1993, the first Global Positioning System became operational, with twenty-four satellites, transforming the movement of freight and people.

The greatest effect of satellites, however, was on communications. In October 1945, Arthur C. Clarke predicted that versions of the V-2 rockets that Germany had rained down on London could be used to launch 'artificial satellites' which, properly positioned, could relay radio and television coverage to the whole planet.²² Clarke would later make his name with science-fiction classics such as *2001: A Space Odyssey*, but his visions were grounded in wartime service on radar. Yet, even he did not expect them to be realised for at least fifty years; in fact, the first communications satellite, Score 1, was launched by the US Army Signal Corps in December 1958, little more than a year after Sputnik. As Clarke admitted in the early 1990s, 'the political accident of the Cold War is really what powered our drive into space. If it had been a peaceful world, we might not even have the airplane, let alone landed on the moon.'²³

In 1960, NASA offered to launch private satellites at cost, provided clients shared their results. The communications giant AT&T quickly signed up, and on 10 July 1962 Telstar 1, a mere 88 centimetres in diameter, accomplished the first trans-Atlantic television transmission from a ground station in Maine to stations in Britain and France. In November 1963, John F. Kennedy's funeral

22 Arthur C. Clarke, 'Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio Coverage?', *Wireless World*, 51 (October 1945), 304–08.

23 Interview quoted in William J. Walker, *Space Age* (New York: Random House, 1992), 218.

was beamed live to Europe, Japan, and parts of North Africa. Nine months later, in August 1964, the Olympic Games in Tokyo were broadcast live across the Pacific. In that same month, the International Communications Consortium (Intelsat) was established by fourteen countries. By 1975, Intelsat had eighty-three members – half the United Nations.

The Cold War was profoundly affected by satellite broadcasting. Historic turning points such as President Richard M. Nixon's China odyssey in 1972 and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 derived their international impact from live television images. But although satellites internationalised television news, they also made it more intensely national by opening up all areas of a vast country to official television. The Soviet Union was the first to grasp the potential. Its Ekran satellites, combined with some 3,000 ground stations, spread national television across Siberia and the Soviet Far East. By the mid-1980s, over 90 per cent of the population could receive at least one channel.²⁴ National satellites subsequently enabled some of Asia's huge developing countries, particularly China, to enlarge their national television network. Although satellites served a similar function in large Western countries – Telesat Canada opened up the country's remote north – it was particularly in authoritarian states that its role in nation-building was significant. Television became the favoured 'transmission belt' for conveying government propaganda to the masses, though most people became inured to yet more programmes about the heroism of labour or the latest five-year plan. In the United States, there was, unusually, no government broadcasting system, but the three big American networks imposed an increasingly monochromatic diet. On both sides of the divide, the Cold War depended for much of its potency on the relatively controlled nature of the mass media. The cable revolution in television news, allowing much greater diversity of information and debate, did not really take hold until after the Cold War was over. In 1965, the three big American networks took 90 per cent of the prime-time audience. In 1995, their share was still 60 per cent.²⁵

Satellites, therefore, internationalised the mass medium of television, but also nationalised it during the Cold War era. Yet, they were only part of a larger revolution in telecommunications in the postwar world.

24 Robert W. Campbell, 'Satellite Communications in the USSR', *Soviet Economy*, 1 (1985), 315–16.

25 Joseph R. Dominick, Barry L. Sherman, and Gary A. Copeland, *Broadcasting/Cable and Beyond: An Introduction to Modern Electronic Media*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993), 68, 125.

In most European countries, post, telephone, and telegraph (PTT) services were under the control of a government department, and this model had been exported to the developing world. PTT services, even more than television, were essential to national communications and vital for national security. Control of them also enabled governments to play 'Big Brother' through mail censorship and phone tapping. Such surveillance was routine in Communist or authoritarian states, but most Western governments during the Cold War also kept PTT services under close control. The Federal Bureau of Investigation under J. Edgar Hoover was notorious for its extensive phone tapping. The United States did not have a government-run phone network, but the American Telephone and Telegraph Company had enjoyed an effective monopoly since the 1930s. It operated the only long-distance network, its subsidiary Western Electric made most of the phones and equipment, and its research arm, Bell Labs, developed the essential technologies. The survival of this monopoly, despite anti-trust actions by the US Justice Department, was the result of the Pentagon's need for a single organisation with all these capabilities that was at the beck and call of the US government. In the late 1940s, the US military accounted directly for 15 per cent of Bell Labs' budget.²⁶ In 1970, AT&T was the largest corporation in the world. It had \$53 billion in assets, generated \$2.5 billion in net income, and employed over 1 million workers.²⁷

Demand for international communications also increased with the growth of world trade and travel. In 1956, the first trans-Atlantic telephone cable (TAT 1) was inaugurated. Two cables ran 2,000 miles from Scotland to Newfoundland, providing thirty-five phone circuits in each direction. Three years later, TAT 2 linked Newfoundland with France. These coaxial cables were a vast improvement on shortwave radio for international phone calls, but they in turn were overtaken by satellites. Intelsat I ('Early Bird'), launched in 1965, had circuits for 240 simultaneous calls; Intelsat IV (1971) boasted 2,000. Over this period, the cost of each circuit fell from around \$20,000 a year to \$700.²⁸ In due course, optical fibres – with their vast bandwidth and complete freedom from electromagnetic interference – offered an even better alternative.

26 Daniel J. Kevles, 'Korea, Science, and the State', in Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (eds.), *Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 314.

27 Peter Temin, with Louis Galambos, *The Fall of the Bell System: A Study in Prices and Profits* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 10.

28 Günter Paul, *The Satellite Spin Off: The Achievements of Space Flight*, transl. by Alan Lacy and Barbara Lacy (New York: Robert B. Luce, 1975), 53–58.

The first trans-Atlantic optical cable, TAT 8, was opened in December 1988. Capable of handling 40,000 simultaneous phone conversations, the system doubled existing trans-Atlantic cable capacity and constituted a serious rival to satellites.²⁹ But this was not until the very end of the Cold War.

In most developed countries, telephone coverage soon became extensive: half the households in the United States had a phone in 1946, 90 per cent in 1970. In West Germany, the proportion rose from 12 per cent to 75 per cent between 1960 and 1980.³⁰ But, in 1985, the Soviet Union had only about one-sixth the number of household phones that the United States had, despite having 18 per cent more people. There were only 1.7 billion intercity calls, compared with 37 billion in the United States. Two-thirds of the transmission network was cable, not much of it coaxial, and, unlike the West, communications satellites carried very little civilian phone traffic. They were used mainly for Soviet television and, from the late 1970s, to transmit copies of Moscow newspapers across the country for local printing and distribution. This again illustrated the priorities of the regime.³¹ The pattern was similar across the Soviet bloc, where phone penetration averaged about 12 lines per 100 people in the late 1980s, compared to the European Community average of 37. Poland and East Germany were particularly backward.³² As in the USSR, equipment was outmoded, reception poor, and waiting lists long. Whereas in the West the emphasis was increasingly on consumerism, the Communist bloc's philosophy remained one of control.

This contrast was accentuated in the mid-1980s by the deregulation of PTT giants in the West, starting with AT&T and followed by the British and Japanese national phone systems. Motivation for these changes was complex, including pressure for more investment and the clamour of potential rivals, but at root the whole rationale of telecommunications was changing. The emphasis was no longer on providing a basic public service but on answering the needs of the new 'information society'. Improved communications were

29 John Bray, *The Communications Miracle: The Telecommunication Pioneers from Morse to the Information Superhighway* (London: Plenum Press, 1995), 289.

30 Eli Noam, Seisuke Komatsuzaki, and Douglas A. Conn (eds.), *Telecommunications in the Pacific Basin: An Evolutionary Approach* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 25–26.

31 Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet and Post-Soviet Telecommunications: An Industry under Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), esp. 15, 22, 95–102.

32 Jürgen Müller and Emilia Nyevtrikel, 'Closing the Capacity and Technology Gaps in Central and Eastern European Telecommunications', in Bjorn Wellenius and Peter A. Stern (eds.), *Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from Experience* (Aldershot, Hants: Avebury, 1996), 354–59.

deemed essential to transmit the vast amounts of data being generated by modern computers.

Computers and the revolution in information

It was in the computer that the chip found its real home.³³ Microprocessors designed originally for electronic calculators were adapted as computer memory, cutting the size and price of computers dramatically. In this technological revolution the military played no part. Far more important was the Californian youth culture of the Vietnam War era, in crucibles such as the Homebrew Computer Club at Menlo Park, on the edge of Silicon Valley. The first Apple computers – not much more than crude circuit boards – were assembled in the family garage of Steve Jobs, a college drop-out. But once Apple had democratised computer power, IBM commandeered it for corporate capitalism. Its personal computer (PC), launched in August 1981, used chips from Intel and a software-operating system from a small Seattle company called Microsoft. IBM's PC put the imprimatur of one of the world's greatest corporations on the personal computer; it was no longer a hobbyist's toy. Other companies rushed to produce 'IBM-compatible' machines, most of them sold with MS-DOS, which, by the mid-1980s, was the dominant operating system in the business and the source of half of Microsoft's annual revenue.³⁴ PC sales doubled from 724,000 in 1980 to 1.4 million in 1981, and doubled again to 2.8 million in 1982.³⁵

In consequence, the US computer market was transformed. In 1978, computer sales were worth \$10 billion, of which about three-quarters were mainframe. By 1984, the figure was over \$22 billion, of which less than half was mainframe. The computer was moving from government and corporations into small businesses and the home. In the process, the industry became much less reliant on government patronage. The federal share of computer-related R&D expenditure fell from two-thirds in the 1950s to one-fifth by the 1980s.³⁶ Without the Cold War, electronics and computing would not have developed so quickly and dramatically in the United States. But the strength of American corporate capitalism and the relative openness of American society

33 On this, see especially Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, *Computer: A History of the Information Machine* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), ch. 10.

34 Daniel Ichbiah and Susan L. Knepper, *The Making of Microsoft: How Bill Gates and His Team Created the World's Most Successful Software Company* (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1991), 93.

35 *Time*, 3 January 1983, 4. 36 Figures from Flamm, *Creating the Computer*, 238, 253.



28. Apple computer, 1983: Apple democratised computer power and demonstrated the advantages of a capitalist economy geared to consumer markets.

made possible spin-offs and cross-fertilisation that were inconceivable in the Communist world.

In January 1983, *Time* magazine gave the PC its 'man of the year' accolade – the first time in fifty-five years that a non-human had been chosen. According to *Time*: 'The "information revolution" that futurists have long predicted has arrived, bringing with it the promise of dramatic changes in the way people live and work, perhaps even in the way they think. America will never be the same again.' *Time* also quoted the Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky: 'What networks of railroads, highways and canals were in another age, networks of telecommunications, information and computerization . . . are today.'³⁷

Once again, the Cold War military played a crucial role in the genesis of information networks. The Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established after the Sputnik furore of 1957 in order to generate long-term technological programmes. One of these projects was to connect the computers of ARPA's participating institutions all over the United States. The challenges were enormous. Linking each computer to all the others by dedicated long-distance phone lines would generate astronomic bills. In any

³⁷ Statistics and quotations from *Time*, 3 January, 1983, 4.

case, their various software systems were horrendously incompatible. So the Arpanet designer, Lawrence G. Roberts, developed the 'packet-switching' method, whereby each message was broken up into small packets and sent along the best available route to be reassembled at its destination. The network was a series of nodes, each with a minicomputer to receive, transmit, and harmonise the software. By the end of 1969, four nodes were operational, but in September 1973 forty nodes were handling 2.9 million packets a day. A public demonstration of the system at an international computer conference in Washington, DC, in October 1972 put computer networking on the map.³⁸

During the 1980s, other networks were developed by government organisations such as NASA, consortia of colleges, and commercial providers. In 1983, ARPA established a set of 'protocols' enabling the various networks to interact, and this marked the beginning of the Internet – used by individuals and organisations to send electronic mail and to create sites of information. It took time to make this uncatalogued mass of electronic sites accessible. The most important innovation was the World Wide Web, spun off by a British researcher, Tim Berners-Lee, from the system he developed in 1989 for CERN, the High-Energy Physics Laboratory in Geneva. This allowed users to move from a word or phrase highlighted on the screen (hypertext) to related information on computers all over the world. The Web made the Net user-friendly for the post-Cold War era of globalisation.

The 'information society' and the end of the Cold War

For all their novelties, computers were a part of a familiar correlation in human history between knowledge and power. In other words, the capacity of governments had grown in proportion to the information at their command – about both their subjects and their enemies. As sociologist Anthony Giddens has observed, 'all states have been information societies'.³⁹ The impetus given to communications and computing by the American national security state during the Cold War fits this pattern. Furthermore, the information society was, in large part, an offshoot of capitalism. Information became a commodity, to be packaged and sold like toothpaste or automobiles – whether to big

38 Lawrence G. Roberts, 'The Arpanet and Computer Networks', in Adele Goldberg (ed.), *A History of Personal Workstations* (New York: ACM Press, 1988), 152. See generally the review essay by Roy Rosenzweig, 'Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet', *American Historical Review*, 103 (1998), 1530–52.

39 Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 178.

corporations in the early days of mainframe computing, or to the ordinary consumer when the PC came of age. Whatever the talk of its global implications, the information revolution had most effect on the capitalist West, on the United States and its Cold War allies.

In computers, the United States resisted early European challenges and maintained a dominant position, thanks especially to the global reach of IBM. In 1987, American machines commanded 60 per cent of the West European market.⁴⁰ In semiconductors, too, the United States sustained a huge lead. Its share of the world market was 61 per cent in 1979. Among the also-rans, Japan's share was 26 per cent – double that of all of Western Europe – thanks to a mixture of innovation, government support, and protectionism.⁴¹ Only near the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, did Japan overtake the United States in the world market for semiconductors.

From the point of view of *production*, therefore, computers and semiconductors were part of a familiar story of national industrial rivalry among the world's advanced states. From the perspective of *application*, however, these new technologies connected countries rather than dividing them. Together with innovations in telecommunications, such as satellites and optical fibres, they made possible the integration of the world's leading developed nations, giving capitalism a new dynamism and internationalism after the stagflation of the 1970s and the decline of the old rust-belt heavy industries. Nowhere was this more evident than in financial services, where American multinationals developed their own global networks. At the forefront was Citicorp, which ran the largest private network in the world, linking offices in ninety-four countries, transmitting 800,000 calls a month by 1985, and allowing the company to trade \$200 billion each day in foreign-exchange markets.⁴² Walter Wriston, Citicorp's chairman, claimed that 'the information standard has replaced the gold standard as the basis of world finance'.⁴³

Traditionally, markets were made by personal deals. This practice became institutionalised in the great stock exchanges and currency markets of the world's leading cities. But the information revolution began to challenge the practice of face-to-face capitalism. In 1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) was established using

40 Flamm, *Creating the Computer*, 168.

41 Figures from Braun and MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature*, 153.

42 Barney Warf, 'Telecommunications and the Globalization of Financial Services', *Professional Geographer*, 41 (1989), 261–62.

43 Quoted in Adrian Hamilton, *The Financial Revolution: The Big Bang Worldwide* (New York: Viking, 1986), 30.

20,000 miles of leased phone lines to link subscriber terminals to a central computing system which recorded prices, deals, and other information. By 1985, 120,000 terminals were connected. With 16 billion shares listed, at a total value of around \$200 billion, NASDAQ had become the third-largest stock exchange in the world, behind New York and Tokyo.⁴⁴ Computerised networks spread to other financial markets, including futures and foreign exchange, expedited by deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s. The new technologies also facilitated 24-hour trading, with the three major centres – Tokyo, London, and New York – occupying time zones that, between them, straddled the whole day.

The information revolution, therefore, lay at the heart of global capitalism's regeneration in the 1980s. This posed an acute problem for the Soviet Union and its allies. Their leaderships understood that information was power: through the appliance of their own science and through stealing it from the West, they had kept up in the arms and space races during the first half of the Cold War. But information is also deeply subversive, which is why these controlled polities insulated scientists and technologists from the rest of society, thereby denying their economies the numerous, if often serendipitous, spin-offs. It also meant that they failed to reap the benefits from information for wealth creation. By the 1980s, this had become a critical problem for the Soviet bloc.

In 1950, S. A. Lebedev produced MESM, the first electronic stored-program digital computer in continental Europe. By the early 1960s, the Soviets had manufactured about 250 second-generation versions, and a third generation started coming on stream in the mid-1970s.⁴⁵ Like Western Europe, the Soviet Union was thereafter unable to keep up technically with the Americans; unlike them, however, it did not enjoy easy access to US high technology, most of which was tightly controlled under Cold War legislation. A report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1955 warned that 'more than 200 large universal electronic computing machines are currently in operation in the United States, while in our own country, there are only three computers'.⁴⁶ Industrial espionage helped, but the result was a derivative technology, and one that lagged well behind the United States. Most Soviet mainframe designs since the 1960s were based on pirated IBM 360

44 *Ibid.*, 42–45.

45 Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union*, 256; Amann and Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union*, 214–17.

46 Slava Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 193.

architecture. In line with other Soviet innovations, moreover, the priority was military applications, followed by computer systems for government ministries. Networks, modelled on the Arpanet, were also developed, both for the government and, in the case of the Akademset, for Soviet R&D work.⁴⁷ But the weakness of the Soviet economy militated against PC development. And the West Coast computer hobby culture that nurtured entrepreneurs such as Steve Jobs and Bill Gates was inconceivable in the Soviet Union.

In microcomputers and microelectronics generally, the Soviets were inferior to their own client states such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Yet even Eastern Europe's pirated products did not compare with authentic Western versions. In 1986, the creator of the Czech Ondra micro lamented the growing penetration of Western PCs:

With these computers comes not only technology but also ideology ... Children might soon begin to believe that Western technology represents the peak and our technology is obsolete and bad ... [I]n 10 years' time it will be too late to change our children. By then they will want to change us.⁴⁸

Thus, the PC and communications revolutions posed a double challenge to the Soviet bloc – economic and ideological. Historian Charles Maier has described the East German economy in the late 1980s as being in 'a race between computers and collapse'.⁴⁹ Moscow's Twelfth Five-Year Plan of 1985 envisaged 1.3 million PCs in Soviet schoolrooms by 1995. But the Americans already had 3 million in 1985 and, in any case, the main Soviet PC, the Agat, was an inferior version of the outdated Apple II.⁵⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader from March 1985, was keenly sensitive to these problems. *Informatizatsiia* (crudely, informationisation) became a buzzword of his new era. His American interlocutor, Secretary of State George Shultz, played on this concern by periodically giving him admonitory tutorials about how the rest of the world was moving from 'the industrial age to the information age' and how only open societies could accomplish this vital transition.⁵¹

Had the Soviet bloc remained a closed system based on coal, steel, and heavy industry, it might have staggered on. But insulation was impossible.

47 Richard W. Judy, 'Computing in the USSR: A Comment', *Soviet Economy*, 2 (1986), 355–67.

48 Quoted in Karen Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 160.

49 Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 73.

50 Judy, 'Soviet Computing', 362–63.

51 George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1993), 586–91, 891–93.

Growth in the 1970s had been funded by Western loans. The result was a soaring foreign debt, which exceeded \$95 billion by 1988, and this had to be repaid or at least serviced by foreign trade.⁵² Yet Soviet bloc competitiveness was falling further behind, as North America and Western Europe transcended their 1970s crisis of capitalism by cutting heavy industry, expanding services, and developing new information technologies.⁵³ Communism now had to face the same structural problems of outdated heavy industry in a globalising market, within a system far more ossified in its command management ideology.

At the same time, the communications revolution in phones and faxes, television and radio, made it ever harder to insulate Soviet bloc citizens from evidence of the failure of their regimes and of the lifestyles of the West. The Iron Curtain could block the movement of people, but it was no barrier to the air waves that carried Western radio and television across Central and Eastern Europe. The BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, and especially Radio Free Europe were all widely heard in the East. Most of East Germany could receive West German television, likewise Austrian television in Hungary, while the Czechs could watch transmissions from both. By the 1980s, television ownership was general, and official jamming had become another casualty of détente with the West. The words and images of these programmes, not to mention the commercials, delivered a damning verdict on the Communist system. And in 1989, unlike the crises of 1956 and 1968, this information could no longer be controlled, thanks to that all-purpose weapon of revolution – the transistor radio. News of the reforms in Poland and Hungary quickly spread across the bloc, especially the opening of the Hungarian–Austrian border, which acted as a magnet for East Germans seeking their right of citizenship in the Federal Republic. And news of the fall of the Wall in November 1989 galvanised protest in Czechoslovakia and Romania. Of course, people power in the streets and divisions within the Communist leaderships were key factors in the revolutions of 1989.⁵⁴ But the speed of events owed much to the multiplier effect of modern technology. It has been aptly observed that 1989 was ‘as much the triumph of communication as the failure of Communism’.⁵⁵

52 Dawisha, *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform*, 118, 169.

53 For the revitalisation of Western and US capitalism in the 1980s, see Giovanni Arrighi’s chapter in this volume.

54 See Jacques Lévesque’s and Helga Haftendorn’s chapters in this volume.

55 James Eberle, ‘Understanding the Revolutions in Eastern Europe: A British Perspective and Prospective’, in Gwyn Prins (ed.), *Spring in Winter: The 1989 Revolutions* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 197.

Science and the dynamics of the Cold War

The Cold War is rightly identified as the nuclear age. Yet many other technologies played their part, usually stimulated and financed in their crucial early stages by military imperatives. The development of transistors miniaturised electronic components, making possible terrestrial satellites and economical computers. Satellites were vital for Cold War intelligence and also for national and international communications, both through television and phones. Computers were essential for directing complex weapons systems and managing masses of information. And computer networks linked by modern communications systems became fundamental to national security and national wealth creation.

In all these areas the United States led the way, with vast infusions of Cold War funding. The Soviet Union usually kept up: its military-industrial complex was more heavily funded and also privileged over consumer demand. The American military system, however, was integrated symbiotically into a dynamic civilian economy geared to consumer demand. Government funding, though often essential in the start-up phase, was soon eclipsed, as new technologies were refined outside the military sector and then adapted anew for Cold War use – the personal computer being a classic example. The computer revolution also brought to crisis point the information deficit in Soviet society. Both superpowers controlled and directed information – social, scientific, and technological – during the Cold War, but the Soviet Union was much more regimented than the United States. In the short term, that kept it going, but eventually the ‘iron curtain’ between its military system, on the one hand, and its civilian economy and society, on the other, was a significant factor in the Soviet collapse.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ For this use of the term ‘iron curtain’, see Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak*, 141.

Transnational organizations and the Cold War

MATTHEW EVANGELISTA

Many actors crowd the stage of Cold War history: political leaders, mass movements, economic and military forces, ideologies, technologies, cultures, and identities. The role of transnational organizations may seem minor by comparison. Yet much evidence suggests that these groups helped keep the Cold War from turning into a hot war and contributed to the peaceful resolution of the East–West conflict and the nuclear arms race that represented its most dangerous component. Transnational contacts often contributed to an atmosphere conducive to the improvement of East–West relations, and sometimes transnational activists influenced specific decisions of governments by, for example, suggesting particular initiatives to resolve conflicts or move forward stalemated negotiations.

Transnational relations have been defined as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.”¹ The concept is intended to capture the phenomenon that many have observed of ordinary citizens involving themselves in issues that used to be the exclusive preserve of governments, or promoting new issues, such as the environment or human rights, onto the agenda of interstate relations.² Such citizen-activists formed networks across borders, established sister-city relationships, and engaged in “track-two diplomacy” as an alternative to the official

1 Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.

2 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco (eds.), *Transnational Social Movements: Solidarity beyond the State* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

negotiations of government diplomats.³ The definition also encompasses regular interactions between state agents of one country and people of no official status in another, or between former and/or future government officials. During the Cold War, some government officials both in Moscow and in Washington maintained good contacts with their own transnational activists and sometimes those of the other side.⁴ Soviet and US officials alike tried to influence the activists – most notably participants in the European peace movements of the 1980s – but by and large organizations managed to maintain their independence.

The broadest coverage of transnational organizations during the Cold War would consider the role of such groups as Oxfam in disaster relief, Amnesty International in the promotion of human rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross in monitoring compliance with the laws of war. This chapter is more narrowly focused on issues of “high politics” – the military and arms-control policies of the superpowers, particularly concerning nuclear weapons, and their involvement in regional conflicts. Many of the organizations discussed included members from or maintained branches in many countries, but the efforts of those organizations were targeted primarily at the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. US and Soviet transnational activists cut a high profile in this account, but citizens of other countries figure as well.

In the context of the Soviet Union, the notion of a “nonstate agent” is somewhat problematic, given the dominant role of the Communist Party in the country’s political life and its supervision over all foreign contacts. Yet even organizations whose Soviet members required official approval of the Communist Party provided opportunities for informal exchange of ideas that deviated from and in some cases ultimately influenced official policy. On the US side as well, many participants in nongovernmental organizations who were acting ostensibly as individuals maintained close ties to, and sometimes sought approval from, their government. For both the US and Soviet governments, the high-level contacts typically enhanced the credibility of these otherwise “ordinary citizens.”

3 These activities were so widespread by the late 1980s that the Center for Innovative Diplomacy in California began publishing a quarterly *Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy* to report on them. On the Soviet case, see David D. Newsom (ed.), *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); and Gale Warner and Michael Shuman, *Citizen Diplomats* (New York: Continuum, 1987).

4 A good example on the US side is Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

Numerous organizations constituted the network of transnational relations during the Cold War. Some adopted names explicitly, even ponderously, describing their activities: the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat; the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Others went by more mysterious names, often meaningful to few beyond the participants themselves: Chautauqua, Dartmouth, Pugwash.

Origins of East–West transnationalism

The heyday of transnational influence on Soviet foreign and security policy came during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the second half of the 1980s. Some important initiatives, however, date back to the mid-1950s, with the death of Iosif Stalin and the onset of the thaw associated with his successor Nikita Khrushchev.⁵ For the *shestidesiatniki*, the “children of the sixties” inspired by Khrushchev-era reformist politics, two events signaled the opening to the outside world and the possibility for forging transnational contacts. They represented themes that persisted throughout the rest of the Cold War era: the importance of recognizing a common humanity and the value of maintaining nongovernmental communication across international borders. The first event was a visit to Moscow State University in June 1955 by Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India, and representative of the newly emerging Non-Aligned movement. Nehru's linking of the “question of peace to the preservation and progress of all human civilization” made a big impression on a young law student in attendance named Mikhail Gorbachev.⁶ The second event was the World Festival of Youth, held in Moscow during the summer of 1957. In the words of Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law and then editor of *Komsomol' skaia pravda*, the newspaper of the Young Communist League, “if the first of these” events – the visit of Nehru – “personified the new, ‘open’ diplomacy, the second was a step towards an open society, a manifestation of the faith of youth in a better future and the faith in youth” on the part of the authorities.⁷ Another Russian observer explained that the festival “was significant in that it allowed

⁵ See David Priestland's chapter in volume I.

⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms], 2 vols. (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. I, 73.

⁷ Aleksei Adzhubei, *Te desiat' let* [Those Ten Years] (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1989), 119 (emphasis added for clarity).

Muscovites to see and even speak with foreigners for the first time in decades.”⁸ In fact, wrote the historian Roi Medvedev, it was the first time “in the history of the USSR that so many guests from other countries had come to Moscow,” and the event left a strong impression in the memories of the city’s residents.⁹

Hopes for such broad-scale contacts between ordinary people were ultimately disappointed, but a certain sector of the Soviet elite did manage to pursue relations with their foreign counterparts. In 1958, for example, the journal *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Problems of peace and socialism) was founded in Prague with an international editorial staff of European, US, and Third World Communists. The Soviet members of the staff who edited the journal in the early 1960s read as a *Who’s Who* of reformist officials and academics who became Gorbachev’s brain trust in the second half of the 1980s: Georgii Arbatov, Oleg Bogomolov, Anatolii Cherniaev, Gennadii Gerasimov, and Georgii Shakhnazarov, among many others.¹⁰ Contacts with foreigners, even if fellow Communists, opened the eyes and minds of the Soviet participants and made them early supporters of ending the Cold War and the arms race.

The post-Stalin era also witnessed the birth of one of the most prominent transnational organizations, the Conference on Science and World Affairs, known as the Pugwash Movement, after the estate in Nova Scotia where it held its first meeting in 1957. It was primarily an organization of scientists interested in issues of public policy, in the first instance the US–Soviet nuclear arms race. If the post-Stalin thaw provided the political preconditions for a transnational dialogue of scientists, developments in nuclear technology provided the stimulus. By 1954, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed and tested thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs or H-bombs), with the potential for explosive power thousands of times greater than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Responding to the alarm caused by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests, Prime Minister Nehru “called

8 Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 140.

9 R. Medvedev, “N. S. Khrushchev, god 1957-i – ukreplenie pozitsii” [N. S. Khrushchev, 1957: A Strengthening Position], originally published in *Argumenty i fakty* [Arguments and Facts], no. 25 (1988), reprinted in Iu. V. Aksiutin (ed.), *Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev: materialy k biografii* [Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev: Materials towards a Biography] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 43–47.

10 Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), esp. 70–73; A. S. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn’ i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995).

for the setting up of a committee of scientists to explain to the world the effect a nuclear war would have on humanity.” At the same time, Bertrand Russell, the British philosopher and mathematician, began to speak out on the danger of nuclear war. He drafted a document echoing Nehru’s call for a conference of scientists “to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction.”¹¹

Russell sought endorsement of his statement from prominent fellow scientists, starting with Albert Einstein, who signed it two days before his death. The Russell–Einstein Manifesto, as it became known, attracted a great deal of attention when Russell read it at a press conference in London in July 1955. The statement urged governments “to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purposes cannot be furthered by a world war.” To fellow scientists it appealed “as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” It insisted that “we have to learn to think in a new way.”¹² The very slogan came to inspire the “new thinking” (*novoe myshlenie*) promoted by Gorbachev and his supporters three decades later. Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign minister who carried out Gorbachev’s epochal reforms, paid tribute to the Russell–Einstein Manifesto in his memoirs as “the key to the most complex and troublesome riddles of the age.”¹³

Bilateral contacts during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years

The original signatories of the manifesto, from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, and the United States, were soon joined by Soviet scientists – most prominently Academician Aleksandr Topchiev. Topchiev, a senior official in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, became head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee.¹⁴ The Soviet leadership initially favored creating an alternative international organization that would be dominated by Communists sympathetic to Soviet policies, as it sought to do at the mass level with the World Peace Council. Soon, however, Khrushchev came to appreciate the role that a transnational dialogue with independent foreign

11 Joseph Rotblat, *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), 1 and appendix 1, 137–40.

12 *Ibid.*, appendix 1, 137–40; Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto,” *Pugwash History Series*, no. 1 (May 2005).

13 Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, trans. by Catherine Fitzpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1991), 46–47.

14 V. M. Buzuev and V. P. Pavlichenko, *Uchenye predosteregaiut* [Scientists Warn Us] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 89.

scientists could play in reducing the risk of war. He also endorsed direct bilateral contacts between Soviet and US scientists. His thinking on this issue was influenced by his relationship with Leo Szilard – one of the leading atomic physicists and an immigrant to the United States from Hungary. Szilard had been in contact with Topchiev about organizing a US–Soviet discussion. In a private meeting in New York, Khrushchev promised Szilard that Topchiev would make all the necessary arrangements.¹⁵

Because illness prevented Szilard from taking an active role at this point beyond securing Khrushchev's blessing, he recommended that Topchiev deal with a group of scientists led by Paul Doty, a Harvard chemistry professor. Their efforts were supported by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which established a Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in March 1961. It became the main vehicle for promoting the bilateral discussions which became known, among the US organizers, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group or SADS. In late November 1961, Topchiev sent a cable to Doty conveying Soviet acceptance of SADS. In the meantime, the bilateral scheme nearly foundered for lack of support on the US side. The Ford Foundation, which initially expressed interest, made financial support for the venture contingent on written approval from the administration of John F. Kennedy. William Foster, the director of the newly created Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), was initially hostile to the idea of a bilateral study group. After two discussions with Doty, he offered to endorse the undertaking only if ACDA were given veto power over selection of the US participants. Doty and his colleagues were not willing to go that far. Foster eventually signed a statement, drafted essentially by Doty's committee, which fell short of an endorsement; it expressed confidence that the group would "act as responsible private citizens and scientists," but were "not official spokesmen in any sense whatever." The Ford Foundation finally awarded the grant to fund SADS in April 1963.¹⁶

¹⁵ See L. Szilard's correspondence with N. Khrushchev and his memorandum of the meeting on October 5, 1960, reprinted in Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, and Gertrud Weiss Szilard (eds.), *Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 46–48, 279–87; William Lanouette, *Genius in the Shadows* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch. 27.

¹⁶ Chronology of the activities of the Soviet–American Disarmament Study (SADS) group, compiled by Anne Cahn, and "Report on Informal Arms Control Meetings with the Soviets," Committee on International Studies of Arms Control, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, n.d. (probably between June 1964 and March 1965). I am grateful to David Wright for providing me with these and other materials from his research in the American Academy archives.

Whereas the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group emerged as a spinoff from the larger, multinational Pugwash Movement, the Dartmouth Conferences originated specifically as a bilateral US–Soviet project. The Dartmouth initiative arose from a conversation between Norman Cousins, editor of the popular *Saturday Review of Literature*, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom Cousins had first met in 1951. In Cousins’s recollection, “Eisenhower’s basic idea was that private citizens who had the confidence of their government could serve as an advanced guard for diplomats,” elucidating disagreements and exploring possible solutions that the two governments were not yet willing to accept.¹⁷ Cousins promoted the idea of such a conference on a visit to Moscow in 1959, and with subsequent Soviet agreement, the first meeting was held on the campus of Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New Hampshire, in October 1960. The Ford Foundation provided initial funding, but later the Kettering Foundation became the main institutional sponsor of the Dartmouth Conferences. Over the years, the roster of regular participants fit Eisenhower’s expectations of prominent personalities, close to their government, and there was some overlap with members of the Pugwash and SADS organizations. Given Dartmouth’s increasing focus on “task forces,” particularly to discuss regional conflicts, specialists on the Middle East, such as Evgenii Primakov and Vitalii Naumkin on the Soviet side, and Harold Saunders and Robert Neumann on the US side, were especially valuable participants. When Dartmouth meetings were held in the Soviet Union, one regular US attendee – David Rockefeller – occasionally found himself invited to visit top leaders such as Khrushchev or Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to talk about matters such as East–West trade.¹⁸

Despite Khrushchev’s forced retirement in October 1964, and the end of the thaw in Soviet culture and politics, his successors continued to support unofficial bilateral and multilateral discussions on security issues. Indeed, the first half-decade of the Leonid Brezhnev era (as we might call the period extending until Gorbachev came into office in March 1985) marked a high point in the activities of the transnational scientists’ movement. Pugwash convened some twenty-five conferences, workshops, and symposia in the five years between the end of Khrushchev’s rule and the first

17 James Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 25.

18 *Ibid.*, passim; Gennady I. Chufirin and Harold H. Saunders, “A Public Peace Process,” *Negotiation Journal*, 9, 3 (April 1993), 155–77.

session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in November 1969.¹⁹ The early Brezhnev period also witnessed the most intense bilateral interchange between Soviet and US scientists, as the Soviet–American Disarmament Study group pursued the work begun during the last year of Khrushchev’s tenure.²⁰ This era also saw what is generally considered the most impressive achievement of the transnational disarmament community: official US and Soviet acceptance of the value of mutual limitations on antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses and the ABM Treaty of 1972 that formalized that acceptance.

Western partisans of the Pugwash movement have long argued that the interchange between scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain generated important ideas that found their way into formal arms-control treaties, contributed to an improvement in East–West relations, and helped avert a nuclear war. The Norwegian Nobel Committee drew a similar conclusion when it awarded its Peace Prize to Pugwash and its longtime director, Joseph Rotblat, in 1995. Scholarly assessments have been more cautious, describing cases of success as well as failure in the Pugwash scientists’ efforts to influence Soviet and US policy.²¹

The partial opening of Soviet-era archives has allowed for some evaluation of the impact on Soviet decisionmaking of the scientists’ arguments. It has also yielded some self-assessments by Soviet Pugwashites. In September 1972, for example, Mikhail Millionshchikov, then chair of the Soviet Pugwash delegation, drafted a report to the ruling presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in anticipation of the fifteenth anniversary of the Pugwash movement. Millionshchikov clearly wanted to impress the academy officials enough to encourage them to continue sponsoring the Soviet delegation. He wrote: “In fifteen years the participants of this movement have examined many important proposals having substantial significance for the resolution of problems of disarmament and the achievement of a reduction in international tensions. Several of these proposals later became subjects of examination at

19 J. Rotblat, Appendix A, “List of Pugwash Meetings, 1957–92,” *Pugwash Newsletter* 29, 4 (May 1992).

20 On the origins of the SADS group, see Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports No. 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, October 1996).

21 For an overview of the Pugwash movement, see Metta Spencer, “‘Political’ Scientists,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 51, 4 (July/August 1995), 62–68; for an account from Russian scientists, see Yu. A. Ryzhov and M. A. Lebedev, “RAS Scientists in the Pugwash Movement,” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 75, 3 (2005), 271–77.

the government level and were used in working out international agreements and treaties.” Among the agreements that, in Millionshchikov’s view, resulted from Pugwash proposals, he lists the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the limited test-ban treaty, international agreements banning the deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor, the biological weapons convention, the ABM treaty, and SALT I.²²

Even accounting for hyperbole, Millionshchikov’s list of what he considers Pugwash’s accomplishments is impressive. Perhaps more interesting is that Millionshchikov valued Pugwash – and particularly the bilateral Soviet–American meetings – for exactly the same reasons his US colleagues did: the unofficial nature of the discussions, the importance of personal contacts, the common language and way of approaching problems that the Soviet and US scientists seemed to share, and the prospect that insights and ideas from the discussions would reach governments: “The importance of the Pugwash meetings consists precisely in the fact that a dialogue takes place there between people who know the problems well and who can unofficially inform those government bodies which deal with these problems through state-to-state channels.” He stressed the participation at past Pugwash meetings of US presidential advisers such as George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Walt Rostow, and Henry Kissinger.²³

The end of détente and the revival of transnationalism

By the beginning of the second decade of Brezhnev’s rule – the mid-1970s – the transnational activists’ successes had virtually put them out of business. Arms negotiations between the superpowers became a normal part of their relations and were handled by professional diplomats and politicians, working full-time, rather than by scientists and other “amateurs.” By the end of the 1970s, however, neither side’s expectations about détente had been fulfilled. The desire on the part of some Soviet leaders to use détente as an excuse for reducing Soviet military spending proved futile. Arms control, even at its most successful, had done little to restrain the costs of the arms race. From the perspective of the US government, attempts to use détente to impose a code

22 “Proekt (dokladnyi zapiski) v Prezidium Akademii nauk SSSR ob itogakh 15-ti letnei deiatelnosti Paguoshskogo dvizheniia uchenykh,” September 24, 1972, M. Millionshchikov papers, fond 1713, opis’ 2, delo I.5.2, no. 209, Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation.

23 *Ibid.*, esp. 5–10.

of conduct on Soviet behavior in the Third World were equally discouraging. Two events in December 1979 epitomized the dual disappointments of détente: the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a new generation of US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The sharp deterioration of East–West relations inspired the transnational amateurs to reactivate their contacts.²⁴

Participants in the Dartmouth Conferences had considerable experience of working during periods of US–Soviet tension. Indeed, one of its early meetings took place in October 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis. Topics at Dartmouth meetings over the years included the Vietnam War, US involvement in Central America, Soviet intervention in Angola, and prospects for peace in the Middle East. In the 1980s, Soviet policy in Afghanistan became a regular topic of discussion. Soviet participants came to understand the seriousness of official US concern about the matter, persuaded by US interlocutors who had earned their trust over the course of many years.²⁵

Although transnational efforts to promote disarmament slackened in the 1970s as the United States and the USSR pursued formal negotiations on arms control, many of the networks had remained in place. Doty, for example, continued to pursue discussions on arms control in the context of the Dartmouth Conferences, even as the activities of his Soviet–American Disarmament Study group ceased. Other US scientists maintained contacts with Soviet counterparts both professionally in pursuit of their scholarly research and politically as they supported colleagues, such as Andrei Sakharov, Iurii Orlov, and others, who had become persecuted as dissidents.²⁶ The deterioration of East–West relations in the late 1970s, the failure of the United States to ratify the SALT II treaty, and especially the bellicose policies of President Ronald Reagan’s administration in the early 1980s revived the transnational linkages of the past and created new ones.

During the 1980s, the main actors on the Soviet side were scientists affiliated with various institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences who formally organized themselves into the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace,

24 For background on the demise of détente in the 1970s, see the chapters in this volume by Nancy Mitchell, Olav Njølstad, and Vladislav M. Zubok.

25 Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained*.

26 Sakharov discusses the efforts of Sidney Drell, Kurt Gottfried, Jeremy Stone, and others in his *Memoirs*, trans. by Richard Lourie (New York: Knopf, 1990), and *Moscow and Beyond, 1986 to 1989*, trans. by Antonina Bouis (New York: Knopf, 1991). For Stone’s account, see Jeremy J. Stone, “Every Man Should Try”: *Adventures of a Public Interest Activist* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999).



29. Dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, after hearing that he has been awarded the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize. Soviet authorities refused permission for him to receive the award.

Against the Nuclear Threat (hereafter the Committee of Soviet Scientists) in 1983. Among the many Western organizations active in transnational efforts of scientists, the most important for security policy were the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). The latter group, founded in 1979, was a direct descendant of the bilateral SADS workshops, although most of the participants on both sides were new. In December 1980, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union officially approved contacts between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and CISAC. The Central Committee proposal was signed by the head of the Science Department and the deputy head of the International Department.²⁷ Less than five

²⁷ "O predvaritel'nykh peregovorakh mezhdru Akademii nauk SSSR Natsional'noi akademiei nauk SShA," No. St-241/98, December 16, 1980, f. 89, op. 46, doc. 75, Russian State Archive for Modern History, the former Central Committee archive, hereafter RGANI.

years later the second official, Anatolii Cherniaev, became Mikhail Gorbachev's top aide for international affairs and a strong advocate of the 'new thinking' on foreign policy.²⁸

Starting in the 1970s, another professional group began to play a role similar to that of the scientists: medical doctors. In the United States, physicians had been active in the movement for a nuclear-test ban in the early 1960s, prompted by concerns about the health consequences of nuclear testing and of nuclear war itself. Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) was founded in Boston in 1961 and was reinvigorated at the end of the 1970s.²⁹ By December 1980, PSR had "gone transnational," when physicians from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva to found the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), an organization that eventually came to include some 200,000 members in eighty countries and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. The award recognized the important contributions IPPNW had made in promoting a transnational dialogue on the threat of nuclear war.³⁰ Among its achievements were the first uncensored television broadcasts in the Soviet Union detailing the consequences of a nuclear war – secured through the intercession of Brezhnev's personal physician years before Gorbachev's policies of glasnost liberalized the media. Indeed, much of the success of the international physicians' movement in influencing the Soviet leadership is owed to the relationship between two of the world's leading cardiologists, Bernard Lown of Harvard and Evgenii Chazov, the "Kremlin doctor."

While the transnational physicians' movement set the moral tone for new disarmament efforts in the early 1980s, the transnational coalition of scientists explored practical measures for slowing the arms race. One of the key figures

28 The first official, Sergei Trapeznikov, was a notorious Stalinist and opponent of most reforms, internal and external. See Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 241, 248–49; and Fedor Burlatsky, *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the Eyes of His Adviser*, trans. by Daphne Skillen (New York: Scribner's, 1991), 238–39. Cherniaev was well suited to support the renewal of transnational contacts between scientists. His first published article was an obituary of Professor Frédéric Joliot-Curie, the famous French physicist and original signatory of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto that founded the Pugwash movement; see Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia*, 227.

29 Helen M. Caldicott, "Introduction," in Ruth Adams and Susan Cullen (eds.), *The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War* (Chicago: Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 1981), 1–3; Richard A. Knox, "MD Group's Aim Is the Prevention of N-War," *Boston Globe*, July 7, 1980.

30 Bernard Lown and E. I. Chazov, "Physician Responsibility in the Nuclear Age," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 274, 5 (August 2, 1995), 416–19; Evgenii Chazov, *Zdorov'e i vlast': vospominaniia "kremlevskogo vracha"* [Health and Power: Memoirs of the "Kremlin Doctor"] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992).

in the Soviet scientists' movement of the 1980s was Evgenii Velikhov, a nuclear and plasma physicist, head of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and a vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences from 1977. His role was very much like Millionshchikov's of a decade earlier. As an academy official, Velikhov was in a good position to organize research projects and conferences in the Soviet Union as well as maintain international contacts. With some background in military research, and a particular expertise in lasers, he maintained a certain degree of credibility among those Soviet officials skeptical of efforts at disarmament. In 1982, Velikhov became head of the Soviet delegation to the meetings of CISAC. He took over in the wake of the death of Nikolai Inozemtsev, the previous head. Inozemtsev had been a social scientist, director of the Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a veteran of the Prague group around the journal *Problemy mira i sotsializma*. Because Brezhnev had great respect for him, Inozemtsev played a major role in promoting East–West détente within the Soviet Union.³¹

When Velikhov took over the CISAC delegation, he wanted to involve more scientists and asked Roald Sagdeev to join. Sagdeev, another prominent plasma physicist, directed the USSR's Space Research Institute and was particularly active in discussions on the militarization of space. He took over as chair of the Soviet delegation in 1986 and served until 1990. In 1987, he invited Andrei Sakharov, recently released from internal exile in Gorkii on Gorbachev's orders, to join the group and attend the October 1987 CISAC meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania.³²

Several other scientists played particularly important roles in the early 1980s. Andrei Kokoshin was trained as an engineer at the Bauman Institute in Moscow before pursuing a career in politics and history. He became deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada (ISKAN), headed by Georgii Arbatov. The son and grandson of military officers, Kokoshin served as an important link to reformers in the Soviet armed forces. Aleksei Arbatov, son of the ISKAN director, worked as a political scientist at IMEMO, and was a strong advocate of developing a cadre of knowledgeable civilian analysts competent to propose alternatives to official military policies formulated by

31 On the relationship between Brezhnev and Inozemtsev, and the latter's role in détente, author interview with A. S. Cherniaev, June 7, 1997, Moscow; and English, *Russia and the Idea of the West*, esp. 155–56, 164. On IMEMO, see also Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).

32 Author interview with Roald Sagdeev, College Park, MD, March 1994.

the Soviet armed forces. Arbatov and Kokoshin, as political scientists, had long worked on issues related to the arms race – particularly analyses of US and NATO military policy.

In addition to the US–Soviet contacts, the 1980s witnessed a proliferation of transnational relations between various groups and individuals in Europe and the Soviet Union. These included élite-level contacts, as represented most notably by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, or the Palme Commission, as it was often called after its chair, the late Swedish prime minister Olof Palme. Links between Soviet academics and officials and members of West European social democratic and “Eurocommunist” parties (especially in Italy) proved important for the transmission of ideas.³³

Although its impact did not become evident until Gorbachev came into office in 1985, the Palme Commission did much of its work during the late Brezhnev era. The commission intended to do for the area of international security what the Brandt Commission on North–South relations had done for international economic development: present a thorough assessment of the current state of affairs and proposals to address it. The Palme Commission’s work began in 1980 and continued through the next several years of deteriorating US–Soviet relations and increasing concerns about the risks of nuclear war. The commission consisted, in addition to the chair, of sixteen prominent political figures from as many countries throughout the world. Former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance participated, as did Academician Georgii Arbatov from the Soviet Union. Retired general Mikhail Mil’shtein, Arbatov’s colleague at the Institute of the USA and Canada, served as an adviser.³⁴

The Palme Commission took advantage of the fact that its leading members were former politicians and government officials. When the commission convened in Moscow in June 1981, for example, Olof Palme held a personal meeting with Brezhnev.³⁵ During a plenary session, the Commission

33 Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 185–214; Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990). On Eurocommunism, see Silvio Pons’s chapter in this volume.

34 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 188–89.

35 “Ob itogakh besedy L. I. Brezhneva (12 iyunia) s predsedatelem Mezhdunarodnoi komissii po razoruzheniiu i bezopasnosti U. Pal’mе,” from the transcript of a Politburo session, June 18, 1981, f. 89, op. 42, doc. 44, RGANI.

members held discussions with prominent representatives of the Soviet foreign and military establishments – Soviet first deputy foreign minister Georgii Kornienko and first deputy chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeev. Soviet authorities were already well aware of the Palme Commission's work. In addition to his original request to participate in the group, Arbatov had sent the Central Committee detailed reports after each session of the commission's work. From these reports Brezhnev-era officials first heard such notions as "common security," which would form the basis for the subsequent Gorbachev reforms.³⁶

Transnational peace movements and citizen diplomacy

Two other forms of transnational activity characterized the later years of the Cold War: the early 1980s witnessed efforts to forge a continent-wide European peace movement, as envisioned by the founders of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, which would link concern for peace with the defense of human rights.³⁷ In the United States, attempts to establish direct contacts between Soviet and US citizens included "sister-city" relationships and large-scale events intended to improve relations between the two countries by having ordinary people get to know each other better.

For Soviet authorities of the Brezhnev period, not all transnational relations were alike. They were particularly suspicious of representatives of popular disarmament movements, such as END, that tried to forge relations with human-rights activists in the East and act independently of any government's influence. The Soviet government and its official Soviet Peace Committee evidently appreciated the efforts of European activists against the deployment of US Pershing II and cruise missiles to Europe in the early 1980s. But END's criticism of Soviet SS-20 missiles was unwelcome. Evidence from the archives of the East German Staatssicherheitsdienst (or Stasi) and elsewhere reveal

36 G. Arbatov, "Otchet ob uchastii v zasedanii Mezhdunarodnoi komissii po razoruzheniiu i bezopasnosti ('Komissiiia Pal'me') sostoiavsheisia v Vene v period s 13 po 15 dekabria 1980 g.," f. 89, op. 46, doc. 63, and other reports in the same folder, RGANI. "Common security" is discussed in the report on the eighth meeting of the commission, December 28, 1981, 2–3.

37 E. P. Thompson, "Protest and Survive," pamphlet put out by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London, 1980; E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), a collection of essays; E. P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982); E. P. Thompson, *The Heavy Dancers* (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Jean Stead and Danielle Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group* (London: Merlin Press, 1982).

efforts, similar to those of the 1950s, to influence Western peace movements to adopt a more pro-Soviet position. The controversy over deployment of the so-called enhanced-radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, provided an opportunity in 1978. The Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Stasi transferred funds to West European Communists and sympathizers active in peace movements, particularly in the Netherlands and West Germany.³⁸

Efforts to influence the West European peace movements to adopt a pro-Soviet line, or even refrain from criticizing Soviet weapons programs, proved largely unsuccessful. In the Netherlands, for example, agents targeted the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, the Interchurch Peace Council or IKV, the largest Dutch peace organization. Yet the IKV defied Soviet wishes by denouncing the SS-20 missiles along with their NATO counterparts. Revelations from Stasi files created a sensation in Britain in 1999 when it was revealed that various figures in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the END movement were paid Stasi informants. The news came as no surprise, however, to the more independent-minded activists of the British peace movement. One informant "outed" by the archival documents, for example, was Vic Allen, an academic at the University of Leeds, a prominent CND activist. Yet Allen, a member of the British Communist Party, was well known for his sympathies towards the Soviet Union. As British home secretary Jack Straw (who as a law student at Leeds was well acquainted with Allen) put it in a parliamentary debate when the scandal broke, "it was obvious beyond peradventure that he was an apologist for the East German regime and all its works, and we did not need the Stasi to tell us that 30 years later."³⁹ According to Joan Ruddock, a Labour MP and former chair of CND, it was precisely Allen's pro-Soviet positions that limited his efforts to influence the organization to tilt toward Moscow. As she recalled in an interview in 1999, "CND was an open, democratic organisation and our opposition to Soviet weapons meant we would never have gone in that direction." Indeed, Ruddock demonstrated the popularity of the independent position when she defeated Allen in a vote for the CND leadership in 1985. As she explained, "he certainly had no influence on national CND, and as a pro-Soviet could never have succeeded to the chair."⁴⁰

38 Beatrice De Graaf, "Détente from Below: The Stasi and the Dutch Peace Movement," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 3, 2 (Winter 2003), 9–20.

39 The transcript of the October 21, 1999, session is available at www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/docs/991021.htm.

40 Quoted in BBC News, September 20, 1999, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/09/99/britain_betrayed/451366.stm.



30. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament protest organized in the streets of London, 1983. The anti-nuclear protest movements in Europe made people aware of the dangers of the nuclear-arms race.

If the Soviet authorities were disappointed in their inability to sway West European activists toward a pro-Soviet position, they were downright alarmed about Western efforts to support independent peace activists in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Forging contacts with organizations such as Moscow's Trust Group and Hungary's Peace Group for Dialogue became a major focus of the activities of END and the Dutch IKV, for example.⁴¹ The Hungarian authorities allowed the Dialogue group to exist for a time, according to Mary Kaldor, a prominent END leader, "because Western peace activists convinced Hungarian officials that the existence of an independent peace movement in the East would help in the campaign against new missile deployments." In 1984, however, once the United States succeeded in deploying its new missiles despite popular protests, the Hungarian government broke up the independent peace group.⁴²

41 De Graaf, "Détente from Below."

42 Stead and Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group*; Ferenc Köszegi and E.P. Thompson, *The New Hungarian Peace Movement* (London: Merlin Press, 1982); Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 51 (July/August 1995), 59. For documentation on relations between END and the official Soviet-bloc peace committees, see Dimitrios I. Roussopoulos, *The Coming of World War Three*, 2 vols. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1986), I, 238–99.

Soviet authorities made no pretense of tolerating independent peace activists, even for the sake of promoting common objectives, such as a halt to US missile deployments. When the Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and USA emerged in Moscow in 1982, appealing for a “dialogue in which average Soviet and American citizens are included on an equal footing with political figures,” the government had its members arrested, beaten, committed to psychiatric hospitals, and expelled from the country.⁴³ Brezhnev’s successors were somewhat more sympathetic to independent European peace activists, but even Gorbachev’s reformist coalition was cautious about some of the more radical and seemingly utopian proposals they advocated: mutual dissolution of the superpower military alliances, withdrawal of Soviet and US troops, and creation of a neutral, united, and nuclear-free Europe.

Peace movements in the United States during the later years of the Cold War were focused less on forging links with Eastern bloc activists than with directly influencing US policy. The Nuclear Freeze campaign and the movement against US intervention in Central America were particularly active.⁴⁴ Perhaps the most visible example of citizen diplomacy in the United States was the series of meetings hosted by the Chautauqua Institute of western New York state in the second half of the 1980s. It combined public speeches by representatives of the US and Soviet governments with performances by musicians and dancers from each country, and visits by ordinary citizens, many of them staying at the homes of their hosts. Reciprocal meetings near Riga, Latvia, in 1986 and Tbilisi, Georgia, in 1988 tested the limits of glasnost in regions where opposition to the Soviet system took on strong nationalist overtones.⁴⁵ “Cultural diplomacy,” the exchange of artists across borders and

43 Their misfortunes were reported at the time in an occasional newsletter, *Return Address: Moscow*, Issue 1 (September 1984), Issue 2 (n.d.), Issue 3 (February 1995); and in the Western press. See, for example, Serge Schmemman, “Soviet Blocks Pacifists’ News Conference,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1982; John F. Burns, “An Independent Disarmament Group is Harassed in Moscow,” *New York Times*, July 7, 1982; no author, “‘Peace March’ Meets Soviet Barriers,” *New York Times*, July 22, 1982; David Satter, “The Soviets Freeze a Peace Worker,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 13, 1982; see also Stead and Grünberg, *Moscow Independent Peace Group*. The quotation comes from the Group’s “Appeal to the Governments and Publics of the USSR and the USA,” Moscow, 4 June 1982,” reprinted in *Return Address: Moscow*, Issue 1, 1.

44 David S. Meyer, *A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1990); David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen’s Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

45 Ross Mackenzie, *When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on US–Soviet Relations, 1985–1989* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006).

bilateral programs for scientific collaboration, also constituted forms of transnational contact between citizens of each country.⁴⁶

Assessments of transnational influence

In his comprehensive study of the Dartmouth Conferences, James Voorhees suggests that there are two ways of assessing the impact of transnational organizations on the policy of governments: “by examining either the direct influence by such communities on state policy or their indirect influence, that is, their ability to influence the climate of opinion in which policy is made.”⁴⁷ Many of the transnational organizations active in East–West relations enjoyed one or both kinds of influence. The international physicians’ movement, for example, by broadcasting its annual conferences uncensored and in full on Soviet television, raised awareness of the nuclear peril not only among the populace at large, but also among elite policymakers.⁴⁸ Gorbachev alluded to the effect of such “consciousness-raising” when he presented IPPNW copresident Bernard Lown a copy of the 1987 INF Treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. He inscribed it as follows: “Dear Bernard! I want to thank you for your enormous contribution in preventing nuclear war. Without it and other powerful antinuclear initiatives, it is unlikely that this treaty would have come about.”⁴⁹ Voorhees argues that the Dartmouth meetings also deserve credit for convincing the Soviet side of the possibility of a deal on intermediate-range forces, despite the seemingly propagandistic nature of Reagan’s initial “zero-option” proposal. He also points to a number of specific instances of influence on matters related to the Middle East. It is not unreasonable to argue that the Dartmouth process, with its years of joint exploration of regional conflict resolution, and the Afghanistan war in particular, made it easier for the Soviet side to contemplate the withdrawal of its troops from that country, eventually implemented under Gorbachev’s insistence.

46 Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003); Carl Kaysen, chair, US National Academy of Sciences, *Review of US–USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1977).

47 Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained*, 333.

48 Soviet officials interviewed in Steven Kull, *Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), 18.

49 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 376.

A number of other important arms-control initiatives would be hard to explain without taking into account the role of transnational organizations. For a long time, Reagan's pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a stumbling block to Soviet negotiators who were unwilling to make reductions in offensive nuclear forces at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) as long as the United States sought to build a defensive "shield." US activists, such as Jeremy Stone and Frank von Hippel, convinced Gorbachev that, if nuclear disarmament went forward, it would undermine US popular support for building expensive and technically dubious defense systems. Under their influence, Gorbachev ordered the "de-linking" of the talks on intermediate and strategic forces and paved the way for the success of the INF and START treaties.⁵⁰ The unprecedented degree of onsite inspection of military bases and production facilities mandated by those treaties also owes a substantial debt to transnational activism. The very first onsite verification of a Soviet arms-control measure was the product of a nongovernmental transnational initiative: in 1986 scientists from the US Natural Resources Defense Council, Federation of American Scientists, and the Soviet Scientists' Committee set up seismic monitoring equipment near the Soviet nuclear-test range in Kazakhstan to verify compliance with the unilateral halt to Soviet underground explosions.⁵¹

Even the transnational links that most discomfited the Soviet leadership starting in the mid-1970s appear to have exerted a certain influence. Daniel Thomas writes, for example, of the Helsinki Watch committees that emerged to call attention to the legal obligations adopted by the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe in the wake of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. By engaging in acts of "civil obedience" – the public exercise of the legal rights that their governments sought to deny them – these activists bolstered the international norms that a reformist Soviet leadership came to recognize as legitimate.⁵² These norms even included what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze called "freedom of choice" – the freedom of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their form of government and even to decide whether they wanted their countries to belong to the Soviet-dominated military alliance anymore. Backed up by a noninterventionary, "nonoffensive defense" policy and substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces in Europe – both the brainchildren of transnational activists – Gorbachev's pledge, made in a

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ch. 15. ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, chs. 13 and 16.

⁵² Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

speech to the United Nations in December 1988, gave the green light to the popular movements that brought the Cold War division of Europe to a peaceful end.⁵³

To argue about the influence of transnational organizations on the end of the Cold War is not to ignore other important contributing factors. Those that figure in most explanations include deteriorating Soviet economic performance, the pressures of a US policy of “peace through strength” and the attendant military buildup, and the personalities of key leaders, such as Gorbachev and Reagan.⁵⁴ The role of even material factors such as military forces and economic conditions is not straightforward, however. Policymakers’ perceptions and values influence how they judge and deal with military threats and economic decline.⁵⁵

Consider the economy, for example. Gorbachev and his reformist colleagues were undoubtedly motivated by economic concerns, but contrary to a “peace through strength” interpretation, their concern was as much for the overall well-being of the Soviet Union and its citizens as for narrow considerations of military capability. In some respects, the reformers benefited from the perception of economic crisis – it gave a sense of urgency to their efforts – but the economic situation did not determine the nature of Gorbachev’s initiatives. Economic conditions were always poorly correlated with periods of Soviet retrenchment or moderation. The most antagonistic Soviet policies toward the outside world were pursued by Stalin in the early postwar period at a time when the Soviet economy was in ruins. By contrast, a sense of economic optimism during the late 1950s had emboldened Stalin’s successors to launch a number of conciliatory initiatives and unilateral gestures of restraint, such as Khrushchev’s troop reductions and a moratorium on nuclear testing. The economic decline of the late Brezhnev era produced little in the way of moderation of foreign and security policy, whereas the early Gorbachev years, which saw an initial improvement in economic performance, also witnessed the onset of the reformist ‘new thinking’.

53 Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces*, ch. 14.

54 For a range of perspectives, see Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and the special issue of *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 2 (Spring 2005), edited by Nina Tannenwald and William C. Wohlforth.

55 William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

A similar indeterminacy confronts arguments about the effect of US military pressure and the Reagan buildup.⁵⁶ Political and military leaders rarely agree on the nature of an external threat or the proper means to counter it. The Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years witnessed a wide range of views among policymakers about the degree to which the United States and NATO Europe should be seen as implacable enemies of the USSR and about the wisdom of pursuing unilateral initiatives of restraint in order to win their trust. Many of the ideas for winding down the arms race and ending the Cold War came from transnational networks that brought together Soviet reformers with Western proponents of arms control, disarmament, and human rights. They were not ideas imposed or even advocated by the United States. Indeed, US and NATO military authorities expressed no interest in theories of nonoffensive defense, developed by European peace researchers, and the US government rejected the Soviet Union's appeals to join its moratorium on nuclear testing (for fear that it might hinder development of nuclear components of an SDI system). Yet these ideas and initiatives captured public attention and provided the normative context for transforming the Cold War relationship, even if they met resistance by hardliners in Gorbachev's own government. Through his control of the domestic agenda and relying upon the authority of his position as top Communist leader in an extremely hierarchical system, Gorbachev was able to implement, without substantial domestic opposition, the ideas that brought the Cold War to an end.

Transnational actors played an important role in developing and promoting those ideas. Members of the international physicians' movement sounded the alarm about the health consequences of nuclear war; scientists associated with Pugwash and its bilateral offshoots developed specific proposals for lowering the risks of nuclear confrontation; scholars in peace research institutes promoted far-reaching schemes for nonviolent resolution of the East–West conflict in Europe and the Third World; citizen diplomats fostered cultural and social contacts while peace activists forged transnational links with defenders of human rights. Few foresaw the peaceful end of the Cold War, yet many worked for decades to achieve it. However crowded the stage of Cold War history, transnational actors have earned their place on it.

⁵⁶ Consider, for example, Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

The biosphere and the Cold War

J. R. McNEILL

Everything is connected to everything else.

V. I. Lenin (1914)¹

When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.

John Muir (1911)²

The Cold War is one of the handful of subjects that can keep hundreds of historians busy all their lives. The literature already authored fills many a bookcase and website, with no end in sight. But little has been said about the environmental dimensions of the conflict. Perhaps for Cold War historians the fate of fish, forests, and so forth seems beside the point when examining an era replete with apocalyptic risks to humankind. It certainly seemed so to the great majority of people in power at the time. Meanwhile, of the squadrons of environmental historians at work on the years 1945–91, almost none have seen fit to link their work directly to the Cold War. This chapter will address some of the linkages between environmental change and the Cold War.

The analysis here focuses on three aspects: agriculture, especially the Green Revolution; transportation infrastructure, especially roads; and weapons production, especially nuclear weapons. Cold War geostrategic priorities shaped state efforts in these arenas, and those efforts brought significant, usually unintended, environmental changes. Obviously, not all environmental change in the years 1945–91 should be attributed to the Cold War. Indeed, with a few exceptions, such as radioactive pollution from nuclear-weapons production and testing, the ecological tumult of the post-1945 era resulted from

1 Quoted in Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), xvi. The original, translated less gracefully, is in V. I. Lenin, "Summary of Dialectics," in *The Collected Works of Vladimir Lenin*, 45 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers and Foreign Languages Press, 1960–70), vol. XXXVIII (1961), 221–22.

2 Muir, *My First Summer in the Sierra* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), ch. 6, www.sierraclub.org.

confluences of multitudes of causes, among which Cold War considerations normally played only a part.

Most environmental change derives from economic activity, and the Cold War was, among other things, a contest of economic production. Proponents of rival ideological and economic systems sought to prove the superiority of Communism or capitalism by claiming that one outproduced the other. Cold War rivals also sought to build bigger and better military-industrial complexes, mobilizing ever vaster quantities of raw materials, energy, and water in determined quests for power and prosperity. The Americans, Soviets, and Chinese took the lead in these efforts and devoted much of their less-populated territories – the US West, Siberia, Xinjiang – to them. These commitments inevitably provoked ecological disruptions, sometimes of sorts and on scales previously unknown in human history.

Ecological tumult, 1945–1991: the Anthropocene

The most bizarre epoch in the history of human relations with the biosphere began with the close of World War II. After 1945, the human race was fruitful and multiplied as never before, depleting more than replenishing the earth. Global population more than doubled (1945–91), reaching 5.3 billion. Economic output roughly quintupled.³ Cheap energy, in the form of coal and especially oil, empowered our species, making it possible to chop the tops off mountains in search of a few grams of gold, or to fell billions of tropical trees in a few decades. A general sense of the magnitude of environmental change in the past century emerges from the estimates in Table 3.

The reasons for this tumult were several and, of course, interconnected. Chief among them were energy use, population growth, and technological change.⁴ All of them were linked to Cold War struggles, and associated ideologies of growth and competition, not least in the fundamental sphere of food.

Agriculture, the Green Revolution, and the Cold War

From its inception, the Cold War included agricultural competition. The ideological competition between Communism and capitalism could be won

3 Angus Maddison, *World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003), 232–33.

4 A more elaborate account appears in J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun*, (New York: Norton, 2000), 267–361.

Table 3. *Magnitudes of environmental changes indexed (AD 1900 = 100)*

	1900	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
Population	100	146	187	228	274	325
Urban population	100	303	442	604	789	1,000
World GNP	100	311	486	820	1,174	1,571
GNP per capita	100	200	260	360	429	482
Total energy production	100	328	557	741	948	1,083
Coal production	100	219	318	362	467	543
Oil production	100	257	5,199	11,246	14,733	15,653
Cement production	100	1,821	4,330	7,820	12,100	15,840
Iron and steel production	100	482	894	1,527	1,886	1,870
Lead production	100	221	307	447	465	404
Copper production	100	481	855	1,320	1,569	1,729
CO ₂ emissions	100	281	472	728	1,010	1,161
SO ₂ emissions	100	245	336	416	513	559
Cattle population	100	172	205	241	271	289
Horse population	100	71	65	60	58	60
Pig population	100	128	202	280	409	439
Sheep population	100	129	165	176	181	199
Cropland	100	146	160	174	188	190
Irrigated area	100	196	285	350	440	490
Forest area	100	93	91	88	87	83
Grassland area	100	83	76	70	65	67
Freshwater use	100	234		447		712
Marine fish catch	100	750	1,650	2,550	2,800	3,550

Source: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE Database (www.mnp.nl/hyde/bdf/); J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun* (New York: Norton, 2000), 121, 180, 213, 247, 283.

or lost on the farm: all claims of superiority would ring hollow if people did not have enough to eat. Many flaws in an economic system could be hidden, denied, or explained away, but hunger was not one of them. Hence, the battles for the hearts and minds of populations around the world included, centrally, campaigns to create contented stomachs.

Around the world, the lean years of the 1930s and the war years before 1945 had brought hunger and, in places, starvation. Food shortages persisted after 1945 in most of Europe, the USSR, China, and several colonial realms in Asia and Africa. At the same time, beginning shortly after the war, population growth spurted almost everywhere in a global baby boom. This resulted in part from release from the more desperate conditions of prior years, in which

fewer people had married and fewer had wanted children. But it also resulted from improved public-health programs, in the form of vaccination regimes and sanitation projects that lowered death rates, especially among children. While these developments struck almost everyone as progress, they did raise concerns about food supply – and its political implications.

Discomfort and agitation in the colonial (and decolonizing) world could, it often seemed, easily translate into Communist advances. In the United States, the global food problem, which some saw as a population problem, soon looked like a political problem. Those most concerned about it quickly learned to couch their interests in terms of the national security of the United States, the surest way to get attention in the corridors of power.

President Harry S. Truman got the message. In his January 1949 inauguration address, he outlined his Point Four Program. Point Three concerned military security and outlined a plan that would lead to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Point Four concerned the “inadequate” food supply of more than half the world’s population. The plight of the hungry masses presented a potential threat to the United States. Thus, it was in the American national security interest to use American expertise to ratchet up food production at home and abroad.

Throughout most of the agricultural era of human history, the easiest way to grow more food was to farm more land. Over time, of course, this option became progressively less viable, as suitable new lands grew scarcer. By the 1940s, the prospects for further expansion of arable were nil in Europe and poor elsewhere, with a few exceptions. The only answer to growing demand for food required rapidly rising yields per acre. This was the goal of the Green Revolution.⁵

The Green Revolution, the most remarkable transformation yet in the 10,000-year history of agriculture, was, in a nutshell, a package of innovations that doubled and quadrupled yields via scientific crop-breeding, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, farm machinery, and irrigation. The crucial step was breeding “dwarf” varieties of wheat and rice whose shortened stalks could hold up an oversized, grain-packed head.

5 Giovanni Federico, *Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36–37, has figures on crop areas around the world for 1910–2000. After 1961 (when the best data, collected by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], begin), the global expansion of arable came to about 10% by 1990. His figures show about a 15% expansion between the 1940s and 1961, a less reliable figure, but not implausible. Almost all that expansion took place in Asia, most of it in China – for which official data provided to the FAO should be taken with several grains of salt.

Using wheat genes obtained in 1946 from Japan, where crop geneticists had been experimenting with semi-dwarf rice and wheat since the 1920s, US scientists created new varieties of wheat that doubled or tripled yields under the right conditions. Crop-breeders in a Mexican wheat-research program financed by American foundations developed varieties that responded prolifically to irrigation and heavy doses of nitrogenous fertilizer. Mexican politicians, while not as consumed as Truman with Cold War worries, had their own reasons for promoting wheat research – especially those with sprawling properties in the wheat-producing regions of the north.

The successes in Mexico – a wheat exporter after 1951 – attracted attention elsewhere, notably in India. In 1960, India imported 5 percent of its food, a situation that raised problems for foreign-exchange balances, for security, and for national pride. Some of the Mexican wheats, developed for hot and dry conditions in Sonora, seemed appropriate for the wheat belts of Punjab and Rajasthan. Indian politicians (at least those who preferred Jawaharlal Nehru's modernizing visions to Mohandas Gandhi's path of local self-reliance) saw a link between higher yields and national security, in their case conceived chiefly as the ability to defeat Pakistan. They also saw in high-yield crops a step toward the modernized, self-sufficient, scientifically advanced India of their nationalist dreams. The enthusiasm of American institutions, mainly the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, was based on anxieties about Malthusian scenarios in South Asia, an emerging ethos of modernization and development, and the presumed vulnerability of India to Soviet influence.⁶ The Green Revolution worked well enough in India for that country to become a food exporter, and real famine never recurred. Most of the political elite and landed classes in India regarded the Green Revolution as a stirring success, good for India and good for themselves.

Southeast Asia was a central theater of both the Cold War and the Green Revolution. After 1949, visions of peasant insurgencies and falling dominoes in Asia bedeviled American statesmen. National security seemed to ride on the uncertain allegiances of tens of thousands of Asian villages. Initially, the favored American approach to this problem revolved around land reform and allied measures. But this involved taking on the landed elites of Asia, an uphill struggle at best. So, by the late 1950s, American policymakers placed their bet instead on new strains of rice that could alleviate hunger and blunt

6 For more on such matters, see Matthew Connelly's chapter in this volume.

the appeal of Soviet or Chinese promises. In this program, they found eager allies in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Where states relied on support from the landed elite, they quickly saw the charm of miracle rice, particularly a strain called IR-8. By the late 1960s, it was planted throughout Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, rice yields doubled between 1965 and 1985, and the country, for the first time in a century, became a rice exporter. Indonesia and Malaysia became self-sufficient in rice. In Vietnam, by the late 1960s, the Americans hoped IR-8 would serve as a miracle weapon to win the war, convincing peasants of the rewards of siding with them against the Communists. But soon the North Vietnamese were planting it too, delighted to raise their yields and break their food dependence on China.⁷ Cambodia, routinely subject to floods too heavy to allow the necessary careful water management (and ravaged by turmoil and war), could not take part in the rice revolution.⁸

China embarked on its own Green Revolution. This came too late to help with the mass famine associated with Great Leap Forward (1959–61) in which 25–30 million people died. After 1949, China embraced Lysenkoism (see below) and set back crop breeding efforts by fifteen years. Thanks to the Sino-Soviet rift, however, Chinese plant geneticists by the early 1960s felt free to change their ways and found encouragement from the Chinese Communist Party for their efforts to raise yields through methods derived from the West (many of the key scientists had studied at Cornell University in New York state). After 1963, they developed a few new strains of rice that raised yields. However, almost all plant geneticists were “sent down” to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, which cost Chinese crop-breeding another fifteen years. But in the 1980s, Chinese scientists developed a superior hybrid rice and, by 1990, some 95 percent of Chinese rice and maize production came from recently developed high-yield varieties; rice yields were twice, and wheat yields four times, those of the 1950s. Crop-breeding, chemical fertilizer, tractors, and expanded irrigation allowed the country to generate the most rapid advances in the long history of Chinese agriculture. The Chinese had several reasons for investing in a Green Revolution with Chinese characteristics, but part of its appeal came from its enhancement of national power as

7 Nick Cullather, “Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54; R. E. Elson, *End of the Peasantry in Southeast Asia: A Social and Economic History of Peasant Livelihood, 1800–1990s* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 63–66, 93–97.

8 Elson, *The End of the Peasantry*, 96–97.

well as the political value of keeping pace with the farmers of East Asia, generally, and Taiwan, in particular.⁹

Between 1960 and 1990, the population of Asia nearly doubled. Cereals (mainly rice and wheat) production more than kept pace. Very little new land was put under cultivation. The social, economic, and geopolitical history of Asia would have been very different without the Green Revolution.

Africa mattered less in Cold War calculations and mattered little in the Green Revolution. Sub-Saharan Africa did not produce much wheat. Its rice, grown in only a few parts of the continent, mainly featured indigenous varieties that could not be crossed with the Asian miracle strains. Moreover, the reliable rains (or irrigation), the transport and credit infrastructure, and the good soils that helped propel the Green Revolution elsewhere were all scarce on the continent. So the main crop-breeding innovations could not easily take root in Africa's food system, which featured mainly cassava and maize. The high-yield maize that flourished in North America did not prosper under African conditions. Research on African maize, begun as early as the 1930s, generated minimal progress until a strain called SR-52 emerged from work in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1960. But political and ecological conditions inhibited both the success and spread of SR-52, so that the yield history of African maize was sluggish, by and large, until the 1980s. Cassava and other African crops – sorghum, millet, yams, sweet potato – never got much attention from scientific crop-breeders. Whereas in 1960 anxieties about hunger focused on Asia, by 1975, they had shifted to Africa. Population grew rapidly in the generation after independence, but food production did not keep pace. Part of the explanation is that Africa commanded a lower priority among those concerned about the geopolitical implications of food supply.¹⁰

The Green Revolution was almost a global phenomenon. While the term is not normally used to refer to the fabulous productivity increases in agriculture in the industrialized countries, the magic of nitrogen and high-yield crop

9 Laurence Schneider, *Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 197–206, 263; Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350–1988* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 233, 235, 242, 250.

10 Derek Byerlee and Carl K. Eicher (eds.), *Africa's Emerging Maize Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Joy Asiema, "Africa's Green Revolution," *Biotechnology and Development Monitor*, 19 (1994), 17–18; D. Tribe, *Feeding and Greening the World: The Role of International Agricultural Research* (Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1994); James C. McCann, *Maize and Grace: Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500–2000* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 140–73.

breeds had worked just as well in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe as in Mexico and India. After the hunger of the 1940s, scientific efforts to maximize food production enjoyed consistent political support in Europe and Japan, both of which increased yields per acre (and per laborer) spectacularly after the late 1940s. In the United States, maize yields quadrupled between 1940 and 1980.

The USSR and the Virgin Lands

Tradition and reaction hamstrung the Green Revolution in the USSR. Despite the Soviet attachment to modern technology and fetishistic devotion to ever higher production quotas, the heart of the Green Revolution, genetic manipulation, did not travel well to the USSR. Soviet ideologists and top leaders found the biology of Trofim Lysenko more to their taste. As a Ukrainian of peasant origin, he had a suitable biography, which his elder and rival, Nikolai Vavilov – one of the greatest plant geneticists who ever lived – did not. Lysenko was especially skilled at thwarting the careers of those who disagreed with him, so from the 1930s until 1965 he and his ideas reigned supreme in Soviet genetics and plant-breeding. His ideas, essentially Lamarckian, did nothing to raise yields in Soviet agriculture. While the rest of the world was doubling yields with new crop breeds, Soviet farmers were encouraged to chill their seeds before planting them.

Soon after the Cold War dawned, the Soviet leadership recognized the food problem as a priority. Postwar economic plans short-changed an agricultural sector ravaged by war, and real famines resulted in 1946–47. Iosif Stalin's 1948 "Grand Plan for the Reconstruction of Nature" proposed to harness the ecology of the European USSR in order to maximize production of food, timber, and electricity, and to let nary a drop of water nor a clod of fertile soil go unused. Stalin intended an intensification of farming, mainly in European Russia and Ukraine, through expanded irrigation, crop rotation, and afforestation (thought to improve the climate and known to check wind erosion). But Stalin died before the Grand Plan could be implemented.

After Stalin's death in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev took a special interest in food production. He estimated that Soviet grain harvests, still no larger than those of 1913, met only 70–75 percent of requirements. He wanted to solve the grain shortage, and to export grain to "friendly" countries – and acquire more leverage over them. He had no faith in Stalin's plan, which in the best of circumstances would have taken too long. Nor could he brook any plan that allowed peasants to escape collectivism.

Instead, Khrushchev chose a bold gamble: the Virgin Lands scheme, the largest plow-up anywhere in the twentieth century. This plan fell squarely within the Soviet tradition of heroic mobilization and promised quick results.¹¹ Speed was important for Khrushchev's political position within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and, he thought, for the USSR's in the Cold War. Moreover, it required no repudiation of Lysenkoism. If the Virgin Lands could supply enough wheat, Khrushchev could claim to have overcome the USSR's grain problem. Much of the farmland in European Russia and Ukraine could be then sown with maize and other feed grains for livestock, so politically important targets for meat and milk might be met.

Beginning in early 1954, more than 300,000 "volunteers" migrated to the steppes of northern Kazakhstan (where Leonid Brezhnev, the future general secretary of the CPSU, was put in charge) and western Siberia. They plowed up millions of hectares of grassland in order to plant wheat. They did it hastily, in soils both good and bad, in a fierce continental climate, where the growing season was often dry and where desiccating winds were routine. At first, the results seemed to justify the gamble, vaulting Brezhnev from obscurity to prominence. Khrushchev ordered yet more steppe plowed up. Harvests in 1956 and 1958 were especially encouraging, leading Khrushchev to promise that Soviet families would soon enjoy more meat and milk per capita than Americans.

But, by the early 1960s, the harvests on the Virgin Lands withered, mainly because of too little rain and too much nutrient depletion. Additionally, maize harvests disappointed Khrushchev's hopes: he had invested heavily in maize, inspired by the American example, but did so without hybrid varieties, ruled out by Lysenkoism, and with too little fertilizer. Bread lines returned, and some cities witnessed food riots. Kremlin leaders felt forced to choose between food rationing, which they rejected, and importing grain from Canada, Australia, the United States, and – perhaps most galling – Romania. Khrushchev's desperate response was to plow up still more steppe. The USSR could blast cosmonauts into orbit, but its biotechnology remained firmly anchored in the Neolithic.

The Virgin Lands scheme covered about 42 million hectares, roughly the size of California or Sweden, and a quarter of all the sown area of the USSR. Its difficulties resulted from (predictably) unreliable rains. The scheme deepened the Soviet vulnerability to drought. It also brought inevitable ecological problems attendant upon giant-scale monocrop production, which meant

¹¹ See David Priestland's chapter in volume I.

declining harvests over the longer term. Monocropping invited weed and pest infestations, as well as depletion of key nutrients most necessary for wheat. The gigantic size of fields on state farms triggered wind erosion, which in dry years turned large parts of the Virgin Lands into dust bowls. Khrushchev had been warned that his scheme would suffer from wind erosion, but he stubbornly denied the possibility; recognition of the risk would have cast doubt on the whole program.¹²

After the disastrous harvest on the Virgin Lands in 1963, Khrushchev finally embraced chemicalization of Soviet agriculture. But when he fell from power in 1964, Lysenkoism lost its last champion, and Soviet scientists began to make up for lost time in plant genetics. Nonetheless, Soviet policy had squandered decades. Its research institutes stood ill prepared to serve as the foundries of a Green Revolution. Its chemical industry could not produce millions of tons of fertilizers overnight. From the mid-1960s onward, the USSR had to direct scarce investment funds into agriculture and frequently had to import grain to avert food crises. At a time when the United States exported food and could use its farms' bounty as a propaganda tool and as a practical incentive for pliant behavior among rulers of hungry populations, the USSR could not reliably feed itself. The Soviets needed a Green Revolution to compensate for the obstacles inherent in collectivization and their ragged rural transport system. Instead, they bet on the Virgin Lands. Thanks to Lysenkoism and Khrushchev's gambles, they lost the battle for the stomachs and created an environmental calamity in the bargain.¹³

The Green Revolution and the environment

The Green Revolution did not give rise to dust bowls, but like every revolution in agriculture it carried profound environmental consequences. From its inception, the Green Revolution had critics aplenty. One dimension of their

12. See Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Lands Programme, 1953–1964* (London: Macmillan, 1976), 156–67, 217–18. Khrushchev was deeply committed to Siberian development as a solution to Soviet problems, and commissioned a thirteen-volume study of Siberia's resources and prospects: V. S. Nemchinov and I. P. Bardin (eds.), *Razvitie proizvoditel'nykh sil vostochnoi Sibiri* [The Development of Industry in Eastern Siberia] (Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 1960), 13 vols.

13. Nikolai Dronin and Edward G. Ballinger, *Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia, 1900–1990* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 171–330; McCauley, *Khrushchev and Soviet Agriculture*; Lazar Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 335, 483–90; William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 261–63, 303, 480–82, 516–21, 606–07.

critique was social: the technologies of the Green Revolution rewarded large-scale farmers more than small peasants, so it encouraged (and in places entrenched) latifundia, the concentration of ownership of agricultural land, and often made poor peasants even poorer.¹⁴ Another dimension was ecological.

Green Revolution landscapes were mainly monocultures. They invited pest infestations. These could be controlled, ideally, by genetic manipulation – the transfer of pest-resistant genes – or, less ideally, by pesticides. In most cases, pesticides were required, chiefly organochlorides that do not easily break down chemically but instead persist in the environment. They posed health risks to the agricultural workers who applied them to the fields, especially if those workers were not aware of the hazards of the chemicals they handled. Moreover, agrochemicals flowed into waterways, poisoning various forms of aquatic life. Many of the chemicals involved were “bio-accumulative,” meaning they persist in the tissues of those creatures that ingest them and thereby work their way up the food chain, appearing in the highest concentrations within the bodies of top predators (including humans). The health risks to farmworkers were essentially preventable, and those who sprayed chemicals on crops in Britain, for example, were much less likely to suffer ill effects than those in places such as Bangladesh, simply because they were better informed and better protected. The risks from dispersion of organochlorides in the aquatic environment were not easily preventable and were felt everywhere. In the United States, the unwelcome effects of organochlorides upon fish and birds featured prominently in the most galvanizing text of the environmental movement, Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962).

A second important ecological consequence of Green Revolution chemicals was increased eutrophication. When aquatic ecosystems acquire too much in the way of nutrients such as nitrogen or phosphorus, the excess nutrients feed algae which, when they die and decompose, soak up dissolved oxygen, in effect suffocating other life forms. Additionally, algal blooms often host toxins dangerous to marine and human life. Eutrophication can happen naturally in lakes, although this is usually a very slow process, and can also result from untreated sewage as well as from agrochemicals. Wherever heavy doses of nitrogen found their way into waterways, eutrophication followed. In extreme cases, sizable “dead zones” resulted, in places such as the Gulf

¹⁴ One example among many, concerning north India, is Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

of Mexico, the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Yellow Sea as well as countless inland lakes. In every case, agricultural runoff was deeply involved.

In most Green Revolution landscapes, irrigation formed a large part of the formula for success. Irrigation almost everywhere, but especially in dry regions with high evaporation rates, produced environmental problems. In Punjab and Rajasthan, among many other regions, irrigation led to high rates of salinization, requiring that some land be taken out of production. Elsewhere, irrigation brought waterlogging and raised groundwater levels to the point where they undermined building foundations. The environmental problems of irrigation date back several millennia and existed in places where the Green Revolution did not, such as Soviet Central Asia. But these soil and groundwater problems intensified and spread as a result of the Green Revolution.

Irrigation normally required dams, so the Green Revolution sharpened the economic logic of building dams. Tens of thousands were built around the world, creating new reservoirs, altering streamflows, and flooding thousands of villages. Dams interfered with the movement of migratory fish and changed the physical and chemical properties of rivers in ways that many species of aquatic life were unprepared for. People who had depended on riverine ecologies for their livelihoods often suffered in consequence. Many of the fiercest environmental struggles of the 1970s and 1980s revolved around dam-building, especially in India. Still more such struggles would have taken place in China had the population not normally feared the likely state response.

The Green Revolution also sharply reduced the biodiversity of agriculture. More and more food came from fewer and fewer cultivars. To date, this has not proved much of a problem, although it has created a situation in which most of the world's eggs are in only a few baskets. A crop disease that penetrates the genetic and chemical defenses of the Green Revolution would prove much more consequential than it would in a world of genetically diverse agriculture. Happily, this has not happened on a large scale, although in 1970 the United States lost 15 percent of its corn crop to a fungus that attacked the most common high-yield variety.¹⁵

Some people judge the benefits of the Green Revolution – higher agricultural production – to be worth the costs, social and ecological. Some do not. Judgments at the moment can only be provisional, for the Green Revolution is

¹⁵ Paul Mangelsdorf, *Corn: Its Origin, Evolution, and Improvement* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1974), 213.

a permanent revolution, both in the sense that it is here to stay and in Trotsky's sense that the revolution will not stop at any intermediate stage. Scientific crop-breeding, especially the business of gene transfers, is in its infancy.

Cold War transport and the environment

For at least 4,000 years rulers have built military roads. Presidents since George Washington have wished to provide the United States with a road system suited to defense requirements. None carried this ambition as far as Dwight D. Eisenhower who, as a lieutenant colonel in 1919, commanded a crosscountry convoy that took two months to traverse 3,000 miles. In the 1920s, Ike wrote a detailed report on the roads of France and their role in facilitating Allied victory in World War I. After D-Day, he brilliantly used those same roads in chasing the Wehrmacht from France. Once in Germany, he marveled at how useful the autobahns were to whoever could control them.

Soon after entering the White House in 1953, Ike put his weight behind efforts to create a new system of highways, what Americans now call the Interstates. He persuaded a fiscally conservative Congress to accept the enormous cost of a new national highway system by stressing the military necessity of such roads. In 1956, Congress passed what is conventionally known as the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act. The American Interstate system was the largest engineering project in world history. By 1991, it came to 41,000 miles (66,000 km) of road, a little less than what the Romans built over several centuries. It paved an area the size of Delaware. Earthmoving equipment developed expressly for the job dug up 250 times as much rock and dirt as was removed in building the Panama Canal.

Eisenhower and Congress had the Cold War very much in mind when authorizing the Interstate system, and in giving its engineers their charge. The roadbeds, bridges, and tunnels of the new highway system were built to accommodate military equipment and vehicles. Its layout was convenient to almost all the more than 400 military bases in the United States outside Alaska. It penetrated all major American cities and would, in theory, expedite evacuations in event of crisis.¹⁶

¹⁶ Mark H. Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941–1956* (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979); Dan McNichol, *The Roads that Built America: The Incredible Story of the US Interstate System* (New York: Sterling, 2006).

All roads, especially big and well-traveled ones, bring environmental effects. The Interstates account for about 1 percent of road length in the United States, but about a quarter of all miles traveled. Their construction had minor effects on vegetation, favoring certain species over others along the roads' edges, and accelerating the dispersion of invasive species and weeds in general.¹⁷ The Interstates affected wildlife too, providing good habitats for bats and pigeons (under bridges and overpasses) as well as hawks and crows which find prey and carrion more easily on broad roadways. Roadkill on the Interstates probably had minimal impact on animal populations, although anyone driving along I-10 amid armadillo carcasses may be forgiven for thinking otherwise.¹⁸ The largest direct ecological effect of the Interstate system was carving up wildlife domains ("habitat fragmentation"). For those species that never or rarely cross broad highways (black bears, grizzly bears, wolves, mountain lions) and need large territories, Ike's dream was a nightmare.

The building of the Interstate system had other direct environmental effects, such as faster soil erosion, and its use had many more. Insofar as the Interstates encouraged driving that otherwise would not have happened, they added to the sum of air and noise pollution. Lead from automobile exhausts caused neurological and brain damage in a few thousand American children until leaded gasoline was phased out in the 1980s. Perhaps 5–6 percent of total US CO₂ emissions originated along the Interstates.¹⁹

None of the direct effects, however, came to much in comparison to the indirect environmental consequences of building the Interstates. They revolutionized economic geography and land use in the United States. Almost all businesses wanted to be within a few miles of an Interstate. Interstates extended the feasible commuting distance to and from cities by scores of miles, facilitating the distinctive urban sprawl of the modern United States. They helped confirm the car culture and seal the victory of trucking over freight railroads. In short, they played a sizable role in generating the postwar American landscape.²⁰

17 Richard T. T. Forman, *et al.*, *Road Ecology: Science and Solutions* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003), 75–111.

18 Ian F. Spellerberg, *Ecological Effects of Roads* (Enfield, NH: Science Publishers, 2002), 118–34.

19 Forman, *et al.*, *Road Ecology*; D. A. Hensher and K. J. Button (eds.), *Handbook of Transport and the Environment* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2003).

20 McNichol, *Roads*, 220–26; Owen Gutfreund, *Twentieth Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).



31. Protest against the dumping of toxic waste, Trenton, New Jersey, 1986. Toward the end of the Cold War, more people became aware of the threat from all kinds of pollution of the environment.

The Interstates also affected the cultural and political landscape in a way pertinent to environmental history: they helped spur environmentalism as a social and political movement in the United States. They did this partly by fomenting, and symbolizing, some of the changes that many Americans found distasteful (namely, more pollution and more sprawl). But they also did so by bringing more Americans to national and state parks and other scenic areas. The new highways enabled more citizens to appreciate the less trammelled parts of nature and to develop or deepen environmentalist sympathies.²¹

In stark contrast, the USSR did little to change its road system until the late 1960s. Stalin was keenly aware of transport's importance for national defense from at least 1930.²² In 1932, the USSR had only about 146,000 kilometers of roads, most unpaved and impassable in muddy spring months. Paradoxically, the lack of good roads in European Russia helped the USSR stymie the Nazi

21 Paul Sutter, *Driven Wild: How the Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), is a useful reflection on the complex relationship between cars and environmentalism.

22 Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transportation Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 55.

invasion in 1941–42. The decision not to invest in roads during the early Cold War may have rested in part on continued worry about invaders from the West. Soviet policy reserved petroleum, steel, rubber, and other goods associated with road-based transport for military and heavy industry. As late as the mid-1960s, the USSR's asphalt road mileage equaled 1% of the United States', and its total road mileage 25%.

Instead, the USSR extended its railroad network by about 38,000 kilometers (between 1945 and 1966), much of which was laid with military priorities in mind.²³ Military concerns helped motivate a long-gestating project that came to fruition in the Brezhnev years, the Baikal–Amur (BAM) railroad. Begun in the 1930s with Gulag labor, and extended by prisoners of war in 1944–46, it lay dormant and unfinished until the 1969 border clashes with China emphasized the strategic vulnerability of the sole line spanning the USSR: the original trans-Siberian railroad skirted the Chinese border.²⁴ The BAM route stood well back from the frontier, at a safe distance from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It would ease the problems of supply for the Soviet naval squadrons operating out of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, an urgent matter in the 1970s when events in Southeast Asia gave the Soviet leadership new concerns in Pacific waters. After years of preparatory work, the hard labor began in 1974, and ended in 1984. The new line covered about 3,500 kilometers and led to the creation of sixty new towns. Its chief economic and ecological impact was to accelerate the exploitation of eastern Siberia's ores, timber, and furs.²⁵

While both the United States and the USSR took military priorities into account when building transportation infrastructures during the Cold War, they made sharply divergent choices. The American initiative was much more pervasive, and so more transformative, economically, socially, and environmentally.

Nuclear-weapons production and the environment

The Cold War superpowers both built nuclear deterrents, but they went about it in somewhat different ways, which led to significantly different environmental impacts, in degree if not in kind. The United States built

23 Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transport Experience* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1968), 48–50, 92–95, 183–84.

24 For the border clashes between the Soviet Union and China, see Sergey Radchenko's chapter in volume II.

25 A. G. Aganbegian and A. A. Kin (eds.), *BAM: pervoe desiatiletie* [BAM: The First Decade] (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1985).

about 70,000 nuclear warheads and tested more than a thousand from 1945 to 1990. The USSR built about 45,000 and tested at least 715. Meanwhile, Britain after 1952, France after 1960, and China after 1964 built hundreds more. The nuclear-weapons industry led to a rapid increase in the volume of uranium mining around the world, especially in the United States, Canada, Australia, Central and Southern Africa, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Nuclear weapons require either enriched uranium or plutonium (made from uranium). So all nuclear powers developed atomic archipelagoes, networks of special sites devoted to nuclear research, uranium processing, and weapons manufacture. These were shielded from public scrutiny by state secrecy, and to some extent, especially in Russia and China, they still are. In the United States, this archipelago involved some 3,000 locales, including the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Rocky Flats Arsenal in Colorado, both crucial to the bomb-making effort. The jewel in this crown, the Hanford Engineer Works (later called the Hanford Site), some 600 square miles of dusty, windy, almost-empty steppe on the banks of the Columbia River in south-central Washington state, opened in 1943.²⁶

Hanford was the principle atomic bomb factory in the United States throughout the Cold War.²⁷ In routine work at Hanford, millions of curies of radionuclides were purposely released (and some accidentally leaked) into the surrounding soil, air, and water. Often the quantities in question exceeded those then thought safe (the limits of what is deemed safe have been decreased over time). In a little over four decades of operation, Hanford generated 500 million curies in nuclear wastes, most of which remained on site. For comparison, the accident in 1979 at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, which put a stop to civilian nuclear power-plant construction in the United States, released 14 curies of radioactivity into the environment. The environmental and health dangers of radioactivity releases and wastes seemed large enough to require constant secrecy and occasional dishonesty on the part of

26 Basic data are presented in Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih (eds.), *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

27 Michele Stenehjem Gerber, *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); T. E. Marceau, et al., *Hanford Site Historic District: History of the Plutonium Production Facilities, 1943–1990* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 2003); John M. Whiteley, "The Hanford Nuclear Reservation: The Old Realities and the New," in Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas Lovrich, John Pierce, and John Whiteley, *Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 29–58.

the responsible officials, but small enough to be an acceptable cost for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The murky story (pertinent Defense Department documents remain secret) of the Green Run shows the degree to which urgency and haste shaped the history of Hanford. In December 1949, the largest single release of radionuclides, known as the Green Run, took place. It was probably an experiment undertaken in reaction to the detonation of the USSR's first nuclear weapon, which registered on radioactivity-monitoring equipment in western North America. American officials had reason to assume the Soviets were using "green" uranium, only 16 or 20 days out of the reactor. If so, it indicated accelerated production schedules for enriched uranium. To test the hypothesis, it seems, they decided to release green uranium from Hanford's smokestacks. Some engineers involved now suggest the experiment went awry. In any case, the Green Run released radionuclides on a scale never matched before or since in the United States, quietly coating downwind communities in iodine-131. The secret experiment vividly indicates the risks American officials felt obliged to run.²⁸

The Soviet nuclear-weapons complex was built in even greater haste and operated with far greater nonchalance. Stalin declared the creation of nuclear weapons to be "goal number one" as the Cold War began, and by 1949 he had what he wanted.²⁹ The Soviet atomic archipelago consisted of uranium mines (in which hundreds of thousands of prisoners died), secret cities built for nuclear research, fuel-processing sites, bomb factories, and test sites. The chief plutonium- and weapons-making centers were near Cheliabinsk in western Siberia, and Tomsk and Krasnoiarsk, both in central Siberia. These secret facilities were often cryptically referred to by their postal codes, i.e., Tomsk-7 and Krasnoiarsk-26. Their histories remain for the most part sealed in secrecy. Cheliabinsk-65, which also went by the name of Maiak ("lighthouse"), is the best known. For fifty years, it has been the most dangerously polluted place on earth.³⁰

28 Gerber, *Home Front*, 90–92; M. A. Robkin, "Experimental Release of 131I: The Green Run," *Health Physics*, 62, 6 (1992), 487–95.

29 For the origins of the nuclear-arms race, see David Holloway's chapter in volume I.

30 Although total radionuclide emissions may have been greater at Tomsk-7, there they were more widely dispersed: Don J. Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet Union* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1997), 451–72. On the Soviet nuclear complex, see Nikolai Egorov, Vladimir Novikov, Frank Parker, and Victor Popov (eds.), *The Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex* (London: Earthscan, 2000); Igor Kudrik, Charles Digges, Alexander Nikitin, Nils

The Maiak Chemical Complex opened in 1948. Over the years, at least 130 million curies (the official figure – others say billions)³¹ of radioactivity have been released at Maiak, affecting half a million people. Most of that occurred in its early years, especially 1950–51, when nuclear wastes were dumped into local rivers, from which thousands of people drew their drinking water. Several thousand villagers were evacuated; those who remained apparently suffer from elevated rates of leukemia.³² In an explosion in 1957, about 20 million curies escaped. Some 10,000 people were evacuated and 200 square kilometers were deemed unfit for human use.³³ Lake Karachai, a small and shallow pond used after 1951 as a dump for Maiak's nuclear wastes, is the most radioactive place on earth. It contains about twenty-four times as much radioactivity as was released in the disaster at Chernobyl in 1986. Today, standing at its shore for an hour would provide a fatal dose of radiation. As it is situated in an often dry landscape, its water level often sinks, exposing lakebed sediments. Fierce Siberian winds periodically scatter the radioactive dust, most damagingly in a 1967 drought.

Its human health effects, if official Soviet and Russian studies are to be believed, were modest.³⁴ However, a chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety once said the mess at Maiak was a hundred times worse than Chernobyl. Evidence offered by journalists who visited the region implies serious and pervasive human health problems.³⁵ So do some epidemiological studies, although their conclusions are often inconsistent.³⁶ In one especially hard-hit village, life expectancy for women in 1997 was

Bøhmer, Vladimir Kuznetsov, and Vladislav Larin, *The Russian Nuclear Industry* (Oslo: Bellona Foundation, 2004); John Whiteley, "The Compelling Realities of Mayak," in Dalton, *et al.*, *Critical Masses*, 59–96.

31 A Norwegian and Russian research team calculated that accidental and deliberate releases of strontium-90 and cesium-137 between 1948 and 1996 at Maiak amounted to 8,900 petabecquerels: Rob Edwards, "Russia's Toxic Shocker," *New Scientist*, 6 December 1997, 15. One petabecquerel equals 10^{15} becquerels; 8,900 petabecquerels is about 0.24 billion curies, roughly 1.8 times the official estimate.

32 Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain*, 399–401.

33 Zhores Medvedev, *Nuclear Disaster in the Urals* (New York: Norton, 1979).

34 Egorov, *et al.*, *Radiation Legacy*, 150–53; Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain*, 419–20.

35 E.g., Mark Hertsgaard, *Earth Odyssey* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998). See also Murray Feshbach, *Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995), 48–49; Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., *Ecocide in the USSR* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 174–79.

36 N.A. Koshikurnikova, *et al.*, "Mortality among Personnel Who Worked at the Mayak Complex in the First Years of Its Operation," *Health Physics*, 71 (1996): 90–3. M.M. Kossenko, "Cancer Mortality among Techa Rivers Residents and Their Offspring," *Health Physics* 71 (1996), 77–82; N.A. Koshikurnikova, *et al.*, "Studies on the Mayak Nuclear Workers: Health Effects," *Radiation and Environmental Biophysics*, 41 (2002), 29–31; Mikhail Balonov, *et al.*, "Assessment of Current Exposure of the Population Living in the Techa Basin from Radioactive Releases from the Mayak

twenty-five years below the Russian national average, and fourteen years for men.³⁷ The true human costs remain elusive at Maiak.³⁸

In one of the many ironies associated with the Cold War, some of its nuclear-weapons development sites became de facto wildlife preserves. As a result of banning humans in the interest of building bombs at the Savannah River Site, ducks, deer, snakes, 250 species of birds, and the largest alligator ever found in Georgia (not an atomic mutant) flourished despite 35 million gallons of high-level nuclear waste scattered around. The Rocky Flats Arsenal in Colorado became a prairie wildlife preserve, where the deer and the antelope play under the watchful eyes of up to 100 bald eagles. The Hanford stretch of the Columbia River, where the first atomic bombs were built, hosted the healthiest population of chinook salmon anywhere along the river.³⁹

The atomic archipelagoes consisted of much more than Hanford and Maiak and their ilk. Nuclear test sites, such as those in Nevada and Kazakhstan, were especially active in the early 1960s and have been radioactive ever since. The Soviet navy had dumping sites at sea for its spent nuclear fuel and contaminated machinery. It polluted inshore waters of the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans, especially around the island of Novaia Zemlia (also used as a bomb test site). Surprisingly, the world's most radioactive marine environment was not Soviet responsibility, but that of Britain. The Windscale site (renamed Sellafield in an attempt to shed notoriety), which produced weapons-grade plutonium for the UK's nuclear arsenal, released radionuclides into the Irish Sea, especially between 1965 and 1980. The Irish Sea does not disperse pollutants efficiently, so the radionuclides linger and turn up in seafood. Windscale also caught fire in 1957, which the British government acknowledged in 1982 and which it blamed for 32 deaths and a further 260 cases of cancer.⁴⁰

In sum, the nuclear-weapons programs of the Cold War probably killed a few hundred thousand people, at most a couple of million, most of them

Facility," *Health Physics*, 92 (2007), 134–47. Ongoing US Department of Energy studies also suggest serious health problems among former Maiak workers. See hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/IHS/ihp/jccrer/active_projects.html.

37 Whiteley, "Compelling Realities," 90, citing Paula Garb, "Complex Problems and No Clear Solutions: Difficulties of Defining and Assigning Culpability for Radiation Victimization in the Chelyabinsk Region of Russia," in B. R. Johnston (ed.), *Life and Death Matters: Human Rights at the End of the Millennium* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1997).

38 The least clear situation is China's, where data are fewer and less reliable even than for Russia. See Alexandra Brooks and Howard Hu, "China," in Makhijani, *et al.*, (eds.) *Nuclear Wastelands*, 515–18.

39 National Geographic News news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/08/0828_wirenukesites.html.

40 Bellona Foundation, *Bellona Report No. 8: Sellafield*, www.bellona.org.



32. The debris in Chernobyl reactor number four seen from the roof of the third reactor. The nuclear accident in April 1986 was an environmental disaster and mobilized opinion in the Soviet Union against the authorities on ecological issues.

slowly and indirectly via fatal cancers caused by radioactivity releases.⁴¹ But nowhere, not even at Maiak, did radioactive pollution kill millions of people and lay waste to broad regions. Cigarettes killed far more people during the Cold War than did nuclear-weapons programs. One is tempted to conclude that the environmental effects of Cold War nuclear-weapons programs were small.

But the story is not over yet. It will not end for about 100,000 years. Most radionuclides decay in hours, days, or months and cease to carry dangers for living creatures. But some wastes created in nuclear-weapons manufacture will remain lethally radioactive for more than 100,000 years, a waste-management obligation bequeathed to the next 3,000 human generations. If not consistently handled adroitly, this will elevate rates of leukemia and certain cancers in humans, especially children, for a long time to come.

⁴¹ Arhun Makhijani and Stephen I. Schwartz, "Victims of the Bomb," in Stephen I. Schwartz, (ed.), *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 395, gives a range of 70,000 to 800,000 for global cancer deaths attributable to US atmospheric testing. Estimates for deaths due to other aspects of nuclear weapons programs are still more inexact, especially where China and the USSR are concerned.

To reflect on the significance of this obligation it may help to remember that 100,000 years ago, mastodons, woolly mammoths and giant saber-toothed tigers roamed the future territories of the USSR and United States, while homo sapiens were just beginning their migrations out of Africa. Long, long after only a few historians know anything about the Cold War, people will either manage Cold War nuclear wastes through all the political turmoil, wars, regime changes, state failures, pandemics, earthquakes, sea-level rises, ice ages, and asteroid impacts that the future holds, or inadvertently suffer the consequences. As yet, there is no solution to the challenge of nuclear-waste storage.

Cold War ecologies

From 1945 to 1991, the tensions and anxieties of the Cold War led the United States and USSR, and eventually several other countries in Europe and Asia, to maintain and refine a perpetual state of readiness for war.⁴² This took many forms. The major powers all expanded military-industrial complexes on a scale never seen before. In the Soviet case 30–40 percent of industrial production went to military ends.⁴³ The Chinese built their military-industrial complex almost from scratch. Between 1964 and 1972, they developed a sprawling array of military industries deep in the interior of their country, bringing intense pollution problems with it.⁴⁴ Some of the major (and lesser) powers pursued population policies intended to maximize their national economic and military strength. The superpowers and their allies also devoted considerable energy to developing agriculture, transportation infrastructure, and nuclear weapons, the three projects considered in this chapter, in their efforts to prevail in the Cold War. Inevitably, these efforts also rearranged ecologies far and wide. In the cases where this was easily foreseen, such as the spread of atomic radiation, the cost seemed worth it to those charged with making decisions. But in most cases, the ecological effects of the projects became visible only once matters were underway.

42 For the arms race, see William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg's chapter in volume II.

43 Valerii Ivanovich Bulatov, *Rossia: ekologiya i armiya* [Russia: Ecology and the Army] (Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1999), has detailed figures.

44 Judith Shapiro, "Environmental Degradation and Security in Maoist China: Lessons from the War Preparation Movement," in Paul G. Harris (ed.), *Confronting Environmental Change in East and Southeast Asia* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 72–86.

The latter half of the Cold War (c. 1970–90) coincided with a worldwide surge in environmental awareness.⁴⁵ This constitutes a further link between the Cold War and environmental history. In Europe, especially Germany, environmentalism emerged in tandem with antinuclear activism. In the United States, India, and elsewhere, discontent with chemicalized agriculture fueled environmentalism. In the USSR, and almost everywhere, air and water pollution, some of it resulting from military industry, helped spark environmental agitation. So did the Chernobyl accident of 1986. Although it took place in a civilian nuclear reactor, the Soviet state, motivated partly by Cold War concerns, made clumsy attempts to keep it secret. One cannot easily disentangle the many roots of modern environmentalism. Some of them, surely, reach into the subsoil of the Cold War and its associated projects. Their deep and disturbing environmental changes helped usher in modern environmentalism, and thereby perhaps a new era in human consciousness.⁴⁶

45 Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000).

46 Luc Ferry, *The New Ecological Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

The Cold War and human rights

ROSEMARY FOOT

Neither the course nor the ending of the Cold War can be understood without some reference to the impact that human rights ideas had on East–West rivalries. Whereas Communist governments regarded civil and political rights as bourgeois trappings, stating a preference instead for the collective rights appropriate to the social and economic goals they propounded, Western liberal capitalist governments gave priority precisely to those rights that the Soviet bloc derided. These divisions in interpretation were crucial because of the way they related to the broader contest. They were ‘not mere preferences which outsiders could take or leave’, but were powerful emblems of success on the ideological battleground. The gaining of adherents to one interpretation over another signalled victory for one and defeat for the other – outcomes that, in turn, could strengthen or undermine the domestic legitimacy of their competing political systems.¹

This particular aspect of the Cold War struggle had both positive and negative results for the promotion and protection of human rights. Rhetorical arguments about the priorities to be given to certain values helped to sustain attention to the human rights idea, even as actual behaviour could prove devastating for human rights protections. Similarly, some of the seeds of the ending of the Cold War germinated as a result of the disillusion of those who experienced the double standards and the failures to promote the conditions under which those protections could advance. We cannot explain the demise of that ideological confrontation without some attention to the ways in which the superpowers’ association with human rights violations de-legitimised both sides, and in particular undermined political systems in the Soviet bloc, encouraging major shifts in policies and the eventual breakdown of Communist order.

¹ R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 62.

A focus on the Cold War confrontation should not obscure, however, the role that broader societal changes played in shaping the international human rights regime in the period after the Second World War. Even without the Cold War that regime would still have developed, although most probably over a different timescale and with a different trajectory. The analytical challenge is to be able to distinguish between the independent role that some of these processes have played, and the particular contribution made by Cold War politics.

Thus, this chapter seeks to uncover as specifically as possible the relationship between the Cold War and human rights, concentrating particularly on the global rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union in this issue area. It begins with a brief discussion of the expectations generated by wartime rhetoric – expectations that were never to be entirely eclipsed – before moving on to describe two oppositional processes: one in which East–West competition, on the one hand, contributed to the wide-scale abuse of rights and, on the other, to the development of some forms of protection. Finally, the chapter investigates the role that human rights ideas played in the ending of the Cold War, an ending that was not only unexpected, but also unexpectedly peaceful.

The main argument is that Cold War rivalries contributed significantly to the extensive violation of many of the rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). National security ideologies are strongly associated with repression and wide-scale abuse of the right to personal security, and many states' adoption of that ideology during the Cold War era demonstrated that association. Nevertheless, the centrality of rights in the discourse and behaviour of East and West helped to sustain the human rights idea and provided opportunities for political actors and organisations other than the state to promote political and legal change related to those values. The correspondence of an overwhelming focus on state security with a failure to promote political freedom, social welfare, or economic prosperity undermined the legitimacy of the governments of the Soviet bloc, and a new leadership in Moscow from 1985 responded in novel ways to try to repair that failure. Moreover, evidence that US foreign policy had often undermined the rights associated with its identity resulted in sharp criticism of the way the United States had defined its national interest and conducted its Cold War policies. Washington's decision in the early 1970s to introduce human rights considerations into its foreign policy was one response to this criticism. By the late twentieth century, these processes had combined to ensure that the promotion and protection of human rights had become a major part of the fabric of a modern and legitimate state.

Human rights prior to the Cold War

The precursors for human rights ideas date back several centuries. However, the twentieth century saw the quickening of interest in areas such as women's minority rights, and over the course of the Second World War human rights talk expanded enormously. H. G. Wells's 1940 pamphlet, *The Rights of Man; Or What Are We Fighting For?* was widely translated and distributed, and had a print run of over 100,000 copies. Allied leaders spoke of the need to defend core rights and denounced the Nazi regime for its many atrocities.

Of all the wartime leaders, the US president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was the most vigorous in mobilising human rights as part of the war effort. His famous 1941 State of the Union address had promoted the 'Four Freedoms' – freedom of speech and religion and freedom from fear and want – as the essential qualities of a democratic and peaceful world. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August of the same year, described their desire to establish postwar peace on the basis of goals which would 'afford assurance that all the men [sic] in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and freedom from want'.²

Stirring phrases such as these inevitably inspired those who did not live out their lives so securely. Nelson Mandela, then a young black lawyer in South Africa, seized upon them, spurring the African National Congress to create its own charter. Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) wrote to Roosevelt asking for assurance that the 'colored peoples of the world, who constitute four-fifths of the world's population', would no longer be subjected to discrimination and treated as inferior. The NAACP co-founder, W. E. B. Du Bois, who represented one of several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the San Francisco conference held in May 1945 to debate the UN Charter's articles, made an important

2 Particularly helpful to this pre-Cold War section are Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950', *Historical Journal*, 47, 2 (2004), 385–87; Kenneth Cmiel, 'Human Rights, Freedom of Information, and the Origins of Third World Solidarity', in Mark Philip Bradley and Patrice Petro (eds.), *Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 108–09; Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005), Introduction and ch. 1; Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Susan Waltz, 'Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights', *Third World Quarterly*, 23, 3 (2002), 437–48; Howard Tolley, Jr., *The UN Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1987), ch. 2; Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 2.

link between racism in the United States and colonialism abroad. NGOs then and thereafter were to prove central in demanding that rights be universally recognised through the creation of an international legal regime.

Against this background of debate and high expectation, the UN Charter came to include human rights in its preamble and six of its articles, including Article 68, which charged the UN's Economic and Social Council to set up bodies with the specific mandate to promote human rights. This brought into being in 1946 the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The UN quickly set to work drafting an international bill of rights, which led in December 1948 to the UDHR (immediately after the opening for signature of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). Work on framing the two human rights covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) proceeded shortly after this, resulting in a UNCHR draft being passed on to the UN General Assembly's Third Committee in 1954.

The politics of repression in the Cold War

There were early signals that this momentum, generated in the immediate postwar years, would not be sustained. Two factors in particular blocked progress: the Cold War's ideological divisions and domestic political concerns that could be linked to that international struggle. If the allies in the Second World War had chosen to describe their opponents as systematic violators of human rights, the antagonisms between the Communist bloc and the Western democracies quickly embraced similar rhetoric. The Truman Doctrine, enunciated in 1947, claimed that all people faced a choice 'between alternative ways of life': one that advanced various freedoms and the other that relied on oppression, terror, and control.³ The Soviet bloc, for its part, pointed to Western practices of racial discrimination and colonialism, as well as to the lack of social and economic rights in the capitalist West.

These polemics confirmed two things: first, that the differences between the two sides would be described in the starkest ways with little room for nuance. Secondly, unlike the Atlantic Charter, or Four Freedoms, from here on, US administrations would have relatively little to do with 'freedom from

3 President Harry S. Truman's Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, available at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm.

want' as a right, preferring to emphasise civil and political rights. The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, projected its way of life as superior to the West in precisely this economic and social realm with its promises to guarantee housing, medical care, and employment. The UDHR contained thirty articles which encompassed all these dimensions, but transforming this declaration into a binding treaty proved to be highly contentious. Two covenants instead of the expected one resulted, one consequence of which has been to encourage the ICESCR's status as the 'step-child of the international human rights movement'.⁴ It took twelve years of article-by-article debate before the two covenants finally emerged for signature in 1966.⁵

Beyond the international rivalry, strong domestic political opposition to the two core covenants in Washington and Moscow also played its part in constraining the legal codification of rights. Nationalists, racists, and conservatives raised objections in the United States, prompting Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to announce in February 1953 that the United States would not ratify any human rights treaty. The Soviet Union continually fretted about the focus on individual rights and the implied watering-down of the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs. However, unlike the United States, it remained more engaged in the early years, quickly seeing the benefits of alignment with developing countries concerned about economic development, control over their own resources, and the protection of newly won sovereignty.

Such politicking easily spilled over into various other aspects of the UN's work. For example, Soviet objection to any effort that did not have repatriation as a defining principle initially damaged efforts to protect the many postwar refugees. For the Soviet bloc, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was simply a propaganda tool of the West. The United States, on the other hand, bypassed the UNHCR in its early years in order to implement its own independent refugee policy that gave favourable treatment to those escaping from Communist rule. The UNHCR's consequent lack of resources meant it could not respond to many appeals for assistance, including from India and Pakistan, whose governments requested material help for the some 14 million refugees generated after partition.⁶

4 David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 77.

5 Susan Waltz, 'Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26 (2004), 806.

6 Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. ch. 3.



33. Guatemalan Mayan Quiche Indians carry the coffins of the forty-one victims found in a clandestine 1980s cemetery, 2001. The atrocities against members of peasant movements in Central America are grim examples of Cold War violations of human rights.

More fundamentally, as the Cold War began to be felt in every part of the globe, its effects overshadowed the profound struggles for social change taking place in many different societies, and obscured the domestic roots of conflict. In Latin America, for example, (as elsewhere) Cold War requirements, Greg Grandin argues, ‘fused together multiple, long-evolving individual, national, and international experiences and conflicts’, raising the stakes and polarising the protagonists. As Grandin notes, ‘Cold war terror – either executed, patronized, or excused by the United States’ – led over 100,000 to be ‘disappeared’.⁷ John Coatsworth writes that it would be difficult to underestimate the cost of the Cold War to Central Americans, with a death toll of approximately 300,000 between 1975 and 1991 alone, out of a population of fewer than 30 million.⁸

Starting first with the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954, which led to the overthrow of a freely elected leftist president, Jacobo Arbenz, the Cold War radicalised state and non-state opponents, reducing the influence of more

⁷ Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), xi, 3.

⁸ See John H. Coatsworth’s chapter in this volume.

moderate forces. For the next three decades, the United States continued to supply Guatemala's security forces with equipment, training, and assistance. Kathryn Sikkink has described the 'green light' that President Ronald Reagan gave for repression in Guatemala as the 'forgotten tragedy of the Reagan administration policy toward Latin America'.⁹

Practices developed earlier in Guatemala – from covert operations to death-squad killings – spread throughout the region. The United States pushed actively for the creation of national and Latin America-wide counter-insurgency networks, especially after the 1959 Cuban revolution. This contributed to the establishment of repressive regimes throughout the continent, including Brazil in 1964, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, Argentina in 1976, and El Salvador in the late 1970s.¹⁰ In the 1960s, the US Army School of the Americas worked with the Latin American security forces to 'defend against communist subversion'. Its manuals, in use until 1991, sanctioned beatings, torture, and executions. Human rights violations in both Argentina and Chile came to a peak during the eras of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, but Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to give them priority. He viewed condemnation of the human rights record of the Augusto Pinochet regime as a 'total injustice' and denigrated his staff 'who have a vocation for the ministry' for placing human rights at the centre of briefing papers prepared for his meeting with the Chilean foreign minister in September 1975.¹¹ The Cold War did not introduce anti-Communism to Latin America, neither did US administrations find virgin ground when it came to developing harsh counter-insurgency techniques, but the continent's entrenched elites found in the United States an accomplice willing to help perpetuate their rule and thwart what they would constantly describe as 'Moscow-dictated' subversion.¹²

The incidence of human rights abuses in the Communist world more than matched that elsewhere, often directed against those who could be labelled as pro-Western subversives or 'stooges'. In order to assist with internal

⁹ Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 180.

¹⁰ Grandin, *Last Colonial Massacre*, esp. preface, introduction, and ch. 3.

¹¹ 'Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal', 29 September 1975, from *Pinochet: A Declassified Documentary* Obit, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (NSA EBB) no. 212, edited by Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm. See also NSA EBB no. 122, which discusses two US Central Intelligence Agency interrogation manuals from the 1960s and 1980s. These outline the coercive interrogation techniques that were in operation then: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/index.htm.

¹² Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, 'The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America', in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (ed.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 299–316.

consolidation and because of fears that enemies abroad would establish links with those at home, the new Chinese Communist regime adopted the 'Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries' between 1950 and 1953 against the backdrop of Chinese involvement in the Korean War. As Julia Strauss has put it: 'From beginning to end, the Campaign invoked the ongoing war in Korea as it defined enemies of the state as saboteurs, fifth columns, and subverters of national unity.' While the official Chinese figures for those executed vary from a low of 700,000–800,000 to a high of 2 million, other materials suggest that 'the scale of the campaign was larger, and the terror more extensive, than has been previously realized'.¹³

The brutality of the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, following on from the terrors associated with Stalinist rule, were moments for rejecting the Soviet system for many among the Western Left, as well as spurring an exodus from or rebellion within socialist bloc countries. Intra-Soviet bloc military interventions reflected a palpable fear in Moscow that any form of liberalisation could lead to a wider unravelling, and showed to outsiders that socialist rule had its internal detractors even among the countries' elites.

Prominent among those detractors in the Soviet Union was the physicist Andrei Sakharov, who criticised the Soviet regime and its leader, Leonid Brezhnev, when the Prague Spring was crushed. As Sakharov's file makes clear, Iurii Andropov, the head of the KGB, the Soviet security and intelligence agency, saw the Soviet physicist as a threat not only because of his appeal among intellectuals inside the country, but also because his writings and petitions signified that the Soviet experiment had failed to retain the loyalty of even its most honoured citizens.¹⁴ In fact, the KGB kept careful records of the numbers of all those it deemed as having committed 'crimes against the state' or having engaged in other anti-Soviet activities, constantly assessing and reassessing the level of repression needed to keep dissent under control.¹⁵ Whereas in 1975 and 1976 the levels of arrests and other forms of harassment

13 Julia C. Strauss, 'Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950–1953', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 1 (2002), 83, 87, 99.

14 Edited and annotated by Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribov, *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 23. In 1975, Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize.

15 See, for example, 'About Some Results of Preventive-Phylactic Work of the State Security Organs', 31 October. 1975, and I. Andropov report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 29 December 1975, both in 'The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files', NSA EBB no. 191, ed. by

were kept low, by 1977, a KGB crackdown began, with repression increasing significantly in 1979 and reaching a peak in 1983.¹⁶

The resort to repression at home was reflected in policies promoted abroad. When it came to making alignments with the developing world, the Soviet bloc and Communist China acted like Western countries. They were not at all choosy about which dictator they supported, provided they remained sufficiently closely aligned to suggest the attractiveness of one politico-economic model over the other.

The Soviet leadership, especially under Nikita Khrushchev, paid particular attention to the Third World, believing that victory in the Cold War could be won there. Thus, Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, by the mid-1970s became the major recipient of Soviet military aid among developing countries, despite his violent repression of the Iraqi Communist Party. The first generation of African leaders that roused the interest of the KGB included the 'Marxist' dictators of Guinea and Mali, Ahmed Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita. After the overthrow of Ethiopia's Haile Selassie in 1974, the Moscow leadership gave its support to Haile Mariam Mengistu's regime only to hear him justifying the 'massacre of [his] opponents, real and imagined, by referring to Lenin's use of Red Terror during the Russian Civil War'. Some scholars have argued that the repressive behaviour of numerous African leaders was a direct result of KGB involvement: '[t]he most enduring Soviet-bloc legacy in many of the post-colonial states of sub-Saharan Africa', writes Christopher Andrew, 'was the help [the KGB] provided in setting up brutal security services to shore up their one-party regimes'.¹⁷

Building the rights regime and sustaining the rights idea

Nevertheless, the ideological conflict that often worked in deadly ways against the protection of human rights could sometimes work in more positive

Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas S. Blanton, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchuv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB191/index.htm. Punishments included prison, detention in psychiatric hospitals, and harsh forms of interrogation.

16 NSA EBB no. 191, authors' commentary at 3. In 1977, Andropov and Mykola Rudenko wrote of the need to 'take more decisive measures'. See 'On Measures for the Curtailment of the Criminal Activities of Orlov, Ginsburg, Rudenko, and Ventslova', 20 January 1977, NSA EBB no. 191.

17 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), esp. 8–9, 142, 428–29. As Michael E. Latham notes in volume II of this study, superpower-supported violence in the Third World increased dramatically by the late 1960s, contributing to a 'tragic pattern of expanded militarization, civil war, and human suffering across some of the poorest regions of the globe'.

directions, sometimes by design, often inadvertently. Finalisation of a declaration such as the UDHR could provide opportunities for other states or NGOs, as well as individuals, to demand movement to the next stage. Longer-term social trends also favoured the embedding and widening of the international human rights regime. We cannot understand the maintenance of the human rights idea without attention to the rise of social movements, and the power of a new discourse stressing the worth of the individual. That discourse, when turned into a legally codified form, provided points of leverage for those willing to act as if the formal guarantees should be taken seriously.

Human rights NGOs of a domestic as well as a transnational kind have always played a primary role in promoting the protection of rights. As a result of improvements in technology, organisation, and resources, these groups were ideally positioned from the 1970s and 1980s to ensure there was wider knowledge about instances of abuse, as well as about any governmental or organisational failures to address these concerns.¹⁸

The UN's human rights bodies became heavily dependent on the information resources of the NGOs and, over time, increasingly receptive to their presence in debate. It is unlikely that the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment would have opened for signature in 1984 without the prior activism and legal expertise of Amnesty International (AI) and others like it. Neither would the UN Working Group on Disappearances – the proposal for which first came before the UNCHR in 1980, with Chile and Argentina as two focal points of the campaign – have been established without similar NGO intervention.¹⁹

Developing countries were also vital in framing norms against racism, discrimination, and colonialism. The anti-colonial movement decided that expression of its demands in the language of rights would increase its political power, even though the argument for self-determination rested on claims for the collectivity.²⁰ Most Western states had been reluctant to include reference to self-determination of peoples in the two core covenants, but Soviet bloc

18 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

19 Ann Marie Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), 170–75 and 251–53. Once Amnesty had placed the issue of torture on the global agenda, Sweden and the Netherlands formally took up the baton within the UN.

20 For an extensive treatment of the role of newly decolonised states in advancing the UN's human rights agenda, see Roland George Burke, 'The Politics of Decolonisation and the Evolution of the International Human Rights Project', Ph.D thesis, University of Melbourne, 2007.

support of the developing-country position, together with growing Third World representation in the UN, forced compromise, and by 1966 the two core covenants opened for signature. If this phrasing was susceptible to manipulation and multiple interpretation and if the United Nations never fully lived up to its early promise in the rights area, it is generally accepted that the UN's enshrining of the principle of self-determination as a 'right' served more quickly to undermine the legitimacy of colonial rule than otherwise might have been the case. The Third World voice grew steadily in strength over the 1950s and early 1960s, nearly eighty former colonies becoming members of the UN by 1965. Their presence ensured the votes necessary to bring about the implementation of the two covenants in 1976 and to launch a new discourse on 'third-generation' rights, such as the right to development.²¹

European governments similarly had helped to keep the human rights idea alive. Prompted by civil society groups and concerned individuals, they moved swiftly after the Second World War to set up region-wide institutions to monitor respect for human rights. The Council of Europe made support for rights and for the rule of law conditions for membership. European states also developed for signature and ratification in 1950 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which gave monitoring powers to the European Commission of Human Rights and judicial decision-making authority to a European Court.²²

Kirsten Sellars argues that the European commitment to building its regional human rights regime owed much to its intention to burnish its anti-Communist credentials and champion its way of life in opposition to that in the East of the continent.²³ Andrew Moravcsik notes that this process relied disproportionately on those European states that wanted to anchor their new, democratic, credentials at a time of regime fragility.²⁴ Yet, whatever the original impulses, the regional rights regime still came to be strong and independent enough to be used against one of its own even at the height of the

21 Mark Philip Bradley in his chapter in volume I of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* notes how decolonisation raised the hopes among the newly independent of achieving the 'individual and collective political and socioeconomic well-being so long denied to them under the imperial order'.

22 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 40; and Sikkink, 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139–70.

23 Kirsten Sellars, *The Rise and Rise of Human Rights* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2002), 80.

24 Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe', *International Organization*, 54, 2 (2000), 217–52.

Cold War, namely Greece under the colonels. In 1967, after the military coup, the Council of Europe suspended Greek membership on the grounds that its actions and behaviour violated the terms of that membership.²⁵ The European Community came to enshrine similar membership principles. In 1973, at the Copenhagen summit, European heads of state and government formally affirmed that entry into the European Community required commitment to the pursuit of human rights and promotion of the rule of law and democracy. The Europeans were also insistent that human rights principles be made a part of the Helsinki Final Act.²⁶

Cold War propaganda could also prove useful to those in the United States working to overturn racist practices. The United States may have removed itself from a central role in promoting international human rights instruments, but that did not prevent others from criticising 'Jim Crow' laws – to good effect – at a time of high Cold War tension. The world's press commented negatively on discriminatory American practices. Shanghai's *Da Gong Bao*, produced under a Chinese Nationalist government, noted the arrest of US senator Glen Taylor, who had infringed segregation laws by using the 'colored entrance' to an Alabama church. Likewise, the newspapers of non-aligned India were full of articles that reported on segregation, the Ku Klux Klan, and the denial of voting rights, comparing US society with British imperial rule. Not surprisingly, by 1949, the US Embassy in Moscow had grown alarmed, reporting that 'the "Negro question"' had become a 'principal Soviet propaganda' theme. In cases such as *Brown v. Board of Education*, the US Justice Department argued successfully that desegregation was in the US interest not simply for domestic reasons, but also because racist laws furnished 'grist for the Communist propaganda mills'. These racist laws prompted 'doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith'. The Justice Department quoted the former US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, at some length to support this argument. Acheson had stated that Soviet propaganda efforts were growing and reaching 'all corners of the world' where the charge of hypocrisy had become impossible to ignore.²⁷ Although it would take another ten years or more before other aspects of

25 Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience*, 39–40.

26 Daniel C. Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas, The Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7, 2, (Spring 2005), 124; and see Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

27 Mary L. Dudziak, 'Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative', *Stanford Law Review*, 41, 1 (1988), 61–120; and Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

racial discrimination were to be addressed under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, nevertheless, this 1954 case has rightly been viewed as a critical turning point.

Reinvigorated champions of civil rights joined forces with anti-Vietnam war activists in the 1960s to make a broader claim that US foreign policy had not only failed to deliver security, but also had violated the values for which the United States supposedly stood. Some key figures who tried to bring about change were the member of the US Congress, Donald Fraser, and the US senator, Tom Harkin. Fraser later stated that he had become sensitised to human rights issues because of a series of international events in which the United States had been involved, including 'military coups in Greece and in Chile, the Vietnam War, the situation in South Africa, and the [1965] US intervention in the Dominican Republic'. Fraser, as chair of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Relations Committee, held hearings in the early 1970s on US foreign policy and human rights violations which brought him into contact with leaders of several human rights organisations. His subcommittee's report subsequently shaped US foreign policy-making. It led to the establishment of a human rights bureau within the State Department, the annual US State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, and the legislation that was intended to condition loans on the basis of a country's human rights record. Some members of Congress supported these initiatives primarily because they could further the anti-Soviet cause. Senator Henry Jackson, for example, and those who coalesced around him desired to focus on human rights violations in the Soviet bloc. In 1974, they passed the Jackson–Vanik amendment which granted most-favoured-nation trading status to the Soviet Union only if the Kremlin relaxed its constraints on Jews seeking to leave the USSR.²⁸

In the mid-1970s, Jimmy Carter decided to make human rights a central part of his electoral appeal. In the debate on foreign policy with the incumbent president, Gerald R. Ford, Carter referred on seven occasions to the military coup in Chile and subsequent human rights abuses. He was so identified with the cause of human rights in Latin America that, on election eve, with his victory virtually guaranteed, members of the Uruguayan military regime abruptly left an election party held in the US Embassy.²⁹ On taking office, Carter moved swiftly to show his commitment, voicing support for Czech dissidents and warning the Kremlin not to muzzle Sakharov or mistreat

28 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, esp. ch. 3. See too Kenneth Cmiel, 'The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States', *Journal of American History*, 86 (December 1999), 1231–50.

29 Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 75.

another protestor, Aleksandr Ginsburg.³⁰ Despite the difficulties Carter encountered in making good on his human rights agenda,³¹ thereafter, the US executive branch has not found it easy to ignore norms and laws that had been put in place.

Civil society organisations emerged in the Soviet bloc as well as in the West. Increased numbers of citizens questioned the repressive nature of the political systems and began focusing on rights issues.³² Ludmilla Alexeyeva dates the awakening of reformist movements in the Soviet Union to Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956 and to the aftermath of the suppression of the Prague Spring. However, she stresses that the birth date of the human rights movement should be 5 December 1965, when the first demonstration under the slogan 'Respect the Soviet Constitution!' took place in Pushkin Square, Moscow. The dissidents argued that, if laws existed, the state was bound to honour them. Challenges of this sort, and others like them in the Eastern bloc, resonated because of the positivist view of international law that prevailed.³³

Samizdat publishing (defined by Vladimir Bukovsky as: 'I write it myself, censor it myself, print and disseminate it myself, and then I do time in prison for it myself') was crucial to cementing bonds between dissident groups and eventually to publicising their demands in the West.³⁴ The International League for Human Rights became the first Western rights organisation to establish links with a similar group in Moscow, affiliating with the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1971, a grouping that counted Sakharov among its members.³⁵

³⁰ See Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume.

³¹ David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, 'Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights', *Diplomatic History*, 28, 1 (January 2004), 113–43, have argued that administration officials were 'well aware of the difficulties, contradictions, and potential inconsistencies and problems with their policy'. However, they remained committed to promoting it. See esp. 117.

³² Robert D. English, 'The Road(s) Not Taken: Causality and Contingency in Analysis of the Cold War's End', in William C. Wohlforth (ed.), *Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), 250–51.

³³ Tony Evans, *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 75. As Jan Werner Müller writes in this volume, Charter 77 subscribed to strict legal positivism, offering to 'help' the state implement the Helsinki Accords of 1975; Matthew Evangelista's chapter argues that these acts of 'civil obedience' served to bolster the 'international [human rights] norms that a reformist Soviet leadership came to recognize as legitimate'.

³⁴ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 12. See, too, Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post Stalin Era* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990).

³⁵ Cmiel, 'The Emergence of Human Rights Politics', 1238.

Helsinki and after

However, it was the 'Helsinki process', started in 1973 with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that was a pivotal moment for the domestic reformers in the Soviet bloc. Thereafter, trans-national linkages between human rights groups there and in the West deepened.³⁶ These ties reflected the desire of many in the East to loosen the bonds of repression and of many in the West to help them do so, but the Western resources committed to supporting that effort owed much to Cold War imperatives.

The primary, initial aim of the CSCE was to stabilise East–West relations. For the Soviets, it represented an opportunity to achieve final recognition of the territorial and ideological division of Europe and to increase levels of economic co-operation, goals that reflected the Kremlin's desire to use détente to reduce the potential for crisis between the Cold War opponents.³⁷ Nevertheless, members of the European Community (EC) were not wholly content with these geostrategic aims. They viewed the unprecedented negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries as an opportunity to expand the promotion of human rights beyond the Western part of the continent. The nine EC member states insisted that human rights provisions be a part of the negotiations. As a result of their persistence, they won agreement in the Helsinki Final Act to Principle VII – 'Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief' – together with a number of concrete measures to expand human contacts and exchanges under the Basket III provisions of the CSCE.

Not expecting these provisions to have any impact, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies not only signed the agreement, but also published the complete text of the Final Act, including these humanitarian principles.³⁸ Communist leaders soon discovered, to their surprise, that dissidents throughout the bloc were willing to test compliance and act as if the text had real

36 Trans-nationalism also affected the evolution of the Cold War in areas other than human rights, such as military security. See Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

37 See Jussi M. Hanhimäki's, Marc Trachtenberg's, Robert D. Schulzinger's, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman's chapters in volume II.

38 As Andrei Gromyko told his Politburo colleagues, 'We are masters in our own house': quoted in William Burr (ed.), *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks between Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1998), 326. See, too, 'Record of Conversation of Cde. L. I. Brezhnev with Leaders of Fraternal Parties', 18 March 1975, NSA EBB no. 191.

meaning. In May 1976, at a press conference called by Sakharov, Iurii Orlov announced the creation of a grouping – the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group – that would monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords. He also called on such groups to be established elsewhere. Similar bodies did form in Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine as well as outside the Soviet Union. The most important were Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the Workers' Defence Committee, the forerunner to Solidarity in Poland.³⁹ In East Germany, many citizens learned from their radios or churches that freedom of movement had been guaranteed in the Helsinki agreement, leading some 100,000 of them to apply to go to the West in the twelve months after signature of the accords.⁴⁰

Another major turning point came in 1979 with the formal establishment of the US Helsinki Watch Committee, funded by the Ford Foundation. It also aimed to monitor compliance with the Final Act and to provide moral support for those struggling for that objective inside the Soviet bloc. This US body soon started to act as a vital conduit for information on repression to the international media, and it lobbied policy-makers at home to continue to press the issue with Soviet leaders.⁴¹

Repression in the Soviet bloc rose over this period, however, indicating the continuing fear in Moscow and elsewhere that, if any relaxation were to occur, the protest movement would become impossible to control. By 1979, twenty-three members of the Soviet Helsinki Committee had been arrested and, in 1980, Sakharov was exiled to Gorkii. In 1982, the Moscow group had to disband, and the Polish Helsinki Committee was forced underground after the 1981 declaration of martial law in that country. Yet, the CSCE review process, with its follow-up meetings in Belgrade in 1977–78, Madrid in 1980–83, and Vienna in 1986–89, would serve to sustain the pressure and the publicity. Western diplomats continued to make full rapprochement conditional on human rights improvements; and activist networks in the West continued to press their governments to remain so focused. Following President Reagan's attacks on repression in the 'evil empire', the US secretary of state,

39 It was no coincidence that the idea of Charter 77 was conceived on the day that the Prague government published details of the country's accession to the two core human rights covenants: noted in Adam Roberts, 'Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights', *American Journal of International Law*, 100, 3 (July 2006), 596.

40 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 107–09. A useful summary of human rights and the CSCE process is contained in Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998), 78–81. See too Jussi M. Hanhimäki, 'Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective', in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 335–36.

41 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 151.

George Shultz, made human rights the number one item on his agenda with Gorbachev in a 1987 meeting. Shultz apparently had become 'increasingly passionate in his private views as a result of firsthand encounters with Soviet dissidents, their families and supporters in the United States'.⁴²

Thus, while in many ways the early 1980s were 'the worst years for the Soviet human rights movement', the Helsinki groups' activities 'became the fertile soil for Gorbachev's perestroika after 1985 . . . The signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the founding of the Moscow Helsinki Group [became] a story of unintended consequences for the Soviet regime.' There was, then, a crucial link between the mid-1970s, the ending of the Cold War, and the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc.⁴³

Human rights and the ending of the Cold War

As we have seen, the deepening interest in human rights ideas in the Soviet bloc and a willingness to try to promote rights, even at great personal cost, pre-dated the formal ending of the Cold War by several years. Attention to these earlier events suggests that using the lens of human rights can tell us something about the end of that confrontation: its timing around the mid- to late 1980s; its direction, including accommodation with the West through internal political reform; and its peaceful character.⁴⁴

Many Soviet dissidents felt compelled to leave their country. Two of these exiles, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky, further eroded the legitimacy of the Soviet system both at home and abroad when they won the Nobel Prize in Literature. The dissident emigres sharpened the focus on Soviet and Eastern bloc repression that Western delegations then highlighted at the CSCE review meetings on the Helsinki Final Act.⁴⁵ Sakharov, the most renowned Soviet dissident, however, stayed in Gorkii, outlived Leonid Brezhnev, Iurii Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko, and was permitted to return to Moscow only after Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985.

42 Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: How the Cold War Came to An End* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 226.

43 NSA EBB no. 191, authors' commentary, 3.

44 See introduction to the special issue of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 'Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War', 7, 2 (Spring 2005), 10.

45 Rubenstein and Gribanov, *KGB File*, 28.

Unlike most others who had risen to the top, Gorbachev had studied law at Moscow University. There, he made a friend of Zdeněk Mlynář, a Czech, who later joined the reformist groups in Prague and helped found Charter 77. Mlynář stayed with the Gorbachevs during a visit to the USSR in the summer of 1967.⁴⁶ Subsequently, Gorbachev described Mlynář as 'probably the person I'm closest to. He always has been.'⁴⁷ While it seems clear that the Gorbachev revolution was one from above rather than from below, the general secretary's friendship with Mlynář suggests he had long been receptive to reformist ideas. And, once he had consolidated his position, Gorbachev rehabilitated to advisory positions some of the individuals who had promoted independent thinking.⁴⁸

The year 1986 was especially important for the improvement of human rights in the USSR. Gorbachev outlined his 'new thinking' at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May, exhorting Soviet diplomats not to 'shrink' from discussing the subject of rights 'freely with the West', although his statement also implied that the diplomats should use the opportunity to give a firm rebuttal to Western criticisms.⁴⁹ Without making a public announcement, by the middle of 1986, the Politburo had almost completely stopped arresting political dissidents. In the autumn, Orlov, the founder of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, was permitted to return from exile in Siberia. With respect to those who had migrated abroad, Gorbachev argued: 'On human rights, let us see what we can do. We need to open a way back to the Soviet Union for the thousands of emigrants, to move this current in the opposite direction.'⁵⁰

Gorbachev's new thinking about human rights was strongly related to his attachment to the idea of a Europe that would run 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'. The Soviet leader was well aware that acceptance within the common European home required a commitment to protecting human rights which partially explains why Gorbachev and other reformers opted for radical

46 Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas', 119. For fuller discussion of the creation and nature of Gorbachev's world-view, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); English, 'Road(s) Not Taken', esp. 253–59.

47 Brown, 'Introduction', Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xiv.

48 Brown, *Gorbachev Factor*, 94–96; Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas', 119–22; Robert English, 'Ideas and the End of the Cold War: Rethinking Intellectual and Political Change', in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds.), *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 130; Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. by Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 93–94.

49 Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 162–63. 50 Thomas, 'Human Rights Ideas', 131.

political reform rather than Chinese-style economic liberalisation under an authoritarian regime.⁵¹

Once Gorbachev had determined on this approach and had articulated (in 1988) a strong commitment to freedom of choice for the peoples in Eastern Europe, activist groups in the bloc pressed their governments to initiate reforms.⁵² In Poland, the government negotiated with and then re-legalised Solidarity, allowing it to participate in elections in June 1989. In Czechoslovakia, the authorities released Václav Havel from prison, and permitted a demonstration commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the UDHR. The East German government tried to resist the tide, but demonstrations continued to grow in strength, and thousands continued to flow through Hungary's now open border with Austria.

Certain Soviet bloc leaders did authorise the use of force against demonstrators and debated whether levels of retaliation should become firmer. The bloody crackdown in Beijing in June 1989 showed what could in fact have happened. Soviet security forces also used force in several of the republics, opening fire on demonstrators in Tbilisi in April 1989.⁵³ But, for the most part, leaders eschewed forcible acts of repression. As Premier Ladislav Adamec of Czechoslovakia argued in November 1989, the use of force would only provoke further resistance that, in turn, would further undermine the legitimacy of the party. Moreover, those subjected to repression would continue to receive support from abroad. Tellingly, he added, 'signed international treaties dealing with human rights cannot be taken lightly'.⁵⁴

Adamec finished his statement by mentioning that his government could no longer automatically rely on support from other socialist governments. Nor could he expect to escape a Western political and economic boycott should force be used.⁵⁵ These arguments show that calculation based on material factors influenced the crucial decisions taken in East European countries in the late 1980s. Indeed, it is not necessary to claim that materialist arguments played no role in the ending of the Cold War. Obviously, as one sceptic on the role of non-material forces has acknowledged, material incentives alongside ideas such as those associated with human rights seemed to

51 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 229–34. English describes Gorbachev's embrace of a 'liberal Weltanschauung' in 'Ideas and the End of the Cold War', 131.

52 Brown, *Gorbachev Factor*, 224–25; *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 'The End of the Cold War' (special issue), 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001).

53 'The Tbilisi Massacre, April 1989: Documents', *ibid.*, 31–48.

54 Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect*, 253. 55 *Ibid.*, 254.

push in the same direction.⁵⁶ However, the effects of several years of non-violent protests in support of human rights and fundamental freedoms, together with Gorbachev's acceptance that the values articulated at Helsinki were universal and that membership in the common European home required endorsement of those ideas, were decisive in shaping the terms of its ending.⁵⁷ These events and understandings underpinned his decision to keep the Red Army in the barracks in 1989 and 1990, even against the opposition of some senior colleagues.

Human rights in the Cold War

The conduct of the Cold War, the national security ideologies that lay at its root, and its all-encompassing scope resulted in the wholesale violations of human rights. The major states at the core of this conflict were either complicit, or centrally involved, and only under certain political circumstances would they address the evidence of abuse. George F. Kennan, the father of US containment policies, had warned in 1946 that the 'greatest danger' that could 'befall [the United States] in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping'. Prescient as always, perhaps even he was surprised at quite how far this would go in the following decades.⁵⁸

Yet, there was a dialogic as well as a dialectical relationship between the Cold War and human rights which operated in ways that kept the human rights idea alive. Rights, even as they were trampled upon, could remain sources of inspiration and reflective of a set of values with which governments wished to be associated. The pillorying of those who egregiously violated rights, even if those criticisms were often prompted by political motives, could serve to keep the focus on those values. The steadily growing association of human rights with legitimate rule challenged authoritarian governments. It also provided opportunities for those who demanded that their rulers, including those who led democratic states, live up to expressed commitments.

⁵⁶ William C. Wohlforth, 'The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 7,2 (Spring 2005), 172.

⁵⁷ See Jacques Lévesque's, Helga Haffendorf's, and Archie Brown's chapters in this volume.

⁵⁸ George Kennan, 'Moscow Embassy Telegram no. 511', 22 February 1946, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946*, VI (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 709.

In ways that were largely unanticipated in the West and in the East, human rights contributed to the Cold War's end. The Helsinki process provided the means by which to express a common Western policy on rights, it acted as a focal point for domestic and trans-national activist pressure, and it had an impact on Gorbachev's thinking about the Soviet place in the world. It also showed the dominance of the discourse on civil and political rights over that of economic, social, and cultural concerns, a dominance that remains controversial.

Despite initially unpromising circumstances, the international human rights regime did manage to become established and extended over the four decades of the Cold War. Many governments, as well as private and public institutions, have come to voice support for the protection of human rights. Some governments even promote rights as a component of their foreign policies and have exposed themselves to scrutiny with ratification of human rights treaties. Nevertheless, this global regime, while powerful in setting standards, is not so powerful when it comes to implementing those standards. One explanation for this weakness relates to the problem of sustaining a priority for rights protections where such rights are said to clash with other foreign-policy objectives. Notably, since the terrorist attacks on and after 11 September 2001, many people have come to re-calibrate the relationship between liberty and security, and once again the individual's right to personal security has come under threat. The Cold War is over, but the struggle for human rights is not.

The Cold War in the *longue durée*: global migration, public health, and population control

MATTHEW CONNELLY

A three-volume history is an impressive monument to Cold War studies. But could it one day be seen as a tombstone? The grave danger inherent in super-power relations might appear to provide enduring reasons to continue studying them indefinitely. A different outcome, after all, could have changed everything. Yet this argument would base the importance of the Cold War on shifting ground: something that might have happened. Only a handful of crises had truly catastrophic potential, and treating them to ever more fine-grained analyses yields diminishing returns. As the Cold War continues to recede into history, scholars will therefore have to work harder to explain its importance to future generations.

If one instead turns to the history of populations and public health – the kind of “structural” history favored by the followers of Fernand Braudel – the period coinciding with the Cold War can be shown to have witnessed changes that were comparable to the impact of global nuclear war, only these changes unfolded over decades and had nearly the opposite demographic effects. The number of people living on earth more than doubled between 1945 and 1989. By the time Germans were living under one government again, world population was growing by the number of people in the reunited nation – more than 80 million – each and every year. The overwhelming majority of them were being born in Asia and Africa. For the largely Russian leadership of the USSR, the higher fertility of Central Asians appeared to pose an existential threat. At the same time, migration flows from the global South began to make non-Hispanic whites a minority in the United States and Islam the second-largest religion in France. And, rather than being forced to flee from cities, people all over the world flocked to them. The mechanization of agriculture and the “urban bias” in national investment strategies contributed to a worldwide exodus from rural areas.

These trends did not arrest the attention of contemporaries as often as the more episodic course of the superpower struggle. But some of the most

famous American Cold Warriors, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, and George F. Kennan, sometimes recognized that they could have more long-term significance. Their fears of “population bombs” and mass migration can appear like a photo negative of the Cold War. They shuddered at the thought of a clash between North and South, and not just armed conflict between East and West. If the “free world” did not actually fall under Communist rule, they worried that the whole world might eventually succumb to famines or uncontrolled migration. Nuclear war would wipe people off the face of the earth, whereas population growth would make the world explode with people. Though scholars who examine the second half of the twentieth century with a Cold War lens often overlook them, these fears shaped policy on decolonization, foreign aid, and international migration. And it was not only Americans who were affected. In 1968, thirty heads of state – including Ferdinand Marcos, Josip Broz Tito, King Hussein of Jordan, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mohammed Ayub Khan, Indira Gandhi, Park Chung Hee, and Harold Wilson – agreed that a “great problem threatens the world . . . the problem of unplanned population growth.”¹

But if the history of populations and public health can seem like a photo negative of Cold War history, it does not, in fact, negate the value of research on superpower relations. The “population explosion” appeared menacing not because it was the opposite of nuclear war, but precisely because the two seemed comparable in their potential to change the world. Ignoring one would limit our understanding of the other, whereas together they can reveal important matters that might otherwise remain in the shadows. By bringing to light the Cold War origins of public-health campaigns, or the way population trends could help reframe the superpower conflict – such as giving rise to the concept of a hungry and volatile “Third World” – our assessments of both the international and the global history of the twentieth century might gain greater depth.

This chapter will suggest an agenda rather than proffer definitive conclusions, posing questions that merit much more study. How, for instance, might the Cold War be seen as a struggle to control populations, and not just territory, with the two superpowers adopting contrasting but comparable approaches to policing their biopolitical boundaries? In what ways did East–West rivalries shape global migration, public health, and efforts to control population growth? Alternatively, to what extent did they develop

¹ “Declaration of Population,” *Studies in Family Planning*, 1, 16 (1967), 1; “Declaration on Population: The World Leaders’ Statement,” *Studies in Family Planning*, 1, 26 (1968), 1; and see also Matthew Connelly, “To Inherit the Earth: Imagining World Population, From the Yellow Peril to the Population Bomb,” *Journal of Global History*, 1 (2006), 308–11.

independently, with deeper roots, a different trajectory, and more long-term impact than anything that emerged out of the superpower struggle?

Making comparisons and connections thus requires making distinctions. If managing global migration, improving public health, and controlling population growth were all part of the Cold War, they also have histories of their own. Their causes and consequences need to be understood on their own terms. Once we have put the superpowers in their place, we will be able to see more clearly how the international history of states and the global history of peoples – usually treated as opposing approaches to understanding the history of the world – can actually go together.²

Capitalist and Communist approaches to managing population growth and movement

The ideology of liberalism would appear to preclude policies to harness people's bodies to serve state interests, or deny individuals' ability to move about with the same freedom as capital, goods, and ideas. But the "leader of the free world" was actually a pioneer in employing migration and sterilization to control the composition of its population. In the late nineteenth century, the United States developed both the bureaucratic procedures and the legal precedents to sift and sort immigrants in order to exclude those considered unfit for citizenship in a free country. Asian residents were denied due process and deprived of their property.³ The United States also pioneered compulsory sterilization of those whom eugenisists deemed to be of inferior quality. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great American jurist, endorsed such measures by equating them to compulsory vaccination. At the same time, courts upheld federal and state laws that prohibited even doctors from providing contraception to married couples.

The USSR, on the other hand, was the first government in the world to make contraception and abortion available in state clinics – but not because it sought to control population growth. Malthus's idea that fertility would inexorably outstrip available resources was, for Communists, a slander against humanity.⁴ Margaret Sanger, the renowned American crusader for scientific

² On the distinction between international and global history – and the possibility of a more constructive dialogue – see the exchange "On Transnational History," *American Historical Review*, 111 (2006), 1441–64.

³ Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders, 1834–1937* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

⁴ Ronald L. Meek (ed.), *Marx and Engels on Malthus* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1953).

contraception and family planning, visited Moscow in 1934 and celebrated its support for reproductive rights. When Iosif Stalin adopted a population-control policy in 1936, it was to *increase* fertility rates, much as Germany, Italy, and France were already doing. The Soviets cut back on contraception, prohibited abortion, and offered cash incentives for large families.⁵ At the same time, Stalin's campaign to eliminate more prosperous peasants as a class assumed a quasi-eugenic character, with whole families rounded up and sent to Siberia as officials proclaimed the goal of cleansing Soviet society.⁶ From 1935, deportations – which would sweep up some 7 million people by 1948 – increasingly targeted national minorities for the unacknowledged purpose of consolidating Soviet control over border regions.⁷

The United States and the USSR therefore pursued divergent but not directly opposing approaches to population growth and movement. They could even agree on how to manage “displaced persons” in Europe at the close of World War II, at least initially. As Tony Judt writes, after World War I the victorious powers in Europe adjusted borders. After World War II, with the exception of Poland, they adjusted populations. This included millions of Italians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Hungarians, but Germans most of all. The allies also agreed that stray Soviet citizens would be repatriated to the East, by force if necessary.⁸

With the onset of the Cold War, compulsory repatriation finally stopped. In 1947, over 1.5 million Soviets, Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs, and other displaced persons from Eastern Europe still remained in the West. German refugees continued streaming in from the East, eventually totaling some 13 million. There were ambitious schemes to redistribute Europe's “surplus” population around the world through the International Refugee Organization and the International Labour Organization (ILO). But the US Congress posed an insuperable obstacle. Proponents of immigration reform argued that the discriminatory nature of US law offended allies, especially China, and

⁵ Margaret Sanger, “The Soviet Union's Abortion Law,” *Women Today*, December 1936; Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 257–61, 327–32, 341.

⁶ Amir Weiner, “Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Soviet Socio-Ethnic Body in the Age of Socialism,” *American Historical Review*, 104 (1999), 1114–55.

⁷ Terry Martin, “Stalinist Forced Relocation Policies: Patterns, Causes, Consequences,” in Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell (eds.), *Demography and National Security* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 309, 315, 321–22.

⁸ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 22–31.

squandered the opportunity to score propaganda victories against countries behind the Iron Curtain. In 1952, Congress finally provided an opening to those fleeing Communist persecution and lifted the blanket exclusion of Asians.⁹

The United States launched a program to incite more defections. Each new “escapee” could be cheered as an augury of eventual victory in the Cold War. But undermining another government’s authority by luring away its population contravened international norms, provoking Moscow to protest to the UN General Assembly. These polemics masked an underlying *modus vivendi*, made apparent when the United States barred entry to most escapees and tried to settle them in Latin America instead.¹⁰ During most of the Cold War, Communist refusal to allow people to go and US unwillingness to let them come made global migration more manageable. It was only occasionally troubled by such cases as Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s advocacy for Jewish émigrés and Fidel Castro’s decision to permit the Mariel boatlift. Otherwise, neither side was willing to change the status quo if that required compromising sovereign control of their borders and thus of their populations.

The Cold War shaped particular migration flows. After being cut off from labor pools to the east, for instance, Germany turned to the south – beginning with Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, then gradually relying more on “guest workers” from Turkey. But the overall pattern of global movement outside the Iron Curtain reflected an extraordinarily complex combination of “push” and “pull” factors. Some were related to the Cold War, including industrial-development strategies that were often funded by foreign aid. But a striking number of migration flows were imperial in origin. The colonial powers attracted and sometimes recruited labor from dependent territories, drawing West Indians and South Asians to Britain, North and West Africans to France, and Haitians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos to the United States. Gradually, male workers began bringing their families with them. This was especially the case for the United States after 1965, when immigration law permitted family reunification. The expectation was that this policy would reproduce the

⁹ Keith Fitzgerald, *The Face of the Nation: Immigration, the State, and the National Identity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 193–97. For the best account of the postwar resettlement programs, see Daniel G. Cohen, “The West and the Displaced, 1945–1951: The Post-War Roots of Political Refugees,” Ph.D. thesis, New York University, 2000.

¹⁰ For an extremely subtle analysis, see Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc ‘Escapees’ and Cold War Borderlands,” *American Quarterly*, 57 (2005), 911–42.

“American family” as it already existed, i.e., overwhelmingly of European descent. Instead, it initiated a pattern of chain migration that led to increasing numbers of immigrants from Asia and Latin America.¹¹

Some of the largest migration flows were not from south to north, but lateral. The 1973 oil crisis was a key turning point. Asian migrant workers streamed to the newly wealthy Gulf states. Conversely, in Europe the recession that came with drastically higher oil prices curtailed recruitment of foreign workers and increased resentment toward those who remained.¹²

If the superpower struggle did not determine the overall pattern or chronology of global migration, it had an episodic impact. Several Cold War conflicts ended with massive refugee outflows, especially from China, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. But so too did many decolonization and postcolonial struggles, most notably the partitions of India and Palestine, the repatriation of colonial settlers – including some 3 million Japanese – and the expulsion of South Asians from East Africa.

From a long-term perspective, the barriers to emigration faced by citizens of Communist states were just part of a global system that developed through a series of crises and regulatory responses. Since the late nineteenth century, it was premised on the principle that states had sovereign and exclusive power to issue or reject visas and passports and adjudicate appeals from refugees. But, while this system channeled movement, migration always threatened to grow out of control. One reason was that new communications technology made apparent gross differentials in living standards, which were even greater between South and North than between East and West. When hundreds of thousands of East Germans finally brought down the Berlin Wall, they were joining millions more people worldwide who were voting with their feet for the right to live and work where they wished. Unprecedented in both absolute numbers and in proportion to world population, this global movement is one of the signal events of the second half of the twentieth century.

¹¹ Fitzgerald, *Face of the Nation*, 217–24; Betty K. Koed, “The Politics of Reform: Policymakers and the Immigration Act of 1965,” Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1999, 172–73, 176, 188–89.

¹² David Held, *et al.*, provide an excellent introduction, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 297–322.

Public health, population growth, and the birth of the Third World

Throughout the Cold War, some argued that it was necessary to go to the root of population problems by managing fertility rates. But the very idea of international aid for what some called “family planning,” others “population control,” seemed likely to stoke tension between the superpowers. In 1948, senior UN officials refused to circulate a proposal by the first director-general of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Julian Huxley, calling for an international conference. Huxley was aiming at “a world population policy” to address both the environmental risks of overall growth and the eugenic danger of relatively higher fertility among the unintelligent. Huxley was told that there was already too much international rancor and that such a conference would merely provoke an ideological debate pitting Malthus against Marx.¹³

This concern was not unfounded. For instance, when the US State Department’s 1949 White Paper defending its China policy cited the Nationalists’ failure to feed a growing population as one of the major reasons for their defeat, it elicited an immediate rejoinder from Chinese leader Mao Zedong. He insisted that Communist revolution and increased production would create “a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products.” For years thereafter, it remained risky for anyone in China to suggest that population growth might pose a problem.¹⁴

But in the first international debates on aiding population control in the governing bodies of UN agencies such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization, it was not the Americans and the Soviets who squared off. One reason is that the Soviets were boycotting UN bodies for not admitting Communist China. The United States, for its part, did not begin supporting international aid for family planning until the 1960s. In the meantime, the State Department merely tried to stop ugly spats among the Cold War allies of the United States over whether the UN should take action, with countries such as Sri Lanka and Norway pitted against Belgium, Italy, and Lebanon. Some of the most vigorous and persistent combatants in this continuing struggle were Cold War neutrals, including Sweden, India, and – on the other side – Ireland. When the Soviets finally began to take a more active role after 1955, they

¹³ Julian Huxley memo to Trygve Lie, March 30, 1948, UNESCO Archives, Paris, inactive correspondence files, 312 A 06 (45) “54.”

¹⁴ H. Yuan Tien, *China’s Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People’s Republic, 1949–1969* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1973), 177–79.

aligned with the Catholic countries of Western Europe and Latin America in opposing international aid for contraception.

Debates over birth control and abortion could not fit into any Cold War framework – or any international framework, for that matter – because the politics underlying them were *transnational* in nature. In UN forums, for instance, the United States initially remained neutral because political leaders worried about provoking the Catholic Church. The Holy See, with permanent observer status in UN bodies, was able to work the corridors organizing diplomatic support while at the same time rallying believers worldwide to lobby their respective governments. Proponents of family planning, for their part, were organized in global networks, such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which fought for affiliate status in the same UN bodies. Some members – especially those from the United States – pushed the IPPF to focus on reducing population growth in poor countries as a way to stop the spread of Communism. But those who conceived of birth control as a human right resisted this agenda, especially since it risked relations with affiliates in Communist countries. The IPPF, like other nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), tried to work with and through states on both sides of the Cold War while pursuing transnational goals – whether feminists inspired by the goal of women's liberation, environmentalists concerned about keeping the planet habitable, or die-hard eugenisists worried about the proliferation of the unfit.¹⁵

The first generation of leaders of UN agencies saw in population problems an opportunity to broaden their mandates, even to move toward world government. As the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) director-general, Sir John Boyd Orr, argued, politicians were hung up on adjusting borders. But UN agencies, by focusing on improving the health of “border-line” populations, could make a much greater contribution to reducing international tensions. Similarly, UNESCO's Huxley pointed out that the population problem “affects the future of the human species as a whole, and not merely the separate nations into which the human species now happens to be divided.”¹⁶ If the population “explosion” posed a threat akin to nuclear war, then population control was no less urgent than arms control. The UN

¹⁵ Matthew Connelly, “Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” *Past & Present*, 195 (November 2006), 246.

¹⁶ Sir John Boyd Orr, “The Choice Ahead: One World or None,” December 14, 1946, Food and Agriculture Organization Archives, Rome (hereafter FAO); J. Orr to Scrutton, 2 September 2, 1947, FAO, RG 1.1, Series A2, Lord John Orr Outgoing Letters; Huxley memo to Trygve Lie, March 30, 1948.

seemed to provide the appropriate forum and agency. Here, too, the choice was “one world or none.”

Like the more ambitious schemes to resettle the “surplus” population of Europe, early UN initiatives to head off a Malthusian crisis came to naught. The United States and Britain defeated Orr’s idea of a World Food Board because they preferred to leave such issues to a proposed International Trade Organization.¹⁷ As many as a third of the member states of the World Health Organization were at the point of withdrawing in 1952 over a proposal to provide birth control.¹⁸ And the issue was kept off the agenda of the first World Population Conference in 1954. When it came to population problems, the world was not divided by Cold War rivalries, but rather by transnational movements that sought to shape the domestic and foreign policies of every state. And these struggles, in turn, could inspire new ways to understand international differences.

Just after the WHO debate, France’s representative on the UN Population Commission, the eminent demographer Alfred Sauvy, wrote a landmark article titled “Three Worlds, One Planet.” It described humanity as being divided between the capitalist West, the Communist bloc, and the “Third World.” The Cold War rivals actually needed each other because they defined their identity through their opposition.¹⁹ Their two paths to modernity would eventually bring them together. The people of the Third World, on the other hand, inhabited an alternate universe. According to Sauvy, “these countries have our mortality of 1914 and our natality of the eighteenth century.” Saving lives with pesticides and antibiotics was cheap, but giving people something to live for was expensive. They would not suffer their plight indefinitely.²⁰

Sauvy’s reference to a Third World was meant to evoke the Third Estate of revolutionary France. But this new world was not permitted to speak for itself. Instead, he described how it was emerging demographically, rather than politically. It was a “slow and irresistible push, humble and ferocious, toward life.” In this way, Sauvy suggested that the Third World needed nothing so much as care and feeding until it was mature enough to choose between the two paths to modernization. Dividing the world in three offered an alternative

¹⁷ Amy Staples, “Constructing International Identity: The World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization, 1945–1965,” Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1998, 211–29.

¹⁸ World Health Organization, *Official Records*, 42 (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1952), 131, 240–42.

¹⁹ For a discussion of identity and the Cold War, see Robert Jervis’s chapter in volume II.

²⁰ “Trois mondes, une planète,” *L’Observateur*, August 14, 1952.

to the Communist/free world dichotomy as well as to the belief that there was only one world, in which all humanity might share common rights and common duties.²¹

In the 1950s, this conceptual framework of three worlds became increasingly common. Previously, especially when Chinese Communist “volunteers” entered Korea en masse and fought US troops, population trends seemed to portend “the engulfment of Western civilization by the peoples of Russia and Asia.”²² The Soviets – often typed as culturally “Eastern,” in part because of their persistently higher population growth rates – seemed ideally positioned to lead “Asiatic masses” in a march on the West.²³ But as the USSR courted newly independent nations, especially under Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership, it came to seem more like a competitor to the United States in a common modernization project, though one in which the Soviets always threatened to unite “the rest” against “the West.”²⁴

Like Sauvy’s concept of a Third World, modernization or “development” initiatives tended to be conservative in their assumptions about the nature of progress and the need for paternalistic guidance. But they could be quite radical in their ultimate aims, especially in the area of public health. Some aimed for a qualitative transformation that would flatten racial hierarchies and erase cultural differences. In introducing the Point Four program in 1949, the first US foreign-aid initiative for “underdeveloped areas,” the State Department promised that eliminating debilitating disease and malnutrition would not merely make the “Eastern peasant” more productive. It would bring “intangible changes in outlook on life,” with “far-reaching effects on the world as a whole.”²⁵

The point, of course, was to change the lethargic and fatalistic peasant into a modern worker and consumer, one who could better resist Communist blandishments. As Kennan had argued in the Long Telegram, Communism

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production: Trend and Outlook* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), 254–56.

²³ Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North–South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000), 753–54.

²⁴ For US–Soviet competition and modernization in the Third World, see Michael E. Latham’s, Douglas Little’s, Fredrik Logevall’s, and Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman’s chapters in volume II.

²⁵ US Department of State, *Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas* (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1950). See also J. R. McNeill’s chapter in this volume.

was a “malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.”²⁶ Yet the Point Four planners themselves acknowledged that they were carrying on work begun decades earlier by the Rockefeller Foundation, which also intended dramatic demonstration projects to help make the world safe for capitalism. This idea of linking public health and geopolitics would guide not only the United States’ own efforts, but also the campaign by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) against tuberculosis and the WHO’s effort to eradicate malaria, in part because they were inspired by Rockefeller Foundation veterans such as Fred Soper and were largely underwritten by the United States.²⁷

Similarly, the very design and construction of research stations charged with exporting a “Green Revolution” to feed the world were expected to change the outlook of the people working there, as the historian Nick Cullather has shown. When farmers took up new strains of wheat and rice, the experience was supposed to transform their whole mentality and make them immune to Communism. The movement of these “miracle” grains was tracked like a new front in the Cold War that could turn the Communist flank in Asia. But, here again, it was the Rockefeller Foundation that had first blazed the trail decades earlier.²⁸

If global public-health and biotechnology campaigns are among the most important and least studied episodes in Cold War history, they cannot be explained only in terms of the Cold War. Major declines in mortality rates in otherwise poor countries were already well underway in the 1930s, at least partly because of colonial public-health programs. And leaders of newly independent nations, such as Suharto of Indonesia and Indira Gandhi of India, also had their own agendas in joining the Green Revolution and disease-eradication campaigns, which could not otherwise have become global in scope.²⁹ For many proponents, “development” signified the triumph of science over politics, of man over nature, and even of man over himself – when it came to population control – in an evolutionary process that trumped geopolitics.³⁰

²⁶ Reprinted in George Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 559.

²⁷ Staples, “Constructing International Identity,” 388–89.

²⁸ Nick Cullather, “Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54; Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review*, 112 (2007), 337–64. See also J. R. McNeill’s chapter in this volume.

²⁹ For the birth of new nations in the early Cold War period, see Mark Philip Bradley’s chapter in volume I.

³⁰ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 1.

To achieve such a transformation, global public-health campaigns tended to target particular diseases for eradication, such as smallpox, malaria, and river blindness. This led to vertical, single-purpose programs that did not address more complex causes of poverty and ill-health. Disillusion set in when eradication proved impossible, environmentalists began pointing to the collateral damage, and even successes appeared to set the stage for a Malthusian crisis – all factors that were largely independent of the superpower struggle. Public-health campaigns had varied outcomes, but their history cannot be reduced to a Cold War story, any more than the history of global migration can. Instead, it too requires interweaving international history – including superpower rivalries, but also decolonization and the development of UN agencies – with the global history of pathogens, scientific networks, and NGOs.³¹

The coming of population control

From the beginning, some of the architects of public-health campaigns worried that nature would have its revenge. Improved public health, the Point Four planners acknowledged, “will at the same time intensify one of the great problems in the success of the program – increases in the population of areas already overpopulated under present economic conditions.”³² This concern was common among British and French colonial officials. In 1948, T.H. Davey, a member of the Colonial Advisory Medical Committee, warned that if new public-health techniques spread throughout the empire Britain might soon confront hopelessly overpopulated and impoverished nations, and find itself “dragged into a war for survival, using against them the most terrible of the weapons which science had produced.” On the eve of the Algerian war, one French administrator wondered whether they ought instead to let “natural selection” among Muslims take its course. But the gathering anticolonial movement compelled both British and French officials to prove that they were improving the lot of their subject peoples.³³

³¹ I am grateful to Bob Brigham for a dialogue that helped clarify my own thinking on this point.

³² “Point Four: Cooperative Program for Aid.”

³³ T.H. Davey, “The Growth of Tropical Populations,” c. March 1948, “Extracts from Minutes of CAMC 443rd Meeting,” March 23, 1948, and accompanying minutes to file, National Archives, Kew, UK, CO 859/154/6; “L’Algérie du demi siècle vue par les autorités,” undated, Archives d’Outre Mer, Aix en Provence, Fonds du Cabinet Civil du Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, 10/CAB/28.

Influential American demographers criticized the colonial powers for failing to effect broad-based development, deemed crucial in reducing fertility rates, without which public-health gains would lead to “overpopulation.” Princeton’s Frank Notestein, who would go on to become the first director of the UN Population Division, argued that “the crux of the problem is the greatest possible reduction of the lag between the downward trends of mortality and fertility. . . . This in fact would require a complete and integrated program of modernization.” Until peasants moved to cities, earned salaries, and enrolled their children in school, they would not understand the need to plan smaller families.³⁴

But an increasing number of activists, especially in the United States and Britain, were pressing for direct action to reduce population growth in poor countries. Those, like Sanger, who had long pressed for birth control as a basic right were now joined by two new constituencies. For environmentalists like Fairfield Osborn and William Vogt, Notestein’s modernization program would only increase the damage people were already doing to the planet. Paul Ehrlich popularized this position with his 1968 bestseller, *The Population Bomb*. It would also inform the work of the Club of Rome – a group of European scientists, industrialists, and officials – and the landmark study they commissioned on environmental scarcities, *Limits to Growth*.³⁵

A third constituency focused instead on population growth as a national security threat. Among them was Hugh Moore, a wealthy entrepreneur, who recruited foreign-policy establishment figures such as Will Clayton and Ellsworth Bunker. For them, “The Population Bomb” – the title of their 1954 pamphlet – represented the danger of a world overrun by “people dominated by Communism.” They eventually circulated over 1.5 million copies. “[W]e are not primarily interested in the sociological or humanitarian aspects of birth control,” Moore privately explained. “We are interested in the use which Communists make of hungry people in their drive to conquer the earth.”³⁶

³⁴ Frank Notestein, “Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure,” in *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944), 152.

³⁵ Fairfield Osborn, *Our Plundered Planet* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1948); William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1948); Paul Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968); Donella H. Meadows, et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

³⁶ Donald T. Critchlow, *Intended Consequences: Birth Control, Abortion, and the Federal Government in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 30–33; John Sharpless, “Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965,” in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 191–93.

President Eisenhower himself was obsessed by population growth in poor countries, confiding to his National Security Council (NSC) that it was “a constant worry to him and from time to time reduced him to despair.”³⁷ He and his key advisers often kept score in the Cold War by counting the population on each side. Initially, he had intended to replace his predecessor’s Point Four program with promotion of trade, but instead increased foreign aid, in part because of competition from Khrushchev. Eisenhower presented his foreign-aid proposals by describing Soviet and Chinese Communists as engaged in a “fantastic conspiracy” that had seized a third of the world’s population; the United States would have to win the remaining billion.³⁸ Eisenhower did not consider the issue of population growth only in a Cold War frame. In fact, he complained that American aid had focused excessively on the Communist threat: “[W]e have had a narrower view than we should have. The real menace here was the one and a half billion hungry people in the world.”³⁹

But Eisenhower rejected the idea that the United States meet requests for assistance in family planning even when it was backed by a blue-ribbon commission chaired by a longtime supporter, William Draper, and including General Al Gruenther, Admiral Arthur Radford, and John J. McCloy. In view of Catholic opposition, he preferred that NGOs take the lead. After leaving office, he agreed to serve with former president Harry S. Truman as honorary co-chairman of Planned Parenthood. John F. Kennedy felt much the same way, telling Draper that the Ford Foundation – then the world’s wealthiest – should commit itself entirely to population control.⁴⁰ In fact, by 1966, when McGeorge Bundy became president of the Ford Foundation, it was spending \$26.3 million on population programs, over \$150 million in today’s dollars.⁴¹

In the course of the 1960s, the US government began giving ever stronger support to population control, pressing other wealthy nations to join in supplying contraceptives while pushing poor countries to accept them. In some cases, such as India in 1966–67, this meant withholding food

³⁷ National Security Council (hereafter NSC) Meeting, May 28, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS (hereafter DDEL), Ann Whitman File, NSC Series.

³⁸ Burton I. Kaufman, *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953–1961* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 169; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 150; for more on Eisenhower and the Cold War, see Robert J. McMahon’s chapter in volume I.

³⁹ NSC meeting, August 18, 1959, DDEL, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series.

⁴⁰ Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 36–40, 73–74.

⁴¹ “Expenditures on Population,” c. October 1966, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, NY, RG IV3B4.2, Population Council, General File, box 36, folder 526.

shipments.⁴² As Johnson put it, “I’m not going to piss away foreign aid in nations where they refuse to deal with their own population problems.”⁴³ Between 1968 and 1976, as population-control campaigns assumed massive proportions – employing hundreds of thousands and sterilizing millions – the United States provided more than half of all international aid. Several countries, including Bangladesh, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia, used foreign aid for two-thirds or more of their family-planning budgets.⁴⁴

But, all along, the political sensitivity of promoting contraception, especially in the Catholic countries of Latin America, led the United States to also work indirectly through NGOs and international organizations, especially the World Bank under Robert McNamara and a new UN agency, the UN Fund for Population Activities. All this would be impossible to explain absent the Cold War. But it was also driven by the specter of North–South conflict. “There are 3 billion people in the world and we have only 200 million of them,” Johnson told troops guarding the Korean demilitarized zone in November 1966. “We are outnumbered 15 to 1. If might did make right they would sweep over the United States and take what we have.”⁴⁵

The strongest and most consistent support for international aid for family planning did not actually come from Washington. In UN debates and per capita contributions, the Scandinavian countries were always in the lead, regardless of their allegiance in the Cold War. Sweden was the first country to support family planning as part of its foreign-aid program – beginning with Sri Lanka, followed by Pakistan. It was considered a means to address the root causes of international conflict. In the 1970s, Norway provided even more aid per capita. Here, too, it was justified by fear of “a catastrophe of unknown dimensions,” of “hunger crisis or war,” as two Norwegian MPs put it during a parliamentary debate.⁴⁶

The countries that accepted such aid – and often solicited it – played on fears of North–South conflict. India and Pakistan were the first to adopt

⁴² Matthew Connelly, “Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period,” *Population and Development Review*, 32 (2006), 629–67.

⁴³ Joseph A. Califano, *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 154–55; Califano, *Inside: A Public and Private Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 172–73.

⁴⁴ Dorothy L. Norton and Ellen Hofstatter, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium of Data through 1978*, 10th ed. (New York: Population Council, 1980), 37.

⁴⁵ “Remarks to American and Korean Servicemen at Camp Stanley,” November 1, 1966, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966*, book II (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1967), 1287.

⁴⁶ Sunniva Engh, “Population Control in the 20th Century: Scandinavian Aid to the Indian Family Planning Programme,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 2005.



34. An elephant displaying banners with slogans promoting birth control in India, 1970. Governments and international organizations spent large sums on such efforts during the Cold War.

policies to control population growth. As India's ambassador to the United States, M. C. Chagla, explained, it made no sense to "build up military bases and enter into military alliances in defense of democracy when you allow the barricades to be overrun by advancing population." Hamid Nawaz Khan of the All Pakistan Women's Association insisted that "States ought to adopt vast programs of controlled reproduction if they don't want to remain powerless before a human tidal wave which will certainly bring about an immense decline of civilization."⁴⁷ They took pride in exercising leadership in a population crisis they considered more grave than the Cold War.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ M. C. Chagla, "Text of Address," 11 May 1961, Archives of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, London (hereafter IPPF), series B, reel 715, frames 2131–37; Commission Économique pour l'Asie et Extrême-Orient, Procès-Verbaux Officiels, 16th session, March 9–21, 1960, 223rd meeting, Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Asie Oceanie 1956–1967, Dossiers généraux, ECAFE, June–August 1960, dossier 441.

⁴⁸ P. N. Haksar to I. Gandhi, 30 July 1969, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, P. N. Haksar Papers, Subject Files, file number 42.

At the first World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974, Cold War alignments broke down completely over a proposed “World Population Plan of Action” (WPPA). The US team under Casper Weinberger wanted targeted reductions to achieve replacement-rate fertility worldwide by 2000. In a high-level review, US policymakers had agreed that otherwise food riots and revolution would close markets to US investment, and raw-material-exporting countries would be led to form more cartels such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries just to acquire the means to feed their people.⁴⁹

But the “Group of 77” non-aligned countries seized the opportunity to press for a “New International Economic Order,” in which countries of the South would take control of their assets and work together to improve terms of trade. China was the first to declare its opposition to the population plan, insisting that the future of mankind was “infinitely bright.” France and Algeria – otherwise unlikely allies – agreed the WPPA was too pessimistic. The USSR and its East European allies opposed numerical targets, but not international aid for family planning. When China’s representative condemned the two superpowers as equally imperialist, the Soviets in the audience turned around and shook hands with their American counterparts.⁵⁰

The line best remembered from the Bucharest conference was that delivered by Karan Singh, India’s minister of health and family planning. Declaring that “the best contraceptive is development,” Singh captured the essence of a new WPPA which dropped fertility-reduction targets. Outside the international limelight, however, national population programs in this period – including both India’s and China’s – increasingly resorted to incentive payments and even physical force to induce people to have fewer children. After Indira Gandhi suspended the constitution in 1976 and arrested tens of thousands of opponents, she launched a campaign in which some 8 million people were sterilized in a single year. In 1983, 20 million people in China submitted to vasectomies or tubectomies during a national crackdown against violators of the one-child policy. Considering that India’s program was developed in close collaboration with Western consultants while China’s was the work of

⁴⁹ P. Claxton to Members of Inter-Agency Committee for the World Population Conference, 5 December 1973, United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), Washington, DC, Nixon Papers, NSC Institutional Files, Study Memorandums, NSSM 200, box H-204; R. Ingersoll to G. Ford, December 14, 1974, Declassified Documents Reference System, Document Number: CK3100290297.

⁵⁰ C. Weinberger to H. Kissinger, September 19, 1974, USNA, Nixon Papers, NSC Institutional Files, Study Memorandums, NSSM 200, box H-204.

Communist cadres, these two campaigns were remarkably similar, including time-bound targets, a mix of government workers and nongovernmental volunteers, use of mobile contraceptive and sterilization teams, payments and penalties to ensure compliance, and an interministerial committee to oversee it all. Both countries could also count on financial support from international and NGOs, such as the UN Population Fund, the World Bank, and the IPPF.

All this aroused growing opposition from the Vatican, swelling numbers of evangelical Christians, and conservative Muslim leaders. They also organized transnationally to gain control of the agenda at international population conferences. In 1984, pro-life activists in the United States and Latin American bishops succeeded in persuading the Reagan administration to reverse US policy at the World Population Conference in Mexico City. Strong congressional opposition made it impossible to cut family-planning assistance. But, henceforth, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was barred not merely from backing coercive programs, but from assisting any organization, such as the IPPF, that provided abortion. Japan helped pick up the slack, but only on condition that the Population Fund and IPPF continue aiding China's one-child policy. One incredulous Reagan administration official noted that the new US stance denying that population growth hindered development was identical to Communist dogma.⁵¹


In fact, the Soviets were themselves reconsidering. For quite a while already, some US officials had considered population control as eminently suited to superpower cooperation, as did independent analysts such as C. P. Snow and Andrei Sakharov in 1968.⁵² Moscow was already softening its stance with regard to international population assistance, no longer assuming it was "a Malthusian trick on the part of the imperialists to keep down the size of the coloured population of the world."⁵³ With the 1979 census, authorities worried that the USSR itself had a problem with the relative growth of its Muslim population. It was increasing three times faster than the Great Russian population. Russians were projected to make up less than half the total population of the USSR by 2000.⁵⁴ At the Communist Party Congress in

⁵¹ R. Levine to R. McFarlane, July 11, 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Records: Subject File, box 82.

⁵² Robert C. Cook, "Spaceship Earth in Peril," *Population Bulletin*, 25 (1969), 1–21.

⁵³ H. W. King, "Soviet View on Population," July 10, 1969, National Archives, Kew, UK, FCO 61/507.

⁵⁴ Murray Feshbach, "Reading Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census," *Population and Development Review*, 8 (1982), 349, 356–57.



Graph 2. The global decline in female illiteracy and fertility

The worldwide decline in fertility rates corresponds far more closely with the worldwide decline in illiteracy among women than with population control programs. Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics and UN Population Division. Graph adapted from FEWER, copyright © 2004, by Ben J. Wattenberg, by permission of Ivan R. Dee, Publisher.

1981, several speakers voiced concern about population trends. Moscow implemented a series of measures to increase family size outside the Muslim republics, including paid leave for new mothers. But it made little difference. Fertility rates in Russia continued to decline through the end of the Cold War while mortality soared.⁵⁵

In view of the radically diverging population dynamics of different countries, the UN World Population Conference that took place in Cairo in 1994

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 358. Regarding the Soviet debate over a “differentiated” population policy, see Cynthia Weber and Ann Goodman, “The Demographic Policy Debate in the USSR,” *Population and Development Review*, 7 (1981), 281–87.

may prove to have been the last of its kind. The end of the Cold War changed the atmosphere of the event, as a host of different constituencies jockeyed for position over a changing international agenda. But the substance of the debate was not radically different: the Vatican and its allies maintained that contraception was always immoral; others continued to argue that population growth, poverty, and mass migration persisted as security threats; and environmentalists still insisted the earth itself must weigh into the balance. But the big winners were feminists, who managed to win acceptance for a platform that placed reproductive rights and health at the center of development. It was a defeat for both the old-guard population-control establishment as well as for their pro-life opponents, despite a last-ditch diplomatic campaign personally directed by Pope John Paul II. Far more important than the end of the Cold War in this outcome was the fact that population growth had begun to slow worldwide. But it was only because of grassroots organizing – begun decades earlier – that feminists were able to seize this opportunity and carry the day.⁵⁶

More generally, the period before and after the end of the Cold War reflects continuity rather than change both in population trends and in policies intended to shape them. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has pursued ever more extreme measures to reverse fertility declines. In the United States, a new population boom that began in the 1980s – largely fueled by immigrants and their children, many following the pattern of “chain migration” established in the 1960s – shows no sign of dissipating. As for foreign aid for family planning, aside from during the administration of William J. Clinton, until 2008, the Mexico City policy has continued to preclude US support for the UN or the IPPF.

The Cold War in a more global perspective

What, then, will be the place of the Cold War in the *longue durée*? Juxtaposing diplomatic history with global history shows how much less “we now know” about matters that may have far more long-term significance. After all, as missiles lay dormant in their silos, some of the most lethal or crippling diseases, including smallpox and polio, were all but eradicated. While emergency rations in fallout shelters decayed and fell into dust, acute famines became increasingly rare. Improvements in nutrition and public health contributed to more than just a dramatic gain in life expectancy for billions of

⁵⁶ Dennis Hodgson and Susan Cotts Watkins, “Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past and Present Alliances,” *Population and Development Review*, 23 (1997), 469–523.

people. They made them visibly bigger and measurably smarter (iodine deficiency alone shaves inches and IQ points).⁵⁷ And if people continue reading Cold War history in the future, it may be because of the rapid spread of literacy around the world.⁵⁸

Some argue that controlling population growth helped China and the “Asian tigers” take off, redistributing the world’s wealth and power in ways at least as significant as the demise of Communism.⁵⁹ Too often they fail to note the collateral damage caused by coercive campaigns, which sterilized tens of millions of people and made women a minority in societies that give preference to sons. Moreover, many hundreds of millions more people freely sought out contraception without having to be bribed or threatened. The main reason for the decline in fertility, as nearly as can be determined, was not government population-control programs, but women’s increasing access to education and therefore to opportunities other than child-bearing (see Graph 2).⁶⁰ This both reflected and reinforced revolutionary changes in gender relations and family formation. The size of the average family has fallen by more than half since 1960, and the elderly are beginning to outnumber the young in Europe and East Asia. Nevertheless, the continued momentum of population growth and increasing consumption now portends what may be even more dramatic developments in the decades to come, above all the prospect that the buildup of greenhouse gases will heat the atmosphere, melt polar ice caps, and flood coastal regions worldwide. Altogether, these trends are literally remaking humanity and changing the face of the earth.

Yet if global history must be understood on its own terms, our understanding will be limited if we do not recognize that international politics could also have a global impact. Differences between the United States and the USSR, such as over freedom of movement, created a *modus vivendi* that made migration more manageable. The concept of a “Third World” emerged from a debate about population growth and poverty, but it caught on only because it also described the arena of an expanding Cold War. Global

⁵⁷ Robert William Fogel, *The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700–2100: Europe, America, and the Third World*, ed. by Richard Smith, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁵⁸ Wolfgang Lutz and Anne Goujon, “The World’s Changing Human Capital Stock: Multi-State Population Projections by Educational Attainment,” *Population and Development Review*, 27 (2001), 323–39.

⁵⁹ Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding, *Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁶⁰ T. Paul Schultz, “Demand for Children in Low Income Countries,” *Handbook of Population and Family Economics*, 1 (1997), 380–84.

public-health campaigns, including aid for family planning, were rooted in an ideological inheritance from empires and philanthropic foundations. But one cannot explain their astonishing growth without accounting for East–West competition.

We can begin to assess the Cold War's impact on history over the *longue durée* only by situating it in a more global perspective, one that takes account of changes in populations and the environment, and not just national governments and international borders. The influence of the Cold War on campaigns to eradicate smallpox and malaria, even if it turns out to be relatively small, may ultimately count for more than all the arms-control agreements put together. It is too soon for definitive conclusions. But the foregoing analysis suggests it is high time historians reconsidered the attention that has been given to different aspects of this era – especially since a satisfactory account of migration, public health, and population control will require far more archive-based studies than have been cited here. As long as people care about where they live, and how long they live, and how many others will be sharing the world with them, these studies should find a large, if not growing, audience.

Even in terms of understanding the Cold War itself, the tight focus on interstate relations, conventionally defined, seems misplaced. Thus, we know Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense, but not the McNamara who transformed the World Bank. We know Dean Rusk as secretary of state and McGeorge Bundy as national security adviser, but we know little about how they ran the largest private foundations in the world. Others who never attained Cabinet positions in any US administration but still managed to change population trends and public health worldwide, such as William Draper and Fred Soper, are virtually unknown in the annals of international history. One of the most striking political developments over the past century has been the growth of international and nongovernmental organizations.⁶¹ Yet even the relatively few historical studies we have tend to examine only a tiny subset of what they did, typically that part which might fit into gaps in Cold War historiography as presently constituted – i.e., a literature based squarely on state archival collections. In the larger agenda of the UN agencies, arms control and peacekeeping have occupied a rather small place, and the Ford Foundation devoted far more resources to developing and exporting biotechnology than to subsidizing anti-Communist intellectuals.

⁶¹ For a more thorough discussion of nongovernmental organizations, see Matthew Evangelista's chapter in this volume.

Intellectual histories of modernization theory have also tended to have a laser-like focus on the struggle between the superpowers. But the idea of modernity is bigger than both the United States and the USSR. Public-health and population-control projects offer exciting new areas for exploration. These were indeed modernization projects. But unlike most other kinds of modernization, the process of turning peasants into wage-earning workers and consumers became quasi-biological in nature. In this way, it revealed one of the more important tensions in the very idea of modernity. If it means anything, modernization means taming nature and harnessing it to a social agenda – which is one reason why hydroelectric dams, despite all their problems, became such potent symbols. Controlling peoples' bodies and harnessing their sexual energy for social purposes is an even more awesome display of power. We will be living with the consequences for decades to come.

Perhaps the most important thing that has happened in the past hundred years, even the past thousand years, is that people have learned that we might remake ourselves as a species, controlling not only our numbers, but also our very nature. But making that happen has usually required the cooperation of governments, which have their own agendas. Whether such efforts succeed or fail, they demonstrate why it is becoming ever more difficult, even misleading, to separate the history of events from the history of “structures,” or the international history of states from the global history of peoples. The challenge for historians, and everyone else, is to explain how over the *longue durée* these different fields, too long treated in isolation, are becoming one and the same.

Consumer capitalism and the end of the Cold War

EMILY S. ROSENBERG

During the chaotic days of the Cold War's end in East Germany and throughout Eastern Europe, capitalist-made consumer goods often seemed both the symbols and the substance of freedom. Throngs of East Germans helped hack down the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and made their way into West Berlin to enter the hallowed halls of the *Kaufhaus des Westens*. Media images of thousands of new shoppers, carrying coveted consumer products back to East Berlin, seemed to mark both the disintegration of Cold War barriers and the victory of capitalist mass consumerism.

Over the following months, image after image linked the rapid implosion of Soviet power to the triumph of consumerism. Pepsi rushed out a television advertisement that positioned its product amidst pictures of the crumbling Berlin Wall and strains of the "Hallelujah Chorus." McDonald's cranked out press releases boasting how East Europeans were developing a taste for American cuisine, and American exporters struggled to meet the demand for Western brassieres, nylon hosiery, lipsticks, and other symbols of what the Kremlin had once derided as consumerist decadence. Prague sprouted new signs reading "I am a billboard. I sell your products," and Barbie became the prestige commodity for young girls. In a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* of December 15, 1989, *Playboy* proclaimed itself to be "Exporting the American Dream" by becoming "the first American consumer magazine published in Hungarian."¹

Scholars have often anchored Cold War histories in geopolitical rivalries, contests waged within high politics and played out on the terrain of the nation-state. This chapter, proposing an alternative, more global, framework for the end of the Cold War, emphasizes the transnational spread of ideas associated

¹ *New York Times*, December 15, 1989, 52.

with mass consumerism. Contrary to the pervasive media images, however, it argues that mass consumption contributed to the Cold War's end less *because* it was closely identified with the United States than because it was *no longer* primarily associated with it.

Three emerging literatures help provide a context for this chapter. First, a growing body of scholarship has urged historians to go beyond the "container" of the nation-state to adopt more transnational or global canvasses.² (Completely writing out the powerful influences of nation-states and policy-makers, of course, would be misguided.) Second, recent scholarly conversations across several disciplines have been critically reexamining discourses of "Americanization," globalization, and modernity.³ Third, a rich historiography on consumerism has developed in the context of varied national and global histories.⁴

This chapter deals with *mass consumerism*, by which I signify a *mass-production and mass-marketing system that imagines a widespread abundance of goods within a culture that emphasizes purchasing, desire, glamour, and flexible, consumption-driven identities*. It argues that in the first half of the twentieth century the idea of "America," for many people in the world, came to be identified with the social imaginary of a mass consumer society. Discourses of Americanism and consumerism (and anti-Americanism and anti-consumerism) blended together. Building on this identification, US government and corporate elites after World War II often claimed a consumerist system as their own and invoked it in Cold War battles as almost synonymous with both America and "freedom."

Gradually, however, mass consumerism became an ever more transnational phenomenon. Throughout the world, as had happened in the United States itself, entrepreneurs and groups drew on diverse impulses to shape variants of mass consumer cultures. By the 1980s, many variants of consumerist imaginaries circled the globe. This globalizing, yet at the same time differentiating, process (which some scholars have called "multilocalism") helped drive the end of the nation-state rivalry known as the Cold War.⁵

2 For example, Thomas Bender (ed.), *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).

3 Petra Goedde, "The Globalization of American Culture," in Karen Halttunen (ed.), *A Companion to American Cultural History* (New York: Blackwell, 2008), surveys some of this literature.

4 Peter Stearns, *Consumerism in World History: The Global Transformation of Desire*, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006), surveys how consumerism developed in different places.

5 On "multilocalism," see James L. Watson (ed.), *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); on "commonalities expressed differently," see Tani Barlow, *et al.*, "The Modern Girl around the World: A Research

Within this broad argument, several recurring themes should be highlighted. First, the late twentieth century's communications revolution was critical in spreading the imaginary of glamour and desire that surrounded consumer products.⁶ Second, discourses of gender and of generational aspiration intertwined with consumerism in complex ways. Third, the "soft power" represented in the spread of communications technologies and their consumerist messages played out differently in different circumstances. In areas with close proximity to the West's rising standards of living (especially East Germany and Eastern Europe), consumerism helped inspire popular revolutions from below. In the Soviet Union, consumer abundance played a different role. There, dissidents remained under tight control, but some well-traveled elites came to embrace the idea that national progress would require borrowing from models, especially in Western Europe, that mixed consumer abundance, greater intellectual inquiry, and social democratic practices. In China, where influences from the vibrancy in Hong Kong and Taiwan seeped into cities, governing leaders accepted consumerism as part of a pragmatic strategy to promote national growth and maintain their legitimacy. Almost everywhere, especially in the Third World, the perceived popular legitimacy of governments (and therefore a variety of nationalist agendas) rested on the promise of consumer goods. Gary Cross has perceptively suggested that consumerism was the "ism" that "won" the ideological battles of the twentieth century.⁷ But it did so in no uniform or simplistic manner.

Before the Cold War

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, many people in the world came to associate mass-produced consumer goods with the United States. Inexpensive and practical American products – Gillette safety razors, Quaker Oatmeal, Singer Sewing Machines, Wrigley's chewing gum – found success worldwide. Their popular, rather than elite, appeal marked them as quintessentially American.

After World War I, American exporters shipped off an even more impressive, or threatening, array of consumer items. US manufacturers specialized in electrical goods, radios, and refrigerators. American automotive, oil, and

Agenda and Preliminary Findings," *Gender and History*, 17 (August 2005), 246. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), offers an influential theoretical perspective.

6 See David Reynolds's chapter in this volume for elaboration.

7 Gary Cross, *An All Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1.

rubber industries promoted internationally the car culture that was converting the United States into a “nation on wheels” and generating both admiration and fear of assembly-line manufacturing techniques. American retailers – Woolworth’s, Montgomery Ward, A & P – merged principles of mass production with techniques of mass retailing and opened branches abroad. A 1929 book called *Selling Mrs. Consumer* proclaimed, “Consumptionism is . . . the greatest idea that America has to give to the world: . . . Pay them more, sell them more, prosper more is the equation.”⁸

Advertising powerhouse J. Walter Thompson and other agencies employed new psychological techniques of persuasion to assist this amazing export wave. The international advertisements for American-made marvels identified the United States with affluence for the masses, a new culture of leisure, a “modern” future, and “modern” women. Women in these global ad campaigns (as at home) were generally portrayed as athletic, unsupervised, and interested in shopping, self-presentation, and fashion. The enormous appeal of Hollywood movies, which dominated screens globally during the 1920s, also spread such images. To many people in the world, “America” lost geographical specificity and became almost a synonym – both embraced and decried – for broad-based affluence, consumer choice, and independent women.⁹

As the Bolsheviks consolidated power within the new Soviet Union after 1917 and introduced a command economy with a controlled informational system, Russians developed a mixed picture of American capitalism. Soviet leaders embraced the idea that machinery, technology, and mass communications would promise greater prosperity. In 1926, when film idols Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford visited Moscow, they were greeted by adoring throngs, but a reporter claimed that, had Henry Ford been the visitor, his popularity would have been so great that “they would have to mobilize the entire Red army to keep the crowds in order.” Many Russians, then, admired and adapted the techniques of mass production and image-making identified with the United States. At the same time, of course, Soviet officials also elaborated the critique that American-style *private*, rather than *state*, ownership would promote monopoly and worker exploitation. This interwar

8 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982); Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film Market, 1907–1934* (London: BFI, 1985); Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For the quotation, see Stuart Ewen, *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer Culture* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), 22.

9 Barlow, *et al.*, “The Modern Girl around the World,” 245–94.

ambivalence toward American mass consumer society would persist into the Cold War.¹⁰

Before World War II, political and cultural conservatives probably constituted the most prominent critics of American consumerism. The critique from the Right warned that mass consumption brought crass materialism, soulless individualism, rampant licentiousness, a dangerous feminization of society, and shallow intellectual achievement. The Great Depression provided fertile soil for such discourses that blurred anti-Americanism and anticonsumerism.

The various themes of pro- and anti-Americanism that flourished internationally in the first half of the twentieth century (like their counterparts in the Cold War era), however, need to be treated cautiously. The supposed meanings of American consumerism were generated out of local cultural and political debates. Proponents of a system of consumerism might seek to identify their domestic programs with the United States as a symbol of the future. But opponents of consumerism, by establishing the United States as its geographic home, could invoke a rhetoric of nationalism on behalf of their own agendas. An array of groups, especially intellectual elites, cultural conservatives, antimodernists, socialists, and Communists, could seek – each in their own countries and even if they had little else in common – to solidify their nationalist credentials by casting the United States as a dangerous Other and then associating consumerist styles, and especially New Women, with national subversion. Long before the Cold War, then, debates over mass consumerism already raged as debates over “Americanization.”¹¹

The early Cold War

World War II lifted the United States out of the Great Depression and restored the basis for a flourishing consumerism at home and abroad. During the war,

10 Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conuncture,” in Catherine Evtuhov and Stephen Kotkin (eds.), *The Cultural Gradient: The Transmission of Ideas in Europe, 1789–1991* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Alan M. Ball, *Imagining America: Influences and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 58.

11 See, for example, Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 35–94; Barbara Sato, *The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Philippe Roger, *The American Enemy: A Story of French Anti-Americanism*, trans. by Sharon Bowman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford, 1994).

GIs spread fashions such as blue jeans and tastes for products such as chewing gum and American cigarettes. Armed Forces Radio popularized American music. Coca-Cola bottling plants advanced with the front lines of US troops, cultivating new markets for the postwar era.¹² As the Cold War became a central concern of postwar politics, new informational bureaucracies in the Department of State and in the postwar governments of occupation vigorously deployed radio, movies, and promises of consumer goods to sway hearts and minds.¹³

The US occupation of postwar Japan, for example, introduced visions of American consumerism. In the popular comic strip *Blondie*, the Bumstead family's appliances, large house, and huge sandwiches advertised what seemed the almost unbelievable material wealth in the United States. And, perhaps more by inadvertence than design, US officials also assisted small and medium-sized businesses in Japan to reorient production away from war materiel toward consumer products such as tea containers, cameras, and motor bicycles. The materialism that so many Japanese intellectuals of the interwar period had abhorred seemed actually to become a focus for national regeneration, although Japanese citizens remained ambivalent consumers, and debates over "Americanization" soon resumed.¹⁴

During the late 1940s and 1950s, as part of the Cold War policy of containment, US leaders created a governmental infrastructure to promote what Charles Maier has called the "politics of productivity." They sought to build opportunities for US investment and to identify American economic models with job growth, rising prosperity, and freedom. As Victoria de Grazia has shown, American experts of the postwar era popularized the so-called Standard of Living, a new measure by which continual economic improvements in the lives of ordinary people could presumably be compared. Meanwhile, the flood of Hollywood movies – encouraged by the US government's pressure on other countries to repeal nationalistic restrictions or

12 See, for example, David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 437–49.

13 See, for example, Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

14 John Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 252, 232–35; Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); Kenkichi Koizumi, "In Search of Wakon: The Cultural Dynamics of the Rise of Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan," *Technology and Culture*, 43 (2002), 29–49; Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

quotas – continued to act as dazzling advertisements for what a high standard of living might look like. In challenging Communist parties over which economic model would boost living standards, Americans and their ideological allies around the world knew their policies had to produce tangible gains, not just promises.¹⁵

Efforts to combat Communism through the politics of productivity in Europe centered on the Marshall Plan, which helped arrange hundreds of missions to the United States, studying everything from agriculture to marketing to industrial relations. The Marshall Plan's counterpart funds financed traveling displays that showed the United States as a country of high productivity and good wages, of full shelves and bulging shops. "Freedom Trains," mobile exhibits that circulated from town to town, carried the slogan "prosperity makes you free." As Marshall Plan money became a major source of advertising revenue for some European media, it nudged Europe toward acceptance of commercial radio advertising, a trend that, in turn, opened more spaces for the selling of both foreign and domestic products.¹⁶

Occupation policies and the Marshall Plan, however, by no means ushered in an era of US-cloned practices. Both Japanese and European citizens remained ambivalent about mass marketing and US-style consumerism. Moreover, as David Ellwood elaborates, each country had its own traditions on which to build local adaptations of American, consumer-oriented capitalism. Various filtering mechanisms both borrowed from and rejected parts of the American model.¹⁷

Building on postwar informational and cultural initiatives, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. A general who had been well acquainted with the benefits of psychological operations, Eisenhower aggressively expanded programs designed to counter the appeal of Communism by stressing benefits of life in the West. One emphasis, begun in 1956, included "people's capitalism."

15 Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," in Maier (ed.) *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 75–129.

16 On economic and cultural aspects of the Marshall Plan, see especially Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), and Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1998).

17 David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longwood Group, 1992); Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951* (London: Routledge, 2006).

This campaign emerged from a Yale University–Advertising Council round-table that sought “a moralistic idea with the power to stir men’s imagination” and tried to coopt the language that Communists used to promise a better life for ordinary people.¹⁸

Cold War cultural exchanges during the 1950s reflected the effort to enlist consumer culture in the fight against Communism. At the 1958 Brussels Universal and International Exhibition, the Soviets featured heavy machinery, Sputnik, and the Bolshoi Ballet. The American pavilion, by contrast, displayed affordable washing machines, dishwashers, a Sears & Roebuck catalog, frozen-food packages, television and recording studios, and a pink built-in oven. Katherine Howard, a prominent Republican activist who served as deputy commissioner of the exhibition, contended that modern kitchens provided one of the most valuable weapons in the psychological battle for freedom.

Howard shaped the pavilion as a display designed to appeal especially to women, showcasing household appliances and practical clothing styles. She extolled American kitchens for freeing women from drudgery. *Vogue Magazine*, a frequent partner in the USIA’s campaigns, staged a daily fashion show at the center of the circular building. Its “Young America look,” appealing to a broad audience, featured jeans and plaid shirts, tennis outfits, evening gowns, and inexpensive sack dresses. American women, the show implied, had abundant leisure time and could slip easily among a variety of social roles simply by changing clothes.¹⁹ Gendered imagery pervaded Cold War contests, as new scholarship related to the linkage between gender and international relations has shown.²⁰

The American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park in Moscow in 1959 took “people’s capitalism” directly to the heart of the beast. The six-room ranch house, the most popular exhibit, set the tone. Ordinary factory workers in the United States, skeptical Russian audiences were told, could afford such a

18 Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 139.

19 Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

20 Helen Laville, “‘Our Country Endangered by Underwear’: Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in *Ninotchka* and *Silk Stockings*,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 623–44. For a review of the scholarship on gender and international relations history, see Kristin Hoganson, “What’s Gender Got to Do with It? Gender History as Foreign Relations History,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 304–22.

house. Fashion shows again displayed stylish, mass-marketed attire. Helena Rubinstein offered free beauty-shop demonstrations to Soviet women until the authorities banned the practice. Coty cosmetics company tried to give away free samples of makeup but, again, authorities intervened. Three model kitchens boasted appliances, convenience foods, and gadgets of all sorts.²¹

The famous “kitchen debate” between Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev occurred against this backdrop of consumerism.²² To Nixon, a system that liberated women from wage labor advanced modern, civilized values and thus fulfilled what he regarded as the proper male role of protecting women. Khrushchev denounced the “gadgets” of the capitalist home – but he also became increasingly determined to prove that socialism could produce comparable consumer satisfaction.

In the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet bloc, governments had begun to acknowledge that rising levels of consumption were needed to enhance their legitimacy. In the immediate postwar period, perhaps, people drew measures of wellbeing from comparisons with the low living standards that prevailed during the war. By the mid-1950s, however, a new generation increasingly looked toward international comparisons. Confident of socialism’s ability to redefine consumerism in a way that would make it possible ultimately to outpace capitalist models, Khrushchev launched plans to enhance housing to accommodate greater personal privacy and to divert resources toward socialist versions of consumer goods. Similarly, East Germany’s leaders, under pressure from rising living standards in West Germany and confronted with a crescendo of refugees fleeing to the West, expanded consumer-credit mechanisms, introduced mail-order catalogs, and planned new self-service retail stores. In 1956, Khrushchev promised to help the German Democratic Republic become a “showcase” of the Cold War, and, in 1958, the East German Communist Party pledged to surpass West Germany in productivity and individual consumption by 1962. The building of the Berlin Wall to staunch the migration to the West rather quickly underscored the failure of this goal and of Khrushchev’s broader vision to reorient socialist planning toward personal consumption. But, by then, on both sides of the Cold War divide, consumer abundance had become widely accepted as an

21 Richard M. Nixon, “Russia as I Saw It,” *National Geographic Magazine*, 116 (December 1959), 718, 723.

22 *Ibid.* See also Karal Ann Marling, *As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 243–83, and Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 10–13, 145–46.

important indicator of national power and as an ultimate test of each system's claims on the future.²³

The exhibitions and pronouncements of the early Cold War illustrated the broader linkage among discourses of class, gender, and race in capitalist vs. socialist (and United States vs. Soviet) rivalry. Both systems claimed to stand for the liberation of workers, of women, and of oppressed or colonized peoples. Both advocated greater social and economic equality. Both invoked the words "democratic" and "liberation." Each saw the other's claims as propaganda designed to mask the "real" structures of oppression and even "enslavement." Capitalists in control of the American state, in Marxist accounts, enslaved workers and colonized peoples, including African-Americans. Soviet-style Communism, in the liberal capitalist story, enslaved every citizen to an all-powerful state. When Nixon and Khrushchev motorboated on the Moscow River after lunch one day in 1959, Khrushchev waved to picnickers and asked Nixon, "Are these captive people? Do they look like slaves?"²⁴ When Nixon gave a radio and television address to the Soviet people, he boasted that "we in America have achieved freedom and abundance for all in a classless society – the very goal that the Communists claim as their own special property!"²⁵ Increasingly, the dreams and realities of consumer abundance marked the terrain of Cold War battle.

US informational officers, however, exercised caution when they stressed consumerism. Critics of capitalism often assumed a tension between materialism and spiritual values and claimed that American culture lacked artistic achievement, meaningful social connection, or spirituality. The propaganda themes of Eisenhower's people's capitalism, therefore, carefully portrayed a high standard of living as arising from the values of hard work, spiritual fulfillment, and commitment to family and community. The typical American, according to USIA guidelines, had "little class feeling" and "constantly strives for progress and improvement in all aspects of their society." The typical American woman, featured in USIA publications, lived modestly and worked hard, without the use of servants. She "cook[ed] the meals, clean [ed] the house, washe[d], iron[ed] and mend[ed] clothes, care[d] for the children, and work[ed] in her flower garden." Problems such as racial

23 See, for example, Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004); Susan E. Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 289–316.

24 "Encounter," *Newsweek*, August 3, 1959. 25 Nixon, "Russia as I Saw It," 717.

segregation and economic disparities appeared within a narrative of progress and of “overcoming” such lapses. The USIA maintained an Office of Religious Information that emphasized the spiritual roots of such positive American values. This office proposed that Eisenhower initiate days of prayer and often mention prayer in public remarks as a way of emphasizing that the Cold War constituted a spiritual, not just a material, struggle. In these presentations, consumer abundance confirmed, rather than threatened, Americans’ piety and providential mission in the world.²⁶

US business elites of the 1950s also established campaigns to fight Communism and what many regarded as the New Deal’s legacy of “creeping socialism.” The American Advertising Council funded domestic propaganda to build support for an activist foreign policy and a rollback of New Deal social policies. At the same time, many businesses developed programs showing that capitalism could accommodate a wide range of workers’ needs (an approach sometimes called “welfare capitalism”). To counter political pressure on government to institute a European-style welfare state, large American employers and insurance companies developed health care, recreational programs, and pension plans for workers. Celebrants of consumerism used this US model, mixing private and public safety-net provisions, to counter claims that capitalism simply exploited workers or provided wages but no long-term security.²⁷

Given the strong censorship imposed in Communist states and the sharply different worlds created within capitalist and Communist Cold War discourse, it is difficult to determine the impact in the Communist bloc of Cold War programs featuring consumer products. Walter Hixson’s *Parting the Curtain*, however, argues that US cultural policies provided people in the Soviet bloc with glimpses that challenged the claims of their governments. When citizens of Communist states encountered displays of consumer capitalism, the cornucopia of goods they saw simply did not jibe with their picture of “wage slavery” under capitalism. Women who were struggling to juggle full-time factory work with full-time home-making duties had trouble seeing how

26 Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 312; Laura Belmonte, “A Family Affair? Gender, the US Information Agency, and Cold War Ideology, 1945–1960,” in Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 79–93.

27 Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public–Private Welfare State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Daniel L. Lykins, *From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of the Cold War Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 2003).

fashion, makeup, leisure time, and labor-saving appliances provided confirmation of a system designed to oppress.²⁸

American presentations of “people’s capitalism,” however, were hardly needed to stir up discontent within the Soviet bloc. Stalin’s postwar looting of Eastern Europe, the Czech coup in 1948, the East European purge trials, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt and numerous rebellions in the Soviet Union itself, the gulags, the spreading surveillance, and the persistent poverty provided fertile grounds for opposition.²⁹ In many respects, the United States’ best ally in building its power in Europe was always the brutal, inefficient Soviet system itself, and consumer products may have provided a symbol that then also became the substance of resistance.

Assessing the impact of the American “politics of productivity” outside the Soviet bloc is equally difficult. In the 1950s in Western Europe and Japan, and elsewhere, people debated their responses to American models of mass production, advertising, and mass culture. As in the interwar era, critics from both Left and Right frequently identified consumer capitalism with the United States as a tactic in their domestic political struggles; their critiques of mass production/consumption continued to involve warnings that American-style products would render society materialistic, conformist, feminized, immature, and governed through spectatorship rather than democratic processes. Yet left-leaning students throughout the world often protested US power during the 1960s and 1970s in large demonstrations characterized by an abundance of blue jeans and American rock music. Consumerism managed to encompass the commodities that were at the center of its system and also those that sometimes became markers of dissent. Responses to the consumerism so often associated with the United States ranged from eager acceptance, to adaptation, to many forms of resistance – sometimes in messy combinations.³⁰

The rivalry between East and West Germany encapsulated the complicated relationship between consumerism and Cold War rivalries. After 1949, both West and East German leaders framed their contest for legitimacy around which system could provide a better life for ordinary people.

West Germany shaped its identity around the broad availability of consumer goods, and the “economic miracle” permeated public culture during

28 Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*.

29 See, for example, Vladimir A. Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*, trans. by Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).

30 Kuisel, *Seducing the French*; Roger, *The American Enemy*; Garon and MacLachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer*.

the 1950s. Even the phenomenal popularity of the “refreshment” Coca-Cola, in the view of one scholar, represented “a West German quest for new spiritual values, for a new flavor of German identity.” Coca-Cola wisely melded its advertising slogans into the widespread desire to “refresh” German culture, creating a hybridized image consistent with a new definition of nationalism. Rather than simply imitating American-style capitalism, West Germans were prompted to embrace free choice in a free market, not to imitate US capitalism but to break from their own past and to focus a new national pride.³¹

East German leaders tried to create a socialist consumerism that could rival, but be different from, the capitalist model. They sought to develop inexpensive and practical household goods that would reach the masses yet avoid the ostentation, waste, and frivolity of the West’s consumer products. The Purimix, a stainless steel cross-blade appliance, for example, avoided wasteful duplication: “it vacuums dust, it waxes, and with the same motor, but naturally with another attachment, it stirs, beats, mixes, pulverizes, chops, purees, and grinds,” reported one women’s magazine. East German fashion shows featured sensible “socialist fashions” that ostensibly satisfied both a yearning for beauty and a need for workplace practicality. A wide array of plastic products developed in the East during the 1950s also symbolized how socialist chemistry might upgrade living standards. East Germans always had access to images of West Germany’s increasingly abundant consumer society, however, and the West became an important standard by which they judged their own wellbeing. The consumption gap took on ever greater political implications.³²

During the late 1940s and 1950s, US-style capitalism and Soviet-style socialism – each allied with rival political groups in most countries of the world – both presented themselves as models not merely of national but of global

31 Erica Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Paul Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 232; David F. Crew, “Consuming Germany in the Cold War: Consumption and National Identity in East and West Germany, 1949–1989, an Introduction,” in Crew (ed.), *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 3, 7; and especially chapters in Crew’s book by S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Miracles for Sale” and Jeff R. Schutts, “Born Again in the Gospel of Refreshment?,” 121–50 and 152–77.

32 Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Crew, “Consuming Germany in the Cold War,” 3, with other chapters by Katherine Pence, “A World in Miniature,” 21–50 (quote, 35), Judd Stützel, “On the Seams between Socialism and Capitalism,” 51–86, and Eli Rubin, “The Order of Substitutes: Plastic Consumer Goods,” 87–120; Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

orders.³³ Both sides framed the Cold War as a long-term contest over which system would outproduce and lift living standards more effectively and humanely than the other.

The late Cold War

Robust consumer revolutions, inspired by the American model, transformed most countries of Western Europe and Japan from the mid-1950s on. The growing scholarship on postwar consumerism, however, increasingly complicates any claim that consumer revolutions simply converged toward “Americanization.” First, countries generated adaptations drawing from their own traditions. People were both attracted and repelled by mass production and consumerism, a historical ambivalence that reflected both a yearning for affluence and individualism yet also a respect for frugality and community.³⁴ Shaped in different ways by historical circumstance and by this ambivalence, consumerism increasingly had a French, or German, or Japanese face.

Moreover, as Richard Pells has written, aspects of American culture “never felt all that foreign” to many people because American mass commercial culture drew from a “transnational America” – a nation of immigrants whose consumer goods and leisure-time innovations often emerged from elsewhere, then adapted to appeal to the broad diversity of American life, and then reemerged in export to world markets. The world, in short, had been transforming the United States, even as American culture also influenced desires across the globe.³⁵

Consumerism, of course, is based upon establishing an accelerating cycle of desire and its always elusive fulfillment. In stimulating and then promising to satisfy material and emotional needs, marketers created a repertoire of images of beauty, style, and sex appeal, often linked to “stars” and celebrities. They advanced rather flexible norms related to gender roles, race, and class. Many of consumerism’s image-codes became broadly recognizable in the non-Communist and, increasingly, in the Communist world. But variants and

33 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 8–72.

34 Garon and MacLachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer*; de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*.

35 Richard Pells, “American Culture Goes Global, or Does It?,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 12, 2002, B 7–9; Kristin Hoganson, “Stuff It: Domestic Consumption and the Americanization of the World Paradigm,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 571–94.

localized adaptations of the social imaginaries based on consumerism emerged in each country. Stephen Grundle argues that in postwar Italy, for example, “the transformation of the Italian imagination can be explained by the concept of *glamour*,” which was both an integral part of an American model, but was also readapted by Italian capitalism and then “gave rise to forms of enchantment of its own” – as in the films of Federico Fellini. (Even the word “*glamour*” was not easily translatable and therefore became modified through language.)³⁶

The growing importance of advertising constituted a major component of localized consumer revolutions. Advertising flourished wherever trade barriers and media regulations fell. In Western Europe, for example, economic integration within the European Community, together with the deregulation of media environments, expanded market size. US television producers accelerated programming: MTV expanded into Europe in 1987, and, during the 1990s, the Disney Channel, the Cartoon Network, and Nickelodeon competed to introduce (and adapt to local customs) their children’s programming. Privately run media, however, also expanded European experimentation, entrepreneurship, advertising, and markets.³⁷ Consumerism thus found expression in differentiated, localized ways (multilocalism). If visions of material abundance and cultural choice could stir fears of change, they could also promote pride in national – and personal – progress.³⁸

In this rapidly globalizing (but not necessarily homogenizing) consumer-driven world, China and the Soviet bloc seemed increasingly isolated, and leaders recognized the need to change if their nations were to maintain a claim to power and legitimacy. America as a *nation* threatened less than the *mass consumer imaginaries* that had now gone global and, by the day, seemed less and less associated with – and thus perhaps less threatening to – any particular national identification. Mass consumerism was no longer a single rival system that had developed most robustly in the United States. It now adopted various guises, and its seductions were enveloping Western Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world. Indeed, many countries incorporated consumerism into ideologies of national advancement, and those on the Left and Right who still

36 Stephen Grundle, “Hollywood Glamour and Mass Consumption in Postwar Italy,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4 (Summer 2002), 95; Vanessa R. Schwartz, *It’s So French! Hollywood, Paris, and the Making of Cosmopolitan Film Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); and Nicholas J. Cull’s chapter in volume II.

37 Pells, *Not Like Us*, 299–302.

38 Angus Maddison, “The Nature and Functioning of European Capitalism: A Historical and Comparative Perspective,” *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, December 1997, www.ggdc.net/maddison/.

tried to identify mass consumption solely with “Americanization” found themselves increasingly irrelevant. Ruling elites in both China and the Soviet bloc appear to have recognized that decline would be inevitable if their countries tried to remain behind economic, cultural, and intellectual barricades.

In China, the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a slow softening in the harsh controls of the Mao Zedong era and broadening connections with the West. Unlike the dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, no single marker signaled the end of the Cold War with China. The decline in the conventions of Cold War exclusions and hostilities, however, closely correlated with the arrival of attributes of consumer capitalism.

At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee in December 1978, Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, called for “modernization.” He then instituted a new open-door policy toward the West that provided a tunnel through which the goods and ideas of consumer capitalism began to flow. By the mid-1980s, the Chinese government began a program to attract tourist money by building golf courses and resorts, such as the luxurious Zhongshan Hot Springs Golf Club in Guangdong province. This emerging tourism sector helped spread new concepts of consumption, leisure, individualism, and fashion, especially to the young. Deng’s reforms also slowly opened the country to advertising, first in newspapers and then on Beijing Radio and Central Chinese Television (CCTV). In 1982, China granted CBS Productions the right to market commercial airtime on China’s only nationwide television network in return for a package of American programming. By 1987, many US entertainment companies had inked similar proposals. In November 1986, the concerts of Jan and Dean (Jan Berry and Dean Torrence), featuring surf-songs such as “Fun, Fun, Fun” and “Surf City,” brought many Chinese young people a taste of foreign lifestyle and live pop music. Orville Schell claims that the exploding popularity of Western rock was “one of the catalysts for a series of momentous political events that were soon to shake China.”³⁹

Although most foreign advertisers could not initially market their goods in China because of tariff restrictions, the first foreign commercials, such as those by Westinghouse Corporation, aimed less at immediate sales than at establishing brand recognition for the future. During the 1980s, slick, color commercials provided Chinese viewers with a window to an outside world of

39 Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 16–18, 110–11.

techniques and of goods. Commercial styles that were flourishing in Taiwan and Hong Kong easily slid into Communist China as well. Moreover, many American companies began to speak out publicly against Chinese import restrictions.⁴⁰

A great fascination with the things and the glamour of capitalism – cars, food, cosmetics, fashions, films, music – swept parts of urban China in the late 1980s. In urban areas, per capita income doubled between 1978 and 1990, and household savings rose in the same period from \$1.85 billion to \$62.5 billion. Consumer durables became commonplace, as did dance halls, new modes of communications, new food and housing options, and new leisure activities. Geremie R. Barmé notes that “one of the central features of consumer culture is that through it shoppers are differentiated and treated as individuals via a so-called commodity self; identities and consumer profiles are melded and desires simulated and directed by the guiding hand of advertisers.” Critics of consumerism view such a process as manipulative, but in China the feeling of being “targeted” by advertisers was a new experience that could feel like individual empowerment, promising choice, abundance, and self-realization. As in other Communist states, top party members themselves became eager consumers.⁴¹

During the 1980s, official Chinese ideology began to embrace privatization and a “socialist market economy” that included the goal of “life satisfaction.” The new idea that economic production needed to *please* people sparked private entrepreneurship and dramatically changed the structures of state-owned enterprises. Advertising and its associated revolution in consumer tastes even became linked to the official nationalistic goal of stimulating China’s economic development. By the 1990s, the merger of state propaganda and commercial advertising had developed its own conventions, with new consumer signs often both undermining and reinforcing the party’s control over the image landscape.⁴²

Simultaneously, the shortcomings of the economic openings that Deng had nurtured brought waves of students into the streets, demanding lower inflation, less corruption, more political freedom, and higher living

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, passim.

⁴¹ Deborah S. Davis, “Introduction: A Revolution in Consumption,” in Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 1–22; Geremie R. Barmé, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 237.

⁴² Hanlong Lu, “To Be Relatively Comfortable in an Egalitarian Society,” in Davis (ed.), *Consumer Revolution*, 124–41; Barmé, *In the Red*, 239.

standards.⁴³ Confrontations took a brutal turn with the government's massacre of student protesters in many major cities and, most famously, in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Both those who governed and those who protested, however, understood the imperative for change. After Deng's dramatic, reform-driven tour of southern China in 1992, American exporters introduced more and more products, and privatized sectors grew even faster. The largest McDonald's in the world opened in Shanghai in April 1992, serving more than 40,000 customers during its opening day; Mastercard began advertising heavily; Starbucks entered the Forbidden City.⁴⁴

Greater consumer choice and enlarged space for sociability challenged the social, cultural, and political monopolies of the state. Western chains, such as fast-food restaurants, movies, shopping malls, and coffee shops, formed places outside the control of family or state and enhanced the ability to act upon individual desire. Western-style dance clubs and other imports promoted a "marketized" cultural form based upon display and the cultivation of desire. Chinese customers, however, also reshaped these institutions to fit Chinese cultural traditions, developing a consumerism that – like consumerism elsewhere in the world – played off, but could not simply be labeled as, "Americanization."⁴⁵

Unease over economic and cultural isolation and pressure for consumerism affected Communist Party leaders elsewhere as well. Official Communist discourse, of course, had presented capitalist America's films, music, and consumerism as attributes of decadence. At the same time, Communist Parties had promised that austerity and collective sacrifices would, in time, produce even greater abundance and productivity than under capitalism. Both claims came under growing challenge.

Official bans against Western products, particularly films and records, worked to heighten their status as objects of desire and associated them with a culture of resistance to the Kremlin's heavy hand. Half-hidden youth clubs and shadowy entrepreneurs devoted to rock music spread a taste for greater access to Western lifestyles. Although the rock scene varied substantially from country to country and area to area in the Communist


43 Marie-Claire Bergère, "Tiananmen 1989," in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (ed.), *Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2003), 239–55.

44 Schell, *Discos*, 343–45.

45 Yunxiang Yan, "Of Hamburgers and Social Space: Consuming McDonald's in Beijing," in Davis (ed.), *Consumer Revolution*, 201–25; and James Farrer, "Dancing through the Market Transition: Disco and Dance Hall Sociability in Shanghai," *ibid.*, 226–49. See also the essays in Kevin Latham, Stuart Thompson, and Jakob Klein (eds.), *Consuming China: Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China* (New York: Routledge, 2006).



35. Urban China became enthralled with mass consumerism during the final decades of the twentieth century: desire for glamour and consumption helped end the Cold War.



36. East German shoppers flocked to West Berlin after the fall of the Wall. An Yves Saint Laurent shopping bag sits in the rear window of an East German car, 1989.

bloc, some commonalities seem clear: rock artists often chose to make their political statements through music; music accentuated a generation gap and provided the anthems for dissent and alternative visions of the future. The 1980s became the golden age of rock in the Soviet bloc. Some scholars have even argued that the roots of the revolutions of 1989 resonated primarily through the rock scene.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Communist promises of future consumer abundance seemed increasingly hollow. West European and Japanese citizens embraced consumer lifestyles beyond the dreams of those in Communist systems, and by the 1980s the great structural weaknesses of Communism proved impossible to hide.⁴⁷ East Germany and then others in the Soviet bloc used foreign loans to cover subsidies for consumer products in attempts to head off rising discontent. Trying to bolster the crackdown against the opposition movement Solidarity, Poland especially began a program of significant borrowing from the West in order to import consumer goods. As strategies of borrowing tried to satisfy citizens' demands, dependence on Western, especially American, capital grew.⁴⁸

Governments in Eastern Europe struggled against a tide of popular discontent fed by the proximity of West European prosperity and openness. In 1989, this tide suddenly swept away the Berlin Wall and then less visible barriers as well. Crowds in country after country deposed their Communist governments and, in effect, ended the Cold War. Popular revolution in Eastern Europe occurred relatively easily and peacefully because, by then, Soviet reformers led by Mikhail Gorbachev had repudiated military interventionism.⁴⁹

The change away from Cold War repression comprised part of Gorbachev's attempt to transform the Soviet Union from above. Throughout the 1980s, urban elites in the Soviet Union chafed under the rigidities and scarcities of

46 Timothy W. Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford, 1990); Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), *Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).

47 Angus Maddison's historical statistics on gross domestic product and per capita GDP suggest the growing disparities in per capita income between capitalist and Communist worlds; statistical tables may be found at www.ggdc.net/maddison/.

48 André Steiner, "Dissolution of the 'Dictatorship over Needs'? Consumer Behavior and Economic Reform in East Germany in the 1960s," in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Jüdt (eds.), *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185.

49 For the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and Germany, see Jacques Lévesque's and Helga Haftendorn's chapters in this volume.

Soviet socialism. Academics, government officials, and anyone else who could do so traveled to the West and returned with video recorders, the latest fashions, and other consumer goods. By the 1980s, over 90 percent of Soviet households had a television and received programming from the West. Use of video recorders soared, as did the circulation of movies from Hollywood and other cultural offerings from the West. Soviet leaders could have continued to manage popular discontent in the Soviet Union, as the apparatus of repression of dissent still worked and the Western temptations were more remote than in Eastern Europe. But the revolution in communications and travel, which fueled a desire for more goods, broader choice, and greater intellectual openness, helped shape an agenda of “new thinking” at the top. Gorbachev, himself, increasingly looked to the pattern of West European social democracy, which combined governmental welfare functions with more open markets and greater consumer choice.⁵⁰ Boris Yeltsin recalled his trip to a supermarket in Houston, with “shelves crammed with hundreds, thousands of cans, cartons, and goods of every possible sort.” He wrote that he felt “sick with despair for the Soviet people.”⁵¹

As the Communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, struggled with how to adapt to the rapidly globalizing consumerist mentalities, the race for influence in the Third World also turned in favor of Western models. During the late 1970s, Soviets leaders had claimed a series of victories by building new alliances with states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. While East Asian governments, which had turned toward a free-market model, were experiencing a remarkable upsurge in economic growth and consumer wellbeing, however, Soviet-influenced experiments in command and collectivized economies lost ground. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet strategy to expand influence in the Third World lay largely in ruins, and the invasion of Afghanistan further sapped Soviet military and economic strength.⁵² Despite widespread criticism in the Third World of interventionist US policies during the 1970s and 1980s, much of the world apparently wanted

50 For an analysis of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, see Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

51 Boris Yeltsin, *Against the Grain: An Autobiography* (New York: Summit, 1990), 255; Igor Birman, *Personal Consumption in the USSR and USA* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). See also Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); and Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22–44.

52 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 480–82; Westad, *Global Cold War*, 250–395.

access to *products* such as music, films, television, casual clothes, fast food, and soft drinks, and hoped to incorporate forms of consumerism into their own nations. Economic migrants and university students from the Third World generally sought to work or study in the United States, not the Soviet Union. The accelerating communications revolution continued to push images of mass consumption toward anyone with access to radio, television, or the Internet.

Although governments in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia espoused a diversity of hopes and plans during the final phase of the Cold War, nationalist goals almost always promised higher living standards and the consumer products associated with modernity and progress. In the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, for example, elites used oil revenues to entrench their power and embraced consumerist lifestyles. Consumerism also had new critics: Islamic fundamentalists denounced Western consumerism for its decadence; movements of the poor experienced growing marginalization in a world of goods that seemed beyond their grasp. Debates over consumerism and its cultural impact produced diverse political effects in the Third World but, by the early 1990s, elites – particularly those with access to education and travel – generally sought consumerist satisfactions for themselves and promised rising prosperity under their leadership. Most nationalist programs seemed firmly wedded to some adaptation of consumer dreams.

Although the fate of consumerism *after* the end of the Cold War is beyond the scope of this chapter, it might nonetheless be relevant to note that mass consumer imaginaries may have helped end the Cold War, but the Cold War's end hardly marked any consensus over the national or international impact of consumerism. The spread of neoliberal policies and the rapid globalization of markets after the end of the Cold War brought disillusionment as well as hope, sharply mounting economic inequality as well as rising aggregate wealth. Discourses of pro- and anti-consumerism, which had so often intertwined with pro- and anti-Americanism and enjoyed strong historical roots in most countries, reemerged in many new guises. Cultural, literary, and political debates over the effects of mass production and mass culture on national and personal values grew more insistent, even as changing economic and international structures reshaped such debates.

Ironically, post-Cold War nostalgia in the old Soviet bloc began to center on the disappearing products of socialist-style consumerism. These once-disdained commodities became markers of lost youth, less harried times, simpler desires, and greater community. Consumption, of course, is all about

dream worlds and, just as commodities can be totems of a desired future, they may also evoke filtered remembrance of things past.⁵³ The popularity that socialist consumerism could not gain in life, it began to win in nostalgic memory.

Consumerism and the Cold War

During the twentieth century, images of mass consumerism comprised a major component in the growth of US global power. People throughout the world, who often associated mass consumption with the United States, emphasized various positives and negatives. Celebrants generally stressed ways in which mass production and consumption, fueled by advertising, promised higher living standards, social mobility, and new kinds of personal freedoms for ordinary people. Critics, on the other hand, lamented standardized products, repetitive labor routines, advertiser-shaped identities, and the idea that personal values might come to revolve around commercial transactions.

The identification between mass consumerism and the United States, however, seemed less and less close with the passage of time. By the 1980s, consumerism had become so globalized and diversified that it no longer automatically stirred visions of “Americanization.” In many localities, the idea of consumer-led growth became incorporated into nationalist programs, and material abundance seemed a test of national success and pride. “Multilocal” consumer revolutions, powered by diverse forms of consumer nationalism, seemed consistent not only with US-style capitalism, but also with systems emphasizing varying models of social democracy and even with China’s “market socialism.”

Consumer goods themselves did not end the Cold War. People did not overthrow governments because they wanted American washing machines and *Playboy* magazines, as the American press often implied. Rather, consumer products by the 1980s had become symbols of diverse and adaptable processes that came, almost everywhere, to represent progress and glamour. As the communications revolution created ever more permeable borders, the imaginary of a beneficent and efficient global Communist system lost its attractions. Many leaders in the Soviet bloc and in China faced the prospects of declining legitimacy and of growing isolation in a world marketplace that

53 For example, Paul Betts, “The Twilight of the Idols: East German Memory and Material Culture,” *Journal of Modern History*, 72 (September 2000), 731–65.

they, as much as anyone, now wanted to join. Mass consumerism, by the closing decades of the twentieth century, had both adapted to and transcended national differentiations. Its iconography mixed both rebellion (often cultural and/or generational) and cooption; it was both radical and conservative. For better or for worse (especially in ecological impact), people throughout the world had come to embrace mass consumption as the look of the future, even as locally specific debates about the impact of consumerism and of “Americanization” continued.

How might the proposition that consumerism, rather than the US nation-state, “won” the Cold War affect the way that historians discuss the late twentieth century? Certainly, frameworks bounded by elite policymaking and by nation-state actors would appear increasingly inadequate. Instead, research agendas would broaden out globally (as is already occurring), to include diverse cultures of consumption, the economics of class and globalization, and the complexities of individual and national aspirations in an age of mass selling.

An ‘incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War

ADAM ROBERTS

The end was dramatic, decisive, and remarkably peaceful: a rapid succession of extraordinary events, symbolised above all by the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the end of the USSR in December 1991. It provokes the question: what factors caused this conclusion of the long-drawn-out and fateful rivalry of the Cold War; and how did interpretations of these events impinge on international relations in the post-Cold War era?

Since these events, some beguilingly simple answers have been offered, always linked with simple policy prescriptions. This tendency, while by no means unique to the United States, has been particularly prevalent there. Some have seen the wave of democratisation around the world, of which the end of the Soviet empire was an important part, as leading towards a secure future thanks to the beneficent workings of the democratic peace. Some have seen the end of the Cold War as a triumph of American values and might, leading to the conclusion that US power could be freely used as an instrument for world-historical change. Some, having previously seen the Cold War as *the* problem of international relations, believed that its ending must mean that the future of world order would be completely different from its past. Such views exerted a pull on policy-makers after the end of the Cold War and shaped their actions.

This exploration is in four parts. First, it summarises certain characteristics of the Cold War that help to explain its ending. Secondly, it provides examples of how fundamental change in the Soviet sphere was foreseen by many acute observers. Thirdly, it explores six possible explanations for the end of the Cold War. Fourthly, it suggests that all six explanations are convincing, and that the manner of the Cold War's end influenced what came after, but did not mean the end of history.

What was the Cold War?

The Cold War had two unique characteristics. The first was the extraordinary fact that in the entire period 1945–91 there were just two major powers, each of

which had inherited from its revolution a rejection of colonialism and a claim to embody universal values. The universalist element in their respective ideologies meant that each needed to show global progress of its social system. The anti-colonial element meant that it was hard for the United States and the USSR to justify dominance of other societies except by reference to the extreme threat posed by the adversary; and it also meant that dominance often had to be exerted clandestinely. Even as the United States and the USSR sought to prevent states in their respective spheres from 'defecting', as in the cases of Cuba in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, some appearance of sovereign independence had to be maintained. The second unique characteristic of the Cold War was the nuclear confrontation, which became particularly serious in the late 1950s, when each side acquired the ability to destroy the other with ballistic missiles. This nuclear factor cast a shadow in many crises, including over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962, but also led to awareness of common interest in security, and to elements of prudence in policy-making.

These two characteristics help to explain why it is reasonable to characterise the East–West confrontation between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the end of the USSR in 1991 as one period called 'the Cold War', and they also help to explain its end. Yet the Cold War was far from being uniformly confrontational throughout; and the processes that ended it developed over decades. Indeed, the term *Cold War* has sometimes been applied to a shorter period. What may be called the *short Cold War* of roughly 1945–55 was a crisis period marked by high tension, rhetorical hostility, show trials in the East and McCarthyism in the United States, international disputes over the future political orientation and security arrangements of many countries, manoeuvring and external manipulation within states to change their external orientation, several simultaneous wars (mainly in Asia) between pro- and anti-Communist forces, deep uncertainties about where the fault lines between East and West lay including in Europe, and more frequent Soviet use of the veto at the UN than in any subsequent period. Yet even during this 'short Cold War' the hostility was not total. There was not the same visceral hatred between the major adversaries as there had been in some actual wars of the twentieth century. The period of wartime alliance was remembered. East–West contact, including diplomatic negotiation on a range of issues, was never wholly absent. The fault lines between East and West became more or less fixed, at least in Europe.

A partial easing of Cold War hostility followed the death of Iosif Stalin in March 1953. From the mid-1950s onwards, there were periods of improvement in East–West relations, but a tangle of problems remained. Although spheres

of influence were tacitly accepted, they could never be explicitly recognised, events such as the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 drawing attention to their inherent inhumanity; and, although stability was seen as a value in its own right, the USSR only partially modified its Leninist language. The *détentes* of the 1960s and 1970s were an incomplete ending because they ratified rather than resolved the East–West confrontation and left behind many sources of further crises. The continued Soviet domination of Eastern Europe led to periodic challenges from within the region. Furthermore, the necessity for the Soviet leadership to demonstrate worldwide progress towards socialism contributed to wars and crises in many parts of the post-colonial world, including Cuba, Congo, Vietnam, and Angola. The US tendency to support or even impose authoritarian regimes provided that they professed strong anti-Communism exacerbated some of these ongoing conflicts.

Subsequent periods of the confrontation from the late 1950s to the late 1980s were at the time often characterised as stalemate, *détente*, and bipolar order. None of these terms was logically antithetical to the idea that there was still a Cold War, but they did imply a change in its character. Some observers called the renewed East–West hostility of the early 1980s the *new Cold War*. The term did not catch on, perhaps partly because the uncertainties of the 1980s were not as extreme as those of 1945–55. By 1987, within two years of the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR's international conduct on a range of issues, especially arms control, was so notably co-operative that talk of an ongoing Cold War ceased to make sense. The denouement of 1989–91, sudden as it was, could occur only because of the crucial fact that the international environment, and patterns of thought within the Soviet orbit, had already changed from the extreme confrontation, and frightening certainties, of the early Cold War years.

Who foresaw change?

While no one could have foreseen the precise way in which the Cold War would end, many suggested, before the mid-1980s, that the inherently flawed Soviet system would eventually collapse. In his famously anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, George F. Kennan had explored the possibility that, if the West contained the USSR, the inherent weaknesses of the system would be exposed in the process of the transfer of power from one leader to others:

it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those 'incredibly swift transitions' from 'delicate deceit' to 'wild

violence' which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.¹

Kennan was evidently referring to Lenin's speech the day after his arrival in Russia in 1917. Other accounts mention a 'gigantically swift progression' in a different direction, 'from wild violence to subtle deceit'.² Yet Kennan deserves credit both for his vision of 'swift transition' – which was to occur in 1989–91 – and for foreseeing that the 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' that he advocated would require skilful diplomacy as well as military toughness:

it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.³

That there could be a connection between maintaining deterrence, accepting the status quo in the Communist world, and assisting processes of change there was envisaged by other astute observers of East–West relations even before the word *détente* entered the lexicon of East–West negotiations in the late 1960s. In 1963, Philip Windsor had written: 'The essential preliminary to an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe is an initial acknowledgement of the division of Germany.' In addition, he had foreseen that such a policy 'could invite revolution'.⁴

Throughout the Cold War, and especially from the 1970s onwards, many who wrote about the USSR identified three types of structural failure that could lead to the end of the USSR or its extended empire.⁵ First, some saw the problem of rival nationalisms within the USSR as insoluble. Secondly, many writers emphasised the closely related idea of imperial overstretch. Thirdly, many viewed the Soviet system as prone to stagnation and degeneration,

1 X [George Kennan], 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, 25 (July 1947), 578–79.

2 V. Lenin speech at party conference in Petrograd of Bolsheviks from all over Russia, 4 April 1917: V. I. Lenin, *Pol'noe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Collected Works], 5th ed., vol. XXXI (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962), 104. Similar wording is in Leon Trotsky, *The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the Triumph of the Soviets*, trans. by Max Eastman (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 234.

3 X, 'Sources of Soviet Conduct', 576. Kennan was not infallible: he was to denounce the 1975 Helsinki Final Act intemperately, though arguably it contributed to the end that he had earlier envisaged for the USSR. See also Matthew Connelly's chapter in this volume.

4 Philip Windsor, *City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945–1962* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), 256 and 257.

5 Works forecasting drastic change in the USSR and Eastern Europe are listed in the bibliographical essay.

though few saw this as leading to collapse or revolution. The Soviet Union's doomed attempt to establish a socialist empire in Eastern Europe was the focus of many prescient analyses. As early as 1980, one distinguished journalist foresaw a drastic change in Soviet policy in response to overextension.⁶ In 1982, Zbigniew Pelczynski, an Oxford political scientist, correctly saw that Poland was on a road from Communism.⁷ By this time the troubles of the Soviet system were increasingly evident. Raymond Aron said in 1982: 'It is my view that the most important and indeed most neglected question in contemporary international relations scholarship is: what will the West do when and if the Soviets decline? How we answer that question will perhaps determine whether there will be war or peace in our time.'⁸ What few foresaw was that the process of Soviet collapse could be as peaceful as it turned out to be.

President Ronald Reagan famously spoke of the coming demise of the USSR. In a speech to the British Parliament on 8 June 1982, he advocated 'the common task of spreading democracy throughout the world', a process in which Marxism-Leninism would be consigned to 'the ash-heap of history'.⁹ He and his colleagues were not consistent on how this was to be achieved. His ambassador to the UN in 1981–85, Jeane Kirkpatrick, famously argued that, whereas non-Communist dictatorships might change, there were 'no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves'.¹⁰ Consequently, the 'Reagan Doctrine', based on the belief that support for armed resistance movements was the only way to undermine certain Marxist regimes, was applied not just in Afghanistan but also in several other countries, including Angola and Nicaragua. After Gorbachev's advent to power, Reagan put less emphasis on this doctrine, thereby worrying its stronger devotees among his advisers, at least one of whom in 1990 still saw Gorbachev as a dangerous adversary.¹¹

6 Richard Davy, 'The Strain on Moscow of Keeping a Grip on its European Empire', *The Times*, London, 18 December 1980.

7 Z. A. Pelczynski, 'Poland: The Road From Communism', Special R. B. McCallum Lecture (Oxford: Pembroke College, [1982]); available in Bodleian Library, Oxford.

8 R. Aron's remarks to Hedley Bull at their last meeting, London, November 1982, cited in Kurt M. Campbell, 'Prospects and Consequences of Soviet Decline', in Joseph S. Nye, Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale (eds.), *Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 153.

9 Ronald Reagan, Address to British Parliament, London, 8 June 1982, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1982* (hereafter PPP: Reagan, plus year) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1983), 744–47.

10 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 51.

11 The special assistant to the president for national security affairs in 1983–86, Constantine Menges, *The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union v. the United States Today* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990), 11.

It has often been observed that few political scientists foresaw the end of the Cold War. In particular, many International Relations specialists got it wrong. As late as 1989, Kenneth Waltz wrote: 'Although its content and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics, and will last as long as that structure endures.'¹² The historian John Gaddis memorably criticised International Relations specialists for failing to see the end of the Cold War coming.¹³ Actually, the academics he was targeting were overwhelmingly American – for it is US specialists in International Relations who have made the boldest claims to being capable of foreseeing and influencing the future, and whose supposedly scientific methodologies tend to be parsimonious, seeking to explain outcomes in terms of a limited range of considerations. With their emphasis on states and international systems, they tend to play down the human dimension of decision-making. They put more emphasis on abstract reasoning and hard facts than on understanding foreign languages and cultures. They easily miss the uniqueness of particular individuals, situations, and moments.

Six possible explanations of the end of the Cold War

The pace of events in 1989–91 was breathtaking and the process astonishingly peaceful.¹⁴ In the last six months of 1989, Communist governments gave way to non-Communist ones in five East European countries; on 10 November 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had become the very symbol of the Cold War, was opened; on 3 October 1990, German re-unification took effect, with the agreement of Germany's neighbours as well as the two superpowers; on 1 April 1991, the Warsaw Treaty, the formalisation of the USSR's alliance system in Eastern Europe, was annulled; on 17 September 1991, the three Baltic states, having achieved independence, were admitted to UN membership; on 25 December 1991, the USSR ceased to exist, being replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 1992, nine former republics of the USSR were admitted to the UN.

12 Kenneth Waltz, 'The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory', in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 52.

13 John Lewis Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Studies*, 17, 3 (Winter 1992/93), 5.

14 As noted by Jacques Lévesque and Helga Haftendorn; see their chapters in this volume.

In this kaleidoscope of events, the Cold War definitively ended. But exactly when? The Cold War, even the 'long' Cold War, ended before the final collapse of the USSR. At the latest, it ended in 1990 or early 1991 when so many major problems of the Cold War were addressed. It can even be argued that the USSR collapsed despite the end of the Cold War, not because of it: the end of the Cold War gave its leaders an opportunity to reform that they failed to grasp. Yet the end of the USSR is inescapably part of the story of the end of the Cold War. This is because the long-standing crisis of the Soviet system was a mainspring of Gorbachev's decision to end the Cold War, and because the manner of the Cold War's ending in Eastern Europe in 1989 influenced what subsequently happened in the USSR. The parts fit together.

In the debates since 1991 about the peaceful end of the Cold War, many explanations have been advanced – sometimes in the belief that only *one* can be correct. However, great events often have multiple causes. The six propositions offered here are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.

(1) *The Soviet leadership reached a rational decision to liquidate a system that did not work*

This approach highlights both the long-standing crisis of the Soviet system and the crucial role of Mikhail Gorbachev and the team with which he worked.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 can be traced back to internal developments in the USSR and allied states as well as to the international situation that they faced. Both types of factors caused a gradual loss of ideological self-confidence on the part of the USSR and its East European allies. Internally, this process gathered pace in the 1970s and 1980s, as the Soviet system failed to develop in the manner foreseen in its ideology, or even to develop at all except in the sphere of military production. Internationally, there was growing awareness of the costs of foreign involvements, and a gradual acceptance of some basic facts and norms of international society.

The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 not only showed what was wrong with Soviet-style Communism, but also how it might change. The Soviet-led intervention to suppress the 'Prague Spring' succeeded eventually in securing the dismissal of Alexander Dubček as first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but it left lasting doubts – including in the USSR itself – about the failings of a system of government that could be kept in place only by tanks. Communism was preserved as a system at the cost of being

¹⁵ For a succinct and authoritative presentation of this perspective, see Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

undermined as a faith, particularly among Communist Parties in Western Europe, which began to develop their own doctrines of 'Eurocommunism'.¹⁶ Above all, the Prague Spring showed that the leadership of a ruling Communist Party might initiate change. Some of those involved in that episode never lost sight of that possibility. There was a direct connection in the friendship between a leading Czech reformer, Zdeněk Mlynář, and Mikhail Gorbachev: they had been students together at Moscow University in 1950–55, and represented an idealistic strand within Communist Parties that took the idea of socialism seriously and sought to save it.

Similarly, in many Third World conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, outward Soviet success could not conceal classic signs of failure and overextension. The US withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 were successes for the Soviet strategy of support for national liberation movements. However, other involvements were to cause greater doubts. The USSR gave continuous and expensive support to regimes which became involved in wars against opposition and/or secessionist movements: in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and Ethiopia.¹⁷

The symbol of all that was wrong in the USSR's encounter with the non-European world was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from December 1979 onwards. Based on the idea that an outside power, by force of arms, could assist socialist development in the unpromising environment of Afghanistan, it ran into difficulties of the kind that often confront modernising interventionists with little understanding of local culture. Afghan resistance was assisted with dollars and advanced weaponry from the United States and Saudi Arabia. The mounting Red Army casualties – and protests by the mothers of soldiers – caused the spread of corrosive doubt inside the USSR about the Communist Party's claim to be the defender of the Soviet people. Afghanistan cracked the thin veneer of the Soviet–Third World solidarity which had been a significant success for Soviet political diplomacy in the 1970s. Gorbachev determined the end of the Afghan intervention when, on 14 April 1988, the Soviet government concluded a UN-brokered agreement on phased withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, duly completed by 15 February 1989. This was a sign of how Gorbachev could liquidate misbegotten enterprises. There was progress, too, on other regional conflicts with an East–West dimension. The agreement on Angola and Namibia, signed in New York on 22 December 1988, provided for

¹⁶ See Silvio Pons's chapter in this volume.

¹⁷ See Vladislav M. Zubok's chapter in this volume, where he suggests that the USSR lost its way in this period; see also Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow's chapter in this volume on how the Cold War wound down in southern Africa.

withdrawal of the 50,000-odd Cuban troops from Angola as well as for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia.

In 1987–88, there were numerous international landmarks in the process of ending the Cold War, mostly resulting from the USSR's new approach to diplomacy. The US–USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF), signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, required the dismantling of two whole classes of nuclear delivery systems by the end of 1991: shorter-range (500–1,000 km) and intermediate-range (1,000–5,500 km). This was the first time that East–West disarmament negotiations had resulted in the elimination of an entire class of weapons. It suggested that Cold War issues were actually being resolved. At the same time, Soviet views of the UN changed: in September 1987, Gorbachev indicated a far more positive Soviet approach than before.¹⁸ Then, on 7 December 1988, in a major speech to the UN General Assembly, he announced that international relations should be freed from ideology, that the 'common values of humanity must be the determining priority', and that force should not be used to deny a nation freedom of choice. This last point was taken as a possible signal that force would not be used in Eastern Europe, emphasised by his announcement of a unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops from that area.

The evidence is overwhelming that, while Gorbachev did not have a convincing idea of the end-state of his revolution, he did not simply react to events, but sought to move them forward. He was clear in his view that, as long as East–West tensions remained high, he could not pursue internal reform, which required both a freeing of resources and co-operation with the outside world. He was equally decisive in avoiding the use of force in response to political developments – a conviction which appears to have deepened after the killing by Soviet forces of at least nineteen pro-independence demonstrators in Georgia on 9 April 1989. He was also influenced, as he has written, by his reluctance to destroy his relations with the West. His approach contrasts markedly with the willingness of the Chinese leadership to use force in Tiananmen Square on 3–4 June 1989.

In Soviet policy-making from 1985 onwards, there was much emphasis on certain ideas and policy proposals that were 'non-realist', marking a departure from inherited policies of military build-up and power projection. On 11 June 1986, in their 'Budapest Appeal', the Warsaw Pact leaders, including Gorbachev, stated that 'the military concepts and doctrines of the alliances

¹⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, 'Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World', *Pravda*, 17 September 1987.

must be based on defensive principles', spelling out at least some parts of what this might mean.¹⁹ The idea of defensive defence, having been advocated in the West as an alternative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy, had migrated to the East to provide an intellectual prop for arms reductions and troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's attachment to the arguably mythical idea of a reformed version of Soviet-style socialism may have been necessary for his leadership of the party, but in economic terms his reforms yielded almost nothing. His failure to understand the force of nationalism within the USSR, and his weakness in 1991 in the face of Boris Yeltsin's bold stance embracing radical change, confirmed his inability to control the forces he had unleashed. He was constantly responding to internal and external pressures – but in his own decisive way.

None of this alters the conclusion that Gorbachev and his close associates made rational decisions to change a system that did not work. They did so largely because of developments within the Communist world, including within the USSR itself; and they were remarkably clear that they would not use force to prop up the system. In short, Gorbachev's stewardship of the USSR from March 1985 is the leading explanation of how the Cold War ended. However, it is far from being the only theory, and it is perfectly compatible with certain other levels of explanation.

(2) *The US leadership turned the tide of the Cold War
against Moscow*

The claim that US policies won the Cold War has been widely made. It can draw strength from the fact that there were enduring bipartisan policies on a range of issues, including engagement in NATO and support for the mujahedin resistance in Afghanistan. The claim has been made in different forms, some of which have been triumphalist about the US role. In his State of the Union address in 1992, President George H. W. Bush declared: 'By the grace of God, America won the cold war.' He suggested that US military preparedness over a long period had been the key factor: 'The American taxpayer bore the

19 Warsaw Treaty Organization, Political Consultative Committee, 'Budapest Appeal to NATO and Other European Countries', 11 June 1986, Call No. DC/20/5159, Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organisations of the Former GDR in the Federal Archives (SAPMO), Berlin. For an account of the new defensive thinking in the USSR, 1986–89, see Geoffrey Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-Provocative Defence: Ideas and Practices in International Security* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 82–106.

brunt of the burden, and deserves a hunk of the glory.' This view of the past led seamlessly to a US-centric view of the future:

A world once divided into two armed camps now recognizes one sole and pre-eminent power, the United States of America. And this they regard with no dread. For the world trusts us with power, and the world is right. They trust us to be fair, and restrained. They trust us to be on the side of decency. They trust us to do what's right.²⁰

Some have suggested that it was not so much the United States in general as Ronald Reagan in particular, US president 1981–89, who won the Cold War.²¹ Two developments in March 1983 are seen as emblematic of Reagan's approach: his denunciation of the USSR as an 'evil empire', and his call for development by the United States of an anti-ballistic missile system (Star Wars).²² It was easy to ridicule these speeches as oversimplifying politics and defying the laws of physics, but both had interesting consequences in the Soviet empire – the latter playing to an ancient Russian fear of superior Western military technology. Nevertheless, the view of Reagan as the victor of the Cold War is open to criticism on several lines. The first is that at the time some of Reagan's close colleagues failed to notice their achievement. Thus, Caspar Weinberger, US secretary of defense 1981–87, wrote in 1988: 'Mr. Gorbachev may be in power for a short or long period. But no general secretary will be allowed to alter in any fundamental way the never-changing Soviet goal of world domination, or the nature of the Soviet regime.'²³

One Reagan biographer, John Patrick Diggins, has made the bold claim: 'Since the era of Washington and Adams, Reagan was the only president in American history to have resolved a sustained, deadly international confrontation without going to war.'²⁴ Diggins can be criticised for casting Reagan in the top starring role, and for attributing to him a more coherent intellectual framework than the evidence supports. However, he is right to emphasise the value of creating a benign security environment. He suggests that both President Reagan and UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher responded to

20 President George H. W. Bush, State of the Union address to the US Congress, 28 January 1992, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library website, www.bushlibrary.tamu.edu.

21 For an assessment, see Beth A. Fischer's chapter in this volume.

22 President Reagan's 'Evil Empire' speech, 8 March 1983, and his 'Star Wars' speech, 23 March 1983, both in PPP: *Reagan, 1983*, I, 359–64 and 440.

23 Caspar W. Weinberger, 'Arms Reductions and Deterrence', *Foreign Affairs*, 66 (Spring 1988), 701.

24 John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 14.

Gorbachev with a unique mixture of firmness and friendliness. These leaders are seen as seizing a major historic opportunity, and as pursuing an active policy of bringing the Cold War to an end through communication, understanding, and trust.²⁵

George Shultz, Reagan's secretary of state, confirms Reagan's willingness to enter into constructive negotiations with the USSR, both in 1982–83 and then after the advent of Gorbachev.²⁶ Jack Matlock, the ambassador to the USSR, presents a similar picture, with rich detail on the prime role played by Gorbachev and his colleagues. Both Shultz and Matlock suggest that US firmness in arms-control negotiations showed that the USSR could not win the arms race, and thus contributed to a major shift in Soviet policy. At the same time, both had difficulties with some of the hawkish ideologues who surrounded Reagan, though not with the president himself. Matlock sums up the US position thus:

While the Reagan administration articulated a strategy for ending the cold war, it did not have a plan to end Communist rule in the Soviet Union. Not that it would have considered that an undesirable goal, but the key members of the administration understood that the United States could not, from the outside, bring down the Soviet regime, and that direct attempts to do so would only strengthen it.

... if we are to credit any one individual for the collapse of Communist rule in the Soviet Union, it has to be Mikhail Gorbachev. It was, after all, he who insisted upon the changes that ultimately threw the Communist Party from its dominant position, and it was he who refused to sanction the use of force to preserve the old system.²⁷

The claim that the United States caused the changes in the Soviet world, if not tempered by recognition of the other causes, is too simple. The conclusion seems inescapable that the policies of the United States and its allies towards the USSR constituted a necessary condition for the changes in the Soviet empire; but they did not constitute a sufficient condition. Moreover, inasmuch as they did influence the eventual outcome, it was because those policies, far from being uniformly hawkish, involved a combination of firmness, restraint, and engagement.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 404–05.

²⁶ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 159–71 and 527–38.

²⁷ Jack Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire: An American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), 670 and 671 (2 separate quotes).

(3) *A stable international framework made it possible for political risks to be taken*

The changes of 1989–91 in Eastern Europe and the USSR took place in an international context marked by a high degree of international co-operation. The late 1980s were a period of relative stability in international relations, marked by East–West diplomatic interchange over a wide range of matters: European security, medium- and long-range nuclear forces, and the ending of regional conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many Western leaders, sensing that changes were happening in Eastern Europe and the USSR, acted to reassure Gorbachev and his colleagues that change could be managed peacefully, without new threats arising. This approach had beneficial effects in Eastern Europe, almost certainly contributing to the Hungarian decision of 10 September 1989 to repudiate a 1969 secret agreement with East Germany and open its border with Austria, allowing East German refugees out. This act made the Berlin Wall pointless two months before it was opened up.

The UN had a significant role in easing the transformation of Soviet foreign and security policy. Not only were some key changes of Soviet policy announced at the UN, but also the UN provided a framework of principles, laws, and procedures within which Gorbachev could justify his policies in terms that did not involve the humiliation of merely picking up the language and policies of the West. The UN Security Council, in particular, provided a platform on which a newly co-operative approach to security could be demonstrated, for example in the resolution that helped end the Iran–Iraq War²⁸ and in the resolution authorising the use of force to reverse the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.²⁹

A key aspect of the international environment was Western Europe. The mere existence of successful democratic states next door, irrespective of any actions that they took, had a powerful effect in Eastern Europe and the USSR, including on Gorbachev personally.³⁰ The fact that in the 1970s Spain, Portugal, and Greece had all moved almost painlessly from autocracy to democracy, and became fully engaged in the European Community, sent a strong message. In the 1980s, the European Community was advancing integration even as

28 UN Security Council resolution 598 of 20 July 1987 on the Iran–Iraq War, passed unanimously.

29 UN Security Council resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, passed by twelve votes for, two against (Cuba and Yemen), and one abstention (China).

30 See the favourable references to Western Europe in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (London: Collins, 1987), ch. 6, 'Europe in Soviet Foreign Policy'.

Communist systems were languishing. The resulting magnetic pull was especially evident in Hungary, as the Soviet Politburo clearly knew by the beginning of 1989.³¹ Gorbachev was aware of the huge debts that East European countries had incurred in the West, and knew that the USSR could not take them on.³²

West Germany's *Ostpolitik* had contributed to Western Europe's pull. In the early 1970s, while much of the Third World was an area of contestation between the USSR and the United States, Europe was apparently stable. The government of Willy Brandt, by its *Ostpolitik* treaties with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany (all concluded in 1970–73), recognised the post-1945 territorial status quo, including the western frontiers of Poland that had long been a source of contention. The division of Germany was accepted in so far as both were admitted to membership of the UN, but the treaty between them established special relations between the 'two states in Germany'. *Ostpolitik* was controversial when it was introduced by Brandt, and remained so at least until 1989. In the eyes of critics, it involved passive acceptance of systems of Communist government and a weakening of West Germany's ties with the West. Supporters of *Ostpolitik* argued that, in addition to the inherent value of the provisions for human and economic interchange, the policy made it harder for the Warsaw Pact governments to present West Germany as a revanchist threat, and thereby weakened the cement that held the communist bloc together. Poland became more restless after the alleged German threat had been removed.

Over a period of at least two decades, the pursuit by the Western powers of a stable international framework, including through the UN and also European détente, played some modest part in helping to weaken the control exercised by Communist regimes. It also contributed to the willingness of Communist leaders to risk basic changes, which they could hardly have done if they had felt seriously threatened by external meddling and war. The Western policies that contributed to this outcome certainly aimed at creating a stable international environment, but they were far from being pacifistic or status quo-oriented: they involved standing up to the USSR on key issues, such

31 References to the European Community in 'Anatoly Chernyaev's Notes from the Politburo Session, 21 January 1989', *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issue 12/13, 'The End of the Cold War' (Fall/Winter 2001), 16–17. See also Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. by Robert D. English (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000).

32 On the debts, see 'Soviet Record of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Egon Krenz, 1 November 1989', in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, issue 12/13, 18–19.



37. The European Central Bank, Frankfurt, with the symbol of the euro – the new currency introduced in 2002. Already during the final phase of the Cold War, the increasing integration of Western Europe had attracted East Europeans.

as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; and they also involved enunciating a doctrine of human rights in an astute and remarkably effective way.

*(4) The Helsinki process provided a basis for a new politics
of human rights within the bloc*

The Helsinki process has often been seen as the particular aspect of East–West détente in Europe that contributed most to the ending of the Cold War. The process was based on the Final Act of the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed on 1 August 1975 at Helsinki by thirty-five heads of state and government. This document was the product of three years of difficult negotiations in which the Western side was led largely by the Europeans in the face of scepticism and even resistance from Washington. It addressed three subject areas, or baskets. Basket I contained a declaration of ten 'principles guiding relations between participating states'. These included the inviolability but emphatically not the permanence of frontiers, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, and, remarkably, 'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' as 'an essential factor for peace'. Provision was also made for mutual observation of military manoeuvres and negotiations on force reductions. Basket II, on economic, scientific, and environmental co-operation, approved a notably wide range of activities as a contribution to security. Basket III, on 'cooperation in humanitarian and other fields', contained an array of practical measures on matters such as human contacts, travel, and the dissemination of information. If implemented there, these measures would have changed Communist states out of all recognition. The 'Final Act' was in fact just the beginning of a long process of diplomatic dialogue on all three baskets. It marked a significant stage in the decline of the Cold War, not least because all participating governments were formally committed to the idea that human rights were a legitimate matter of discussion between European states.³³

The Helsinki process had its limits. Any illusions of smooth and steady progress in human rights and European security generally were exposed by events such as the imposition of military rule in Poland in December 1981, and the 'Euromissiles' crisis in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was triggered by a Western concern about simultaneous Soviet superiority in medium-range missiles and in conventional forces. However, once new missiles had been installed in certain NATO countries, the Helsinki process provided one basis for continuing negotiations on security matters. Helsinki harked back to an ancient theme of European diplomacy: the powers, while still pursuing their rivalries elsewhere, agree to maintain a degree of stability in Europe. This time there was a key difference. The USSR sought stability in Eastern Europe, but the West, which could not endorse the status quo there, hoped that the Helsinki process would promote change.

The Helsinki Final Act, along with the ongoing process of conferences and exchanges, had multiple effects in the Communist world. The standards that it set, especially in Basket III, were a direct encouragement to movements such

33 For a survey of the role of human rights, see Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia; and they also had an effect on politics within the bloc more generally. Even at the time when the Final Act was negotiated, there was some awareness that it could provide a basis for change within the USSR and Eastern Europe – an outcome that some negotiators from Western countries had worked towards, and those from Communist states feared. Anatolii Dobrynin, the long-serving Soviet ambassador to the United States, wrote that the Soviet Politburo had paid little attention to the negotiations. 'But when the treaty was ready and the third basket emerged in its entirety before the members of the Politburo, they were stunned.'³⁴ In the United States, at least initially, the Helsinki process had been viewed with suspicion by many decision-makers, including Secretary of State Kissinger, who belatedly saw its merits.³⁵ Fierce denunciations of the Final Act as allegedly accepting the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe came from both Democrats such as Senator Henry Jackson and Republicans such as Ronald Reagan, then governor of California.

The evidence is that the Helsinki process contributed to the subsequent ending of the Cold War in three main ways. First, it reinforced the idea that a stable international framework could be achieved through restraint and co-operation. Secondly, it committed the leaders of participating countries, even Communist states, to accept the legitimacy of human rights dialogue. Thirdly, within Communist states it encouraged the development of independent political movements pressing for implementation of the human rights norms enunciated at Helsinki.

(5) *Non-violent opposition in Eastern Europe and the USSR
assisted change*

An extraordinary and central fact of the ending of the Cold War is the disciplined role played by opposition movements. Their reliance on methods of civil resistance made it difficult for Communist governments to portray them as a security threat and enabled them to keep up a dialogue with their adversaries that in the end assisted the peaceful transitions of power. In Eastern Europe, the movements had originated long before 1989 and had taken different forms: in Poland, the workers' movement from 1970–71 onwards, and the role of the Catholic Church; in Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, drawing on Helsinki and

34 Anatolii Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), 346.

35 See the informative and favourable account of the Helsinki meeting of 1 August 1975 in Henry Kissinger's final volume of memoirs, *Years of Renewal* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 657–63.

UN-based human rights covenants for legitimacy; in Hungary, a combination of party-led change and gradual growth of civil society institutions; in East Germany, the key role of the churches, and also of emigration as an effective form of resistance to the regime.

It was never certain that the USSR would eschew force just because it had not been provoked by acts of opposition violence: the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was reminder enough. However, the form that the opposition movements took contributed to Soviet reluctance to intervene forcibly. This hardened into a principle only after Gorbachev came to power in 1985; and even then it might have changed if the opposition movements had used violence.³⁶

The peaceful struggles in Eastern Europe, culminating in 1989, had two effects without which the final phase of the Cold War could have been different. The first was on the leadership of Communist Parties. These events showed that it was possible for a ruling Communist Party to allow the transition to a multi-party democratic system without bloodshed or vengeance. In this, as in the end of the Cold War generally, the crucial event was not the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, but the conclusion of the Polish round-table talks in April 1989. This breakthrough led to elections in June and the formation of a mainly non-Communist government in August. Thus, Poland was the model for what some versions of Marxist theory said was impossible: a peaceful transition from one system to another. The same conclusion flowed from the compromise agreement in Hungary of 18 September 1989, providing for a new constitution and new electoral laws. The violent postscript in December 1989, the summary trial and execution of President Nicolae Ceaușescu of Romania and his wife after fleeing Bucharest (the only such occasion in the East European revolutions), was the exception that proved the rule that leaders saw more merit in a soft landing than in remaining inflexible to the last.

The second effect was on the peoples of the USSR. The methods of peaceful struggle were picked up and adapted not only in Soviet client-states, but also within the USSR itself. The rapid growth of civil resistance in the three Baltic republics of the USSR was shown by the 'Baltic Chain' on 23 August 1989, in which between 1 and 2 million people joined hands and called for 'the peaceful restoration of our statehood'. In the next two years the three Baltic

36 See Mark Kramer, 'The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 6, and 7 (2003–05), 178–256, 3–64, and 3–96.



38. On 25 November 1989, more than 500,000 Czechs and Slovaks braved a snowstorm to meet at Letná Plain, Prague, in a fast-developing campaign against Communist Party rule. Nonviolent opposition contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War.

governments realised how crucial the maintenance of non-violent discipline was: their success in this, even after 13 January 1991, when Soviet forces killed sixteen people outside the Lithuanian parliament, was the prelude to the subsequent Soviet recognition of their independence.³⁷

37 For a discussion of developments in the Baltic states and the dissolution of the USSR, see Alex Pravda's chapter in this volume.

The most crucial ripple effect of civil resistance came when, in response to the essentially conservative *coup d'état* in the USSR on 19 August 1991, there was massive opposition, leading to the coup's collapse on the evening of 21 August. This event, more than any other, opened the way to the advance of Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation, who famously stood on a tank to call for the end of the coup, and who, unlike Gorbachev, had no difficulty in advocating the end of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and indeed of the USSR itself. In this case, as in Eastern Europe in 1989, civil resistance could succeed partly because the ruling Communist Parties had lost the ideological certainty that had been so important in their systems of one-party rule.

(6) *Nationalism contributed to the end of the USSR and of the Cold War*

Nationalism – in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and the USSR itself – presented Gorbachev with problems throughout his period of rule. Almost all the political developments of 1989–91 involved nationalisms, which assumed many different forms and functions. In the East European countries, there was a strong sense of national pride re-asserting itself against an externally imposed system of rule. Within the USSR, Stalin's near-elimination of certain ethnic minorities contributed to a legacy of bitterness that found expression in 1991 in the rush for secession by the republics that made up the USSR. The Soviet government's responses, and sometimes non-responses, were shaped by a growing awareness both of the costs of maintaining a vast empire and of the failure of the Communist dream of overcoming national divisions within a new classless society.

The role of nationalism in the breakup of the USSR cast a shadow on the future. Often a unifying force within states, assisting their transition, nationalism had the opposite role in some republics. The most violent consequences of the breakup of the USSR were in those republics that had large ethnic minorities and a history of inter-ethnic violence. In Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, conflicts with ethnic and separatist dimensions had broken out by 1992. These wars, based on rival divisive nationalisms within the new post-Soviet states, were more a by-product of the end of the Cold War than a cause.

The end of the Cold War and after

The 'incredibly swift transition' of 1989–91 was the most remarkable case of large-scale peaceful change in world history. Two concluding questions arise

from this process. First, which of the factors outlined above was the most critical in changing the mindset of Communist leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe? Secondly, what impact did these events – and certain simple interpretations of them – have on what came after?

The historical evidence suggests a multi-faceted explanation of the end of the Cold War. Each of the six possible explanations explored above is well supported and has persuasive power. Thus, the factors that led to the end of the Cold War include what might easily be seen as ideological opposites and logical incompatibles: both force and diplomacy; both pressure and *détente*; both belief and disbelief in the reformability of Communism; both non-violent resistance in some countries and guerrilla resistance in others; both elite action and street politics; both nuclear deterrence and the ideas of some of its critics; both threat and re-assurance; both nationalism in the disparate parts of the Soviet empire and supra-nationalism in the European Community. A worrying possibility is that the Cold War would not have ended but for two myths: that Soviet-style Communism could be reformed, and that Star Wars could work. The complexity – indeed indigestibility – of this mix of factors helps to explain why they have not attracted the same attention as have the ideas of the great simplifiers.

The end of the Cold War shaped what came after for the better. The avoidance of major war in a process as vast and traumatic as the collapse of the USSR was astonishing, as was the subsequent consolidation of democratic systems of government in many East European countries. Yet the post-Cold War world had no shortage of problems. As with European decolonisation in earlier decades, so the collapse of socialist empires and the emergence of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav states led to many wars and crises. Claims that there was a new world order were undermined by phenomena such as failing states in parts of Africa and Asia, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist visions of a non-Western order, the emergence of new forms of terrorist attack, the revivals of assertive nationalisms, and the tendencies towards authoritarianism in many superficially democratic states. In facing old conflicts and some new ones, the US role as the 'one sole and pre-eminent power' proved far more troubled and costly than the elder President Bush had foreseen in 1992.

Of the many simplifying views of the end of the Cold War, two merit special comment because they cast a shadow into the future. The first is the idea that the USSR was forced into change by Reagan's arms build-up in the 1980s. As one would expect, the principal Soviet figures involved are critical of this interpretation, and suggest that events could have unfolded faster without some of Reagan's early policies and rhetoric. More importantly, some of the key US figures involved, including George Shultz and Jack Matlock, while

supporting a mixture of strength and diplomacy, resist simple conclusions about the role of external pressures. The documentary evidence now available indicates that the pressures for change felt by the Soviet leadership were of many different kinds: some came from Europe rather than the United States, and some dated back to long before Reagan's presidency. Much of it came from generational change. The post-Stalin generation was better educated, less afraid, more impatient with the failures of the system, and readier to relinquish the wartime conquests of their parents. The huge Soviet arms burden was certainly a factor. Not all of this arms burden can be explained as a reaction to US policy, as the Soviet military-industrial complex also had its own internal dynamic. The dreadful thought that pervaded Soviet debates in the Gorbachev years was that all the USSR's vast military effort had not provided much leverage with the West, and was largely unusable. While the Russian concern about Star Wars fed into this state of mind, the defensive resolve and steadiness of the West over a long period may have been more important, and the wretched performance of the Soviet economy trumped both.

A closely related simplifying view saw the end of the Cold War as the end of history. This reinforced the deep American sense that, if only tyrannies around the world could be deposed, peoples would live in freedom and peace. Many visions and policies – from the 'new world order' invoked by President Bush in 1990 to the neo-conservative dreams of imposing democracy in 2003 – reflected a belief in universalism: that all peoples basically want the same political system, and the military force of democracies can assist the historical process. In the excitement and confusion of the Cold War's end, the spirit of imposed universalism fled from Moscow, but flourished as never before in its other favourite haunt, Washington, DC.

In a speech in 1984, Henry Kissinger said: 'The Soviet Union must decide whether it is a country or a cause.'³⁸ Under Gorbachev's leadership it eventually did so, embracing the norms of international society. It tried to become a country. However, this led to the terrible discovery, which had not been spelled out by Kissinger, that when the USSR ceased to be a cause it rapidly ceased also to be a country. Although Kissinger did not say it, the United States, too, is both cause and country. This truth, reinforced by simplistic interpretations placed on the Cold War's ending, was to be its strength, and also its weakness, in facing the problems of the post-Cold War world.

³⁸ Speech in Brussels, 13 January 1984; text in Henry Kissinger, *Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays, 1982–1984* (London: Michael Joseph and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), 186.

The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

The Cold War ended suddenly and surprisingly. A great geopolitical and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union ceased. One historical era closed and another opened. But it was an historical turning point unlike others in the past, ones with dates such as 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945. In this case, the old bipolar order collapsed peacefully without war between the great powers. Moreover, unlike past postwar moments, the global system – or at least the dominant core of that system led by the United States – was not overturned. Quite the contrary. The world that the United States and its allies created after World War II remained intact. The end of the Cold War simply consolidated and expanded that order. The Soviet bloc – estranged from the West for half a century – collapsed and began a slow process of integration into that order. As such, the end of the Cold War was not the beginning of a new world order, but the last gasp in the completion of an old one.

But if the end of the Cold War began as a consolidation of the US-led postwar order, deeper and more profound shifts – not immediately apparent – were also set in motion. The globalization of the world economy and the growing market orientation of the developing world were forces for change. The nature of the “security problem” in the global system also changed. The threat to international order was no longer great power war – as it had been for centuries – but violence and instability emerging from weak, failed, and hostile states residing on the periphery of the system. September 11, 2001, dramatically marked this shift. At the same time, the United States itself emerged preeminent – or “unipolar” – after the Cold War, although by the end of the 1990s its power and position in the global system were widely contested. Driven by these gathering developments, the old American-led international order that survived the end of the Cold War appears increasingly to be in crisis.

The restructuring of international relations after the Cold War is a tale of two orders. During the Cold War, these two orders coexisted. One was the Cold War bipolar order. The other was the American-led liberal hegemonic order

that existed “inside” the larger bipolar global system. When the Cold War ended, the “inside” order became the “outside” order, that is, its logic was extended to the larger global system. In one sense, this is a story of the triumph of an American-style liberal international order. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc was a collapse of the last great challenge to this order – and in the two decades since the end of the Cold War no rival logics of order have yet appeared. But, in another sense, it is a story of a slow-motion crisis of authority and governance of this liberal hegemonic order. During the Cold War, the United States asserted its authority and established “rule” through leadership in bipolar balancing and management of a liberal order organized around strategic bargains, institutions, and the provision of public goods. That order survived the end of the Cold War, but the character of “rule” – tied as it has been to the United States’ hegemonic position – has been thrown into doubt.

This chapter makes four arguments.

First, the end of the Cold War was a conservative world-historical event, a story of the triumph, continuity, and consolidation of the American-led postwar order. It is now clear that the United States and its democratic allies had in fact created a deeply rooted, dynamic, and historically unique political order in the shadow of the Cold War. This was the construction of the American-led liberal hegemonic order, which was built in part to strengthen the United States and its allies in the Cold War struggle – but it also had a logic and integrity of its own, so much so that it survived the end of the Cold War and became the core and organizing logic of the postwar global system.

Second, this “inside” order expanded and deepened during the 1990s and onward. Its watchwords were globalization, integration, democratization, and the expansion of liberal international order. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) were elements of this expansion and deepening process. The expansion of NATO and the reaffirmation of American alliances in East Asia also amounted to a consolidation of the American-led postwar liberal international order. Adding stability to this globalizing system were nuclear weapons, which made great power war – and its transforming impact – unlikely, and the democratic character of the leading industrial societies, which gave the system a core of liberal democratic states operating within a democratic zone of peace.

Third, along the way, however, the bargains and institutions of this American-led order came under pressure. The globalization of the world economy set new players and issues into motion. Fragmentation and disorder in the Middle East and Africa – and the rise of fundamentalism in Afghanistan,

Iran, and elsewhere – emerged, in part, as a legacy of policies and actions taken during the Cold War. The rise of new security threats eroded the logic of alliance and security partnerships. The rise of American unipolarity also created new discontents. The United States became the preeminent global state unchecked by traditional great power balancing forces. After September 11, the country showed itself to be not the satisfied protector of the “old order,” but a threatened and insecure power bent on transforming the global system – and it resisted the bargains and constraints of its own postwar order. As a result, in the first years of the new century, the character of “rule” in world politics was thrown into question. From 2001 to 2009, the United States appeared less willing to play the liberal hegemonic leader. There emerged a crisis of governance.

Finally, out of this crisis of governance new forms of cooperation are taking shape. The post-Cold War era of American-led order seems to be giving way to a new pluralism of governance. Old multilateral institutions – the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank – are competing with other modes of governance. These include less formal mechanisms – such as the G-20 and other coalitions – and regional organizations. The worldwide financial crisis and economic slowdown, which began in 2008 with an American banking crisis, will only add to this reworking of institutional arrangements. How this new system of pluralistic governance and fragmented authority will operate is still unclear. In this sense, we are currently living between eras when the old logic of order is eroding, but the new logic is not yet fully evident.

As the Cold War recedes into history, its place in the larger drama of twentieth-century world politics becomes clearer. The Cold War can now be seen not so much as a distinct global struggle as part of a deeper and longer-term struggle that unfolded within the West – one in which the United States and Western Europe searched for workable ways to organize and manage a modern system of international order. This struggle was over how the Western great powers – as democratic and capitalist states – could create a stable liberal international order, and it played itself out across the century amidst world war and economic depression. The starting point of this struggle is ambiguous – perhaps it began at the end of the nineteenth century, with British and American liberals and progressives looking for alternatives to traditional balance-of-power rivalry, continuing with Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective security, and taking a decisive turn in the 1940s with the Atlantic Charter, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and the Atlantic Pact – a sequence of pronouncements and initiatives that embodied ideas and lessons brought forward from earlier decades to inform the American-led

postwar-order-building agenda. In the background, a British-led nineteenth-century world economy and geopolitical order was giving way to an American-led twentieth-century world economy and geopolitical order.

Under the cover of the Cold War, a revolution in relations between the Western great powers took place. It was a Western order built around cooperative security, managed open markets, multilateral governance, and American liberal hegemonic leadership. The Cold War facilitated the building of this order – particularly the strategic bargains between the United States and Europe – but the project began before the Cold War and survived its end. Indeed, the Cold War ended as it did in large part because this Western order was so integrated, dynamic, and cooperative. This liberal international order did not come to life automatically. It was built around hegemonic bargains that today seem to be eroding. It remains uncertain whether a new system of governance and rule can emerge to guide and protect the evolving liberal international order in an era of rising non-Western states and contested and uncertain American leadership.

The end of the Cold War as a postwar moment

The most significant restructurings of the international system have occurred after major wars – 1815, 1919, and 1945. This makes sense. The violence of great power war tears apart the old order. The war itself strips the rules and arrangements of the prewar system of their last shreds of legitimacy. Indeed, great power war is perhaps the ultimate sign that an international order has failed – revisionist states seek to overturn it through aggression, while status quo states cannot defend it short of war. Moreover, the aftermath of war brings with it new winners and losers – and the victors are empowered to organize a new system with rules and arrangements that accord with their interests. Wartime leaders, as they mobilize their societies and justify sacrifice, find themselves articulating ambitious war aims and offering grand visions of a new postwar order. Armistice agreements and peace conferences provide opportunities to lay down new rules and principles of international order.¹

¹ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Orders, 1648–1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994).

The end of the Cold War does not easily fit this pattern. The Cold War, of course, was not a war as such but a sustained period of bipolar rivalry – a militarized geopolitical standoff. It ended peacefully when, in effect, the leaders of the Soviet bloc called a halt to the competition. This began initially with President Mikhail Gorbachev's articulation of "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy aimed at relaxing East–West tensions and creating political space for domestic reforms.² "Gorbachev cooperated to end the Cold War because he knew that the Soviet Union could not be reformed if the Cold War continued," argues the last US ambassador to the Soviet Union.³ At the end of 1988, Gorbachev ordered a unilateral reduction of 500,000 Soviet troops, half coming from Eastern Europe and the western parts of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev also signaled a new Soviet tolerance of political change within Eastern Europe itself, declaring that the "use of force" could not and should not be used as an "instrument of foreign policy," and that "freedom of choice" was a universal principle that applied to both capitalist and socialist systems. This statement amounted to a de facto repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had declared it a Soviet right and responsibility to intervene in Eastern Europe to safeguard socialism. In the following year, Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan. To the United States, Gorbachev offered a vision of *partnerstvo*, or partnership, that entailed replacing the Cold War's "negative peace" with cooperation between the superpowers in pursuit of joint interests. The ideological basis of the Cold War was fast disappearing.

The definitive end to the Cold War came with the spectacular unraveling of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union two years later. The Cold War could have ended without the implosion of the Soviet Union. Indeed, this is what Gorbachev had hoped for – a reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union that would keep Communist rule in the Soviet Union and superpower relations intact. But, instead, the end of the Cold War took the form of the collapse of bipolarity itself. Soviet bloc countries elected new governments, Germany was united and remained inside NATO, and the Soviet Union itself disappeared. The old bipolar international order vanished and a new distribution of power took shape.

The Cold War ended, as Robert Hutchings observes, "not with military victory, demobilization, and celebration but with the unexpected capitulation

² See Archie Brown's chapter in this volume.

³ Jack F. Matlock, Jr., *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004), 316.

of the other side without a shot being fired.”⁴ After past great wars, the old international order was destroyed and discredited, opening the way for sweeping negotiations over the basic rules and principles of postwar international order. But, in this case, the American-led system of order did not simply survive the end of the Cold War, but was widely seen as responsible for the Western triumph. Western policy toward the Soviet Union was vindicated, and the organization of relations among the advanced industrial democracies remained stable and cooperative. In this sense, the end of the Cold War was a conservative historical event. It entailed the peaceful capitulation of the Soviet Union – reluctant, to be sure, and not on the terms that Gorbachev had hoped. But the collapse of the Soviet “pole” left in place the American “pole” – and, with it, the American-led rules, institutions, and relationships that had been built during the Cold War became the new core of post-Cold War world order.⁵

Yet, at the same time, this Western grouping of democracies presented a sufficiently unthreatening face to the Soviet Union during its time of troubles that its leaders were willing to move forward with domestic reform and a reorientation of their foreign policy. The West was both dynamic and, ultimately, defensive. Gorbachev and the other Soviet leaders were convinced that the United States and Western Europe would not exploit their weakness. The pluralistic and democratic character of the countries that formed the Atlantic alliance, the multiple and conflicting positions toward the Soviet Union that existed within and among these countries, and transnational and domestic opposition movements toward hardline policies all worked to soften the face that Kremlin leaders saw as they looked westward. The alliance itself, with its norms of unanimity, made an aggressive policy by one country difficult to pursue. These aspects of Western order all served to make Gorbachev’s historic gamble less risky.⁶

If the end of the Cold War was itself a surprise to many observers, so, too, was what followed: the remarkable stability and continuity of cooperation within the American-led order. Few observers expected this outcome either. Rather than continuity and consolidation of the Western order, the widespread expectation was for its gradual breakdown and movement toward a

4 Robert Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 343.

5 See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, 25 (Winter 2000/01), 5–53.

6 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” *International Security*, 16 (Winter 1991/92), 74–118.

more competitive multipolar system.⁷ One prominent view was that with the end of the Cold War – and the disappearance of bipolarity and the unifying threat of Soviet power – the global system would return to its older pattern of a multipolar balance of power. This, of course, was the pattern of international politics that had more or less prevailed for centuries – from 1648 to 1945. No single state dominated the system and alliance commitments were flexible. For traditional realist scholars, the bipolar system was a historical anomaly. The expectation was that the global system would return to its old pattern rather than persist as an even more anomalous “unipolar” system. The classic statement of this logic was articulated by Kenneth Waltz, namely, that states balance against power and, as a result, the appearance of a single dominant state will stimulate the rise of other great powers or coalitions of states to balance against the leading state.⁸ This was the view of John Mearsheimer, who argued in 1992 that “bipolarity will disappear with the passing of the Cold War, and multipolarity will emerge in the new international order.”⁹ Waltz also speculated on the prospects for the reemergence of an array of great powers – Japan, Germany, China, the European Union, and a revived Russia.¹⁰ Christopher Layne argued that the extreme preponderance of American power would trigger counterbalancing reactions by Asian and European allies or, at least, a loosening of the political and security ties that marked the Cold War era.¹¹ Expectations also existed for a return to competitive multipolarity in East Asia.¹²

Others saw the post-Cold War world returning to instability and conflict, but argued that it would revolve around geoeconomic competition. The United States, Europe, and Japan in particular would emerge as competing economic blocs, each built around a different type of capitalism and regional order. The new security competition would be over economic gains, and it

7 See survey of views by Michael Mastanduno, “A Realist View: Three Images of the Coming International Order,” in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19–40.

8 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

9 John Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton (eds.), *Rethinking America’s Security* (New York: Norton, 1992), 227. See also Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security*, 15 (Summer 1990), 5–57; Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 266 (August 1990), 35–50.

10 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, 18 (1993), 45–73.

11 See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” *International Security*, 17 (Spring 1993), 5–51.

12 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Era,” *International Security*, 18 (Winter 1993/94), 5–33.

would divide capitalist states and fragment the global economic system. Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels argued that “mercantile realism” was the emerging form of international competition, where powerful states would pursue “economic balancing” and that geoeconomic interests might be pursued at the expense of more traditional political and security objectives.¹³ In one version of this argument, put forward by Lester Thurow, the post-Cold War world would be dominated by three regional powers – a US-led bloc centered around NAFTA, a European bloc led by Germany, and an Asian bloc organized by Japan.¹⁴

Some American government officials at this time also worried about a return to a competitive multipolar system. During the last years of the first administration of George H. W. Bush, Defense Department officials, led by Paul Wolfowitz, came forward with a strategic planning document – the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 – charting the United States’ global security challenges after the Cold War. A draft of the report argued that a central goal of American security policy must be to block the rise of rival states or peer competitors. As James Mann observes: “Vague as it was, this language seemed to apply to Japan, Germany or a united Europe, as well as to China and Russia. The draft said the United States should discourage the ‘advanced industrial nations’ from challenging America’s leadership, in part by taking their countries’ interests into account but also through unmatched military strength.”¹⁵ The leaked document triggered criticism from Europeans and others offended by the suggestion that the United States would seek to block the advance of its allies. The revised document dropped this language, but the central argument remained that the United States must maintain its commanding military position and, in the report’s words, “preclude any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests.”¹⁶

13 Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” *International Security*, 22 (Spring 1998), 171–203.

14 Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America* (New York: Murrow, 1992); and Fred Bergsten, “America’s Two Front Economic Conflict,” *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (March/April 2001), 16–27. For a survey of American thinking as it related to Japan and Asia during this period, see Michael Mastanduno, “Models, Markets, and Power: Political Economy and the Asia-Pacific, 1989–1999,” *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000), 493–507.

15 James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 210. See also Barton Gellman, “Keeping the US First: Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” *Washington Post*, March 11, 1992, A1; and Gellman, “Pentagon Abandons Goal of Thwarting US Rivals,” *Washington Post*, May 24, 1992, A1.

16 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993), 3, quoted in Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans*, 212.



39. The fiftieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999. The organization had already gained three new members from the former Soviet bloc: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In 2004, seven new members joined, including the Baltic states, which had been part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

What these and other views reflected was the assumption that the Cold War was an essential “glue” that held the advanced industrial countries together, dampening conflict and facilitating cooperation. Conflict and instability among major states would return. Order and cohesion in the West had come about as a result of cooperation to balance against an external threat, in this case the Soviet Union, and with the disappearance of the threat, alliance partnership and cooperation would decline. The expectation was that, with the end of the Soviet threat, the West, and particularly the security organizations such as NATO, would weaken and eventually return to a pattern of strategic rivalry.

But none of these expectations came to pass. In the years that followed the end of the Cold War, relations among the advanced industrial countries remained stable and open. During the 1990s, the Cold War alliances were reaffirmed – NATO increased its membership and the US–Japan alliance was deepened. Trade and investment across these regions have grown, and institutionalized cooperation in some areas has expanded. There are several

surprises here – about the post-Cold War distribution of power and the responses to it. Rather than a return to a multipolar distribution of power, the United States emerged during the 1990s as a unipolar state. It began the decade as the only superpower and it grew faster than its European and Japanese partners. Likewise, the realist expectation of a return to the problems of anarchy – great power rivalry and security competition – did not emerge. Europe and Japan remained tied to the United States through security alliances, and Russia and China did not engage in great power balancing.

So two unanticipated grand historical developments marked the end of the Cold War – its sudden and peaceful end, culminating in the collapse and partial integration of the Soviet bloc into the West, and, in the decade that followed, the continuing stability and expansion of the American-led international order.

The Cold War and the tale of two orders

These historical surprises bring us back to the tale of two orders. It is clearer now than at the time, but two orders were built in the 1940s. One was the Cold War order built out of the threats and imperatives that emerged as a consequence of the struggle with the Soviet Union – this is the order that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The other order was the US-led international order that was built “inside” the bipolar system in the shadow of the Cold War. This is the Western liberal order – reinforced by the Cold War, but constructed as a relatively distinct “project” dating back to the early decades of the twentieth century. It is this one that survived and prospered after the Cold War and provided the liberal logic for the wider international system.¹⁷

¹⁷ The argument that the longer era of world war and Cold War – 1914 to 1990 – can be treated as a single protracted struggle over the terms of international order and the creation of a modern liberal system is made in various ways by many authors who use terms such as “long war” and “long crisis” to depict its extended duration. See Bruce Cumings, “The End of the Seventy-Years’ Crisis: Trilateralism and the New World Order,” in Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Loriaux (eds.), *Past as Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 9–32; Charles Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,” in Maier, (ed.), *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 153–84; Paul Starr, *Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), ch. 5; and Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Knopf, 2002). Eric Hobsbawm calls it the “short twentieth century”: Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).

The Cold War order was organized around bipolarity, containment, deterrence, and ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. By comparison, the ideas and policies of the Western liberal order were more diffuse and wide-ranging. It was less obvious that the liberal democratic agenda was a “grand strategy” designed to advance American security interests. But, in other respects, it was the more enduring American project, one that was aimed at creating an international order that would be open, stable, and friendly. This new international order was designed to solve the problems of the 1930s, including the world economic breakdown and the growth of competing geopolitical blocs that paved the way for world war. The challenge was not just to deter or contain the power of the Soviet Union, but to lay the foundations for an international order that would allow the United States to thrive. This impulse – to build a stable and open international system that advantaged the country – existed before, during, and after the Cold War. Even at the moment when the Cold War gathered force, the grand strategic interest in building such an order was appreciated. Indeed, one recalls that the most renowned national security paper of the Cold War, NSC-68, laid out a doctrine of containment – but it also articulated a rationale for building a positive international order. The United States needed, it said, to “build a healthy international community,” which “we would probably do even if there were no international threat.” The United States needed a “world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish.”¹⁸

The vision of an American-led liberal international order was expressed in a sequence of declarations and agreements. The first was the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which spelled out a view of what the Atlantic and wider world order would look like if the allies won the war. This agreement was followed by the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, the Marshall Plan in 1947, and the Atlantic pact in 1949. Together, these agreements provided a framework for a radical reorganization of relations among the Atlantic democracies. The emerging Cold War gave this Western-oriented agenda some urgency, and the US Congress was more willing to provide resources and approve international agreements because of the threats of Communist expansion that lurked on the horizon. But the vision of a new order among the Western democracies predated the Cold War. Even if the Soviet Union had not slipped into history, some sort of new order would have been built across the Atlantic.

¹⁸ NSC 68 as published in Ernest May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 40.

This order among the democracies was built around four ideas.¹⁹ One basic commitment was that there would be economic openness among the regions. That is, capitalism would be organized internationally and not along national, regional, or imperial lines. In many ways, this was what World War II was fought over. Germany and Japan each had built their states around the military domination of their respective geographical regions. Russia was also an imperial power unto itself. Even Britain had an imperial trade system, and this was also a threat to an open world economy. During the 1930s, in the United States the debate among scholars and policy thinkers was about the implications for their country of a world of regional blocs. The debate was actually settled by the time the United States entered the war – it could not be a great power and survive only in the western hemisphere. The country would need to have access to trade and resources from the vast Eurasian regions. Capitalism would need to be organized on a global basis.²⁰

The second idea behind the Western democratic order was that the new arrangements would need to be managed through international institutions and agreements. It was not enough simply to open the system up. There would need to be an array of transgovernmental and international institutions that would bring government officials together on an ongoing basis to manage economic and political change. This was the view of the economic officials who gathered in Bretton Woods in 1944. Many of them took the lesson from the heightened role of governments during the economic downturn of the 1930s. Governments would need to play a more direct supervisory role in stabilizing and managing economic order. New forms of intergovernmental cooperation would need to be invented. Indeed, it is no accident that the most ambitious era of international institution-building took place after 1945; these forms were bilateral, multilateral, regional, global, economic, political, and security-oriented. The democratic countries enmeshed themselves in dense institutional relationships.

The third idea was that a new social bargain would underlie the Western democratic order. Progressive notions embedded in New Deal liberalism were injected into the US vision of postwar arrangements. This was the message that Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill communicated to the world in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The industrial democracies would

19 See Ikenberry, *After Victory*, ch. 6; and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies*, 25 (April 1999), 179–96.

20 See Carlo Maria Santoro, *Diffidence and Ambition: The Intellectual Sources of US Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), ch. 5 and 6.

provide a new level of social support, a safety net for peoples of the societies of the Atlantic world. If the citizens of these countries were to live in a more open world economy, their governments would help stabilize and protect these people with the welfare state. Job insurance, retirement support, and other social protections were to help the industrial democracies operate in a free trade system. Building such a compensation mechanism – the modern welfare state – provided fundamental support to an economically integrated Western democratic order.²¹

Finally, the West was to be tied together in a cooperative security order. This was a very important departure from past security arrangements within the Atlantic area. The idea was that Europe and the United States would be part of a single security system. Such a system would ensure that the democratic great powers would not go back to the dangerous game of strategic rivalry and balance-of-power politics. The goal of cooperative security was implicit in the other elements of Western order. Without the Cold War, it is not clear that a formal alliance would have emerged as it did. Probably, it would not have taken on such an intense and formal character. But a security relationship between Europe and the United States that lessened the incentives for these states to engage in balance-of-power politics was needed and probably would have been engineered. A cooperative security order – embodied in a formal alliance institution – ensured that the power of the United States would be rendered more predictable and benign.

The Western order that emerged after 1945 was built upon these institutions and principles – and this deeper vision. European and American leaders in the 1940s and after created a shared order that was built on institutions, commitments, habits, and organizational principles that together produced a remarkable political order. If the Cold War order embodied a bipolar standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Western order embodied a revolution in the relationships between the democratic-capitalist states.

Post-Cold War liberal international order

With the sudden end of the Cold War, this “inside” order survived and provided the organizing logic of the post-Cold War global system. The decade of the 1990s became a “liberal moment.” Democracy and markets flourished

²¹ On the links between the Atlantic Charter and the social welfare ideas that emerged from the New Deal, see Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

around the world, globalization was enshrined as a progressive historical force, and ideology, nationalism, and war were at a low ebb. Russia became a quasi-member of the West, and China was a “strategic partner” with Washington. Existing institutions were strengthened and new ones were built. Alliances were reaffirmed and extended. The European Union was launched and its membership expanded. Newly market-oriented developing countries – what were termed “emerging markets” – became increasingly integrated into the world economy.

The first post-Cold War impulse of the Bush administration in the early 1990s was to build on this logic of Western order. Across security and economic areas, the United States sought to design and expand regional and global institutions. In relations toward Europe, State Department officials articulated a set of institutional steps: the evolution of NATO to include associate relations with countries to the east, the creation of more formal institutional relations with the European Community, and an expanded role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the western hemisphere, the Bush administration pushed for NAFTA and closer economic ties with South America. In East Asia, APEC was a way to create more institutional links to the region, demonstrating American commitment to the region and ensuring that Asian regionalism moved in a trans-Pacific direction. Bush’s secretary of state, James A. Baker III, later likened his administration’s post-Cold War order-building strategy to American strategy after 1945.²²

This strategy of building on the logic of the existing order – and expanding and integrating countries into it – was continued during the administration of William J. Clinton. The idea was to use multilateral institutions as mechanisms to stabilize and integrate the new and emerging market democracies into the Western democratic world. In an early statement of this “enlargement” doctrine, Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, argued that the strategy was to “strengthen the community of market democracies” and “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible.” The United States would help “democracy and market economies take root,” which would in turn expand and strengthen the wider Western democratic order.²³ The target of this strategy was primarily those parts of the world that were beginning the process of transition to market democracy: countries of

22 James A. Baker III, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam, 1995), 605–06.

23 Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 60, 1 (October 15, 1993), 13–19. See also Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The

Central and Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Promising domestic reforms in those countries would be encouraged – and locked in if possible – through new trade pacts and security partnerships.²⁴

By the end of the 1990s, a major consolidation and expansion of the US-led international liberal order had been accomplished. The organizational logic of the Western order built during the Cold War was extended to the global level. NATO expansion was completed, providing an institutional basis to stabilize and embed new entrants into the Western order – creating greater security among alliance partners and reinforcing democratic and market institutions. NAFTA and APEC were also pursued as mechanisms to reinforce and lock in the worldwide movement, begun in the late 1980s, toward economic and trade liberalization. Finally, the creation of the WTO in 1995 provided a further attempt to expand and institutionally strengthen the foundations of liberal international order. Building on the old General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO marked a major step in establishing a judicial basis for international trade law.

In fact, during the 1990s, trade and investment expanded across the developed and developing world, and emerging countries became more fully integrated into the larger system. The democratic world itself expanded with countries making the transition from socialist and authoritarian pasts. At the same time, the great powers remained at peace. Japan and Western Europe remained tied to the United States, and China and Russia were moving closer to, rather than away from, the United States. While there was much debate whether the United States had a grand strategy after the Cold War, the Clinton administration did have a liberal orientation – a strategy of multilateral management of a globalizing world system.²⁵

In the background, the stability and character of the US-led post-Cold War order were reinforced by the country's commanding power position – advantages which gave it the ability to exercise hegemonic leadership. There were several aspects to these power advantages. One was simply its preeminence in global power capabilities. The United States was the largest economy in the world at the beginning of the 1990s – and it continued to outpace the other

Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, 106 (Spring 1997), 116. For a survey of post-Cold War American foreign policy and the Clinton administration's efforts to define a strategic vision, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 – the Misunderstood Decade between the End of the Cold War and the Start of the War on Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

24 White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: White House, July 1994), 6.

25 See Robert Wright, "Clinton's One Big Idea," *New York Times*, January 16, 2001.

advanced economies during the decade. These economic advantages were partly due to the relative weakness of the other traditional great powers – Russia collapsed, the European Union grew slowly, and Japan entered a decade of economic stagnation.

Behind the scenes, the reserve position of the US dollar gave Washington a special status as an economic power – rights of “seigniorage,” which meant that it could run deficits, fight foreign wars, increase domestic spending, and go into debt without fearing the pain that other states would experience. Because of its dominance, the United States did not have to raise interest rates to defend its currency, taking pressure off chronic trade imbalances. In the post-Cold War era, Asian countries, such as China and Japan, and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were the primary holders of American debt rather than Europe, although the advantages for Washington remained. These advantages were highlighted during the George W. Bush administration, when the United States was able to launch a costly war on Iraq while running budget deficits and cutting taxes – a foreign policy made possible by the ability of the United States to sell its debt to foreign countries such as China and Japan.

In addition to its economic dominance, the United States was also the only global military power – that is, the only country capable of projecting military power to all corners of the world. At the end of the 1990s, the United States was responsible for 36 percent of total world military spending. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Washington boosted its defense expenditures and its share increased to more than 40 percent of the world total – or roughly equal to the expenditures of the next fourteen countries. By 2005, the United States was responsible for half of global military spending. At the same time, it retained most of its Cold War-era alliance partnerships and far-flung bases in Europe and Asia.²⁶

The United States’ hegemonic position has also been reinforced by nuclear weapons – which has made it harder for other states to overturn the existing power structure. Even if other major states – rising in power – wanted to challenge the United States, a wholesale reorganization of the system through great power war is no longer feasible. The costs are too steep.

²⁶ For documentation on the United States’ power preponderance, see William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, 24 (Summer 1999), 5–41; Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony,” *ibid.*, 28 (Summer 2003), 5–46; and Paul Kennedy, “The Eagle Has Landed,” *Financial Times*, February 2, 2002.

So the twentieth century ended with world politics exhibiting a deeply anomalous character – the United States had emerged as a “unipolar” power situated at the center of a stable and expanding liberal international order. The other traditional great powers had neither the ability nor the desire to challenge – let alone overturn – this unipolar order. It was built on the realities implicit in the international distribution of material capabilities. But it was also built on the rules, institutions, partnerships, and political norms affecting how states do business with each other – aspects of the system that had been designed during the Cold War.

Unipolarity and its discontents

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the coherence and stability of this American-led liberal international order have become less certain. To be sure, the United States continued to play a hegemonic role in the operation of the system. It provided security through alliance partnerships in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as a market for the world’s exports. It also championed an open world economy. But long-term shifts in the global system – partially unleashed by the end of the Cold War – began to erode the bargains and institutions that supported this liberal hegemonic order. Indeed, the underlying governance and rule of the global system – and the authority and legitimacy of American power – have been increasingly thrown into question. The administration of Barack Obama was elected to office with a commitment to restore the United States’ global standing, but the deep sources of change in the global system create formidable challenges to its renewal agenda.

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of unipolarity. In one sense, this was a boon to the global system – creating an open and integrative order that was not thwarted by great power balancing and competing regional blocs. But unipolarity did create extraordinary power advantages for the United States that in the hands of the Bush administration – and spurred by the American reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11 – altered the global perceptions of costs and benefits of unipolarity for various states within it.

When President Bush came to office in 2001, questions already existed about the American operation of a unipolar order. In the last years of the Clinton administration, worry about how the United States would exercise unipolar power was already spreading. The American-led NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 provided a revealing glimpse of the new patterns of world politics in the post-Cold War era: despotic states and hostile regimes in

peripheral regions generating threats that challenge the rules and institutions of the postwar Western order and provoke the controversial use of American military force. Others around the world worried, such as French foreign minister Hubert Védrine, who described the United States as a “hyperpower.”²⁷

Even without American policies and pronouncements that might aggravate the situation, the shift from Cold War bipolarity to American unipolarity carried with it risks and uncertainties – and more than a decade after the Cold War it initiated a global geopolitical adjustment process that continues today even as the “unipolar moment” appears to be ending. The first implication of the shift to unipolarity is that it enhanced the power position of the United States. This is true for several reasons. The unipolar state has more discretionary resources – more unspent power – than before because it no longer faces a peer competitor. Likewise, the absence of a great power coalition balancing against it also reduces the external constraints on American power. Weaker and smaller states have fewer “exit” options. Overall, the unipolar state has a more encompassing impact on the global system.

But the disappearance of the Cold War threat also removes some leverage for the unipolar state. Weaker states – and longstanding alliance partners – are no longer threatened by a rival global power. The centralizing security problem of the Cold War – manifest in the bipolar competitive struggle – is gone and security problems inevitably decentralize into regional ones. The United States continues to play a role in many of these regional security trouble spots, but its overall leverage as the global security provider is diminished.

It is the impact of unipolarity on the general framework of Western and global rules and institutions that triggers the most worries. At the very least, the shift in power capabilities in favor of the United States would help explain why it might want to renegotiate older rules and institutions. In this sense, the country after the Cold War entered into its second “hegemonic moment.” After World War II, it translated its power advantages into a set of global and regional institutions; it created a liberal hegemonic order. By the end of the 1990s, the United States’ unipolar advantages put it in a position to engage in a similar sort of adjustment process. During the Clinton years, this adjustment and renegotiation of the liberal hegemonic order primarily entailed expanding and deepening the liberal international order. But the expansion and

27 “To Paris, US Looks Like a ‘Hyperpower,’” *International Herald Tribune*, February 5, 1999.

integration of the global system – a byproduct of the old order – have brought new issues and new demands for rules and institutions as well as new controversies and conflicts.²⁸

The shift from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity gave the United States incentives to renegotiate its hegemonic bargains with other states. But – more profoundly – unipolarity may also have created conditions that reduced the willingness of the United States to operate within frameworks of agreed-upon rules and institutions. The unique global position that the United States occupies has led it to demand special status and exemptions from multilateral rules and institutions. For example, the United States could not be party to the anti-land mine convention because its troops are uniquely deployed in harm's way – such as along the border between North and South Korea.²⁹

Unipolarity also creates more possibilities for the lead state to influence or control the policies of other states without incurring commitments to multilateral rules and institutions. Its preponderance of power creates opportunities for it to push “adjustment” off onto other states. Accordingly, the United States has been able to set its own domestic regulatory standards in some areas – and this pushes other countries and regions to adopt similar standards.

In the background, other long-term shifts in the global system are putting pressure on the rules and institutions of the American-led liberal hegemonic order. One is the erosion of state norms of sovereignty. This is the unfolding of the human rights revolution – a development deeply embedded in the postwar liberal international project.³⁰ The breakthrough was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1948.³¹ By the end of the Cold War, the notion was increasingly established that the international community had a moral and legal claim on the protection of individuals within states. In the 1990s, this “contingent” character of sovereignty was pushed further. The international community was seen as having a right – even a moral obligation – to intervene in troubled

28 See Robert Jervis, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” *Washington Quarterly*, 29, 2 (2006), 7–19; and G. John Ikenberry, “Global Security Trap,” *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, 1, 2 (September 2006), 8–19.

29 See John Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance,” in Michael Ignatieff (ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 304–38.

30 For a discussion of the Cold War and human rights, see Rosemary Foot's chapter in this volume.

31 See Mary Ann Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration* (New York: Random House, 2002).



40. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, September 11, 2001: 9/11 challenged the globalized, multilateral world order.

states to prevent genocide and mass killing. NATO intervention in the Balkans and the war against Serbia were defining actions of this sort.³²

The next step in the erosion of norms of state sovereignty occurred in the aftermath of September 11. The American-led intervention in Afghanistan – where outside military force was used to topple a regime that actively protected terrorist attackers – was widely seen as a legitimate act of self-defense. The outside world has a legitimate claim to what goes on within a sovereign state if that state provides a launching pad, breeding ground, or protected area for transnational violence. The Bush administration pushed the

32. An important step in this regard was the elaboration of the doctrine of the international community's "responsibility to protect." See *The Responsibility to Protect* (Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001).

limits of this principle in its invasion of Iraq. Now it was the anticipatory threat of a state itself – and its ambitions to gain weapons of mass destruction – that provided the justification for intervention.

As a result, the erosion of norms of sovereignty has ushered in a new global struggle over the sources of authority in the international community. The shift in the “security problem” in the global system compounds this question of legitimate authority inherent in the rise of unipolarity. Great power war is no longer the central danger in the global system. Nuclear deterrence and democratic peace among the advanced countries – together with American dominance – make security competition and war unlikely among the traditional great powers.³³ Rather, the threat of violence and insecurity now comes from more peripheral regions of the world. Despotism states that acquire destructive weapons or weak states that host terrorist groups are the new global threats. These new threats play havoc with old notions of deterrence, alliance, self-defense, and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. If intervention into the affairs of weak and hostile states in troubled regions of the world is the new frontier of international security, the problems of who speaks for the international community and the establishment of legitimate rules on the use of force multiply. The United States’ unipolar military capabilities are both in demand and deeply controversial.

The challenges ahead

The United States, together with allied European and East Asian partners, created a distinctive type of international order – organized around open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental institutions, and cooperative security. This political order was cemented both by the hegemonic power of the United States and by the unusual bonds of cooperation that are possible among democracies. Today, this order is in jeopardy. The United States is deeply ambivalent about making institutional commitments and binding itself to other states – ambivalence and hesitation that have been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, American unipolarity, and new security threats. But the United States still possesses profound incentives to build and operate within a liberal rule-based order. Just as importantly, that order is now not simply an extension of American power and interests – it has taken on a life of its own. American power may rise or fall and its foreign-policy ideology may wax and wane between multilateral and imperial impulses – but the wider and deeper liberal global order is now a reality that the United States must accommodate.

33 See Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review*, 96 (March 2002), 1–14.

In the meantime, the currently unfolding global financial crisis is generating new pressures and demands for rewriting the rules and remaking the institutions of global politics and capitalism – pushing and pulling the liberal international order in uncharted directions. The post-Cold War rise of the Washington Consensus and the ideology of the unfettered market have now come to an end. States will inevitably become more active players in international finance and trade. The hierarchy of states – and the distribution of wealth and power – will shift and turn.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the global system is at a remarkable moment. The United States dominates the world as no state has in the past. At the same time, the political relations and institutional frameworks built over the past half-century for the organization of world politics have eroded. The United States is both partly responsible for this situation and a casualty of it: it has the capacity to dominate the world, but not the legitimacy to rule. It has power but not authority.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a world system characterized by globalization and American unipolarity. Relations between poles and peripheries shifted. With the end of bipolar competition, Africa, the Middle East, and other parts of the developing world lost their strategic importance to Washington – and this, arguably, has contributed to the fragmentation and disorder that followed in large stretches of these troubled regions. Iran and Afghanistan are emblematic of this shift. The rise of fundamentalism in these countries and the conflicts that have ensued are, in part, the result of the policies followed and actions taken during the Cold War. The legacies of the Cold War remain, manifest as failed states and civil wars around the world. The “inside” Western order has now become the “outside” order – but the United States and its Western partners are faced with deep conflicts and ravaged societies that the “inside” states are ill-equipped to manage.

But even if liberal order survives the current upheavals associated with the Bush administration and its war in Iraq, it is an order that rests on shifting and transformed foundations. The “liberal project” was brought into the postwar world with the help of a hidden hand of American hegemony and Cold War bipolarity. The end of the Cold War, unipolarity, eroded sovereignty, and transformed security threats provide a less favorable environment in which to safeguard and manage liberal order. The American-led liberal project itself has partly brought us to this impasse – its success has helped strip away the old foundations of the order. Liberal internationalism stands triumphant, but also more alone and vulnerable.

Bibliographical essay

The bibliographical essays in the three volumes of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War* aim at being selective and critical overviews of the literature available in each subfield of historical investigation. The entries are written by the authors of the chapters in the main text, with additions, deletions, and crossreferences suggested by the editors. Readers may want to look at the bibliographic entries in more than one volume to get an overview of the literature on a particular issue or region.

1. The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century

There exists no single volume on the intellectual history of the last third of the twentieth century, or even one that would convincingly cover the postwar period in Western Europe or the United States. A useful collection of essays on political thought in the twentieth century as a whole is Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); also still useful is Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies: A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984). Books that successfully weave together accounts of European political history and judgments on some of the major developments in European political thought are Tony Judt's *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2005) and Mark Mazower's *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin, 1998); still useful is George Lichtheim, *Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Phoenix, 2000). A useful survey of European political thought in East and West is also provided in Noel O'Sullivan, *European Political Thought since 1945* (New York: Palgrave, 2004); a seminal essay that makes sense of developments in West European political thought since the 1970s is Mark Lilla's "The Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and Its Discontents," *Daedalus*, 123, 2 (1994), 129–57.

The emergence of French antitotalitarianism is skillfully charted in Pierre Grémion, *Modernisation et progressisme: fin d'une époque 1968–1981* (Paris: Editions Esprit, 2005), and in Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: France's Antitotalitarian Moment* (New York: Berghahn, 2004). Also useful is Mark Lilla (ed.), *New French Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Developments in German political thought are surveyed in Chris Thornhill, *Political Theory in Modern Germany* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), and in Jan-Werner Müller, *German Ideologies since 1945* (New York: Palgrave,

2002). On Italy, see Norberto Bobbio, *Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

On the end of the social democratic consensus, see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism* (New York: New Press, 1998), Sheri Berman, *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), and David Marquand and Anthony Seldon, *The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain* (London: Fontana, 1996).

On the rise of the New Right in economics and libertarianism in general, see, as primary texts, Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, *Free to Choose* (New York: Harcourt, 1980), and Friedrich Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) and *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 3 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1973–79). From a Gramscian perspective, but with a wealth of historical documentation, see Bernhard Walpen, *Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft: eine hegemonietheoretische Studie zur Mont Pèlerin Society* (Hamburg: VSA, 2004); for the Mont Pèlerin Society's self-presentation, see R. M. Hartwell, *A History of the Mont Pèlerin Society* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1995); on Hayek in particular, see Alan Ebenstein, *Friedrich Hayek: A Biography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Also worth consulting is Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Macmillan, 2008). On the political thought associated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher more generally, see Godfrey Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), Robert Devigne, *Recasting Conservatism: Oakeshott, Strauss, and the Response to Postmodernism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), and Donald T. Critchlow, *The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

On the emergence of neoconservatism in particular, one should consult Irwin Stelzer (ed.), *Neoconservatism* (London: Atlantic, 2004), Irving Kristol, *Neoconservatism: Autobiography of an Idea* (New York: Free Press, 1995), and Jacob Heilbrunn, *They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons* (New York: Doubleday, 2008). A thought-provoking retrospective of the movement can be found in Tod Lindberg, "Neoconservatism's Liberal Legacy," *Policy Review* (October 2004).

Primary texts from dissidents in the Eastern bloc are helpfully assembled in H. Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson (eds.), *Civic Freedom in Central Europe: Voices from Czechoslovakia* (London: Macmillan, 1991), and John Keane (ed.), *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1985). Among the important secondary literature are Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia* (New York, Routledge, 1988), Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Aviezer Tucker, *Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), Padraic Kenney, *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), and Barbara J. Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003).

2. The world economy and the Cold War, 1970–1990

The literature that deals specifically with the relationship between the global political economy and the Cold War in the period 1970–1990 is rather thin. Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), and the concluding chapters of Thomas McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), are probably the best introductions. Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993), contains a useful survey of the uneven regional impact of the demographic, technological, and environmental transformations that underlay the closing decades of the Cold War. Robert Brenner's *The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2005* (London: Verso, 2006) and chs. 4–6 of Giovanni Arrighi's *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century* (London: Verso, 2007) provide complementary overviews of the evolution of the global political economy since the late 1960s.

Key texts on the crisis of US hegemony of the 1970s in the international relations literature are David Calleo, *The Imperious Economy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), and Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Outside the international relations literature, early diagnoses of the crisis include Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Dynamics of Global Crisis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), and Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, and John Harrison, *Capitalism since World War II: The Making and Breakup of the Great Boom* (London: Fontana, 1984). Among the works that focus on international monetary relations, especially useful are Eugène L. Versluysen, *The Political Economy of International Finance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), Riccardo Parboni, *The Dollar and Its Rivals* (London: Verso, 1981), Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), and Francis Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Fred Halliday's *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983) is still the most useful account of the broader geopolitical trends that led to the neoliberal turn and the escalation of the Cold War under Ronald Reagan. Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), and Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), provide contrasting but equally useful insights into the impact of the neoliberal counterrevolution on the global political economy. Different aspects of the impact on the Third World are explored in Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Neoliberalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), John Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000).

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global and national political-economic conditions that contributed to the Soviet demise, see Martin Walker, *The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), Marshall I. Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology* (New York: Norton, 1987), Iliana Zloch-Christy, *Debt Problems of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Abel Aganbegyan, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. (eds.), *The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet Military Burden* (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), and Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), *The Disintegration of the Soviet Economic System* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

The literature on the rise of East Asia in the concluding decades of the Cold War is vast but mostly focused on the development of individual states rather than the region. The key concept in this literature is that of the "developmental state," originally proposed in Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). An excellent sample of this literature is collected in Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), and is well surveyed in Robert Wade. "East Asian Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," *World Politics*, 44 (1992), 270–320. The emerging regional perspective on the rise of East Asia is best exemplified by Ravi. A. Palat (ed.), *Pacific Asia and the Future of the World-System* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shirasishi (eds.), *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), and Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden (eds.), *The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

See also section 3 of the bibliographical essay in volume I and section 3 in volume II.

3. The rise and fall of Eurocommunism

A large amount of literature about Eurocommunism was written in the second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. However, this literature is now much more meaningful as a source for understanding the political and intellectual perception of the phenomenon at the time than for studying it today. A comprehensive historical account of Eurocommunism has not yet appeared. A general profile can be found in the chapter dealing with the period in Aldo Agosti, *Bandiere rosse: un profilo storico dei comunismi europei* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1999). For a consideration of Eurocommunism in the broader context of the history of the Left in Europe, see Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: Tauris, 1996). On the roots of Eurocommunism in 1968, the best account available is Maud Bracke, *Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007). For collections of speeches and articles by the Eurocommunists, see Bernardo Valli, *Gli eurocomunisti* (Milan: Bompiani, 1976), and Sergio Segre, *A chi fa paura l'eurocomunismo?* (Rimini and Florence: Guaraldi, 1977). The main attempt to present a theoretical view by a Eurocommunist leader is Santiago Carrillo, *L'eurocomunismo e lo Stato* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1977).

On the international policy of the Italian Communist Party and Enrico Berlinguer's Eurocommunist strategy, see Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi,

2006). For a biography of Berlinguer, see Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer* (Roma: Carocci, 2006). In terms of documentation, quite interesting are the secret notes written by Berlinguer's personal secretary Antonio Tatò: *Caro Berlinguer: note e appunti riservati di Antonio Tatò a Enrico Berlinguer 1969–1984* (Turin: Einaudi, 2003). For a useful collection of documents on the Italian Communist Party's European policy, see Mauro Maggiorani and Paolo Ferrari, (eds.), *L'Europa da Togliatti a Berlinguer: testimonianze e documenti 1945–1984* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005). Some documents on the relations between Moscow and the Italian Communist Party are published in Silvio Pons, "Meetings Between the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rome, 1978–1980," *Cold War History*, 3 (2002), 157–66. The most important memories by protagonists are Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Napoleone, 1994), and Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal PCI al socialismo europeo: un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005).

There are no specific studies on the international policy of the French Communist Party. A useful general history of the party is Stéphane Courtois and Marc Lazar, *Histoire du Parti Communiste Français* (Paris: PUF, 1995). Some interesting information can be found in Gérard Streiff, *Jean Kanapa 1921–1978: une singulière histoire du PCF*, 2 vols. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001). For a biography of Georges Marchais, see Thomas Hofnung, *Georges Marchais: l'inconnu du Parti Communiste Français* (Paris: L'Archipel, 2001). For a comparative history of the French and Italian Communist Parties, see Marc Lazar, *Maisons rouges: les Partis Communistes Français et Italien de la Libération à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1992).

On the Spanish Communist Party, a general history is G. Morà, *Miseria i grandezza del partido comunista de Espana, 1939–1985* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1986). The most important memoir is Santiago Carrillo, *Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2006).

On American views of Eurocommunism in Henry Kissinger's time, see Mario Del Pero, *Henry Kissinger e l'ascesa dei neoconservatori: alle origini della politica estera americana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006; English edn., 2009), and parts of Dana Allin, *Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power 1969–1989* (London: Macmillan, 1994). On the attitude of the Carter administration toward Eurocommunism, see Irwin Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," *Ricerche di Storia Politica*, 2 (2006; English edn., 1999).

On the Soviet views of Eurocommunism, it can be still useful to read Joan B. Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer* (London: Tauris, 1986), and Heinz Timmermann, *The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987). For an overview of Soviet foreign policy, see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). Documentation on Soviet secret operations against Eurocommunism can be found in Christopher Andrew with Vasili Mitrokhin, *l'archivio Mitrokhin: le attività segrete del KGB in occidente* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2000). An important memoir from the Soviet side is A. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995).

4. The Cold War and Jimmy Carter

The Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, GA, has declassified enough documents to support serious research on many subjects. Some documents and several oral histories are online; see www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/. The Cold War International History Project

offers many Soviet bloc documents; especially relevant are its Carter Brezhnev and Afghanistan projects. Many of its documents are online. See www.wilsoncenter.org/cwhip. Some of the most important are in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997). The National Security Archive is particularly rich in documents on Iran and Central America. Most are available online to subscribing libraries. The online Declassified Documents Reference System, available by subscription, can be very useful. The American Presidency Project contains all presidential public statements. See www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/. The Jimmy Carter Oral History Project at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia (Charlottesville, VA) includes many useful interviews. See millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/diglibrary/oralhistory/carter/index.html.

Memoirs are critical to understanding the administration's foreign policy. It is instructive to contrast Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983). Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam, 1982), focuses almost exclusively on the Middle East peace negotiations. Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency* (New York: Putnam, 1982), treats the administration's tumultuous final year. While serving in the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council, Robert Gates (*From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996]) garnered important insights into the administration's use of covert operations. Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Random House, 1995), exudes contempt for the Carter administration.

For Carter's biography, begin with Jimmy Carter, *An Hour Before Daylight: Memories of a Rural Boyhood* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). The aptly titled *Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to Post-Presidency*, by Peter Bourne (New York: Scribner, 1997) is written by a friend of the president who served in the administration.

Two overviews of the Carter presidency that put the administration's foreign policy in context are John Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), an excellent collection of essays, and Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, *The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.*, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), which is highly critical. W. Carl Biven, *Jimmy Carter's Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), provides necessary background.

The most useful general studies of Carter's foreign policy are Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), an early overview that remains relevant, and Robert Strong, *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), a good collection of case studies. For a stimulating study of the administration's first two years, see Olav Njølstad, *Peacekeeper and Troublemaker: The Containment Policy of Jimmy Carter, 1977–1978* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 1995).

For Carter's approach to human rights, Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), provides an incisive overview. For a highly critical view, see Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). Lars Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin*

America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), focuses on the region most associated with the human rights policy's successes and failures.

On détente, the Cold War, and relations with the Soviet Union, Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), is indispensable. Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), is a penetrating analysis of the impact of ideology on the development of the Cold War. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), is particularly useful for the Horn of Africa, Iran, and Afghanistan. Essential for understanding the SALT II negotiations is Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

There are many good monographs on US policy toward particular countries during the Carter years. On Central America, William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), covers the Carter years concisely. The analysis penned by the National Security Council Latin America expert Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), is detailed and insightful.

The best article on Carter's policy toward Africa is Piero Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba," *International History Review*, 18 (1996), 70–103. J. A. LaFebvre, *Arms for the Horn* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), Paul Henze, *The Horn of Africa* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), and Donna Jackson, *Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2007), are useful.

The former US ambassador to Italy, Richard Gardner, *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005), explains the administration's struggles with Eurocommunism. A Central Intelligence Agency analyst illuminates US policy toward Poland in Douglas MacEachin, *US Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980–1981* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2002).

On Iran, James Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), provides a sweeping overview. A National Security Council expert on Iran, Gary Sick, *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Times Books, 1991), argues that the campaign team of Ronald Reagan delayed the release of the hostages.

The literature on the Middle East is extensive, but the work of William Quandt, particularly his *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986), is most useful because the author, then on the National Security Council staff, was a participant at the negotiations and had access to documents that remain classified. On China, recommended is the readable survey by James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1998).

See also sections 5 and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

5. Soviet foreign policy from détente to Gorbachev, 1975–1985

Among general overviews, Richard Andersen, *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy during the Brezhnev Years* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

1993), is a fine study of Soviet foreign policy of the Leonid Brezhnev period with special emphasis on internal political struggles in the Soviet elite. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (eds.), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (London: Palgrave, 2002), is a collection of essays on various aspects of Soviet foreign policy under Brezhnev based on new evidence. Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), is an early study of internal dynamics of the Soviet Politburo and decisionmaking of the Brezhnev period. Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), is a good overview of what Soviet foreign-policy specialists thought in the Brezhnev period and after. Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), is the most comprehensive study of US–Soviet relations and détente based on extensive interviews and archival documents in both countries. In Russian, Rudolph Pikhov, *Sovetskii soiuz: istoriia vlasti* [The Soviet Union: A History of Power] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograph, 2000), is a study of Soviet foreign and domestic policy based on full access to Soviet archives by a former head of the Russian Archival Administration. Egor Gaidar, *Gibel imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), provides an original assessment of Soviet imperial decline through the prism of international finances, Soviet economics, and oil prices. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Vladislav M Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), provide general overviews of the era. Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), has many good essays connecting the late Brezhnev era with the Mikhail Gorbachev period.

Among biographies and memoirs, the following stand out: Iurii Aksiutin (ed.), *L. I. Brezhnev: materialy k biografii* [L. I. Brezhnev: Biographical Material] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), an edited volume of recollections of former Soviet political leaders; Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), the memoir of a former director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of USA and Canada Studies; Karen N. Brutents, *Tritsats' let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1998), a very valuable and candid memoir of the former deputy head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Anatolii Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), the memoir of a staffer in the International Department who was to become Gorbachev's key foreign-policy aide; Nikolai Detinov and Alexander Saveliev, *The Big Five: Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), a detailed study of the process of Soviet decisionmaking and arms control politics written by two chief Soviet negotiators; Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), a comprehensive and unique memoir by the Soviet ambassador, who was involved in Soviet decisionmaking; Georgii Kornienko, *Kholodnaia voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika* [The Cold War: An Account from a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), a detailed and perceptive memoir by the former USSR deputy foreign minister; and Roi Medvedev, *Neizvestnyi Andropov: politicheskaia*

biografiia Iurii Andropova [The Unknown Andropov: A Political Biography of Iurii Andropov] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Prava Cheloveka," 1999), a detailed appraisal of the KGB leader and Brezhnev's successor.

The materials of the Carter–Brezhnev Project, reflected in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), are immensely valuable for the study of the late Brezhnev era.

See also sections 4 and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

6. Islamism, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Peter Avery, et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. VII, *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), is the best overview of Iran in the twentieth century, but see also Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), analyzes the shah's economic and military policies and abuse of power. Amin Saikal, *The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), provides a thorough discussion of the shah's rule in the context of Iran's place in the dynamics of the Cold War. Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), perceptively discusses the composition and political intrigues of the Iranian political elite under the shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (Toronto: Irwin & Company, 1980), is the shah's response to some of the criticisms of the Pahlavi period.

On the Iranian Islamist revolution, Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), is the standard work, discussing its root causes and consequences. Rohullah K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), evaluates the main reasons for the Iranian revolution and its challenges as well as responses to the challenges in the Middle East. Ayatullah Rohullah Khomeyni, *Islamic Government* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, 1979), provides translation of Khomeini's writings on what constitutes an Islamic order. Ray Takeyh, *Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic* (New York: Times Books, 2006), discusses Khomeini's legacy and the place of Iran in the region and US–Iranian relations prior to and after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), is a thoughtful assessment of Khomeini's vision and Iran's efforts at reform during the first presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2001). Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, *Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), provides a historical analysis of the postrevolutionary factional politics of Iran and the emergence of an Iranian version of American neoconservatism that has an uncompromising foreign-policy agenda and major implications for US, EU, and Middle Eastern policymakers.

On Iranian foreign affairs, Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, new ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003), provides a detailed account of the Central Intelligence Agency's 1953 intervention in Iran and its consequences.

James A. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American Iranian Relations* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), is a thorough study of US Iranian relations from the early 1940s to the mid-1980s. Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), analyzes the shah's rule, the Iranian revolution, and American responses to it, while Ali Ansari, *Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), is a concise yet comprehensive analysis of the myths and prejudices that have developed on both sides and shaped policy and public opinion. On the Soviet side, Amin Saikal, "Soviet Policy toward Southwest Asia," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 481 (September 1985), 104–16, evaluates Soviet policy toward Iran and Afghanistan. Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Soviet–Iranian Relations: A Quarter-Century of Freeze and Thaw," in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vicomoch (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post-World War II Era* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1974), is a survey of Soviet–Iranian relations during the first two and a half decades of the Cold War.

On Afghanistan, Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), provides thorough coverage of the country's history, politics, and culture. Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), analyzes the evolution of Afghan politics and society since the foundation of the modern Afghan state in the middle of the eighteenth century. Abdul Aziz Danishyar, *The Afghanistan Republic Annual, 1974* (Kabul: Department of Publicity for Afghanistan, 1974), is a good overview of where Afghanistan was in terms of social development when the revolutionary era began. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), provides detailed information about Afghanistan's Soviet-backed Communist parties, their rivalries, and their rise to power. Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), is a study of the development of pro-Soviet Communist groups in Afghanistan, with coverage of the Soviet invasion of the country and its consequences. Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), gives an account of the 1978 coup from the point of view of a member of President Mohammed Daoud's inner circle. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2004), is the best overview of US involvement. Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), *The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), examines various aspects of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the consequences of the Soviet withdrawal from the country. William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (Houndmills: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), is a study of Afghan conflicts from the time of the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan in the mid-1950s to the toppling of the Taliban regime and establishment of the internationally backed government of Hamid Karzai. On the big issues, Amin Saikal, *Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?* (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), considers the state of relations between the West and the domain of Islam in both historical and contemporary terms, with a discussion of the Iranian revolution and the Afghanistan and Palestinian problems.

For US and Soviet policies, see sections 4, 5, and 7 in this bibliographical essay.

7. The collapse of superpower détente, 1975–1980

The indispensable work for students of superpower détente and its collapse in the 1970s is Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). Other essential interpretations are provided by John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Joseph Nye, Jr. (ed.), *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), Mike Bowker and Phil Williams, *Superpower Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1988), Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations in the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), and, analyzing détente within a wider historical context, William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), and Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

An excellent account on the rise and fall of détente as seen from the Soviet perspective is Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995). Other important books on Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s are Adam B. Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), and G. M. Kornienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskii vzgliad na vneshniiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985 goda* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992).

On the American side, invaluable first-hand accounts are found in the political memoirs of Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978), Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983).

There is a rich scholarly literature on US–Soviet policy in the 1970s and early 1980s. Particularly worth mentioning are Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), and Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

The role of US and Soviet intelligence is covered by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), and Douglas J. MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2002). An important source of documentation is Donald

P. Steury (ed.), *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994).

Superpower détente collapsed in part because of disputes over regional conflicts and conflicting geopolitical aspirations. Informative studies are Paul Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1991), Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), Olav Njølstad, "Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years," *Cold War History*, 4 (2004), 21–55, Carol R. Saivetz, "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Détente," and Odd Arne Westad, "The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978–1979," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 72–94 and 118–48, respectively, and Westad (ed.), *The Global Cold War*.

Another bone of contention between the superpowers in the 1970s was human rights. For a comprehensive analysis of the international implications of the Helsinki Conference, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). A critical interpretation of Carter's policy on human rights is Joshua Muravchik, *The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights Policy* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986).

US–Soviet military competition and the two countries' quest for strategic arms control in the 1970s are tracked meticulously by Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*. Other useful perspectives are offered by Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), Dan Caldwell, *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), and Olav Njølstad, "Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Détente," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 34–71.

The rise of conservatism in the United States played a crucial role in the declining support of détente in American society. A general overview is provided by Dan Caldwell, "The Demise of Détente and US Domestic Politics," in Westad (ed.), *The Fall of Détente*, 95–117. Important case studies are Paula Stern, *Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), and Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983).

Invaluable oral history documentation on the demise of détente is found in the transcripts of the various conferences on the subject in 1994–2002 arranged by the Carter–Brezhnev Project, an informal collaboration between the Watson Center for International Affairs at Brown University, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and the Woodrow Wilson Center.

See also sections 4, 5, and 6 in this bibliographical essay.

8. Japan and the Cold War, 1960–1991

The literature on Japan's role in the Cold War is closely linked to studies of Japanese–American relations in the post-World War II era. Most historians perceive a continuity stretching from the Occupation era through the early 1970s, with a long denouement of the Cold War in Asia that lasted from approximately 1972 until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Japanese-language histories of the entire era have focused on the Occupation period, the lives of prominent political figures, domestic politics, and economic aspects of the

relationship with the United States. Many of these studies rely upon journalistic sources and memoirs. The lack of access to official Japanese source material, especially for the period after the 1960s, has limited the quantity and quality of Japanese scholarship on the Cold War. Most of the English-language histories of Japan and the Cold War (as well as those translated from Japanese) rely heavily on source materials from the US National Archives and presidential libraries, along with the British Public Record Office.

Among the best broad English-language overviews of Japan vis-à-vis the United States, the Soviet Union, and China for the period both before and after 1960 are Asahi Shimbun, *The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations* (New York: Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *The Alliance, America-Europe-Japan: Makers of the Postwar World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); Roger Buckley, *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945–1990*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The United States and Japan in the Postwar World* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1989); Akira Iriye, *China and Japan in the Global Setting* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler (eds.), *Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951–2001* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1922–1975* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: Japanese-American Relations throughout History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Athlone, 1988).

Several studies of the Occupation era and the 1950s shed direct light on Japan's role in the Cold War up to and beyond the 1960s. Generally speaking, they examine the reasons the United States came to view Japan as the economic and security pivot of containment in the Pacific, and what costs and benefits accrued to each member of the so-called Pacific alliance. The best of these studies include William Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947–1955* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Richard Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Aaron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan's Postwar Economic Revival* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mark S. Gallicchio, *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asia Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989); Sayori Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950–1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001); John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies: United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002).

Japan's Cold War role during the 1960s was bracketed by the riots over the revision of the security treaty in 1960 and conflicts with Washington over the Vietnam War and Richard M. Nixon's China initiative. These issues are discussed in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Thomas Havens, *Fire across the Sea: Vietnam and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Timothy P. Maga, *Hands across the Sea: US-Japan Relations, 1961–1981*

(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1997); George R. Packard, III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life between Japan and America*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1986); see also LaFeber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

The dramatic changes in the strategic and economic relationships among Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam during the Nixon years are examined in Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007); I. M. Destler, Fukui Haruhiro, and Hideo Sato, *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese–American Relations, 1969–1971* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971); U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984); Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1979), and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1982); Armin H. Meyer, *Assignment Tokyo: An Ambassador's Journal* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); see also La Feber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, Japan's international role was shaped largely by its chronic trade imbalance with the United States, its growing economic involvement in China, and its cooperation with the anti-Soviet Reagan-era arms buildup. For a discussion of these events, see James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, *Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: Easton Press, 1995); Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1988); George P. Shultz, *Turnoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1993); Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980). These issues, as well as the position of Japan at the end of the Cold War, are also discussed in LaFeber, *The Clash*, and Schaller, *Altered States*.

See also entries for Japan in section 12 of the bibliographical essay for volume I.

9. China and the Cold War after Mao

For China's domestic and international developments from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, a useful source (although without the benefit of access to post-Cold War documentation) is Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. XV (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The last chapters of Jonathan Spence's acclaimed *Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999) serve as an excellent reference for the larger context of the discussion of this chapter.

The Cultural Revolution is best discussed by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), which is based on extensive research on party documents and other Chinese-language sources. Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen offer a solid study of the institution and practice of China's international relations in the 1960s and 1970s in *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1998).

Mao Zedong stood at the center of China's domestic and foreign policymaking. Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* (New

York: Random House, 1994), has a wealth of useful information provided by a person who worked with Mao for over two decades. *Mao: The Unknown Story* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, provides a highly critical and controversial account of Mao's life and career. Philip Short's *Mao: A Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999), although relatively thin in covering Mao's activities during the Cultural Revolution, presents a balanced treatment of Mao and his "continuous revolution." *Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait*, by Maurice Meisner (Malden, MD: Polity Press, 2007), offers a critical review of Mao's political career and its legacies. For texts of Mao's "Intermediate Zone" thesis and "Three Worlds" theory, see *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1998).

Zhou Enlai was another central figure in Chinese diplomatic activities. An insightful and informative biography is Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, Biography* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). Another useful source on Zhou is Barbara Barnounin and Yu Changgen, *Zhou Enlai: A Political Life* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006).

On Chinese–American rapprochement, the last chapter of Chen Jian's *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001) reconstructs China's path toward improving relations with the United States with the support of newly declassified Chinese documents. Margaret MacMillan, in *Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2007), offers a very readable account of Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. William Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li (eds.), *Normalization of US–China Relations: An International History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), gathers a group of leading scholars to provide a comprehensive historical coverage of Chinese–American relations following the rapprochement. Evelyn Goh, in *Constructing the US Rapprochement with China: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), traces changing American perceptions toward China. Primary sources on the subject can be found in William Burr, *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 1999).

On Chinese–American relations from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, the most revealing study is Robert Ross's *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995). Also useful are Jim Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China: From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1999), and Patrick Tyler's *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, an Investigative History* (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999). Two diaries by chief US diplomats in Beijing vividly record daily developments of US–China relations in the 1970s. See Jeffrey Engel (ed.), *The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Priscilla Roberts (ed.), *Window on the Forbidden City: The Beijing Diaries of David Bruce, 1973–1974* (Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2001).

On China's relations with the Soviet Union, Yang Kuisong, in "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement," *Cold War History*, 1, 1 (2000), 21–52, provides an insightful account of the Chinese leadership's "war scare" in 1969. Qian Qichen, former Chinese foreign minister, offers firsthand accounts of how Beijing and Moscow improved their relations in the 1980s in his memoirs, *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).

On China's reform and opening process, a useful introduction can be found in Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reforms after Mao* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987). Maurice Meisner, in *The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978–1994* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), discusses the collapse of Chinese socialism in the reform years. Reviews of China's changing foreign policy during the reform years are provided in David M. Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Key texts reflecting Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on reform and opening are included in *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vols. II and III (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994). For Deng's experience during the Cultural Revolution, see Deng Rong, *Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution: A Daughter Recalls the Critical Years* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2002).

For varying perspectives on the Tiananmen Square crisis, see Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), and Dingxin Zhao, *The Power of Tiananmen: State–Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Zhang Liang (ed.), *The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force against Their Own People – in Their Own Words* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), contains documents (the authenticity of some of which is yet to be confirmed) about the Tiananmen tragedy of 1989.

See also sections II and 17 in the bibliographical essay in volume I and sections 14 and 17 in volume II.

10. The Cold War in Central America, 1975–1991

In the past twenty years, the US government has declassified many records and documents relating to the Cold War in Latin America. Many of the most controversial and revealing declassifications came as a result of requests by researchers using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The National Security Archive, now at George Washington University, was instrumental in securing access to major collections of documents and records, including materials on US policy toward Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, and Central America in the 1980s, now available in published volumes and via the archive's website, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.

US government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, have also declassified much material both in response to FOIA requests and lawsuits and then, in the 1990s, to new presidential guidelines. While the administration of George W. Bush partially reversed this trend toward greater openness, much new material had already become available and more has been released in recent years. The two volumes of the Department of State's official *Foreign Relations of the United States* relating to US–Latin American relations during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration contain newly declassified Central Intelligence Agency reports, minutes of meetings in the Oval Office, and telephone transcripts, in addition to more conventional correspondence between ambassadors and the department (volumes XXXI and XXXII Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004, 2005). Volumes relating to the Richard M. Nixon administration await publication but, barring last-minute interventions, should be available soon.

Many Latin American countries make government documents and records accessible via well-organized Foreign Ministry archives and national archives. Even the more controversial aspects of relations with the United States, which involved police and military establishments, can now be scrutinized through documents released to truth commissions, for trials of officials accused of committing abuses, or in entire documentary collections released by democratic governments. The websites of the National Security Archive, mentioned above, and the Hispanic Division of the US Library of Congress at www.loc.gov/r/r/hispanic/ provide information and links to most of these materials.

Excellent historical surveys of US–Latin American relations have appeared in recent years, including Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, *Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), and Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of US–Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Historical surveys of US relations with Central America include John H. Coatsworth, *Central America: The Clients and the Colossus* (New York: Twayne, 1994), Walter LaFeber's lively *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1984), and Thomas M. Leonard's more sedate *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991).

Most historical accounts of the Cold War in US–Latin American relations focus on a single Latin American country. A notable recent exception is Greg Grandin's energetic *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). Cuban foreign policy in the Americas is expertly covered in Jorge Domínguez, *To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). For a highly readable account by a journalist who covered the region for the *New York Times* and other US as well as Latin American newspapers, see Henry Rayment, *Troubled Neighbors: The Story of US–Latin American Relations from FDR to the Present* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2005). Essential reading on the economic and policy background to the conflicts can be found in Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Political Economy of Central America since 1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also Charles D. Brockett, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Cold War conflicts in Central America, with unprecedented intensity between 1978 and 1990 in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, inspired a vast scholarly as well as popular output. For the best account of US policymaking in Central America during the Reagan years, see William LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For an exhaustively researched analysis of the structure and behavior of the US-trained and -equipped military and police establishment of the region, see Robert H. Holden, *Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For an interesting account of the Carter administration's efforts to contain the Sandinista revolution, see Robert Pastor, *Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), and Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, *At the Fall of Somoza* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

Guatemala's protracted civil wars originated in the successful US intervention that overturned an elected government in 1954. The classic account of this event, now in a new edition that adds discussions of the post-1954 conflicts as well as the peace accords of December 1996, is Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). See also Piero Gleijeses's masterful *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), and Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Mayas, Marxists, and the Cold War in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Newly reclassified Central Intelligence Agency documents on its role are summarized in Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). For an account of the holocaust unleashed by the Guatemalan military in the early 1980s, see the report of the independent Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Guatemala: Memory of Silence* (Tz'inil na'tab'al): *Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification* (Guatemala: Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, 1999), Prologue and Conclusions, Parts I and II, available online at shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html.

The implications of the end of the Cold War for US policy in Latin America are discussed in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 1999), and Robert Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001).

II. The Cold War and southern Africa, 1976–1990

For relevant documents, see the annual volumes of *Africa Contemporary Record*, edited by Colin Legum (London: Africana Publishing Company, 1979–); Goswin Baumhögger with Ulf Engel and Telse Diederichsen, *The Struggle for Independence: Documents on the Recent Development of Zimbabwe (1975–1980)* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1984), Kenneth Mokoena (ed.), *South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History, a National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press 1993), and websites such as those of Aluka, the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, the Digital National Security Archive, and the Central Intelligence Agency. For documentation on Cuban involvement in southern Africa, see, e.g., David Deutschmann (ed.), *Changing the History of Africa* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1989), Nelson Mandela and Fidel Castro, *How Far We Slaves Have Come* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991), and Jorge Risquet, "Two Centuries of Solidarity," (www.tricontinental.cubaweb.cu/revista).

The single most important memoir on the US side is Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also the relevant sections of Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), and Peter W. Rodman, *More Precious than Peace* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1994). Among books by United Kingdom actors, see especially

David Owen, *Time to Declare* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), and Marrack Goulding *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002).

Among the most relevant South African memoirs are two by key military men: Jannie Geldenhuys, *A General's Story* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1995), and Magnus Malan, *My Life with the South African Defence Force* (Pretoria: Protea, 2006). Rhodesian memoirs, from very different perspectives, include Ian Smith, *The Great Betrayal: The Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith* (London: Blake, 1997), Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: Rhodesia's CIO Chief on Record* (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1987), and Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2006). There is useful interview material on Rhodesia in Michael Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), and more generally in Tor Sellström (ed.), *Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1999).

The relevant secondary material remains thin, but see the Introduction and the other articles in *Cold War History*, 7, 2 (2007). On the impact of the Cold War on South Africa, Gareth Evans, "The Great Simplifier: The Cold War and South Africa, 1948–1994," in A. Dodson, (ed.), *Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 136–51, is useful, as are sections on southern Africa in books such as David E. Albright, *Africa and International Communism* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), Zaki Laidi, *The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of Rivalry 1960–1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), and Fred Marte, *Political Cycles in International Relations: The Cold War and Africa 1945–1990* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994).

On South Africa, see James Barber and John Barrett, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–1988* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and the exchange between Adrian Guelke and John Daniel in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 14, 1 (1996) on the end of the Cold War and the South African transition, while on the Communist Party see Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades against Apartheid* (London: Indiana University Press, 1992). For blinkered South African views of Communism, see D.J. Kotze, *Communism in South Africa* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1979). Robert Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1985), is well informed, while on South African policy to Rhodesia see Sue Onslow, "'We Must Gain Time': South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Kissinger Initiative of 1976," *South African Historical Journal*, 56 (2006), 123–53; Onslow, "South Africa and the Owen–Vance Plan," *South African Historical Journal*, 51 (2004), 130–58; and Onslow, "Noises Off: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement, 1979–1980," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 2 (2009), special issue on Liberation Struggles, Exile and International Solidarity.

For the United States and the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, see, e.g., Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001), and Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe 1965–1980* (Harare: Sapes Books, 2001). The role of the frontline states is analyzed in Gilbert Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994). T. Sellström's detailed *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Solidarity and Assistance 1970–1994* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2002) is of broader interest than its title suggests.

For Carter and southern Africa, see Nancy Mitchell's chapter in this volume and the related section of this bibliographical essay. For the Reagan era, the best studies are

Pauline Baker, *The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1989), Christopher Coker, *The United States and South Africa 1968–1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), and Alex Thompson, *Incomplete Engagement: United States Foreign Policy towards the Republic of South Africa 1981–1988* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), provides a wider perspective, while more focused studies include Christopher Saunders, "The United States and Namibian Independence, c. 1975–1989," *Journal of Contemporary History* (Bloemfontein), 28, 1 (June 2003), 83–91.

Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow* (Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1999), is a major contribution by an activist-scholar, who draws on Russian and South African archives. For Soviet policy, see also the relevant articles in Maxim Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007), and A. Mishra, *Soviet Policy towards Anti-Colonial Movements in Southern Africa* (Delhi: Vista, 2006). Older studies include Daniel Papp, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa," in Robert H. Donaldson (ed.), *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), and Keith Somerville, "The USSR and Southern Africa since 1976," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 1 (March 1984), 73–108. One of the few accounts of the Chinese role is Steven Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961–1993," *China Quarterly*, 142 (1995), 388–422. For studies of the Cubans after 1975, see Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), Piero Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8, 2 (2006), 3–51; and his chapter in volume II of the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*.

12. The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War

There are by now many useful memoirs by leading Soviet political actors concerning the final decades of the USSR and the perestroika period in particular. Mikhail Gorbachev's memoirs are clearly important. They appeared in Russian in two volumes, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms] (Novosti, Moscow, 1995), with a considerably abbreviated volume of *Memoirs* published in English the following year (New York: Doubleday and London: Transworld). Revealing insights into the evolution of Gorbachev's thinking are to be found in the book based on his recorded discussions with his old friend, Zdeněk Mlynář, the main author of the reformist Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1968: Gorbachev and Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Gorbachev has more recently published another volume of reflections and memoirs – much shorter than his two volumes of memoirs but having considerable overlap with them. Called *Poniat' perestroiku ... pochemu eto vazhno seichas* [Remembering Perestroika: Why It Is Important Now] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), the book does, nevertheless, have some new elements.

Eduard Shevardnadze produced a short memoir soon after his resignation as Soviet foreign minister in 1990 called *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991). Much more useful are the diary-based books of Gorbachev's principal foreign-policy

aide, Anatolii Cherniaev. That covering his life up to 1985, *Moia zhizn' i moe vremia* [My Life and My Times] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), has not been translated into English, but his essential book for the period of the end of the Cold War exists as *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000). It is well translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker. Another Gorbachev aide who produced an important account of his work is Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reformation through His Aide's Eyes] (Moscow: Rossika Zevs, 1993). It deserves to be translated into English, but has not been.

The same applies to the fullest memoirs and reflections of Aleksandr Iakovlev, published just two years before his death and appropriately entitled "Twilight": *Sumerki* (Moscow: Materik, 2003). A close colleague of Gorbachev, and former Politburo member who still works at the Gorbachev Foundation, Vadim Medvedev, has produced several informative books which are not as well known as they deserve to be (none of them has been translated): *V kommande Gorbacheva: vzgliad iznutri* [In Gorbachev's Team: An Inside Look] (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), *Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma"* [The Collapse: How It Became Inevitable in the "World Socialist System"] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), and *Prozrenie, mif ili predatel'stvo: k voprosy ob ideologii perestroiki* [Recovery, Myth or Treachery: On the Ideology of Perestroika] (Moscow: Evraziia, 1998). Evgenii Primakov, who was influential in foreign-policy thinking during perestroika (and, successively head of foreign intelligence, minister of foreign affairs, and prime minister in the Yeltsin years), has published a volume of memoirs and reflections in English: *Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). More useful on the ending of the Cold War are, however, the memoirs of Gorbachev's interpreter at all his major summit meetings, Pavel Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997).

Anatolii Dobrynin, who spent almost a quarter of a century as Soviet ambassador to Washington before becoming head of the International Department of the Central Committee during perestroika, published informative memoirs: *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962–1986* (New York: Times Books, 1995). Dobrynin is fairly critical of Gorbachev and, still more, of Shevardnadze. Also critical is Egor Ligachev in his lively volume, *Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). Other critical accounts of perestroika and of its foreign policy by insiders are the memoirs of Dobrynin's successor as head of the International Department, Valentin Falin, *Bez skidok na obstoiatel'stva: politicheskie vosponimaniia* [Without Reference to Circumstances: Political Memoirs] (Moscow: Respublika, 1999), and two volumes by the first deputy head of that department during perestroika, Karen Brutents, *Tridtsat' let na Staroi ploshchadi* [Thirty Years on Staraia Ploshchad] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999) and *Nesbyvsheesia: neravnodushnye zametki o perestroike* [That Which Did Not Happen: Subjective Notes on Perestroika] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2005). Critical perspectives on arms control and military affairs can be found in a collaborative volume of reflections, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: vzgliad na vnesmiuiu politiku SSSR do i posle 1985* [Through the Eyes of a Marshal and a Diplomat: A Critical View of the USSR's Foreign Policy before and after 1985] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992) by the chief of the general staff, Sergei Akhromeev and his close colleague, Georgii Kornienko,

who served as first deputy foreign minister under Andrei Gromyko and until early 1986 when he became deputy to Dobrynin in the International Department. A rather poisonous account of Gorbachev is published by his former chief of staff who joined the putsch against him in August 1991, Valerii Boldin. The book first appeared in English in 1994 as *Ten Years that Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by His Chief of Staff* (New York: Basic Books) and in a slightly longer version in Russian a year later: *Krushenie p'edestala: shtrikhi k portretu M. S. Gorbacheva* [The Crumbling of a Pedestal: Sketches of a Portrait of M. S. Gorbachev] (Moscow: Respublika, 1995). There are other Russian works which portray Gorbachev as an outright traitor to the Soviet Union. The author of these to have held the most senior rank is former KGB chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov. See, for example, his two volumes of memoirs, *Lichnoe delo* [Personal File] (Moscow: Olimp, 1996).

While Kriuchkov's memoirs are useful for the insights they provide into his psychology and the outlook of his conservative colleagues, four more rewarding volumes of memoirs by Russians who played a role in Soviet politics during the perestroika period are Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992), Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars* (New York: John Wiley, 1994), Andrei Sakharov, *Moscow and Beyond 1986 to 1989* (New York: Knopf, 1991), and Andrei S. Grachev, *Final Days: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999).

Among the issues on which Grachev's book sheds interesting light are the political dimensions of the economic crisis. A judicious analytical account of the development and decline of the economic system can be found in Philip Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy* (London and New York: Longmans, 2003). Russian perspectives on the last stages of the system are provided in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich (eds.), *The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders' History* (Armonk NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), and, together with much archival data, in Egor Gaidar, *Gibel' imperii: uroki dlia sovremennoi Rossii* [Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006).

Of the American memoirs, light on Soviet as well as US actions is cast in two volumes by Jack F. Matlock, Jr. (analytical as well as autobiographical accounts): *Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995) and especially *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (New York: Random House, 2004). Other essential reading includes: Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: The Autobiography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), and James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: Putnam's, 1995). One should add Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), though both Shultz and Matlock are disparaging of Gates's inability, given that he was the senior Soviet specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency and subsequently its director, to understand the significance of the changes in the Gorbachev era.

Major Western scholarly studies of the perestroika era include George W. Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Brown, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus (eds.), *The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse* (Boulder,

CO: Westview, revised ed., 1995), Gordon M. Hahn, 1985 2000: *Russia's Revolution from Above. Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), and Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

The dynamics of ethnic nationalism and protest in the perestroika period are explored systematically in Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Analysis of Soviet collapse within a wider comparative context may be found in Alexander Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), and Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Historical treatments of nationalism in the USSR include Ronald Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1993), V. Stanley Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, *Lithuania: The Rebel Nation* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), Bohdan Nahajlo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst and Company, 1999), and Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1994).

The ways in which developments in Eastern Europe affected protest and disintegration in the USSR receive meticulously researched and detailed analysis in a three-part series of articles by Mark Kramer, "The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union," part I of which appears in the first of two very useful special editions of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 5, 1 (Winter 2003), 3–16, devoted to the collapse of the Soviet Union; Part II appears in the second special edition, 5, 4 (Fall 2003), 2–42, and Part III in 6, 3 (Summer 2004), 1–3.

On the development of the new thinking and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy, important research findings are available in Michael R. Beschloff and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Level: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Little, Brown, 1993), George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), Archie Brown (ed.), *The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2004), Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), *Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2004), Julie M. Newton, *Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe* (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2003), Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987), Odd Arne Westad, *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Cass, 2001), and *Journal of Cold War Studies*, "Ideas, International Relations, and the End of the Cold War" (special issue), 7, 2 (Spring 2005).

Archival sources from the Soviet side now include a substantial number of minutes of Politburo meetings. Those from the Soviet archive Fond 89 are available in microfilm in major Western libraries, including the Bodleian Library, Oxford, the Hoover Institution,

Stanford, and the National Security Archive, Washington, DC. The latter archive (in addition to the Library of Congress and the Bodleian Library, Oxford) also has the useful Volkogonov Papers which include extracts from Politburo minutes. Some of the notes from both the Politburo and less formal meetings, taken by members of Gorbachev's inner circle, have been published in Russian: V Politbiuro TsK KPSS ... Po zapisam Anatoliia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova (1985–1991) [Inside the Politburo: From the Notes of Anatolii Cherniaev, Vadim Medvedev, and Georgii Shakhnazarov (1985–1991)] (Moscow: Alpina, 2006). The original transcripts are in the archives of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow.

See also section 5 in this bibliographical essay and sections 7 and 17 in volume II.

13. US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush

Most of the key foreign policymakers in the Reagan administration have written memoirs. The most pertinent to the ending of the Cold War are Ronald Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), Alexander M. Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Inside Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), and Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner, 1990). Jack F. Matlock Jr.'s volume, *Reagan and Gorbachev* (New York: Random House, 2004), stands out among these memoirs as it includes not only firsthand accounts but also scholarly analysis and context.

Lou Cannon has spent decades writing about Ronald Reagan, and his *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991) is among the best biographies of the president. Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson have edited a volume about Reagan's radio commentaries during the 1970s entitled *Reagan: In His Own Hand* (New York: Free Press, 2001). This book provides extraordinary insight into Reagan's evolving political views in the decade before his presidency. The presidential diaries also shed light on Reagan's priorities and beliefs during his years in office. See *The Reagan Diaries* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), edited by Douglas Brinkley.

Raymond L. Garthoff has written several meticulously researched volumes on the Cold War. The most pertinent to this chapter is *The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). On the 1984 shift in US policy, see Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era, the United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), and Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Columbia, MD: University of Missouri Press, 1997), as well as the memoirs cited above. For an engaging study of Reagan in comparison to other Cold War presidents, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007).

On President Reagan's policies toward the Third World, see James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). Odd Arne Westad places the Reagan Doctrine in a broader context and

examines how American interventionism during the 1980s continues to reverberate today. See Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Although written in 1984, Strobe Talbott's *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984) remains a useful account of the administration's positions on arms control. For more contemporary accounts, see the Shultz, Weinberger, and Garthoff books, as well as Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Reagan, Euromissiles, and Europe," in W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham (eds.), *The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 133–54. Two excellent volumes on the Strategic Defense Initiative are Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), and Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005). FitzGerald's book is one of the most detailed accounts of the idea of national missile defense and the Strategic Defense Initiative program in particular, while Lettow focuses on President Reagan's antinuclearism. The two authors disagree on the role of SDI in ending the Cold War.

During the 1980s and 1990s, President Reagan was frequently portrayed as an intellectual lightweight who was not in charge of his own administration. More recent studies, however, depict a more formidable leader whose unconventional ideas were not adequately appreciated at the time. For example, see Richard Reeves, *President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), and John Patrick Diggins, *Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007).

For more on the debates surrounding triumphalism, see Beth A. Fischer, *Triumph? The Reagan Legacy and American Foreign Policy Today* (forthcoming). One of the first works in this school was Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Cold War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). See also Richard Pipes, "Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (January/February 1995), 154–61. The Weinberger and Gates memoirs also fall into this group. Vladislav M. Zubok has written an interesting historiography of this school of thought and responses to it. See "Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of 'the Turn,'" in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 343–67.

The literature on foreign policymaking within the administration of George H. W. Bush is more limited. The best insider accounts of the ending of the Cold War are George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), and James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). On the United States and the reunification of Germany, see Philip Zelickow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott have also written a solidly researched account of the Bush administration and the ending of the Cold War. See *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993). For a broader perspective, see Olav Njølstad (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

14. Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979–1989

To minimize overlap with other chapters, the bibliography for this chapter excludes general histories of the Cold War, avoids coverage of Eastern Europe, and is selective in its reference to US and Soviet sources. Until West European archives on these years are opened, some of the best primary sources on the period are memoirs of the key political leaders. These include, for West Germany, Helmut Schmidt's *Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), which is less a memoir than a series of recollections on his dealings with the United States, the USSR, and China (but, for all that, useful on Cold War issues); his successor, Helmut Kohl's *Erinnerungen, 1982–1990* (Frankfurt: Droemer Verlag, 2005), which is quite outspoken on some issues, not least his rivalry with Margaret Thatcher; and, by the man who was foreign minister for eighteen years, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification* (New York: Broadway Books, 1998). The last, while focusing on reunification in 1989–90, covers the years 1979–88 in some detail, but is rather disappointing in its factual and uncontroversial tone. For Britain, see especially Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), which certainly does not avoid controversy; and the memoirs by two of her foreign secretaries: Peter Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past* (London: Fontana, 1989), who held the post in 1979–82; and Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (London: Macmillan, 1994), whose tenure in 1983–89 included his development of "Howe's Ostpolitik."

From American policymakers, see especially the following trio, focusing on the Reagan years: Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1990), unfortunately rather like Genscher in its combination of blandness and inordinate length; Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984), who can be quite frank about difficulties in his period as secretary of state in 1981–82; and George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1993), a thoughtful, intelligent, and full account. On the Soviet Union, the best in the sense of dealing with Western European concerns are Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), and Anatoly Chernenko, *My Six Years with Gorbachev* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000). Unfortunately François Mitterrand died soon after his presidency and never completed a memoir, so France is poorly served in this regard. Staying with primary sources, a valuable collection of documents is Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War* (London: Tri-Service Press, 1990).

Many secondary works on the Cold War treat it principally from a superpower perspective, but useful works that deal with West European concerns in the international events of the 1980s are Richard Davy (ed.), *European Détente: A Reappraisal* (London: Sage, 1992), which deals with a number of countries in turn; Victor-Yves Ghebali, *La diplomatie de la détente: la CSCE, 1973–1989* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989); Thomas Halverson, *The Last Great Nuclear Debate: NATO and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons in the 1980s* (London: Macmillan, 1995); Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–1987* (London: Macmillan, 1989); Vojtech Mastny, *Helsinki, Human Rights and European Security: Analysis and Documentation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); and

Helene Sjursen, *The United States, Western Europe and the Polish Crisis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). Specifically on Gorbachev's policies and Western Europe in the later 1980s, see Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997), David Shumaker, *Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet–West German relations, 1985–1990* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), and, on the elusive “common home” idea, Marie-Pierre Rey, “Europe Is Our Common Home: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept,” *Cold War History*, 4, 2 (January 2004), 33–65.

Also valuable are studies of the foreign policy of the leading states. Here France is better served, especially by Frédéric Bozo, “Before the Wall: French Diplomacy and the Last Decade of the Cold War, 1979–1989,” *Nobel Institute Research Paper* (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2002), Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts (eds.), *La politique étrangère de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985), Beatrice Heuser, “Mitterrand’s Gaullism: Cold War Policies for the Post-Cold War World?,” in Antoni Varsori (ed.), *Europe 1945–1990s: The End of an Era?* (London: Macmillan, 1995), and Ronald Tiersky’s biography, *François Mitterrand* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). On British foreign policy under Thatcher, see especially Paul Sharp, *Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), a wide ranging discussion; Geoffrey Smith, *Reagan and Thatcher* (New York: Norton, 1991), on the revival of the “special relationship” in these years; and two biographies, John Campbell’s *Margaret Thatcher*, vol. II, *The Iron Lady* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003), and Hugo Young’s critical *One of Us* (London: Pan, 1989). For works on Germany, see section 16 in this bibliographical essay.

On the internal political changes in West European countries, including the revival of liberal democracy and the declining fortunes of the Communists, see either J. Robert Wegs and Robert Ladrech, *Europe since 1945: A Concise History* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 5th ed., 1996) or John W. Young, *Cold War Europe, 1945–1991: A Political History* (London: Arnold, 1996). On developments in the European Community, see Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), who is enthusiastic about the European project; John Gillingham, *European Integration, 1950–2002: Superstate or New Market Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), who is more detached; and Charles Grant, *Delors: Inside the House that Jacques Built* (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1994), which is a biography of one of the key architects of deeper integration in the 1980s.

15. The East European revolutions of 1989

Given the magnitude of the immediate consequences of the East European revolutions of 1989, the literature on the topic is considerable and very diversified. Among the books that deal with the Soviet bloc as a whole, early and useful ones are Charles Gati: *The Bloc that Failed: Soviet East European Relations in Transition* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), and J. F. Brown: *Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991). A sophisticated comparative analysis of the 1989 revolutionary process in each country is Renée de Nevers’s *Comrades No More: The*

Seeds of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). An overall view is also found in Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). An essay and account covering the 1989 events in each of the East European countries is François Fejtő, *La fin des démocraties populaires* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1992).

Explaining Soviet permissive policies in Eastern Europe as a whole in 1989 and their decisive impact in every Warsaw Pact country is the aim of Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Soviet policies are also the object of Glenn Chafetz's *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy toward Eastern Europe, 1985–1990* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). The memoirs of two of Gorbachev's chief advisers for East European affairs are particularly useful for making sense of Soviet policies. They are Vadim A. Medvedev, *Raspad: kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma"* [Collapse: How It Became Inevitable in the "World Socialist System"] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), and G. Shakhnazarov, *Tsena svobody: reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* [The Price of Freedom: Gorbachev's Reforms through the Eyes of His Aide] (Moscow: Rossika zevs, 1993). For post-Soviet Russian analyses and perspectives, G. N. Sevostianov (ed.), *Revoliutsii 1989 goda v stranakh Tsentral'noi (Vostochnoi) Evropy* [The Revolutions of 1989 in the Countries of Central (Eastern) Europe] (Moscow: Nauka, 2001), is interesting.

Monographs dedicated to the dynamics of the revolutionary process in each East European country are the most numerous in the case of Poland, the more so if the Solidarity experience of 1980–81 is taken into account. On that crucial year, a chief reference remains Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). A solid overview of Solidarity's experience from its beginnings to its rise to power in 1989 is to be found in David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990). A very thorough analysis of the Polish Communist leaders' calculations and expectations in embarking on the grand compromise with Solidarity is in Jacqueline Hayden's *The Collapse of Communist Power in Poland: Strategic Misconceptions and Unanticipated Outcomes* (London: Routledge, 2006). A main actor's views on these issues can be found in the memoirs of Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaînes et le refuge: mémoires* (Paris: J. C. Lattès, 1992). Views of the Solidarity leader are in Lech Wałęsa's *The Struggle and Triumph: An Autobiography* (New York: Arcade, 1991).

Hungary, which made the second revolutionary breakthrough of 1989, also comes second after Poland for the number of scholarly monographs dealing with its experience. A most comprehensive one is Rudolf L. Tokes, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1987–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Other very useful ones are Ágnes Horváth and Árpád Szokolczai, *The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of Hungary* (London, Routledge, 1992), and Patrick O'Neill, *Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Collapse of Communism* (Northampton, MA: Elgar Studies on Communism in Transition, 1998). The influence of János Kádár's legacy on the transformations of 1989 is best understood through Andrew Felkay, *Hungary and the USSR, 1956–1988: Kadar's Political Leadership* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).

Scholarly monographs devoted exclusively to the Czechoslovak events of 1989 are not very numerous. Useful ones are John F. N. Bradley, *Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1992), and Rob McRae, *Resistance and Revolution: Vaclav Havel's Czechoslovakia* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997). Among the memoirs of the main protagonists of the revolution are Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), and *Essais politiques* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1989), along with Alexander Dubcek, *Dubcek Speaks* (New York: I. B. Tauris, distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Given the dramatic character of Romania's revolution – the last of 1989 – and the extensive disinformation and mysterious events that surrounded it, it is not surprising that a number of important books have been written on the topic. Many are of a highly speculative nature and carry wild interpretations on the role of internal and foreign actors. Among the more prudent and scholarly monographs, one of the best, an early one, is Nestor Ratesh, *The Entangled Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1991). Also interesting and useful is Peter Siani-Davis, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). On the much debated role of the notorious Securitate during the events of 1989, the most widely researched, cautious, and informative work is Dennis Deletant, *Ceausescu and the Securitate* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995). For memoirs of two of the most important political actors of 1989, see Ion Iliescu, *Romania at the Moment of Truth* (Paris: Henri Berger, 1994), and Silviu Brucan, *The Wasted Generation: Memoirs of the Romanian Journey from Capitalism to Socialism and Back* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

Apparently because of the lesser geopolitical importance of Bulgaria, its smaller size, and the less dramatic regime change it underwent, no specific study of its 1989 revolution exists in West European languages. However, these events are well described and analyzed in most of the comparative books listed in the first part of this section. They are also covered and well framed in Richard Crampton's *History of Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

See also section 16 of this bibliographical essay.

16. The unification of Germany, 1985–1991

In spite of the relatively short time that has passed since the events, the reunification of Germany is rather well researched. The historian should first look at a collection of documents edited by Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Interior: *Deutsche Einheit: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Special Edition from the Archives of the Chancellor's Office 1989/90, (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998). It contains about 500 documents on the process of unification released by the chancellor's office along with a good introduction by the editors. The general reader is referred to the four volumes of *Geschichte der Deutschen Einheit*, written by a team of scholars under the direction of Werner Weidenfeld, a close associate of former chancellor Helmut Kohl. These volumes also profit from the archives of the chancellor's office. The first volume by Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), deals with the former chancellor's approach to policy on Germany as a whole. The second volume, on the economic aspects of reunification, by Dieter Grosser, *Das Wagnis der*

Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: politische Zwänge im Konflikt mit ökonomischen Regeln (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), is very instructive. An overview of the intra-German aspects of unification is given in Wolfgang Jäger, *Die Überwindung der Teilung: der innerdeutsche Prozeß der Vereinigung 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), while the international aspects are dealt with by Werner Weidenfeld, *Außenpolitik für die Deutsche Einheit: die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999).

A number of memoirs add detail and special flavor. Very valuable are the works of two close associates of Helmut Kohl. In Wolfgang Schäuble, *Der Vertrag: wie ich über die deutsche Einheit verhandelte* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), the chancellor's former chief of staff gives an insider's account on negotiating with his counterparts from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the unification treaty, while Horst Teltschik, Kohl's foreign-policy aide, tells the story of the international negotiations on unification and details many little-known facts: Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991). Unfortunately, neither Kohl's memoirs nor the memoirs of Foreign Minister Genscher meet strict historical standards. Helmut Kohl in his *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich: Droemer, 2005) remembers events up to March 1990 but frames them according to his political predilections. Hans-Dietrich Genscher's *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Siedler, 1995) suffers from a certain vagueness intended not to offend people who were still alive.

As the above works have been written by West Germans, they emphasize the Federal Republic's perspective. They should be complemented by publications focusing on the GDR. Three works stand out: Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer: die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996) uses recently opened SED party files. In Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993), a Berlin-based American journalist tells the story of German reunification and gives many details on the domestic situation in the two German states. The most analytic work is Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). In it, the renowned Harvard historian analyzes the economic and political collapse of the GDR and puts it into the context of the Cold War and its demise. There is no authentic account by a GDR scholar. Heinrich Bortfeld, *Washington-Bonn-Berlin: die USA und die deutsche Einheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), is a solid work by an East German historian, but emulates Western perspectives, while Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Abwicklung der DDR: die "2+4-Verhandlungen." Ein Insiderbericht* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992), a West Berlin political scientist who participated in the process of reunification as head of the East German foreign office's planning staff, gives a rather bitter account of the end of the GDR.

The memoirs of the leading American political figures at the time should also be consulted. President George H. W. Bush gives a joint account together with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Random House, 1998), while his secretary of state, James A. Baker III, has titled his autobiography *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). Another report comes from two National Security Council staffers, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). All three works base their account on the same sources and use an internal State Department historical study drafted by Robert Zoellick. Bush and Scowcroft are most explicit on their talks with other leaders; Baker

focuses on the 2+4 talks, relations with Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and the other crises American foreign-policy officials had to attend to at the time (e.g., Lithuania and the Gulf War); while Zelikow and Rice span the presidential, National Security Council, and State Department level and give details on internal deliberations.

For a British view, the reader is referred to the very personal but revealing memoirs of the then prime minister: Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993). The best French viewpoint with special emphasis on Mitterrand appears in Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand: la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005; English translation, Berghahn Books, 2009). A perspective on Soviet positions is offered by Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. An Analysis based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, Interviews* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

To put reunification into the context of German post-World War II history, the reader should refer to Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), which gives an overview of German foreign policy from 1945 to 2005 and is based on a large body of documents.

See also section 15 of this bibliographical essay.

17. The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991

For bibliographical entries on the collapse of the Soviet Union, see section 12.

18. Science, technology, and the Cold War

On the overall patterns of big science, see Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (eds.), *Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial Complex at MIT and Stanford* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), a useful account ranging well beyond these two pioneering universities, and, for international comparisons, Etel Solingen (ed.), *Scientists and the State: Domestic Structures and the International Context* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). On the Soviet side, see Loren R. Graham, *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Nikolai Kremensov, *Stalinist Science* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Paul Josephson, "'Projects of the Century' in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev," *Technology and Culture*, 36 (1995), 519–59, and David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), which is invaluable on Soviet science and technology in general. More generally, see two related volumes of essays: Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davies (eds.), *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper (eds.), *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), though the data in each are somewhat outdated. For fuller bibliographical information on the USSR, in both English and Russian, consult the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's excellent "Virtual Guide to the History of Russian Science and

Technology" at web.mit.edu/slava/guide/. For the British story, see the essays in Robert Bud and Philip Gummert (eds.), *Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories, 1945–1990* (London: Harwood, 1999).

For semiconductors, see Robert Buder, *The Invention That Changed the World* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), on wartime radar and its multitudinous spinoffs, Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, *Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), a good introduction to the science and the history, and Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddesdon, *Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), an excellent overview of microelectronics from the transistor to the chip, based on key archives. Two important articles on the role of the military are Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940–1960," *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences*, 18 (1987), 149–229, and Thomas J. Misa, "Military Needs, Commercial Realities, and the Development of the Transistor, 1948–1958," in Merritt Roe Smith (ed.), *Military Enterprise and Technological Change* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 253–87.

On satellites, Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), remains an essential introduction to the space race, but see also Matthew J. von Bencke, *The Politics of Space: A History of US–Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). Günter Paul, *The Satellite Spin-Off: The Achievements of Space Flight*, transl. by Alan Lacy and Barbara Lacy (New York: Robert B. Luce, 1975), is useful on the wider implications, and Robert W. Campbell, "Satellite Communications in the USSR," *Soviet Economy*, 1 (1985), 313–39, is a good introduction on the Soviet side. For the impact on telecommunications, see Robert W. Campbell, *Soviet and Post-Soviet Telecommunications: An Industry under Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), a rare and very useful study, and John Bray, *The Communications Miracle: The Telecommunication Pioneers from Morse to the Information Superhighway* (London: Plenum Press, 1995), a good overview of the changing technologies.

An outstanding introduction to computers is Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, *Computer: A History of the Information Machine* (New York: Basic Books, 1996). See also Kenneth Flamm, *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), and Paul Edwards, *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). For the Soviet side, see Richard W. Judy, "Computing in the USSR: A Comment," *Soviet Economy*, 2 (1986), 355–67, and Slava Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002) – like Edwards on the United States, an interesting study of ideology and discourse. On SAGE, see the special issue of *Annals of the History of Computing*, 5, 4 (October 1983), 319–403. For computer networks, consult the autobiographical piece by Lawrence G. Roberts, "The Arpanet and Computer Networks," in Adele Goldberg (ed.), *A History of Personal Workstations* (New York: ACM Press, 1988), 143–67, and, more generally, Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, *Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). See generally the review essay by Roy Rosenzweig, "Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet," *American Historical Review*, 103 (1998), 1530–52.

Paul Maddrell, *Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), is a pioneering analysis of scientific intelligence, using East German sources. Some of the implications of technological crisis for the end of the Cold War are explored in Loren R. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), which uses the story of Peter Palchinsky as a parable of Soviet technological failure, Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), especially chapter 2 on the “race between computers and collapse,” and Tomasz Goban-Klas and Pal Kolstø, “East European Mass Media: The Soviet Role,” in Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 110–36, on the impact of information.

19. Transnational organizations and the Cold War

The activities of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and International Affairs have been documented by its founding member and longtime head, Joseph Rotblat, in *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), in publications of the organization’s proceedings and in accounts drawing on Pugwash archives and interviews with participants. See Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto,” Pugwash History Series, no. 1 (May 2005), and Bernd W. Kubbig, “Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US–Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty,” PRIF Reports, 44, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, October 1996). Russian accounts include Yu. A. Ryzhov and M. A. Lebedev, “RAS Scientists in the Pugwash Movement,” *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 75, 3 (2005), 271–77.

The scholarly literature on transnational relations began in Germany with an article by Karl Kaiser in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 1 (1969), and in the United States with a special issue of the journal *International Organization*, later published as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). It included a chapter by Lawrence Scheinman on the control of nuclear energy, with a brief discussion of Pugwash. Interest in transnational relations revived in the 1990s, again following the lead of the activists themselves. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization*, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 185–214; Thomas Risse-Kappen, (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), with chapters by Patricia Chilton on transnational contacts between human rights activists in Eastern and Western Europe and by Matthew Evangelista on transnational coalitions between Soviet and Western scientists and physicians working on issues of disarmament and arms control; Evangelista’s *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” *International Organization*, 46, 1 (1992),

101 45; and Kai-Henrik Barth, "Catalysts of Change: Scientists as Transnational Arms Control Advocates in the 1980s," *Osiris*, 21 (2006), 182–206.

Several studies focused on official and unofficial cultural exchanges and "citizen diplomacy." See Carl Kaysen, chair, US National Academy of Sciences, *Review of US USSR Interacademy Exchanges and Relations* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1977), David D. Newsom (ed.), *Private Diplomacy with the Soviet Union* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), Gale Warner and Michael Shuman, *Citizen Diplomats* (New York: Continuum, 1987), Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2003), Ross Mackenzie, *When Stars and Stripes Met Hammer and Sickle: The Chautauqua Conferences on US–Soviet Relations, 1985–1989* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), and James Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002).

Numerous studies have focused on the activities of particular individuals involved in transnational activism: Helen S. Hawkins, G. Allen Greb, and Gertrud Weiss Szilard (eds.), *Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), William Lanouette, *Genius in the Shadows* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Jeremy J. Stone, "Every Man Should Try": *Adventures of a Public Interest Activist* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), Bernard Lown and E. I. Chazov, "Physician Responsibility in the Nuclear Age," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 274, 5 (2 August 1995) 416–19, and Evgenii Chazov, *Zdorov'e i vlast': vospominaniia "kremlevskogo vracha"* [Health and Power: Memoirs of the "Kremlin's Doctor"] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992). A memoir by a cofounder of the Greenham (UK) women's peace camp, established to oppose the deployment of US cruise missiles in the early 1980s, also includes discussion of her experiences traveling in the Soviet Union in an attempt to forge transnational links between disarmament activists: Ann Pettitt, *Walking to Greenham: How the Peace Camp Began and the Cold War Ended* (Aberystwyth: Honno Welsh Women's Press, 2006).

Transnational relations during the Cold War included important transgovernmental contacts between proponents of moderation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For an account by a key American participant, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). For a study that stresses the influence of contacts between Soviet and East European proponents of reform Communism, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997). A detailed account of Mikhail Gorbachev's long association with Italian Eurocommunists is Antonio Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov: i colloqui di Natta e Occhetto con il leader sovietico* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1990). Gorbachev himself describes such experiences in his own memoirs, *Zhizn' i reformy* [Life and Reforms] (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), 2 vols.

Transnational human rights and disarmament activists were explicit about the strategies they pursued, starting in the early 1980s, to end the Cold War. Some of the key works include E. P. Thompson, *Beyond the Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), and Thompson, *The Heavy Dancers* (New York: Pantheon, 1985). For a scholarly study, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). The landmark account of transnational peace activism during the Cold War is Lawrence S. Wittner's trilogy, *The Struggle against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993–2003).

20. The biosphere and the Cold War

Aside from the several authors interested in the subject of nuclear weapons and their radioactive contamination consequences, no scholars have explicitly addressed Cold War links to environmental history. Other aspects of the full picture have to be pieced together from fragments found here and there. So any bibliography will have to be long on nuclear weapons, where there is a literature, and short elsewhere.

General works on environmental history of the world in the era of the Cold War include Ramachandra Guha, *Environmentalism: A Global History* (New York: Longman, 2000), a concise survey of environmental movements, and J. R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun* (New York: Norton, 2000), a general assessment of environmental change and its causes around the world since 1900. On war and environment in general, see Richard P. Tucker and Edmund Russell (eds.), *Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of Warfare* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2004), which is to date the most useful treatment of warfare's environmental impacts. On the Soviet experience in general, a bleak assessment is Murray Feshbach, *Ecocide in the USSR* (New York: Basic Books, 1992); on Mao's China, see Judith Shapiro, *Mao's War on Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). A helpful study of state ambitions, technology, and environment, much of it in a Cold War context, is Paul Josephson, *Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002). A detailed study of East German forests and their exploitation under Soviet occupation is Arvid Nelson, *Cold War Ecology* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

On the agricultural dimensions of the Cold War, Nick Cullather, "Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (2004), 227–54, is indispensable on the Southeast Asian theatre of the Green Revolution, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Two critiques of the Green Revolution in Asia deserve attention, a measured one by Prabhu Pingali and Mark Rosegrant, entitled *Confronting the Environmental Consequences of the Green Revolution in Asia* (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1994), and a more strident one, Vandana Shiva's *The Violence of the Green Revolution* (London: Zed Books, 1991), especially pointed on ecological matters. The most helpful general discussion of the Green Revolution in the Cold War context is John Perkins, *Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), with much to say about India especially. A recent study, mainly on yields and economics, is R. E. Everson and D. Gollin, "Assessing the Impacts of the Green Revolution, 1960–2000," *Science*, 300, 5620 (2003), 758–62.

On the Soviet attempts to improve agriculture and their environmental difficulties, three books in particular can be recommended. Zhores Medvedev, *Soviet Agriculture* (New York: Norton, 1987), is the view of an émigré, and still an essential text. The best book in English on the Virgin Lands remains Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Land Programme, 1954–1964* (London: Macmillan, 1976). Very helpful on the ecological aspects is Nikolai Dronin and Edward Bellinger, *Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia, 1900–1990* (Budapest: Central European University, 2005). On science and agronomy, albeit mostly in the 1920s and 1930s, see Nils Roll-Hansen, *The Lysenko Effect* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003).

On transportation infrastructure in the Cold War, the basic stories can be found in Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transport Experience: Its Lessons for Other Countries* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1968), a helpful primer, but neglectful of military aspects, and Mark H. Rose, *Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939–1989* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), which also disregards the military dimensions. In addition, see Robert N. North, *Transport in Western Siberia: Tsarist and Soviet Development* (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1979), and a useful popular history, Dan McNichol, *The Roads that Built America* (New York: Sterling, 2006). The environmental effects of roadbuilding are presented in Richard T. T. Forman, et al., *Road Ecology: Science and Solutions* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003) and Ian F. Spellerberg, *Ecological Effects of Roads* (Enfield, NH: Science Publishers, 2002).

On the environmental implications of nuclear weapons the literature is vast. A useful compendium of basic data is Don J. Bradley, *Behind the Nuclear Curtain: Radioactive Waste Management in the Former Soviet Union* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1997). Helpful reportage, if short on analysis, is Nikolai N. Egorov, Vladimir M. Novikov, Frank L. Parker, and Victor K. Popov (eds.), *The Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex: An Analytical Overview* (London: Earthscan, 2000). Careful general assessments are Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih (eds.), *Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), on all the major nuclear weapons programs, and on the American one Stephen I. Schwartz, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998). Global fallout from American and Soviet nuclear testing is the theme of Richard L. Miller, *Under the Cloud: The Decades of Nuclear Testing* (New York: Free Press, 1986). The Hanford experience is well treated in Michele Stenehjem Gerber, *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), and Roy Gephart, *Hanford: A Conversation about Nuclear Waste and Cleanup* (Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 2003). The contamination problems at Cheliabinsk are summarized in Scott Monroe, “Cheliabinsk: The Evolution of Disaster,” *Post-Soviet Geography*, 33 (1992), 533–45. Citizen ecological activism against nuclear weapons is the theme of Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas Lovrich, John Pierce, and John Whitely, *Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). A helpful collection on ecological implications of nuclear testing around the world is Sir Frederick Warner and René J. C. Kirchman (eds.), *Nuclear Test Explosions: Environmental and Human Impacts* (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2000). A Russian treatment of weapons systems and the environment appears in chapter 2 of V. I. Bulatov, *Rossiiia: ekologiia i armiia* [Russia: Ecology and the Army] (Novosibirsk: TsERIS, 1999).

21. The Cold War and human rights

Archival evidence on US positions relating to this topic can be found in some volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*. See, for example, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, III, United Nations Affairs (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), 1536–81. The National Security Archive in Washington, DC, has electronically posted many documents

in English that provide an invaluable contribution to the understanding of Soviet bloc repression and the working methods of human rights movements in the Eastern bloc. For two examples among several of relevance, see the 2006 "The Moscow Helsinki Group 30th Anniversary: From the Secret Files," and the 2007 "Charter 77 after 30 Years: Documenting the Landmark Human Rights Declaration."

Several books help to demonstrate the dialectical relationship between the Cold War and human rights. Daniel C. Thomas, in *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), makes a particularly compelling case for the causal role of ideas, and argues that Helsinki human rights norms contributed to both the collapse of Communism in the Soviet bloc and the peaceful end to the Cold War in Europe.

A number of studies cover the human rights consequences of US behavior in Latin America and elsewhere. Greg Grandin's *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), excoriates Washington for policies that fortified repressive forces and militarized societies in the region. Thomas C. Wright's *State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), focuses on governmental abuses and the way those abuses spurred on the development of the international human rights regime. It also demonstrates the US tendency to overlook the transgressions of its regional allies. Tony Evans, in *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), argues that, while the United States played an important role in putting human rights on the international political agenda, it also played an equal part in ensuring the weaknesses of the procedures for protecting human rights.

Some texts address the ways in which the civil-rights struggle in the United States intersected with the Cold War. These include Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), Carol Anderson, *Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

One of the most influential general books on human rights is R. J. Vincent's *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). One chapter, devoted specifically to human rights in East–West relations, argues powerfully that divisions over what constituted human rights were at the root of the Cold War conflict. Some textbooks on the subject also draw illustrative material from the Cold War era. Of particular note are Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1st ed. 1993, 2nd ed. 1998), and David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights in International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1st ed. 2000, 2nd ed. 2006). See too Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991).

There are several historical treatments. Paul Gordon Lauren's *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), in its final part, outlines some of the obstacles that Cold War politics placed in the path of the human rights movement. The journalist Kirsten Sellars, in *The Rise and Rise of Human Rights* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2002), provides a particularly scornful treatment of the political uses to which the idea of human rights has been

put since 1945. Susan Waltz's valuable work illustrates the contribution made by states other than the major powers to the building of the international human rights regime. See her "Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 23 (2001), 44–72, and "Universal Human Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26 (2004), 799–844. An important doctoral thesis on the role of newly decolonized states is Roland Burke's "The Politics of Decolonisation and the Evolution of the International Human Rights Project," University of Melbourne, 2007.

The growth of human rights activism and pressure has been a topic of considerable interest to scholars. Some of it, as with the Thomas volume referred to above, links these phenomena to Cold War outcomes. William Korey's *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) is one of the most comprehensive studies. Activism in the United States is covered in Kenneth Cmiel, "The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States," *Journal of American History*, special issue (December 1999), 1231–50.

Human rights movements, sometimes called dissident movements in the former Soviet Union, are treated in a number of publications. Joshua Rubenstein has exposed the repressive nature of the Soviet state and the bravery of individuals and dissident groups. See his *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights* (London: Wildwood House, 1981), and Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov (ed. and annotated), *The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). Ludmilla Alexeyeva has published *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985).

Numerous democratic states developed external human rights policies some fifteen years before the Cold War's end. Peter R. Baehr, in *The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), covers these developments. See, too, David P. Forsythe (ed.), *Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000). President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy has been of particular interest. See, for example, Lars Schoultz's excellent *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). Kathryn Sikkink has provided an impressive analysis of the period from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton. See her *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Cold War politicking over human rights within the United Nations is treated in Howard Tolley, *The UN Commission on Human Rights* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), and Tom J. Farer and Felice Gaer, "The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning," in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1993), 240–96.

22. The Cold War in the *longue durée*: global migration, public health, and population control

William H. McNeill set the standard for putting contemporary history in the broadest possible context. See especially *Plagues and Peoples* (New York: Anchor Books, 1976). For his essays focusing on population, see *Population and Politics since 1750* (Charlottesville, VA:

University Press of Virginia, 1990), which notes that “the global growth of population is the most fundamental and pervasive disturber of human society in modern times” (49). The challenge is to demonstrate how, precisely, such a fundamental and pervasive force interacted with international politics over time. Geoffrey Barraclough’s *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (New York: Pelican, 1967), especially the chapter on “The Dwarfing of Europe,” remains one of a kind. Likewise, Heinz Gollwitzer, *Die gelbe Gefahr: Geschichte eines Schlagworts. Studien zum imperialistischen Denken* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), is still unsurpassed as a comparative analysis of fear of population growth, migration, and economic competition. For more studies of the interrelationship between demography and diplomacy, see Robert A. Huttenback, *Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colonial Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830–1910* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1985), and Avner Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

The history of migration should be the logical place to begin reexamining the recent past as a struggle to control populations, and not just territory. But some of the best studies, such as Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), are still national in nature, describing how immigrants were received – or not – rather than tracing their transnational itineraries, or explaining the global context that created both migration and standardized means to control it. For important new work that explores this broader terrain, see Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (eds.), *Migration, Migration History, History*, 2nd rev. ed. (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), Anita Bocker, Kees Groenendijk, Tetty Havinga, and Paul Minderhoud (eds.), *Regulation of Migration, International Experiences* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 1998), and especially Adam McKeown’s history of Asian migration and the globalization of border controls, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). On passports more specifically, see John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

The field of demographic history has given far more attention to mortality and fertility, the other two determinants of population, often focusing on accounting for change – quite literally, when data are scarce. It has tended to give less attention to the political causes and consequences. A classic in the field is Thomas McKeown, *The Modern Rise of Population* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), a précis of decades of research, which argues that improved nutrition was more important than medicine. Amartya Sen’s Nobel Prize winning work shows how famines tended to occur when governments were unaccountable: *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

In recent years, demographers and anthropologists have continued trying to reintegrate the study of population trends into political and institutional contexts, in part because of a reaction against Cold War-era demography. This work looks more closely at struggles over migration, distribution of food, clean water, and medicine, and women’s access not just to birth control, but also to education and paid work. For introductions, see Susan Greenhalgh (ed.), *Situating Fertility: Anthropology and Demographic Inquiry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), David I. Kertzer and Tom Fricke, “Toward an Anthropological Demography,” in Kertzer and Fricke (eds.), *Anthropological Demography: Toward a New Synthesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1–35.

Part of the reaction against Cold War demography reflected a suspicion that too much of it served the foreign-policy priorities of funding agencies. Contemporary accounts by “insiders” are both unapologetic and highly informative, especially Phyllis Tilson Piotrow, *World Population Crisis: The United States Response* (New York: Praeger, 1973); see too Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, “The Politics of Bucharest: Population, Development, and the New International Economic Order,” *Population and Development Review*, 1 (1975), 87–114, as well as their other chronicles of UN conferences. Some of the most critical studies of this history were undertaken by demographers themselves, especially Dennis Hodgson, “Orthodoxy and Revisionism in American Demography,” *Population and Development Review*, 14 (1988), 541–69, and Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” *Population and Development Review*, 19 (1993), 659–701.

More recently, historians have undertaken archive-based accounts of international public-health campaigns, which delve more deeply into ideological and technological origins pre-dating the Cold War. See, for instance, the fascinating study by Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Sunil Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930–1965* (London: Palgrave, 2006). Erez Manela’s current project on smallpox eradication and Robert Bringham’s research on malaria will doubtless prove important additions to this growing corpus. The history of colonial medicine as an auxiliary in power projection will continue to provide essential context; see especially Philip D. Curtin, *Disease and Empire: The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

International organizations are just beginning to get their due. For the earlier history of cooperation – and competition – in health and nutrition, see Paul Weindling, *International Health Organizations and Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and, after 1945, Amy Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Have Changed the World 1945–1965* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006). On population, Richard Symonds and Michael Carder, *The United Nations and the Population Question, 1945–1970* (London: Sussex University Press, 1973), is still indispensable.

Archive-based accounts of population control, by contrast, tend to be framed as US Cold War history. See Donald T. Critchlow, *Intended Consequences: Birth Control, Abortion, and the Federal Government in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), John Sharpless, “Population Science, Private Foundations, and Development Aid: The Transformation of Demographic Knowledge in the United States, 1945–1965,” in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 176–200. On the earlier, more international history, see Alison Bashford, “Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 49 (2007), 170–201, and Matthew Connelly, “Seeing Beyond the State: The Population Control Movement and the Problem of Sovereignty,” *Past & Present*, 195 (2006), 197–233.

For more on the historiography of population control, see Matthew Connelly, “Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 45 (2003), 122–47.

23. Consumer capitalism and the end of the Cold War

The scholarly literature on the rise of consumerism is vast. On the reshaping of economic and social realms in the twentieth-century United States specifically, begin with Elizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Knopf, 2003), Gary Cross, *An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and Charles F. McGovern, *Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890–1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judd (eds.), *Getting and Spending American and European Consumer Society in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), is a helpful comparative collection.

On the global expansion of US commercial culture before World War II, see especially Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982), and Tani Barlow, et al., "The Modern Girl around the World: A Research Agenda and Preliminary Findings," *Gender and History*, 17 (August 2005), 245–94. For debates that this expansion generated in the interwar era and beyond, see, on Europe, Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); on Japan, see Harry D. Harootyan, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 35–94.

On consumerism and cultural politics during World War II and the postwar occupations, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London: Routledge, 1989), and David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (London: HarperCollins, 1996).

The economic and cultural aspects of the Marshall Plan era in Europe are examined in Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), and Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1998). See also David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction* (London: Longwood Group, 1992), and Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951* (London: Routledge, 2006).

On the spread of Hollywood movies, see Thomas Guback, *The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America since 1945* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), Ian C. Jarvie, *Hollywood's Overseas Campaign: The North Atlantic Movie Trade, 1920–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and John Trumbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery over the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

On consumerism and US propaganda/informational campaigns, see especially Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006), and Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). On the Brussels and Moscow exhibitions begin with Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of*

Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

Various interpretations of the impact of American consumerism include Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), Susan E. Reid and David Crowley (eds.), *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe* (New York: Berg, 2000), Martin Daunt and Matthew Hilton (eds.), *The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America* (New York: Berg, 2001), Paolo Scrivano, "Signs of Americanization in Italian Domestic Life: Italy's Postwar Conversion to Consumerism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 317–40, and Sheldon Garon and Patricia L. Maclachlan (eds.), *The Ambivalent Consumer: Questioning Consumption in East Asia and the West* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

On Germany, see especially David F. Crew (ed.), *Consuming Germany in the Cold War* (New York: Berg, 2003), Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), and Paul Betts and Greg Eghigian (eds.), *Pain and Prosperity: Reconsidering Twentieth-Century German History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). On women, see Jennifer A. Loehlin, *From Rags to Riches: Housework, Consumption, and Modernity in Germany* (New York: Oxford, 1999), Erica Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), and Mary Nolan, "Consuming America, Producing Gender," in R. Laurence Moore and Maurizio Vaudagna (eds.), *The American Century in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 243–61. See also many essays by Katherine Pence, especially "'You as a Woman Will Understand': Consumption, Gender, and the Relationship between State and Citizenry in the GDR's June 17, 1953 Crisis," *German History*, 19 (2001), 218–52.

On representations of women's roles in consumerism, amplify the above with Helen Laville, "'Our Country Endangered by Underwear': Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in *Ninotchka* and *Silk Stockings*," *Diplomatic History*, 30 (September 2006), 623–44, Emily S. Rosenberg, "Consuming Women: Images of Americanization in the American Century," *Diplomatic History*, 23 (Summer 1999), 479–98, and Susan E. Reid, "The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40, 2 (2005), 289–316.

On China and consumerism, Orville Schell, *Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), provides an early account. Complicated cultural juxtapositions are explored in Geremie R. Barme, *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), essays in Deborah S. Davis (ed.), *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), and essays in Kevin Latham, Stuart Thompson, and Jakob Klein (eds.), *Consuming China: Approaches to Cultural Change in Contemporary China* (Routledge, 2006).

On the uneasy relationship between Communist bloc authorities and rock music, see Timothy Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), *Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), and

essays in Sabrina P. Crnkovic, *et al.* (eds.), *Kazaam! Splat! Ploof! The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

On relevant cultural changes associated with the Soviet Union, see Alan M. Ball, *Imagining America: Influences and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), Eric Shirvaev and Vladislav M. Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia from Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), and sections 12 and 17 of this bibliographical essay.

24. An ‘incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War

Forecasts can be merely lucky, but many works contained soundly based indications of turbulence in the USSR and Eastern Europe. A survey of such indications is Seymour Martin Lipset and Gyorgy Bence, “Anticipations of the Failure of Communism,” *Theory and Society*, 23, 2 (April 1994), 169–210. A cautious consideration of possible Soviet decline, published in the early years of Brezhnev’s rule, is Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), usefully summarized in Brzezinski’s “Concluding Reflections” (151–55). One year after this came a punchier work from a Soviet citizen, Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (London: Allen Lane, 1970), which Amalrik described as “based not on scholarly research, but only on observation and reflection.” In the mid-1970s, a 25-year-old French demographer, Emmanuel Todd, wrote *La chute finale: essai sur la décomposition de la sphère soviétique* (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976), translated as *The Final Fall: An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet Sphere* (New York: Karz, 1979), basing his argument partly on infant mortality rates in the USSR. In the year when the Berlin Wall fell, but before it did so, Brzezinski published his obituary, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner, 1989).

Early warnings of nationality problems within the USSR include Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World* (London: Methuen 1960), especially 238–45 and 297–303, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, *L’empire éclaté: La révolte des nations en URSS* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), translated as *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), and Randall Collins, “The Future Decline of the Russian Empire,” in Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 186–209. See also Richard Pipes, “Reflections on the Nationality Problems in the Soviet Union,” in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 453–65. For a sampling of Senator Moynihan’s thoughts, writings, and speeches in 1979–87 on the parlous state of the USSR, see his *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 35–44.

Soviet commitments near and far, including in war-prone postcolonial states, formed one basis for historians of imperial overstretch to envisage trouble. The distinguished French historian, J.-B. Duroselle, in *Tout empire périra: une vision théorique des relations internationales* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1981), foreshadowed the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire, but then backtracked, saying that totalitarian systems could resist change (347–48). Seven years later,

Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), while seeing US decline as more likely, noted that Soviet imperial decline was possible, but might lead to war: "there is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully" (514).

There is continuing disagreement about whether East–West negotiations prolonged the Cold War or contributed to its end. On the question of whether the negotiations before and after the 1975 Helsinki Final Act were seen from the start as providing a basis for change in the Communist world, see the posthumous account by a UK diplomat who was deeply involved, Michael Alexander, *Managing the Cold War: A View from the Front Line* (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2005).

The processes and events in 1985–91 that ended the Cold War, being so numerous and varied, are not all captured in any single work. The causes of change in the USSR, and the reasons for the reluctance of the Soviet leadership to use force, are outlined in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996). Another detailed account of the period 1985–91 emphasizing the decisive role played by Gorbachev in ending the Cold War is Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For an exploration of the personal and political connections between the events of 1968 and those of 1989–91, see Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdeněk Mlynář, *Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), including the introduction by Archie Brown. The Cold War International History Project is particularly strong on the end of the Cold War, offering a wealth of documentary evidence. See, e.g., Vladislav M. Zubok, "New Evidence on the 'Soviet Factor' in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13, *The End of the Cold War* (Fall/Winter 2001), 5–23, the documents on the April 1989 Tbilisi massacre in the same issue, 31–48, and many other memoirs of the period. As various Cold War International History Project publications indicate, developments in Eastern Europe – especially Poland, where the first transition to non-Communist government occurred – played a key part in ending the Cold War. A useful account of the rise and impact of Solidarity is in A. Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Western officials involved in the end of the Cold War have given testimony which stresses the importance of constructive engagement. See especially George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner, 1993), Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), Jack Matlock, US ambassador to the USSR 1987–91, *Autopsy on an Empire: An American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1995), Robert L. Hutchings, the director for European Affairs at the National Security Council in 1989–92, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), and Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. by Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

Useful broad surveys of the end of the Cold War are Charles Gati, *The Bloc that Failed* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), and Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994). Two edited works which take a long perspective on the implications for international relations generally are Richard Ned Lebow and Richard K. Herrmann (eds.), *Ending the*

Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), and Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds.), *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations* (London: Cass, 2005).

25. The restructuring of the international system after the Cold War

There are a variety of literatures that illuminate the logic and character of the post-Cold War transformation of the global system. One literature explores the rise and decline of great powers and the international orders that they establish and dominate. Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) provides a seminal statement of the theory and history of these grand shifts in the rules and governance of the global system. Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987) provides a sweeping survey of these classic international dynamics, focusing on leading states in various historical eras and the political, strategic, and economic foundations of their preeminence and trajectory of rise and decline. These books are part of a larger literature that provides theoretical and historical accounts of long-term change in power dynamics and the character of the system. For statements that focus primarily on the realist foundations of the global system, see the standard texts, A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958), Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, various editions), as well as John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001). For more liberal-oriented statements of the logic of global change, focusing on industrialization and modernization, see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), Clark Kerr, *The Future of Industrial Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For a classic treatise on the interconnections between geopolitical and international economic change, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).

Another literature on state power and international change focuses on so-called power transitions. The arguments here attempt to trace the ways in which shifting power balances between rising and falling states generate insecurity, competition, and war. The classic formulations of this macrotheoretical field of study include Organski's *World Politics* and Ronald L. Tammen, *et al.*, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000). For a useful survey of the theory and history of power transitions, see Randall Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (New York, 1999), 1–31.

Another literature looks at the changing character of the orders themselves – looking at the ways in which powerful states have used their advantages after war or other upheavals in the international system to shape the rules and institutions of order. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) examines the great postwar-order building moments – 1815, 1919, 1945, and after the Cold War. See also the accounts by Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Regarding American policy in building the postwar liberal international order, see Ikenberry, *After Victory*. Elizabeth Borgwardt's *A New Deal for the World* (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) traces the transfer of American interwar ideas about politics and economics to the postwar system.

Scholars have only recently been examining American foreign policy in the 1990s in the context of the end of the Cold War. A general overview is provided by John Dumbrell, *Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992–2000* (New York: Routledge, 2009). In *Power and Purpose: US Policy toward Russia after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul examine American policy toward Russia after the Cold War. Strobe Talbott places the Clinton years and order building after the Cold War in the context of the long historical struggle to develop systems of global governance in *The Great Experiment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008). For a scholarly and policy assessment of post-Cold War foreign policy during the 1990s, see Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, *America between the Wars* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

Recently, scholars have also explored the ways in which the rise of American unipolar power after the Cold War has shaped and reshaped patterns of great power relations. See Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno's *Unipolar Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and G. John Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). On the transformation of sovereignty and human rights in the postwar international system, see Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2nd ed. 2002). The complexities of globalization are explored in Anthony G. McGrew and David Held, *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). On the changing interests and involvements of the United States in the developing world since the end of the Cold War, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).